

# AMERICAN STATE PAPERS.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS.

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1st CONGRESS.]

No. 1.

[1st SESSION.

### MILITARY FORCE IN 1789.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, ON THE 10TH OF AUGUST, 1789.

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE:

I HAVE directed a statement of the troops in the service of the United States to be laid before you, for your information.

These troops were raised by virtue of the resolves of Congress, of the 20th of October, 1786, and the 3d of October, 1787, in order to protect the frontiers from the depredations of the hostile Indians; to prevent all intrusions on the public lands; and to facilitate the surveying and selling of the same, for the purpose of reducing the public debt.

As these important objects continue to require the aid of the troops, it is necessary that the establishment thereof should, in all respects, be conformed, by law, to the constitution of the United States.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

NEW YORK, August 10th, 1789.

#### *A statement of the Troops in the service of the United States.*

The establishment, as directed to be raised and organized by the acts of Congress, of 3d of October, 1787, to wit:

##### ONE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY, consisting of

1 lieutenant colonel commandant, 2 majors, 7 captains, 7 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 4 mates.	
Eight companies, each of which to consist of four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, and sixty privates,	560

##### ONE BATTALION OF ARTILLERY.

1 major, 4 captains, 8 lieutenants, 1 surgeon's mate.	
Four companies, each of which to consist of 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 60 privates,	280

Non-commissioned and privates,	840
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That the pay of the troops was fixed by the act of Congress, of the 12th of April, 1785, and confirmed by the acts of the 20th of October, 1786, and the 3d of October, 1787, to wit:

Lieutenant colonel commandant at \$50 per month,		Mate, at	\$30 per month,
Major, - - - 45 do.		Sergeants, - - -	6 do.
Captain, - - - 35 do.		Corporals, - - -	5 do.
Lieutenant, - - - 26 do.		Musicians, - - -	5 do.
Ensign, - - - 20 do.		Privates, - - -	4 do.
Surgeon, - - - 45 do.			

That the subsistence to the officers, in lieu of rations, are the same as during the late war, to wit:

Lieutenant colonel commandant,		Ensign, - - -	\$8 per month,
Major, - - - \$20 per month,		Surgeon, - - -	16 do.
Captain, - - - 12 do.		Mate, - - -	8 do.
Lieutenant, - - - 8 do.			

That lieutenants, acting as adjutant quarter master and paymaster, are allowed, by the act of Congress, of the 12th of April, 1785, for their extra duty, \$10 per month.

That the allowance of forage is as follows:

3 Majors, each \$12 per month,	
1 Surgeon           6 do.	
3 Regimental staff, each \$6 do.	
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That, by the act of Congress, of the 31st July, 1787, Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Harmar was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General by brevet, with an allowance of the emoluments, but not the pay, of said rank. That the emoluments are as follows, to wit:

Subsistence,	-	\$64 per month,
Forage,	-	18 do.

That each non-commissioned officer and soldier is allowed, annually, one suit of uniform clothes, as follows: One coat, 1 vest, 2 pairs woollen overalls, 2 pairs linen overalls, 1 hat, 4 shirts, 4 pairs shoes, 4 pairs socks, 1 stock, 1 stock clasp, 1 pair shoe buckles, 1 blanket.

That each non-commissioned officer and soldier is also allowed one ration per day, to consist of the following articles:

1 pound of bread or flour,	1 quart salt,	} to every 100 rations.
1 pound of beef or $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of pork,	2 quarts vinegar,	
1 gill of common rum.	2 pounds soap,	
	1 pound candles,	

That the troops in actual service are as follows:

Two companies of artillery, raised by virtue of the acts of Congress, of the 20th of October, 1786, and continued by the act of Congress, of the 9th of April, 1787, one of which is stationed at the arsenal at West Point, on Hudson river, and the other at the arsenal at Springfield, on Connecticut river, - - - - - 76

Troops stationed on the frontiers, as follows:  
At the various posts northwest of the Ohio, - - - - - 596

Wanting, to complete the establishment, - - - - - 672  
168

Non-commissioned and privates, - - - - - 840

That all the troops were enlisted for three years.

That the engagements of the two companies of artillery, at West Point and Springfield, will expire the beginning of the year 1790.

That, of the troops on the frontiers, enlisted by virtue of the acts of Congress, of the 3d of October, 1787, 528 non-commissioned officers and soldiers will have to serve, generally, to the middle of the year 1791; and two companies, consisting of 68 non-commissioned and privates, until towards the month of May, 1792.

That the change in the Government of the United States will require that the articles of war be revised and adapted to the constitution. That the oaths, necessary to be taken by the troops, be prescribed, and also the form of the commissions which are to be issued to the officers.

All which is humbly submitted to the President of the United States.

H. KNOX.

WAR OFFICE, *August 8th, 1789.*

[1st CONGRESS.]

No. 2.

[2d SESSION.]

## ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, ON THE 21ST OF JANUARY, 1790.]

*Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives:*

The Secretary for the Department of War has submitted to me certain principles to serve as a plan for the general arrangement of the militia of the United States.

Conceiving the subject to be of the highest importance to the welfare of our country, and liable to be placed in various points of view, I have directed him to lay the plan before Congress, for their information, in order that they may make such use thereof as they may judge proper.

UNITED STATES, *January 21, 1790.*

GEO. WASHINGTON.

WAR OFFICE, *January 18, 1790.*

SIR: Having submitted to your consideration a plan for the arrangement of the militia of the United States, which I had presented to the late Congress, and you having approved the general principles thereof, with certain exceptions, I now respectfully lay the same before you, modified according to the alterations you were pleased to suggest.

It has been my anxious desire to devise a national system of defence adequate to the probable exigencies of the United States, whether arising from internal or external causes; and at the same time to erect a standard of republican magnanimity, independent of, and superior to, the powerful influences of wealth.

The convulsive events, generated by the inordinate pursuit of riches or ambition, require that the Government should possess a strong corrective arm.

The idea is therefore submitted, whether an efficient military branch of Government can be invented, with safety to the great principles of liberty, unless the same shall be formed of the people themselves, and supported by their habits and manners.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the most perfect respect, your most obedient servant,

H. KNOX,

*Secretary for the Department of War.*

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

## THE INTRODUCTION.

That a well constituted republic is more favorable to the liberties of society, and that its principles give a higher elevation to the human mind than any other form of Government, has generally been acknowledged by the unprejudiced and enlightened part of mankind.

But it is at the same time acknowledged, that, unless a republic prepares itself by proper arrangements to meet those exigencies to which all States are in a degree liable, that its peace and existence are more precarious than the forms of Government in which the will of one directs the conduct of the whole, for the defence of the nation.

A government, whose measures must be the result of multiplied deliberations, is seldom in a situation to produce instantly those exertions which the occasion may demand; therefore it ought to possess such energetic establishments as should enable it, by the vigor of its own citizens, to control events as they arise, instead of being convulsed or subverted by them.

It is the misfortune of modern ages, that governments have been formed by chance and events, instead of system; that, without fixed principles, they are braced or relaxed, from time to time, according to the predominating power of the rulers or the ruled: the rulers possessing separate interests from the people, excepting in some of the high-tioned monarchies, in which all opposition to the will of the princes seems annihilated.

Hence we look round Europe in vain for an extensive government, rising on the power inherent in the people, and performing its operations entirely for their benefit. But we find artificial force governing every where, and the people generally made subservient to the elevation and caprice of the few: almost every nation appearing to be busily employed in conducting some external war; grappling with internal commotion; or endeavoring to extricate itself from impending debts, which threaten to overwhelm it with ruin. Princes and ministers seem neither to have leisure nor inclination to bring forward institutions for diffusing general strength, knowledge, and happiness; but they seem to understand well the Machiavelian maxim of politics—divide and govern.

May the United States avoid the errors and crimes of other governments, and possess the wisdom to embrace the present invaluable opportunity of establishing such institutions as shall invigorate, exalt, and perpetuate, the great principles of freedom—an opportunity pregnant with the fate of millions, but rapidly borne on the wings of time, and which may never again return.

The public mind, unbiassed by superstition or prejudice, seems happily prepared to receive the impressions of wisdom. The latent springs of human action, ascertained by the standard of experience, may be regulated and made subservient to the noble purpose of forming a dignified national character.

The causes by which nations have ascended and declined, through the various ages of the world, may be calmly and accurately determined; and the United States may be placed in the singularly fortunate condition of commencing their career of empire with the accumulated knowledge of all the known societies and governments of the globe.

The strength of the Government, like the strength of any other vast and complicated machine, will depend on a due adjustment of its several parts: its agriculture, its commerce, its laws, its finance, its system of *defence*, and its manners and habits, all require consideration, and the highest exercise of political wisdom.

It is the intention of the present attempt to suggest the most efficient system of defence which may be compatible with the interests of a free people—a system which shall not only produce the expected effect, but which, in its operations, shall also produce those habits and manners which will impart strength and durability to the whole government.

The modern practice of Europe, with respect to the employment of standing armies, has created such a mass of opinion in their favor, that even philosophers and the advocates for liberty have frequently confessed their use and necessity in certain cases.

But whoever seriously and candidly estimates the power of discipline, and the tendency of military habits, will be constrained to confess, that, whatever may be the efficacy of a standing army in war, it cannot in peace be considered as friendly to the rights of human nature. The recent instance in France cannot with propriety be brought to overturn the general principle, built upon the uniform experience of mankind. It may be found, on examining the causes that appear to have influenced the military of France, that, while the springs of power were wound up in the nation to the highest pitch, the discipline of the army was proportionably relaxed. But any argument on this head may be considered as unnecessary to the enlightened citizens of the United States.

A small corps of well disciplined and well informed artillerists and engineers, and a legion for the protection of the frontiers and the magazines and arsenals, are all the military establishment which may be required for the present use of the United States. The privates of the corps to be enlisted for a certain period, and after the expiration of which to return to the mass of the citizens.

An energetic national militia is to be regarded as the *capital security* of a free republic, and not a standing-army, forming a distinct class in the community.

It is the introduction and diffusion of vice, and corruption of manners, into the mass of the people, that renders a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised, and avarice, indolence, and effeminacy of manners predominate, and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate the minds of the youth in the paths of virtue and honor, that a standing army is formed and riveted for ever.

While the human character remains unchanged, and societies and governments of considerable extent are formed, a principle ever ready to execute the laws, and defend the state, must constantly exist. Without this vital principle, the government would be invaded or overturned, and trampled upon by the bold and ambitious. No community can be long held together, unless its arrangements are adequate to its probable exigencies.

If it should be decided to reject a standing army for the military branch of the government of the United States, as possessing too fierce an aspect, and being hostile to the principles of liberty, it will follow that a well constituted militia ought to be established.

A consideration of the subject will show the impracticability of disciplining at once the mass of the people. All discussions on the subject of a powerful militia will result in one or other of the following principles:

First, Either efficient institutions must be established for the military education of the youth, and that the knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the community, by the mean of rotation; or,

Secondly, That the militia must be formed of substitutes, after the manner of the militia of Great Britain.

If the United States possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its extensive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country; reverence and obedience to its laws; courage and elevation of mind; openness and liberality of character; accompanied by a just spirit of honor: in addition to which their bodies will acquire a robustness, greatly conducive to their personal happiness, as well as the defence of their country; while habit, with its silent but efficacious operations, will durably cement the system.

Habit, that powerful and universal law, incessantly acting on the human race, well deserves the attention of legislators—formed at first in individuals, by separate and almost imperceptible impulses, until at length it acquires a force which controls with irresistible sway. The effects of salutary or pernicious habits, operating on a whole nation, are immense, and decide its rank and character in the world.

Hence the science of legislation teaches to scrutinize every national institution, as it may introduce proper or improper habits; to adopt with religious zeal the former, and reject with horror the latter.

A republic, constructed on the principles herein stated, would be uninjured by events, sufficient to overturn a government supported solely by the uncertain power of a standing army.

The well informed members of the community, actuated by the highest motives of self-love, would form the real defence of the country. Rebellions would be prevented or suppressed with ease; invasions of such a government would be undertaken only by mad men; and the virtues and knowledge of the people would effectually oppose the introduction of tyranny.

But the second principle, a militia of substitutes, is pregnant, in a degree, with the mischiefs of a standing army; as it is highly probable the substitutes from time to time will be nearly the same men, and the most idle and worthless part of the community. Wealthy families, proud of distinctions which riches may confer, will prevent their sons from serving in the militia of substitutes; the plan will degenerate into habitual contempt; a standing army will be introduced, and the liberties of the people subjected to all the contingencies of events.

The expense attending an energetic establishment of militia may be strongly urged as an objection to the institution. But it is to be remembered, that this objection is levelled at both systems, whether by rotation or by substitutes: for, if the numbers are equal, the expense will also be equal. The estimate of the expense will show its unimportance, when compared with the magnitude and beneficial effects of the institution.

But the people of the United States will cheerfully consent to the expenses of a measure calculated to serve as a *perpetual barrier* to their liberties, especially as they well know that the disbursements will be made among the members of the same community, and therefore cannot be injurious.

Every intelligent mind would rejoice in the establishment of an institution, under whose auspices the youth and vigor of the constitution would be renewed with each successive generation, and which would appear to secure the great principles of freedom and happiness against the injuries of time and events.

The following plan is formed on these general principles:

First, That it is the indispensable duty of every nation to establish all necessary institutions for its own perfection and defence.

Secondly, That it is a capital security to a free state, for the great body of the people to possess a competent knowledge of the military art.

Thirdly, That this knowledge cannot be attained, in the present state of society, but by establishing adequate institutions for the military education of youth; and that the knowledge acquired therein should be diffused throughout the community by the principles of rotation.

Fourthly, That every man of the proper age, and ability of body, is firmly bound, by the social compact, to perform, personally, his proportion of military duty for the defence of the state.

Fifthly, That all men, of the legal military age, should be armed, enrolled, and held responsible for different degrees of military service.

And sixthly, That, agreeably to the constitution, the United States are to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such a part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

#### THE PLAN.

The period of life, in which military service shall be required of the citizens of the United States, to commence at eighteen, and terminate at the age of sixty years.

The men comprehended by this description, exclusive of such exceptions as the Legislatures of the respective States may think proper to make, and *all actual mariners*, shall be enrolled for different degrees of military duty, and divided into three distinct classes.

The first class shall comprehend the youth of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age; to be denominated the *Advanced Corps*.

The second class shall include the men from twenty-one to forty-five years of age; to be denominated the *Main Corps*.

The third class shall comprehend, inclusively, the men from forty-six to sixty years of age; to be denominated the *Reserved Corps*.

All the militia of the United States shall assume the form of the legion, which shall be the permanent establishment thereof.

A legion shall consist of one hundred and fifty-three commissioned officers, and two thousand eight hundred and eighty non-commissioned officers and privates, formed in the following manner:

##### 1.—THE LEGIONARY STAFF.

One Legionary, or Major General.

Two Aids-de-Camp, of the rank of major; one of whom to be Legionary Quartermaster.

One Inspector and Deputy Adjutant General, of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

One Chaplain.

##### 2.—THE BRIGADE STAFF.

One Brigadier-General.

One Brigade Inspector, to serve as an Aid-de-Camp.

##### 3.—THE REGIMENTAL STAFF.

One Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.

Two Majors.

One Adjutant.

One Paymaster, or Agent.

One Quartermaster.

##### 4.—TWO BRIGADES OF INFANTRY.

Each brigade of two regiments; each regiment of eight companies, forming two battalions; each company of a captain, lieutenant, ensign, six sergeants, one drum, one fife, and sixty-four rank and file.

##### 5.—TWO COMPANIES OF RIFLEMEN.

Each company to have a captain, lieutenant, ensign, six sergeants, a bugle-horn, one drum, and sixty-four rank and file.

##### 6.—A BATTALION OF ARTILLERY,

Consisting of four companies; each to have a captain, captain-lieutenant, one lieutenant, six sergeants, twelve artificers, and fifty-two rank and file.

##### 7.—A SQUADRON OF CAVALRY,

Consisting of two troops; each troop to have a captain, two lieutenants, a cornet, six sergeants, one farrier, one saddler, one trumpeter, and sixty-four dragoons.

In case the whole number of the advanced corps in any State should be insufficient to form a legion of this extent, yet the component parts must be preserved, and the reduction proportioned, as nearly as may be, to each part.

The companies of all the corps shall be divided into *sections* of twelve each. It is proposed, by this division, to establish one uniform vital principle, which in peace and war shall pervade the militia of the United States.

All requisitions for men to *form an army*, either for state or federal purposes, shall be furnished by the advanced and main corps, by means of the sections.

The Executive Government, or commander in chief of the militia of each State, will assess the numbers required, on the respective legions of these corps.

The legionary general will direct the proportions to be furnished by each part of his command. Should the demand be so great as to require one man from each section, then the operation hereby directed shall be performed by single sections. But if a less number should be required, they will be furnished by an association of sections, or companies, according to the demand. In any case, it is probable that mutual convenience may dictate an agreement with an individual to perform the service required. If, however, no agreement can be made, one must be detached by an indiscriminate draught, and the others shall pay him a sum of money equal to the averaged sum which shall be paid in the same legion for the voluntary performance of the service required.

In case any sections or companies of a legion, after having furnished its own quota, should have more men willing to engage for the service required, other companies of the same legion shall have permission to engage them. The same rule to extend to the different legions in the State.

The legionary general must be responsible to the commander-in-chief of the militia of the State that the men furnished are according to the description, and that they are equipped in the manner, and marched to the rendezvous, conformably to the orders for that purpose.

The men who may be draughted shall not serve more than three years at one time.

Reserved corps, being destined for the domestic defence of the State, shall not be obliged to furnish men, excepting in cases of actual invasion or rebellion; and then the men required shall be furnished by means of the sections.

The actual commissioned officers of the respective corps shall not be included in the sections, nor in any of the operations thereof.

The respective States shall be divided into portions or districts; each of which to contain, as nearly as may be, some complete part of a legion.

Every citizen of the United States, who shall serve his country in the field for the space of one year, either as an officer or soldier, shall, if, under the age of twenty-one years, be exempted from the service required in the advanced corps. If he shall be above the age of twenty-one years, then every year he shall so serve in the field shall be estimated as equal to six years' service in the main or reserved corps, and shall accordingly exempt him from every service therein for the said term of six years, except in cases of actual invasion of, or rebellion within, the State in which he resides. And it shall also be a permanent establishment, that six years' actual service in the field shall entirely free every citizen from any further demands of service, either in the militia or in the field, unless in cases of invasion or rebellion.

All actual mariners, or seamen, in the respective States, shall be registered in districts, and divided into two classes. The first class to consist of all the seamen from the age of sixteen to thirty years, inclusively. The second class to consist of all those of the age of thirty-one to forty-five, inclusively.

The first class shall be responsible to serve three years on board of some public armed vessel or ship of war, as a commissioned officer, warrant officer, or private mariner; for which service they shall receive the customary wages and emoluments.

But, should the State not demand the said three years' service during the above period, from the age of sixteen to thirty years, then the party to be exempted entirely therefrom.

The person so serving shall receive a certificate of his service, on parchment, according to the form which shall be directed, which shall exempt him from any other than voluntary service, unless in such exigencies as may require the services of all the members of the community.

The second class shall be responsible for a proportion of service in those cases to which the first class shall be unequal. The numbers required shall be furnished by sections, in the same manner as is prescribed for the sections of the militia.

#### OF THE ADVANCED CORPS.

The advanced corps are designed not only as a school in which the youth of the United States are to be instructed in the art of war, but they are, in all cases of exigence, to serve as an actual defence to the community.

The whole of the armed corps shall be clothed according to the manner hereafter directed, armed and subsisted at the expense of the United States; and all the youth of the said corps, in each State, shall be encamped together, if practicable, or by legions, which encampments shall be denominated *the annual camps of discipline*.

The youth of *eighteen* and *nineteen* years shall be disciplined for *thirty* days successively in each year; and those of twenty years shall be disciplined only for ten days in each year, which shall be the last ten days of the annual encampments.

The non-commissioned officers and privates are not to receive any pay during the said time; but the commissioned officers will receive the pay of their relative ranks, agreeably to the federal establishment for the time being.

In order that the plan shall effectually answer the end proposed, the first day of January shall be the fixed period, for all who attain the age of eighteen years, in any part, or during the course of each year, to be enrolled in the advanced corps, and to take the necessary oaths to perform, personally, such legal military service as may be directed, for the full and complete term of three years, to be estimated from the time of entrance into the said corps, and also to take an oath of allegiance to the State and to the United States.

The commanding officer, or general of the advanced legions of the district, shall regulate the manner of the service of the youth, respectively, whether it shall be in the infantry, artillery, or cavalry; but, after having entered into either of them, no change should be allowed.

Each individual, at his first joining the annual camps of discipline, will receive complete arms and accoutrements, all of which, previously to his being discharged from the said camps, he must return to the regimental quartermaster, on the penalty of ——— dollars, or ——— months' imprisonment.

The said arms and accoutrements shall be marked, in some conspicuous place, with the letters. M. U. S. And all sales or purchases of any of said arms or accoutrements, shall be severely punished, according to law.

And each individual will also, on his first entrance into the advanced corps, receive the following articles of uniform clothing: one hat, one uniform short coat, one waistcoat, and one pair of overalls, which he shall retain in his own possession, and for which he shall be held accountable, and be compelled to replace all deficiencies during his service in the annual camps of discipline.

Those who shall serve in the cavalry shall be at the expense of their own horses and uniform helmets, and horse-furniture; but they shall receive forage for their horses, swords, pistols, and clothing, equal in value to the infantry.

At the age of twenty-one years, every individual having served in the manner and for the time prescribed, shall receive an honorary certificate thereof, on parchment, and signed by the legionary general and inspector.

The names of all persons to whom such certificates shall be given, shall be fairly registered in books, to be provided for that purpose.

And the said certificate, or an attested copy of the register aforesaid, shall be required as an indispensable qualification for exercising any of the rights of a free citizen, until after the age of ——— years.

The advanced legions, in all cases of invasion or rebellion, shall, on requisition of lawful authority, be obliged to march to any place within the United States; to remain embodied for such time as shall be directed, not to exceed one year, to be computed from the time of marching from the regimental parades; during the period of their being on such service, to be placed on the continental establishment of pay, subsistence, clothing, forage, tents, camp-equipment, and all such other allowances as are made to the federal troops at the same time, and under the same circumstances.

If the military service so required should be for such a short period as to render an actual issue of clothing unnecessary, then an allowance should be made in proportion to the annual cost of clothing for the federal soldier, according to estimates to be furnished for that purpose from the War Office of the United States.

In case the legions of the advanced corps should march to any place in consequence of a requisition of the General Government, all legal and proper expenses of such march shall be paid by the United States. But, should they be embodied and march in consequence of an order, derived from the authority of the State to which they belong, and for State purposes, then the expenses will be borne by the State.

The advanced corps shall be constituted on such principles that, when completed, it will receive one-third part and discharge one-third part of its numbers annually. By this arrangement, two-thirds of the corps will at all times be considerably disciplined; but, as it will only receive those of eighteen years of age, it will not be completed until the third year after its institution. Those who have already attained the ages of nineteen and twenty years will, in the first instance, be enrolled in the main corps.

But one half of the legionary officers to be appointed the first, and the other the second year of the establishment. The officers of each grade in the States, respectively, shall be divided into three classes, which shall by lot be numbered one, two, and three, and one of the said classes, according to their numbers, shall be deranged every third year. In the first period of nine years, one-third part will have to serve three, one-third part six, and one-third part nine years. But, after the said first period, the several classes will serve nine years, which shall be the limitation of service by virtue of the same appointment; and in such cases, where there may not be three officers of the same grade, the limitation of nine years' service shall be observed. All vacancies occasioned by the aforesaid derangements, or any casualties, shall be immediately filled by new appointments.

The captains and subalterns of the advanced corps shall not be less than twenty-one, nor more than thirty-five, and the field officers shall not exceed forty-five years of age.

Each company, battalion, and regiment, shall have a fixed parade or place at which to assemble. The companies shall assemble at their own parade, and march to the parade of the battalion, and the battalions to the regimental parade; and when thus embodied, the regiment will march to the rendezvous of the legion. Every commanding officer of a company, battalion, and regiment, will be accountable to his superior officer that his command is in the most perfect order.

The officers to receive subsistence money, in lieu of provisions, in proportion to their respective grades, and those whose duties require them to be on horseback will receive forage in the same proportion.

Every legion must have a chaplain, of respectable talents and character, who, besides his religious functions, should impress on the minds of the youth, at stated periods, in concise discourses, the eminent advantages of free governments to the happiness of society, and that such governments can only be supported by the knowledge, spirit, and virtuous conduct of the youth—to be illustrated by the most conspicuous examples of history.

No amusements should be admitted in camp, but those which correspond with war—the swimming of men and horses, running, wrestling, and such other exercises as should render the body flexible and vigorous.

The camps should, if possible, be formed near a river, and remote from large cities. The first is necessary for the practice of the manœuvres, the second to avoid the vices of populous places.

The time of the annual encampments shall be divided into six parts or periods, of five days each; the first of which shall be occupied in acquiring the air, attitudes, and first principles of a soldier; the second in learning the manual exercise, and to march individually, and in small squads; the third and fourth, in exercising and manœuvring in detail, and by battalions and regiments; in the fifth, the youth of twenty, having been disciplined during the two preceding annual encampments, are to be included. This period is to be employed in the exercise and tactic of the legion; or, if more than one, in executing the grand manœuvres of the whole body—marching, attacking, and defending, in various forms, different grounds and positions; in fine, in representing all the real images of war, excepting the effusion of blood.

The guards, and every other circumstance of the camp, to be perfectly regulated.

Each State will determine on the season in which its respective annual encampments shall be formed; so as best to suit the health of the men, and the general interests of the society.

The United States to make an adequate provision to supply the arms, clothing, rations, artillery, ammunition, forage, straw, tents, camp equipage, including every requisite for the annual camps of discipline; and also for the pay and subsistence of the legionary officers, and for the following general staff: One inspector general, one adjutant general, one quartermaster general, with a deputy for each State.

These officers will be essential to the uniformity, economy, and efficacy of the system, to be appointed in the manner prescribed by the constitution of the United States.

The quartermaster general shall be responsible to the United States for the public property of every species, delivered to him for the annual camps of discipline; and his deputy in each State shall be responsible to him.

At the commencement of the annual camps of discipline, the deputy quartermaster will make regular issues to the legionary or regimental quartermasters, as the case may be, of all the articles, of every species, provided by the United States.

The returns for the said articles to be examined and certified by the highest legionary or regimental officer, as the case may be, who shall be responsible for the accuracy thereof.

At the expiration of the annual camps of discipline, all public property (clothing excepted) shall be returned to the deputy quartermaster of the State, who shall hold the legionary quartermaster accountable for all deficiencies. All the apparatus and property so returned, shall be carefully examined, repaired, and deposited in a magazine, to be provided in each State for that purpose, under the charge of the said deputy quartermaster, until the ensuing annual encampment, or any occasion which may render a new issue necessary.

Corporal punishments shall never be inflicted in the annual camps of discipline; but a system of fines and imprisonment shall be formed for the regular government of said camps.

#### OF THE MAIN CORPS.

As the main and reserved corps are to be replenished by the principle of rotation from the advanced corps, and ultimately to consist of men who have received their military education therein, it is proper that one uniform arrangement should pervade the several classes.

It is for this reason the legion is established as the common form of all the corps of the militia.

The main legions, consisting of the great majority of the men of the military age, will form the principal defence of the country.

They are to be responsible for their proportion of men, to form an army whenever necessity shall dictate the measure; and on every sudden occasion to which the advanced corps shall be incompetent, an adequate number of non-commissioned officers and privates shall be added thereto, from the main corps, by means of the sections.

The main corps will be perfectly armed, in the first instance, and will practise the exercise and manœuvres, four days in each year, and will assemble in their respective districts, by companies, battalions, regiments, or legions, as shall be directed by the legionary general; but it must be a fixed rule, that, in the populous parts of the States, the regiments must assemble once annually, and the legions once in three years.

Although the main corps cannot acquire a great degree of military knowledge in the few days prescribed for its annual exercise, yet, by the constant accession of the youth from the advanced corps, it will soon command respect for its discipline, as well as its numbers.

When the youth are transferred from the advanced corps, they shall invariably join the flank companies, the cavalry or artillery, of the main corps, according to the nature of their former services.

#### OF THE RESERVED CORPS.

The reserved corps will assemble only twice, annually, for the inspection of arms, by companies, battalions, or regiments, as shall be directed by each State. It will assemble by legions, whenever the defence of the State may render the measure necessary.

Such are the propositions of the plan, to which it may be necessary to add some explanations.

Although the substantial political maxim, which requires personal service of all the members of the community for the defence of the State, is obligatory under all forms of society, and is the main pillar of a free government, yet the degrees thereof may vary at the different periods of life, consistently with the general welfare. The public convenience may also dictate a relaxation of the general obligation as it respects the principal magistrates, and the ministers of justice and of religion, and perhaps some religious sects. But it ought to be remembered that measures of national importance never should be frustrated by the accommodation of individuals.

The military age has generally commenced at sixteen, and terminated at the age of sixty years; but the youth of sixteen do not commonly attain such a degree of robust strength as to enable them to sustain, without injury, the hardships incident to the field; therefore the commencement of military service is herein fixed at eighteen, and the termination, as usual, at sixty years of age.

The plan proposes that the militia shall be divided into three capital classes, and that each class shall be formed into legions; the reasons for which shall be given in succession.

The advanced corps, and annual camps of discipline, are instituted in order to introduce an operative military spirit in the community. To establish a course of honorable military service, which will, at the same time, mould the minds of the young men to a due obedience of the laws, instruct them in the art of war, and, by the manly exercises of the field, form a race of hardy citizens, equal to the dignified task of defending their country.

An examination into the employments and obligations of the individuals composing the society, will evince the impossibility of diffusing an adequate knowledge of the art of war, by any other means than a course of discipline, during the period of nonage. The time necessary to acquire this important knowledge cannot be afforded at any other period of life with so little injury to the public or private interests.

Without descending to minute distinctions, the body of the people of the United States may be divided into two parts—the yeomanry of the country, and the men of various employments, resident in towns and cities. In both parts it is usual for the male children, from the age of fourteen to twenty-one years, to learn some trade or employment, under the direction of a parent or master. In general, the labor or service of the youth, during this period, besides amply re-paying the trouble of tuition, leaves a large profit to the tutor. This circumstance is stated to show that no great hardships will arise in the first operations of the proposed plan; a little practice will render the measure perfectly equal, and remove every difficulty.

Youth is the time for the State to avail itself of those services which it has a right to demand, and by which it is to be invigorated and preserved. In this season, the passions and affections are strongly influenced by the splendor of military parade. The impressions the mind receives will be retained through life. The young man will repair with pride and pleasure to the field of exercise; while the head of a family, anxious for its general welfare, and perhaps its immediate subsistence, will reluctantly quit his domestic duties for any length of time.

The habits of industry will be rather strengthened than relaxed by the establishment of the annual camps of discipline, as all the time will be occupied by the various military duties. Idleness and dissipation will be regarded as disgraceful, and punished accordingly. As soon as the youth attain the age of manhood, a natural solicitude to establish themselves in the society, will occur in its full force. The public claims for military service will be too inconsiderable to injure their industry. It will be sufficiently stimulated to proper exertions, by the prospects of opulence attending on the cultivation of a fertile soil, or the pursuits of a productive commerce.

It is presumed that thirty days annually, during the eighteenth and nineteenth, and ten days during the twentieth year, is the least time that ought to be appropriated by the youth to the acquisition of the military art. The same number of days might be added during the twentieth as during the two preceding years, were not the expense an objection.

Every means will be provided by the public to facilitate the military education of the youth, which it is proposed shall be an indispensable qualification of a free citizen: therefore they will not be entitled to any pay. But the officers, being of the main corps, are in a different predicament. They are supposed to have passed through the course of discipline required by the laws, and to be competent to instruct others in the military art. As the public will have but small claims for personal services on them, and as they must incur considerable expenses to prepare themselves to execute properly their respective offices, they ought to be paid while on actual duty.

As soon as the service of the youth expires in the advanced corps, they are to be enrolled in the main corps. On this occasion, the republic receives disciplined and free citizens, who understand their public rights, and are prepared to defend them.

The main corps is instituted to preserve and circulate throughout the community the military discipline, acquired in the advanced corps; to arm the people, and fix firmly, by practice and habit, those forms and maxims which are essential to the life and energy of a free government.

The reserved corps is instituted to prevent men being sent to the field whose strength is unequal to sustain the severities of an active campaign. But, by organizing and rendering them eligible for domestic service, a greater proportion of the younger and robust part of the community may be enabled, in case of necessity, to encounter the more urgent duties of war.

It would be difficult, previously to the actual formation of the annual camps of discipline, to ascertain the number in each State of which it would be composed. The frontier counties of several States are thinly inhabited, and require all their internal force for their immediate defence. There are other infant settlements, from which it might be injurious to draw away their youth annually for the purpose of discipline.

No evil would result, if the establishment of the advanced corps should be omitted in such districts for a few years. Besides, the forbearance in this respect would lessen the expense, and render the institution more compatible with the public finances.

The several State Legislatures, therefore, as best understanding their local interests, might be invested with a discretionary power to omit the enrolments for the advanced corps, in such of their frontier and thinly inhabited counties, as they may judge proper.

If the number of three millions may be assumed as the total number of the inhabitants within the United States, half a million may be deducted therefrom, for blacks, and, pursuant to the foregoing ideas, another half million may be deducted, on account of the thinly settled parts of the country.

The proportion of men of the military age, from eighteen to sixty years inclusively, of two millions of people, of all ages and sexes, may be estimated at four hundred thousand. There may be deducted from this number, as actual mariners, about fifty thousand, and a further number of twenty-five thousand, to include exempts of religious sects, and of every other sort which the respective States may think proper to make.

Three hundred and twenty-five thousand, therefore, may be assumed, as the number of operative, fencible men, to compose the militia. The proportion of the several classes of which would be nearly as follows:

Firstly, The advanced corps, one-tenth composed of the youth of the ages of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years,	32,500
Secondly, The main corps, six-tenths and one-twentieth,	211,250
Thirdly, The reserved corps, two-tenths and one-twentieth,	81,250
	325,000

The following estimate is formed for the purpose of exhibiting the annual expense of the institution of the advanced corps, stating the same at thirty thousand men.

*Estimate of the expense of the annual camps of discipline, as proposed in the foregoing plan, arising on each of the first three years, and, after that period, of the annual expense of the institution.*

THE FIRST YEAR.

10,000 suits of uniform clothing, stated at eight dollars, each suit of which shall serve for the three years' discipline,	\$80,000
10,000 rations per day, for 30 days, each ration at 10 cents,	30,000
The expense of four complete corps of legionary officers, of all descriptions, for 30 days, including pay, subsistence, and forage,	27,870

Forage for the cavalry,	\$4,800
Straw, camp kettles, bowls, axes, canteens, and fuel,	20,000
Annual proportion of the expense of tents for officers and soldiers, which may serve for eight annual encampments,	3,000
Four legionary standards,	2,000
Regimental colors,	1,000
Consumption of powder and ball, shot, and shells, damage to arms and accoutrements and artillery, and transportation of the same, stated at	25,000
Hospital department,	5,000
Contingencies of the quartermaster's and other departments,	15,000
General staff, adjutant general, quartermaster general, inspector general, and their deputies,	12,000
Entire expense of the first year,	<u>\$225,670</u>

## ADDITIONAL EXPENSES ON THE SECOND YEAR.

10,000 rations per day, for 30 days, are 300,000 rations, at 10 cents,	\$30,000
The expense of four complete corps of legionary officers, of all descriptions, for 30 days, including pay, subsistence, and forage,	27,870
Four legionary standards,	2,000
Regimental colors,	1,000
Forage for the cavalry,	4,800
Tents, straw, camp kettles, bowls, axes, canteens, and fuel,	20,000
Hospital department,	5,000
Contingencies in the quartermaster's and other departments,	15,000
Ammunition, damage to arms and accoutrements,	15,000
	<u>\$120,670</u>
Expense of the first year,	225,670
Combined expenses of the first and second years,	<u>\$346,340</u>

## ADDITIONAL EXPENSES ON THE THIRD YEAR.

The expense of 10,000 rations, for 10 days, is 100,000 rations, at 10 cents,	\$10,000
Forage,	1,600
For the camp equipage,	10,000
Tents,	1,500
Hospital stores,	1,000
Ammunition, damage to arms and accoutrements,	10,000
Contingencies in the quartermaster's and other departments,	10,000
	<u>\$44,100</u>
Combined expenses of the first and second years,	346,340
The total expense of the first three years,	<u>\$390,440</u>

It is to be observed, that the officers for four legions will be adequate to command the youth of eighteen, who commence their discipline the first year; and that the same number of officers will be required for the second year. The youth of the third year may be incorporated by sections in the existing corps, so that no additional officers will be required on their account.

Hence it appears that the expense of 10,000 men, for one year, amounts to	\$225,670
20,000 for the second year, to	346,340
30,000 for the third year, to	390,440
If the youth of the three ages of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty, be disciplined at once, the last mentioned sum will be about the fixed annual expense of the camps of discipline; from which, however, is to be deducted 6,000 dollars, being the expense of the standards and colors, the former of which will be of a durable nature, and the latter will not require to be replaced oftener than once in twenty years,	6,000

The annual expense of the advanced corps, \$384,440

Thus, for a sum less than four hundred thousand dollars, annually, which, apportioned on three millions of people, would be little more than one-eighth of a dollar each, an energetic republican militia may be durably established, the invaluable principles of liberty secured and perpetuated, and a dignified national fabric erected on the solid foundation of public virtue.

The main and reserved corps must be perfectly organized, in the first instance, but the advanced corps will not be completed until the third year of its institution.

The combination of troops, of various descriptions, into one body, so as to invest it with the highest and greatest number of powers, in every possible situation, has long been a subject of discussion and difference of opinion. But no other form appears so well to have sustained the criterion of time and severe examination as the Roman legion. This formidable organization, accommodated to the purposes of modern war, still retains its original energy and superiority. Of the ancients, Polybius and Vegetius have described and given the highest encomiums of the legion. The former, particularly, in his comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages of the Macedonian and Roman arms, and their respective orders of battles, has left to mankind an instructive and important legacy. Of the moderns, the illustrious Mareschal Saxe has modelled the legion for the use of fire arms, and strenuously urges its adoption, in preference to any other form. And the respectable and intelligent veteran, late inspector general of the armies of the United States, recommends the adoption of the legion.\*

"Upon a review," says he, "of all the military of Europe, there does not appear to be a single form which could be safely adopted by the United States. They are unexceptionably different from each other; and, like all other human institutions, seem to have started as much out of accident as design. The local situation of the country, the spirit of the government, the character of the nation, and, in many instances, the character of the prince, have all had their influence in settling the foundation and discipline of their respective troops, and render it impossible that we should take either as a model.

"The legion, alone, has not been adopted by any; and yet I am confident in asserting, that; whether it be examined as applicable to all countries, or as it may immediately apply to the existing or probable necessity of this, it will be found strikingly superior to any other.

"1st. Being a complete and little army of itself, it is ready to begin its operations on the shortest notice or slightest alarm.

"2d. Having all the component parts of the largest army of any possible description, it is prepared to meet every species of war that may present itself.

\* Vide letter addressed to the inhabitants of the United States, on the subject of an established militia.



“ And, 3d, as in every case of detachment, the first constitutional principle will be preserved, and the embarrassments of draughting and detail, which in armies differently framed, too often distract the commanding officer, will be avoided.

“ It may easily suggest itself, from this sketch, that, in forming a legion, the most difficult task is to determine the necessary proportion of each species of soldiers which is to compose it. This must obviously depend upon what will be the theatre, and what the style of the war. On the plains of Poland, whole brigades of cavalry would be necessary against every enemy; but, in the forests and among the hills of America, a single regiment would be more than sufficient against any. And, as there are but two kinds of war to which we are much exposed, viz. an attack from the sea side, by an European power, aided by our sworn enemies settled on our extreme left, and an invasion of our back settlements by an Indian enemy, it follows, of course, that musketeers and light infantry should make the greatest part of your army.”

The institution of the section is intended to interest the patriotism and pride of every individual in the militia, to support the legal measures of a free Government, to render every man active in the public cause, by introducing the spirit of emulation, and a degree of personal responsibility.

The common mode of recruiting is attended with too great destruction of morals to be tolerated; and is too uncertain to be the principal resource of a wise nation in time of danger. The public faith is frequently wounded by unworthy individuals, who hold out delusive promises, which can never be realized. By such means, an unprincipled banditti are often collected, for the purpose of defending every thing that should be dear to freemen. The consequences are natural: such men either desert in time of danger, or are ever ready, on the slightest disgust, to turn their arms against their country.

By the establishment of the sections, an ample and permanent source is opened, whence the State, in every exigence, may be supplied with men whose all depends upon the prosperity of their country.

In cases of necessity, an army may be formed of citizens, whose previous knowledge of discipline will enable it to proceed to an immediate accomplishment of the designs of the State, instead of exhausting the public resources, by wasting whole years in preparing to face the enemy.

The previous arrangements, necessary to form and maintain the annual encampments, as well as the discipline acquired therein, will be an excellent preparation for war. The artillery and its numerous appendages, arms and accoutrements of every kind, and all species of ammunition, ought to be manufactured within the United States. It is of high importance that the present period should be embraced to establish adequate institutions to produce the necessary apparatus of war.

It is unworthy the dignity of a rising and free empire, to depend on foreign and fortuitous supplies of the essential means of defence.

The clothing for the troops could with ease be manufactured within the United States, and the establishment in that respect would tend to the encouragement of important manufactories.

The disbursements made in each State for the rations, forage, and other necessary articles for the annual camps of discipline, would most beneficially circulate the money arising from the public revenue.

The local circumstances of the United States, their numerous sea-ports, and the protection of their commerce, require a naval arrangement. Hence the necessity of the proposed plan, embracing the idea of the States obtaining men on republican principles for the marine as well as the land service. But one may be accomplished with much greater facility than the other, as the preparation of a soldier for the field requires a degree of discipline, which cannot be learned without much time and labor; whereas the common course of sea-service, on board of merchant vessels, differs but little from the service required on board of armed ships; therefore, the education for war, in this respect, will be obtained without any expense to the State. All that seems to be requisite on the head of marine service is, that an efficient regulation should be established in the respective States, to register all actual seamen, and to render those of a certain age amenable to the public for personal service, if demanded within a given period.

The constitutions of the respective States, and of the United States, having directed the modes in which the officers of the militia shall be appointed, no alteration can be made therein. Although it may be supposed that some modes of appointment are better calculated than others to inspire the highest propriety of conduct, yet there are none so defective to serve as a sufficient reason for rejecting an efficient system for the militia. It is certain that the choice of officers is the point on which the reputation and importance of a corps must depend; therefore, every person who may be concerned in the appointment, should consider himself as responsible to his country for a proper choice.

The wisdom of the States will be manifested by inducing those citizens of whom the late American army was composed to accept of appointments in the militia. The high degree of military knowledge which they possess was acquired at too great a price, and is too precious, to be buried in oblivion. It ought to be cherished, and rendered permanently beneficial to the community.

The vigor and importance of the proposed plan will entirely depend on the laws relative thereto. Unless the laws shall be equal to the object, and rigidly enforced, no energetic national militia can be established.

If wealth be admitted as a principle of exemption, the plan cannot be executed. It is the wisdom of political establishments to make the wealth of individuals subservient to the general good, and not to suffer it to corrupt or attain undue indulgence.

It is conceded that people, solicitous to be exonerated from their proportion of public duty, may exclaim against the proposed arrangement as an intolerable hardship. But it ought to be strongly impressed that, while society has its charms, it also has its indispensable obligations. That, to attempt such a degree of refinement as to exonerate the members of the community from all personal service, is to render them incapable of the exercise, and unworthy of the characters of freemen.

Every State possesses, not only the right of personal service from its members, but the right to regulate the service on principles of equality for the general defence. All being bound, none can complain of injustice, on being obliged to perform his equal proportion. Therefore, it ought to be a permanent rule, that those who in youth decline or refuse to subject themselves to the course of military education, established by the laws, should be considered as unworthy of public trust or public honors, and be excluded therefrom accordingly.

If the majesty of the laws should be preserved inviolate in this respect, the operations of the proposed plan would foster a glorious public spirit, infuse the principles of energy and stability into the body politic, and give a high degree of political splendor to the national character.

1st CONGRESS.]

No. 3.

[2d SESSION.

**TROOPS, INCLUDING MILITIA, FURNISHED BY THE SEVERAL STATES DURING THE  
WAR OF THE REVOLUTION.**

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 11, 1790.

WAR OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, *May 10, 1790.*

In obedience to the order of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of War submits the statement, hereto annexed, of the troops and militia furnished, from time to time, by the several States, towards the support of the late war.

The numbers of the regular troops having been stated from the official returns, deposited in the War Office, may be depended upon; and in all cases where the numbers of militia are stated from the returns, the same confidence may be observed.

But, in some years of the greatest exertions of the Southern States, there are no returns whatever of the militia employed. In this case, recourse has been had to the letters of the commanding officer, and to well informed individuals, in order to form a proper estimate of the numbers of the militia in service; and although the accuracy of the estimate cannot be relied on, yet it is the best information which the Secretary of War can at present obtain. When the accounts of the militia service of the several States shall be adjusted, it is probable that the numbers will be better ascertained.

There are not any documents in the War Office from which accurate returns could be made of the ordnance stores furnished by the several States during the late war. The charges made by the several States against the United States, which have been presented by the commissioners of accounts, are, probably, the only evidence which can be obtained on the subject.

All which is humbly submitted to the House of Representatives.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*A Statement of the number of Non-commissioned Officers and Privates of the Regular troops and Militia furnished by the several States from time to time, for the support of the late war.*

*Statement of the troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the army, for the year 1775.*

STATES.	TROOPS FURNISHED.	
	Number of men in continental pay.	Number of Militia.
New Hampshire, - - - - -	2,824	
Massachusetts, - - - - -	16,444	
Rhode Island, - - - - -	1,193	
Connecticut, - - - - -	4,507	
New York, - - - - -	2,075	
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	400	
	27,443	27,443

N. B. The above troops were enlisted to serve to the last of December, 1775.

*Conjectural estimate of Militia employed in addition to the above.*

Virginia, for six months, - - - - -	2,000	
Do. State corps for eight months, - - - - -	1,180	
		3,180
North Carolina, for three months, - - - - -		2,000
South Carolina, for six months, - - - - -	2,500	
Do. State troops, - - - - -	1,500	
		4,000
Georgia, for nine months, - - - - -		1,000
		10,180
Grand Total, - - - - -		

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the army, for the year 1776.*

STATES.	Numbers of men in continental pay.	Numbers of Militia.	Total of Militia and Continentals.
New Hampshire, - - - - -	3,019		
Massachusetts, - - - - -	13,372	4,000	17,372
Rhode Island, - - - - -	798	1,102	1,900
Connecticut, - - - - -	6,390	5,737	12,127
Delaware, - - - - -	609	145	754
Maryland, - - - - -	637	2,592	3,229
Virginia, - - - - -	6,181		
North Carolina, - - - - -	1,134		
South Carolina, - - - - -	2,069		
Georgia, - - - - -	351		
New York, - - - - -	3,629	1,715	5,344
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	5,519	4,876	10,395
New Jersey, - - - - -	3,193	5,893	9,086
Grand Total, - - - - -	46,891	26,060	72,951

*Conjectural estimate of Militia employed, in addition to the above.*

New Hampshire, averaged at four months, - - - - -			1,000
Massachusetts, do. - - - - -			3,000
Connecticut, do. - - - - -			1,000
New York, do. - - - - -			2,750
Virginia, do. - - - - -			
North Carolina, averaged at eight months, - - - - -			3,000
South Carolina, do. six months, - - - - -			4,000
Georgia, - - - - -		750	
Do. State troops, - - - - -		1,200	
			1,950
			16,700
		Grand Total, - - - - -	89,651

Quotas fixed by Congress, September, 1776, for three years or during the war.

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from the actual returns of the Army, for the year 1777.*

STATES.	Quotas required.		Troops furnished.		Total of Militia and Continentals.
	Number of Battalions, 680 men each.	Number of men.	Number of Continentals.	Number of Militia.	
New Hampshire, - - - - -	3	2,040	1,172	1,111—3 months,	2,283
Massachusetts, - - - - -	15	10,200	7,816	2,775—3 do.	10,591
Rhode Island, - - - - -	2	1,360	548	- - - - -	548
Connecticut, - - - - -	8	5,440	4,563	- - - - -	4,563
New York, - - - - -	4	2,720	1,903	929—6 do.	2,832
New Jersey, - - - - -	4	2,720	1,408	- - - - -	1,408
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	12	8,160	4,983	2,481—5 do.	7,464
Delaware, - - - - -	1	680	299	- - - - -	299
Maryland, - - - - -	8	5,440	2,030	1,535—3 do.	3,565
Virginia, - - - - -	15	10,200	5,744	1,269—5 do.	7,013
North Carolina, - - - - -	9	6,120	1,281	- - - - -	1,281
South Carolina, - - - - -	6	4,080	1,650	- - - - -	1,650
* Georgia, - - - - -	1	680	1,423	and State troops,	1,423
Besides the above Congress authorized the commander-in-chief, on the 27th December, 1776, to raise sixteen additional regiments of infantry, - - - - -	16	10,880			
Returns of May, 1778, of artillery, Cavalry, - - - - -	3	2,040			
		3,000			
	107	75,760	34,820	10,100	44,920

\* By the resolve of the 15th July, 1776, Georgia was authorized to raise in Virginia, North and South Carolina, two regiments of infantry, and also two companies of artillery, of fifty men each. These troops were chiefly enlisted for one year, and the time expired in 1777.

*Conjectural estimate of Militia employed in addition to the above.*

New Hampshire and Vermont, for 2 months,	-	-	-	-	2,200
Massachusetts, for 2 months,	-	-	-	-	2,000
Connecticut, for 2 do.	-	-	-	-	2,000
New York, for 6 do.	-	-	-	-	2,500
New Jersey, for 2 do.	-	-	-	-	1,500
Pennsylvania, for 3 do.	-	-	-	-	2,000
Delaware, for 2 do.	-	-	-	-	1,000
Maryland, for 2 do.	-	-	-	-	4,000
Virginia, for 2 do.	-	-	-	-	4,000
South Carolina, for 8 do.	-	-	-	-	350
Georgia,	-	-	-	-	750
Rhode Island, for 6 do.	-	-	-	-	1,500
					23,800
Grand Total,					68,720

February 26, 1778, Congress resolved to have the following number of men furnished by each State.

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the Army, for the year 1778.*

STATES.	Quotas required.		Furnished.		Total of Militia and Continental Troops.
	Number of Battalions of 522 men each.	Number of men.	Number of Continental Troops.	Number of Militia.	
New Hampshire,	3	1,566	1,283	-	1,283
Massachusetts,	15	7,830	7,010	*1,927	8,937
Rhode Island,	1	522	630	†2,426	3,056
Connecticut,	8	4,176	4,010	-	4,010
New York,	5	2,610	2,194	-	2,190
New Jersey,	4	2,088	1,586	-	1,580
Pennsylvania,	10	5,220	3,684	-	3,684
Delaware,	1	522	349	-	349
Maryland, including the German battalion,	8	4,176	3,307	-	3,307
Virginia,	15	7,830	5,230	-	5,236
North Carolina,	9	4,698	1,287	-	1,287
South Carolina,	6	3,132	1,650	-	1,650
Georgia,	1	522	673	-	673
Total,	86	44,892	32,899	4,353	37,252

Total from returns, - - - - - 37,252

*Conjectural estimate of the Militia employed in addition to the above.*

New Hampshire for 2 months,	-	-	-	-	500
Massachusetts, 2 do.	-	-	-	-	4,500
New Jersey, -	-	-	-	-	1,000
Virginia, - 2 do.	-	-	-	-	2,000
Ditto, guarding convention troops,	-	-	-	-	600
South Carolina, - 3 months,	-	-	-	-	2,000
Georgia, 2,000 militia 6 months and 1,200 State troops,	-	-	-	-	3,200
					13,800
Grand Total,					51,052

\* Guarding Convention troops.

† Short levies and militia for six months.

March 9, 1779, Congress resolved that the infantry of these States, for the next campaign, be composed of eighty battalions, viz:

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the Army, for the year 1779.*

STATES.	Quotas required.		Furnished.	
	Number of Battalions, 522 men each.	Number of men.	Number of men.	Militia.
New Hampshire, - - - - -	3	1,566	1,004	222
Massachusetts, - - - - -	15	7,830	6,287	1,451
Rhode Island, - - - - -	2	1,044	507	756
Connecticut, - - - - -	8	4,176	3,544	
New York, - - - - -	5	2,610	2,256	
New Jersey, - - - - -	3	1,566	1,276	
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	11	5,742	3,476	
Delaware, - - - - -	1	522	317	
Maryland, - - - - -	8	4,176	2,849	
Virginia, - - - - -	11	5,742	3,973	
North Carolina, (8 months) - - - - -	6	3,132	1,214	2,706
Georgia, - - - - -	1	522	87	
<b>Total,</b> - - - - -	<b>80</b>	<b>41,760</b>	<b>27,699</b>	<b>5,135</b>

Total from returns, - - - - - 32,834

*Conjectural estimate of Militia, employed in addition to the above.*

New York, for 3 months, - - - - -	1,500
Virginia, 2 do - - - - -	3,000
Ditto, 6 do - - - - -	1,000
Ditto, guarding convention troops, - - - - -	600
North Carolina, for 8 months, - - - - -	1,000
South Carolina, for 9 do - - - - -	4,500
Georgia, - - - - -	750
<b>Total Conjectural,</b> - - - - -	<b>12,350</b>
<b>Grand Total,</b> - - - - -	<b>41,584</b>

January 24th, 1780.

*Resolved,* That the States furnish by draught, or otherwise, the deficiencies of their respective quotas of eighty battalions, apportioned by a resolve of Congress of 9th March, 1779.

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the Army, for the year 1780.*

STATES.	Quotas required.		Furnished.	
	Number of Battalions of 522 men each.	Number of men.	Number of men.	Militia.
New Hampshire, - - - - -	3	1,566	1,017	760
Massachusetts, - - - - -	15	7,830	4,453	3,436
Rhode Island, - - - - -	2	1,044	915	
Connecticut, - - - - -	8	4,176	3,133	554
New York, - - - - -	5	2,610	2,179	668
New Jersey, - - - - -	3	1,566	1,105	162
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	11	5,742	3,337	
Delaware, - - - - -	1	522	325	231
Maryland, - - - - -	8	4,176	2,065	
Virginia, - - - - -	11	5,742	2,486	
North Carolina, - - - - -	6	3,132		
South Carolina, - - - - -	6	3,132		
Georgia, - - - - -	1	522		
<b>Total,</b> - - - - -	<b>80</b>	<b>41,760</b>	<b>21,015</b>	<b>5,811</b>

Total from returns,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26,826
<i>Conjectural estimate of Militia employed in addition to the above.</i>										
New York,	-	-	2	months,	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Virginia,	-	-	12	do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,500
Do.	-	-	3	do.	-	-	-	-	-	3,000
North Carolina,	-	-	average	12	do.	-	-	-	-	3,000
South Carolina,	-	-	4	do.	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Do. Do.	-	-	8	do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	750
									Conjectural,	16,000
									Grand Total,	<u>42,826</u>

Arrangement 3d October, 1780.

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the Army, for the year 1781.*

STATES.	Quotas required.		Furnished.	
	Number of Battalions, 576 men each.	Number of men.	Number of men.	Number of Militia.
New Hampshire,	2	1,152	700	
Massachusetts, (4 months' men)	11	6,366	3,732	1,566
Rhode Island,	1	576	464	
Connecticut, (4 months' men)	6	3,456	2,420	1,501
New York,	3	1,728	1,178	
New Jersey,	2	1,152	823	
Pennsylvania,	9	5,184	1,346	
Delaware,	1	576	89	
Maryland,	5	2,880	770	1,337*
Virginia,	11	6,336	1,225	2,894†
North Carolina,	4	2,304	545	
South Carolina,	2	1,152		
Georgia,	1	576		
Total,	58	33,408	13,292	7,298

Total from returns, - - - - - 20,590

*Conjectural estimate of Militia employed in addition to the above.*

Virginia,	-	-	-	-	2,000	} †
North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	3,000	
South Carolina,	-	-	-	-	3,000	
Georgia,	-	-	-	-	750	
Total Conjectural,						8,750
Grand Total,						<u>29,340</u>

\* With General Green. † Before York Town:

‡ The average number employed during ten months of the year may be estimated at six thousand.

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from actual returns of the Army, for the year 1782.*

STATES.	Quota Required.		Furnished.
	Number of Battalions, 576 men each.	Number of men.	Number of men.
New Hampshire, - - - - -	2	1,152	744
Massachusetts, - - - - -	11	6,336	4,423
Rhode Island, - - - - -	1	576	481
Connecticut, - - - - -	6	3,456	1,732
New York, - - - - -	3	1,728	1,198
New Jersey, - - - - -	2	1,152	660
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	9	5,184	1,265
Delaware, - - - - -	1	576	164
Maryland, - - - - -	5	2,880	1,280
Virginia, - - - - -	11	6,336	1,204
North Carolina, - - - - -	4	2,304	1,105
South Carolina, - - - - -	2	1,152	
Georgia, - - - - -	1	576	
Total,	58	33,408	14,256

Total, from returns, - - - 14,256

*Conjectural estimate of Militia, employed in addition to the above.*

Virginia, - - - - -	-	1,000	
South Carolina, - - - - -	-	for 4 months, 2,000	
Georgia, - - - - -	-	750	
Total, conjectural,	-	-	3,750
Grand total,	-	-	18,006

*Statement of the Troops furnished by the following States, taken from the actual returns of the Army, for the year 1783.*

STATES.	Quotas required.		Furnished.	Total number of Continentals and Militia.
	Number of Battalions of 576 men each.	Number of men.	Number of Continentals.	
New Hampshire, - - - - -	2	1,152	733	
Massachusetts, - - - - -	11	6,336	4,370	
Rhode Island, - - - - -	1	576	372	
Connecticut, - - - - -	6	3,456	1,740	
New York, - - - - -	3	1,728	1,169	
New Jersey, - - - - -	2	1,152	676	
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	7	5,184	1,598	
Delaware, - - - - -	1	576	235	
Maryland, - - - - -	5	2,880	974	
Virginia, - - - - -	11	6,336	629	
North Carolina, - - - - -	4	2,304	697	
South Carolina, - - - - -	2	1,152	139	
Georgia, - - - - -	1	576	145	
Total,	58	33,408	13,476	13,476

N. B. The Army in the Northern Department discharged the 5th November, 1783, and that in the Southern States, on the 15th November, 1783.

WAR OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, *May 10, 1790.*

H KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

[2d CONGRESS.]

No. 4.

[1st SESSION.]

## COURT OF INQUIRY ON GENERAL HARMAR.

FORT WASHINGTON, *September 24, 1791.*

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency the proceedings of the court of inquiry which sat agreeably to the general order of the 14th instant, "to inquire into the personal conduct of Brigadier General Harmar, commanding officer on the late expedition against the Miami Indians."

The court have taken the utmost pains to investigate the subjects committed to them, and have expected that some persons would have attended from Kentucky, on the occasion, as mentioned in your Excellency's letter of the 15th. Finding no personal evidence come forward from that quarter, have this day closed the proceedings, and present to your Excellency their opinion as *specially directed*.

There are some depositions handed in, but, as they are not authenticated under the seal of any court of record, or by the prothonotary of any county, the court conceive they can only subjoin them to the proceedings for information to your Excellency, as they have been to the court. They are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your Excellency's most obedient servant,

RICHARD BUTLER, *Major General, President.*

His Excellency Major General ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

*Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry, held at Fort Washington, September 15th, 1791, agreeably to the order of the 14th inst. of which the following is a copy:*

"A court of inquiry, of which Major General Butler is appointed President, and Lieutenant Colonels Gibson and Darke, members, will sit to-morrow, 12 o'clock, at the Southeast block-house, Fort Washington."

Major General RICHARD BUTLER, President.

Lieutenant Colonels GEORGE GIBSON, }  
WILLIAM DARKE, } Members.

*After orders, September 14th, Head Quarters.*

"Lieutenant Warren, of the 2d United States' regiment, is appointed to record the proceedings of the court of inquiry directed to sit at Fort Washington, by the orders of this day."

W. SARGENT, *Adj. General.*

The court met, agreeably to the above order, and were duly sworn according to law. The following letter was read, from his Excellency Major General St. Clair, directed to Major General Butler, President of the court of inquiry:

"FORT WASHINGTON, *September 15, 1791.*

"SIR:

"The court, of which you are appointed President, is ordered for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of Brigadier General Harmar, the commanding officer upon the late expedition against the Miami Indians.

"In the course of your investigations, all the circumstances of the campaign, from the time the army departed until it returned to Fort Washington, are to be taken into consideration. These will embrace the personal conduct of the General; the organization of the army; the orders of march, encampment and battle; the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, the 19th, and the 21st of October, and whether the said detachments were duly supported, and if not, the reasons which prevented the said support. The articles of war specify, that courts of inquiry shall not give their opinion on the merits of any case, excepting they shall be specially thereto required. This seems to be one of the cases in which an opinion is requisite; you will therefore please, sir, to take the opinion of the court on all, and every, of the points above specified, and convey the same to me when the inquiry shall be closed.

"Some evidences have been expected from Kentucky; whether they will attend or not, I cannot inform the court; but the principal officers of the militia who served in the army of General Harmar have had notice that the court would meet this day. I have heard from none of them, excepting Lieutenant Colonel Trotter, who writes to me that his attendance is doubtful; that Colonel Hall is gone to the Atlantic States, and he believes Colonel M<sup>r</sup> Mullen likewise."

Brigadier General Harmar, being called upon for his evidences, furnished the court with a list of persons, whereupon the court ordered them to be summoned to attend. The court then adjourned to meet at 3 o'clock P. M.

Three o'clock P. M.—The court met, agreeably to adjournment.

The gentlemen who were summoned, not being ready to give in their evidences, the court adjourned to meet at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning.

SEPTEMBER 16th.

The court met, agreeably to adjournment, and Major Ferguson being called in and sworn, deposed as followeth: That, sometime about the 15th July, it was determined to carry on an expedition against the Miami villages. One thousand militia from Kentucky, and five hundred from Pennsylvania, with what could be collected of the 1st United States' regiment, and one company of artillery, was to form the army. The militia from Kentucky began to assemble at Fort Washington about the middle of September; those were very ill equipped, being almost destitute of camp kettles and axes; nor could a supply of these essential articles be procured. Their arms were, generally, very bad, and unfit for service; that as he was the commanding officer of artillery, they came under his inspection, in making what repairs the time would permit; and as a specimen of their badness, he informed the court, that a rifle was brought to be repaired without a lock, and another without a stock. That he asked the owners what induced them to think that those guns could be repaired at that time? And they gave him for answer, that they were told in Kentucky that all repairs would be made at Fort Washington. Many of the officers told him, that they had no idea of there being half the number of bad arms in the whole district of Kentucky, as was then in the hands of their men. As soon as the principal part of the Kentucky militia arrived, the General began to organize them; in this he had many difficulties to encounter. Colonel Trotter aspired to the command, although Colonel Hardin was the eldest officer, and in this he was encouraged both by men and officers, who openly declared, unless Colonel Trotter commanded them, they would return home. After two or three days the business was settled, and they were formed into three batalions, under the command of Colonel Trotter, and Colonel Hardin had the command of all the militia. As soon as they were arranged, they were mustered; crossed the Ohio, and, on the 26th, marched, and encamped about ten miles from Fort Washington. The last of the Pennsylvania militia arrived on the 25th September. These were equipped nearly as the Kentucky, but were worse armed; several were without any. The General ordered all the arms in store to be delivered to those who had none, and those whose guns could



not be repaired. Amongst the militia were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old, infirm men, and young boys; they were not such as might be expected from a frontier country, viz. the smart active woodsman, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to revenge the injuries done them and their connexions. No, there were a great number of them *substitutes*, who probably had never fired a gun. Major Paul, of Pennsylvania, told him, that many of his men were so awkward, that they could not take their gun-locks off to oil them, and put them on again, nor could they put in their flints so as to be useful; and even of such materials, the numbers came far short of what was ordered, as may be seen by the returns. That, on the 31st September, the General with the continental troops, marched from Fort Washington, to join Colonel Hardin, who had advanced into the country, for the sake of feed for the cattle, and to open the road for the artillery. On the 3d October, the whole army joined, and was arranged in order of march, encampment, and battle; these would appear by the orderly-book, with this difference in the encampment—the space they were to occupy, when in order of battle; which was to be open, was always to be filled up with their fires, nor was any intervals to be left between battalions. This was done to prevent, in some measure, the cattle and horses from getting out of camp; and the sentinels round camp had orders not to let the cattle or horses pass out after dark, just before which time they were brought within their fires. Those precautions, aided by the care and industry of Mr. Wells and his assistants, succeeded well in preventing loss of cattle—he was informed there were only two oxen lost from the time the whole army took up the line of march, until it returned to Fort Washington; but he was sorry to say, it was not the case of the pack-horses: the generality of the people employed in that department, were ignorant of their duty, indolent, and inactive; nor was it in the power of the General to remedy these defects. The shortness of the time for assembling and organizing the army put it out of his power to look about and select fit characters; he was of course obliged to take those that offered. After he was in the woods it was out of his power to exchange them for better, and punishments for neglect of duty was out of the question. The principles upon which the horses were employed induced the drivers, who were chiefly parties in the business, to lose and otherwise destroy them, rather than return them to their owners; by this means the proprietors had a high appraisal paid them for their horses, and daily pay for services, until they were lost; by adding to the above the negligence of sentinels, he accounted for the number of horses lost, which, in his opinion, it was out of General Harmar's power to prevent.

After the army was arranged, they continued their march without any material occurrence, until the 13th, when the horse fell in with two Indians, and took one of them prisoner, who informed that the Indians were not in force at the Maumee village. This day they reached a place called the French Store, at which place, a Frenchman, who was then with the General as a guide, had lived. He informed that the village was about ten leagues distant. From this place, on the morning of the 14th, Colonel Hardin was detached with six hundred men, to endeavor to surprise the Miami village; the army moved at the same time, and although it rained the whole day, they continued their march with diligence until late. The horse were ordered to be tied up this night, to enable the army to move early the next day, which it did. This diligence of the army on its march induced him to believe, the General was endeavoring to guard against any disaster that might happen to Colonel Hardin, which he was of opinion would have been in his power: for Colonel Hardin had not gained more than four miles of the army, on the first day's march. On the 17th, the army arrived at the Miami village; here were evident signs of the enemy having quitted the place in the greatest confusion. Indian dogs and cows came into their camp this day, which induced to believe the families were not far off. A party of three hundred men, with three days' provision, under the command of Colonel Trotter, was ordered, as he understood, to examine the country around their camp, but, contrary to the General's orders, returned the same evening. This conduct of the Colonel's did not meet the General's approbation, and Col. Hardin, anxious for the character of his countrymen, wished to have the command of the same detachment for the remaining two days, which was given him. This command marched on the morning of the 19th, and was the same day shamefully defeated. Colonel Hardin told him, that the number which attacked him did not exceed one hundred and fifty, and that, had his people fought, or even made a show of forming to fight, he was certain the Indians would have run. But on the Indians firing, which was at a great distance, the militia ran, numbers throwing away their arms, nor could he ever rally them; Major Ray confirmed the same. He did not know what influenced the detachment on the 21st. But, from the enemy being flushed with success on the 19th, it became necessary, if in his power, to give them a check, to prevent the army from being harassed on its return; which they might have done, will readily be granted by every one who has the least knowledge of the Indians, and an army encumbered with cattle and packhorses, much worn down; and although the detachment was not so fortunate, as was reasonably to have been expected, yet he firmly believed it prevented the savages from annoying their rear, as they never made their appearance after. With respect to supporting that detachment, which consisted of four hundred chosen troops, he always believed them superior to one hundred and fifty Indians, which was the greatest number as yet discovered, had it not been for misconduct and disobedience of orders by the officers who were on the command. He understood that Major Ray's battalion had been advanced to cover them, which was as many as could possibly have been spared, taking into view that those in camp could not be depended on, and many were without arms, having thrown them away. To support with the whole army, was impracticable; the pack-horses being weak, and greatly reduced in numbers; the artillery horses very much reduced, and unable to undergo much more fatigue, but at the certain loss of the artillery; as it was, they were obliged to send to Fort Washington for horses to assist in hauling it in. The march of the army was as regular and well conducted, as was possible to be done with militia. With respect to the General's conduct, report says, that he was intoxicated all the campaign, and unable to execute the important duties of his station. He had mentioned his commanding the artillery, which was posted at the head of the centre column, and here the General chiefly was, during the march; of course he had an opportunity of seeing, and being with him through the day; in the morning he received his orders from him, and when they halted to encamp, he chiefly pointed out the ground where the artillery should be posted; his duty called him often to his tent, before they marched in the morning, and after they halted in the evening; in short, had he been given to drunkenness, he had as good an opportunity of seeing it as any other officer in the army. Yet he declared, that, from their leaving Fort Washington, until their return, he never saw General Harmar intoxicated, or so as to render him unfit for the execution of any duties. In him, and his abilities, as an officer, he placed the greatest confidence, never doubting his orders, but obeying with cheerfulness, being conscious they were the production of experience and sound judgment.

Question by the Court. What were your reasons for thinking punishment for neglect of duty out of the question?

Answer. The state of the army being such, that it obliged the General not to do any thing that would tend to irritate the militia.

Question by the Court. Is it your opinion that the organization of the army was a judicious one—such a one as was well calculated for the security of the troops?

Answer. It is my opinion that it was the most judicious organization that could be made, and calculated for the interest of the United States.

Question by the Court. Is it your opinion that the order of encampment was a judicious one, and that the extreme parts were so disposed as were calculated to give security to the army and its appendages?

Answer. I think no better disposition could have been made.

Question by the Court. Do you think the order of battle calculated so as to have been easy of execution and easily formed?

Answer. I think it was the best that could have been formed, and well calculated for covering the appendages of the army.

Question by the Court. Do you know the General's motives for making the detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st October?

Answer. I do not know the General's motives for making the detachment of the 14th, but I suppose it was for the purpose of surprising the *Maumee* village, as we had taken an Indian the day before, who gave us information that the Indians were in great confusion there, and that they were not in force, and very much divided in their counsels. We expected to surprise them before they separated.

Question by the Court. What were the movements of the army after that detachment was made?

Answer. We continued our march next day, until an express arrived to inform us that the Indians had evacuated the village; when we halted.

Question by the Court. What was the distance between the main body and the detachment?

Answer. About four miles.

Question by the Court. Do you think that the army was within supporting distance when that detachment was made?

Answer. On the first day we were.

Question by the Court. Do you know what induced the General to make the detachment of the 19th?

Answer. The day preceding that on which the detachment was made, Indian dogs and cattle came into our camp, which led us to believe the Indians were near us, more especially as they had left their village in such haste. I suppose it was for the purpose of examining the country around the camp. A detachment of three hundred men, under the command of Col. Trotter, with three days' provision, was made on the 18th, with orders to continue out three days, but which nevertheless returned into camp the same evening. The General appeared displeased at their disobedience of orders. Col. Hardin, wishing to retrieve the character of the militia, asked the General's permission to take out the same detachment on the 19th, which was granted.

Question by the Court. What motives led Col. Hardin at such a distance as fifteen miles from camp?

Answer. I understood that he got on the trails of the Indians, and that he had discovered an Indian on horseback, about one mile from where he fell in with their main body.

Question by the Court. Upon hearing of the defeat of that detachment, did you understand that the General ordered any support?

Answer. I don't know that he did; the first intelligence of the defeat was brought us by those who were defeated, late in the evening.

Question by the Court. Do you know the motives for the detachment of the 21st, either from the General himself, or any of his confidential officers?

Answer. I do not know from the General, but it was my opinion, as well as that of other officers; that the defeat of the 19th had so panic struck the army, that, had the Indians attacked on the retreat, it might have been lost, which induced the General to send the detachment in the rear.

Question by the Court. Had the General ordered another detachment upon the ground, where the defeat of the 19th happened, do you think the militia would have gone, or would they have mutinied?

Answer. I am rather inclined to think they would not have gone.

Question by the Court. With respect to the general conduct of General Harmar in the course of the campaign, is it your opinion that it was judicious, and in every respect commendable?

Answer. I do think it was perfectly so; I have the greatest confidence in, and good opinion of, his military abilities.

Captain Strong being sworn, deposed: That he knew of no circumstance during the whole campaign that could, in his opinion, affect the military character of the General. That the organization of the army appeared, to his judgment, extremely judicious, and such he believed was the general opinion of the officers. That the order of march seemed to him no less judicious and military in all its parts; that the order of encampment and battle met, if he mistook not, with the approbation of every officer able to judge of it; that the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st October, appeared to him to be a question that could only be answered by the General, or perhaps by his confidential officers, or those more immediately attached to his person; that he had reason to believe, that those detachments were not properly supported, but it was his opinion, at the same time, that the fault lay not with the General; who had given orders, in each case, that were not complied with, at least until it was too late.

Question by the Court. With respect to support in the action of the 21st, was there any support ordered that you know of?

Answer. I was present when the order was given to Major Ray to move with his battalion to support Major Wyllys.

Question by the Court. Do you know what distance they marched for that purpose, or how long they were gone from the army?

Answer. I do not recollect perfectly how long, but I think it was not long.

Question by General Harmar. Is it your opinion that the making the detachment under Major Wyllys was attended with good consequences to the army, or not?

Answer. I think it was attended with useful consequences to the army.

The Court then adjourned to 3 o'clock P. M.

Three o'clock P. M. The Court having met, agreeable to adjournment,

Lieutenant Hartshorn was sworn, and deposed, That he knew of no circumstances, during the whole campaign, that could in his opinion affect the military conduct of the General; that the organization of the army appeared to his judgment extremely judicious, and such, he believed, was the general opinion of the officers; that the order of march seemed to him no less judicious and military in all its parts; that the order of encampment and battle met, if he mistook not, with the approbation of every officer able to judge of it; that the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st of October, appeared to him to be a question that could only be answered by the General, and perhaps by his confidential officers, or those more immediately attached to his person; that as to the question of support, he had reason to believe the detachment was not properly supported; but it was his opinion at the same time, that the fault lay not with the General, who had given orders, in each case, that were not complied with, at least until it was too late.

Question by the Court. Do you know, sir, in the course of the campaign, from the time the army left Fort Washington, until its return to that place, any circumstance that could militate against the military character of the General?

Answer. I know of none.

Question by the Court. Do you know of any unnecessary delays?

Answer. None at all; far from it, every thing was done to get forward the army.

Question by the Court. Does any instance of inebriety in the General come within your knowledge, during the course of the campaign?

Answer. I know of none.

Question by the Court. So far as you are a judge of the organization of the army, do you think it was proper and judicious?

Answer. So far as I could judge, I think it was extremely judicious.

Question by the Court. Had you any conversation with the officers of the army on the subject of the organization of the army?

Answer. I had, and with those who I think were judges, who thought it to be very good.

Question by the Court. Did the arrangement of march appear to be so connected as to be able to support each other in case of attack?

Answer. I think it did, and seemed no less judicious and military in all its parts.

Question by the Court. Did the extreme parts of the encampment appear to be so formed, as to be competent to cover the main body of the army in case of attack by the enemy?

Answer. Perfectly so.

Question by the Court. Was you in the first engagement of the army?

Answer. I was in the action of the 19th of October.

Question by the Court. Was you in the detachment of the 14th?

Answer. I was not.

Question by the Court. Did the order of battle on the 19th appear to you to be a judicious one?

Answer. I think it was not a judicious one.

Question by the Court. Who was the officer who commanded the troops in that action?

Answer. Colonel Hardin.

Question by the Court. In what manner did you attack the enemy—was it in columns, or did you display in any regular order?

Answer. We were attacked in front of columns.

Question by the Court. When you were attacked, were you ordered to display, or form in any regular order?

Answer. No.

Question by the Court. In what manner did you oppose the enemy when you were attacked?

Answer. By endeavoring to form the line to charge them.

Question by the Court. What troops came within your notice that attempted to form when charged?

Answer. Not more than thirty federal troops, and ten militia.

Question by the Court. How many militia had you?

Answer. I don't know.

Question by the Court. What became of the rest of the militia?

Answer. They gave way and ran.

Question. Do you think that, if the militia in that action had been properly formed, and in time, they would have been sufficient to have beat the enemy?

Answer. They were.

Question by the Court. Do you know the motives for making the detachment on the 14th?

Answer. It was supposed for the purpose of gaining the Maumee village before the Indians left it, as we were informed they were preparing to leave it.

Question by the Court. Is that your own opinion?

Answer. It is, and was the general opinion in camp.

Question by the Court. What was the result of the action of the 19th—were the continental troops and the ten militia defeated?

Answer. They were cut to pieces except six or seven.

Question by the Court. Do you know from head quarters, or from any principal officers of the army, what were the motives for making the detachment of the 19th?

Answer. It was for the purpose of overtaking a party of Indians, whose trails had been discovered.

Question by the Court. Was there any attempt made to support that detachment from the main body?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question by the Court. What was the distance between the main body of the army and the detachment attacked?

Answer. Fourteen or fifteen miles.

Question by the Court. From the conduct of the militia, do you think that the General had a right to expect any great support from them, if he had been attacked?

Answer. I don't think he had.

Question by the Court. Was you in the action of the 21st?

Answer. I was not.

Question by the Court. Do you know the motives for making the detachment of the 21st?

Answer. It was for the purpose of seeing if any Indians were in the village.

Question by General Harmar. Did you not think the detachment sent back under Major Wyllys competent to engage any body of the enemy?

Answer. It was sufficient for any body of Indians in that country.

Question by General Harmar. To what cause was it owing, that the detachment did not succeed so perfectly as I could have wished for?

Answer. Because they did not obey your orders; they did not march at the time they were directed.

Question by General Harmar. Upon the first intelligence do you recollect any support I ordered?

Answer. I recollect you ordered a battalion, I think under Major Ray.

Ensign Morgan being sworn, deposed as followeth: That, as he did not join the army under the command of General Harmar until the 13th October, he was unacquainted with its progress until that time, when the army appeared in good order. As he was an ensign, and carried the standard every fourth or fifth day after his joining the army, he was frequently near the General, and always observed, as far as he could judge, the greatest propriety of conduct. As to the organization of the army, the order of march, encampment, and battle, they are perfectly explained in the general orders. As to the motives which influenced the General in sending out the different detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st, he was unacquainted—the opinion he took up concerning the one of the 14th was, that the General, finding the army discovered, resolved to make a push for the towns before they were abandoned, and as he could not do it with his whole army, formed the detachment on the 14th under Colonel Hardin; the motive for the detachment on the 19th he was utterly unacquainted with, that of the 21st, as he supposed, was to pick up any straggling Indians who might have come to the towns, to see what they had been about, but without an idea of the Indians being in force.

Question by the Court. Do you think that the party of militia that were attached to Major Wyllys' detachment was sufficient to have defeated the Indians if they had done their duty?

Answer. If they had been together, I think they were.

Question by the Court. What time did you return to the army from the action of the 21st?

Answer. About 5 o'clock P. M. The action commenced soon after day-light.

Question by the Court. Did you see any thing of the detachment under Major Ray, on your return?

Answer. I saw only a party three miles from camp, under Captain Craig, that were going to our support.

Question by the Court. What was the disposition of the militia after you returned to the army—were they well affected to the service and orderly?

Answer. I think they were very disorderly, and very inattentive to their duty, and some appearances of mutiny among them, with both officers and men; and turned out, upon one occasion particularly, to oppose a punishment that had been ordered by the General.

Question by the Court. Do you remember any thing of General Harmar's ordering his cannon to fire upon them?

Answer. I remember that General Harmar once said, that if the militia behaved again in so scandalous a manner, that he would order his cannon to fire on them.

Ensign Britt being sworn, deposed: That with respect to the personal conduct of General Harmar, he knew that he was indefatigable in making arrangements for the execution of the plans which had been formed for the expedition; and he also knew that the difficulties were great which the General had to encounter in organizing the militia, and in endeavoring to establish that harmony, which was wanting in their commanding officers, Colonels Hardin and Trotter, which he accomplished apparently to their satisfaction; that he was at all times diligent in attending to the conduct of the officers in the different departments of the army, and that he was always ready to attend to such occurrences as were consequent to the same, and the necessary exertions to have his orders carried into execution were not wanting; but that there were great deficiencies on the part of the militia, either owing to the want of authority in some of their officers, or from their ignorance or inattention; that the generality of them scarcely deserved the name of any thing like soldiers; that they were mostly *substitutes* for others, who had nothing to stimulate them to do their duty; that as to the dispositions for the order of march, form of encampment, and order of battle, they were matters which he, being a young officer, could say little about; he presumed they would answer for themselves; that the General's motives for detaching Colonel Hardin on the 14th October, when they were told they were but ten leagues from the Indian towns, he supposed to be, from information they received by a prisoner who was taken on the 13th, that the Indians at the Maumee village were in great consternation and confusion; and the prospects were, they

might be easily defeated if found in that situation; that in order to support this detachment, the horses of the army were ordered to be tied up at night, so that the whole army might be ready to march early in the morning, which was done accordingly; and that when Colonel Hardin reached the village, the main body was not more than five or six miles in his rear; that the detachment under Colonel Trotter was ordered to reconnoitre for three days the neighborhood, to endeavor to find out the savages, who had fled from their towns; that this party returned the evening of the same day they started, and next morning Colonel Hardin marched with the same party, and fell in with the Indians; that an engagement ensued, in which he was routed owing to the cowardly behavior of the militia under his command; that the motives which he conceived led to detaching the party under Major Wyllys on the 21st were, that the Indians having avoided engaging the whole army, would collect at their towns, and harass the rear and flanks, as much as possible on its return, and a stroke at them before they could assemble in large bodies would prevent their doing it with much effect; that the party accordingly met with the Indians, and a battle followed, in which numbers were killed on both sides; that the moment the news of this arrived in camp, Major Ray, with his battalion of Kentucky militia, was ordered to march to the support of Major Wyllys, but that he did not proceed far before he returned.

Question by the Court. Did you at any time, in the course of the campaign, perceive that General Harmar was intoxicated?

Answer. I did not; I lived in the General's family, and should have known it had any thing of that kind happened.

Doctor Allison being sworn, deposed: That the organization of the army, the orders of march, encampment, and battle, were questions which would be more amply answered by a reference to the orderly book, than they could be from the mere relation of an individual, or from any other official information; that, as to the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st October, those were questions which, if answered at all, must be merely speculative opinions, which it was not always prudent to divulge, nor would they, in his judgment, be admitted as evidence, or even perused by any tribunal, and therefore were nugatory; and, as he had not the honor of being in the cabinet, it was utterly out of his power to give any other; that, as soon as the news arrived of the misfortune of the third detachment, a reinforcement was immediately ordered by the General, but whether it actually set out, or what induced it to return, he could not say, or whether sufficiently strong, he did not conceive himself a judge. His situation, as surgeon, prevented a minute attention to every, or, indeed, any of the arrangements of the army; yet, as far as they came within his view, or knowledge, they were judicious and uniform; that every attention was paid to the army by the General, in every situation; that every step was taken by him that prudence and military knowledge could suggest, the circumstances of the army would permit, or that necessity required.

Lieutenant Denny, being sworn, deposed: That General Harmar began his preparations for the campaign soon after the 15th July, and that every day was employed in the most industrious manner; that the calculations for provisions, horses, and stores, were immediately made out, and orders given accordingly; that great exertions were used by Captain Ferguson to get in readiness the artillery and military stores, and, indeed, every officer was busily engaged, under the eye of the General, in fitting out necessary matter for the expedition, but particularly the quartermaster; not a moment's time appeared to be lost. Fifteenth and 16th September the Kentucky militia arrived, but instead of seeing active riflemen, such as is supposed to inhabit the frontiers, they saw a parcel of men, young in the country, and totally unexperienced in the business they came upon, so much so, that many of them did not even know how to keep their arms in firing order; indeed, their whole object seemed to be nothing more than to see the country, without rendering any service whatever. A great many of their guns wanted repairs, and, as they could not put them in order, our artificers were obliged to be employed; a considerable number came without any guns at all. Kentucky seemed as if she wished to comply with the requisitions of Government as ineffectually as possible; for it was evident that about two-thirds of the men served only to swell their numbers. Nineteenth September, a small detachment of Pennsylvania militia arrived, and the 25th of September, Major Doughty, with two companies of federal troops, joined them from Muskingum. Governor St. Clair had arrived from New York the 22d, and the remains of the Pennsylvania militia came on the 25th. The militia, last mentioned, were similar to the other, *too many substitutes*. The General lost no time in organizing them, though he met with many difficulties. The colonels were disputing for the command, and the one most popular was least entitled to it. The General's design was to reconcile all parties, which he accomplished, after much trouble. The Kentuckians composed three battalions, under the Majors Hall, M'Mullen and Ray, with Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Trotter at their head. The Pennsylvanians were formed into one battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Trumbley and Major Paul, the whole to be commanded by Colonel John Hardin, subject to the orders of General Harmar; that, on the 26th September, the militia marched on the route towards the Indian towns. The 30th, the General having got forward all the supplies that he expected, he moved out with the federal troops, formed into two small battalions, under the immediate command of Major Wyllys and Major Doughty, together with Captain Ferguson's company of artillery, and three pieces of ordnance. On the 3d of October, General Harmar joined the advanced troops early in the morning; the remaining part of the day was spent in forming the line of march, the order of encampment and battle, and explaining the same to the militia field officers. General Harmar's orders will show the several formations. On the 4th the army took up the order of march as is described in the orders. On the 5th a reinforcement of horsemen and mounted infantry joined from Kentucky. The dragons were formed into two troops; the mounted riflemen made a company, and this small battalion of light troops were put under the command of Major Fontaine.

The whole of General Harmar's command then may be stated thus:

3	battalions of Kentucky militia,	} 1133
1	do. Pennsylvania do.	
1	do. Light troops mounted do.	
2	do. Federal troops,	
Total,		1453

The line of march was certainly one of the best that could be adopted, and great attention was paid to keep the officers with their commands in proper order, and the pack-horses, &c. as compact as possible. The order of encampment appeared to be well calculated not only for defence, but to preserve the horses and cattle from being lost; however, notwithstanding every precaution was taken, and repeated orders given to the horse-masters, to hope well their horses, and directions to the officers and men not to suffer any to pass through the lines, many of them, owing to the carelessness of the militia, and the scarcity of food, (though great attention was paid in the choice of ground) broke loose and strayed through the lines after night, and even passed the chain of sentries which encircled the camp, and were lost. Patrols of horsemen were ordered out every morning by day-light, to scour the neighboring woods, and to bring in any horses that might have broke through the lines; and a standing order directed the pickets to turn out small parties, and drive in every horse. This was done, he believed, to expedite the movement of the army. There was no less attention paid to securing the cattle every evening when the army halted; the guard, which was composed of a commissioned officer and thirty or thirty-five men, built a yard always within the chain of sentries, and sometimes in the square of encampment, and placed a sufficient number of sentries round the enclosure, which effectually preserved them; there was not more than two or three head lost during the whole of the campaign. On the 13th of October, early in the morning, a patrol of horsemen captured a Shawanee Indian. On the 14th October, Colonel Hardin was detached with 600 light troops, to push for the Miami village; he believed that this detachment was sent forward in consequence of the intelligence gained of the Shawanee prisoner, which was, that the Indians were clearing out as fast as possible, and that if they did not make more haste, the towns would be evacuated before their arrival. As it was impossible for the main body of the army, with all their train, to hasten their march much, the General thought proper to send on Colonel Hardin, in hopes of taking a few, before they would all get off. This night the horses were all ordered to be tied up, that the army might start by day-light, on purpose to keep as near Colonel Hardin as possible; the distance to the Indian towns, when the detachment

marched ahead, was about thirty-five miles. On the 15th, every exertion was used to get forward the main body this day; they found that the advanced party had gained but very few miles. On the 16th, in the evening, met an express from Colonel Hardin, who had got into the village, informing the General that the enemy had abandoned every place. On the 17th, about noon, the army arrived at the Omece towns; on the 18th, Colonel Trotter was ordered out with three hundred men, militia and regulars, to reconnoitre the country, and to endeavor to make some discoveries of the enemy. He marched but a few miles, when his advanced horsemen came upon two Indians and killed them. The colonel was contented with this victory, and returned to camp. Colonel Hardin was displeased because Colonel Trotter did not execute his orders, and requested the General to give him the command of the party; it was granted; and, accordingly, Hardin marched next morning; but, he believed he had not two thirds of his number when two miles from camp: for, to his certain knowledge, many of the militia left him on the march, and returned to their companies. Whether he knew it or not, he could not tell; but that he proceeded on with a determination to trace some fresh signs of the enemy. He believed the plan was merely to gain some knowledge of the savages. He at length came upon a party not exceeding one hundred, but was worsted, owing entirely, as he was informed, to the scandalous behavior of the militia, many of whom never fired a shot, but ran off at the first noise of the Indians, and left the few regulars to be sacrificed; some of them never halted until they crossed the Ohio. The army, in the mean time, was employed burning and destroying the houses and corn, shifting their position from one town to another; that, on the 21st of October, the army having burned five villages, besides the capital town, and consumed or destroyed near twenty thousand bushels of corn in ears, took up the line of march on the route back to Fort Washington, and encamped about eight miles from the ruins; that, about nine o'clock, P. M. the General ordered out four hundred choice men, militia and regulars, under the command of Major Wyllys, to return to the towns, intending to surprise any parties that might be assembled there, supposing that the Indians would collect to see how things were left. The General had felt the enemy, knew their strength, and calculated much upon the success of this enterprise; that it was the general opinion the force of the savages was nothing equal to this detachment, and unless by some such means, there was no possibility of getting any advantage of them; however, the best laid plan was in some measure defeated by the disobedience of the militia, who ran in pursuit of small parties, and left Major Wyllys unsupported. The consequence was, that the Major, with most part of the regulars, were killed; and our loss was equal, if not greater, than the savages; that the intention of this detachment was evident to all the army, and would have answered the fullest expectations, provided a due obedience had been observed on the part of the militia—to provide against disobedience of orders was what, he believed, no one would think of, and had it not been the case, the Major, in his opinion, might have returned crowned with laurels. That the main body waited for the return of this detachment, but, to their mortification, about eleven o'clock, A. M. of the 22d, a fellow who ran back from the field, gave them information of Major Wyllys' misfortune. General Harmar immediately despatched Major Ray, with his battalion, to the assistance of the parties, but the Major did not get the length, before he met Colonel Hardin returning to camp with his wounded. He was led to believe that about this time, the General lost the confidence he had in the militia; those of them among the dead, were of the best men; that the effective strength was very much reduced by sickness and otherwise; the regular troops did not furnish more than two hundred; they were, in his opinion, very insufficient, and he was also clearly of opinion that, had the enemy made an attack upon their camp that evening, or the morning following, the militia were so panic struck, that very few of them would have stood; the consequences that would have happened, stared every person with horror; the sick and wounded, and all the stores, artillery, &c. would have fallen a prey to the savages. That this was also the opinion of several of the principal officers, who advised General Harmar of the danger of attempting to return to the towns, from the time it would take up, and the probability that the delay would give the savages time to collect from distant quarters. He observed that the 22d October was employed in fixing biers for the wounded, and in making repairs. He also observed that the frost had destroyed the food early on their march out, and that the horses of the army were now become very much reduced, so much so, that it was utterly impossible for the main body to perform any thing rapidly, and to get back upon the road which they had so lately passed, was attended with difficulty; he said that the greatest attention was paid, the little army was kept compact, and vigilance was the word from all who had any reputation to lose. That the militia, on their return, began to be refractory, showing great signs of a revolt, discharging their pieces in open defiance of the general orders; some of them, however, were detected and punished, which gave umbrage, and was afterwards the cause of many illnatured reports, spread without any foundation, to injure the General's reputation. He further observed that the army returned, by slow marches, back to fort Washington; that General Harmar's conduct during the campaign was observed to be sober, steady, and attentive to the service, and as his duty required him to be frequently near the General, should certainly have discovered it, had he been at any time intoxicated, as has been reported. Every evening, as duty as the army halted, the General made his remarks for that day, and issued orders for the movement and arrangements for the next; and every morning he was found among the first prepared for the field.

The court adjourned to to-morrow morning, 9 o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 10th, 9 o'clock, A. M. The court met, agreeably to adjournment, and again adjourned to September 19th, at 3 o'clock, P. M.

SEPTEMBER 19th, three o'clock P. M.

The court having met again, adjourned to to-morrow morning, 9 o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 20th.

The court having met, according to adjournment, -

Major Zeigler, being sworn, deposed: That some time had elapsed before the different corps and battalions could be organized, on account of rank—the militia officers disputing for the command; and, after a good deal of exertion by General Harmar, they commenced their march on the 30th September, 1790, the militia, under Colonel Hardin, having been sent on a few days before; and, on the 3d October, they joined the militia, and took up their line of march, and encamped as mentioned in the General's orders. He observed that the orders of march and encampment, motions, &c. &c. were such as would have done honor to the first officers either in America or Europe. All necessary precautions were observed, to gain the point General Harmar set out for. On the 14th of October he was ordered to advance with Colonel Hardin, commanding fifty rank and file of the federal troops, being part of six hundred men; at ten o'clock they took up their march, and, before they left the ground, the rest of the army was ordered to parade and follow them, which he remembered to have seen the army from an eminence, as he inclined towards the left with the column to which he was attached. The fifteenth, about three o'clock, P. M. they arrived at the Miami villages, and, at the same time, Colonel Hardin sent an express to General Harmar, to inform him that the villages were evacuated. It was his opinion that the motives for this manœuvre was in consequence of a Shawanese which they took a few days before, and who acquainted the General that the Indians were ready to move away. The army arrived the seventeenth, in the forenoon; and that day, as well as the rest, they were all busy in destroying the Indian corn, &c. &c. He further observed, that, on the eighteenth, Colonel Trotter was detached with three hundred men of militia, including thirty federal troops, but that the Colonel returned the same day without bringing any information, and that, on the morning following, Colonel Hardin took command of the same party and advanced, to procure some knowledge of the enemy, and on his discovering the enemy, those which were in the rear would not come up and support those engaged in front, and very few of those in front stopped, but ran, and the militia fled in a shameful manner, and the few federal troops, not supported, fell a sacrifice; the Major said, that a sergeant of militia, behaving very improper at that time, could not be brought to trial, on account of a brother of his being a captain, and who made parties that would have been attended with bad consequences, should he be punished, as his brother declared he would raise some men, and bid defiance. That, on the 21st of October, 1790, after they had destroyed a great quantity of corn and five or six villages, they took up their line of march towards Fort Washington, and at night Major Wyllys was detached with four hundred choice men, in hopes to surprise a body that might be at the ruins—this party was supposed to be sufficiently strong for any number of the enemy embodied. Major Wyllys marched in three columns, with intention to join with the right and left columns at the Miami village, but that

the column under the command of Major M'Mullen fell in with a small party of Indians; they followed them, and disobeyed the orders of Major Wyllys, in pursuing them, and leaving the others unsupported, and so was the left wing, which would not have been if they had joined them, as he supposed it to be sufficiently strong for that party. He also remembered very well being on picket, or commanding one of the wings as Captain *au Carrée*, when the first men arrived with the intelligence that their party had gained ground, and, at that very instant, General Harmar ordered Major Ray with his battalion to the assistance of those engaged, lest that information should not prove true, but he went but two miles or two and a half, then meeting the scattered detachment, returned, to the great surprise of General Harmar; that the success of the detachment was defeated in a great measure by the militia running a-head, and leaving Major Wyllys unsupported. The army remained this day in dressing and fixing the wounded—the militia behaving so bad in several instances, destroyed every confidence the General had in them, otherwise he would have returned with the army; but as things were situated, it would have been running too great a hazard. The army returned back to Fort Washington; nothing appeared wanting on the part of the General; every attention was paid to the army to guard against surprise. The Major observed that there had been very injurious reports spread about General Harmar, but, if he was to be credited, he knew of nothing that could be alleged against him, or could that possibly injure his reputation in any respect—the good of the service appeared to be his constant study.

Question by the Court. I think, sir, you said, that, on the fifteenth, at three o'clock, P. M. you arrived at the Miami village. What did you do after your arrival there—were the militia in good order?

Answer. When we arrived we were very much fatigued; having marched twenty-eight miles that day, I directed that my own men should not go thirty yards from camp. The militia, like a rabble, strolled into the neighboring villages, in parties of thirty or forty, after plunder—such was the situation that one hundred and fifty warriors might have beat us off the ground.

Question by the Court. Did you see any desire in the militia to return to the ground where Major Wyllys was defeated, or do you suppose they would have gone had they been ordered to go?

Answer. I suppose they would not have gone—they appeared to be panic struck.

Question by the Court. Are you of opinion that the personal conduct of the General was regular, steady, and tended to the good of the service?

Answer. Undoubtedly so, and very much to the credit of the General.

Question by the Court. From your long knowledge of service, do you think that, from the complexion of the troops General Harmar had to organize, that the formation of the army was judicious?

Answer. I think it was.

Question. Do you think that the order of march, and encampment, was calculated to secure every part of the army and its appendages?

Answer. Yes, very much so.

Question by the Court. From your experience, do you think that the order of battle directed by General Harmar was judicious?

Answer. Yes, perfectly so.

Captain Doyle, being sworn, deposed: That, previous to the campaign going out last fall, every day was employed in the most industrious manner; on the arrival of the Kentucky militia, they were all much disappointed, that, instead of seeing complete riflemen, many were armed with old muskets, much out of repair; the General immediately ordered them repaired with all expedition. He referred the court, as to the line of march, to the General's orderly book, and informed the court, that the personal conduct of the General, through the campaign, was uniform and steady, and that, had the General's orders been strictly obeyed, he was confident he must have come home with honor. As to what influenced the General to make detachments he could not say; he was in the detachment of the 14th October, and that the behaviour of the militia in that detachment was very disgraceful; they ran from town to town in pursuit of plunder, contrary to orders, and, on the arrival of General Harmar at the town, two-thirds of them dispersed in the same manner. The General ordered cannon to be fired, merely to collect them, and he at the same time harangued the officers, informing them of the ill consequences of such conduct. That the General's not returning to the village, after the ill-success of the last detachment, he believed, was owing to his not having confidence in his army. At that time there was a great rumor in camp; the general voice was for returning; their horses were much worn down; and the militia showed great signs of revolt. The reports that the militia circulated after their return home, and which was much to the prejudice of General Harmar, was, he believed, owing to the General's having a few of them punished for disobedience of orders; he thought it certain that they had no grounds for their ill-natured reports, and that General Harmar would have been justifiable in arresting one or two of the most popular field officers, and sending them home with disgrace—but a thing of that kind he observed would have broke up the army. He knew of no part of the General's conduct, during the whole of the campaign, that could be censured, without it was showing too much lenity to the militia, and thanking them for their conduct, when they merited punishment.

Question by the Court. Do you think that the sending the detachment under Major Wyllys tended eventually to the preservation of the army?

Answer. I think the Indians would have harassed us very much, on our return, if that detachment had not been made.

Question by General Harmar. Did the enemy annoy the army at all after that detachment was made?

Answer. No, they did not.

Question by General Harmar. Did we see any Indians afterwards?

Answer. We did not.

Lieutenant Sedam, being sworn, deposed: That he had the honor of serving under General Harmar, last fall, on a campaign against the Indians of the Maumee village, and that he saw nothing in his conduct but what he thought was very proper; that, relative to the organization of the army, he was but little acquainted, and therefore referred the court to the General's orderly book; that he was entirely unacquainted with General Harmar's motives for sending out the different detachments, and if those detachments were not properly supported, it did not appear to him to be the fault of the General, for the militia were a poor set, and behaved very ill upon all occasions; that after the first action, he heard Major Paul of the Pennsylvania militia say; he hoped General Harmar would not put any confidence in them, for he was sure they would not fight.

Question by General Harmar. When I was upon the return at Chillicothe, I ordered one of the militia to be whipped; I was informed that Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen said I had no right to punish them; did you hear me reprimand them for that conduct?

Answer. After the man was punished, I heard you say to Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen, that you would send them both home with disgrace, for their bad conduct.

Ensign Armstrong, being sworn, deposed as follows: That the militia being ordered into battalions and organized, in which he knew the General met with great difficulty; that the order of march and encampment could be better ascertained by a reference to the orderly book, than any thing he could add on the subject; that the conduct of the militia, in every instance, seemed calculated to obstruct every measure adopted by General Harmar; that the conduct of the General, in every particular, was perfectly consistent and uniform, and every step taken by him appeared to be the dictates of prudence and sobriety; that what induced the General to send out the detachments was wholly unknown to him, and, therefore, unanswerable by him.

Captain Armstrong, being sworn, deposed: That on report being made to General Harmar, by Major M'Mullen and others, that the tracks of women and children had been seen on the route leading towards the Kickapoo towns, a Northwest course, and supposing the enemy had left their families and baggage not far distant from camp, General Harmar, on the morning of October 18th, detached Colonel Trotter, Colonel Hall, Major Ray, and Major M'Mullen, with thirty federal troops, the mounted infantry, part of the cavalry, and a detachment of militia, amounting in the whole to 300 men. After they had proceeded about one mile, the cavalry gave chase to an Indian, who was mounted; him they overtook and killed; before they returned to the column, a second one appeared, on which the four field officers left their commands, and pursued, leaving the troops near half an hour without any directions

whatever. The cavalry came across the second Indian, and after wounding one of their party, killed him also. When the infantry came up to this place, they immediately fell into confusion, which he gained permission to leave them some distance on the road, where he formed an ambuscade. After he had been some time at his station, a fellow on horseback came to him, who had lost the party in pursuit of the first Indian; he was much frightened, and said he had been pursued by fifty mounted Indians. That on his telling this story to Colonel Trotter, notwithstanding his observations to him, he changed his route, marched in various directions until night, when he returned to camp. That on their arrival in camp, General Harmar sent for him; and after answering him many questions, ordered one subaltern and twenty militia to join his command. With those he crossed the river St. Joseph about ten at night, and with a guide proceeded to an Indian town, about two miles distant, where he continued with his party until the morning of the 19th. His party fired upon an Indian and retook from him two horses. About nine o'clock he joined the remainder of the detachment under Colonel Hardin. They marched on the route Colonel Trotter had pursued the day before, and after passing a morass about five miles distant, they came to where the enemy had encamped the day before. Here they made a short halt, and the commanding officer disposed of the parties at a distance from each other; after a halt of half an hour, they were ordered to move on, and Captain Faulkner's company was left on the ground; the Colonel having neglected giving him orders to move on. After they had proceeded about three miles, they fell in with two Indians on foot, who threw off their packs, and the brush being thick, made their escape. He then asked Colonel Hardin where Captain Faulkner was? He said he was lost, and then sent Major Fontaine with part of the cavalry in search of him, and moved on with the remainder of the troops. That some time after, he informed Colonel Hardin a gun had fired in their front, which might be considered as an alarm gun, and that he saw where a horse had come down the road, and returned again; but the Colonel still moved on, giving no orders, nor making any arrangements for an attack. That some time after, he discovered the enemy's fires at a distance, and informed the Colonel, who replied, that they would not fight, and rode in front of the advance, until fired on from behind the fires; when he, the Colonel, retreated, and with him all the militia except nine, who continued with him, and were instantly killed, with twenty-four of the federal troops; that seeing his last man fall, and being surrounded by the savages, he threw himself into a thicket, and remained there three hours in day-light; during that time he had an opportunity of seeing the enemy pass and re-pass, and conceived their numbers did not amount to one hundred men; that some were mounted, others armed with rifles, and the advance with tomahawks only; he was of opinion that had Colonel Trotter proceeded, on the 18th, agreeably to his orders, having killed the enemy's sentinels, they would have surprised their camp and with ease defeated them—or had Colonel Hardin arranged his troops, or made any military disposition, on the 19th, that they would have gained a victory. Their defeat he therefore ascribed to two causes; the un-officerlike conduct of Colonel Hardin, (who he believed was a brave man) and the cowardly behavior of the militia; many of them threw down their arms loaded, and he believed that none, except the party under his command, fired a gun. What he saw of the conduct of the militia on that day, and what he felt by being under the command of a man who wanted military talents, has caused him to determine, that he would not willingly fight with the one, or be commanded by the other. That he referred the court to the orderly book, which pointed out the line of march, encampment, and battle.

Question by the Court. Are you clearly of opinion that, if the militia had done their duty, they were fully competent to have defeated the Indians?

Answer. I think they were fully so.

Question by the Court. According to your ideas, as an officer of experience, was the formation and arrangement of the different corps of the army by General Harmar, at the commencement of the expedition, judicious?

Answer. I think they were.

Question by the Court. Did the line of march appear to you to be a judicious one, calculated for the protection of the army in all its parts?

Answer. I think so.

Question by the Court. Do you think the mode of encampment was calculated both for defence and protection?

Answer. As much so as any one that could possibly be adopted.

Question by the Court. What was your opinion of the General's order of battle?

Answer. I think it was a judicious one.

Question by the Court. Do you think that the making the detachment of the 21st was in its consequences useful to the return of the army?

Answer. I can judge from circumstances only; that we were not harassed by the enemy afterwards.

Question by the Court. Do you know if any detachment was made for the purpose of supporting Major Wyllys?

Answer. As soon as information of the Major's misfortune arrived in camp, the General ordered all the troops under arms, but whether any detachment was made from them or not, I don't know.

Question by the Court. Do you suppose that if General Harmar had ordered the army back, the militia would have gone?

Answer. I am of opinion that, if a serious attack had been made, in fifteen minutes the militia would have deserted us, and left the federal troops and artillery to be sacrificed.

Question by General Harmar. Do you recollect the proceedings of the militia at Chillicothe, on our return?

Answer. I recollect your saying to Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen, that you would post them, in their country, for their un-soldier-like conduct, and that they ought to be hanged.

Ensign Shamburgh being sworn, deposed: That the organization of the army under General Harmar was, as far as he was capable of judging in military affairs, exceedingly well; that the march, encampment, and order of battle, were also, in his opinion, very well planned; that he was not capable of judging of the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st October, but it was his opinion, at that time, that the General was apprehensive, that, as the savages had been successful in the preceding engagements, they would harass his army on his return; in consequence thereof he ordered the party commanded by Major Wyllys in order to check them, which he believed had its effect; he recollected that the different detachments sent out were numerous, and he believed sufficient to fight such number of Indians as were then together, if the commanding officers thereof had taken more precaution. He had been told at the time, that Major Ray was ordered to support Major Wyllys, but he could not determine whether that officer had obeyed his orders. He observed that the loss of so many pack-horses was owing to the neglect of horse-masters; notwithstanding the repeated orders of the General on that head, it appeared to him as if they were parties concerned, and glad to lose their horses, because they had a very great appraisement for the same. He observed that he did duty in the ordnance department at that time, and had fifty pack-horses under his direction, which gave him an opportunity to know the negligence and incapacity of both horse-masters and drivers.

Question by General Harmar. Do you think after the last detachment was made under Major Wyllys, and the remains of his party returned to camp, that the militia would have gone back if they had been ordered?

Answer. I think not.

Question by the Court. Was the appearance of the militia, after the action of the 21st, orderly or disorderly?

Answer. Very disorderly.

Question by the Court. Was there any particular cause ascribed that you heard of for their disorderly conduct?

Answer. Not that I know of; the militia, both officers and men, seemed determined to go home, and said frequently, that ten federal regiments should not keep them.

Question by the Court. Did you observe whether the militia were as well treated as the federal troops?

Answer. Perfectly the same.

Ensign Gaines (who was captain of horse in General Harmar's expedition) being sworn, deposed: That, on the expedition, he was almost every evening at General Harmar's tent until the 24th October, when he was detached forwards to Fort Washington, and that, during the whole time, he did not see General Harmar in the least intoxicated

with liquor, but that on the contrary the General conducted the army in a manner which in his estimation did him great honor. He further observed, that he had served on a number of expeditions against the savages, undertaken by the militia of Kentucky, and that he never saw in any of them, the like good order and military arrangement which accompanied General Harmar's expedition; he also observed that the people in Kentucky never alleged any charge against General Harmar, until Colonel John Hardin had acquitted himself, before a board of inquiry, of several charges exhibited against him, respecting his conduct on that expedition; that the populace finding nothing they could say to the prejudice of the Colonel would be believed, levelled their malice at General Harmar. He did not conceive that any thing would have been said against the General in that country, if a Baptist preacher's son, who resides there, had not been whipped in the army for disobedience of orders.

Question by the Court. I think you say you have been in several expeditions against the Indians—did the militia who were with General Harmar conduct better, or worse, than those in other expeditions?

Answer. Much better, Sir.

Question by the Court. Was you in the action of the 19th?

Answer. I was.

Question by the Court. Is it your opinion that if the militia had been properly arranged in that action, and would have fought, that they would have been sufficient to have defeated the Indians?

Answer. Yes: for it appeared to me that the Indians were surprised—that if Colonel Trotter on the preceding day had not returned, he most certainly must have been in their camp, and completely defeated them: for I had taken two of their spies the day before, which appeared to be the only two they had out.

Question by the Court. Do you think that if General Harmar had ordered the army back, after the action of the 21st, that the militia would have gone?

Answer. They would not have gone willingly. I think in that case there would have been danger of mutiny. When the militia of Major Wyllys' detachment were ordered to march, they appeared to be unwilling to go, and some were so much so, as to cry.

Question by the Court. Is it your opinion that the movement of the detachment under Major Wyllys, had a good effect in securing the army from being attacked and harassed on its return?

Answer. I think it had a very good effect.

Question by the Court. Did the Indians ever attack you afterwards?

Answer. Not while I continued with the army.

Captain Asheton being sworn, deposed: That the organization of General Harmar's army was a source of trouble and difficulty, arising from disputes among the militia officers for precedence; but when effected, was, in all its parts, systematical; that the organization of the army, the order of march, encampment, and battle, when duly considered, cannot fail to raise the General in the estimation of every military man; that it had been basely reported, that the General was in a state of intoxication nearly the whole of the campaign. This, he asserted to be a malicious falsehood; and he averred, that his personal conduct, during that time, will ever do him honor. He said, the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th, and 21st of October, could only be accounted for by the General himself; but he supposed, that the detachment under Col. Hardin, was sent in consequence of information gained from a prisoner taken on the morning of the 13th, and from a Frenchman employed as a guide, who reported, that it was something more than half a day's ride from a place called the French Store (at which place the army encamped the night of the 13th) to the Maumee villages. This detachment was supported by the whole army, and moved off the ground at the same time, with as much rapidity as possible, and arrived at the villages on the 17th, where the army encamped. On the morning of the 18th, I mounted guard in front of the encampment. In the course of that day, I was informed that a detachment of 300 men was ordered out under Colonel Trotter, with three days' provision, with orders to scour the country; but they returned the same evening to camp, without effecting any thing. Colonel Hardin, disgusted at the conduct of Colonel Trotter, and anxious to retrieve the lost honor of his countrymen, solicited the same command, which was granted. He marched on the morning of the 19th, while he was yet on guard, and was defeated the same day by the Indians. He could not say what influenced the General to send out a detachment on the 21st; but he observed that the Indians were flushed with success in the action of the 19th. That it had become necessary to give them a sudden check, in order to prevent the army from being harassed on its return; and that, if this was the General's intention, he was fully persuaded it had its desired effect. On the 21st, the army marched eight miles from the Maumee villages on its return. Late that night, a corps of 340 militia, and sixty of the federal troops, under the command of Major Wyllys, were detached, that they might gain the vicinity of the Maumee villages before the morning, and surprise any Indians who might be found there. The detachment marched in three columns, the federal troops in the centre, at the head of which he was posted, with Major Wyllys and Colonel Hardin in his front—the militia formed the columns to the right and left. From several delays, occasioned by the militia's halting, they did not reach the banks of the Omee till some time after sunrise. The spies then discovered the enemy, and reported to Major Wyllys, who halted the federal troops, and moved the militia on some distance in front, where he gave his orders and plan of attack to the several commanding officers of corps. Those orders were not communicated to him. That Major Wyllys reserved the command of the federal troops to himself. Major Hall, with his battalion, was directed to take a circuitous route round the bend of the Omee river, cross the Pickaway Fort, (or St. Mary's) which brought him directly in the rear of the enemy, and there wait until the attack should commence with Major M'Mullen's battalion, Major Fontaine's cavalry, and Major Wyllys with the federal troops, who all crossed the Omee at, and near, the common fording place. After the attack commenced, the troops were by no means to separate, but were to embody, or the battalions to support each other, as circumstances required. From this disposition it appeared evident, that it was the intention of Major Wyllys to surround the enemy, and that, if Colonel Hall, who had gained his ground undiscovered, had not wantonly disobeyed his orders, by firing on a single Indian, the surprise must have been complete. The Indians then fled with precipitation, the battalions of militia pursuing in different directions. Major Fontaine made a charge upon a small party of savages—he fell the first fire, and his troops dispersed. The federal troops, who were then left unsupported, became an easy sacrifice to much the largest party of Indians that had been seen that day. It was his opinion that the misfortunes of that day were owing to the separation of troops, and disobedience of orders. After the federal troops were defeated, and the firing in all quarters nearly ceased, Colonel Hall and Major M'Mullen, with their battalions, met in the town, and, after discharging, cleaning, and fresh loading their arms, which took up about half an hour, proceeded to join the army unmolested. He was convinced that the detachment, if it had been kept embodied, was sufficient to have answered the fullest expectations of the General, and needed no support; but that he was informed a battalion under Major Ray was ordered out for that purpose.

Question by the Court. Is it your opinion, that, if the General had ordered the army back, the militia would have gone?

Answer. I do not think they would.

Lieutenant Kersey being sworn, deposed: That when the militia arrived at Fort Washington, they were formed into battalions, and properly organized. He knew that General Harmar had a great deal of difficulty to get them arranged: their arms and accoutrements were in very bad order. He wished to refer the court to the General's orderly book for information relative to the order of march. In his opinion, General Harmar's conduct was uniform, steady, and sober, during the whole expedition. He was also of opinion, that the detachment of the 14th was in consequence of information received from a prisoner, taken the morning before; which was, that the enemy were running away; and the detachment of the 19th, was to gain some knowledge of them; and the detachment of the 21st, was to surprise and take advantage of them; which, in his opinion, would have happened, had the militia attended to the directions and plan laid down for that enterprise. He observed, that the reduced state of the pack horses, notwithstanding every attention was paid to secure and keep them in good condition, rendered it impossible for the army to take any advantage of the enemy. The militia had proved that they were not to be depended upon; their dastardly behavior, in three instances, destroyed every confidence the General had in them. He therefore determined to return, and not to hazard another engagement unless the enemy came in reach of the main body. That



the army took up the march to return to Fort Washington, and it was with great difficulty that the General kept them together until they arrived there.

Question by the Court. From your knowledge of service, is it your opinion that the organization of the army was judicious?

Answer. I think it was.

Question by the Court. Do you think that all the movements of the army were so connected, as to be able to sustain each other in case of attack by the enemy?

Answer. I think they were.

Question by the Court. Do you think, that, through the course of the campaign, the General's conduct was open and decisive throughout?

Answer. I think it was.

Question by the Court. Was the conduct of the militia tolerably regular, on their advance towards the Maumee towns?

Answer. It was more regular than it was on the return; but it was very irregular.

Question by the Court. Do you suppose it was necessary to make the detachment of the 21st, in order to prevent the Indians harassing the army on its return?

Answer. I think it was, and for that purpose.

Question by the Court. If the General had ordered the army to return to the towns, after Major Wyllys's misfortune, would the militia have gone?

Answer. I think they would not; they would have mutinied.

Question by the Court. Was the army harassed by the Indians after the 21st, on its return?

Answer. Not to my knowledge; I believe there was not one seen.

The court adjourned to meet at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning.

SEPTEMBER 21.

The court met, according to adjournment. Major Heart was sworn, and deposed: That General Harmar's conduct on his expedition in October, 1790, was at all times steady, calm, and deliberate, and was always attentive to the arrangements and applications made to him, and to the informations given, as far as came under his observation; that he was often at his quarters and marched in front of the right column, which was generally within fifty yards of him; that the organization of the army being published in the daily orders, would speak for itself; he however never heard an individual find fault with it, during the campaign, or point out any defects, except in the commissary and pack-horse departments, and in those the execution, and not the arrangements, were found fault with; that the order of march was in three columns, covered with front, rear, and flank guards, which order was generally preserved, and as well executed as could be expected with a body composed mostly of militia, and embarrassed with pack-horses; that the encampment was in a square, with the baggage, horses, cattle and stores in centre—guards were posted in such manner as to form a line of sentries round the whole, field officers appointed to dispose those guards, and to see duty well done, and they were so disposed as to prevent surprise, and had the horse department followed orders, would have secured the horses. As they had not occasion to form the line of battle, he could not determine how it would have been executed, but it was simple, easy to be understood, and universally approved. With respect to making the detachments, he had never been in council, and could only assign such motives as offered themselves at the time from a concurrence of circumstances. The detachment of the 14th, he presumed, at that time, was made in consequence of information obtained from a prisoner, that the Indians were confused and distracted in their counsels, and was designed to surprise them, prevent their concerting measures to unite, and attack them, and not give them time to secure their provisions and property, and that the desired effect was answered, so far as to prevent their securing so much as they would otherwise have done. The whole army was put in motion the moment the detachment moved off, and followed with as much rapidity as artillery and stores would admit of, to support the detachment; that the detachment of the 19th was made in consequence of repeated information of having discovered a trail of men, women, and children, and on the fullest assurance, as he was then informed, that the detachment was adequate for attacking the party they were in quest of a corps de reserve was ordered, but never came up. It was dark before information was brought to the General that the party were defeated, and a support could not be sent that night; a detachment was ordered to march next morning, but for what purpose, he could not say. The detachment of the 21st, he had every reason to believe, was made on the general system, viz: to find the enemy, and give them a check, to prevent their attacking and harassing the army on the retreat, and on that principle the detaching was inevitable; he did not know that any support was ordered; he was on the left, but he knew that the greater part of the detachment came in very soon after the intelligence of the defeat was brought, and it was too late for giving any assistance. He did not expect that the General would make a detachment to support them, after the repeated proofs that the militia would not stand, and he presumed the situation of the horses would not admit of returning with the army. He supposed the detachment calculated to cover itself, and doubtless would have happily succeeded, had the right and left columns obeyed the orders which it is said Major Wyllys had given. He knew of no one circumstance in the General's conduct, during the expedition, which ought to injure his reputation; and though the misfortunes of the 21st were to be lamented, yet he believed the salvation of the remainder of the army, the baggage, and stores, were due only to the making that detachment.

Question by the Court. On the arrival of the troops in camp, who were defeated on the 21st, do you think, from the state of mind the militia were in, that if the General had ordered the army back the militia would have gone?

Answer. I do not know whether they would or not, but if they had gone, and not having any place to retreat to, I am of opinion they would have fled as soon as they were attacked, and have left the federal troops to be sacrificed.

The court then adjourned to to-morrow morning nine o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 22.

The court having met according to adjournment, directed the recorder to write the following letter to his Excellency General St. Clair:

FORT WASHINGTON, September 22, 1791.

SIR:

I am directed by the court of inquiry, now sitting in this place, to inform your Excellency, that the court have gone through the examination of all the witnesses that have been adduced, and that those from Kentucky, that were referred to in your Excellency's letter to the president of the court, have not appeared; the court are now ready to close their proceedings, unless your Excellency has information of any further evidence being ready, of which the court beg to be informed.

I have the honor to be, with the most perfect respect, your Excellency's most obedient servant,  
WINSLOW WARREN, Recorder to the Court.

To his Excellency General Sr. CLAIR.

To which letter his Excellency General St. Clair sent the following answer:

FORT WASHINGTON, September 22, 1791.

SIR:

You will please to inform the court that I know of no evidences here, other than those that have been before them, and that it is not probable those from Kentucky will come forward; I therefore see no reason why the proceedings should not be closed.

I am, sir, your very humble servant,

AR. ST. CLAIR.

Mr. WARREN, Recorder to the Court of Inquiry.

Soon after the following letter was received:

SEPTEMBER 22, 1791.

SIR: Since I wrote to you a moment ago, I have been informed that it is probable more testimony will be offered to the court in the course of this day. If the court then have not already closed their proceedings, I wish they would be pleased to defer it until to-morrow morning, of which you will please to inform them.

I am, sir, your humble servant,

AR. ST. CLAIR.

Mr. WARREN.

To which the following answer was returned:

FORT WASHINGTON, *September 22, 1791.*

SIR: I am directed, by the president of the court of inquiry, to inform your Excellency, that, in consequence of the last letter with which you was pleased to honor them, they have adjourned, to meet to-morrow, 9 o'clock A. M.

I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient servant,

WINSLOW WARREN.

His Excellency General St. CLAIR.

The court then adjourned to September 23d, 9 o'clock, A. M.

SEPTEMBER 23d.

The court met, according to adjournment, and no further evidences appearing, came to a resolution to close their proceedings.

The court having deliberately considered the evidence before them, separately and aggregately, are unanimous in the following opinion:

First, That the personal conduct of the said Brigadier General Harmar was irreproachable.

Second, That the organization of the army was calculated to support harmony, and give mutual confidence to the several parts.

Third, That the order of march (a copy of which is annexed to these proceedings) was perfectly adapted to the country through which the army had to pass.

Fourth, That the order of encampment and battle (plans of which are also subjoined) were judicious, and well calculated to give security to the camp, energy to the troops in case of attack, and simple in its execution.

Fifth, That there were just reasons for the detachments of the 14th and 19th of October; that the detachment of the 21st was made on good principles, and had the designed effect of securing the return of the army, and preventing the enemy from harassing their rear. That the General had ordered support for the said detachment in time, but that his orders were not properly executed; and that the conduct of the said Brigadier General Josiah Harmar merits high approbation.

RICHARD BUTLER, *Major General, President.*

Attest, WINSLOW WARREN,  
*Lieutenant, and Adjutant to 2d United States Regiment, Recorder to the Court.*

The depositions No. 1, 2, 3, 4, have been handed in and read to the court; they have thought proper to subjoin them to their proceedings, for your Excellency's information.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Camp about thirty-one miles from Fort Washington, on the }  
Waters of the Little Miami, October 3, 1790. }

As the army is now assembled, the following line of march is to be observed, viz:

ORDER OF MARCH.

Spies and Guides.



Advance Company.




Pioneers.



McCullen's Battalion of Kentucky Militia.



FEDERAL TROOPS.




Ammunition.

Officers' Baggage, &c.

Flour and Salt.

Cattle.



Hall's Battalion of Kentucky Militia.



Rear Guard.




FLANK.  
Colonel Treby and Major Paul, Pennsylvania Militia.



FLANK.  
Major Ray's Battalion Kentucky Militia.




THE FOLLOWING IS THE ORDER OF ENCAMPMENT.




THE FOLLOWING IS THE ORDER OF BATTLE.

*In case of an Attack in Front.*




In case of an attack at night, the troops form inside the fires.

*In case of an attack on the Right Flank.*



*In case of an attack in Rear.*



*In case of an attack on the Left Flank.*

## No. 1.

*Territory of the United States Northwest of the river Ohio.*

Caleb Worley, of the county of Fayette, in the district of Kentucky, lieutenant in Colonel Paterson's battalion of Kentucky militia, maketh oath and saith: That this deponent served, as lieutenant, in a battalion of Kentucky militia, commanded by Major M'Mullen, on the late expedition undertaken against the savages of the Omece towns, and that he, this deponent, had very frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing with Brigadier General Harmar, who commanded the whole forces so employed. And this deponent saith, that he never did, to the best of his knowledge, see the said General Harmar in a state of intoxication, nor wanting in that duty and attention which he owed to the safety and order of the troops under his command. And further saith not.

C. WORLEY.

Sworn the fifth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, at Cincinnati, in the county of Hamilton, before me, George Turner, one of the judges in and over the territory aforesaid.

G. TURNER.

## No. 2.

*Territory of the United States Northwest of the river Ohio.*

John Thorp, superintendent of artificers, in the army of the United States, now serving at Fort Washington, in the county of Hamilton, maketh oath and saith: That he, this deponent, commanded the corps of pioneers on the late expedition against the Omece towns, under the command of Brigadier General Josiah Harmar; that, during the whole march of the forces so under the said General Harmar's command, both advancing and returning, it appeared to him, this deponent, that the said General conducted himself in a regular and truly military manner; that the General's department was, on all occasions, no less regular, becoming, and military, while in camp, than on the march, to the best of this deponent's knowledge and belief; and that, although it was a part of this deponent's duty to attend personally on the General early every morning, and also at the encampment every night, yet he, this deponent, does not remember that he ever perceived the said General Harmar in a state of intoxication during the whole expedition, but, on the contrary, verily believes that the said General Harmar's conduct, throughout the expedition, was marked with great sobriety and eminent vigilance.

JOHN THORP.

Sworn at Fort Washington, aforesaid, the twenty-seventh day of April, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, before me, one of the judges in and over the territory aforesaid.

G. TURNER.

## No. 3.

*Territory of the United States Northwest of the river Ohio, ss.*

William Wells, of the North Bend, in the county of Hamilton, Esquire, one of the judges of the common pleas held in and for the said county, and superintendent of commissary's stores during the late expedition against the Omece savages, being duly sworn, maketh oath, and saith as follows, that is to say: First, this deponent saith, that the duties of his late appointment, as superintendent aforesaid, required him to be about the person of the General commanding the troops on that expedition, every morning and night, and that the said commanding General (Josiah Harmar, Esquire) uniformly appeared to him, this deponent, in a state of sobriety, competent to the transaction of any business pertaining to his station. And further this deponent saith not.

WILLIAM WELLS.

Sworn at Cincinnati, in the county of Hamilton, and territory aforesaid, this nineteenth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, before me, George Turner, Esquire, one of the judges in and over the said territory.

## No. 4.

*The affidavit of Colonel John Hardin, taken in consequence of a court of inquiry to be held at Fort Washington, respecting the conduct of Brigadier General Harmar, on the expedition against the Maumee towns, in October, 1790.*

This deponent being first sworn, deposeth and saith: That, on his arrival with the Kentucky militia, at the mouth of Licking, he commenced an acquaintance with General Harmar; found, from his conversation, that he had the good of his country, and the expedition, very much at heart; business was carried on regular, and with as much expedition as the nature of the case would admit. About the first of October we proceeded on our march; after the line of march was formed, the General issued his orders regularly, and observed, very strictly, that they were executed. On our march there was an Indian prisoner taken, who gave information that the Indians and French were repairing the old fort at the Maumee town, and that the Indians were not likely to get any of the neighboring tribes to join them; this prisoner also informed us they did not know that General Harmar had any artillery. After receiving this information, the General, and this deponent, consulted upon the matter, and it was agreed to detach six hundred men, leaving all their heavy baggage, and march rapidly to the towns, hoping that the enemy would fly to their fort, provided the artillery was not discovered, and that six hundred rank and file would be sufficient to keep them in their fort until General Harmar arrived with the artillery and balance of the army. Accordingly, when the General was informed, by the guides, that they were within thirty or thirty-five miles of the towns, there was a detachment ordered to make ready, with all possible expedition. Those orders were so pleasing to the officers that they disputed who should go; and some cast lots, in order to settle the dispute. This deponent being honored with the command, left the General with his detachment, and saw him no more until he arrived at the Maumee village, which, he thinks, was about three or four days after he left him, during which time he heard no complaints of General Harmar. After the General's arrival at the Maumee village, and the Indians all fled, he expressed a very great desire to make his route by the Wea towns on the Wabash; for this purpose there was a council ordered to be held; but, before the council met, finding the Indians had stole, the night before, a number of the pack horses, and some of the light-horsemen's horses, there was a stop put to the business, and the thoughts of the route by the Wea towns laid aside. There was an old French captive that was taken, informed us that the Indians were scattered in the woods, and were not able by any means to fight us, and that they had not got any assistance from other tribes; this induced this deponent to solicit the General for a command of about three or four hundred men, to range the woods for ten or twelve miles, which he granted, and ordered the three hundred men to be furnished with three days' provisions. These orders were as pleasing to the officers and soldiers as the former. Colonel Trotter insisted he had been promised a command, and as it appeared this would be productive of something very clever, he wished to be indulged with the command of the detachment then ordered out; which was granted by the General, this deponent consenting thereto. Col. Trotter marched on the morning of the 18th of October, equipped for a tour of two or three days, in order to hunt up Indian camps. He returned on the evening of the same day, at the time the General and the deponent was about fixing of guards in order to captivate any of the enemy that might come to steal horses. The General appeared much displeased with the conduct of Colonel Trotter, and ordered the same party out again that

evening, and for this deponent to go next morning and take charge of them. This deponent, agreeable to the orders given, collected what he could of the party next morning, and after proceeding about ten miles, fell in with a party of Indians, who began a very brisk fire on the detachment, who retired without making but very little resistance, notwithstanding all exertions to prevent them. This deponent, when he returned to camp, informed the General what had happened—that it was owing to the cowardly behavior of the militia; and insisted on another party's being sent to the battle ground. The General informed this deponent he would let him know in the morning. Accordingly, he told him that he had not completed the object that he was ordered to do, and that, if any thing should happen to prevent him, he should be reflected on, as he had been in the possession of the towns so long, and had not destroyed them; that he would first give orders for that purpose, and then he would be better able to judge what was best to be done. On the morning of the 20th, orders were given for destroying of the towns, which was executed accordingly; at this time the men appeared more timid than before. The General told this deponent he thought it would not answer a good purpose to go to the battle ground, as the men's spirits appeared to be very low at the hearsay of so many men being killed, and that the sight of the mangled bodies would make them much more so, and the Indians, if not able to fight us, would be gone, and that he should give orders to take up the line of march to Fort Washington. Accordingly, on the morning of the 21st, we left the towns, and began our march for the mouth of Licking, in about eight or nine miles encamped. The night being very clear, and the moon giving light, this deponent informed the General, that he thought it would be a good opportunity to steal a march on the Indians, as he had reason to believe they returned to the towns as soon as they knew the army had left it. The General did not appear fond of sending a party back; but this deponent urged the matter, informing the General, that as he had been unfortunate the other day, he wished to have it in his power to pick the militia, and try it again, and at the same time endeavored to account for the men's not fighting, and desired an opportunity to retrieve the credit of the militia. The General appeared not to be of opinion the enemy would return so soon, but told this deponent he might take about one hundred men and go back. This deponent replied, he did not wish to go back with less than five or six hundred men; the General answered, that the troops were very much fatigued, and that it would not answer any valuable purpose to send so many men. This deponent then left the General. In about half an hour he was sent for, when the General informed him that he intended to send Major Wyllys back, with all the federal troops that could be spared, saying, at the same time, they were the men that would stand to the work, and that he wanted about one hundred of our best militia. After some conversation between the General and this deponent, the latter went to Major Wyllys, and told him he did not like his going back with so few men; the Major also thinking the number too few, wished this deponent to speak to the General on the subject, which was done. Major M'Mullen and Major Hall were then sent for, and the design made known to them; they both appeared well pleased with the affair. It was then proposed what number of men would be sufficient; this deponent recommending from four to six hundred; they both concluded that four hundred men was fully sufficient; the General seemed perfectly satisfied that any number of troops that were thought adequate to the purpose should be ordered; accordingly, four hundred men, consisting of sixty regulars, three hundred foot militia, and forty horsemen, rank and file, properly officered, were ordered to be ready to march at midnight. This deponent was honored with the command of the militia. The troops marched agreeable to orders, about two o'clock, and after proceeding to the towns, they fell in with a party of Indians; a battle ensued (the result of which is generally known) as they returned, about one and a half miles before we got to camp. This deponent sent a horseman forward to inform the General what was done; and very shortly after he had despatched this horseman, met Major Ray, with about thirty men, who informed him there had come a horseman into camp, and had acquainted the General that the party was nearly all cut off; that the General had sent him with what men he could get out of the militia, to meet what had escaped of the detachment; that those with him was all that would turn out. This deponent informed the Major otherwise, and requested him to wait until Major M'Mullen, Major Hall, and Major Ormsby, should come up; that they were but a small distance behind, and he would go forward to the General. When this deponent arrived at camp, and informed the General what was done, he appeared to be well satisfied: he also asked the General if he would not send back another party to keep possession of the battle ground; he replied he would not divide his army any more. When this deponent insisted on the whole army's marching back, (no person being present except the General, Major Doughty, and this deponent) the General answered—you see the situation of the army; we are now scarcely able to move our baggage; it will take up three days to go and return to this place; we have no more forage for our horses; and if the Indians intend to collect, which he apprehended they would, from their success on the 19th, it would give them a great opportunity; that they had got a very good scourging, and he would keep the army in perfect readiness to receive them, should they think proper to follow; and finally concluded, that, under the present circumstances, it was best to move forward to fort Washington, and if the Indians did follow, he would make every exertion in his power to defeat their intentions. Major Doughty appeared perfectly to agree with the General in opinion. The bounds of the camp were made less; the army continued at the same camp until next morning. Orders were given to march at the usual hour, which was eight o'clock; during this time this deponent never heard any person express a desire to go back to the towns, except two soldiers of Major Ray's party, by the names of Miller and Hammond. Next morning, at the hour appointed to march, the General moved with the front of the army, and halted at a very small distance, litters not being ready for all the wounded. This deponent, with the rear guard, and many others, did not leave the camp until ten o'clock, when they moved on and joined the army; the whole then proceeded on towards fort Washington, with as much regularity as was observed in going out, until we came to the old Chillicothe, on Little Miami, when a number of the militia, contrary to orders, fired off their guns. This deponent endeavored to put a stop to such disorderly behavior, and commanded that those offenders that could be taken should be punished agreeable to general orders; and having caught a soldier himself in the very act of firing his gun, ordered a file of men to take him immediately and carry him to the six pounder, and for the drummer to tie him up and give him six lashes; this deponent was shortly after met by Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen, and a number of militia soldiers, who in an abrupt manner asked him by what authority he ordered that soldier whipped; he replied, in support of general orders; on which a very warm dispute ensued between Colonel Trotter, Major M'Mullen, and this deponent. The General being informed of what had happened, came forward, and gave Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen a very severe reprimand, ordered the federal troops to parade, and the drummer to do his duty, swearing he would risk his life in support of his orders: the man received the number of lashes ordered, and several that were confined were set at liberty; numbers of the militia seemed much pleased with what was done. This intended mutiny being soon quashed, the army proceeded in good order to Fort Washington. When the army arrived at the mouth of Licking, the General informed this deponent he had determined to arrest some of the militia officers for their bad conduct, and send them home with disgrace; but this deponent opposed his intention, alleging that it would be a disgrace to the whole militia; that he would perhaps stand in need of their assistance on some future occasion, and it would sour their minds and cause them to turn out with reluctance; and that his discharging them generally with honor perhaps would answer a better purpose; the General readily indulged the request of this deponent. This deponent further observes, that during the expedition he never heard officer nor soldier find fault, or give the most distant hint of being displeased, with the General's conduct in any respect, nor charge him with cowardice or drunkenness, and expected the General had given general satisfaction; and what more confirmed his opinion, was, after their arrival at Fort Washington the General invited all the field and some other officers to dine with him, amongst whom was Colonel Trotter, Major Doughty, Major Hall, and Major M'Mullen; dinner being over, wine was introduced. The General stepping out on some occasion, Major Hall proposed drinking his health; it was unanimously agreed to, and with as much cheerfulness as any other health that was proposed; this deponent continued at Fort Washington a few days after, and never heard any person speak a disrespectful word of General Harmar, or find fault in the least with his conduct whilst on the expedition. When this deponent returned home in Kentucky, hearing such reports respecting the expedition, was much amazed, but concluded it arose from a want of knowledge and proper information, or from prejudice. This deponent further saith, that he looked on General Harmar to be a very brave and experienced officer. And further saith not.

JOHN HARDING,

NELSON, ss.

This day came Colonel John Hardin before me, a justice of the peace for said county, and made oath that the above affidavit was just and true, to the best of his knowledge, and subscribed his name in my presence. Given under my hand this fourteenth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one.

JOHN CALDWELL.

I have read the above affidavit, and what comes within my knowledge of it, I know to be true, and the rest I believe to be true. Given under my hand this fifteenth of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one.

STEPHEN ORMSBY.

Sworn to before me, a justice of the peace for Nelson county.

BENJAMIN FRYE.

2d CONGRESS.]

No. 5.\*

[1st SESSION.

CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE INDIANS, IN 1791, UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 8TH OF MAY, 1792.

Mr. FITZSIMONS, from the committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition under Major General St. Clair, reported that the committee had, according to order, proceeded to examine all the papers furnished by the Executive Department relative thereto, sundry papers and accounts furnished by the Treasury and War Departments, with explanations of the same by the heads of those departments in person, to hear the testimony of witnesses upon oath, and written remarks by General St. Clair, upon the facts established by the whole evidence, and that, as the result of their inquiries, the committee had agreed to the following report:

The contract for the supplies of the army on the route from Fort Pitt, was made by Theodosius Fowler, with the Secretary of the Treasury, and bears date the twenty-eighth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and ninety; that at the same time a bond, in the penalty of one hundred thousand dollars, with Walter Livingston and John Cochran, securities thereto, was entered into for the due execution of the contract.

That, on the third day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, the contract was wholly transferred from the said Fowler to William Duer, a copy of which transfer was lodged in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury; that, by letter from the Secretary of War, bearing date the twenty-fifth of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, addressed to William Duer, it appears that he was considered as the contractor; that no correspondence appears to have taken place subsequently to that time, between Theodosius Fowler and either the Treasury or War Departments; that, on the sixth day of March, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, a contract was entered into by William Duer with the Secretary at War, for supplying the troops with provisions until their arrival at Fort Pitt, and at Fort Pitt; a bond was at the same time entered into by the said William Duer for the due execution of the said contract, in the penalty of four thousand dollars, without any security whatsoever.

That the act making provision for the defence of the frontiers received the signature of the President of the United States the third of March, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one. That General St. Clair was appointed commander-in-chief of the army destined for the expedition on the fourth day of the same month, and on the twenty-eighth left Philadelphia for Fort Pitt, at which place he arrived the sixteenth day of April, and from thence proceeded to Lexington, and from thence to Fort Washington, where he arrived on the fifteenth day of May. At the time of the arrival of the General at Fort Washington, the garrison there consisted of seventy-five non-commissioned officers and privates fit for duty; the garrison at Fort Harmar of forty-five; at Fort Steuben of sixty-one; at Fort Knox of eighty-three; and on the fifteenth day of July the whole of the first United States' regiment, amounting to two hundred and ninety-nine non-commissioned officers and privates, arrived at Fort Washington, under orders from the commander in chief. General Butler was appointed the second in command, in the month of March, and immediately proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for the recruiting service; that he arrived in Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, the twentieth of April, and continued there till the thirtieth of the same month; that he arrived at Carlisle, in the State of Pennsylvania, on the ninth of May, and at Fort Pitt on the twenty-second of the same month. It appears that no moneys for purchasing supplies were furnished at Carlisle, which was the place of rendezvous, for the enlisted soldiery, on the ninth of May, and that Mr. Smith, agent for the contractor, was actively engaged in furnishing supplies for the troops, on credit.

It appears by letters from John Kean, another of the contractor's agents, that no moneys had been received by him on the eighth of May, and it appears that, on the twenty-third of March, there was advanced to William Duer, upon the last mentioned contract, from the treasury, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars; that there was advanced upon the first mentioned contract, the sum of seventy thousand dollars, in the following sums, and at the following dates, to wit:

March 22d,	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	Dollars.
April 7th,	-	-	-	-	-	15,000	do.
April 25th,	-	-	-	-	-	15,000	do.
May 7th,	-	-	-	-	-	20,000	do.
July 20th,	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	do.

It appears from the correspondence of General Butler with the Secretary of War, from the ninth of May to the ninth of June, repeated complaints were made of fatal mismanagements and neglects, in the quartermaster's and military stores department, particularly as to tents, knapsacks, camp kettles, cartridge boxes, packsaddles, &c. all of which articles were deficient in quantity and bad in quality.

The packsaddles, particularly, were made in Philadelphia, which, with the transportation, amounted to more than double the price at which they might have been procured at Fort Pitt, and were found, upon examination, to be unfit for use; the arms sent forward appear not to have been duly examined, and arrived at Fort Pitt extremely out of order, and many totally unfit for use, which circumstance rendered repairs absolutely necessary, and added to the delay of the troops at Fort Pitt.

It appears that a great proportion of the powder supplied for the use of the army, was not of good quality, though an experiment was made by Major Ferguson at Fort Pitt, with a howitzer, who reported in favor of the quality of the powder. On the ninth of June General Neville, another of the contractor's agents, informed General Butler that he had not, at that time, received any moneys from the contractors, for the purchase of provisions, &c. for the troops, and was obliged to supply them on credit; that the country furnished provisions in abundance at a cheap rate, when money was had for the purchase. That, shortly after this information was communicated to General Butler, at his request four hundred dollars were advanced to General Neville by the quartermaster, for the purchase of provisions for the troops. The troops arrived at Fort Pitt in the following order, to wit:

\* See Nos. 6 and 9.



May 16th. Captain Slough sixty-nine men;

May 18th. Captain Powers seventy-eight men;

May 19th. Captain Cribbs forty men; same day, Captain Guthrie twenty-three;

May 25th. Captain Armstrong seventy-six; same day, Captain Kirkwood sixty-seven;

May 28th. Captain Snowden one hundred and one;

June 2d. Captain Sparks eighty-three;

June 3d. Captain Butler sixty-one; same day, Captain Brock eighty-two; same day, Captain Vanswearingen eighty-eight;

June 5th. Captain Pike seventy-three; total, including officers and privates, eight hundred and forty-two; and left that place in the following order: Major Ferguson, with Captain Armstrong's company, about the first of June; Captain Snowden, with the troops under his command, on the—day of—; Major Gaither, with about five hundred men, 12th of July; and on the 22d August the last of the troops under the command of Captain Phelon, and General Butler, with the Quartermaster General, on the 26th of August.

It appears, that General Butler had orders from the Department of War to protect the frontiers with the troops under his command, and that the delays in sending forward the troops from Fort Pitt arose partly from that circumstance, and partly from the temporary want of supplies of provisions and other necessaries, and from the want of the necessary boats for their transportation, which were not in readiness as soon as the troops were. It appears, that General Butler acted with ability, activity, and zeal, in his command at Fort Pitt, and that the delays of the troops there cannot be imputed to his want of judgment, or his want of exertion.

The troops met with considerable difficulties and delays in going down the river from the low state of the water, and arrived at Fort Washington in the following order. Captain Mumford, from North Carolina, with about fifty men on the—day of—; Major Ferguson, with Capt. Armstrong's company, on the—day of—; Major Gaither, with the troops under his command, on the—day of—; Colonel Darke, with the troops under his command, on the—day of—; and the Kentucky militia on the—day of—.

The army, consisting of about two thousand non-commissioned officers and privates, moved from Fort Washington, by orders from the commander in chief, to a place about five or six miles from thence, called Ludlow's station, where they continued till the seventeenth day of September, at which time the whole army amounted to about two thousand three hundred non-commissioned officers and privates fit for duty. That, the price of rations at Fort Washington, agreeably to contract, was  $6\frac{2}{90}$ ths of a dollar per ration; the price of rations at Ludlow's station was  $15\frac{3}{90}$ ths of a dollar per ration.

That the inducements of the commander in chief to this movement appear to have been to furnish *green* forage for the horses and beef cattle of the army, to instruct the soldiery in field exercise, and other necessary discipline, and to deprive them of the means of intoxication, which were very plentifully supplied at Fort Washington, and used to an excessive degree by the soldiery, to correct the excessive use of which the most rigid attention to discipline was found incompetent.

Mr. Hodgdon was appointed Quartermaster General in the month of March, and continued at Philadelphia until the 4th of June, he then proceeded to Fort Pitt, where he arrived the tenth of the same month. No sufficient causes have appeared to the committee to justify this delay, and his presence with the army appears to have been essentially necessary previously to that time; the duties of the commander in chief were much increased in consequence of the absence of the Quartermaster General, and after a continued expectation of his arrival at Fort Washington, for more than six weeks, the commander in chief gave him express orders, by letter, to repair to camp without delay.

The receipt of the letter is acknowledged, but the orders contained therein were neither answered nor obeyed, and his arrival at camp was not until the tenth of September. The commander in chief, until that time, in addition to the duties of his office, discharged those of the Quartermaster General, and the military stores furnished by that department were so deficient, from mismanagement and neglect, that many things essential to the movements of the army were either wholly made or repaired at Fort Washington, and even the tools for the artificers to work with: the Quartermaster particularly informed the commander in chief that two complete travelling forges were sent forward, and, upon examination, both of them were found to be without an anvil; many other things equally necessary were either wholly omitted, or unfit for their intended use. There were six hundred and seventy-five stand of arms at Fort Washington the first of June, and most of those totally out of repair. The commander in chief appears to have been correct and attentive in all his communications with the Secretary of War, and to have discharged the various duties which devolved upon him with ability, activity, and zeal.

The army moved from Ludlow's station on the seventeenth day of September, and arrived at the place where Fort Hamilton is now erected, on the—day of—; they employed about fifteen days building that fort, and then proceeded in their march to the place where Fort Jefferson is now erected, forty-four miles distant from Fort Hamilton, where they arrived on the twelfth day of October, and commenced their march from that place on the 24th of the same month; that the army at this time consisted of about 1700 non-commissioned officers and privates fit for duty; at this time the army had not more than three days' supply of flour, and were sometimes at one fourth, and sometimes at one half, allowance of that article, the deficiencies of which allowance were made up by increasing the quantity of beef, with which they were plentifully supplied. The army was delayed five or six days, on the march from Fort Jefferson, for the want of provisions, and the season was so far advanced that sufficient green forage for the horses could not be procured, from which circumstance many of the horses were totally lost, and others rendered unfit for service.

The orders to the commander in chief to proceed with the expedition were express and unequivocal, so much so as, in the opinion of the committee, to preclude the commander in chief from exercising any discretion relatively to that object.

On the 31st of October, about sixty of the Kentucky militia deserted in a body, and the first regiment, consisting of about three hundred effective men, was detached with a view to cover a convoy of provisions which was expected, and which it was supposed was in danger from the deserted militia, and to prevent farther desertions.

On the third of November, after detaching the first regiment, the army consisted of about fourteen hundred effective men, and on the morning of the fourth, about half an hour before sunrise, a general attack was commenced, and in a few minutes thereafter, nearly the whole army was surrounded by the enemy; the action continued about four hours, during which several charges were made by part of the army, which caused the enemy to give way, but produced no good effect; the attack was unexpected, the troops having been just dismissed from the morning parade: it commenced upon the militia who were in advance of the main army, and who fled through the main army, without firing a gun; this circumstance threw the troops into some disorder, which, it appears, they never completely recovered during the action; the fire of the army was constant, but not well directed, and it appears that a part of the troops behaved as well as could be expected from their state of discipline, and the manner and suddenness of the attack; the commander in chief appears to have been cool and deliberate in the whole of the action, and the officers in general active and intrepid; the whole order of march, as far as the committee are capable of expressing an opinion, appears to have been judicious, and the ground for action well chosen; the retreat was disorderly in the extreme; after it commenced no orders were obeyed, if any were given, the men having lost all regard to discipline or control; all the precautions appear to have been taken for the safety and comfort of the wounded, which the circumstances of the case would admit of.

The committee have had no competent evidence before them to ascertain the number of the enemy in action; there were various conjectures as to the number from different persons, from five hundred the lowest, to one thousand or twelve hundred the highest.

Mr. Barton, a witness examined by the committee, conversed with a chief at Niagara, who was in the action, and was by him informed, that the number of the enemy in action was one thousand and forty, and that six hundred more had convened, but were engaging in hunting at the time of the action. He was also informed that the enemy had not collected in any considerable numbers, until a few days before the action. This information appears to be corroborated by some other circumstances, sufficient to induce a belief of the fact in the committee.

The contractors for supplies, agreeably to the terms of contract, were to furnish horses, &c. for the transportation of the supplies; in this condition of the contract there was a total failure, which compelled the commander in chief to direct between six and seven hundred horses to be purchased by Israel Ludlow, one of the contractor's agents, to draw bills on Mr. Duer, the acting contractor for payment, which bills were endorsed by the commander in chief, to the amount of about seventeen thousand dollars, were protested by the contractor, and paid at the treasury; the persons employed by the agents of the contractor to drive the horses appear to have been totally unacquainted with that business, and from the want of bells, hobbles, and other necessaries of that kind, as well as from other gross mismanagement, many of the horses were lost, and others rendered unfit for service; from which causes there were not packhorses sufficient to transport the necessary quantity of flour from Fort Washington for the use of the army on their march; this circumstance retarded the execution of the expedition.

The officers, agreeably to the terms of contract, had an election of drawing the whole of the rations, to which their rank entitled them, or of receiving the contract price of them in cash; the contractor's agents, not being furnished with money for this purpose, gave rise to a general order, by which the officer was directed to receive a certificate from the contractor's agent, called a due bill, of one of which bills the following is a copy: "Due Major H. Gaither, one hundred and seventy-three complete rations on the route to Miami village, as appears by Mr. Wilson's certificate."

FORT WASHINGTON, *November 27th, 1791.*

MATT. EARNEST, for WM. DUER.

This due bill issued upon the officers signing some acknowledgment of satisfaction for his whole retained rations, which acknowledgment of satisfaction forms a voucher for settlement to the contractor, with the treasury department; and the officer is refused payment for these due bills at the pay-office. All casualties, by which these evidences of debt become lost or destroyed, are the gain of the contractor, and the loss of the officer.

It is suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, though not with positive certainty, that a sufficient sum will be found due from the treasury to the contractors, upon a final settlement, to cover all these debts to the officers; the general order, which had the operation before stated, continued in force about five or six weeks, and was abolished about the 19th of October. The privates of the levies received but three dollars pay each, from the time of their respective enlistments, to the time of their respective discharges, and were actually discharged without pay or settlement; notes of discharge were given them, specifying the time of their service, and bearing endorsements, that some advancements had been made to them in account, without stating the amount, the object of which is suggested to have been to prevent transfers; the intended effect was not produced by the measure; the notes were sold for trifling considerations, the real sums due on the notes were various, from ten to twenty-five dollars, and they were frequently sold for one dollar, or one gallon of whiskey; the moneys for the pay of the levies did not leave Philadelphia till the 4th of December, nor arrive at Fort Washington till the 3d of January, 1792, some time after the last enlisted levies were known to be entitled to their discharges; two reasons have been assigned by the Secretary of War for this delay of payment, the one, because there was no regular paymaster to the army, and the difficulties of transmitting moneys to the army at so great a distance, in consequence of the want of such an officer; the other, because it was supposed the army would be, at that time at the Miami village, so far advanced in the wilderness, as not to admit of the practicability of discharging the levies, the total defeat of the army not having been previously counted upon.

The clothing for the levies appears to have been of a very inferior quality, particularly coats, hats, and shoes, the last of which, in many cases, lasted not more than four days, and better clothing was furnished them upon their enlisting into the regular service, which was for a time countenanced by the commander in chief.

Various modes appear to have been pursued by the officers in enlisting the levies, which occasioned great uneasiness and some confusion; a considerable part of the Virginia battalion was so enlisted, that the terms of their enlistments appear to have expired the first of November; the orders to the recruiting officers appear not to have been sufficiently explicit upon this point, whether the terms of enlistment were to commence at the time of enlistment, or at the arrival at a place of rendezvous. The militia appear to have been composed principally of substitutes, and totally ungovernable, and regardless of military duty or subordination. It appears that the commander in chief had it in contemplation to commence the expedition at least one month earlier than it was commenced, with the force he then had, which was not very different from the real force in action; but was prevented for the want of the quartermaster and contractor, and in consequence of the extreme deficiencies and derangements of the business of those departments, the person sent forward by the Quartermaster being totally incompetent for the business, and the contractor's agents not being sufficiently supplied with money to enable them to execute their duties.

It appears to the committee, that, in the wilderness, where vegetables are not to be had, and the duties of the soldier uncommonly hard, the rations allowed by law, if completely supplied, are insufficient. This circumstance, with others, produced discontent and desertion among the soldiers.

It appears to the committee, that there were appropriated for the use of the War Department, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, the sum of six hundred and fifty-two thousand seven hundred and sixty-one dollars and sixty-one cents, and that there have been advanced by the treasury to the War Department, upon that appropriation, five hundred and seventy-five thousand nine hundred and six dollars and fifty-seven cents, to wit:

						Dolls.	Cts.
1791	February	advanced	-	-	-	-	15,000 00
"	March,	do.	-	-	-	-	46,002 20
"	April,	do.	-	-	-	-	100,106 20
"	May,	do.	-	-	-	-	80,109 80
"	June,	do.	-	-	-	-	55,387 44
"	July,	do.	-	-	-	-	14,105 39
"	August,	do.	-	-	-	-	14,554 59
"	September,	do.	-	-	-	-	14,796 53
"	October,	do.	-	-	-	-	184 81
"	November,	do.	-	-	-	-	107 28
1792	January,	do.	-	-	-	-	33,753 00
"	February,	do.	-	-	-	-	43,562 61
"	March,	do.	-	-	-	-	1,741 16

Amounting to, 419,311 01

To which add moneys borrowed from the Bank of North America, on loan, without interest, 156,595 56

575,906 57

And that the treasury has always been in readiness to make the requisite advances upon the request of the Secretary of War. It does not appear to the committee, in what manner, and to what amount, these advancements have been disbursed, the accounts not having been yet settled at the treasury; nor was it possible, from the nature of the case, that they could, at this time, have received any conclusive or satisfactory information on that point.

From the foregoing state of facts, the committee suggest the following as the principal causes, in their opinion, of the failure of the late expedition under Major General St. Clair.

The delay in furnishing the materials and estimates for, and in passing the act for the protection of the frontiers; the time, after the passing of which, was hardly sufficient to complete and discipline an army for such an expedition, during the summer months of the same year.

The delays consequent upon the gross and various mismanagements and neglects in the Quartermaster's and contractors' departments; the lateness of the season at which the expedition was undertaken, the green forage having been previously destroyed by the frost, so that a sufficiency of subsistence for the horses necessary for the army could not be procured.

The want of discipline and experience in the troops.

The committee conceive it but justice to the commander in chief, to say, that, in their opinion, the failure of the late expedition can, in no respect, be imputed to his conduct, either at any time before or during the action; but that as his conduct in all the preparatory arrangements was marked with peculiar ability and zeal, so his conduct during the action furnished strong testimonies of his coolness and intrepidity.

The committee suggest, as reasons for leaving the numbers of troops, at particular periods, and the dates of some facts blank, the want of sufficient time to complete the report with minuteness, and, in some instances, the want of necessary evidence.

The said report being read,

*Resolved*, That this House will, early in the next session, proceed to take the same into consideration.

2d CONGRESS.]

No. 6.\*

[2d SESSION.]

## ST. CLAIR'S DEFEAT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NOVEMBER 14, 1792.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 1st November, 1792.

SIR:

After the close of the late session of Congress, I saw, with much concern, the report of the committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the expedition under Major General St. Clair, of the 8th of May, 1792, which, having been presented to the House, in the last moments of its session, was ordered to be printed, and has since circulated in the public newspapers throughout the United States, containing suggestions, most of them founded upon *ex parte* investigation, which have been understood in a sense very injurious to my reputation.

Learning that the present day was appointed for taking into consideration the above mentioned report, I have waited, with anxious expectation, for some act of the House enabling me to attend the progress of the examination upon which they are about to enter, for the purpose of furnishing such information and explanations as might conduce to a right understanding of facts, in which I am so materially implicated. The failure of a proposition which, I am informed, was made to the House, with that view, has added to my solicitude and regret. Thus situated, I feel myself called upon to ask of the justice of the House, that some mode may be devised, by which it will be put into my power to be present, during the course of the intended inquiry, as well to hear the evidence on which the several allegations contained in the report are founded, as to offer the information and explanations to which I have alluded. To this step I am impelled by a persuasion that an accurate and satisfactory investigation cannot otherwise be had, with equal advantage, if at all. And my entire reliance upon the equity and impartiality of the House will not permit a doubt to exist, on my part, that such an investigation will be exclusively the object of their desire and pursuit.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest respect, your most obedient, humble servant,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

The SPEAKER of the Honorable the House of Representatives of the United States.

2d CONGRESS.]

No. 7.

[2d SESSION.]

## ESTIMATES FOR THE YEAR 1793.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 12, 1792.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 11, 1792.

SIR:

The President of the United States has directed me to submit to the House of Representatives, in pursuance of their resolve of the 4th instant, the enclosed papers containing certain materials whereon the estimate of the contingencies of the War Department, for the year 1793, has been founded; and, also, the explanation of certain heads of articles in the general estimate, called "conjectural."

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

The SPEAKER of the Honorable House of Representatives of the United States.

*Of the contingencies of the War Department, for the year 1793.*

In estimating the expenses of any given corps of troops, in a stationary situation, or upon a peace establishment, every probable demand may be foreseen, specified, and calculated. But, in estimating the expenses of an army, in the time of war, designed for offensive operations, the case is materially otherwise. For, after all the stated and probable expenses are estimated, there ought to be an allowance either to make up for short estimates of the several heads of supplies, or to serve as a fund to defray moderate losses by casualties.

\* See Nos. 5 and 9.

All active armies are liable to the loss of provisions, the means of transportation, ammunition, clothing, &c., by numerous accidents attending on a state of war. But, in the case contemplated in the estimates, the chance of such accidents is greatly increased by the subtlety and activity of the enemy, and our ignorance of the wilderness in which the troops may operate.

It has generally been considered as wise to appropriate a sum for casualties, to be applied to the public service in case of necessity. If no such case occurs, no expenditure will take place, and, of course, the money will remain in the treasury. But, if no contingent fund be appropriated, the operations of an army may be arrested at a critical moment, and the army itself lost, or the public service greatly injured, for the want of means which might be acquired, if authority and provision existed for the purpose.

But futurity being inscrutable to the limited faculties for man, he is unable to ascertain the form or value of demands which have not, and which never may have, any existence.

All that can possibly be done, in the present case, is to exhibit the expenses of the late campaigns, and thence to infer the sum which may be judged proper to appropriate for the contingencies of the future, the strength and time of service of the relative armies being duly considered.

It will appear, by paper No 1. that the claims for allowance, and the accounts actually settled, at the treasury, for the loss of horses, arms, &c. in the expedition under General Harmar, amount to seventeen thousand eight hundred and sixty-four dollars two cents, for which sum an appropriation was contemplated, by the act of the 11th day of February, 1791, embracing one hundred thousand dollars, for the said expedition.

The estimates presented for the services of 1791 were embraced by two appropriations, the first of the 11th day of February, 1791, for fifteen thousand three hundred and six dollars, including the sum of ten thousand three hundred and six dollars, for the Quartermaster's department.

The other, of the 3d day of March, 1791, for twenty-five thousand dollars, amounting, in all, for the said year, to forty thousand three hundred and six dollars.

The stores and other property lost in the defeat of the 4th of November, 1791, as stated in the paper No. 2, amount to thirty-two thousand eight hundred and ten dollars and seventy-five cents.

In addition to these losses, it appears, by paper No. 3, that the contractors have a claim at the treasury for provisions and horses, amounting to fifty-four thousand six hundred and thirteen dollars and thirty-five cents, of which, perhaps, the sum of ten thousand dollars may be estimated for contingencies, the articles having fallen into the hands of the enemy. Whether this sum will exceed, or fall short of, the allowances which shall be made, will depend upon the proofs which shall be produced at the treasury.

The other contingent expenses, for the year 1791, are contained in paper No. 4, amounting to nine thousand six hundred and twenty-one dollars and twenty cents.

The total expenditures made, and allowances claimed, under the head of contingencies, for the year 1791, will probably amount to fifty-two thousand four hundred and thirty-one dollars ninety-five cents.

The estimates for the services of the year 1792 also specified two sums for the contingencies of the War Department. The first, of twenty thousand dollars, was authorized by the act which passed the 23d day of December, 1791, entitled "An act for making appropriations for the support of Government, for the year 1792."

The other sum of thirty thousand dollars was authorized by the act which passed the 2d day of May, 1792, entitled "An act for raising a further sum of money for the protection of the frontiers, and for other purposes therein mentioned," both sums amounting to fifty thousand dollars.

The expenses already under this head are contained in paper No. 5, amounting to ten thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars nine cents.

It is to be observed, that the fund appropriated to the Indian department having been exhausted by goods given, and payments made, to the Creeks, the Cherokees, the Choctaws, and Chickasaws, and also to the Six Nations, that, in addition to the above sum, expended in the year 1792, as contingencies, twenty-four thousand seven hundred and seven dollars and ninety-eight cents has been applied to the Indian department.

The expenses of the Indian department are, at this critical period, as difficult to be previously calculated as those of the army, excepting the stipulated sums to the Creeks, Cherokees, and Six Nations, and the agents employed to the several tribes. Besides the said expenditures, the contractors of the present year lost, about the 5th of October last, one hundred horses, said to be captured by the Indians. If they prove this they will be entitled to an allowance by the terms of their contract.

Hence it will appear, that the sum of fifty thousand dollars, requested to be appropriated for the year 1793, is not inordinate.

For the sums which shall be expended vouchers will be required, in the usual manner of other accounts, excepting, always, the sums which may be expended, by the commanding general, for secret services, in which it would be prejudicial to the public interests to disclose names. But this sum is not large, and his reputation stands pledged to the public for its just appropriation.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

[2d CONGRESS.]

No. 8.

[2d SESSION.]

## ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY IN 1792.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, DECEMBER 27, 1792.

The President of the United States, by virtue of the powers vested in him by law, hereby establishes the following organization of the troops of the United States:

The commissioned officers hereinafter designated, together with the non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, authorized by law, amounting to 5,120, are to be denominated—

THE LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES, which is to be divided into four sub-legions.

### THE LEGIONARY STAFF.

One Major General, or Legionary General,  
Two Aids-de-camp,  
One Adjutant and Inspector,  
One Major Commandant of Cavalry,  
One Major Commandant of Artillery,

One Quartermaster,  
One Deputy Quartermaster,  
One Surgeon,  
One Chaplain.

## THE SUB-LEGIONS.

Each Sub-legend to consist of the Officers hereinafter named, and 1,280 non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, and Privates, to wit:

## STAFF.

One Brigadier, or Sub-Legionary General, One Quartermaster,  
One Aid-de-camp, One Surgeon.  
One Brigade, or Sub-Legionary Major and Inspector,

*One Troop of Dragoons, consisting of*

One Captain, One Farrier,  
One Lieutenant, One Saddler,  
One Cornet, One Trumpeter,  
Six Sergeants, Sixty-five Dragoons.  
Six Corporals,

*One Company of Artillery, to consist of*

One Captain, Four Corporals,  
Two Lieutenants, Two Music,  
Four Sergeants, Fifty Privates, including ten Artificers.

*Two Battalions of Infantry, and one Battalion of Riflemen, each consisting of*

One Major, One Sergeant Major,  
One Adjutant, One Quartermaster Sergeant,  
One Quartermaster, One Senior Musician, and  
One Surgeon's Mate,

*Four Companies, each to consist of*

One Captain, Six Corporals,  
One Lieutenant, Two Music,  
One Ensign, Eighty-one Privates.  
Six Sergeants,

N. B. The Rifle Companies, one Bugler and eighty-two Privates.

One Troop of Dragoons, - - -	80
One Company of Artillery, - - -	60
Four Companies of Rifle, (95 each) - - -	380
Eight Companies of Infantry, (95 each,) - - -	760
Aggregate, - - -	1,280
	4
The Legion of the United States, non-commissioned Officers and Privates, - - -	5,120

*Summary view of the General, Field, Commissioned, and Staff Officers, of the Legion of the United States:*

## GENERAL STAFF.

One Major General, or Legionary General, One Quartermaster,  
Four Brigadiers General, or Sub-Legionary Gen- One Deputy Quartermaster,  
erals, One Surgeon,  
One Adjutant, One Chaplain.

*Field.*

Fourteen Majors, commissioned, Forty-eight Ensigns,  
Fifty-six Captains, Four Cornets.  
Sixty Lieutenants,

*Medical Staff.*

Four Surgeons, Six Surgeons' Mates, for Garrison duty and  
Twelve Surgeons' Mates, extra service.

N. B. The Aids-de-camps are included in the number of commissioned Officers.

The particular companies and Officers, who shall form the several Sub-Legions, respectively, will be pointed out to Major General Wayne, in subsequent instructions, after the President of the United States shall have approved the same.

## CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE INDIANS IN 1791, UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 15, 1793.

Mr. GILES, from the committee to whom was re-committed the report of the committee, appointed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the expedition under Major General St. Clair, together with the documents relating thereto, including the letter from the Secretary of War, and the memorial of Samuel Hodgdon, have proceeded to re-examine the documents formerly before them, as far as seemed necessary; to hear and examine other testimony produced to them; to hear and consider the written communications, made by the Secretary of War, Samuel Hodgdon, and the commander in chief of the expedition; and, as the result of their further inquiries, made the following supplementary report:

The original report commences in the following words:

"The contract for the supplies of the army, on the route from Fort Pitt, was made by Theodosius Fowler with the Secretary of the Treasury, and bears date the twenty-eighth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and ninety; that, at the same time, a bond, in the penalty of one hundred thousand dollars, with Walter Livingston and

John Cochran securities thereto, was entered into for the due execution of the contract; that, on the third day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, the contract was wholly transferred from the said Fowler to William Duer, a copy of which transfer was lodged in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury; that, by letter from the Secretary of War, bearing date the twenty-fifth day of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, addressed to William Duer, it appears that he was considered as contractor; that no correspondence appears to have taken place subsequently to that time between Theodosius Fowler and either the Treasury or War Departments."

From documents received by the committee, since their last appointment, it appears, that the copy of the before mentioned transfer was not lodged in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, until the seventh of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one; at which time it was received by the Secretary of the Treasury, under cover of a letter from William Duer, informing him of the circumstance of the said transfer, and making requisitions for certain advances of money; that the Secretary of the Treasury, by letter in reply of the same date, agrees to make the advances required to William Duer, *as the agent of Theodosius Fowler*.

It appears that all the warrants issued from the Treasury, for the purposes of this contract, were issued to William Duer, as the agent of Theodosius Fowler.

The Secretary of the Treasury has furnished the committee with the written opinions of the Attorney General of the United States, and several other lawyers of eminence, all of whom concur in opinion, that the securities to the bond, originally given by Theodosius Fowler, for the execution of this contract, are now responsible for all damages consequent upon any breach of that contract.

The Secretary of War, who alone appears to have been the agent, on the part of the United States, in all things relating to the execution of the contract has always corresponded with William Duer as the contractor, and his correspondence commences at a date prior to that of the copy of the contract lodged at the treasury.

The original report proceeds:—

"That, on the sixth of March, one thousand seven and ninety-one, a contract was entered into by William Duer with the Secretary of War, for supplying the troops with provisions until their arrival at Fort Pitt, and at Fort Pitt. A bond was, at the same time, entered into by the said William Duer for the due execution of the said contract, in the penalty of four thousand dollars, without any security whatsoever."

It appears, by a re-examination of the documents formerly before the committee, that the date and terms of the last mentioned contract were misrepresented; the date being the twenty-sixth, instead of the sixth, of April, and the terms of the contract being to furnish provisions for the troops until their arrival at Fort Pitt, but not during their continuance at that place. The first of these mistakes appears to have been merely casual; the second appears to have arisen from paying greater attention to the manner in which the contract was really executed, than to the terms of the contract itself; it having been conceived, by the committee, that Colonel Neville, the agent for supplying the troops during their continuance at Fort Pitt, acted under the last mentioned contract. This circumstance is rendered the less material, from the consideration that, according to the plan of the campaign, no delay of the troops at Fort Pitt was counted upon. The statement is otherwise correct.

The Secretary of War, in his communication, states, that it was not the custom of the office to require other security than that of the contractor, for the due execution of contracts of small amount; and it appears, by a letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, written since the former report, that the Secretary of War consulted with him upon the occasion alluded to, and that he agreed in opinion, that farther security was not necessary.

It is stated in the original report, after speaking of one of the contractor's agents, that

"It appears by letters from John Kean, another of the contractor's agents, that no moneys had been received by him on eighth of May, and it appears that, on the 23d of March, there was advanced to William Duer, on the last mentioned contract, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars."

Upon re-examining the letters of John Kean, it appears that he had received the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars, and no more, before the aforesaid eighth day of May, which was before overlooked by the committee. And it appears, from documents received by the committee since their report, that the sum of fifteen thousand dollars was not advanced to William Duer, on account of the last mentioned contract, on the 23d of March. The committee were led into this mistake, by a document received from the Treasurer, representing the fact as stated in the original report, which document is still before the committee. The true state of this transaction, as recently stated, appears to be as follows:

A warrant issued in favor of Joseph Howell, on the twenty-third of March, for the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, for the use of the War Department generally, and not for William Duer, as stated in the account rendered by the Treasurer: of which sum, were advanced to William Duer, on the twenty-sixth of March, four thousand dollars; on the eighth day of May following, were paid to James Smith, contracting agent for William Duer, one thousand dollars; and between the twenty-first of May and the twenty-third of July, were paid to John Kean, another agent for William Duer, four hundred and thirty-seven dollars and ninety-one cents; making the whole sum advanced on the last mentioned contract, five thousand four hundred and thirty-seven dollars and ninety-one cents. The residue of the fifteen thousand dollars is suggested to have been applied to the use of the War Department generally.

The original report states, that

"It appears from the correspondence of General Butler, from the ninth of May to the ninth of June, repeated complaints were made of fatal mismanagements and neglects, in the Quartermaster's and military stores' departments, particularly as to tents, knapsacks, camp kettles, cartridge boxes, packsaddles, &c. all of which articles were deficient in quantity, and bad in quality. The packsaddles, particularly, were made in Philadelphia, which, with the transportation, amounted to more than double the price at which they might have been procured at Fort Pitt, and were found, upon examination, to be unfit for use."

Mr. Hodgdon has produced to the Committee a number of ex-parte affidavits and certificates, to prove, that these several articles were furnished in sufficient quantities, and of good quality. Most of these affidavits, however, were made by the manufacturers of the respective articles, or persons in the employment of Mr. Hodgdon, and generally written in a different hand writing from that of the subscribing deponents; and most of the certificates, by persons unknown to the committee. But the testimony formerly taken by the committee, and the corroboration of it by the evidence of respectable and disinterested persons, lately taken by the committee, in presence of Mr. Hodgdon, appears abundantly sufficient to justify the statement of facts contained in the original report. With respect to the packsaddles, however, it is necessary to remark, that some qualification of the expression used in the original report would be proper. They appear to have been made of different sizes: those of the largest size are proved to have been wholly unfit for use, the horses used for packhorses being generally small. Some of the smaller packsaddles, however, appear to have been used in the campaign, and to have answered the intended purpose better than was at first expected.

It is stated in the original report, that

"The arms sent forward appear not to have been duly examined, and arrived at Fort Pitt extremely out of order, and many totally unfit for use, which circumstance rendered repairs absolutely necessary, and added to the delay of the troops at Fort Pitt."

The committee are led to conclude, from authentic information recently received, that the complaint of the arms intended for the regular troops and levies is unfounded; some of the arms appear to have been damaged, after they were put into the hands of the troops, from their inexperience or carelessness, though delivered to them in good order.

The committee were induced to make the unqualified statement contained in the original report, from the unqualified manner in which this subject is spoken of by some of the witnesses, formerly examined by the committee;

they not having stated, with sufficient precision, the causes of the arms being out of repair, nor specifying the probable number requiring repairs.

The original report proceeds with the following expression:

"It appears, that a great proportion of the powder, supplied for the use of the army, was not of good quality, though an experiment was made by Major Ferguson, at Fort Pitt, with a howitzer, who reported in favor of the quality of the powder."

The committee are satisfied, from experiments made since the original report by Captain Ford, at Fort Washington, upon request of the Secretary of War, and by samples of the powder from thence, actually furnished the committee, that the powder was originally of good quality; but that a certain quantity of it was damaged by exposure to the air and moisture after being issued to the troops. And it appears to have been powder of this description, upon which experiments were made by some of the officers in the expedition, which produced unfavorable impressions as to the quality of the powder in general; for it is certain, a belief was currently entertained amongst the officers, that the powder in general was not of good quality. The insufficiency of the powder, after the army took the field, is accounted for from the bad quality of the tents. It is in testimony to the committee, that great quantities of the fixed ammunition were actually rendered useless from that cause.

It is stated in the original report, that

"Mr. Hodgdon was appointed Quartermaster General in the month of March, and continued at Philadelphia until the 4th of June, he then proceeded to Fort Pitt, where he arrived on the 10th of the same month. No sufficient causes have appeared to the committee to justify this delay, and his presence with the army appeared to have been essentially necessary previously to that time."

In this statement, the duration of Mr. Hodgdon's stay at Fort Pitt was casually omitted, which appears to have been from the tenth of June till the twenty-sixth of August. The insertion of this fact will sufficiently explain the sense of the committee, in the inference respecting the time, in which the presence of the Quartermaster General was necessary at the army.

It is stated in the original report, that

"There were six hundred and seventy-five stand of arms, at Fort Washington, on the first of June, and most of those totally out of repair."

These arms, the precise number of which appears not to be accurately ascertained, are admitted, by the Secretary of War, to have been at Fort Washington, in the situation described, but he suggests, that they were old and useless arms, which had been collected at that place, and were not counted upon as any part of the supply of arms for the expedition. It appears, that the regular troops and levies were completely supplied with arms, without recurrence to this stock; but a number of them was repaired, by orders of the commander in chief of the expedition, with a view, as he suggests, to arm the militia from Kentucky, who, it was expected, would arrive either insufficiently armed, or not armed at all: and he did not conceive the arrangements made by the War Department competent to arming the militia, together with the other troops.

The original report states, that

"The privates of the levies received but three dollars pay each, from the time of their respective enlistments to the time of their respective discharges, and were actually discharged without farther pay or settlement; notes of discharge were given them, specifying the time of their service, and bearing endorsements, that some advances had been made to them on account, without stating the amount, the object of which is suggested to have been to prevent transfers; the intended effect was not produced by the measure; the notes were sold for trifling considerations, the real sums due on the notes were various, from ten to twenty-five dollars, and they were frequently sold for one dollar, or one gallon of whiskey; the moneys for the pay of the levies did not leave Philadelphia, till the fourth of December, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, nor arrived at Fort Washington till the third of January one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two, some time after the last enlisted levies are known to have been entitled to their discharges."

In addition to the reasons contained in the original report, respecting the discharging of the levies, without their stipulated pay, which are admitted by the Secretary of War to have been justly stated, he has, in his late communication suggested to the committee, that, at the time of the discharge of the levies, there was actually in the hands of the Quartermaster General the sum of sixteen thousand two hundred ninety-two dollars and seventy cents, which were subject to be applied to any object, agreeably to the discretion of the commander in chief of the expedition, and might have been applied, if he thought proper, to the payment of the discharged levies, and would have been sufficient for two months' pay to the officers, and four months' pay to the privates. This sum is admitted by the Quartermaster General to have been in his hands at the time of the discharge of the levies, and would have been applied to their pay, if orders had been given by the commander in chief of the expedition for that purpose. But that no such orders ever were received by him. The Secretary of War infers, from these circumstances, that no censure should be imputed to the War Department for not having paid implicit attention to this subject.

The circumstances respecting this transaction have been attentively examined by the committee, and appear to them to be the following:—The Quartermaster General, upon his leaving Philadelphia, was furnished with the sum of twenty thousand dollars for the use of that Department. He was afterwards furnished with two other sums, to wit, the sum of seventeen thousand eight hundred and forty four dollars and fifty cents, on the twenty-third day of July, and the sum of two thousand two hundred and twenty four dollars and sixty cents, on the seventh day of July, making together the sum of twenty thousand and sixty nine dollars and ten cents. It appears, by letter from the Secretary of War, to the commander in chief of the expedition, that five thousand dollars of this sum were to be applied to the pay of the regular troops, if the commander in chief should deem that a proper application of the money, which, however, was not done. The remaining part of this money was intended to form a kind of military chest, to answer contingent expenses; subject, however, to the control of the commander in chief. It appears that the Quartermaster General, in addition to these supplies of cash, was authorized to draw bills on the Secretary of War, with this restriction—that the commander in chief should approve of all drafts, and certify the necessity or propriety of making them. The Quartermaster General commenced his drafts, at Fort Pitt, previously to his arrival at head quarters, to the amount of two thousand six hundred dollars, and continued them after his arrival; but it does not appear that those drafts were certified, or sanctioned, by the commander in chief: all which drafts were honored by the Secretary of War.

It is suggested by the commander in chief, that he never considered the money, before mentioned, appropriated to the pay of the levies, upon their discharges, nor that it was ever intended to be applied to that object. He further suggests a want of knowledge of the money, said to be on hand, at the time of the discharges of the levies, although he admits, that the Quartermaster General, shortly after his arrival at head quarters, tendered him a statement of the cash on hand, which he returned, without examination, observing, that he had already received sufficient information relatively thereto, from the Secretary of War; that he was informed of the amount of moneys originally received by the Quartermaster General, and conceived that he could form some idea of the balance on hand, from the sums disbursed in consequence of warrants drawn by him, which, he expected, were paid from that fund; that his want of information, as to the real balance, arose from the circumstance of the bills drawn by the Quartermaster General without his knowledge, or the requisite certificate from him, which bills operated as a relief to that fund, for their amount. The commander in chief of the expedition further suggested, to the committee, in presence of the Quartermaster General, that, upon making drafts upon the fund before alluded to, he usually inquired of the Quartermaster General, whether it was sufficient for the purpose of answering the draft, and upon repeating this inquiry, just before the discharge of the levies, he received for answer, "that the chest was very low." This statement was acquiesced in, or, at least, not denied by the Quartermaster General.

The Quartermaster General has furnished the committee with a statement of his account, by which, it appears, that he had on hand, on the fifth day of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, cash to the amount of fifteen thousand nine hundred and twelve dollars and forty-two cents, and two thirds of a cent, which, he suggests, have been since applied to the use of his department. This balance is denied to have been on hand, by the commander in chief, at that time; and he has furnished a statement of disbursements from the original fund, which leaves the amount of the balance, at the time of the discharge of the levies, of one thousand four hundred eighty-three dollars eighty-six cents, exclusive of five thousand dollars appropriated to the pay of the old troops.

The commander in chief further suggests, that there was no paymaster to the army, nor any person authorized to settle the accounts of the soldiers, and ascertain the real balances due to them, until the arrival of Mr. Swann, on the third day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two; and infers, that he had no authority to direct a settlement and order pay to the soldiers, until he was informed of the arrangements made at the War Office, relatively to that object. This suggestion is strongly confirmed by a letter from the Secretary of War, addressed to the commander in chief, and forwarded by Mr. Swann, which designates Mr. Swann as paymaster, and contains instructions relatively to the terms of settling the accounts of the soldiery. The same letter serves to show, that the twenty thousand and sixty-nine dollars and ten cents, put into the possession of the Quartermaster General, were not conclusively destined for the pay of the levies, nor so considered by the Secretary of War, because it is asserted in the letter, that Mr. Swann is furnished with a sum of money sufficient for the whole pay of the levies, without making any deduction in consequence of the moneys furnished the Quartermaster General.

It is asserted by the Secretary of War, in his communication to the committee, that the time of the service of the levies did not expire until after the arrival of Mr. Swann at Fort Washington, particularly Gaither's and Rhea's battalions, the term of their enlistments having been to serve six months after their arrival at Fort Washington; which was deemed the place of rendezvous. The time which had elapsed from the period of enlistment, to their arrival at Fort Washington, or the evident impropriety of annexing such a condition to the enlistments, caused the condition itself to be dispensed with, and those levies were actually discharged shortly after the twelfth of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, in consequence of having served six months, which is the extent of the service authorized by law, and actually received certificates, at that time, of having performed six months' service.

Upon a re-examination of the residue of the original report, and the evidence now before the committee, they are satisfied with the same, and find no material alterations or corrections necessary.

A regard for candor has induced the committee to adopt this mode of reporting, because the original report is thereby preserved, mistakes existing in the same, and which are now corrected, and the causes of those mistakes rendered obvious, and the whole subject presented to view upon the fairest terms, in the opinion of the committee, o all persons in any degree concerned therein.

[3d CONGRESS.]

No. 10.

[1st SESSION.]

## RETURN OF ORDNANCE, ARMS, AND MILITARY STORES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, DECEMBER 16, 1793.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 14th, 1793.*

IR:

I have the honor to submit a return of the ordnance, arms, and military stores, in possession of the United States.

It resulted from the casual circumstances of the late war, that these stores were accumulated principally at the following points, viz: New London, in Virginia; Philadelphia; West Point, on Hudson River; and Springfield, on Connecticut River; all of which, perhaps, excepting Springfield, are improper places for permanent magazines.

The important characteristics for magazines and arsenals seem to be perfect security against enemies, internal and external, blended with an easy access by water. The expense of land transportation of heavy articles, for a series of years, compared with that by water, renders the latter quality indispensable for a magazine.

The situation of New London, being destitute of water communication with the ocean, is not a proper place for a permanent magazine, and it would seem therefore necessary that some other position should be sought on James River, more suitable for the erection of proper buildings.

It may be questionable whether a populous city is a proper place for the repository of large quantities of military stores, on account of the accidents to which such places are liable by fire and other causes. Hence it is intended that a part of the stores, now deposited in Philadelphia, shall be removed to some safe position higher up the Delaware.

West Point, on Hudson River, although a precious link in the chain which binds the States together, has, on account of the well known navigation of that river, and the easy access from the ocean, been considered as an improper place for an extensive magazine. For this reason part of the surplus stores have been removed temporarily to Albany.

During the late war a number of valuable brick buildings were erected at Carlisle, in Pennsylvania, as well for the reception of stores, as to accommodate a number of workmen in the Ordnance Department; but these buildings were not much used after the apprehensions of invasion subsided, owing to the expense and delay occasioned by the land transportation. The same causes still prevent their use in any considerable degree.

The situation of the United States would seem to require, that three capital magazines should be established permanently, one for the southern, one for the middle, and one for the eastern States, with such subdivisions as may be deemed indispensable for general use.

It would also seem to be a dictate of sound national policy, that the United States should always possess one hundred thousand arms placed in their respective arsenals, and that the battering and field artillery and ammunition should be in ample proportion.

It is presumed that all the cannon, arms, and ammunition required by the United States, might be fabricated among ourselves. It is possible the expense may be greater than if the articles were imported, but this circumstance is not of such moment as to be compared with the solid advantages which would result from extending and perfecting the means upon which our safety may ultimately depend.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

The PRESIDENT of the United States.



*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Springfield, Massachusetts.*

<i>Brass Ordnance.</i>		<i>Paper Cartridges.</i>	
6 pounders, -	-	18 pounders, -	726
3 pounders, -	56	12 do. -	727
	10	6 do. -	100
		4 do. -	70
		3 do. -	80
<i>Howitzers.</i>		<i>Fuzes Filled.</i>	
8 inch, -	2	13 inch, -	2,171
Do. unfinished, -	1	10 do. -	978
5½ inch, -	9	8 do. -	978
Do. unfinished, -	1	5½ do. -	1,487
4½ inch cohorn and bed, -	1		
Iron beds for 13 inch mortars, -	4		
<i>Travelling Carriages.</i>		<i>Muskets, &amp;c.</i>	
4 pounders, long, -	5	New French arms, -	6,678
6 pounders, short, -	28	Old do. do. -	55
6½ inch howitzers, French, -	2	Carbines, -	298
		Pistols, -	495
<i>AMMUNITION.</i>		<i>Swords.</i>	
<i>Shot Strapt.</i>		<i>Military Stores.</i>	
9 pounders, -	259	Ammunition wagons, -	2
6 do. -	192	Do. boxes, -	267
4 do. -	1,244	Worms, of sorts, -	16
3 do. -	457	Trail and common handspikes, -	88
		Kegs yellow paint, ground in oil, -	3
		Cask Spanish brown, -	1
		Do. red lead, -	1
		Gun worms, -	3,529
		Sword belt, -	1
		Bayonet belts, -	21
		Iron bottoms for grape, -	344
		Handsaws, -	2
		Yards duck, -	8
		Bullet pouches, old, -	369
		Carbine rods, chests, -	2
		Gun rods, do. -	6
		Tent, -	1
		Scales and weights, pairs, -	2
		Scales, without beams, -	1
		Tin end pieces for cartridge boxes, -	1,370
		Tin cases, for do. do. -	298
		Cartridge boxes and belts, -	271
		Chests of cannon cartridge paper, -	7
		Tube boxes, -	38
		Fire hook, one, -	wt. lb. 80
		Turners' tools, sets, -	1
		Beds for 13-inch mortars, unfinished, -	6
		Rammer heads, of sorts, -	161
		Sponges, for 4 pounders, -	29
		Lintstocks, -	11
		Portfire stocks, -	14
		Sheep skins, -	2
		Laboratory chests, -	1
		Tompions for 4 pounders, -	45
		Worms and ladles, -	6
		Rope, 3½ inch, fathoms, -	10
		Copper hoops, -	lbs. 187
		Saltpetre, barrels, -	2½
		Empty tubes, -	4,381
		Fuzes, 13 inch, not fixed, -	1,184
		Copper ladles, sorts, -	48
		Emery, pounds, -	11
		Tin lanterns, -	5
		Buckles for pouches, -	649
		Clasps for do. -	73
		Fronts for do. -	20
		Hooks for do. -	34
		Wheels for 4 pounders, -	28
		Do. for 3 pounders, -	5
		Do. for wagons, -	12
		Do. for travelling forges, -	4
		Do. partly made, -	9
		Carriage cheeks in the rough, -	47
		Wagon tops, -	2
		Wagon boxes, -	20
		Slowmatch, hhds. -	2
		Felloes, -	500
		Grindstones, -	2
		Chests of iron gun mounting, -	7

## Return of Ordnance, &amp;c. at Springfield—Continued.

Cask tin, - - - - -	1	Boring mill, - - - - -	1
Empty cases for 6 pounds,	180	Limbers framed, not ironed,	5
Do. for 4 pounds,	136	Angers,	8
Copper and laboratory kettles,	1	Anvil,	1
Large screws,	3	Armorer's tools, set,	1
Large screw plates,	3	Bench vices,	5
Brass gun mounting,	168		
Brimstone, pounds,	300	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
Portfires, dozen,	70	Old cartridge boxes,	12
Portfire moulds and drifts,	1	Tents,	6
Gun locks, old,	250	Jockey caps,	20
Iron hooks and thimbles,	14	Powder, barrel,	1
Iron chains,	5	Old camp kettles,	7
Gun slings,	21	Drum,	1
Drum sticks,	1	Arm chests,	67
Fifes,	2		
Iron stoves,	2	Armorer's shop,	1
Iron pots,	7	Blacksmith's do.	1
Spokes,	5,300	Harness maker's do.	1
		Coal house,	1
<i>Implements.</i>		Travelling forge, unfinished,	1
Blacksmith's bellows,	1	Backs for travelling forges,	14
Beck irons,	1		

## Return of Ordnance and Military Stores, deposited at West Point.

<i>Brass Ordnance.</i>			12 pounds, - - - - -	231
			9 do. - - - - -	78
24 pounds, dismantled,	-	3	<i>Round Shot.</i>	
12 do. mounted,	-	3	24 pounds, - - - - -	1,466
12 do. dismantled,	-	8	18 do. - - - - -	2,778
6 do. do.	-	7	12 do. too large for the gauge,	1,391
4 do. do.	-	19	9 do. too large for the gauge,	4,137
3 do. do.	-	1	6 do. - - - - -	220
<i>Iron Ordnance.</i>			6 do. - - - - -	2,884
24 pounds, dismantled,	-	6	4 do. - - - - -	2,382
18 do. mounted,	-	2	3 do. - - - - -	1,067
18 do. dismantled,	-	22	<i>Srapt Shot.</i>	
12 do. do.	-	3	24 pounds, fixed,	200
12 do. bad do.	-	2	18 do. unfixd,	92
9 do. do.	-	11	12 do. do.	7
6 do. do.	-	2	12 do. fixed,	233
4 do. do.	-	8	9 do. unfixd,	455
3 do. do.	-	4	6 do. do.	36
2 do. do.	-	2	6 do. unfixd,	832
<i>Howitzers.</i>			4 do. fixed,	1,694
8 inch, brass, dismantled,	-	13	3 do. unfixd,	1,349
5½ do. do. do.	-	5	3 do. fixed,	86
<i>Iron Mortars.</i>			3 do. unfixd,	748
13 inch, mounted,	-	2	do. unfixd,	771
<i>Brass Mortars.</i>			<i>Grape Fixed.</i>	
10 inch, dismantled,	-	9	9 pounds, - - - - -	95
Mortar beds, good,	-	7	6 do. - - - - -	166
8 inch, dismantled,	-	1	4 do. - - - - -	55
5½ inch, mounted,	-	2	3 do. - - - - -	65
do. dismantled,	-	8	<i>Grape unfixd.</i>	
4½ do. do.	-	7	24 pounds, - - - - -	2
Mortar beds, good,	-	4	18 do. - - - - -	344
8 inch mortar bed, good,	-	1	12 do. - - - - -	39
<i>Shells.</i>			9 do. - - - - -	10
13 inch, - - - - -	-	181	6 do. - - - - -	345
10 inch, - - - - -	-	499	4 do. - - - - -	187
8 do. - - - - -	-	1,562	3 do. - - - - -	257
5½ do. - - - - -	-	458	Loose Grape, - barrels,	11
4½ do. - - - - -	-	64	<i>Case fixed.</i>	
<i>Travelling Carriages.</i>			24 pounds, - - - - -	133
24 pounds, good,	-	3	12 do. - - - - -	119
18 do. do.	-	10	9 do. - - - - -	43
12 do. do.	-	5	<i>Case Shot fixed.</i>	
4 do. do.	-	1	6 pounds, - - - - -	1,949
8 do. do.	-	10	4 do. - - - - -	2,393
<i>AMMUNITION.</i>			3 do. - - - - -	921
<i>Bar Shot.</i>				
24 pounds, - - - - -	-	31		
18 do. - - - - -	-	47		

## Return of Ordnance, &amp;c. at West Point—Continued.

<i>Case unfixcd.</i>				Rampart arms, - - - -	348
24 pounders, - - - -	-	108	Carbines, - - - -	468	
18 do. - - - -	-	73	Pistols, - - - -	59	
12 do. - - - -	-	180			
6 do. - - - -	-	491	<i>Ladles.</i>		
4 do. - - - -	-	393	24 pounders, - - - -	8	
3 do. - - - -	-	193	18 do. - - - -	39	
<i>Garrison Carriages.</i>				12 do. - - - -	24
24 pounders, - good, -	-	6	9 do. - - - -	15	
18 do. - do. -	-	27	6 do. - - - -	88	
12 do. - - - -	-	18	4 do. - - - -	45	
9 do. - - - -	-	2	3 do. - - - -	33	
6 do. - - - -	-	16	2 do. - - - -	9	
<i>Paper Cartridges, empty.</i>				<i>Worms.</i>	
24 pounders, - - - -	-	- 5,680	24 pounders, - - - -	15	
18 do. - - - -	-	- 14,533	18 do. - - - -	50	
12 do. - - - -	-	- 6,633	12 do. - - - -	48	
9 do. - - - -	-	- 3,805	9 do. - - - -	45	
6 do. - - - -	-	- 3,758	6 do. - - - -	68	
4 do. - - - -	-	- 4,721	4 do. - - - -	39	
3 do. - - - -	-	- 2,345	3 do. - - - -	57	
2 do. - - - -	-	- 559	<i>Case shot.</i>		
10 inch, - - - -	-	- 2,703	8 inch, - - - -	60	
<i>Flannel Cartridges, empty.</i>				5½ do. - - - -	522
24 pounders, - - - -	-	- 697	4¾ do. - - - -	60	
12 do. - - - -	-	- 130	<i>Sponges.</i>		
4 do. - - - -	-	- 11	24 pounders, - - - -	28	
5½ inch, - - - -	-	- 150	18 do. - - - -	70	
4¾ do. - - - -	-	- 202	12 do. - - - -	83	
<i>Caps.</i>				9 do. - - - -	73
24 pounders, - - - -	-	- 818	6 do. - - - -	160	
12 do. - - - -	-	- 2,065	4 do. - - - -	86	
6 do. - - - -	-	- 525	3 do. - - - -	109	
<i>Cylinders.</i>				2 do. - - - -	28
24 pounders, - - - -	-	- 900	10 inch, - - - -	46	
12 do. - - - -	-	- 1,850	8 do. - - - -	35	
6 do. - - - -	-	- 793	5½ do. - - - -	41	
<i>Fuzes.</i>				4¾ do. - - - -	7
13 inch, - - - -	-	- 1,128	<i>Bayonets.</i>		
10 do. - - - -	-	- 4,931	Spare, - - - -	- 1,743	
8 do. - - - -	-	- 5,633	Scabbards, - - - -	- 14,005	
4¾ do. - - - -	-	- 1,075	Spears, - - - -	641	
<i>Powder.</i>				Swords, - - - -	389
Double barrels, - - - -	-	146	do. scabbards, - - - -	40	
Single do. - - - -	-	762	Esopontons, - - - -	54	
Half do. - - - -	-	2,123	<i>Cartridges.</i>		
Pounds, - - - -	-	4	Musket, - - - -	318,415	
Meal, - - - -	-	cwt. 6.0.19	Blank, - - - -	- 19,115	
<i>Tins.</i>				One pound paper filled, - - - -	70
Boxes, - - - -	-	2	Pistol, - - - -	- 2,734	
Barrels for cartridge boxes, - - - -	-	1	<i>Military Stores.</i>		
Barrels, - - - -	-	2	Limbers to 12 pounders, - - - -	2	
Sheets, - - - -	-	362	Do. 18 do. - - - -	5	
<i>Instruments, and a book.</i>				Do. 24 do. - - - -	1
Brass calipers, - pairs, - - - -	-	1	5½ inch mortar beds, good, - - - -	2	
Wooden do. - do. - - - -	-	2	Limbers to 8 inch mortars, - - - -	7	
Fuze engine, - - - -	-	1	Oil cloths, - - - -	13	
Brass shot gauges, - - - - set,	-	1	Bags for grape shot, - - - -	728	
Field engineer, - - - -	-	1	Steel, - - - -	pounds, 201	
<i>Muskets.</i>				Sulphur, - - - -	233
Stands of arms, - - - -	-	7,058	Saltpetre, - - - -	6	
Do. - without ramrods, - - - -	-	302	White lead, - - - -	99½	
French, - - - -	-	706	Spanish brown, - - - -	37	
English, - - - -	-	12	Thread, - - - -	4	
Do. - without ramrods, - - - -	-	214	Iron of a 10 inch mortar bed, - - - -	107	
Rifles, - - - -	-	5	Flints, - - - -	111,927	
Smooth rifles, - - - -	-	20	Cartouch boxes, - - - -	177	
			Box of lock limbs, - - - -	1	
			Drum shells, - - - -	55	
			Drum sticks, - - - -	pairs, 6	
			Waist belts, - - - -	653	
			Frogs for do. - - - -	200	
			Coils slow match, - - - -	111	
			Gun worms, - - - -	477	
			Powder measures, - - - -	12	

*Return of Ordnance, &c. at West Point—Continued.*

Pincers, . . . . .	1	Copper ladles, . . . . .	35
Funnels, . . . . .	14	Brass belt buckles, . . . . .	40
Gouge bits, . . . . .	212	Park stakes, . . . . .	2
Priming wires, . . . . .	188	Tins for strap shot, . . . . .	40
Gimlets, . . . . .	2	Coffins for false fires, . . . . .	29
Screw belts, . . . . .	47	Boxes loose grape, . . . . .	131
Fire balls, . . . . .	29	Woods for case shot, . . . . .	517
Clasps for cartridge boxes, . . . . .	1,295	Do. for strap do. . . . .	704
Woods for do. . . . .	10	Travelling carriages, without boxes or wheels, . . . . .	11
Tins, for do. . . . .	4	Carriage wheels, . . . . .	14
Gunner's belts, . . . . .	74	Limbers, . . . . .	2
Haversacks, . . . . .	56	Copper hook for the magazine, . . . . .	1
Lantern, . . . . .	1	Powder trays, . . . . .	50
Lintstocks, . . . . .	303	10 inch carcass shells, . . . . .	7
Portfire stocks, . . . . .	258	Steel ramrods, . . . . .	600
Lead aprons, . . . . .	129		
Powder horns, . . . . .	473		
Drudge boxes, . . . . .	19	<i>Implements.</i>	
Tube do. . . . .	42	Mallets, . . . . .	92
Tubes filled, . . . . .	4,326	Shell scrapers, . . . . .	47
Do. empty, . . . . .	6,222	Hand bellows, . . . . .	3
Fuze sets, . . . . .	113	Pair canhooks, . . . . .	1
Shell hooks, . . . . .	45	Anvils, . . . . .	6
Kit ladle, . . . . .	1	Boxes smith's tools, . . . . .	2
Cannon spikes, . . . . .	87	Chest with carpenter's tools, . . . . .	1
Copper pans, . . . . .	7	Trail handspikes, . . . . .	165
Scale beams, . . . . .	5	Handspikes, . . . . .	182
Sets scales, . . . . .	3	Screw drivers, . . . . .	2
Sets weights, . . . . .	2	Hand vices, . . . . .	2
Pounds rope, . . . . .	818½	Tomahawks, . . . . .	45
Budge barrels, . . . . .	33	Coopers' copper vices, . . . . .	3
Elevating screws, . . . . .	5	Do. do. knives, . . . . .	2
Linch pins, . . . . .	64	Do. do. adzes, . . . . .	2
Washers, . . . . .	54		
Cap square keys, . . . . .	23	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
Gins, . . . . .	3	Round shot 6 pounders, . . . . .	60
Iron gin blocks, . . . . .	9	Do. 12 do. . . . .	52
Wooden do. . . . .	24	Do. 18 do. . . . .	233
Pair of blacksmith's bellows, . . . . .	1	Do. 24 do. . . . .	7
Port fires, . . . . .	1,416	Single barrels powder, . . . . .	19
Sponge caps, . . . . .	109	Half barrels do. . . . .	3
Gun locks, . . . . .	79	Muskets, . . . . .	8,617
Tackle block, . . . . .	1	Bayonets, . . . . .	2,617
Tin canisters, . . . . .	115	Carbines, . . . . .	112
Sets men's harness, . . . . .	33	Pistols, . . . . .	407
Sets drag ropes, . . . . .	122	Blunderbusses, . . . . .	3
Rammer heads, . . . . .	41	Wall piece, . . . . .	1
Sponge do. . . . .	112	Swords, . . . . .	62
Wooden wads, . . . . .	739	Smith's vices, . . . . .	4
Junk do. . . . .	165	Flints, . . . . .	15,942
Wooden tube boxes . . . . .	54	Sets men's harness, . . . . .	14
Fids for grape, . . . . .	1,040	Fuzes, . . . . .	2,885
Tompions, . . . . .	184	Lanterns, . . . . .	23
Packsaddle, . . . . .	1	Sets drag ropes, . . . . .	5
Horsemen's swivels, . . . . .	114	Tubes, . . . . .	3,378
Wagons, . . . . .	2	Portfires, . . . . .	852
Tumbrels, . . . . .	15	Tumbrels, . . . . .	2
Divel, . . . . .	1	Travelling forges, . . . . .	3
Empty fuzes, . . . . .	1,575	8 inch carcasses, . . . . .	56
Wooden tube boxes, . . . . .	54	Gun worms, . . . . .	81
Fire balls, . . . . .	248	Gunslings, . . . . .	101
Smith's vice, . . . . .	1	Port cartouch boxes, . . . . .	91
Hair pouches, . . . . .	248	Cartouch box belts, . . . . .	1,486
Stands of colors, . . . . .	5	Dragon do. . . . .	47
Sets of mounting, . . . . .	8	Bayonet scabbards, . . . . .	61
Cannon searchers, . . . . .	4	Drumshells, . . . . .	1
do. slings, . . . . .	2	False fires, . . . . .	45
Crucible, . . . . .	1	Fifes, . . . . .	6
Tin canteens, . . . . .	403	Cartouch boxes . . . . .	4,222
Bayonet belts, . . . . .	590	5½ inch howitzer wheels, . . . . .	2
Musket barrels, . . . . .	199	Travelling forge, and howitzer timber wheels, . . . . .	16
Pistol do. . . . .	301	Hammers, . . . . .	2
Sword blades, . . . . .	1,023	Pounds of powder, . . . . .	323¾
Straps for tompions, . . . . .	11	Gin, . . . . .	1
Hand grenade shells, . . . . .	170	Iron gin blocks, . . . . .	2
Flat formers for cannon cartridges, . . . . .	17	Size board for cannon shot, . . . . .	1
Round do. for do. . . . .	15	Truck carriages, . . . . .	1
Musket formers, . . . . .	152	Flannel cartridges empty, . . . . .	8
Toggles for drag ropes, . . . . .	179	Musket cartridges, . . . . .	21,457
Wooden marline spikes, . . . . .	2		

## Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Fort Rensselaer, and its Dependencies.

<i>Iron Ordnance.</i>							
12 pounders, mounted,	-	-	2	9 do.	-	-	2
9 do. do.	-	-	3	6 do.	-	-	5
6 do. do.	-	-	7	4 do.	-	-	1
4 do. do.	-	-	2	3 do.	-	-	2
3 do. do.	-	-	3	<i>Sponges.</i>			
6 do. dismantled,	-	-	3	12 pounders,	-	-	5
3 do. do.	-	-	1	9 do.	-	-	2
<i>Brass Ordnance.</i>				6 do.	-	-	8
4 $\frac{1}{2}$ mortar, mounted,	-	-	1	4 do.	-	-	1
<i>Round Shot.</i>				3 do.	-	-	3
12 pounders,	-	-	165	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch,	-	-	1
9 do.	-	-	550	<i>Military Stores.</i>			
6 do.	-	-	1,515	Spare garrison carriage,	-	-	1
4 do.	-	-	216	Lead aprons,	-	-	9
3 do.	-	-	96	Tubes,	-	-	342
6 and 9 pounders, at Fort Schuyler,	-	-	120	Portfires,	-	-	8
<i>Strap Shot.</i>				Portfire stocks,	-	-	6
12 pounders, fixed,	-	-	51	Lintstocks,	-	-	10
6 do. do.	-	-	31	Slow match,	-	-	lbs. 58
3 do. do.	-	-	73	Gunner's belt,	-	-	1
12 do. unfixed,	-	-	28	Priming wires,	-	-	38
6 do. do.	-	-	1	Gouge bits,	-	-	3
3 do. do.	-	-	27	Cannon spikes,	-	-	2
<i>Case Shot.</i>				Drag ropes,	-	-	sets, 6
12 pounders, fixed,	-	-	62	Sheep skins,	-	-	7
9 do. do.	-	-	119	Twine,	-	-	skeins, 4
6 do. do.	-	-	65	Junk,	-	-	hhd. 1
3 do. do.	-	-	121	Raw hides,	-	-	6
12 do. unfixed,	-	-	25	Gin,	-	-	1
9 do. do.	-	-	15	Wooden gin blocks,	-	-	2
3 do. do.	-	-	16	Powder horns,	-	-	5
<i>Grape Shot.</i>				Stands of arms,	-	-	5
6 pounders, unfixed,	-	-	21	Cartridge boxes,	-	-	5
<i>Flannel Cartridges.</i>				Musket cartridges,	-	-	1,392
12 pounders, filled,	-	-	8	Do. do. blank,	-	-	1,320
9 do. do.	-	-	3	Paper,	-	-	quires, 26
3 do. do.	-	-	19	Thread,	-	-	lb. $\frac{1}{2}$
<i>Paper Cartridges.</i>				Budge barrel,	-	-	1
6 pounders, filled,	-	-	12	Drudge boxes,	-	-	3
3 do. do.	-	-	6	Kit brush,	-	-	1
12 do. empty,	-	-	58	Kit ladles,	-	-	2
9 do. do.	-	-	263	Tin funnel,	-	-	1
6 do. do.	-	-	88	Powder measures,	-	-	set, 1
4 do. do.	-	-	33	Fuze,	-	-	sets, 2
3 do. do.	-	-	68	Gun worms,	-	-	8
<i>Shells.</i>				Loose grape,	-	-	boxes, 29
8 inch,	-	-	120	Tube box,	-	-	1
4 $\frac{1}{2}$ do. filled,	-	-	1	<i>Implements.</i>			
Do. do. empty,	-	-	65	Hammer,	-	-	1
Fuzes,	-	-	99	Pincers,	-	-	1
<i>Ladles.</i>				Handspikes,	-	-	15
12 pounders,	-	-	3	Chisel,	-	-	1
9 do.	-	-	2	Mallet,	-	-	1
6 do.	-	-	3	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>			
4 do.	-	-	1	Muskets,	-	-	44
3 do.	-	-	4	Bayonets,	-	-	13
<i>Worms.</i>				Gun barrels,	-	-	6
12 pounders,	-	-	2	Gun locks,	-	-	8
				Guards,	-	-	4
				Beech plates,	-	-	4
				3 pound empty paper cartridges,	-	-	31
				6 pound filled flannel do.	-	-	1
				9 pound case shot, fixed,	-	-	6
				12 pound strap shot, do.	-	-	1
				Tubes,	-	-	160
				Cartridge boxes,	-	-	150
				Musket cartridges,	-	-	1,204
				6 pound case shot, fixed,	-	-	11
				9 pound empty paper cartridges,	-	-	5

Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Philadelphia.

Brass Ordnance.				Arms.			
Howitzers, 8 inch, mounted,	-	-	2	Muskets,	-	-	11,434
2 $\frac{3}{4}$ do. do.	-	-	2	Fusees,	-	-	14
Cannon, 4 pounders, do.	-	-	6	Rifles,	-	-	110
3 do. do.	-	-	1	Carbines,	-	-	1,032
2 do. do.	-	-	1	Blunderbusses,	-	-	43
Howitzers, 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ inch, dismantled,	-	-	2	Pistols,	-	-	251
Mortars, 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch, do.	-	-	11	Gun slings,	-	-	300
5 $\frac{1}{2}$ do. do.	-	-	9	Cartouch boxes,	-	-	1,600
8 do. do.	-	-	2	Flints,	-	-	592,450
10 do. do.	-	-	10				
13 do. do.	-	-	3				
16 do. do.	-	-	3				
Cannon, 3 pounders, do.	-	-	1				
4 do. do.	-	-	3				
9 do. do.	-	-	4				
Iron Ordnance.				Powder.			
24 pounders, mounted, loaned to State of Pennsylvania,	5		5	Single barrels, in the magazine at French Creek,			150
18 do. do. do. do.	3		3	do. do. do. do.			13
12 do. do. do. do.	28		28	do. do. do. do.			20
Howitzers, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch, dismantled,	-	-	47	do. do. do. do.			12
Cannon, 12 pounders, do.	-	-	1	Double barrels, in the magazine at Schuylkill,			17
9 do. do. do.	-	-	6	Single do. do. do. do.			36
6 do. do. do.	-	-	10	do. do. do. do.			515
4 do. do. do.	-	-	2	do. do. do. do.			1
1 do. do. do.	-	-	5				
Shells.				Lead.			
Hand grenades,	-	-	966	Weight of lead,	71 ton, 15 c. 0 qr. 18 lb.		
10 inch shells,	-	-	4,562	Musket ball, 53 boxes, of 100			
8 do. do.	-	-	1,360	net each, is	2 " 7 " 0 " 8 "		
4 $\frac{1}{2}$ do. do.	-	-	138				
Cannon Ball.				Horsemen's Equipage.			
2 $\frac{1}{2}$ pounders,	-	-	209	Canteens,	-	-	363
3 do.	-	-	6,938	Haversacks,	-	-	2,440
4 do.	-	-	20,147	Drums,	-	-	21
6 do.	-	-	3,352	Do. cases,	-	-	20
9 do.	-	-	3,275	Do. pairs of sticks,	-	-	39
12 do.	-	-	5,543	Do. cords,	-	-	4
18 do.	-	-	3,649	Do. heads,	-	-	16
24 do.	-	-	958	Do. shells,	-	-	12
32 do.	-	-	27	Fifes,	-	-	21
Pounds of grape shot,	-	-	96,912	Brushes and wires,	-	-	3,525
				Camp kettles,	-	-	42
				Sergeant's swords,	-	-	2,240
				Do. belts,	-	-	80
Bar Shot.				Saddles complete,			
3 pounders,	-	-	1	Bridles,	-	-	495
6 do.	-	-	1	Halters,	-	-	495
9 do.	-	-	203	Valises,	-	-	495
12 do.	-	-	410	Nose bags,	-	-	495
18 do.	-	-	17	Swords,	-	-	396
24 do.	-	-	3	Do. belts,	-	-	495
32 do.	-	-	1				
Case Shot Unfixed.				Fuzes, 10 inch, filled,			
2 $\frac{1}{2}$ pounders,	-	-	52	8 do.	-	-	3,552
3 do.	-	-	98	Do. empty, of sizes,	-	-	1,670
4 do.	-	-	1,412				1,900
6 do.	-	-	64	Adzes,	-	-	2
9 do.	-	-	66	Ammunition boxes,	-	-	23
12 do.	-	-	175	Awl hafts,	-	-	50
24 do.	-	-	1	Do. blades,	-	-	44
5 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch,	-	-	9	Auger,	-	-	1
8 do.	-	-	47	Axe-eye wedges,	-	-	2
				Brands,	-	-	25
				Bayonet mandrills,	-	-	2
				Do. blades,	-	-	126
				Do. frogs,	-	-	742
				Do. sockets,	-	-	133
				Book cases,	-	-	2
				Brass pistol barrels,	-	-	80
				Breech wrenches,	-	-	5
				Bullet nippers,	-	-	6
				Do. moulds,	-	-	22
				Button do.	-	-	2
				Brass weights,	-	-	8
				Belt buckles,	-	-	3,430
				Boring bits,	-	-	2
				Braces,	-	-	10
				Bags, (small sand)	-	-	9,100
				Back and belly bands,	-	-	40
				Buff belts,	-	-	11
				Blocks for horsemen's caps,	-	-	20
				Bridle bits,	-	-	3
				Bands for spears,	-	-	31
				Bellows pipes,	-	-	4
				Breast plates,	-	-	4
				Brace stocks,	-	-	6
				Ball patterns,	-	-	11
Grape Shot Unfixed.				Round Shot, Strapt, Unfixed.			
3 pounders,	-	-	1,668	3 pounders,	-	-	724
4 do.	-	-	2,045	4 do.	-	-	613
6 do.	-	-	1,040	6 do.	-	-	747
9 do.	-	-	109	9 do.	-	-	12
12 do.	-	-	353	12 do.	-	-	446
				24 do.	-	-	9

## Return of Ordnance, &amp;c. at Philadelphia—Continued.

Blind bridles,	2	Musket cartridge formers,	240
Bolts, with keys,	15	Marking irons,	7
Buckles for halters,	380	Mail pillions,	6
Barrel scraper,	1	Mortars for composition,	1
Breechings,	12	Marlinespikes,	24
Box handles,	13	Needles,	20,000
Buttress,	1	Nest of weights,	1
Bundles of reeds,	22	Nail tools,	21
Cannon wads,	936	Nose caps,	105
Do. scraper,	1	Oil stone,	1
Caps and cylinders,	3,000	Pistol locks,	17
Cannon drifts,	7	Do. trigger plates,	49
Cutting knives,	2	Do. caps,	1,050
Copper pump,	1	Do. thumb pieces,	7
Canvas valise,	1	Do. side plates,	59
Drills,	2	Do. pipes,	1,741
Do. bow,	1	Do. stocks,	2,800
Do. stock,	1	Do. cock pins and jaws,	400
Desks,	5	Do. guards,	47
Drawers,	10	Do. cocks,	160
Drawing knives,	12	Do. hammers,	100
Espontoons,	2	Do. main and side springs,	400
Ferules for tool handles,	30	Do. lock pins,	700
Fascine hatchet,	1	Pairs of scales,	3
Frogs,	13	Do. stirrup irons,	510
Fire fenders,	2	Do. horse shoes,	7
Fire balls,	209	Do. drum hooks,	1
Gauge bits,	44	Do. fire tongs,	2
Gin, tackle, and blocks,	73	Do. andirons,	2
Grindstone,	1	Do. ox shoes,	49
Gins, with blocks,	2	Do. handcuffs,	7
Gun worms,	12,365	Paper cartridges, sizes,	11,144
Grenadier's match pipes,	20	Portfire stocks,	59
Halberds,	25	Priming wires,	100
Hooks and thimbles,	17	Powder horns, with straps,	443
Hatchets,	12	Powder proof,	1
Hinges for spears,	9	Plane,	1
Hoe,	1	Palms,	2
House chairs,	9	Pincers,	3
Horseman's tent,	1	Padlock,	1
Hinge hooks,	4	Quires writing paper,	600
Hand vice,	1	Do. musket C paper,	1,360
Hay rake,	1	Quadrants, (wood)	4
Iron pistol barrels,	190	Quoiler hooks,	99
Do. tripets,	2	Rammer sponge, and ladle heads,	400
Do. crow bars,	6	Do. handles,	30
Do. skimmer,	1	Ramrods, iron,	100
Do. pot,	1	Do. borers,	12
Ivory mouth piece,	1	Do. reamers,	12
Ladles, (copper)	104	Rivets,	300
Lintstocks,	34	Regulation books,	33
Lbs. stone emery,	130	Pocket moulds,	2
Do. cannon cartridge paper,	21	Do. formers and drifts,	21
Do. desk furniture,	400	Rifle sights,	16
Do. wrought iron,	224	Rivets for cartridge boxes,	100
Do. steel,	7,840	Ragstones,	2
Do. black lead,	224	Rifts,	7
Do. antimony,	140	Rivet tools,	1
Do. yellow ochre,	65	Star shot,	350
Do. sulphur,	30	Sliding do.	13
Do. saltpetre,	13,440	Sword blades, (old)	110
Lock plates,	830	Do. belts, unfinished,	42
Linings for caps,	223	Do. do.	165
Leather portfire cases,	2	Do. guards,	378
Musket barrels,	300	Do. blades, forged,	3
Do. locks,	4,300	Saws,	3
Do. butt pieces,	1,900	Smith's hammers,	30
Do. guards,	3,828	Staves for budge barrels,	200
Do. bands,	6,000	Screw bits,	40
Do. cocks, with pins,	1,900	Set shot gauges,	1
Do. do. without pins,	1,219	Single do.	6
Do. hammers,	1,405	Scrapers,	3
Do. pipes,	1,559	Steel cores, for mounting,	300
Do. side plates,	3,335	Stamps,	17
Do. jaws,	595	Screw plates,	4
Do. trigger plates,	2,848	Spring sets,	1
Do. triggers,	1,159	Swages,	26
Do. side and breech pins,	18,111	Sets and Mallets,	31
Do. cock pins,	120	Do. scale chains,	2
Do. main and hammer springs,	4,324	Serpent moulds,	1
Do. sears,	464	Spindle for a lathe,	1
Do. tumblers,	390	Strap for breech band,	1
Do. bridles,	456	Spade belt,	1
Do. side springs,	4,281	Spools for wheels,	160
Do. breechings,	42	Standard cases,	23
Do. pans,	126	Sockets for spears,	10
Do. stocks,	100	Spears, with handles,	51
Do. splices,	500	Do. without do.	300

Return of Ordnance, &c. at Philadelphia—Continued.

Scythe, . . . . .	1	Weights, . . . . .	55
Screws and wipers, . . . . .	100	Wood mallets, . . . . .	80
Swivels for cartridge boxes, . . . . .	700	Do. screws, . . . . .	3,000
Shell hooks, . . . . .	19		
Do. scrapers, . . . . .	11	<i>DAMAGED STORES.</i>	
Spear and socket for color poles, . . . . .	1		
Silk division colors, . . . . .	16	<i>Ordnance.</i>	
Do. tassels, . . . . .	11	2¼ inch brass howitzers, . . . . .	3
Shot blocks, sizes, . . . . .	1,500	Augers, . . . . .	5
Scale dishes, . . . . .	6	Adze, . . . . .	1
Scythe rings, . . . . .	95	Blunderbusses, . . . . .	76
Do. nibs, . . . . .	78	Bayonet belts, . . . . .	53
Do. wedges, . . . . .	100	Bayonets, . . . . .	100
Staples, . . . . .	130	Bar shot, . . . . .	35
Smith's tongs, . . . . .	11	Camp kettles, . . . . .	65
Swingle trees, without irons, . . . . .	70	Drum shells, . . . . .	58
Stoves, . . . . .	3	Dutch oven, . . . . .	1
Stove feet, . . . . .	4	Flannel cartridges, . . . . .	10,000
Stools, (sitting) . . . . .	20	Fuses, . . . . .	106
Smith's vices, . . . . .	5	Files, . . . . .	136
Shell pattern, . . . . .	1	Fish kettle, . . . . .	1
Scale beam, . . . . .	1	Gunner's belt, . . . . .	1
Side bars for carbines, . . . . .	127	Handsaws, . . . . .	3
Shot patterns, . . . . .	42	Haversacks, . . . . .	270
Stock buckles, . . . . .	288	Horsemen's spears, . . . . .	15
Tubes, sizes, . . . . .	10,000	Do. caps, . . . . .	1,250
Do. box, . . . . .	1	Lanterns, . . . . .	52
Trail and handspikes, . . . . .	40	Muskets, . . . . .	1,482
Tin powder measures, . . . . .	50	Rifles, . . . . .	76
Tool handles, . . . . .	62	Musket locks, . . . . .	2,300
Tin cartouch boxes, . . . . .	200	Do. barrels, . . . . .	1,125
Do. measures, sizes, . . . . .	13	Planes, . . . . .	22
Taps, for screw plates, . . . . .	9	Pistols, . . . . .	3
Turner's tools, . . . . .	21	Ramrod borers, . . . . .	6
Tailpipe springs, . . . . .	168	Sets men's harness, . . . . .	15
Thumb pieces, . . . . .	192	Swords, . . . . .	45
Tire bales, . . . . .	2	Do. blades, . . . . .	103
Tin pipes for cartridge boxes, . . . . .	200	Tinman's shears, . . . . .	2
Tacks, . . . . .	1,000	Watering pot, . . . . .	1
Tables, . . . . .	6	Color, . . . . .	1
Tin Canteens, . . . . .	20		
Toggles for drag ropes, . . . . .	400		
Thumb latches, . . . . .	16	<i>Powder.</i>	
Tomahawks, . . . . .	6	3 double barrels, } say 2,800 lbs.	
Tongue chains, . . . . .	3	14 single do. }	
Tackle blocks, with hooks, . . . . .	50	6 half do. }	
Do. do. without, . . . . .	60	2 barrels, } mealed.	
Torches for signals, . . . . .	50	1 half do. }	
Tin canisters, . . . . .	80	A quantity of old iron, weight unknown.	
Wad hooks, . . . . .	94		

Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Carlisle, in Pennsylvania.

<i>Iron Cannon.</i>				
4 pounders, . . . . .	1	Half barrels, . . . . .	7	
do. not finished, . . . . .	1	Mealed, pounds, . . . . .	61	
		Musket cartridges, boxes, . . . . .	7	
<i>Shot.</i>				
12 pounders, case, fixed, . . . . .	4	Paper cartridges, bag sizes, . . . . .	720	
9 do. . . . .	18	Do. cylinders, do. . . . .	4436	
4 do. . . . .	9	Do. caps, for do. . . . .	666	
3 do. . . . .	26			
<i>Military Stores.</i>				
6 pounders, grape fixed, . . . . .	6	Set of drag ropes, . . . . .	1	
3 do. . . . .	11	Ladles and worms, sizes, . . . . .	8	
12 pounders, grape unfixed, . . . . .	36	Sponges, do. . . . .	4	
9 do. . . . .	142	Lintstocks, . . . . .	4	
6 do. . . . .	427	Portfire stocks, . . . . .	5	
4 do. . . . .	120	Sponge heads, sizes, . . . . .	119	
3 do. . . . .	202	Ladle heads, do. . . . .	17	
3 do. for pateraroes . . . . .	37	Rammer heads, do. . . . .	28	
Pounds of grape, sizes, . . . . .	53,224	Tompions, do. . . . .	5	
		Blocks, of sizes, for round, grape, and case shot, . . . . .	650	
<i>Round Shot.</i>				
12 pounders, . . . . .	122	Gun carriage, not finished, . . . . .	1	
9 do. . . . .	1681	Sides for do. . . . .	26	
4 do. . . . .	2095	Old elevating screws, . . . . .	3	
Round shot, strap, . . . . .	152	Do. wall pieces, . . . . .	12	
		Do. blunderbusses, . . . . .	20	
<i>Powder.</i>				
Double barrels, . . . . .	3	Do. bayonets, . . . . .	163	
Single do. . . . .	10	Do. do. scabbards, . . . . .	768	
		Old broken swords, . . . . .	39	
		Do. scabbards for do. . . . .	27	
		Do. Shot pouches, . . . . .	12	
		Do. Halberds, . . . . .	21	
		Do. Espontoons, . . . . .	2	
		New cartouch boxes and belts, . . . . .	29	



*Return of Ordnance, &c. at Carlisle—Continued.*

Old cartouch boxes, without belts,	1,373	Old camp kettles,	27
Do. gun slings,	13	Pairs of horse shoes,	141½
Do. bayonet belts,	13	Fire buckets,	50
Do. gun barrels,	925	Long pine table,	1
Do. locks,	1,801	Pairs of large scales,	1
Walnut gun stocks,	919	Do. small copper do.	1
New French gun locks,	447	Iron weights, 56 lbs.	15
New Dutch do.	487	28 do.	2
Pikes, with handles,	506	14 do.	3
Do. for light horsemen, no handles,	310	7 do.	2
Sockets and hinges for do.	310	4 do.	1
Sets bullet moulds,	2	3 do.	1
Small do.	4	Copper weights, 4 lbs.	1
For wall pieces, do.	3	1 do.	1
Tomahawks, with handles,	1,007	½ do.	1
Do. without do.	1,019		
Brushes and wires,	41		
Old flints,	80	<i>Implements.</i>	
Do. drum rims and hoops,	8	Bellows for travelling forges,	3
Box of forged gun locks,	1	Stake anvils of sizes,	6
Portfire cases,	126	Machine for boring gun barrels,	1
Fuzes drove, 10 inch,	41	Large wheels and frames,	1
5½ do.	400	Small polishing wheels,	3
Sulphur, in hogsheads,	21	Old grindstones,	2
Do. tierces,	10	Handbill hooks,	24
Do. barrels,	10	Hand barrow,	1
Pounds of umber,	312	Cutting knives,	7
Do. antimony,	300	Shoemaker's hammers,	8
Do. paper of cannon cartridges, sorts,	1,620	Plasterer's tools,	12
Reams of musket cartridges,	2	Handsaws of sorts,	9
Box of small glass,	1	Shovels,	7
Sides of tanned leather,	36	Brickmaker's flasks,	12
Travelling forges, not finished,	1	Plamer for do.	2
Pounds of gun carriage iron,	125	Copper adze,	1
Do. of wrought iron,	1,680	Shoemaker's lasts,	138
Gun scalp,	173	Lastmaker's tools,	1
Pounds of gun carriage nails,	20	Box of armorer's do.	1
Small bells,	1	Small do. do.	1
Back chains,	7	Shoemaker's and saddler's benches,	39
Pounds of new chain links,	25	Branding irons,	8
Bannet sockets, not finished,	1,077	Spatulas, shod with copper,	2
Hinges and hooks, for travelling forges,	67	Pairs of tinman's shears,	2
Pump borers,	2	Old iron machine,	1
Mill irons,	4	Stone mason's tools, of sorts,	24
Wagon and gun boxes,	287	Powder mullers,	2
Pounds of block tin plate forged,	42		
Arm chest with cartouch box leather,	1	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
Do. with old gun furniture,	3	Old guns,	840
Breech pans,	7	Single barrels powder,	5½
Carriage wheels, not shod,	25	Tubes,	850
Do. shod,	46	Musket cartridges,	628
Iron frame, for furnace door,	1	Pounds wrought iron,	1,680
Iron pestle and mortar,	1	Old guns,	167
Old writing desk,	1	Old locks,	32
Old tin canteens,	6	Large wheels and frames,	1
Wooden do.	11	Small polishing wheel,	1
Old tin tube boxes,	10	Handsaws,	6
Wooden mallets,	101	Pairs of horse shoes,	141½
Pump iron,	1	Box of small lasts,	1
Old gins and falls,	2	Old bayonets with scabbards,	50
Stove plates, of sizes,	11		

*Return of Shot and Shells, the property of the United States, at the undermentioned places.*

NEW JERSEY.				Shot, 1 pile,	4,125
<i>Mount Hope Furnace.</i>				Grape,	5
				Do.	800
Shells, 10 inch,	-	-	2,160	<i>Batsto Furnace.</i>	
8 do.	-	-	4,439	Shells, 10 inch,	114
5½ do.	-	-	4,747	8 do.	429
Shot, 18 pile,	-	-	6,849	Shot, 24 pile,	938
6 do.	-	-	3,455	18 do.	1,719
3 do.	-	-	140	12 do.	409
Grape,	-	-	20		
<i>Rockway Forge.</i>				PENNSYLVANIA.	
Shells, 10 inch,	-	-	2,835	<i>Durham Furnace.</i>	
Carcasses, 10 inch,	-	-	511	Shells, 10 inch,	293
Shot, 18 pile,	-	-	2,265	8 do.	105
12 do.	-	-	2,399	Shot, 24 pile,	229
9 do.	-	-	1,577	18 do.	227
6 do.	-	-	1,103	12 do.	45
4 do.	-	-	1,134		
3 do.	-	-	1,099		
8	m				

Return of Shot and Shells, &c.—Continued.

<i>Oley Furnace.</i>		MARYLAND.	
Shells, 10 inch,	1	<i>Baltimore.</i>	
8 do.	75	Shells, 10 inch,	417
Shot, 32 pile,	363	Shot, 24 pile,	50
24 do.	261	18 do.	159
12 do.	130	12 do.	679
<i>Berkshire Furnace.</i>		<i>Johnston's Ferry.</i>	
Shells, 10 inch,	902	Shells, 10 inch,	1,876
8 do.	256	8 do.	1,348
Shot, 24 pile,	131	Shot, 24 pile,	3,906
18 do.	912	18 do.	1,805
<i>Cornwall Furnace.</i>		12 do.	134
Shot, 12 pile,	3,555	<i>Elkton.</i>	
<i>Mary Ann Furnace.</i>		Shells, 10 inch,	3,426
Grape shot,	15	9 do.	270
		8 do.	969
		Shot, 24 pile,	570
		18 do.	1,405
		9 do.	33

Return of Ordnance and Military Stores, in the States of Delaware and Maryland.

<i>AT ELKTON.</i>		<i>Damaged Stores at Turner's Creek.</i>	
<i>Iron Ordnance.</i>		Garrison carriages, 24 pounders,	2
18 pounders,	9	18 do.	9
12 do.	13	12 do.	10
9 do.	11	<i>At Georgetown.</i>	
6 do.	4	Garrison carriages, 9 pounders,	2
2 do.	2	Travelling carriages, 24 pounders,	4
1 do.	1	18 do.	7
18 Cannonade,	20	Cannonade carriage, 18 do.	1
<i>Military Stores.</i>		Limbers with wheels, 24 do.	2
Copper ladles,	15	18 do.	3
Sponges and rammers,	15	12 do.	2
Worms,	5	6 do.	1
Cartridge cases,	5	Drag ropes,	17
Lintstocks,	5	Slow match,	lbs. 100
Bayonets,	4	Muskets, broken,	15
Cartridge boxes,	13		

Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at New London, Virginia.

<i>Brass Ordnance.</i>		WITHOUT CARTRIDGES.	
8 Pounders,	1	<i>Strapt Shot.</i>	
6 do.	2	12 Pound,	17
3 do.	3	7 do.	588
Howitzers, 5½ inch,	1	3 do.	333
<i>Carriages and Wheels.</i>		1 Box of mixed,	1
6 Pounders,	1	<i>Case Shot.</i>	
3 do.	2	12 Pound,	72
SHOT.		6 do.	82
<i>Round Fixed.</i>		4 do.	21
Amusette,	36	3 do.	106
12 Pound,	20	Amusette,	39
9 do.	2	<i>Howitzers.</i>	
6 do.	1,561	8 Inch,	21
4 do.	26	5½ do.	48
3 do.	1,144	4½ do.	138
<i>Case Fixed.</i>		<i>Grape Shot.</i>	
6 Pound,	403	6 Pound,	5
4 do.	6	3 do.	33
3 do.	487	Box of loose,	1
<i>Grape Fixed.</i>		<i>Round Shot, Loose.</i>	
6 Pound,	98	6 Pound,	380
4 do.	30	3 do.	360
3 do.	66		

## Return of Ordnance, &amp;c. at New London—Continued.

<i>Shells.</i>				<i>Bayonets.</i>	
Filled $4\frac{3}{8}$ inch,	-	-	41	Wanting cleaning,	1,168
Do. handgrenades,	-	-	111	Broken,	60
Empty $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch,	-	-	51		
Carcasses $4\frac{3}{8}$ inch,	-	-	60		
<i>Fuzes.</i>				<i>Military Stores.</i>	
Good fixed 10 inch,	-	-	363	Common cartridge paper, ream,	1
Do. 8 do.	-	-	174	Do. do. quires,	11
Do. $5\frac{1}{2}$ do.	-	-	21	Musket cartridges, dozens in boxes,	25,173
Empty 8 inch,	-	-	620	Do. dozens of good, included in the casks of damaged,	11,160
CARTRIDGES.				Pistol cartridges, dozens,	155
				Musket flints,	18,250
				Pistol do.	900
				Gun locks wanting cleaning,	725
				Lock plates,	136
				Gun swivels,	1,080
				Bands,	580
				Guards,	250
				Breech pieces,	480
				Box of side brasses,	1
				Boxes of parts of locks,	2
				Bullet moulds, double,	4
				Do. single,	5
				Musket ball, boxes containing 100 each,	6
				Do. chest supposed 1,000 lbs.	1
				Bar lead, pigs, weight of each 150 lbs.	5
				Screw drivers,	688
				Gun worms,	374
				Double shot mould,	1
				Lead aprons,	56
				Kit,	lb. 34
				Kit brush,	1
				Kit ladle,	1
				Quick match, boxes,	3
				Slow match,	lb. 470
				Portfires,	786
				Tubes, sizes,	3,800
				Tube boxes, sorts,	13
				Drudging boxes,	6
				Sponges,	5
				Ladles,	7
				Worms,	10
				Men's harness, pairs,	2
				Drag ropes, do.	6
				Priming horns,	23
				Gunners' belts, (incomplete)	11
				Portfire stocks,	19
				Lintstocks,	22
				Fuze engine,	1
				Fuze sets and drivers, sizes,	24
				Copper measures, do.	30
				Grenadier match pipes,	60
				Do. matches,	78
				Barrel shot bottoms, size,	1
				Copper hoops,	16
				Bullet nippers, pairs,	2
				Sheets of tin,	189
				Cannon cartridge formers,	4
				Musket do.	45
				Meels,	3
				Portfire formers,	1
				Do. drift sets,	1
				Do. moulds,	1
				Sieves,	2
				Shot gauges, set,	1
				Casting pot,	1
				Pound of Twine,	1
				Earthen jug,	1
				Shot ladle,	1
				Harnessmaker's benches,	2
				Stocker's rounds,	15
				Hollows,	3
				Laboratory chests,	3
				Keg paint,	1
				Tackle blocks, pair,	1
				Small scales and weights,	1
				Writing desk,	1
<i>Powder.</i>				<i>Implements.</i>	
Double barrels,	-	-	24 $\frac{3}{4}$	Ogee planes,	2
Barrels,	-	-	71	Grooving plane, pair,	1
$\frac{3}{4}$ barrels,	-	-	7	Felling axe,	1
$\frac{1}{2}$ barrels,	-	-	27	Broad chisel,	1
				Hatchet,	1
				Square,	1
				Bevil,	1
<i>Muskets.</i>					
British, wanting cleaning,	-	-	993		
French do.	-	-	238		
Musket barrels,	-	-	889		
Do. with parts of mounting,	-	-	354		
Do. with locks,	-	-	166		
Steel ramrods,	-	-	151		
Stocks unfinished,	-	-	25		
Fusee barrels,	-	-	15		
<i>Swords.</i>					
Dragoon,	-	-	66		
Infantry,	-	-	25		
Scabbards,	-	-	61		
Espositoons,	-	-	4		

*Return of Ordnance, &c. at New London—Continued.*

Double irons,	2	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
Screw U.	1	Ordnance carriage,	1
Brands U. S.	2	Boxes of fuzes,	2
Small chisels,	5	Empty flannel cartridges,	220
Gouges,	2	Muskets, (unfit for service)	3,488
Brace stocks,	2	Musket barrels, do.	105
Centre bits,	2	Fusees, do.	38
Turner's tool,	1	Light infantry cartridge boxes,	2,000
Drawing knife,	1	Cartridge boxes wanting repair,	867
Hand hammer,	1	Do. unfit for service,	3,300
Breech wrenches,	5	Musket cartridges, casks,	105
Screw plates and taps,	2	Do. boxes,	24
Nippers, pair,	1	Gunlocks,	100
Bow saw,	1	Barrels powder,	14
Drills,	3	Half barrels powder,	37
Tongs,	1	Gunner's haversacks,	23
Riveting hammer,	1	Lanterns,	3
Bench vice,	1	Files,	7
Swage hammer,	2	Drums,	6
Polishing brush,	1	Double barrels powder,	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Gunsmith's tool,	1	Pistol cartridges, dozens,	34 $\frac{1}{2}$
Bayonet borers,	6		
Cast swage anvil,	1		
Spoke shave,	1		

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Manchester, Virginia.*

<i>Brass Ordnance.</i>		<i>Shells empty.</i>	
6 Pounders field pieces,	2	8 Inch,	2
<i>Howitzers.</i>		5 $\frac{1}{2}$ Inch,	268
8 Inch shells,	69	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ Inch,	10
5 $\frac{1}{2}$ Inch do.	46	<i>Fuzes.</i>	
4 $\frac{1}{2}$ Inch do.	100	8 Inch, empty,	76
<i>Carriages.</i>		5 $\frac{1}{2}$ Inch, fixed,	76
24 Pound field carriage, (incomplete)	1	<i>Paper Cartridges empty.</i>	
18 do. do.	7	24 Pound,	32
8 do. do. (German)	1	12 do.	5
6 do. do.	1	Swivel,	2,110
18 do. garrison do.	1	<i>Muskets.</i>	
Wheel sizes,	41	Wanting cleaning,	6
<i>Limbers.</i>		Barrels off,	52
18 Pound,	6	Butts of, with parts of mounting,	24
6 do.	3	Steel ramrods,	32
<i>SHOT.</i>		<i>Swords.</i>	
<i>Case.</i>		Dragon,	1
24 Pound,	90	Scabbards,	28
18 do.	34	Espontoons,	50
12 do.	644	Pikes,	15
9 do.	54	Bayonets wanting cleaning,	70
9 do.	46	<i>Military Stores.</i>	
<i>Strapt.</i>		Stand for flag staff,	2
24 Pound,	202	Gins, (incomplete)	2
12 do.	636	Gun worms,	25
<i>Grape.</i>		Sponges, sizes,	172
24 Pound,	72	Ladles, do.	22
18 do.	6	Worms, do.	54
12 do.	14	Portfire,	1
9 do.	27	Pounds slow match,	75
A quantity of loose shot not ascertained.		Tube, sizes,	550
<i>Round Shot Loose.</i>		Box rocket staffs 82,	1
24 Pound,	710	Men's harness, sets,	29
18 do.	3,560	Drag ropes, sets,	6
12 do.	1,457	Gunner's belts, (incomplete)	5
9 do.	1,900	Priming horns,	13
6 do.	1,288	Priming wires,	10
4 do.	39	Shell hooks,	7
Bar Shot—sizes,	156	Shell scrapers,	8
		Sheets of tin,	4
		Copper hoops,	13
		Bag shot bottoms for 8 inch howitzers,	225
		Sponge caps, sizes,	7
		Budge barrel,	1
		Steel spikes, sizes,	62
		Shot ladle,	1

## Return of Ordnance, &amp;c. at Manchester—Continued.

Box old iron, - - - - -	1	Cooper's copper driver, - - - - -	1
Pair large scales, - - - - -	1	Gouge, - - - - -	1
Washers, - - - - -	38	Jack screw, - - - - -	1
Do. with draghooks, - - - - -	10	Brand U. S., - - - - -	1
Trail rings, - - - - -	6	Do. C. A., - - - - -	1
Breast hooks, - - - - -	2	Gunner's punches, - - - - -	10
Linch pins, - - - - -	14	Do. bits, - - - - -	12
Trunnion plates, - - - - -	2		
Wheel box, - - - - -	1		
Spades and shovel handles, - - - - -	408		
		<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
<i>Implements.</i>		Beds for cohorns, unfit for service, - - - - -	11
Old smoothing plane, - - - - -	1	18 Pound limber, - - - - -	1
Hollow, - - - - -	1	Muskets, - - - - -	16
Moving gouges, - - - - -	4	Pistols, - - - - -	2
Chisels, - - - - -	3	Broken bayonets, - - - - -	35
Square, - - - - -	1	A quantity of bayonets, belts, and scabbards, unfit for service, - - - - -	
Cooper's cross, - - - - -	1	Locks, - - - - -	22
Nail tool, - - - - -	1	Cartridge boxes, - - - - -	80
Buttress, - - - - -	1	Tube boxes, - - - - -	2
Cole chisels, - - - - -	4	Tin canteens, - - - - -	22
Breech wrench, - - - - -	1	One budge barrel, - - - - -	1
Smith's tongs, - - - - -	2	Sheep skins, - - - - -	24
Hammers, - - - - -	2	Lantern, - - - - -	1
Smith's punch, - - - - -	1	Drums, - - - - -	2
Smith's anvil, - - - - -	1	Bugle horn, - - - - -	1
Calking iron, - - - - -	1	French horns, - - - - -	2
		Tinman's shears, - - - - -	2

## Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Fort Washington, Western Territory.

		<i>Brass Ordnance.</i>		Bayonet belts, - - - - -	143
6 Pounds, - - - - -	3			Bayonet scabbards, - - - - -	943
3 do. - - - - -	5			Fusees and bayonets, - - - - -	12
Howitzers, 8 inch, - - - - -	1			$\frac{3}{4}$ inch fusees, - - - - -	1,000
Ditto, $5\frac{1}{2}$ do. - - - - -	2			Cartridge boxes with belts, - - - - -	341
				Do. without do. - - - - -	597
<i>Iron Ordnance.</i>				Infantry boxes and belts, - - - - -	1,060
4 Pounds, - - - - -	1			Priming wires and brushes, - - - - -	1,855
Cohorns, - - - - -	2			Pairs of pistols, - - - - -	15
				Horseman's swords, - - - - -	15
<i>Carriages and Limbers.</i>				Fusees, drove 8 inch, - - - - -	5,564
6 Pounds, - - - - -	3			Do. do. $5\frac{1}{2}$ do., - - - - -	415
3 do. - - - - -	4			Do. not drove $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch, - - - - -	500
8 inch howitzers, - - - - -	1			Carbines, - - - - -	10
$5\frac{1}{2}$ do. do. - - - - -	2			Drums, - - - - -	6
Carriage wheels, pairs, - - - - -	7			Pairs drumsticks, - - - - -	5
				Rifles, - - - - -	64
<i>Fixed Ammunition.</i>				Rifle pouches, - - - - -	55
Rounds of 6 pound grape shot, - - - - -	41			Pouch belts, - - - - -	125
Do. of 6 do. strapt shot, - - - - -	41			Belts and frogs, - - - - -	35
Do. of 3 do. do. - - - - -	5			Bugle horns, - - - - -	10
Do. of 6 do. case shot, - - - - -	3			Arms wanting repair, - - - - -	251
Do. of 3 do. do. - - - - -	3			Infantry box belts without boxes, - - - - -	15
				Old cartridge box belts, - - - - -	372
<i>Unfixed Ammunition.</i>				Blunderbusses, - - - - -	15
6 Pound shot, - - - - -	3,287			Tin boxes of cartridges, - - - - -	1,214
4 do. - - - - -	2,622			Haversacks, - - - - -	10
3 do. - - - - -	783			Gunner's belts, - - - - -	8
Rounds of 6 pound grape shot, - - - - -	70			<i>Military Stores, &amp;c.</i>	
Do. of 3 do. strapt do. - - - - -	60			Sponges and rammers, - - - - -	10
Do. of 3 do. case do. - - - - -	12			Worms and ladles, - - - - -	10
Do. of case shot for $8\frac{1}{2}$ inch howitzers, - - - - -	19			Linstocks, - - - - -	10
Case shot, $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch, in kegs, each containing 24, - - - - -	96			Portfire stocks, - - - - -	465
Loose grape shot, - - - - -	152			Tube boxes, - - - - -	10
Hand grenades, - - - - -	262			Tin lanterns, - - - - -	12
				Trail handspikes, - - - - -	10
<i>Powder.</i>				Lead aprons, - - - - -	10
Pounds of cannon, - - - - -	8,203			Covering aprons, - - - - -	10
Do. of musket, - - - - -	12,749 $\frac{1}{2}$			Ammunition kegs iron bound, - - - - -	4
Do. of rifle, - - - - -	3,092 $\frac{1}{4}$			Iron port-fire rammers, - - - - -	4
Powder horns, - - - - -	49			4 pound copper measures, - - - - -	2
Artillery do. - - - - -	9			Tompions and collars, - - - - -	10
Pistol cartridges, dozens, - - - - -	506			Dipping ladles, - - - - -	2
				Pounds of lead dross, - - - - -	300
<i>Arms.</i>				Set of ordnance types, - - - - -	1
Muskets, - - - - -	689			Copper tube, - - - - -	1
Bayonets, - - - - -	831			New drag ropes, - - - - -	22
				Old do. - - - - -	16
				Men's harness, - - - - -	4
				Dark lanterns, - - - - -	12
				Pounds of brimstone, - - - - -	63
				Pounds of antimony, - - - - -	85

Return of Ordnance, &c. at Fort Washington—Continued.

Gin tackle and rigging,	1	Sponge skins,	12
Wooden ditto,	1	Pounds of solder,	104
Rasps,	2	Set of tinman's tools,	1
Chisels,	2	Hammer springs,	397
Scrapers,	2	Hammers,	260
Knives for the laboratory,	6	Sear springs,	413
Pairs of scissors,	20	Mainsprings,	600
Pairs of shears,	2	Musket cocks with pins,	600
Drawing knife,	1	Sweet oil, gallons,	30
Powder sieves,	4	Aquafortis, pounds,	3
8 day clock,	1	Drum snares,	17
Wooden quadrants,	1	Mouth pieces for bugle horns,	24
Astronomical ditto,	1	Howitzer packsaddles with pillions,	16
Tin funnels,	4	Sheets of brass,	10
4 pound melting ladles,	2	Sheets of copper,	22
Axes for cannon,	4	Armorer's bellows,	1
Brass portfire mould and clock,	1	Pounds of spun cotton for quick match,	20
Pounds of musket ball,	20,582	Pounds of portfire paper,	300
Pounds of lead,	3,854	Reams of brown wrapping paper for cartridges,	99
Do. of buckshot,	615	Pounds of saltpetre refined,	100
Flints,	73,519	Brass quadrants, without plumbs,	5
Reams of cannon cartridge paper,	29	Set of brass shot gauges,	1
Reams of musket ditto,	40	Coils slow match,	222
Quires of do. ditto,	9		
Reams of packing paper,	1½	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
Gun worms,	1,044	Pounds of damaged powder,	2,250½
Screw drivers,	2,113	Musket balls,	2,824
Shot moulds,	3	Old bayonets,	240
Drum heads,	16	Old muskets,	639
Drum cords,	31	Fusees and bayonets,	3
Drum cases,	8	Fusee bayonets,	56
Rifle spear blades,	468	Pistols,	11
Rifle ladles,	13	Belts,	15
Tomahawks,	236	Scabbards,	15
Scalping knives and scabbards,	68	Horseman's brass covered caps,	46
Musket bullet moulds,	10	Swords,	10
Pounds of lampblack,	10	Espontoons,	21
Buck shot moulds,	6	Rifles,	4
Yards of flannel,	233½	Cartridge boxes,	2
Pounds of thread,	45		

Return of Ordnance and Military Stores at Fort Hamilton.

<i>Iron Ordnance.</i>		<i>Dozens Cartridges.</i>	
6 Pounder,	1	Musket ball,	1
1 do.	1	Buckshot,	547
Howitzer, 5½ inch,	1	Fusee,	87
		Pistol,	72
<i>Carriages.</i>		Blank musket cartridges,	5,230
6 Pounder,	1	Rifle powder,	kegs, 2½
1 do.	1	<i>Military Stores.</i>	
Howitzers, 5½ inch,	1	Garrison flag,	1
Limbers, 6 Pounds,	12	Trail handspikes,	2
<i>Fixed Ammunition.</i>		Lead aprons,	2
Case, 6 pound,	1	Tarpaulins,	2
5½ inch,	10	Gunner's belts,	2
Grape, 6 pound,	25	Portfire stocks,	5
Strapt, 6 do.	23	Linstock,	4
Shells, 5½ inch,	10	Tube boxes,	2
<i>Unfixed Ammunition.</i>		Tubes,	6
Case, 6 pound,	60	Portfires,	11
Grape, 6 do.	85	Leather haversacks,	3
1 do.	12	Drag ropes,	2
Strapt, 6 do.	85	Drudging box,	1
Shells, 5½ inch, empty,	33	Lantern,	1
<i>Sponges and Rammers.</i>		Cartridge box belts,	48
6 Pounder,	1	Bayonet belts,	25
1 do.	1	Muskets,	27
Howitzer, 5½ inch,	1	Rifles,	41
<i>Worms and Ladles.</i>		Old swords,	2
6 Pounder,	1	Powder horns,	116
1 do.	1	Pouch belts,	84
Howitzer, 5½ inch,	1	Musket ball, in boxes,	lbs. 600
<i>Tompions and Collars.</i>		Lead,	lbs. 106
6 Pounder,	1	Canteens,	17
Howitzer, 5½ inch,	1	Flints,	600
		Artillery horns,	2
<i>Damaged Stores.</i>			
		Musket,	45
		Rifles,	11
		Cartridge boxes,	68
		Drum and pair of sticks,	1

*Return of Military Stores deposited at Fort St. Clair.*

Musket flints,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,764
Do. cartridges,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,448
Do. do. (damaged.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,305
Rifle flints,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200
Do. powder,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	lbs. 251
Bar lead,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	lbs. 249
Slow match,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	lbs. 8

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores at Fort Jefferson.*

<i>Iron Ordnance.</i>					<i>Cartridges.</i>				
6 Pounder,	-	-	-	1	6 Pound, blank,	-	-	-	40
Howitzer, 5½ inch,	-	-	-	1	Musket cartridges, 61 kegs, containing dozens,	-	-	-	4,434
					Fusee, do. 3 do. do.	-	-	-	235
					Pistol, do. -	-	-	-	50
<i>Shot.</i>					<i>Military Stores.</i>				
Case, 5½ inch,	-	-	-	8	Portfire,	-	-	sticks,	10
Do. do. unfixed, 6 boxes, containing,	dozens,	-	-	20	Drudging box,	-	-	-	1
Do. 6 pound, do. 8 do. do.	rounds,	-	-	120	Tube box,	-	-	-	1
Do. 3 do. do. 3 do. do.	dozens,	-	-	120	Haversacks,	-	-	-	2
Grape, fixed,	-	-	-	10	Sponges,	-	-	-	2
3lb. do. do. 4 boxes, containing	dozens,	-	-	64	Ladle,	-	-	-	1
3lb. do. unfixed, 4 boxes, containing	do.	-	-	96	Musket flints,	-	-	-	15,596
Strapt, fixed,	-	-	rounds,	7	Muskets,	-	-	-	16
Do. unfixed,	-	-	do.	2	Musket ball, 10 boxes, containing each 100 lbs.	-	-	-	1,000
6lb. do. do. 22 boxes, containing	do.	-	-	308	Do. single,	-	-	-	385
3lb. do. do. 4 do. do.	do.	-	-	120	Buckshot,	-	-	-	130
					Slow match,	-	-	lbs.	175
<i>Shells.</i>					Bayonets,	-	-	-	12
5½ inch, fixed,	-	-	-	5	Lead,	-	-	lbs.	80
Do. do. 8 boxes, containing,	dozens,	-	-	43	Set of copper scales and weights,	-	-	-	1
Dead shells, 5½ inch,	-	-	-	2	Drag ropes,	-	-	-	3
					Sets men's harness,	-	-	-	2
<i>Carriages.</i>					<i>Damaged Stores.</i>				
6 Pounders,	-	-	-	1	Musket powder, 8 barrels,	-	-	-	lbs. 653
3 do.	-	-	-	2	Rifle, do. 6 do.	-	-	-	lbs. 437
					Powder,	-	-	-	lbs. 107

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Pittsburg.*

<i>Ordnance.</i>					<i>Carbines, do. do.</i>				
Howitzers (brass) mounted,	-	-	-	1	Fusees,	-	-	-	3
6 pounders (iron) do.	-	-	-	3	Esportoon,	-	-	-	1
					Musicians' swords and belts,	-	-	-	4
					Swords with belts and scabbards,	-	-	-	46
<i>Ball.</i>					<i>Military Stores.</i>				
12 pounders,	-	-	-	1,458	Ladles, 6 pounders,	-	-	-	6
					Sticks, portfire,	-	-	-	14
<i>Shot.</i>					Ammunition boxes,	-	-	-	12
6 pounders, grape,	-	-	-	80	Tin boxes for cartridges,	-	-	-	345
6 do. canister,	-	-	-	85	Gun worms,	-	-	-	210
Case shot unfixed,	-	-	-	140	Brushes and wires,	-	-	-	166
					Box musket ball,	-	-	-	1
<i>Powder.</i>					Reams musket cartridge paper,	-	-	-	7
Double barrels cannon,	-	-	-	1	Set powder sieves,	-	-	-	1
Single do. coarse musket,	-	-	-	14	Bugle horns,	-	-	-	3
Do. do. fine do.	-	-	-	9	Slow match, pounds,	-	-	-	58
Do. do. do. rifle do.	-	-	-	3	Saltpetre, refined, do.	-	-	-	44
					Brass shot gauges, set,	-	-	-	1
<i>Arms.</i>					Tumbrels,	-	-	-	2
Blunderbusses,	-	-	-	10	Lead, pounds,	-	-	-	13,358
Rifles, complete,	-	-	-	34	Sheet lead, do.	-	-	-	171
Muskets without bayonets, &c.	-	-	-	275	Rifle flints,	-	-	-	13,009
Do. do. locks,	-	-	-	51	Musket do.	-	-	-	39,838
					Cartouch boxes without belts, damaged,	-	-	-	97

## Returns of Ordnance and Military Stores deposited at Fort Franklin.

<i>Arms on hand.</i>		<i>Military Stores in use.</i>	
Rifles, - - - - -	6	Cartridge boxes, - - - - -	19
Muskets, - - - - -	18	Musket cartridges, - - - - -	91
Bayonets, - - - - -	11	Powder horns, - - - - -	9
Flints, - - - - -	360		
Musket balls, pounds, - - - - -	1,500	<i>Smiths' Tools in use.</i>	
Powder kegs, - - - - -	10	Anvil, - - - - -	1
		Beck horn, - - - - -	1
<i>Military Stores on hand.</i>		Sledge, - - - - -	1
Cartridge boxes, - - - - -	24	Hammers, - - - - -	4
Musket cartridges, - - - - -	2,912	Screw plate, - - - - -	1
Powder horns, - - - - -	8	Tongs, - - - - -	1
Bullet mould, - - - - -	1	Pincers, - - - - -	1
Melting ladle, - - - - -	1	Burnishers, - - - - -	1
Bayonet belts, - - - - -	44		
Cartridge paper, quires, - - - - -	11	<i>Damaged Stores.</i>	
Steel, pounds, - - - - -	14	Muskets, - - - - -	6
Iron, do. - - - - -	104	Bayonets, - - - - -	7
		Cartridge boxes, - - - - -	12
<i>Arms in use.</i>		Melting ladle, - - - - -	1
Rifles, - - - - -	10	Bellows, - - - - -	1
Muskets, - - - - -	21	Vice, - - - - -	1
Bayonets, - - - - -	20	Files, - - - - -	6
Flints, - - - - -	30		

## \*Aggregate abstract of the principal articles contained in the foregoing returns.

Iron cannon, of different sizes, - - - - -	214	Musket ball, - - - - -	6 tons, 16 cwt. 1 qr. 3lbs.
Iron howitzers, - - - - -	49	Cannon cartridges, - - - - -	15,263
Iron mortars, - - - - -	2	Musket do. - - - - -	905,460
Iron cohorns, - - - - -	2	Pistol do. - - - - -	10,716
Brass cannon, - - - - -	153		
Brass howitzers, - - - - -	43	<i>Damaged.</i>	
Besides the last mentioned cannon, there are now casting at Springfield, 30 pieces brass ordnance and 20 brass 5½ inch howitzers.		Iron cannon, - - - - -	21
Brass mortars, - - - - -	63	Brass howitzers, - - - - -	3
Brass cohorn, - - - - -	1	Muskets, - - - - -	15,670
Muskets, - - - - -	31,015	Bayonets, - - - - -	3,035
Bayonets, - - - - -	4,022	Pistols, - - - - -	423
Pistols, - - - - -	805	Flints, - - - - -	15,942
Flints, - - - - -	1,610,119	Powder, barrels, - - - - -	136½
Powder, barrels, - - - - -	4,460½	Musket ball, - - - - -	1 ton, 5 cwt. 24lb.
Lead, - - - - -	87 tons, 7 cwt. 1 qr. 18 lbs.	Musket cartridges, - - - - -	5,137
		Do. do. boxes, - - - - -	24

## Delivered of the principal articles since last General Return, dated 7th October, 1789.

Brass cannon, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	16
Iron Ordnance, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	11
Muskets, forwarded to the army, - - - - -	-	-	-	7,619	
Do. do. to the State of Georgia, - - - - -	-	-	-	2,000	
Do. do. to the Southwestern territory, - - - - -	-	-	-	1,000	
Do. sold to the State of South Carolina, - - - - -	-	-	-	600	
Do. to the Minister of France, 4th October, 1791, for the use of the French colonies, - - - - -	-	-	-	1,000	
					12,219
Powder, forwarded to the army, - - - - -	-	-	-	bbls. 844½	
Do. do. to the State of Georgia, - - - - -	-	-	-	75	
Do. do. to the Southwestern territory, - - - - -	-	-	-	40	
					959½
Musket ball, forwarded to the army, - - - - -	-	-	-	tons, 36 10 3 21	
Do. do. to the State of Georgia, - - - - -	-	-	-	3 3 1 16	
Do. do. to the Southwestern territory, - - - - -	-	-	-	3 2 2 0	
					42 16 3 9
Pig Lead, forwarded to the army, - - - - -	-	-	-	tons, 23 1 1 27	
Do. do. to the State of Georgia, - - - - -	-	-	-	4 5 1 9	
Do. do. to the Southwestern territory, - - - - -	-	-	-	0 18 1 18	
					28 4 0 16

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 14, 1793.

H. KNOX, Secretary of War.



3d CONGRESS.]

No. 11.

[1st SESSION.]

## PURVEYOR OF PUBLIC SUPPLIES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 7, 1794.

*Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives :*

Experience has shown that it would be useful to have an officer particularly charged, under the direction of the Department of War, with the duties of receiving, safe keeping, and distributing the public supplies, in all cases in which the laws and the course of service do not devolve them upon other officers, and also with that of superintending, in all cases, the issues in detail of supplies, with power, for that purpose, to bring to account all persons entrusted to make such issues, in relation thereto. An establishment of this nature, by securing a regular and punctual accountability for the issues of public supplies, would be a great guard against abuse, would tend to ensure their due application, and to give public satisfaction on that point.

I therefore recommend to the consideration of Congress, the expediency of an establishment of this nature, under such regulations as shall appear to them advisable.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES, January 7, 1794.

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 12.

[1st SESSION.]

## PURVEYOR OF PUBLIC SUPPLIES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 19, 1794.

The select committee, to whom was referred the message received from the President of the United States on the 7th January last, relative to the appointment of an officer for receiving, safe keeping, and distributing the public supplies, made the following report:

That an officer, similar to that contemplated by the President's message, existed during the late war.

That the effects of order and accountability in the department of military stores were then of such eminent utility as induce a hope in your committee, that similar benefits will result from such an establishment at this time. It is of great importance, that the depositories of ordnance and military stores should be annually visited and inspected; and that the quality, as well as the quantity, of such stores should exactly correspond with the returns transmitted to the War Office. This object appears the more desirable, if not indispensable, in the present distributed state of the public arsenals, which extend from Springfield, in Connecticut, to New London, in Virginia, and which are now superintended by persons of little or no accountability.

With the duties of receiving and safe keeping the public supplies, it is also of importance that particular attention should be paid to the issues, in detail, of such supplies; and that the officer superintending the same should be vested with powers, not only that the application of such supplies is consonant to the object Government had in view, but to call to an account all persons entrusted to make such issues, and to cause a settlement to be thereof made.

From which considerations, your committee are of opinion, that it is expedient such an establishment should be made; and thereupon submit the following resolution:

*Resolved,* That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill providing for the compensation which will be required in the establishment of an office, under the Department of War, for the receiving, safe-keeping, and distributing of military stores and supplies.

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 13.

[1st SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 28, 1794.

Mr. FITZSIMMONS made the following report:

The committee directed to report on such of the ports and harbors of the United States as require to be put in a state of defence, with an estimate of the expense thereof, report, as their opinion, that the following ports and harbors ought to be put in a state of defence, to wit:

Portland, *Maine,*  
 Portsmouth, *New Hampshire,*  
 Cape Anne,  
 Salem,  
 Marblehead, } *Massachusetts,*  
 Boston,  
 Newport, *Rhode Island,*  
 New London,  
 9 m

New York,  
 Philadelphia,  
 Baltimore,  
 Norfolk,  
 Wilmington, *North Carolina,*  
 Ocracoke Inlet,  
 Charleston, *South Carolina,*  
 Savannah, *Georgia.*

That, in their opinion, the fortifications ought to be of a nature to defend the several ports and harbors against surprise by naval armaments; and that the parapets of the batteries and redoubts should be formed of earth, where circumstances will admit.

That the several places, to be fortified, be garrisoned by troops in the pay of the United States.

The estimates, submitted herewith, will show the expense as well of erecting the fortifications, as for providing the cannon and military stores, and the annual expense of supporting the troops. The number of troops to be employed, in each port, is likewise specified.

From these estimates it appears that the sums necessary to erect the fortifications, amount to - \$76,053 52

That it will be necessary to provide two hundred cannon, which, together with their carriages, 96,645 00  
&c. amount to

Making, together - - \$172,698 52

And that the annual expenses of the troops, necessary to garrison the several fortifications, including pay, subsistence, &c. amount to \$90,349 25

It may be proper for the committee to remark, that, in their opinion, it will be necessary, for the security of the United States, to provide the number of cannon above specified, even if the fortifications, before mentioned, should not be erected.

*An estimate of the probable expense of fortifying the following Harbors in the manner specified:*

	Dollars. Cts.	Dollars. Cts.
<b>PORTLAND, Maine, Twelve heavy Cannon.</b>		
The formation of a parapet of earth, for twelve pieces, . . . . .	375 00	
The facing twelve embrasures, at \$14 98 each, . . . . .	179 76	
The expense of twelve platforms, at \$25 75, . . . . .	309 00	
A redoubt constructed of a form, to be adapted to the nature of the ground, to be equal to an hundred feet square, . . . . .	650 00	
A magazine, . . . . .	200 00	
Embrasures and platforms, for four field pieces, . . . . .	160 52	
A block house or barracks, for fifty men, . . . . .	500 00	
For pickets, palisadoes, and to provide for articles difficult to foresee or enumerate, . . . . .	375 00	
		2,749 28
<b>PORTSMOUTH, New Hampshire, Fifteen Pieces.</b>		
A parapet, for fifteen pieces, . . . . .	468 75	
Embrasures and platforms, for fifteen pieces, at \$40 73, . . . . .	609 95	
A redoubt, . . . . .	650 00	
Embrasures and platforms, . . . . .	160 52	
A magazine, . . . . .	200 00	
Block house or barracks, . . . . .	500 00	
Pickets, palisadoes, and contingencies, . . . . .	375 00	
		2,964 22
<b>CAPE ANN, Eight Pieces.</b>		
Expense of the construction of the parapet, embrasures, and platforms, . . . . .	573 84	
A block house; . . . . .	500 00	
A magazine, . . . . .	200 00	
Contingencies, . . . . .	150 00	
		1,423 84
<b>SALEM, Eight Pieces.</b>		
The expense the same, . . . . .	1,423 84	
<b>MARBLEHEAD, Eight Pieces.</b>		
The expense the same, . . . . .	1,423 84	
<b>BOSTON, CASTLE ISLAND, Thirty-six Pieces.</b>		
To put the works in order, estimated at, . . . . .	6,000 00	
<b>GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, Twelve Pieces.</b>		
The same as at Portland, . . . . .	2,749 28	
		13,020 80
<b>NEWPORT.</b>		
Four pieces on travelling carriages, so that no battery may be necessary to be erected.		
<b>GOAT ISLAND, Twenty Pieces.</b>		
To put the works in order, . . . . .		3,000 00
<b>NEW LONDON, Twelve Pieces.</b>		
The same as at Portland, . . . . .	2,749 28	
<b>GROTON, Twelve Pieces.</b>		
The same as at Portland, . . . . .	2,749 28	
		5,498 56

<i>NEW YORK, (Governor's Island,) Twenty-four Pieces.</i>			
The expense of constructing batteries, embrasures, and platforms, for 24 pieces,		1,727 52	
A redoubt with embrasures,		810 00	
Magazine,		200 00	
Block-house or barracks,		500 00	
Contingencies,		500 00	
		3,737 52	
<i>PAULUS HOOK, Sixteen Pieces.</i>			
Parapets, embrasures, and platforms for batteries of 16 pieces,	\$1,151 68		
Redoubt,	650 00		
Four embrasures, and platforms for ditto,	160 00		
A magazine,	200 00		
A block-house,	500 00		
Non-enumerated articles and contingencies,	500 00		
		3,161 68	
<i>NEW YORK.</i>			
Batteries for several parts of the city for 42 pieces,	\$1,312 50		
The expense of the materials and executing platforms and embrasures for 42 pieces at \$40 73,	1,710 66		
Three magazines,	600 00		
Two block-houses, or other buildings equal thereto,	1,000 00		
Contingencies,	1,000 00		
		5,623 16	
Twenty of these pieces may be on travelling carriages, so as to be moved as circumstances might require.			12,523 36
<i>THE DELAWARE, (Mud Island,) Forty-eight Pieces.</i>			
In order to complete the present works for 48 pieces, and a garrison of fifty men,			8,737 94
<i>BALTIMORE, Twenty-eight Pieces.</i>			
Parapets, embrasures, and platforms for batteries, for 28 pieces,		2,015 44	
A redoubt, with four embrasures,		810 00	
Two magazines,		400 00	
Block-house or barracks,		500 00	
Contingencies,		500 00	
		4,225 44	
<i>NORFOLK, Twenty-four Pieces.</i>			
Batteries, embrasures, and platforms,		1,727 58	
Redoubt, with embrasures,		810 00	
A magazine,		200 00	
Block-house or barracks,		500 00	
Contingencies,		500 00	
		3,737 58	
<i>WILMINGTON, Twelve Pieces.</i>			
Batteries, embrasures, and platforms, for 12 pieces,		863 76	
Redoubt, with embrasures,		810 00	
Magazine,		200 00	
Block-house or barracks,		500 00	
Contingencies,		500 00	
		2,873 76	
<i>OCRACOKE, Eight Pieces.</i>			
Batteries for 8 pieces, embrasures, &c.	\$573 84		
Magazine,	200 00		
Block-house or barracks,	500 00		
Contingencies,	500 00		
		1,773 84	
<i>CHARLESTON.</i>			
To be fortified with 72 pieces, which may be divided into three sets of batteries and redoubts,			11,212 32
<i>SAVANNAH.</i>			
The same works and expense as for Norfolk,			3,737 52
		Total amount,	\$76,053 62

*The number of cannon required for the before mentioned places, to wit:*

Portland,	-	-	12	New London and Groton,	-	-	24
Portsmouth,	-	-	15	New York and its dependencies,	-	-	82
Cape Ann,	-	-	8	The Delaware,	-	-	48
Salem,	-	-	8	Baltimore,	-	-	28
Marblehead,	-	-	8	Norfolk,	-	-	24
Boston,	-	-	-	Wilmington, North Carolina,	-	-	12
Castle Island,	-	-	36	Ocracoke,	-	-	8
Governor's Island,	-	-	12	Charleston,	-	-	72
			48	Savannah,	-	-	24
Newport,	-	-	24				
			445				445

The number which might be furnished from the public arsenals,	150
Supposed may be furnished by the respective States, and which would require to be new mounted,	150
Deficient,	145
	<u>445</u>

But, as the precise number of those which are supposed may be furnished by the respective States are uncertain, it would seem most prudent to have cast 200 heavy pieces, of the caliber 24 and 36 pounders.

An estimate of the expense of one hundred twenty-four pound cannon, each weighing 2 tons—200 tons at \$80,	\$16,000
100 of the caliber of cannon of 36 pounders, at 3 tons—300 tons, at \$80,	24,000
200 garrison carriages and implements for the said cannon, at \$60,	12,000
150 carriages and implements for the cannon supposed to be furnished by the respective States, at \$50,	7,500
The expense of mounting the 150 cannon proposed to be furnished from the public arsenals, are already included in the general estimate of the War Department, for the year 1794.	
200 tons of twenty-four pound ball, at \$40,	8,000
360 tons of thirty-six pound ball, at 40 dollars,	14,400
The expense of powder is not estimated, as a considerable quantity is in possession of the public, as will appear by the returns.	
For paper for cartridges, slow-match, port-fires, drag-ropes, carriages to move the cannon from place to place, and all contingencies relatively to the artillery,	6,000
For transportation of the cannon and shot from the public arsenals, and also from the furnaces where they may be cast, to the several fortifications stated in the foregoing estimate,	6,000
Four engineers, to be employed six months to construct and direct the works, with the pay, subsistence, and forage, of lieutenant colonels commandant,	2,745
	<u>\$96,645</u>

*Summary of the foregoing estimates.*

Fortifying the several enumerated harbors,	\$76,053 62
Expense of 200 battering cannon, to be purchased, with carriages and implements, ball, transportation of cannon and ball, pay, &c. of engineers, and all other contingencies relative to the artillery,	96,645 00
Total amount,	<u>\$172,698 62</u>

*An estimate of the number of Troops required as the ordinary protection of the aforesaid Fortifications.*

	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.
Portland,			1	1	2	2	17
Portsmouth,			1	1	2	2	17
Cape Ann,			1	1	2	2	17
Salem,			1	1	2	2	17
Marblehead,			1	1	2	2	17
Boston, Governor's Island,			1	1	2	2	17
Castle Island,		1	1	2	2	2	24
Newport,			1	2	2	2	24
New London,			1	1	1	2	17
Groton,			1	1	1	2	17
New York,		1	2	6	6	2	81
Delaware,		1	2	6	6	2	81
Baltimore,			1	2	2	2	24
Norfolk,			1	2	2	2	24
Wilmington,			1	1	1	2	17
Ocracoke,		1	1	2	2	2	34
South Carolina,		1	2	6	6	2	81
Savannah,			1	2	2	2	24
To act as inspectors to be constantly employed in visiting the posts,	2						
	2	5	21	39	45	36	550

If the several works should be garrisoned in ordinary by a part of the legion of the United States, now in service, the expense is already calculated in the general estimate of the War Department for the year 1794. But, in order to save references thereto, the expense of the number of troops proposed is here specified.

It will not escape notice, that the proposed troops are not artillery, but infantry. It is, however, supposed, that some of the artillery officers in service might be used on the present occasion, and that part of the infantry officers might be chosen for the purpose, who would soon acquire a tolerable degree of knowledge in the use of cannon.

*Estimate of the expenses of the number of troops to be posted in the aforementioned works, as their ordinary protection, for twelve months.*

PAY.			
2 Majors, to act as Inspectors, &c. at \$50 per month,		\$1,200	
5 Captains,	40	2,400	
11 Lieutenants,	26	3,432	
10 Ensigns,	20	2,400	
39 Sergeants,	6	2,808	
45 Corporals,	5	2,700	
36 Music,	4	1,728	
550 Privates,	3	19,800	
			\$36,468 00
SUBSISTENCE.			
2 Majors, four rations per day,	2,920		
5 Captains, three rations per day,	5,475		
11 Lieutenants, two rations per day,	8,030		
10 Ensigns, two rations per day,	7,300		
670 Non-commissioned officers and privates, one ration per day,	244,550		
	268,275		
268,275 rations, at fifteen cents per ration,			40,241 25
FORAGE.			
2 Majors, at ten dollars per month,			240 00
CLOTHING.			
670 Suits, at twenty dollars per suit,			13,400 00
			\$90,349 25

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 28, 1794.*

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 14.

1st SESSION.

ARSENALS AND ARMORIES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 5, 1794.

Mr. FITZSIMONS, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the President's speech of the third of December last, as relates to arms and military stores, magazines and arsenals, made the following report:

That, in addition to the arsenal at Springfield, there ought to be erected two other arsenals, with magazines and other necessary buildings, at such place as may be directed by the President of the United States, and so as to accommodate the Southern and Middle States.

That, in addition to the arms and military stores on hand, there ought to be provided,

7,000 muskets, with bayonets,  
2,000 spare bayonets,  
1,000 large horsemen's pistols,  
100 tons of salt-petre, or 50 tons of powder,  
200 tons of lead.

That there ought to be established a national armory for the purpose of making and repairing arms.

The committee submit, herewith, estimates of the expense of erecting two additional arsenals and magazines, amounting to, \$59,000 00

Of the cost of the additional arms and military stores necessary to be provided, amounting to 143,640 00

And of the annual expense of a national armory, from which may be expected 4,200 muskets, and bayonets annually, amounting to 22,865 20

In conformity with the foregoing opinions and estimates, the committee beg leave to offer the following resolutions:

*Resolved,* That the President of the United States be authorized to direct two arsenals and magazines to be erected, in proper situations, to accommodate the Southern and Middle States; and that a sum, not exceeding fifty-nine thousand dollars be provided for that purpose.

*Resolved,* That a national armory be erected; and that a superintendent, and two master armorers be appointed by the President of the United States, to superintend the same. That so many persons may, from time to time, be employed therein, as the Secretary for the Department of War may judge necessary; and that a sum not exceeding twenty-two thousand eight hundred and sixty-five dollars be provided for defraying the expense thereof.

*Resolved,* That a sum, not exceeding one hundred and forty-three thousand six hundred and forty dollars, be provided for the purpose of purchasing an additional quantity of arms and ammunition.

No. 1.

*Estimate of the expense of purchasing the following articles.*

7,000 muskets, at 9 dollars each,		\$63,000
2,000 bayonets, at 1 do.		2,000
1,000 large horsemen's pistols, at 4 dollars each,		4,000
100 tons saltpetre, at \$400 00 per ton,		40,000
200 do. lead, 173 20 do.		34,640

Dollars, 143,640

## No. 2.

*Estimate for two sets of Arsenals and Magazines.*

A brick building, three stories high, one hundred and seventy-five feet long, and forty-two feet wide, would contain twenty thousand muskets, artillery and carriages in proportion, together with all the light appendages thereof.	
Such a building has been estimated, at the present rate of workmanship, to cost	\$15,000
An arched brick magazine, capable of containing two thousand five hundred barrels of powder,	2,500
Brick barracks, and workshop for one hundred armorers, and barracks for the necessary guard,	10,000
Purchase of the necessary ground,	2,000
	29,500
	Dollars,

There is, at present, at Springfield, an excellent brick magazine, and a variety of wooden buildings, which, with repair, may serve the purpose of securing the public stores at that place, for several years.

If, therefore, two principal arsenals and magazines should be erected at present, besides subordinate ones, they might be sufficient. For the expenses of the latter, the sums contained in the general estimate of the War Department might be adequate.

Two sets of magazines and arsenals, workshops and barracks, each at 29,500 dollars, . . . \$59,000

## No. 3.

*An estimate of the annual expense of the institution of a National Armory, of one superintendent and seventy workmen, and thirty boys.*

One superintendent, at 60 dolls. per month,	Dolls. per ann.	720 00
Two master armorers, 40 . . . do.		960 00
Sixty-eight journeymen, 15 . . . do.		12,240 00
Thirty boys, as apprentices, clothing annually, at 20 dollars each		600 00
		14,520 00

## RATIONS.

One superintendent, three rations per day	1,095	
Two master armorers, two each,	1,460	
Sixty-eight journeymen, one and half each,	37,230	
Thirty boys, one and a half each	16,425	
	56,210	Rations at 12 cents. 6,745 20
Rent of workshops and barracks, estimated at		600 00
Barrack utensils, annually, for one hundred men and boys, beds, blankets, fuel, &c.		1,000 00
		Dollars 22,865 20

## PRODUCE.

Muskets and bayonets which the above workmen may make monthly, 350, annually, 4,200, at 9 dolls. each	Dollars, 37,800
Deduct for materials on each, 2 dolls. 25 cts.	9,450
	28,350 00
Hence it would appear, that the probable profit of the labour of the above mentioned number of men and boys, would amount annually to	5,484 80

Economy and experience may even increase the profit, especially where the proposed apprentices should be rendered expert workmen. But were there no profit at all, but a loss incurred, it is humbly conceived, an institution of this nature, by disseminating the knowledge of so valuable an art, would, in a just political view, amply compensate the expense.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 4th, 1794.*

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 15.

[1st SESSION.]

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 24, 1794.

Mr. COBB, from the committee appointed to report whether any, and what, alterations are, in their opinion, necessary to the act, "more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," made the following report:

That they are impressed with the importance of a more energetic system for the establishment of an uniform militia than what is contemplated by the present existing law of the United States; but, in viewing this subject, as applied to the Constitution of the United States, and the powers therein expressly reserved to the different States, they have their doubts how far Congress can, consistent therewith, make any important alterations or amendments to the present law; and as the right of training the militia is constitutionally reserved to the States, if they can be impressed with the importance of exercising this power, and directing its operation, more especially to the light infantry and grenadier companies of each regiment, an efficient force may be thereby created, and equal to any that can probably be obtained by any additional law of the United States, made under the constitutional powers of Congress. Under this view of the subject, and until further experience shall be had under the existing law, the committee are of opinion that no amendment is necessary to the act for establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States.

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 16.

[1st SESSION.

## INCREASING THE ARMY, AND CALLING INTO SERVICE 80,000 MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 27, 1794.

MR. SEDGWICK, from the committee to whom it was referred to report the means of rendering the force of the United States more efficient, made the following report:

That effectual measures ought to be adopted to complete the present military establishment of the United States, and that provision ought to be made that the same may be kept full.

That an additional corps of artillery, not to exceed eight hundred men, officers included, and also including one chief and four assistant engineers, ought to be raised, garrisoning the fortifications which are or may be erected for the defence of the sea coast.

That the President be authorized and empowered to call on the Executives of the several States, to take effectual measures, as soon as may be, to organize and hold in readiness to march, at a moment's warning, eighty thousand effective militia, (officers included,) to be apportioned to the States respectively, in proportion to the whole number of white inhabitants, that is to say:

To the State of Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,333
South Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,550
North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,331
Kentucky,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,532
Virginia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,377
Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,418
Delaware,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,256
Pennsylvania,	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,768
New Jersey,	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,318
New York,	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,971
Vermont,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,139
Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,881
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,697
Massachusetts,	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,885
New Hampshire,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,544
							80,000

which detachment of militia shall be officered out of the present militia officers, or others, at the option and discretion of the constitutional authority of the States respectively.

That any independent corps of cavalry, artillery, or infantry, may be accepted as part of the said detachment of militia, provided they shall voluntarily engage, and provided the same shall be deemed eligible by the President.

That the President be desired to request the Executives of the several States to take effectual care that the men, detached as aforesaid, be armed and equipped according to law.

That provision ought to be made by law for organizing and raising a military force under the authority of the Government of the United States, to consist of ——— rank and file, with the proper officers, to serve for the term of ——— years, or during a war which may break out between the United States and any foreign European power, and that the President be authorized to take the measures necessary for raising the same: *Provided*, That no such measures be taken by the Executive, until war shall be actually commenced between the United States and some foreign European power.

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 17.

[1st SESSION.

## MILITARY FORCE IN 1794.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JUNE 5, 1794.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 5th, 1794.

SIR:

In obedience to the order of the honorable the Senate of the United States, of yesterday, I respectfully submit a statement of the troops of the United States, according to the last returns.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient servant,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

The honorable the PRESIDENT *pro tempore of the Senate.*

*Return of the Non-commissioned Officers and Privates belonging to the Legion of the United States.*

2,843	with General Wayne, including garrisons of Fort Washington, Fort Hamilton, Fort Knox, &c.
189	Georgia
42	Fort Fayette, (Pittsburg)
24	Fort Franklin
16	Big Beaver
30	Wheeling
75	South Western Territory
359	Recruits on the march, and at the different rendezvous.
3,578	

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 5, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 18.

[2d SESSION.]

## MILITARY FORCE IN 1794.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, NOVEMBER 25, 1794.

UNITED STATES, November 25, 1794.

*Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:*

I lay before you a statement of the troops in the service of the United States, which has been submitted to me by the Secretary of War. It will rest with Congress to consider and determine, whether further inducements shall be held out for entering into the military service of the United States, in order to complete the establishment authorized by law.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, November 24, 1794.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit to your view a statement of the non-commissioned officers and privates at present in the service of the United States, specifying the places where they are, and the periods which they have still to serve.

The force immediately under Major General Wayne is much lessened by the expiration of the services of his troops, and is inferior to the demand of existing circumstances. Unless, therefore, he be reinforced early in the ensuing spring, the advantages which he has gained in the course of the present year, which ought to be permanently secured, must be in danger of being relinquished.

The experiments which have recently been made to engage men for military service, on the present inducements, evince, decisively, that no expectation can be indulged of completing the numbers authorized by law without further encouragement.

I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

*Statement of the Non-commissioned Officers and Privates in the service of the United States, specifying the places where they are, and the periods which they have still to serve.*

Under General Wayne, and at the posts on the lower part of the Ohio,	2,643
Posts on the upper parts of the Ohio and on the march,	398
Southwestern territory,	73
Georgia,	146
Fortifications on the sea coast, and recruiting rendezvous,	369
	<u>3,629</u>
Enlisted in 1791, and will expire in 1794,	202
Ditto in 1792, and will expire before 30th June, 1795,	1,607
Ditto ditto, will expire from 1st July to the 31st December,	602
Ditto in 1793, will expire in 1796,	692
Ditto in 1794, will expire in 1797,	368
Muster rolls wanting, estimated to be enlisted in 1793 and 1794,	158
	<u>3,629</u>

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, November 24, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 19.

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 4, 1794.

Mr. FITZSIMMONS, from the committee to whom was referred that part of the message of the President which respects the fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States, made the following report:

That by the report of the Secretary at War, it appears, that in pursuance of the act of the last session, the fortifications of the different ports and harbors are in considerable forwardness, excepting only the port of Boston, and Wilmington, in the State of Delaware, suspended for reasons assigned by the Secretary, in his report.\*

That contracts have been entered into for the ordnance necessary, and measures taken for progressing in the fortifications, as soon as the season will permit.

That from the necessity of enlarging the plan of defence in some instances, and the enhanced price of labor and materials, since the first estimate was made, a sum not less than 225,500 dollars, will be necessary to complete the plan of defence contemplated, admitting the fortifications to be constructed of timber and earth; and if executed with stone, to a much larger sum.

The committee, taking into view the circumstances connected with this subject, and having received the necessary information from the Secretary of War, submit the following resolutions:

*Resolved,* That the necessary works for fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States ought to be continued, and constructed of the most durable materials, so as best to answer the purposes of defence and permanency.

*Resolved,* That a sum, not exceeding 500,000 dollars, (over and above the sums already appropriated) be appropriated for the purpose aforesaid; and that a sum, not exceeding 100,000 dollars per annum, be provided for the service aforesaid.

*Resolved,* That the President of the United States be authorized to give preference, in point of time, to the completion of such of the said fortifications as he may think adviseable.

\*This report is not now to be found—See No. 24.



3d CONGRESS.]

No. 20.

[2d SESSION.

## PURVEYOR OF PUBLIC SUPPLIES.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 11, 1794.

*Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:*

I transmit to you, for consideration, a representation made to me by the Secretary of the Treasury, on the subject of constituting an officer to be specially charged with the business of procuring certain public supplies.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES, December 11, 1794.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, December 2, 1794.

The Secretary of the Treasury has the honor respectfully to make the following representation to the President of the United States, in order that he may determine on the expediency of laying the subject of it before Congress. The procuring of military supplies generally is, with great propriety, vested by law in the Department of the Treasury. That department, from situation, may be expected to feel a more habitual solicitude for economy than any other, and to possess more means of information respecting the best modes of obtaining supplies. It is, however, important that the particular arrangement should be such as to enable the department to execute the trust in the best manner. This branch of the public business forms a very considerable one of the public expenditure. Including supplies for the Navy, it is so extensive as, to be well executed, would occupy the whole time and attention of one person possessing the requisite qualifications. This, with the growth of the country, must be every year more and more the case. It cannot, therefore, be conducted in detail by the head of the department, or by any existing officer of it, now charged with other duties, without being less well executed than it ought to be, or interfering with other essential duties, or without a portion of both these inconveniences, to the material detriment of the public service. Experience has already verified the position.

It must then, of necessity, either be confided to a special agent employed by the head of the department, or to a new officer of the department, to be constituted by law, and to act under the direction and superintendance of that head. The last mode is preferable to the first, for obvious reasons.

Wherever an object of public business is likely to be permanent, it is more fit that it should be transacted by an officer of the Government, regularly constituted, than by the agent of a department specially entrusted. The officer can be placed, by law, under more effectual checks. In the present case that idea is particularly important. The person entrusted ought to be prohibited, under penalties, from all dealing on his own account in the objects of supply. The duration and emoluments of a mere agency being precarious, a well qualified man, disposed to make the necessary sacrifices of other pursuits, and to devote himself exclusively to the business, could with much greater difficulty, if at all, be found.

The compensation to such an officer ought, it is conceived, to weigh nothing as an objection. Independent of the equivalent expense arising from the necessity of employing and compensating an agent, it is morally certain that the close, constant, undivided attention, of a person charged exclusively with this object, and in condition, for that reason, to make the minute as well as extensive inquiries and investigations which are often requisite, would produce savings to the United States, with which the salary of the officer could bear no comparison. It is equally evident that it would contribute greatly to punctuality, despatch, and efficiency in procuring the supplies.

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, *Secretary of the Treasury.*

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 21.

[2d SESSION.

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 11, 1794.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 10, 1794.

SIR:

In obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, I have the honor to submit to the House of Representatives, a statement of such difficulties and inconveniences as have occurred in the execution of the act, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States."

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

The SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the United States.

The Secretary of War, in obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, respectfully submits the following statement of such difficulties and inconveniences as have occurred in the execution of the act, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States."

That a difficulty of primary importance appears to oppose the execution of the first section of the before recited act. The militia are requested to arm and equip themselves, at their own expense; but there is no penalty to enforce the injunction of the law.

The subscriber is informed, that several States have passed auxiliary laws to the act of Congress. The laws of the following States, upon this subject, are in his possession, to wit: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina.

The penalties, by these, for non-equipment and armament, appear to be according to the following extracts:

MASSACHUSETTS—*passed the 22d June, 1793.*

“And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid—That every non-commissioned officer or private of the infantry, who shall neglect to keep himself armed and equipped, as aforesaid, or who shall, on a muster day, or at any other time of examination, be destitute of, or appear unprovided with, the arms and equipments herein directed, (except as before excepted,) shall pay a fine, not exceeding twenty shillings, in proportion to the articles of which he shall be deficient, at the discretion of the justice of the peace before whom trial shall be had. And all parents, masters, and guardians, shall furnish those of the said militia, who shall be under their care and command, with the arms and equipments, before mentioned, under the like penalties for any neglect: And whenever the *select men*, of any town, shall judge any inhabitant thereof, belonging to the militia, unable to arm and equip himself in manner as aforesaid, they shall, at the expense of the town, provide for, and furnish, such inhabitant, with the aforesaid arms and equipments, which shall remain the property of the town, at the expense of which they shall be provided. And if any soldier shall embezzle, or destroy, the arms and equipments with which he shall be furnished, he shall, upon conviction before some justice of the peace, be adjudged to replace the article or articles which shall by him be so embezzled, or destroyed, and to pay the cost from the process arising against him. And if he shall not perform the same, within fourteen days, after such adjudication, it shall be in the power of the select men, of the town to which he shall belong, to bind him out to service, or labor, for such term of time as shall, in the discretion of the said justice, be sufficient to procure a sum of money equal to the value of the article or articles so embezzled or destroyed, and pay cost arising as aforesaid.”

NEW JERSEY—*passed June 5, 1793.*

“And if any such militia-man shall appear, when called out to exercise or into service, without a musket or a rifle, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of three shillings and nine pence; and for want of every other of the aforesaid articles six pence. Each and every man so enrolled as aforesaid, and providing himself with the arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, required as aforesaid, shall hold the same exempted from all suits, distress, executions, or sales for debt, or the payment of taxes. *Provided always*, That whenever the *majors* of any battalion shall judge any person, enrolled therein, unable to arm and equip himself, as aforesaid, such person shall not be subject to any fine for not arming; any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.”

PENNSYLVANIA—*passed the 11th April, 1793.*

“*Provided always*, That whenever the *field-officers* of any regiment shall judge any person enrolled therein unable to arm and equip himself as aforesaid, such person shall not be subject to any fine for not arming; any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.”

It does not appear that any specified penalty is imposed by this act on persons neglecting to arm and equip themselves.

MARYLAND—*passed at November sessions, 1793.*

“And any non-commissioned officer or matross in the artillery, and any non-commissioned officer or dragoon, who shall so refuse or neglect to attend on any of the said days, armed and accoutred as aforesaid, (except as before excepted,) shall forfeit a sum not exceeding two-thirds of a dollar per day; and all other non-commissioned officers and privates who shall refuse or neglect to attend, armed and accoutred as herein before directed, (except as before excepted,) shall forfeit and pay *one cent* per day, unless excused for appearing without arms and accoutrements, by the commanding officers of their respective companies for the day.”

NORTH CAROLINA—*passed the 18th July, 1794.*

“And every non-commissioned officer and private who shall fail to appear on the said occasions, shall forfeit for every such failure or neglect, ten shillings, or, if appearing, he be not armed and provided in manner as directed by this act, shall, for such deficiency, forfeit and pay five shillings. And if the *officers of a company, or any two of them*, after an examination upon oath, shall adjudge any person or persons, enrolled as aforesaid, to be incapable of providing and furnishing him or themselves with the arms, ammunition, and accoutrements required by this act, they shall make report thereof to the next battalion court-martial, as the case may be, who may, if it should appear necessary, exempt such person or persons from the fines and forfeitures by this act imposed, until such arms and accoutrements shall be provided and delivered him or them by the court-martial, who shall take security for the safe keeping of such arms and accoutrements, to be returned when required.”

But it is certain that, were the penalties greatly enhanced, an insuperable difficulty would occur in obtaining the requisite number of arms in any reasonable period. The numbers comprehended in the act, from eighteen to forty-five years of age, inclusively, deducting the exempts and mariners, may be estimated probably at about four hundred and fifty thousand men. Of these, probably not one hundred thousand are armed as the act requires, although a greater number might be found of common and ordinary muskets, without bayonets. The deficiency cannot be supplied from Europe, under the present circumstances. The only solid resource to obtain a supply, is the establishment of manufactories within each state.

The deficiency of arms cannot be more forcibly exemplified than that, to arm the militia lately called into service, estimated at fifteen thousand, the number of ten thousand arms have been issued from the public arsenals. Loss and injury must be expected to arise upon the articles issued.

No adequate provision appears to be established by the act, for securing the obedience of the militia to the call of the Executive of the United States.

It would seem essential, that any law which the Congress should pass upon the subject of the militia, should contain within itself all the necessary provisions for its complete execution.

The late experiment proves, at least in some parts, that the laws were inefficient, and had it not been for voluntary zeal, which came to its aid, the community might have experienced great evils.

It would appear to be essential, that when the militia are in actual service, they ought to be bound by the military code of the United States.

The enrolment of men of the ages specified in the act, notwithstanding the exemptions, holding them responsible for military service, and enforcing the same, appears to be a circumstance which may operate injuriously to the industry and convenience of the community.

Of the returns enjoined by the tenth section of the said act, the following only have been received.

	<i>From sixteen to forty.</i>	<i>Forty to sixty.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Massachusetts,	54,428	22,819	77,247
Connecticut,	-	-	15,851
New Jersey,	-	-	25,887
Georgia,	-	-	10,120

Whether the act in question is susceptible of such alterations and amendments, on its present principles, as will secure the advantages to be derived from a well organized militia, or whether a limited, but select, and efficient

corps of militia, formed on a principle of rotation, or otherwise, and taken from the classes least injurious to the industry of the community, would not better fulfil that object, and at the same time better comport with economy are questions which the wisdom of Congress alone is competent to decide.

All which is submitted,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, 10th December, 1794.

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 22.

[2d SESSION.]

FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 19, 1794.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 19, 1794.

In pursuance of the instructions of the President of the United States, the Secretary of War respectfully submits to the House of Representatives copies of the instructions to the engineers, for erecting the fortifications for the defence of the sea ports of the United States, and their reports thereupon.

It is respectfully suggested, that the plans which accompany these papers are considered as essential parts of the reports of the engineers; but as it is not practical to have them copied in any reasonable time for the use of the House, the originals are submitted, with the hope, that the House will please to order their return to this office, as soon as the subject of their inquiry shall be finished.

North Carolina has ceded certain places to the United States, conformably to the act hereunto subjoined, and the Legislature of Maryland has passed a resolve, giving permission for the erection of fortifications; a copy of which is also hereunto subjoined. And it is also understood that the Legislature of Rhode Island has passed an act, ceding the jurisdiction of Goat Island, in the harbor of New York.

No particulars were given to any superintendents from the subscriber; they were appointed generally by the Governors, and were to superintend the actual execution of the works, under the orders of the engineers.

The agents were appointed in the line of the Treasury Department, for the purchase of materials and obtaining the labor, and to receive from, and to account to, the treasury, for sums expended for the fortifications.

The mounting of the artillery being an incidental expense of the Ordnance Department, has been paid by warrants from this office.

All which is respectfully submitted,

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA.

At a General Assembly, begun and held at Newbern, on the seventh day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand and ninety-four, in the nineteenth year of the independence of said State, being the second year of the said Assembly.

CHAP. I.

*An act to cede to the United States certain Lands, upon the condition therein mentioned.*

Whereas the Congress of the United States have passed an act to provide for the defence of certain ports and harbors in the United States, in which is comprised Cape Fear river, and Ocracock inlet, and also to erect a light-house on the head land of Cape Hatteras: And whereas it is expedient that the United States should have the exclusive jurisdiction of a sufficient quantity of land, on which said forts and light-houses shall be erected:

*Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same,* That part of the public ground, laid out by the commissioners of Smithville for a fort on Cape Fear river, including part of the ground whereon Fort Johnson formerly stood, with the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, shall be, and the same is hereby, ceded to the United States of America, under the condition hereinafter mentioned.

*And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,* That the exclusive jurisdiction of Beacon Island, in the harbor of Ocracock, and four acres of land at the head land of Cape Hatteras, and also as much of the town of Smithville, adjoining Fort Johnson, as may be found necessary for the said fort, not exceeding six acres, shall be ceded and stand vested in the United States, as soon as the proprietors of said lands shall convey the same to the United States.

*And be it further enacted,* That the above mentioned lands are, and shall be, ceded to the United States upon the express condition, that the fortifications, light houses, and beacons, for which the said lands are ceded, or to be ceded, shall be erected within three years, and be continued and kept up forever thereafter, for the public use.

*And be it further enacted,* That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to debar or hinder any of the officers of this State from serving any process, or levying executions, within the limits ceded by this act to the United States, in the same manner, and to the same effect, as if this act had never been made.

MARYLAND.

BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, December 25, 1793.

Whereas the United States may think it necessary to erect a fort, arsenal, or other military works or buildings on Whitestone Point, for the public defence:

Therefore, *Resolved,* That, upon the application of the President of the United States to the Governor, for permission to erect a fort, arsenal, or other military works on the said point, for the purpose aforesaid, the Governor shall, and may, grant the same, with the consent of the owner of the soil.

By order:

WM. HARWOOD, *Clerk.*

Read the first time and ordered to lie on the table. By order:

BY THE SENATE, December 25, 1793.

WM. PERRY, JUN. *Clerk.*

Read the second time and assented. By order:

BY THE SENATE, December 28, 1793.

WM. PERRY, JUN. *Clerk.*

True copy from the original.

WM. HARWOOD, *Clerk.*

True copy.

JOHN KITTY, *Clerk of the Council.*

*Plans and Maps respecting the Fortifications, and which accompany the within statements.*

BY ROCHEFONTAINE.

Portland, No. 1.  
 Portsmouth, No. 1.  
 Rhode Island, Nos. 1 to 8, and memoir.  
 New London and Groton, Nos. 1 to 6, and memoir.  
 Town and harbor of New London.

Governor's Island, New York, Nos. 1 to 6.—By VINCENT.

(These are contained in a tin case.)

No. 1. Plan and profiles of proposed floating batteries, with a memoir.  
 No. 2. Two plans and one profile of Bedloe's Island, and a memoir.  
 No. 3. Three plans, one profile of Oyster Island, and a memoir.  
 No. 4. One plan and two profiles on Governor's Island.  
 No. 5. Plans and profiles at the Narrows, Nos. 1 to 13. N. B. No. 11 wanting.  
 No. 6. Two profiles of Forts Putnam and Clinton, West Point, and a memoir, with general observations.

Fort Mifflin, one, and a memoir.—By L'ENFANT.

Fort Nelson, and the ground round it, 1.  
 Fort Norfolk, 2.  
 Elizabeth river, and its defences, 3.  
 Fort on Craney Island, 4.  
 Fort and Map, at Baltimore, 5 and 6. } BY RIVARDI.

Annapolis, 1 and 2. }  
 Alexandria, 1 and 2. } BY VERMONNET.

Ocracock bar, No. 1, }  
 Fort on Beacon Island, 2, }  
 Profile of do. 3. } BY MARTINON.

Fortifications, Charleston, No. 1.—By PERRAULT.

Sketch of Fort Putnam.—By D. NIVEN.

NOTE. The above plans and maps were returned to the War Department.

## FORTIFICATIONS FROM NEW LONDON TO PORTLAND, INCLUSIVE.

*Instructions to Mr. Bechet Rochefontaine, acting as temporary Engineer in the service of the United States.*

In pursuance of the directions of the President of the United States, you are hereby appointed an engineer, for the purpose of fortifying the ports and harbors herein after mentioned, viz: New London, in the State of Connecticut, Newport, in the State of Rhode Island, Boston, Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portland, in the State of Massachusetts, and Portsmouth, in the State of New Hampshire.

You are therefore immediately to repair to the ports to be fortified in the said States, respectively, and in case the Governors should be near any of the said ports, you are to wait upon them and exhibit these instructions. But if the Governors should be at any considerable distance from your route, you are respectfully to notify them of your appointment, enclose them a copy of these instructions, and inform them that you have repaired to the ports aforesaid, in order to make the necessary surveys and investigations relatively to your mission, which you will submit to their consideration, and take their orders thereon.

As soon as you shall receive their approbation of your plans, you are to construct the works, and to execute them with all possible vigor and despatch.

The following is an extract of the estimate on which the appropriations for the fortifications have been founded. The proportion of expense, therefore, herein stated for the ports aforesaid, must not be exceeded, viz:

NEW LONDON, *Twelve heavy Cannon.*

The formation of a parapet of earth for twelve pieces,	\$375 00
Facing twelve embrasures, at fourteen dollars ninety-eight cents each,	179 76
The expense of twelve platforms, at twenty-five dollars seventy-five cents each,	309 00
A redoubt, constructed of a form to be adapted to the nature of the ground, to be equal to 100 feet square,	650 00
A magazine,	200 00
Embrasures and platforms for four field pieces,	160 52
A block house, or barracks, for fifty men,	500 00
For pickets, palisadoes, and to provide for articles difficult to foresee or enumerate,	375 00
	<u>\$2,749 28</u>

To be garrisoned by 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 2 musicians, 17 privates.

GROTON, *Twelve Pieces.*

The same expense as at New London, and to be garrisoned by the same number of troops,	<u>\$2,749 28</u>
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GOAT ISLAND, *Eight Pieces.*

To put the works in order,	<u>\$3,000 00</u>
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NEWPORT, *Three Pieces.*

On travelling carriages, so that no battery may be necessary to be erected.

Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 24 privates.

BOSTON, CASTLE ISLAND, *Thirty-six Pieces.*

To put the works in order, estimated at	<u>\$6,000 00</u>
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GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, *Twelve Pieces.*

The expense the same as at New London,	<u>\$2,749 28</u>
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The Castle to be garrisoned by 1 captain, 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 24 privates.  
Governor's Island, 1 2 2 17 17

MARBLEHEAD, *Eight Pieces.*

Expense of the construction of the parapet, embrasures, and platforms,	-	-	-	-	-	\$573 84
A block house,	-	-	-	-	-	500 00
A magazine,	-	-	-	-	-	200 00
Contingencies,	-	-	-	-	-	150 00
						<u>\$1,423 84</u>

Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 17 privates.

SALEM, *Eight Pieces.*

The expense the same as at Marblehead,	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$1,423 84</u>
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Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 17 privates.

CAPE ANN, GLOUCESTER, *Eight Pieces.*

The expense the same as at Marblehead,	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$1,423 84</u>
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Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 17 privates.

PORTLAND, *Twelve Pieces.*

The expense the same as at New London,	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$2,749 28</u>
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Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 17 privates.

PORTSMOUTH, *Nine Pieces.*

A parapet for nine pieces,	-	-	-	-	-	\$281 75
Embrasures and platforms for nine pieces,	-	-	-	-	-	360 57
A redoubt,	-	-	-	-	-	650 00
Embrasures and platforms,	-	-	-	-	-	160 52
A magazine,	-	-	-	-	-	200 00
Block house or barracks,	-	-	-	-	-	500 00
Pickets, palisadoes, and contingencies,	-	-	-	-	-	375 00
						<u>\$2,527 34</u>

Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 17 privates.

But the peculiar situation of Newport, and its importance to a marine enemy, will justify a greater portion of expense than is contemplated in the estimate. A strong redoubt or two, upon the heights near the town, ought to be constructed; the experience of the American, English, and French troops, who successively occupied that place during the late war, will have pointed out the spots most proper to be occupied. Upon mature consideration, therefore, it appears that Newport, or rather the ground in its neighborhood, ought to be so fortified as to prevent any sudden possession of that place by an enemy, from which our commerce would suffer excessively.

It will be readily perceived, by the lowness of the estimate, that the parapets of the works intended to be erected are to be of earth, or where that cannot easily be obtained of an adhesive quality, the parapets may be faced with strong timber, and filled in with such earth as can be had.

It is, however, conceived that, in most cases, earth may be procured, and that a parapet made thereof, will not only form a solid defence, but even be durable, if the earth be tenacious, and properly sloped and sodded inside and out, and the seed of knotgrass sown, so as to bind the earth and sods together.

It is, however, apprehended that the embrasures, made in this manner, would suffer from the explosion of the powder from the cannon, and that, therefore, where the batteries are not *en barbette*, that the embrasures ought to be framed with joist, and faced with plank of two inches thick.

When the batteries are to be erected on points of land, islands, or other places at a distance from the towns intended to be defended, they ought to be covered or secured by a redoubt, or other enclosed work, in which the garrison should reside constantly, either in a barrack or a strong block house, as shall be judged most expedient. But, in general, as the garrisons will be weak in numbers, a block house, mounting one or two small pieces of cannon in its upper story, will be more secure, and therefore to be preferred. These, however, ought not to be much, if any, exposed to the fire of heavy cannon. A block house will not contain more than fifty men; if the garrison, therefore, should be enlarged, tents must be used.

The redoubts, in general, ought to be of a size to contain five hundred men, so as to resist a sudden enterprize of an enemy; and, perhaps, the idea ought to be embraced, in the first instance, that they should be of such extent as to admit timber casemates to be erected hereafter, so as to enable the garrison to resist, in some tolerable degree, a bombardment.

But it is not proposed at present to erect such casemates, excepting for a magazine, which must be formed of massy timber, and be six feet thick on the roof, exclusive of the earth, and jointed and calked in such a manner as to be perfectly tight. Care must be taken to have these magazines properly ventilated and free from dampness. They are to be of a size sufficient to hold one hundred and fifty rounds of powder for each piece of cannon intended to be served from it. The spot at which a magazine of this nature shall be fixed, will require great judgment, so as to combine security against an enemy, either open or subtle, or any danger from common accidents.

Your judgment will also direct what part of your works shall be protected by frieze, and what by palisadoes, or whether your redoubts shall have embrasures, or fire *en barbette* with small cannon. As the redoubts are to cover the batteries, they would certainly secure and resist better without embrasures. The batteries are to annoy.

The choice of the ground, on which the batteries and works are to be erected, with all the combinations and effects depending thereon, will rest upon your judgment, under the directions of the Governor.

It has not been intended, by any thing herein specified, to point out the particular manner in which the works should be executed. Outlines only have been given, to serve in regulating the expense, which is limited by the sums before mentioned.

Some person, in whose ingenuity and industry confidence can be placed, will be appointed at the said ports, respectively, to superintend the actual execution of the works according to your directions. Arrangements will also be made by him, or some other person, to obtain the necessary workmen, implements, and materials, which will be required in this business: but every thing must be previously calculated and estimated by you.

Although the business herein entrusted to your charge, is, of itself, of an highly honorable nature, and strongly evincive of the confidence of the President of the United States, which would probably enhance your reputation, yet it is explicitly to be understood by you, that the employment is only temporary, and not conferring or involving any military rank whatever.

For a compensation of your services and personal expenses, you will be allowed and paid at the rate of four dollars per day, while you shall be employed. For all reasonable extra expenses, such as necessary boat hire, and persons to assist in your surveys, you will be allowed; but for those you must keep regular accounts, and take receipts.

You are to deliver to the Governors copies of all your plans, surveys, soundings, &c. and also transmit copies of the same to this office.

You are also to make a weekly report to this office of your proceedings.

A reverberatory furnace, for red hot balls, must be erected for each battery.

You are hereby authorized to have made, in all cases where your judgment shall direct, new semi-circle carriages for cannon, now used on the sea-coast of France, instead of the old garrison carriages.

This improvement of firing en barbette will prevent the necessity of embrasures, which, in most cases, serve no other purpose but as a trap to catch the enemy's balls, and kill the defenders of a battery.

It is true, the expense will be greatly enhanced by adopting this improvement, but this will be lessened in some degree by saving the expense of the embrasures and platforms.

It will be proper, in most cases, where the earth works are to be erected, to have them done by contract. I have written to the agents upon this subject, and I also request your attention thereto.

It is probable that one or two sub-engineers may be appointed under your orders, as your line will be very extensive.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this 29th day of March, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*A General Return of the Situation of the Fortifications of the Seaport Towns in the States of New England.*

STATE OF CONNECTICUT.

NEW LONDON.—On the 12th April, his Excellency the Governor of the State came from Norwich to New London, to visit the two sides of the harbor, and was pleased to approve of the plan of fortification, which has since been partly executed.

It consists, on the New London side of the harbor, of a citadel in stone masonry, bomb proof, covering a powder magazine, and will serve for the garrison to live in in time of peace. The citadel is surrounded with batteries and glacis, to cover it from the direct fire of ships of war, and to scour the entrance of the harbor and the neighborhood of the citadel with cannon and musketry.

The artillery consists of six eighteen and twenty-four pounders, on coast carriages; four nine and six pounders, on travelling carriages.

There is also a reverberatory furnace for heating balls.

The fortification of that side is nearly completed, and requires only to be trimmed, which will be done either this fall or early in the next spring.

On the Groton side of the harbor, the fortifications consist of a fort, made of earth and sods, containing a citadel, of brick masonry, covering a powder magazine, bomb proof, and serving for the garrison to live in; and a battery, near the harbor, under the protection of the fort, with a covered way, communicating from one to the other. The battery is also to be defended by a guard house, of brick masonry, with a powder magazine, bomb proof, under it.

The artillery of the fort will consist of three eighteen and twenty-four pounders, on coast carriages, and four six pounders, on travelling carriages; that of the battery, of five eighteen and twenty-four pounders, to be mounted on coast carriages. A reverberatory furnace will also be erected in it.

The fortification of that side of the harbor is far from being complete; the want of labor has been, in a great measure, the cause of the delay.

The citadel will be completed and covered before winter, as well as the powder magazine. The repairing of the old fort is only begun, and will be continued in the beginning of next spring.

The sum granted by Congress was	-	-	-	-	\$ 5,498 56
That expended to this day, is about	-	-	-	-	\$ 4,500 00
To complete New London Fort,	-	-	-	-	300 00
Do. Groton Fort,	-	-	-	-	1,798 56
					<u>6,598 56</u>

Sum to be provided to complete the defence of New London, - - - - - \$ 1,100 00

For the mounting of the artillery, the Secretary of the Treasury has granted a first sum of - 250 00

It will cost for the mounting of the guns, staving, upon an average, 90 dollars for every coast carriage, and 60 dollars for every travelling carriage, for guns or howitzers, \$1,740 00

For a reverberatory furnace, for the battery of Groton, that of New London being erected, 100 00

\$ 1,840 00

The sum to be provided for these two objects, - - - - - \$ 1,590 00

Total sum to be granted for New London, - - - - - \$ 2,690 00

The garrison on the New London side will consist, in time of peace, of twenty-two men.

In time of war, fifty men.

The fort and citadel may afford a cover, in case of an attack, to one thousand men.

The garrison of the fort and battery, on the Groton side of the harbor, in time of peace, twenty-two men.

On account of the battery and guard house, in time of war, eighty men.

In case of an attack by an enemy, eight hundred men.

There is in the fort and batteries, a sufficient number of good cannon for the armament of New London and Groton.

The land occupied by the fortifications is the same that was formerly fortified, and is the property of individuals. The agent at New London has, in consequence of a requisition for the purpose, attempted to buy it. The extravagant price set upon it, and other difficulties in the way of procuring it, have induced the agent to make an application to the Legislature of the State for the purpose.

It is to be observed, that the object of the fortifications on the two sides of the harbor of New London is, the defence of the entrance of the harbor, by a cross fire of heavy cannon, with red hot balls, on shipping attempting to force their way through, and the protection of the trade in the harbor. Those batteries are well secured against a surprise, or any sudden attack. In order to take possession of them, or to operate their destruction, the enemy must undertake a regular attack: in that case, the whole force of the country ought to be brought against him.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND.

NEWPORT.—On the 8th of May, his Excellency the Governor of the State visited the harbor and the ports on Rhode Island, to be taken possession of. The security of the harbor and island, which consists in the defending the entrance of the harbor, and securing, by all means, a free and open communication with the interior parts of the State, for the militia to come to the assistance of Newport in case of an attack.

The Governor was pleased to approve of the system of defence, which has since been partly executed.

It consists of a fort on Goat Island, with a citadel, in stone masonry, bomb proof, serving for the garrison to live in, and having under it two powder magazines. The whole is nearly completed.

At Tomany Hill, a citadel in brick masonry, serving for the garrison to live in, with a powder magazine, bomb proof, under it. This will be completed before the winter.

At Butts Hill, a citadel in every respect equal to the above on Tomany Hill. This by want of means, has been postponed to another year.

At Howland's Ferry, a battery and a guard house, in brick masonry, with a powder house, bomb proof, under it. The guard house and powder magazine are executed. The battery is contracted for, and will be erected before the spring.

The sum granted by Congress was,	\$5,000	
Expended to this day, or contracted for to complete the works begun as above mentioned,	6,104	\$1,104
There remains unprovided for, a sum of		1,200
Also, to erect the citadel, magazine, &c. at Butts Hill,		
Total of the sum to be provided to complete the above defence of Newport, Rhode Island,		<u>\$2,304</u>

The artillery of the works will consist, at the fort on Goat Island, of 16, 18 and 24 pounders, on coast carriages, and two 6 pounders, on travelling carriages.

A reverberatory furnace is erected there.

At Tomany Hill, of four 12 pounders, or howitzers, on travelling carriages.

At Butts Hill, of four 12 pounders, or howitzers, on travelling carriages.

At the battery at Howland's Ferry, of four 18 and 24 pounders, on coast carriages, a reverberatory furnace is also to be erected there.

The mounting of the above artillery and the furnace will cost, \$2,600

The first sum granted for the same by the Secretary of the Treasury, \$500

There remains to be provided for that object, a sum of 2,100

Total of the money to be provided, for the fortification and artillery, above stated, 4,404

The possession of Rhode Island, and the harbor of Newport, is so important to an European nation at war with the United States, that it will perhaps be thought necessary to increase its defence, and to provide it even against a regular expedition; in that case it would be necessary to cover the fort, on Goat Island, with a glacis, and covered way all round, which will produce the double advantage of securing the parapets of the fort against the direct fire of the guns of ships forcing their passage up, and of affording a cover for a larger garrison in case of an attack. This proposed addition to the fortifications of Goat Island being executed, it might then withstand even a regular attack.

The additional expense would be—

The glacis and covered way, \$3,000

For the mounting of twelve pieces of cannon, 12 and 18 pounders, on new garrison carriages, and

six 6 pounders, or howitzers, on travelling carriages, 1,560

Total of the additional expense, \$4,560

The garrison of Goat Island will be, in time of peace, men, 31

In time of war, 100

In case of an attack, if executed as it is now, without any additional works, 500

With the additional works, 2,000

The garrison of Tomany Hill will consist, in time of peace, man, 1

In time of war, men, 50

In case of an attack of all the inhabitants of Newport, and of the Island, the garrison at Butts Hill will consist

in time of peace, of man, 1

In time of war, men, 60

In case of an invasion of the militia of the State, the garrison of Howland's Ferry battery will be of one man in time of peace, and in time of war, ten men of the garrison of Butts Hill will be stationed there monthly.

The grounds occupied by the fortifications, now erected with leave of the owners, have not yet been bought, owing to the exorbitant demand of some, and other difficulties referred to the Secretary of War.

It is to be observed, that there are, at present, but eight guns at Rhode Island, viz: three 24's, three 18's, and two 6's.

#### STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Boston.—On the 25th of May, his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, elected, since that time, Governor of the State of Massachusetts, declared to the engineers, that he did not find himself empowered to approve of the execution of the law of the United States, respecting the fortification of the seaport towns in the State, without the advice of the Legislature, meeting a few days afterwards. His Excellency, however, gave orders to the officers of the Executive of the State, to the State garrison of the Castle Island, and to the gentlemen, select men of every seaport town, directed to be fortified, to assist, every one in his capacity, the engineer in his reconnoitering and surveys.

On the first of June, his Excellency was furnished with a general plan of defence for the harbor of Boston.

On the 4th of June, a committee of the Legislature, appointed for the purpose, called on the engineer, to be present at one of their conferences respecting the fortification of the harbor, and that of Castle Island particularly.

On the 8th, the said committee visited Castle Island, with the engineer, that being the only post in the State that the Legislature would have any thing to do with as to fortifying.

On the 11th, his Excellency permitted the engineer to visit the seaport towns of Salem, Marblehead, and Cape Ann, until the Legislature should come to a determination on the questions, proposed in the address of the Governor, respecting the fortification of the harbor of the State.

On the 20th, his Excellency authorized the engineer to proceed to the State of New Hampshire, the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts having not yet come to any vote on the subject of fortifications.

On the 24th of June, the Secretary of War having directed the engineer to repair to Portland as soon as possible, his Excellency was informed by the engineer, that he should go to Portland from Portsmouth, agreeable to the Secretary's orders, and as the local situation of the former would render it very long to wait for his Excellency's approbation, after the plan of fortification should be formed, the engineer proposed, as most advisable, to act in concert with the select men of that town, and even to begin the construction of fortifications, such as should be approved by those gentlemen: his Excellency's further orders would, however, regulate the conduct of the engineer, and his silence on the subject would be construed as a consent to the engineer's proposal.

#### PORTLAND.

On the 14th of July, the select men of Portland, previously advised by the Governor of the arrival of the engineer, visited the harbor. On the 15th, the citizens, in a legal town meeting, authorised the select men to purchase, in behalf of the town, and for the United States, the ground necessary for the erecting of the fortifications for the defence of the harbor.

The 21st July, the select men having approved the plan of fortification, and the Governor having made no objection to the plan of conduct proposed as above, the engineer began the works, which consist of—

A fort erected on the hill, formerly occupied by the fort, with parapets, supported by stone walls and sods.

A citadel of brick masonry, serving for the garrison to live in, and covering a magazine, bomb proof.

A battery near the harbor, with a guard house, in brick masonry, to defend with musketry the guns of the battery, and a powder magazine, bomb proof. Also, a covered communication from the fort to the battery.

The sum granted by the United States, was \$2,749 28

The Secretary of War has granted in addition, 900 00

The artillery of the fort will consist of four 6 and 12 pounders, mounted on travelling carriages.

At the battery of ten pieces, 32, 18, and 12 pounders, mounted on coast carriages.

Also, a reverberatory furnace, for heating balls.

The works are completed, or will be so before the winter, with the sum above mentioned.

The mounting of the artillery will cost,

The Secretary of the Treasury has granted,

\$1,200  
250

Sum to be provided for the artillery,

\$950

The garrison of Portland, in time of peace, is to be twenty-three men.

In time of war, it ought to be one hundred men.

In case of an attack, it will be the rendezvous of the militia, and may contain five hundred men.

If it were thought necessary to cover that post, which is now secured against any sudden attack, against a regular expedition by land and sea, it would be necessary to surround the fort with two advanced posts and glacis.

The two advanced posts and glacis would cost

\$5,000 00

The mounting 12 pieces of cannon on howitzers, in addition to the above, in garrison and travelling carriages,

700 00

For 4 gun boats, two of them with furnaces,

2,800 00

Total of the additional expense, on that plan,

8,500 00

The garrison of Portland, with the additional works, above mentioned, might be 2,000 men.

The artillery now in the fort and battery at Portland, is to be replaced, except one 18 pounder, as soon as good ones can be procured, but if the said guns can bear proving, there is a sufficient number for the armament of the works now executed.

Four acres of land, for the fortifications, have been bought for \$68.

On the 29th July, the engineer waited on his Excellency the Governor of Massachusetts, at Boston: the Legislature not having decided any thing respecting the fortifications of the State, his Excellency could not give any approbation to the erecting of any throughout the State, even at Portland, where the select men, and town meeting, had irregularly acted, in purchasing land for the United States, without being authorized to do it by the Legislature of the State.

On the 16th of August, the Secretary of War authorized the engineer to erect fortifications, according to the law of the United States, at Salem, Marblehead, and Cape Ann.

SALEM.—The inhabitants of Salem, in a legal town meeting, unanimously voted a cession to the United States of the ground which should be thought necessary for the defence of their harbor; immediately thereupon the works were begun. They consist of a fort, erected on the old fort called Fort William, in masonry and sods; a brick citadel, calculated for the garrison to live in, and covering a powder magazine, bomb proof.

The artillery of that fort will consist of six pieces; 24, 18 and 12 pounders on coast carriages; four pieces, 6 and 12 pounders, on travelling carriages; a reverberatory furnace; also, two pieces, 18 and 24 pounders, to arm the battery on Juniper's Point in time of war.

A number of old guns, now there, will serve, if they bear proof, until good ones can be provided.

The sum granted by the United States for the fortifications, was,

\$1,423 84

The Secretary of War has granted a sum of

600 00

Total, \$2,023 84

That sum will nearly complete the works intended to be erected.

The mounting the artillery and furnace will cost,

\$1,060 00

The Secretary of the Treasury has granted a first sum of

250 00

Sum to be provided for the artillery,

\$810 00

The garrison of Salem is to be, in time of peace, of 23 men.

On account of Juniper battery, in time of war, ought to be 60 men.

In case of an attack, the militia will occupy the above fort, Juniper's battery, and the old Fort Lee, securing the passage to the neck. In that case, 12 or 15 hundred men may fight with great certainty of success.

The situation of Salem is such, that it would not be advisable to spend more money, than what is necessary to complete the fort actually begun.

MARBLEHEAD.—For the reason alluded to above, the fortification at Marblehead was not commenced before the 1st September. It consists of a battery to defend the entrance of the harbor, and citadel, of brick masonry, to defend the battery erected on the spot occupied by the old fort, covering a powder magazine, bomb proof, and calculated for the garrison to live in.

The artillery will consist of six 42, 18, and 24 pounders on coast carriages, and four 6 and 9 pounders, or howitzers, on travelling carriages.

Also, a reverberatory furnace.

The sum granted by the United States for the fortifications, was

\$1,423 84

The Secretary of War has granted an additional sum of

900 00

\$2,323 84

That sum will nearly complete the works intended and begun.

The mounting the artillery, and furnace, will cost,

\$700 00

The Secretary of the Treasury has already granted

250 00

Sum to be provided for the artillery,

450 00

The garrison of Marblehead, in time of peace, is to be 23 men.

In time of war it ought to be 40 men.

In case of an attack there may be covered in the fort and citadel two or three hundred men.

The situation of Marblehead is such, that the works erecting now are sufficient to put the harbor in a respectable state of defence.

There is a number of old guns in the fort which, after being proved, may serve until good ones can be provided; there are also four good travelling carriages, and many implements of artillery, which have been deducted from the expense contemplated for mounting the artillery.

The ground was the property of the town; the inhabitants, in a town meeting, have ceded it to the United States. The property of a citizen was blended with that of the town, and was necessary for the citadel, and for the use of the garrison; it has been bought for the sum of 310 dollars.

CAPE ANN.—On the first of September the fortifications at Cape Ann were begun; the delay is to be ascribed to the same cause as above mentioned.

The defence of Cape Ann consists of a fort erected on the spot where the fort formerly was, and a citadel covering a powder magazine, bomb proof, and calculated for the garrison to live in.

The artillery consists of six 18 and 24 pounders, mounted on coast carriages, and two 12 and 9 pounders on travelling carriages.

Also a furnace for heating balls.

The sum granted by the United States was

\$1,423 84

The Secretary of War has granted an additional sum of

600 00



This total sum of \$2,023 84 is thought to be equal to the expense to be incurred by the works begun.

The mounting of the artillery and furnace will cost	\$760 00
The Secretary of the Treasury has granted	250 00

Sum to be provided for that object,	\$510 00
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The garrison at Cape Ann, in time of peace, is to be of 23 men.

In time of war it ought to be of 50 men.

In case of an attack, the militia might defend the fort and citadel, and man a battery at the mouth of the harbor with 500 men.

It is to be observed, that the resources of the three last places, in mechanics and laborers, are so small, that it has been utterly impossible, even by granting higher wages, to make up for the unforeseen delay above mentioned, and it is, therefore, very uncertain whether they will be put in a state of defence before the winter.

Boston.—The defence of the harbor has, by order of the Secretary of War, been left to be erected at another time.

Upon a general view, the defence of that harbor will consist in fortifying Castle Island and Governor's Island.

The repairing of the battery on Castle Island, and erecting in the centre of it a fort, with bomb proof, for the garrison, will cost	\$20,000
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The repairing of the fort on Governor's Island, erecting batteries, and building a citadel, bomb proof, and a powder magazine, will cost	6,000
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The artillery will consist, on Castle Island, of 20 pieces of cannon on coast carriages,	1,800
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12 pieces of light artillery, or howitzers, on travelling carriages,	720
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4 mortars,	200
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2 reverberatory furnaces,	200
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On Governor's Island, 20 pieces of heavy artillery, on coast carriages,	1,800
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4 light pieces, or howitzers, on travelling carriages,	240
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2 mortars,	100
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2 reverberatory furnaces,	200
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Implements of artillery for the two Islands,	1,100
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For the armament of Dorchester's battery, Fort Hill battery, Noddle's Island battery, and Charleston	
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Point battery, which are to be erected in case of war only, eight pieces of cannon, on coast car-	
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riages,	720
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Also four gun boats, with furnaces, for heating balls,	3,200
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Total,	36,180
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It is to be observed that there is the number of 300 pieces of good artillery in the ports of Boston; the above computation, therefore, only comprises the expense of mounting.

PORTSMOUTH, New Hampshire.—On the 30th June, his Excellency, the Governor of New Hampshire, visited the harbor, and has approved of the plan of fortification which has since been executed.

It consists of a fort of masonry and sods, erected on the point where the light house stands, with a citadel calculated for the garrison to live in, and covering a powder magazine bomb proof.

The artillery consists of seven pieces of heavy cannon, 42, 24, and 18 pounders, on coast carriages, and six pieces of light artillery, to be mounted on travelling carriages.

Also, a reverberatory furnace.

The sum granted by the United States is	\$2,527 34
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The Secretary of War has granted the additional sum of	900 00
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\$3,427 34
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The total sum of \$3,427 34 will probably complete the works, before the winter.

The sum granted to mount the artillery is	\$250 00
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The mounting of a 42 pounder has cost	169
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The probable expense for the others, and for the reverberatory furnace, will be	1,180
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Sum to be provided for the mounting of the artillery,	1,099
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The garrison of that fort is to be, in time of peace, of	men, 23
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In time of war, as that garrison will be left almost entirely to its own strength, and has also to	
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watch over the little harbor, it ought to be of	200
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In case of an attack, the militia ought to have there	600
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The peculiar situation of the harbor of Portsmouth renders any expense for its security, over the sums calculated above, almost entirely useless; yet, if any addition were contemplated to be necessary, it would be, to put the fort, which defends the entrance of the harbor perfectly well, in a condition to withstand an attack by land. That might be done, by covering the side of the fort looking toward the little harbor by a glacis and covered way. The expense attending that additional defence may be calculated at \$2,000.

A gun boat might also be stationed in the little harbor, for the protection of coasters.

The ground occupied by the fort is the property of the United States.

It ought to be remarked, after viewing the state of defence of the seaport towns in New England, that the only object aimed at has been the security of the harbors against an attack by water, by rendering their entrance as dangerous as possible to an enemy, and the protection of the trade in the same, which end is supposed to have been attained. Every battery is secured against a sudden attack and surprise, by a citadel, in masonry, almost within reach of the bayonet from the guns. But none, except the harbor of Newport, has been secured against a combined and regular attack by land and by water. It is, particularly, when the enemy shows a disposition to lay siege to the forts above mentioned, that the force of the country ought to be turned out against him.

NEW LONDON, October 26th, 1794.

S. ROCHEFONTAINE, *Engineer, P. J.*

P. S. For any details respecting the fortifications of the several ports alluded to in the above memorial, the Secretary of War is referred to the plans and other documents transmitted, from time to time, to the War Office.

#### FORTIFICATIONS, NEW YORK.

*Special instructions to Charles Vincent, acting as a temporary Engineer in the service of the United States.*

SIR:

The President of the United States, considering the importance of New York, from its local situation, and the difficulty of fortifying it with small means, is desirous of having the separate opinions of several engineers upon the subject. You will, therefore, please to repair to that city, and, if the Governor be present, show him these instructions. If, however, he should be still absent, you will wait upon General Lamb, the collector of the port, and request of him a boat and hands to attend you in your inquiries, and he will, also, be so good as to obtain some gentlemen to accompany you who are perfectly acquainted with the harbor. In order to assist you in your judgment, I transmit you herewith a map of the harbor from Sandy Hook up to the city. I also enclose you the estimate of the sums which have been appropriated by Congress to this object.

NEW YORK, GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, *Twenty-four Pieces.*

The expense of constructing batteries, embrasures and platforms, for 24 pieces,	\$1,727 52	
A redoubt with embrasures,	810 00	
Magazine,	200 00	
Block house or barracks,	500 00	
Contingencies,	500 00	
		3,737 52
		\$3,737 52

PAULUS HOOK, *Sixteen Pieces.*

Parapets, embrasures, and platforms, for batteries of 16 pieces,	\$1,151 68	
Redoubt,	650 00	
Four embrasures and platforms for do.	160 00	
A magazine,	200 00	
A block house,	500 00	
Non enumerated articles and contingencies,	500 00	
		3,161 68
		\$3,161 68

## NEW YORK.

Batteries for several parts of the city, for 42 pieces,	\$1,312 50	
The expense of the materials, and executing platforms and embrasures for 42 pieces, at \$40 73,	1,710 66	
Three magazines,	600 00	
Two block houses, or other buildings equal thereto,	1,000 00	
Contingencies,	1,000 00	
		5,623 16
		5,623 16
		<u>\$12,523 36</u>

Twenty of these pieces may be on travelling carriages, so as to be moved as circumstances might require. It will be readily perceived that the amount of this appropriation will not effectually fortify an harbor so circumstanced as New York. But this sum cannot be exceeded, and all your estimates are to be conformed accordingly.

The works that are the most important are to be pointed out in your plans, and every thing which shall be undertaken is to form hereafter a part of the general plan.

The parapets which have been contemplated, have been of earth. It is conceived that, in most places, earth may be procured of a tenacious quality, and that a parapet formed thereof, would be respectable, as well for its defence as its duration, more especially if it is properly stopped and sodded, and sown with a certain species of grass called knotgrass.

It will depend upon your judgment at what places to have embrasures, or what to fire en barbette with the new carriage, such as are used on the sea coast of France.

It is, however, apprehended, that in all cases where embrasures are necessary, they ought to be framed of joist, and faced with two inch plank. Embrasures formed of earth are too liable to be injured.

It will be necessary that each plan should be accompanied with an estimate of the expense, and pointing out the number of cannon required, and also stating the number of men which would be necessary to finish the work within a given period, say three months.

The batteries which are to be erected on points of land, islands, or other places at a distance from New York, ought to be covered or secured by a redoubt, or other enclosed work, in which the garrison should reside constantly, either in a barrack, or a strong blockhouse, as shall be judged most expedient. But, in general, as the garrisons will be weak in numbers, a block house mounting one or two small pieces of cannon in its upper story will be more secure, and therefore to be preferred. These, however, ought not to be much, if any, exposed to the fire of heavy cannon. A block house will not contain more than fifty men. If the garrison, therefore, should be enlarged, tents must be used.

The redoubts in general ought to be of a size to contain five hundred men, so as to resist a sudden enterprise of an enemy, and perhaps the idea ought to be embraced in the first instance, that they should be of such extent as to admit timber casemates to be erected hereafter, so as to enable the garrison to resist, in some tolerable degree, a bombardment.

But it is not proposed at present to erect such casemates, excepting for a magazine, which must be formed of massy timber, and be six feet thick on the roof, exclusive of the earth, and jointed and calked in such a manner as to be perfectly tight. Care must be taken to have the magazines properly ventilated, and free from dampness. They are to be of a size sufficient to hold one hundred and fifty rounds of powder for each piece of cannon intended to be served from it. The spot at which a magazine of this nature shall be fixed, will require great judgment, so as to combine security against an enemy, either open or subtle, or any danger from common accidents.

Your judgment will also direct what parts of your works shall be protected by a fraize, and what by palisadoes, or whether your redoubts shall have embrasures, or fire en barbette, with small cannon. As the redoubts are to cover the batteries, they would certainly secure and resist better without embrasures—the batteries are to annoy.

The choice of the ground on which the batteries and works are to be erected, with all the combinations and effects depending thereon, will rest upon your judgment, under the directions of the Governor. It has not been intended by any thing herein specified, to point out the particular manner in which the works should be executed. Outlines only have been given to serve in regulating the expense, which is limited by the sums before mentioned.

A reverberatory furnace for red hot balls must be erected for each battery.

Having finished your plans, you are to lay one copy before the Governor, and to transmit another to me, with full details of the reasons for your opinions. It is to be desired that you instantly undertake this business, in order that you may be ready to receive further orders, which will be given to you as soon as you shall be able to execute them.

I enclose you two letters, the one for the Governor, and the other for General Lamb, the Collector, who, you will please to observe, is requested to advance you one hundred dollars, if you request it.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this 1st day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*General observations on the defence of the Harbor and City of New York, by Mr. Vincent.—New York, 1794.*

There is no need of a long meditation on the means of defence to be employed in New York, to obtain a certitude that they ought to tend only to ensure the safety of the harbor; and this place has no attack to fear from troops landed or arrived in the extent of the State of which it is the metropolis. The difficulties to keep the necessary communications between an army landed and its fleet, the repeated combats which these troops, when landed, should have to maintain against men provided with all necessaries, and the number of which would be daily increasing, against men defending their properties, with that valor and enthusiasm which nothing but a just and well known cause can inspire, offer so many insuperable obstacles, that they leave no room to believe that an enemy will ever attempt a landing that could not but prove fatal to him.

We can easily form the same judgment of all enterprises from an enemy already master of land communications with the State of New York, and without supporting our opinion with the glorious events of the late war, number of reasons demonstrate the absurdity of an attempt of this nature, which will never be thought of against this flourishing city.

We will not, consequently, consider in this moment the city of New York as susceptible to be attacked by an enemy, reduced to make long approaches by land, but we shall be taken up with the only thought of ensuring the safety of its harbor, which being at this moment entirely open for ships of the first rate, gives too much foundation to fear lest an enterprising enemy might come to an anchor in it with very indifferent forces, destroy all defenceless merchant vessels, and, at the best, lay the city under enormous contributions.

Such an unheard of calamity is not only possible, but much to be dreaded at the present moment; and when we reflect on the risks one of the finest harbors in the world is exposed to; one that nature, and the social institutions of the inhabitants it enriches, leads by long strides to become the greatest and most flourishing emporium of the two worlds; we cannot forbear a sentiment mixed of dread and regret, when we see that nothing has been done yet towards the safety of a point of such importance, and we feel a pressing desire to see its defence established, towards which has proved more generous than we generally observe it to be.

Effectively, on casting one's eyes on the map, we see that the signal man placed in the light house, can long before hand give notice of the forces discovered by him in sea. Signals agreed upon can give an instantaneous warning to all persons committed to the defence of the city and harbor; of the imminent danger, first important advantage to be obtained, and would highly facilitate the dispositions of defence.

Arrived at the entrance of Sandy Hook, the hostile ships will have yet twenty miles to run before they can annoy the city and the vessels in its harbor, and to how many obstacles is not that long passage subjected? they must by day, and only during high water, follow with a steady attention, and winds infinitely variable, follow a winding channel, before to arrive to that part of the same channel where the contracted current increases its rapidity, and where the wind leaves generally the entering ships, and abandons them to all the means of defence so easy to establish in that part.\*

If we suppose the first difficulties presented by nature to be conquered, and they cannot be so without subjecting the enemy to a great loss, when art will join its resources, it is, we think, out of doubt, that the new obstacles laid in the enemy's way, by means of the islands so happily situated in the river, will oblige him to give up any idea of forcing the entry of the port, or will be at least sufficient to make him repent his temerity, if he should dare to attempt it, what we cannot believe.

Having thus delineated a true picture of the numerous advantages offered by nature for the defence of New York harbor, we will immediately enter into particulars on what additions we think art ought to make to it.

One should, in reading this, have constantly the map before one's eyes, as we have it in writing; after having, however, sufficiently reconnoitred the ground.

There is no doubt but the soonest one may annoy the enemy attempting to force the entrance of the harbor, the best it will be; and this idea creates naturally a desire to establish crossed fires on the narrow entrance of the channel, ahead of Sandy Hook; but the difficulties and expenses arising from constructions exposed to an open sea, which must be terrible at certain times, combined with the hardships a garrison exposed in the middle of the waves and difficult to provide, should be subjected to, have led to think, that on a channel of such length, and presenting such good positions, though more approached, it would be better at the present moment to establish nothing ahead of that point; it will be advantageous, however, to have at Sandy Hook's tower, two pieces mounted in battery, the use of which will be to give the signals agreed upon, these signals will be repeated by Stag Stake Fort, and successively by Beedle's and the city.

By means of these signals, the city and the defences, whatever they may be, will be readily informed of the moment when the hostile ships will enter Sandy Hook's bars, and the first obstacle destined to oppose them in the narrows will be ready to be displayed in all their latitude.

They will consist on the left shore of the battery, served as well as all other ones to be constructed, with red hot balls, and mounting fifteen pieces of the largest caliber on coast carriages, having their motions in the horizontal and vertical plans; to these fifteen pieces will be added four ten inch mortars for this battery, the gorge of which will be slightly shut, as it ought to be commanded and fully seen by an earth redoubt to be established on the steep shore superior to it; this battery will besides be founded on the rising ground advancing two hundred fathoms in the narrows, and covered only with five or six feet water at low water; it seems useless to say that the use of this battery and of the redoubt will be to procure crossing fires on the channel, by means of the batteries placed on the opposite shore; two pieces on field carriages should also be placed on the lowest point of the same left shore, where the passage widening forms the beginning of New York Bay. These two pieces, which would discover the whole bay, might be protected by a second redoubt, which being connected with the first by a line well traced, should form a kind of entrenched camp, where might repair the militia troops, if, against all likelihood, the enemy should attempt a landing in York Bay to come and take the batteries. This act of temerity should lay him under the necessity to master the entrenched camp, which would give a considerable advantage over him, for nothing can be of greater moment than to cause the enemy to lose a precious time, during which forces may be collected to complete his destruction.

We think that the means of defence, to be established on the left shore of the Narrows, can be reduced to what we have mentioned; and although we have spoken of two redoubts, a joining line to form an entrenched camp, it is easily understood that this powerful means of defence is no way necessary at this present moment, and even that, until the low battery be established, it will be sufficient to erect earth batteries, which may be constructed with very little expense, and in a short while, on the steep shore, the elevation of which is far better adapted to the defence to be obtained than the level of the sea, that will always expose such low batteries to all shots directed below the horizon, either by the enemy, either by our own batteries of the opposite shore; these shots making generally ricochets with great success; but the establishing of the low battery, shortening by two hundred fathoms the distance of the fires, we have thought it our duty not to neglect the advantage.

Having spoken of the defence to be established on the left shore of the Narrows, we shall now take in consideration the right shore, which is much more interesting on account of the vessels coming much closer to it, driven by the currents, and endeavoring to avoid the advancing high grounds.

A battery mounted with fifteen pieces of the largest caliber will be established in Sandy Bay, above the level of the highest tides, its gorge will be shut, and it will have four mortars and flanks, mounted with two four pounders, to defend it.

Above this battery and the steep bank, will be erected Fort Stag Stake, covering the inferior battery, and forming very advantageous crossing fires with those of the opposite shore; it will be, besides, connected by a covered way with a redoubt to be erected on the extremity of the steep bank, where formerly stood a block house. Mortars will be placed in the covered way joining the fort and redoubt; this last will be defended by six pieces of the largest caliber. These mortars, combined with the defences already designed, will complete the protection necessary for the channel in the narrows; but as it is prudent to calculate all possibilities in cases of such high importance, we will suppose that the enemy should attempt a landing in order to master the right shore's defences. This determines us to propose to occupy by a redoubt the heights of Cherry Hill, connecting this redoubt with Fort Stag Stake, by a double covered way, traced with intelligence, and seizing, by another covered way, an important ground below Fort Stag Stake, which is susceptible to receive a number of men sufficient to oppose any enterprise of the enemy on Staten Island, the object of which might be to possess the defences therein established, or what is not so likely to attack the city and harbor.

Thus, in our opinion, should be ensured the defence of the right shore of the Narrows; the entrenched camp we have mentioned, useless for the present moment, might be of very little expense, and present to the militia of the island a point of rendezvous, which the enemy would not, without danger, leave behind.

\* Narrows.

Of all these works, the most urging ones are also the plainest; the block house redoubt Fort Stag Stake, and the intermediate batteries, should be constructed immediately. These first defences would cost but little; and, combined with those established on the opposite shore, might already present a very respectable opposition to the enemy.

Supposing, however, he might succeed in forcing this first passage, he should find new obstacles on approaching Bedloe's Island, situated so as to face the channel, and whose fires might cross, with great advantage, those of Governor's Island, and concur with those of Oyster Island; a new battery should, consequently, be erected on that Island, mounted with six pieces of the largest caliber, and two mortars.

After Bedloe's, and on the same side of the channel, we find a very low Island, (Oyster Island,) which, its proximity to the city, to Bedloe's and Governor's Islands, renders infinitely precious; it will be necessary to place there the same defence as on Bedloe's Island, making use of coast carriages; the right hand shore being protected in this manner nothing will be wanting to its defence.

Considering now the left hand shore, of which there is but one point occupied in the narrows, it will suggest the necessity to bestow the greatest attention in forming a solid protection on Governor's Island, the happy position of which can procure crossing fires with most of the points taken on the right hand shore, being equally distant from Bedloe's and Oyster Islands, and the city, with which it is possible to obtain crossing fires on the entrance of East river, where should, probably, retire all the riches of the harbor, should the coast come to be attacked.

This point will be consequently the object of the nicest attention; it will be occupied by at least twenty pieces of the largest caliber, and four mortars, the whole distributed with cautious knowledge.

All the works to be made in Bedloe's, Oyster Island, and Governor's Island, will be of little cost; the execution of them may be undertaken immediately; they cannot be ordered too soon.

The defence of the channel, established as we have expressed, we think that no fleet should ever undertake to force it; and we are of opinion that there would be no subject of fear on account of the town; this will dispense from seeking to add to the proposed works batteries, connected with the place; the surest effect of similar establishments would be to draw the fire of the ships; and, should the enemy be so far advanced as to beat on them, the city would run the risk of being destroyed; the object of defence would be frustrated, and there is no sacrifice but would seem of no consequence to avoid such a calamity.

It is then in front of the city that we must look for its defence, which seems to be assured by the means of the works designed along the channel; but, should it here remain, yet some fears, which nothing but the importance of the object might justify, we might propose to anchor, ahead betwixt Governor's and Oyster Islands, an unsubmersible floating battery, that might combine for its defence all the advantages of land batteries, such as red hot balls, and other defensive resources. Such batteries would be lasting and of little expense in this country; they appear even the most natural means to be employed for the protection of the United States' harbors. The advantage which these ambulatory forts enjoy, by being able to be removed from one place to another, and to give a good covering to their defenders, should entitle them to a particular preference from a country abounding in wood, and whose population is not advanced. Such a battery should be armed with ten guns and two mortars, and might also serve as a fixed point for a chain, shutting any portion of the channel starting from Oyster Island. This caution, by straitening the entrance of the harbor, should render more efficacious the means of defence, cumulated on that part of the channel left free for the navigation.

We shall limit there the means of defence we judge convenient to propose for the city and harbor of New York, deeming unnecessary to take greater cautions against ships which, having forced the channel, would attempt to burn the vessels retired in East river. We are too much persuaded of the impossibility that the enemy should ever come so far; and, when we reflect on the risks that same enemy would be exposed to, should, after a check, contrary winds force him to remain a prey to all the means of destruction that might be directed against him, we cannot believe that the city and harbor of New York will ever have any thing to dread from an hostile fleet. We cannot, however, disapprove the idea of many persons, which, considering all the riches of the harbor cumulated in the East river, propose to erect another battery east of the public work, and joining the city so as to have crossing fires over the entrance of the East river with batteries of Governor's Island.

Having thus given a general idea of the means of defence, which seem convenient to a point that ought, undoubtedly, be looked upon as one of the most important in the Union, we will endeavor to collect, in a general table, and at one view, all that we have deemed necessary to undertake, in order to ensure to this harbor the security conveyable to the most magnificent emporium of the universe.

NEW YORK, the 10th of —ber, 1794.

EXCELLENCY:

Being always in expectation of one answer to my two last letters, I see, with great uneasiness, coming the moment at which I must deliver to the commissioners, for the fortifications at New York, my plans and memorials relating to the defence of the harbor. I am in the opinion that it is my duty to submit every thing to your approbation; and, in order that you may more easily explain your idea, and to be better understood, I have prayed the Captain Pray, who has been always busy about these works, to bring to you all my papers. This brave and very intelligent man thinks himself very happy in taking this opportunity to present to you his respects. I have requested the Captain Pray to be here the 20th of this month, the appointed day by the commissioners for the communication of my papers; and I am under the greatest necessity to pray you to send me again every thing but what is relating to West Point; and I will observe to you that, upon the memorial relating to the Fort Clinton, I have made one important addition concerning the objection offered against my project.

It is my duty, Excellency, to remember to you, that I want your approbation for being able to go on upon the model proposed for the floating batteries. You will find in the papers one plan and one memorial upon this important subject, which I recommend to your particular attention.

One memorial, relating to the formation of one body of artillery, for the defence of New York, is also in the papers, and is, perhaps, worthy of your examen.

I work every day, Excellency, so much as possible, for being able to answer to the high commission, and surely to the high commission with which I am honored. I am every day helped by the gentlemen employed with me; and, nevertheless, I see very much to do yet for giving every thing relative to the great project of defence of this harbor. We continue what appears to me the most important; and, as I think you want to have one copy of every general plan, we shall be very busy till the spring, which must begin for our works as early as possible.

If any plan should appear to you more proper to be sent again to you, one copy should be taken immediately, according to your orders, which I hope to be sent again by the Captain Pray.

I am, with the highest respect, Excellency, your most obedient servant,

Secretary of War.

VINCENT.

FORTIFICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES—GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

State, by approximation, of the necessary expense for finishing the proposed works for the defence of the harbor and city of New York against a marine enemy.

NAMES OF THE SPOTS TO BE FORTIFIED.	NAMES OF THE WORKS TO BE CONSTRUCTED.	AMOUNT OF EACH WORK.		WHOLE.	OBSERVATIONS.
		Now to be erected.	To be erected at war time.		
Lighthouse,	A flag staff and a lodging for four gunners, . . .	.	100	100	
Cherry hill,	The redoubt to repair, with some lodgings, . . .	.	1,500	1,500	
Block house's hill,	One mortar's enclosed battery, with lodgings for fifty men,	2,500	.	2,500	
The hill between block house and flag staff,	One enclosed redoubt, armed with howitzers and small artillery pieces,	.	1,000	1,000	
The communication between this redoubt and flag staff, with the lodgings of that fort,	The old fort to be rebuilt, with many alterations, . . .	15,000	2,500	2,500	
The flag staff fort,	One small battery with two or three firing mouths, . . .	.	600	600	
The small spot at the north of flag staff,	One strong enclosed battery mounted with sixteen pieces heavy artillery,	25,000	.	25,000	
Sandy bay, under flag staff hill, left side of the narrows,	One enclosed redoubt to protect the low battery, . . .	.	4,000	4,000	
The upper shore, near Denie's ferry,	One strong enclosed battery mounting sixteen pieces of heavy artillery,	60,000	.	60,000	
The bank under this redoubt covered with water,	A projected battery for twenty pieces of heavy cannon, protected by one strong redoubt enclosing one gaol,	25,000	.	25,000	This important work, already begun, is to be finished as soon as possible.
Bedloe's Island,	One strong enclosed battery mounting eight pieces of heavy artillery,	2,000	.	2,000	Do. do. do.
Oyster Island,	One bastioned square commanding two low batteries, quite finished,	30,000	.	30,000	A great part of these works is finished. It is to be observed, nevertheless, that being only sodded, it will not stand a very long time; and that if they were lined with stones, the estimate should be very much higher.
Governor's Island,	The biggest mortars to be had, . . .	500	.	500	To be constructed as soon as possible.
The public walk called the Battery, in the city, Upon the river, . . .	Two floating batteries mounting ten pieces of heavy artillery each, to be stationed between Oyster and Governor's Island, . . .	10,000	10,000	20,000	To be constructed so soon as possible, so much that they are not to be injured standing always in the water, and that one of them, at least, should be very useful to the tranquillity and good order to be maintained in the harbor.
	General amount, . . .	\$160,000	\$19,700	\$179,700	
	Contingencies, . . .	2,300	.	2,300	
	Totally, . . .	.	.	\$182,000	

General Observations.—All these estimates are calculated according to the prices which should be right to be given for the materials and the workmanship; but the experience has proved this year that we cannot expect great efforts of men working by day's work; and, if the works to be erected are pursued by the same way, great augmentation upon the above price must be expected, particularly for the works made by the common laborers.  
 New York, the 1st of —ber, 1794.

VINCENT.

## FORTIFICATIONS, PHILADELPHIA, AND WILMINGTON, DELAWARE.

*Instructions to Peter Charles L'Enfant.*

SIR:

In pursuance of the directions of the President of the United States, you are hereby appointed a temporary engineer for the purposes of fortifying the ports of Philadelphia and Wilmington, upon the river Delaware.

You are therefore immediately to proceed in the execution of this business, under the general directions of the Governors respectively of the States of Pennsylvania and Delaware.

The following is an extract of the estimate on which the appropriations of the fortifications have been founded:

For Mud Island and Philadelphia,	\$11,913 82
For Wilmington,	3,000 00

The proportions of expense therefore must not be exceeded. But every thing now undertaken must be completed and be considered as the parts of a more general, perfect, and permanent plan, to be hereafter executed; provided the sum now appropriated should prove insufficient, which is highly probable.

It is presumed that the completion of Fort Mifflin, at Mud Island, will be considered as the first object to be undertaken in Pennsylvania. The works to be erected at Wilmington, in the State of Delaware, will also require immediate attention in order to be put in a train of execution.

It will be perceived, by the lowness of the estimates, that the parapets of the works to be erected are in general to be of earth, or, where that cannot be obtained of an adhesive quality, the parapets may be faced with timber and filled in with earth. A parapet, however, formed of tenacious earth, is conceived not only to afford a solid defence, but even to be durable, provided it be properly sloped and sodded inside and out, and sown with a species of grass called knotgrass, so as to bind the sods and earth together.

Your judgment will decide where to have embrasures for your batteries, and where to fire en barbette, and also where to have the common garrison, and where the new carriages to fire en barbette, at present used on the sea coast of France.

You will also direct what part of the works shall be protected by palisadoes and what by fraizes.

It is conceived to be essential that all batteries which are erected on islands or points of land at a distance from support ought to be protected by redoubts or other enclosed works, and that such redoubts ought to be secured by a block house, where the garrisons, which in ordinary cases will be but small, ought constantly to reside.

In the construction of the redoubts, or enclosed works, they ought in the first instance to be constructed so as to contain a respectable garrison, suppose five hundred men, and casemates ought also to be contemplated in the construction, although they will not now be erected.

It has also been contemplated in the estimates that the magazines should be formed with timber, and five or six feet thick on the roof, so as to resist a heavy shell. This thickness is independent of the earth which may be placed over the timber. These magazines ought to be well ventilated, so as to be entirely free from dampness, and of a size to hold one hundred and fifty rounds of powder for each piece of cannon.

The spots at which magazines of this nature should be fixed will require great judgment, so as to combine security against all enemies, either open or subtle, and against common accidents.

A reverberatory furnace, of the best construction, in order to heat balls red hot, must be erected for each battery.

These are general ideas, but are not to constrain your own judgment, excepting as to the limitations of the expense, which, as before mentioned, must not be exceeded.

The choice of the ground on which the batteries and works are to be erected, together with all the combinations and effects dependent thereon, will rest upon your judgment under the directions of the Governors.

All the plans must be accompanied with sections and elevations, so that a complete judgment may be formed thereof, an estimate of the expense must also be formed of each work, and the number and size of the cannon intended must be specified. One copy to be given to the Governor, and one transmitted to this office, to which also you must weekly report your progress.

Your requisitions for labor and materials must be made upon \_\_\_\_\_, who is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to account for the sums to be expended at Philadelphia, and upon \_\_\_\_\_, who is appointed for the same purpose at Wilmington.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this 3d day of April, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*Copy of a letter from Major L'Enfant to the Secretary of War.*

PHILADELPHIA, April 19th, 1794.

SIR:

Much consideration being requisite in combining a fortification, especially when the safety of a capital city is the immediate object, I cannot but wish for time to mature my ideas on the subject; and seeing what grand system of defence the protection of a fort on Mud Island will require, and, independent of which, a stand at that spot can give no kind of security, your opinion being to determine my process, the following notes I conceive necessary to facilitate your judgment of the principle on which to direct my labor.

First, Viewing the situation proposed, I find, that however spacious as the fluid surface appears to be, the breadth of the ship channel is sufficiently narrow, and can be absolutely commanded over by the cannon from Mud Island; that batteries erected at A, under the defence of a fort B, would play right down the stream over the width of the river; that they would batter in front, every vessel coming up, and do more damage, in proportion, to the crowding of sail. No position would be safe to stand by them, and the batteries easily covered from the land side, the garrison being perfectly secure, the fort may be expected to make a steady defence. But that its defence should be effectual in stopping a navy, on this I will observe, that the great object of an expedition rendering of no consequence the loss to which a daring attempt may expose, a fort standing alone may easily be passed; and, as a variety of circumstances would here occasion some additional forts, to render the attempt to force the pass impracticable, it becomes a question, whether some other position in the river may not be found more eligible to make the establishment? But, until I shall have acquired all the information I need to support an opinion in the affirmative, looking upon Mud Island as the spot determined upon, the only method I see of making it answer the object, would be, to take advantage of a bank, to erect a second fort at C, the defence of which would co-operate with those of Mud Island, as may easily be seen on the small sketch of the river to which these notes have reference; that bank only three or four feet under water, easily to be wharfed, no inconvenience being to result to the current with which this bank runs parallel, the measure would prove most beneficial, and the trust which I place in its effects makes me desirous it may be first attempted.

The situation also, D, would be important to secure as well those at G, E, F, where batteries under the cover of Red Bank, and of another post at H, would much annoy a shipping engaged with the forts, as was experienced last war from a battery at F; protecting one another, these batteries would see down the river as far as would the defence of Mud Island, and of the fort C; they would procure a cross fire all the way, but especially above the forts; there it would become such, that no vessel should ever venture through, especially as having first to steer close between the two fires A and C; these different batteries successively to be passed should leave no safe position to repair a damage sustained.

With this, the greatest possible security would be ensured to the city of Philadelphia, and without need of chevaux de frise, an expedient which once might have been commendable, but which, for having in a manner succeeded, should not, however, be thought necessary at this time. In no case whatsoever, I would not advise the sinking of any of them, being well convinced, that more embarrassment would ensue to trading navigation, and more injury be caused by the necessary alteration which it would occasion in the bank and current, than there can be benefit

derived from; all considered, every such means are mere expedients and contrivances, subject to accidents in their accomplishment at the moment when danger is near, and they are too precarious a protection for a nation to rest its safety upon, and ought never to be made a consideration in the delineation of a plan for fortification, the grand object of which should be to ensure perfect security, with a little trouble, and with as few military as possible.

All kinds of forts, and most particularly one as intended, ought then to be made capable of self-defence, and should be so situated as to check alone the progress of an enemy, in a country especially where militia being the main body to muster from, much time is required before troops can be assembled and marched. Too much attention cannot be paid, to make all fortifications capable of standing against a vigorous attack; and whenever this cannot be done, it is better not to have any, as by becoming useless they must prove greatly prejudicial.

Guided by these reflections, and considering that the defence of a pass on which the safety of the city of Philadelphia depends, is of an importance, as must make the expense attending the accomplishment of an effectual plan to defend it, a trivial consideration, although, endeavoring to restrain the works, as may be first begun, within the limited sum granted by the Government, I could not, in viewing the situation of Mud Island, confine my labor immediately to the contriving of a figure for a work, the combination of which, I perceived, demanded a previous investigation of the particular circumstances of the opposite shore, and some reflection on the manner of attack possible to be carried against; independent of which consideration, any fortifications as may be erected there, will ever stand a mere mock of defence.

Far remote from the sea as that situation is, it is certain, that no attack will ever be made, unless it is a very determined one; and, viewing the precedent of the manœuvres of an army by a circuitous march to take possession of Philadelphia, cannot establish a probability of such an attempt being renewed under the present circumstances of the country, all grand operations must now be first directed toward gaining the pass for shipping, which, consequently, would determine an operation against the defence of Mud Island, or of any other situation in the river, on a very different principle than was once carried on there in 1777. Taking, however, that expedition under consideration, the result of my inquiries about, and the observations I have made on the proprieties and inconveniences of a stand so circumstanced, convince me, that in addition to the work above mentioned, as necessary for the defence of the ship channel, others will be wanted to cover and protect these.

The cover of a regular fortified post, to command over Province and Carpenter's Island, will be wanted sufficiently spacious to admit, as the occasion may require, a good garrison, and made strong to support regular approaches and hinder them from being carried directly against the forts on Mud Island, where they may still easily be advanced on the island below, which is but the consolidated part of the same mud bank on which the fort would stand.

The small sketch may show the situation where this post should be fixed, the figuration of the work being left undetermined until a proper survey of the country round has been obtained—whether in the manner of a horn, or crown work, must depend from the manner of the establishment on Mud Island, which it must cover, and by which it ought to be defended.

Some difficulties will be, to continue the work on the island a regular one, the solid part being too narrow to admit of square forts, whose line of defence it would render too short; an inconvenience would also arise from crooked lines, these being always defective, for a situation easily to be surrounded, as half of the circuitous line must inevitably be seen in the flank and rear. Wishing to avoid this inconvenience, and to procure a larger front of fire over the channel, I would determine upon the position of the battery as at A, which will show the advantages of that direction over that of the old forts, the remains of which cannot be any way serviceable but my making use of the materials.

N. B. The defect of that old fort, not only lay in the configuration of its line of defence, which, as General Dupontail well observed, are too short for mutual protection, but its situation is altogether so ill judged as to be enfiladed from every point from whence an attack is the most likely—a disadvantage in no manner remedied by the improvement proposed by that officer, who surely did not see the situation with a proper attention, or he must have observed, that no part of the addition which he planned would have been more secure than the old; no work, indeed, would be possible to contrive making the old one serve, which could be made a stand even against a few gun boats in the west channel; necessarily then, rejecting all idea of connecting any new work with the former one, I would establish the forts and batteries back of the wall now standing, making this serve as a cover, until the work is sufficiently advanced to mount the batteries, after which it would be pulled down, making the stone serve the construction of the principal forts.

As to what relates to the construction of the batteries and forts, the island being mostly overflowed and of a soft clay bottom, it will necessitate to some expense to lay on a solid base in logs framed in the manner of a grate under the whole, with a kind of upright framing to receive the platform; observing that, however temporary the object of the batteries now to be made may be, the time of which they may be of use, perhaps distant, may render them then out of repair, and consequently useless, or that being ever so near at hand, a defect in the superstructure being to accelerate their destruction, their object would be unanswered, and the confidence placed in them being disappointed, the sparing of proper materials and of the labor should, in both cases, be dearly repaid by the loss of valuable lives, and the disasters attending a weak resistance.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

P. CHARLES L'ENFANT.

*Copy of a letter from Major L'Enfant to the Secretary of the Treasury.*

PHILADELPHIA, September 15, 1794.

SIR:

After all possible exertions on my part, to progress the fortification at and near Mud Island, and however attentive I have been in confining the extent of my operations to the limited sums assigned for, it is with the greatest concern I am to inform you that those means, by proving too small, have long since forced me to relent of the progress; they are at present so far exhausted, that, unless you can procure a sufficiency of supply to continue the work for two months longer, the whole must stop before any part is brought to that state of perfection necessary to be guarded against winter, and answer to some object of defence.

In endeavoring to obviate the consequent injury which I saw must result from leaving what is done in a state still imperfect, and apprehending no new supply could be procured, since last supplementary sum obtained has itself proved much less than what I had been led to expect from General Knox's own promises, I determined upon an expedient step, that of soliciting, through the Governor of Pennsylvania, the necessary assistance from the State. This measure, and the information I gave to a committee of the House at their visit on the island, and at two subsequent meetings on the business, determined a report agreeable to my wish—a sum of *six thousand* dollars they granted as an advance, leaving the manner of repaying it to the next Legislature to determine upon, and also referring to the same, the consideration of what would be proper to do respecting the cession of the island to the United States. This was the purport of the bill this committee proposed, and, on another part having obtained the concurrence of some of the members the least disposed to favor federal measures, I judged that but little opposition would be made to the bill; in this hope, however, I have been frustrated by the sudden adjournment of the Legislature, who confined their labor to the consideration of the few bills which the Governor, *in haste of leaving town with the militia*, pointed out as the most essential for them to pass. Left by this disappointment in the same dilemma of difficulties as had induced my application, the prosecution of the business solely now depends on what you can do, and in soliciting you to give me immediate directions, I must beg, before you determine on the arrest of the whole of the operations, that you will consider the consequences, giving a due attention to the particular statement, herein enclosed, of the actual situation of the several parts of the work that is engaged in conformity to order of April 27, and 29th ultimo.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

P. CHARLES L'ENFANT.

P. S. The enclosed statement of the progress of the work on Mud Island, I would beg you would, after perusing it, and when may be convenient, return it to the Board of War, as, in the hurry of business, I have had no time to keep a copy.

Mr. T. Francis, who sent me the sketch of the account, by which there appears, September 22d, a balance in his hands of \$1,618 66, wanted immediately to stop all operations. I have requested him to wait until I receive your directions, and hope you will favor me with them as immediately as possible.


PHILADELPHIA, September 25, 1794.

Statement of the progress made at the several parts of the fortifications, begun at, and near, Mud Island, in the river Delaware, agreeably to order of the 27th, and 29th April last.

*Works on the Middle bank east of Mud Island.*

After the many contrarieties experienced, both in procuring the necessaries, and in effecting the sounding, and laying of the work in the water; out of two of the several cones and caissons waoss which are to be made the base to erect upon the fort, and which, after being framed together ready to sink, were maliciously set adrift by unknown persons; one portion, which that accident caused to detach from the other, has at last been sunk to its place; but, for want of that support which I intended it should receive from the part cut off from it, has sunk to a greater depth than expected, and this has necessitated the application of more timber, and greater quantity of stones and iron, with the means of which, the work is still only raised level with the low water line, under which it must continue to sink gradually, until it can be fastened to the next pile, now secured from the drift, but waiting to be sunk until a sufficiency of supply of lumber and of stone can be procured, so as to render the operation safe, and admit of its being raised as fast as it will sink, and until it is made steady, and brought level with the first part.

When these two piles are connected together, they will form the base for half of the front of the fort, but as this half lay on the declivity of the bank and toward the main current, it can never be well secured until the other half is completed, as may well be judged of from the small sketch of the section of that work hereafter expressed.



*References.*

- A—Bank of mud and sand.
- B—Cone first sunk, and how it sunk for want of the support C.
- b—Additional work to keep it to the low water line.
- C—Caisson that has been detached and is necessary to sink to fasten the part B b.
- D—Other half, which will absolutely secure the whole bank within the frame.

The situation of the part B will show the absolute necessity of sinking immediately the part C, and of fastening both together, raising the whole above the high water line, as expressed by the dotted line - - - else, that, by laying as it does, close to the main current, it may give way under the pressure of floating ice, and slip down into the channel, which cannot be apprehended when raised above high water, the banking of any body of ice all round being in no way dangerous, the deepest part of the frame running parallel with the bank, and with the current.

*Works upon Mud Island.*

The new grand battery extending towards the main channel, under cover of the wall parapet, is but progressed so far as to have the wharf, which is its foundation, completely raised on an extent of about 700 feet, sunk in a depth of from four to fifteen feet, partly in the mud and partly in the stream current. Behind this a large esplanade is formed over the deep swamp, opposite to the old barracks, filled in to the height of the wharfs, level with the high water mark; which left this part to be raised, all over, to about three feet more, (making allowance for the natural settling of new made ground,) before the parapet can be raised and the battery properly mounted; now, the guns being only laid along side the edge of the wharf to forward its settling.

The next work is the old wall rampart of about 290 yards long. Of that wall, the remains of the old fort, 160 yards, has been banked inside, ready to form a parapet and rampart platforms; the whole about forty-five feet broad and on an average ten feet high, which left this part about seven feet still lower than it ought to be to mount the cannons upon. Adding to this, a portion of a line of intrenchment, which is just beginning, on an extent of about 140 yards, but which is yet one half below the height it is to be. They altogether comprehend all what has been attempted of the plans approved of, for the improvement of the fort on Mud Island, and the construction of the new one intended upon the middle bank.

The manner how the whole has been directed, determining the greatest progress in all the part most difficult to come at, and which would be impossible to attempt at a moment of imminent danger, will show that I have been less anxious to make a show of progress, flattering to the eyes, than eager in bringing forward those parts on which, I consider, the good defence of the place most particularly depends. On another part, I considered, all the parapet I could raise, being made of muddy clay, must, however well rammed down as it is, alter in their shape, in proportion as the whole will settle down, that glacis and level of angles must deface, as long as the watery substance is not fairly expunged, from within, and this being not to be expected, but after the winter has passed over. It therefore becomes economical to delay, until the spring, to sod and slope properly the whole.

Giving this sketch of the situation of the fortifications at, and near, Mud Island, nothing having been attempted but that was of necessity to perform; if, notwithstanding all possible economy, the provision made proves unanswerable, to a proper accomplishment of what is begun, before the bad season comes. I think I need not say any thing more of the circumstances, by which those funds at disposal have proved insufficient, than calling to memory the great inconvenience, under which the operations were conducted, at a place destitute of every comfort for the hands; lay open to all accidents of the season, uncommonly bad in the months of June, July, and August, when extraordinary freshes and storms greatly injure the work and caused an increase of labor which could not have been foreseen nor avoided, having had successively to repair the extensive bank round the Island; to build new sluices; open new drains; and to dig over and over again all ditches; without which the whole Island must have been overflowed; the whole work upset, and the laboring hands, with the garrison, reduced to the most unhappy situation.

P. CHARLES L'ENFANT.

*Copy of a letter from Major L'Enfant to the Secretary of War, dated*

PHILADELPHIA, May 16, 1794.

SIR:

Complying with your directions, I repaired to the State of Delaware, and in my way to the Governor, first took a view of the situation at Wilmington.

That place well sheltered, by nature, against a navy, as may come up the river, I found need but of a small battery to have its harbor protected.



Two situations offer for that battery, which may be said to be equally advantageous, if considering only the navigation through Christiana and Brandywine creeks; the one at A, at the confluence of these two canals, the other, lower down at B, rightly at the mouth of the main branch; but as the object of a post, as intended, can only be to guard the merchantmen and store, in the confined harbor of Christiana creek, from insult, the situation B, is the only eligible—its advantage over the other would be, its greatest vicinity to the grand channel of the river, over which the post there, would keep a good look out; while the battery may play over the wide surface truly, not as to stop, but greatly incommode a vessel, which it would necessitate to keep aloof from that shore. This post would be out of the reach of the commanding ground at Wilmington; it would be more independent from that town, and its garrison better trained there to military duty, by having sorties sent out to patrol over the space C C C, over which, whenever a suspected vessel lay in the river, it will be essential to keep a good watch, because it is to be observed, that an attempt to burn the shipping, or plunder the stores, lying at D D D, must be made that way, the navigation through the creek, even if it should be left without a battery, being not safe for such an attempt, as after the alarm is given, the inhabitants mustering behind the bank all along the meander of the creek, would easily prevent the going back of any boats, or armed vessels; this consideration, and that of the particular circumstances of the ground H H H, east of the *Brandywine* and *Christiana* creeks, down to the river shore, convincing me of the perfect security of that side, I would view a post erected at A, as absolutely useless. The British, it has been objected, had a redoubt erected there last war, at A a, which to some people is conclusive, that that must be the situation; to this it need only be observed, that that redoubt was to close the right of a line of defence from the height, north of the town, all along, and fronting toward the *Brandywine*, from which side they had to fear, and nothing to apprehend from that, C C C being master of the river, a circumstance which, now to be absolutely the reverse, would necessitate in case the post at A should be insisted upon to extend that post, crossing it over the *Christiana* creek, and establishing a strong redoubt at F, to master those marshes, partly covering the space C C C, the difficulties of passing which, thought by the vulgar a great security, it is well known of all partisans are the weaker of defence, must always become a mean to favor their design.

The next of my inquiries carried me lower down the river; much had been said to me of the pass at Eagle point, which the Governor of Delaware had been solicited to represent to the Federal Government, as the most eligible place for a fort; and, knowing he had declined making the representation, under expectation I would make it my business on my arrival at Newcastle, I engaged one of the stage sloops; and in company with the proprietors of the land about that point, together with a number of captains of vessels, I proceeded immediately to the sounding of the river, first across the main channel, and coming upon the *Pip Ash*; a bank forming an island opposite Eagle and Reedy Points, continued the sounding along side of that bank, oft times going across and back again, and reached Reedy Island, thence coming back, sounding close to the main shore, until out of that pass; which the operation proved to have a channel much wider, and more free, than had been imagined; this well satisfied the persons the most desirous of seeing a fort erected there, that it would not answer the object; a single fort at the point surely would not be a defence. Nevertheless, looking upon that situation, with the one opposite, upon the *Pip Ash* Island, it cannot be questioned but that pass may be well armed, and that proper works erected there would protect the whole river back; there being no other pass but a shallow channel east of the *Pip Ash*, and running close to it, the width of the river toward Jersey being barren all over. With respect to the self security of the works, on these two points, this would be greater than in any situation I have observed, considering the distance of the Jersey shore would not admit of any battery to be erected, against a fort on the *Pip Ash*, and that the one at Eagle Point, lying at the end of a long and narrow neck, which requires a circuitous march to take possession of, would be guarded against regular approaches, the undertaking of which would be a tedious and difficult operation.

The perfect security which the protection of that pass would ensure to the whole river, and to the several harbor towns on its shore, being an object fully to compensate the expense of erecting proper works on it, although the means at present inadequate, as they are, to the accomplishment of those temporary works, determined upon, cannot indulge me in the idea that these shall be undertaken at present. I could not but wish to ascertain myself the propriety of that situation, of an importance, in my opinion, not to be lost sight of, when the means of the country will render the undertaking practicable.

Many other observations could be made on the propriety of different situations for look-out forts, on the east and west shore of the Delaware, and where small batteries may greatly distress a navy; as, for instance, at a point opposite Wilmington, close to which the main channel runs, and every large vessel must pass. These means of distressing an enemy in a river, the navigation of which is so liable to be invaded as is that contemplated, can never be too much multiplied; and, adding to those look outs, gun boats, or rowing galleys, I question not but the river would be effectually defended against all small naval expeditions; the facility now, the most contemptible of privateers will find to plunder or lay under ashes those stores and vessels lying at Chester, Marcus Hook, and Newcastle; but places more immediately accessible than is Wilmington, being inviting them to the attempt, I cannot but express my opinion, they ought to have been the first to protect; each of them are most susceptible of being well defended with batteries at the head of wharves prolonging out in the river, and post on the shore; they would become as many defences to the river itself. Newcastle, in particular, should be provided for; not because of its great commercial interest, which I conceive rather limited, owing to the back navigation carrying the country produce another way, but because of its importance, when militarily viewed, that place being an essential point in that grand chain of posts for garrisons, which should be combined together, from the southward to the eastern States, all along the coast, as well as on the back frontiers.

This situation, Newcastle, is most happily circumstanced to be made strong, and to unite all what is requisite, a grand garrison. Many situations across to the Chesapeake head would be proper stands to entrench for detached corps, which would shut up all passage through that neck, whose protection requires also some strong establishment on *Sassafras* river and at *Turkey point*, the particular circumstances of which places I could not take upon me to survey, finding these were out of the limits of Delaware; their immediate importance, however, to, and connexion with, the defence for the protection of the States of Delaware and Pennsylvania, should annex them to that district, which would lessen the inconveniency which must necessarily result from carrying on the fortifications in each district, independent of each other, in lieu of determining its situation and force from the consideration of the relation which a spot may have with, and the assistance it may give or receive from, those in other States. A manner of process the only economical and secure in the establishment of fortifications, when intended to defend a grand frontier, and an exclusive sea coast; for which, to adopt a general system, should be first laid down; a proper survey of every situation ought at first to have been made, connecting these in a general map, and determining thereon what nature of fortifications may be necessary, with respect to the population of the States, and the habit and disposition of the people, on whose exertion and support those defences may depend.

Finding that no ground at Wilmington had yet been purchased, and the Governor of that State wishing some time to consider, and determine upon the appointment of a proper person to conduct the work, he understanding that the cannon for the fort proposed, could not immediately be had; no inconvenience being to result from a little delay in beginning it, I agreed with him, that after sending him the result of my observation on the propriety of the situation, I should determine that I should wait for his answer, and his appointment of a day for me to meet with him, and proceed according as may be judged most eligible. Doubting not he will communicate previously with you on the subject, I shall esteem it a favor to obtain your opinion on the propriety of the foregoing observations.

*From Major L'Enfant to the Secretary of War, dated Philadelphia, 2d July, 1794.*

Str:

The Governor of Delaware's answer to two of my letters, coming into my hands on the very evening after I received your notification of the 30th past, I thought most expedient before I go and meet with him, to answer in writing to his objections, and to the reasons which he gave to cover the motives of the opposition made by the

inhabitants of Wilmington, respecting the emplacement I have designated, to fortify upon. The copy of this answer I here enclose to you, for your consideration of the circumstances that determined my choice. The next post will probably bring me the Governor's final determination, and I shall accordingly proceed on as you direct, provided no new difficulties occur, which I greatly apprehend. Major Bush's late communication to me, contains some reflections which have been cast upon me, on a misrepresentation of the motives actuating me, which, I trust, those who know me will consider as insulting as it is unmerited; but this is but an account of the profit of office.

For some time past the work at Mud Island has acquired a pretty close attention, and as we are now on the point of sinking part of the grand wharves, on the middle bank, which is about framing, and staked out in the water, being possibly necessitated to go there at the moment's call, unless a purchase of the ground as shall be determined at Wilmington, is actually effected, so that the work may be set about immediately, my repairing there can be no advancement to the business, and will rather interfere with the more important work of the forts here.

*From Major L'Enfant to the Governor of the State of Delaware, dated Philadelphia, 1st July, 1794.*

SIR:

It will perhaps be needless for me to enter here more largely than I have done before, on the merit of the situation I have chosen to erect fortifications for the defence of the navigation to Wilmington; since, after what I have already said, the objections made, and the expressions of your letter of the 28th ultimo, most fully convinces me, no arguments ever so demonstrative of the error of the opposition I meet with, will persuade contrarily to the determination apparently taken to force the establishment on that situation, suitable to some of the inhabitants of that place, to the hazard of its proving useless, and thereby becoming detrimental to the interest of the United States.

However determined in my choice, as I have been from two important considerations—the immediate security of the navigation to the place, which the law directs—next, that of making the establishment small, as it may be susceptible of serving for the protection of the Delaware shore, I indeed but little expected the difficulties I now encounter, and wishing to evidence the principle actuating me, it becomes necessary I should answer to your objections, with that freedom the candor of my intentions authorize. You say, sir, “the work necessary to be erected where I determined, must be attended with much greater expense,” &c. Without asking how this has been ascertained, but presuming from your own observation, you speak from a computation of the difference of a free labor, which you say the inhabitants are willing to perform, provided the work is erected where they wish it to be, meaning apparently by this, that their assistance cannot be expected where I propose. I must first observe this would have but little weight with me, because the works intended having a permanent object, would better be constructed by proper workmen carrying it on gradually, than to have recourse to those expedients of mustering the citizens at large, which may do well at a moment of immediate necessity; when circumstances may require those works to be made complete. Admitting that what I propose may cause an exceed of expense as you imagine, it may be answered, that by the situation of the work that expense would in a manner prove a saving to the public, for reason of the double use the work would then be, while affording the most effectual defence at the entrance of Christiana creek. The circumstance of the situation you must surely not have attended to. When speaking of the other you say, “that place being fortified will command all of both the creeks, which the lower place won't do, *except the very mouth of Christiana.*” Is not, sir, that the first entrance of the Brandywine creek? and of all other small branches whose mouths lay far up? and is it not, consequently, that by securing the *very mouth of Christiana*, I secure all other branches of navigation, the same as by shutting the street door of a house, one may leave the inside door open, without fear of robbery? I mentioned that fixing a post at the mouth of that creek, would make the battery play over the river, &c.; and in your endeavor to lessen that advantage, you observe, “the main ship channel ran far off?” but you do not consider how, in the defence of that channel with galleys, gun boats, or the like, that fort would facilitate the manœuvres of such vessels—how it would permit their keeping in the river before any naval force, by assuring them shelter and protection, without the bar of the creek, up of which stream in fault of these, such vessels must seek a retreat, with the danger in their way of being destroyed from behind the bank, or at least blockaded in, so as to become absolutely useless.

Another misjudgment of the circumstance of the spot which I propose, is evinced by your apprehension of the ground all round being easy to inundate, “difficult to reinforce with militia in case of alarm or emergency;” “nay” say you, “impossible if an enemy should land below, and cut down the bank, whereby the whole work would be covered with water.” Certainly this must be a mistake, being constant that the best security for all fortified posts is, that facility of laying the country round under water—an expedient which an enemy would rather dread, and endeavor to prevent, than be eager to facilitate, as this would be shutting himself the way to conquest. That by laying all the low ground under water, “would make it difficult and impossible to reinforce or to supply the fort,” is not better founded, seeing evidently that the navigation from the town down, by the facility of the creek, can by no exertions whatever, be impeded, and that the way on the summit of the banks each side of the creek, only made more secure by the marsh being inundated, no army could cut off the communication to the forts under such circumstances as you may suppose.

With respect to salubrity, you object “the situation is remarkably unhealthy.” I might also contend this, observing that the bottom of the meadow, on that side of the creek, is rather more raised than on the other; that it has good springs of water, and a number of habitations close by the bank, whose inhabitants look as healthy as in other places. In short, if we were to listen to the opinion of the concerned on either side, we would have heard that the situation at Wilmington is the most feverish of the two. This can only argue, that, where a jealousy amongst settlers does exist, but little confidence can be placed in their opinion on such subjects. It may, therefore, be wise to conclude, from the nearness of the two places, only separated by a stream 300 yards wide, as also from the sameness of the circumstance of the ground each side, no difference in point of health can exist, such as can argue contrarily to the good reasons I have stated to make the establishment at or near the mouth of the creek, where it may become of some service while at.

The place at the rock a fort can in no manner serve, but as a dead show of defence, as, although that situation sees and commands over both creeks, as you mention small boats may, notwithstanding, pass, stealing away under cover of the bank, unnoticed by the garrison, this, and the consideration that a serious attempt against the mills at Brandywine, or against the shipping in Christiana harbor, cannot reasonably be made through that way, it is to be concluded, that a battery then will only answer for a salute, and to afford an afternoon diversion to the inhabitants of the town. That this should be an object with many, if I may judge from the reasoning which I have heard on the subject, I believe it, especially since what you mention of an objection to the fort below, being “its remote situation, which would render it inconvenient to the inhabitants.” For their repairing there I must own I see no frequent necessity, nor indeed conceive the advantage, even in the case of an enemy being near: for a fort, to be answerable to its object, should be made capable of defending itself, without need of external corps of troops to protect and cover it, as you seem to contemplate, by way, I presume, of removing any objections to the commanding heights back of the situation of the rock, saying “it is the business of the militia to guard and defend these heights, which, I make no doubt, they will do against any forces that may attempt.” &c.

I doubtless confide as much as you do in the courage of freemen to defend their rights and privileges; however, I must confess I am apprehensive the efforts of a militia would be fruitless on such a call. Besides, it is to be noticed that none of the works at either place contemplated can protect the town; that, in case of a serious attack, the town must, of necessity, fall the first; and, as the only advantage then which can be expected from this fort is, that, by shutting the navigation of the creek, it would cut off a communication between an enemy possessing the town and the shipping in the river, it needs but a moment of consideration to be convinced, that the only eligible position is at the very mouth of Christiana creek, since being no more in power to place your militia so as to defend the rock, a work of whatever strength, then must fall with the town.

The foregoing being meant to show the propriety of my insisting upon the choice I have made, I trust you will believe I am determined to this from a sense of my duty, for you will doubtless consider, that, although I am to act under your directions, yet the expressions of my instructions being to the following purport: "the choice of the ground, together with all the combinations and effects depending thereon, will rest upon your judgment," I become responsible for the consequences of yielding inconsiderately, or through courtesy, to opinions contrary to those which I entertain.

Proceeding, in all my operations, independent of any influence but that of a warm and sincere wish, by all my might, to promote the general good, while I point out what I truly conceive the only expedient means to secure the main object of general defence, and give immediate security to the place which the law directs, I would sincerely regret to see a party spirit oppose my steps, if by arming the prejudices of an uninformed multitude, it should succeed in raising a jealousy against operations on which depend the peace and the preservation of the blessing of that liberty we so long have contended for.

To conclude, should you still insist on rejecting the situation I propose, for that which the inhabitants of Wilmington wish, in opposition to all the reasoning condemning the measure, it will be necessary you will, by a positive injunction to me to proceed accordingly, remove from me all the responsibility, taking upon yourself the consequences.

Should you, on the contrary, as I hope you will, agree with my choice of the spot near the mouth of Christiana creek, I should wish that measures may be immediately taken to effect the purchase of part of the ground which I caused to be surveyed, extending the lot so as to include the principal, if not the whole, of the rising ground, forming a kind of island in the meadow; the small house, as it stands upon, would serve as a barrack, which would be enclosed in a fortified redoubt, which would cover, with great advantage, the battery on the bank below. From the certified disposition of the proprietor to sell, no difficulties can arise on that score, and as to the expense, this would be greatly compensated by making the house subservient to the purpose of a garrison, and, also, by the saving in raising a parapet out of solid ground, which would not occasion any thing like the expense at places where it would be necessary to bring the dirt from a distance. In the interim of these operations, and merely to convince the inhabitants of Wilmington, I wish, as much as may be consistent with a sense of my duty, to make every thing agreeable to them, I would erect a small battery at the rock, which need not be enclosed but by a palisade, making the small house then serve as a barrack.

#### FORTIFICATIONS AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, AND NORFOLK, VIRGINIA.

*Instructions to John Jacob Ulrick Rivardi, acting as temporary Engineer in the service of the United States.*

In pursuance of the direction of the President of the United States, you are hereby appointed an engineer, for the purpose of fortifying the ports and harbors hereinafter mentioned, viz. Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, Alexandria and Norfolk, in the State of Virginia.

You are, therefore, immediately to repair to the ports to be fortified, in the said States, respectively, and, in case the Governors should be near any of the said ports, you are to wait upon them and exhibit these instructions; but, if the Governors should be at any considerable distance from your route, you are respectfully to notify them of your appointment, enclose them a copy of these instructions, and inform them that you have repaired to the ports aforesaid, in order to make the necessary surveys and investigations relatively to your mission, which you will submit to their consideration, and take their orders thereon.

As soon as you shall receive their approbation of your plans, you are to construct the works and execute them with all possible despatch.

The following is an extract of the estimate on which the appropriations for the fortifications have been founded; the proportions of expense, therefore, herein stated, for the said ports, must not be exceeded, viz.

##### BALTIMORE, 28 pieces.

Parapets, embrasures, and platforms for batteries, for 28 pieces,	\$2,015.44
A redoubt, with four embrasures,	810.00
Two magazines,	400.00
Block house with barracks,	500.00
Contingencies,	500.00
	<u>\$4,225.44</u>

Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 24 privates.

##### NORFOLK, 24 pieces.

Batteries, embrasures, and platforms,	\$1,727.52
Redoubt, with embrasures,	810.00
A magazine,	200.00
Block house or barracks,	500.00
Contingencies,	500.00
	<u>\$3,737.52</u>

Garrison to consist of 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 2 musicians, 24 privates.

Alexandria was inserted by the Legislature, and not contained in the original estimate, it is, therefore, at present to be fortified with works for twelve pieces.

It will readily be perceived, by the lowness of the estimate, that the parapets of the works intended to be erected are to be of earth, or, where that cannot easily be obtained of an adhesive quality, the parapets may be faced with strong timber, and filled in with such earth as can be had.

It is, however, conceived that, in most cases, earth may be procured, and that a parapet made thereof will not only form a solid defence, but even be durable, if the earth be tenacious and properly sloped and sodded inside and out, and the seed of knotgrass sown so as to bind the sods and earth together.

It is, however, apprehended that the embrasures, made in this manner, would suffer from the explosion of the powder from the cannon, and that, therefore, where the batteries are not en barbette, that the embrasures ought to be framed with joist, and faced with plank, of two inches thick.

Where the batteries are to be erected on points of land, islands, or other places, at a distance from the towns intended to be defended, they ought to be covered or secured by a redoubt, or other enclosed work, in which the garrison should reside constantly, either in a barrack or a strong block house, as shall be judged most expedient. But, in general, as the garrisons will be weak in numbers, a block house mounting one or two small pieces of cannon in its upper story will be more secure, and, therefore, to be preferred. These, however, ought not to be much, if any, exposed to the fire of heavy cannon. A block house will not contain more than fifty men; if the garrison, therefore, should be enlarged, tents must be used.

The redoubts, in general, ought to be of a size to contain five hundred men, so as to resist a sudden enterprise of an enemy, and perhaps the idea ought to be embraced, in the first instance, that they should be of such extent as to admit timber casemates, to be erected hereafter, so as to enable the garrison to resist, in some tolerable degree, a bombardment.

But it is not proposed at present to erect such casemates, excepting for a magazine, which must be formed of massy timber, and be six feet thick on the roof, exclusive of the earth, and jointed and caulked in such a manner as to be perfectly tight. Care must be taken to have these magazines properly ventilated and free from dampness; they are to be of a size sufficient to hold one hundred and fifty rounds of powder for each piece of cannon intended to be served from it. The spot at which a magazine of this nature shall be fixed will require great judgment, so as to combine security against an enemy, either open or subtle, or any danger from common accidents.

Your judgment will, also, direct what parts of your works shall be protected by friezes, and what by palisadoes, or whether your redoubts shall have embrasures, or fire en barbette, with small cannon. As the redoubts are to cover the batteries, they would certainly secure and resist better without embrasures—the batteries are to annoy.

The choice of the ground on which the batteries and works are to be erected, with all the combinations and works depending thereon, will rest upon your judgment, under the directions of the Governors.

It has not been intended, by any thing herein specified, to point out the particular manner in which the works should be executed. Outlines, only, have been given to serve in regulating the expense, which is limited by the sums before mentioned.

Some person, in whose ingenuity and industry confidence can be placed, will be appointed, at each of the said ports, to superintend the actual execution of the works, according to your directions. Arrangements will also be made by him, or some other person, to obtain the necessary workmen, implements, and materials, which will be required in this business; but every thing must be previously estimated and calculated by you.

Although the business, herein entrusted to your charge, is, in itself, of an highly honorable nature, and strongly evincive of the confidence of the President of the United States, and which would, probably, enhance your reputation, yet it is explicitly to be understood by you that the employment is only temporary, and not conferring or involving any military rank whatever.

For a compensation for your services and personal expenses, you will be allowed and paid at the rate of four dollars per day, while you shall be employed. For all reasonable extra expenses, such as necessary boat hire, and persons to assist in your surveys, you will be allowed; but for these you must keep regular accounts and take receipts.

You are to deliver to the Governors copies of all your plans, surveys, soundings, &c., and also transmit copies of the same to this office. You are also to make a weekly report to this office of your proceedings. I have issued my warrant, in your favor, for two hundred and fifty dollars, as an advance on account of your compensation and personal expenses.

As it is conceived that the case of Norfolk is the most pressing, you will stay no longer in Baltimore than is necessary to inform the Governor, mark out the works, and leave the execution for the present to Captain Stricker, or some other person whom the Governor may appoint for that purpose.

You will please to give every necessary direction or advice relatively to the mounting of the cannon at those places. I have written to Captain Stricker at Baltimore, and the Governor will appoint some person for Norfolk. Colonel Fitzgerald, of Alexandria, may have the superintendance of mounting the cannon at that place. A reverberatory furnace, for hot balls, must be erected for each battery.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this twenty-eighth day of March, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*Copy of a Letter from J. J. U. Rivardi to the Secretary of War, dated*

BALTIMORE, April 13, 1794.

SIR:

I had the honor to receive, yesterday night, your letter of the 11th instant. I hasten to answer it, and to communicate to you my plans for the fortifications of Baltimore; they were drawn in the greatest hurry, but are sufficiently exact to convey a good idea of the spot, its advantages, and its defences.

The point of land represented in the small map, accompanying the plan, is about three miles from town to its extremity, where the old fortifications are placed; the branch of river, which extends itself to Baltimore, and forms the harbor, has hardly one hundred and twenty perches breadth at the entrance, where there was a chain, during the last war, as is marked in the map; the points, marked A B, indicate the opening left for the passage of vessels; the water is deep enough there to admit a frigate. There are two banks, expressed by dotted lines, which render it impossible to any vessel of some burthen to sail in any other direction but that dotted on the map; a direction which presents the broadside to the front of the lower battery.

You will please to observe, that every work, which I propose, is expressed in the paper with yellow color; there are three parts to be attended to in the works exhibited in the plan, viz: the lower battery, A, B, C, the upper battery D, E, F, and the star fort G.

The lower battery's greatest defect, in point of construction, is, that a vessel, after having passed the upper reef, can with ease pour its broadside in the side of the guns; this enfilade is prevented by raising the epaulement, 1, 2, 3, which affords, likewise, sufficient room to pursue, with a sure fire, a vessel which should have succeeded in passing; whereas the battery, in its present situation, must be abandoned, as soon as a vessel, even of a few guns, passes the point. The salient angle B, is totally undermined by the water, and partly fallen down, in such a manner that, without having recourse to an expensive pilotis, there is no possibility to do any thing except to bring the line, B, C, back to 4, 5, and B, 4, to 5, 6; by that method the direction of the fire is not altered, and there is still space enough for the free management of the artillery; the height I, covers the battery on that side, and the ground round it is so commanded by the upper works, that the enemy could derive no advantage from it. That lower battery can contain twenty guns, whereas there were only eleven formerly, by a bad idea that it was better to have more in the upper works. I think it will be indispensable to have a beam of two feet to the battery even if the embrasures were faced with timber or *sauçissons*. The communication from the lower to the upper works, was from I) to H, but it has been destroyed by some persons who transformed the whole of the spot, together with the ground intended for the powder magazine, into a deep pit, by digging for red ochre. I propose, therefore, to bring the whole of it to a gentle slope, in which it will be easy to cut a road for the cannon, the lower battery will then be commanded by the redoubts, which formerly could not fire a single bullet into it.

The upper battery commands the lower one very imperfectly; being too near of it, considering its height and the necessary thickness of the breastwork, it will be necessary to take away a good deal of its ascent, otherwise, the epaulements, indispensable for its protection, would be of an enormous and very expensive elevation. Six guns can be conveyed to the lower battery, as five pieces in embrasures, and three or four on frame carriages, will be quite sufficient, the latter to be on the line D, E, and the embrasures as marked in the plan; that upper battery had the same fault of the lower one, viz: to have its rear completely open from the town side, so that a vessel, in intelligence with the enemy, would silence the whole of the guns, after having sailed down the river as far as the point O. In general, a small body of men, landing in boats any where on the western side of the point, might with ease, in the present state of things, penetrate wherever they should think proper, and spike the guns.

The only and the cheapest method I could contrive to secure the whole of the works, and to establish mutual defence, is to continue the epaulement, D, in E; then to project a line, E, F, terminated by the redans, F, G, H; by that method we obtain a well directed cross-fire on the land side, the defence of the river is increased of the flank, F, G, the upper battery is sheltered, and we obtain a commodious space, well covered, for the barracks and magazines; the ditch running before the breastwork, E, F, G, H, communicates with that of the redoubt, drains the ground, and forms a barrier round the works.

The Star fort never was entirely finished, and the greatest part of the ditch is filled up with the earth of the parapets; that kind of redoubt, always bad in itself, (the fires being oblique, and the salient, as well as the entrant

angles, indefensible) is rendered still more so, the perpendicular of construction being one-fourth, instead of one-third of the side of the polygon; the only method by which it is possible to render the place able of a good defence, is to construct the two small bastions, J and K, in small pieces, en barbette, on travelling carriages, would defend, by their fire, the whole breadth of the point; all the entrant and salliant angles, but two, would be perfectly flanked; a powder magazine could be constructed in the bastion K, as it is the driest place in the whole point, the platform itself serving as a bomb proof. I am sorry the mail, which closes to night, forces me to be more laconic than I should be on that head, but the inspection of the plan will supply any further explanation.

There ought to be, on the opposite shore and close to the chain, a small *tete de pont*, or, what would be better, a square redoubt, to prevent any boat from destroying the chain in the night. I would have it slightly constructed, and to hold only a couple of small four pounders, that the enemy could make no use of it against the lower battery.

I think it would be highly necessary to have immediately a couple of carriages made, if it was only to have the pieces examined and tried, which I would like to see done before I go. I shall, with the greatest pleasure, give every necessary direction on that head, as soon as I have your positive orders, and shall likewise, in a few days, write down what carriages should be requisite for the different works.

It is evident that the sum allowed by the Government, is entirely insufficient, even to repair the old works, and to erect the necessary buildings, platforms, carriages, &c.; but I have been assured, that the militia will turn out, and give all possible assistance. The sum above mentioned will then be sufficient for materials, carpenters' work, &c. I shall want 1,280 feet solid timber, for the facing of some part of the works, at one shilling a foot; 1,400 palisadoes to freize and palissade the berm and ditch of those two sides of the redoubts which are not flanked, besides the necessary timber for facing the embrasures and covering the platforms; much will be done by the citizens of Maryland. General Williams is absent, and is in such a bad state of health, that he is not expected to return. Lieutenant Dodge seems to be an active man, and well calculated to forward the execution of the business; but I wish a man, understanding the geometrical part of the business, could be now and then consulted during my absence. There is one Mr. Francois Gardy, who is perfectly competent to that business, and who, with very little encouragement, would attend when it would be necessary. I have sent to-day my plans to the Governor, with all the necessary explanations, and shall have the honor of communicating to you his answer as soon as I receive it. I imagine the best method will be, to begin by the barracks, to go on then with the lower battery, and to proceed in the order the importance of the works will dictate. I shall repair to Norfolk as soon as I am at liberty to go. I do not know even if it would not be better to sail there first, as in twenty-four hours I could easily perform that journey by water, and when I should be ready for plans I could then go to Alexandria.

Please to inform me how many guns you intend to send down to this place, and what calibre, and likewise what quantity of ammunition. Mr. Dodge mentioned to me likewise, that he did not know yet when he could receive the funds for the purchase of materials. I crave again indulgence on account of this very neglected letter; my hurry, and my quality of a foreigner, will, I hope, be sufficient apologies to entitle me to it.

*Copy of a letter from J. J. U. Rivardi, to the Secretary of War, dated*

BALTIMORE, April 20, 1794.

SIR:

Having received two days ago letters of the Governor of Maryland, expressing his full satisfaction of the plans which I proposed, I drew immediately the lines on the ground, and prepared drawings and sections on a large scale, for the superintendent of the works; I think, therefore, that nothing can delay either their execution, or my journey to Norfolk, for which place I set off to-morrow by the packet. I shall take the liberty now to state to you the demand for tools and materials which I delivered to Lieutenant Dodge, viz:

*For the barracks.*—A frame forty feet by sixteen, five thousand feet of one inch plank, one thousand feet one inch and one quarter ditto, four thousand shingles, nails, and the necessary hinges, window frames, &c.

*For workmen's tools.*—One hundred shovels, thirty pick-axes, thirty-six pickets, seventy wheel barrows, a hundred fathom line.

*Workmen.*—Six workmen for the barracks, and six journeymen for the fortifications. I signed that first demand the 15th April, 1794.

The second demand is for two gins, with their blocks and falls; for one crowbar; and for an addition of six workmen. It is signed the 19th of April, 1794.

I gave, besides, an estimate of the necessary materials for platforms, embrasures, &c. as follows:

*For 32 platforms,* requiring, each, 125 feet of oak timber, one foot square, and 261 feet of oak plank, three inches and a half thick. Squared oak, 4,000 feet; plank, 8,352 feet.

*For 28 embrasures,* each wanting 166 feet of two inch plank, 4,648 feet.

*For the guns.* Eleven garrison carriages for 18 pounders; four garrison carriages for 12 pounders; six travelling carriages for 12 pounders, and two after trains. One travelling carriage for a 6 pounder, if it bears trial.

I gave the necessary directions for the carriages, and Mr. Dodge will contract for the wood necessary to their construction, as they will then be much cheaper than the pattern which I had made here. I saw one eighteen pounder mounted yesterday, and showed, myself, how to try it. The company of artillery of the town offered their services for trying all the other pieces in the same manner. In general, it seems that the citizens are disposed to give every possible assistance; so that I hope the whole plan will be executed for the sum allowed by the Government. I directed the superintendent to proceed immediately with the lower battery, as the most important, and to mount the cannon, as the platforms and parapets are ready for their reception. The first letter I shall have the honor to write to you, will be dated at Norfolk. I beg you to depend upon my diligence, and believe me to be, with the utmost respect.

*Copy of a letter from Major Rivardi to the President of the United States.*

NORFOLK, 6th May, 1794.

SIR:

I take the liberty, for the first time, to address your Excellency concerning the difficulties which I meet, in the performance of the task you did me the honor to entrust me with. I found, in Baltimore, the situation so advantageous, the soil so proper for fortification, and the zeal of the inhabitants so favorable to my purpose, that, after having given the necessary plans, I left the place with strong hopes that the works should be executed for the sums allowed by Government for that purpose.

At my arrival here, I found an extensive coast, requiring multiplied points of defence; a soil, loose, without the least adhesive quality; the people, though disposed to assist with all their power, much less numerous than at Baltimore; and I compared, with great concern, the sums allowed for the latter place and Norfolk.

I tried the ground, and find it is unavoidable to support it with an interior revetment of bricks or fascines. I should prefer the first as durable, particularly as the thickness of the ground before it will prevent any ball from penetrating deep enough to endanger the soldiers fighting behind; twelve hundred dollars would very likely be sufficient to obtain that end.

Were it on a business in which the safety of the country and my honor should not be interested, I should say that it is possible to regulate the works according to the given means; but, in the present case, I should highly blame myself if any thing was left undone, so as to afford an excuse for a bad defence hereafter, or an occasion to accuse me of ignorance or neglect.

Since my arrival, public money has been expended only for the purchasing of materials and tools, the labor being done almost entirely by the public. Governor Lee's exertions and indefatigability have removed almost every obstacle which I undoubtedly should have experienced had he not been here as soon as myself. I crave your Excellency's consideration on that subject, and can assure that nothing shall be done but what will be strictly necessary.

J. J. U. RIVARDI.

*Copy of a letter from Major Rivardi to the Secretary of War.*

NORFOLK, June 24, 1794.

SIR:

My occupations, since I had the honor to write to you last, have been so numerous, that it was impossible for me to send the plans which accompany this letter sooner. I hope you will excuse their not being followed immediately by a chart of Elizabeth river, and by that of Craney Island. Having no other instrument but a plain surveying compass, without telescopes, I am under the necessity of multiplying my operations ad infinitum, and very often to omit minute details which would nevertheless be useful in a map that is to be consulted for marches, &c. Should it be possible to send me a theodolite, I would consider it as a very particular favor.

The two plans which I have the honor to submit to your inspection will lose much by not being accompanied by a map to show their exact situation and distances, together with the direction of the channel in its whole extent. I shall, however, try to explain the matter as much as it is possible, and in a fortnight I hope to remedy what should remain obscure by sending the necessary plans and a chart.

Fort Nelson is situated on a small point of land, projecting from Portsmouth side, in Elizabeth river, nearly opposite Norfolk, and within point blank shot of it. It commands the whole of the harbor, as well as its entrance. The letters in red, *abcd efgh i*, show the ancient lines of Fort Nelson, (the magistrate only is traced, and the following were the principal faults of construction:)

1st. The line *cd*, afforded to the pieces mounted there, a direction out of the mid-channel, as it appears by the inspection of the dotted line, *ll*, whereas, the present direction *mm*, from the new line *CD*, co-operates effectually with the battery *A B*. To obtain that direction, I was obliged to construct the flane *B C*, which covers the face of the opposite bastion. The said flane would have been greater if I had not been forced to consult the line of the highest tide, which sometimes raises to the counterscarp.

2d. The line *ef* was not flanked.

3d. The redans *efg*, offered too acute a salient angle, the side *fg*, was both too short and too oblique to flank the line *gh*.

4th. The side *hi*, makes too obtuse an angle with *ia*, to flank it.

5th. The line *ab* was without any defence whatever.

6th. The whole terreplein of the fort was so very high above the level of the sea, that no part of the interior of the fort was safe at a very short distance of the breast work. The foundation of the windmill, which served as a powder magazine, was entirely open to the shot. I was obliged to sink the whole terreplein considerably; the four large traverses serve now as a very good shelter, and even as an entrenchment to secure a retreat. They had another advantage, that of employing a vast deal of ground, which should otherwise have been removed. There is not a part of the terreplein, at the present time, where the men will not be perfectly covered by the works.

Having examined the faults of the former fort, I shall beg leave to state the objections which, at first sight, could be made to the present construction:

1st. *A B*, *C D*, and *I H*, are the only flanked sides towards the river; the lines *DE*, *EF*, *FG*, *GH*, not deriving the least defence from each other.

2d. The entrant angle *G*, might have been omitted, as well as the salient angle *E*.

Without entering into every reason which led me to prefer that form, I shall only observe, as for the first objection, that, from *C* to *F*, the best form to give to a battery, would have been a part of a circle, or an arc of about 120 degrees; but as a cource can never be flanked, I preferred making the angles *D* and *E*; and, in order to cover them, I constructed a kind of caponiere, leading through the ditch to a place d'armes, which flanked sufficiently these lines; for it is plain that this is the last place where a landing, in order to form an attack, would be attempted. *D* is also covered by the flank *av*, *E* by the caponiere 4, 5, 6.

With respect to the angle *G*, it is so very obtuse, that it little differs from a straight line, which could not have been obtained without diminishing the side *F E*, and carrying *H I* more inwards, as the ground before *G* is too low to admit of its being brought forward. In short, in fortification of the works fronting a river which offers no landing but out of gun shot, the chief intention of the lines towards the water must be entirely directed towards rendering the navigation as difficult as possible, disposing the guns in such manner as to bear upon the mid-channel through its whole extent; the mutual defence of flanks and sides is a rule from which an engineer may then depart, though he never can do it when he constructs towards the land side. The batteries *A B C D*, afford an excellent cross-fire with the batteries *J K* and *A B* of Fort Norfolk; the guns from *D* in *F* bear then upon the vessels nearly at the distance of a musket shot.

Towards the land, or Portsmouth side, the entrant angles *S T V*, *N M L*, will appear at first a singular innovation, but the advantages derived from it being considered, they will, I hope, be considered as a useful one. If two simple bastions had been constructed, the faces towards the water could not have been flanked, and the shoulder, or angle de l'épaule, would either have become too acute, or the flanked angle would have fallen in *B*, which would have been intolerable. The only side in the whole fort, which is not immediately flanked, is *L K*, where the saillie is managed. As it is impossible, however, to attack it in front, without passing under the fire of the flank *R Q*, and of the lines *N M*, *M L*, it is sufficiently protected.

With regard to Fort Norfolk, the ground is so advantageously situated to command the channel, that the front, *J K A B C D E* was almost dictated. The brisure of the courtine, which would be a fault in land fortification, became unavoidable, as by that the two batteries command the two principal points, viz: *A B* has its direction towards the western branch, where the British troops landed last war, and co-operates as a middle point with the fort of Craney Island, and that of Portsmouth; *B C* fires along the channel, in front of Craney Island—the disadvantage arising from that construction is, that the faces *J K*, *D E*, being parallel to *A B*, *B C*, they are not protected by the flanks of the horn work, a consideration which must yield to the advantage procured by being able to direct two guns more on the points just mentioned, which would not have been the case, if the courtine had been straight; besides, those faces cannot be attacked in front; and if the enemy wanted to turn the line *D E*, he would have to pass under the fire of a wing of a flank of the bastion *F*. I shall only add, that all the ground round the fort is perfectly level, as far as musket shot, then it is surrounded by woods, where an enemy could be stopped, either by abattis, or by small parties. No gun could be brought, without great trouble, to annoy the land defences, and they are sufficient to afford two hundred men a very gallant defence against eight times that number. By the time I have finished the plans concerning Craney island, the chart of the river will be ready likewise; and I hope that you will think, with Governor Lee, that it would have been difficult to find a better method of defence.

Whatever delays there may be in the completion of my plans on the paper, you may rest assured, sir, that there are none in their execution on the ground, as far as our means will allow it. I am forced to superintend every thing myself, in order to avoid errors, for I can employ nobody who is acquainted with the subject, except Mr. Courty, who does not speak a word of English.

I wrote to Mr. Vermonet, and received no answer. I am also only informed, very imperfectly, of the proceedings of Mr. Dodge, at Baltimore. I am much afraid that he has too much confidence in his abilities, and that there will be a deviation from my plans: for although I gave him very plain instructions, I expected he should ask for further explanations and directions as he went on with his works.

The front J K A B C D E is much advanced at Fort Norfolk. The Governor of the State presses much to see a beginning at Craney island, and I should have complied already, but for the great scarcity of hands. However, as Fort Nelson is greatly advanced, I will be able, in three days, to break ground there. I shall have the honor to write to you in a few days likewise, concerning the mounting of the guns, and several other objects, regarding the necessary implements, magazines, &c.

J. J. ULRICK RIVARDI.

*Copy of a letter from Major Rivardi to the Secretary of War.*

NORFOLK, July 6, 1794.

SIR:

I hope you will have received the plans and letters which I have had the honor to send to you the 24th June last. The bad weather, the deficiency of cash, and the circumstance, fatal to the progress of our works, that all the people are engaged at their crops, have put a temporary slowness in every thing here. I therefore employed that time in visiting the country, taking the necessary surveys, and drawing the map of Elizabeth's river, which I join to this letter. It is a very accurate one with respect to the distances, creeks, soundings, and windings of the river. The roads are likewise carefully marked, and I lament only that it is not drawn with more neatness; my various occupations, and the hurry in which I did it, will, I hope, be a title to your indulgence. The scale I made use of, is of a mile and a half, viz: 7,920 feet English measure; it is subdivided in 108 chains, each 36 $\frac{1}{2}$  feet.

If I receive the theodolite which I had the honor to mention in my last, I will then be able to supply your office with a map, including Cape Henry, and the mouths of all the different rivers, James, Nansemond, &c. That map would be very useful to establish signals, communications, &c. Next week I shall have the honor, sir, to send you a plan of the redoubt to be erected at Craney island, a spot of too much importance to be neglected, as all the vessels are forced to come under point blank shot of it, as you may see by the chart.

I wish you would have the goodness to inform me in what manner you intend to have the furnaces for heating the shot constructed. The adjective *reverberatory*, annexed in my instructions, makes me think that you mean to employ a new construction which I am ignorant of; but if the furnaces, as made use of four years ago in Germany and in France will be sufficient, I can give the necessary directions, even with some improvements made (in the channel leading the shot on the gridiron) by the Russians in the last war.

I have been forced, for the necessary surveys, to a number of extraordinary expenses. The \$200 which I received at Philadelphia for that object, have been expended some time; and as some journeys will, perhaps, be necessary, either to Baltimore or to Alexandria, I shall take the liberty to beg you to send me some fresh supply for extraordinary expenses, when you have the goodness to forward me the advance of the sum allowed for my compensation, which I shall be in want of by the end of this month.

Here I enclose a return of the laborers employed at the fortifications for a fortnight. It will show you, sir, what difficulties this scarcity of hands must subject us to. Much is promised for the beginning of next month. Much, indeed, is necessary, in order to have the forts completed this summer, which I hope will be the case.

I have been honored by no letter of yours since the 16th ultimo. I hope it is not a mark of dissatisfaction, as I never shall give (as much as it will lay in my power) the smallest occasion to doubt my exactitude and my activity in the performance of the business entrusted to me.

J. J. U. RIVARDI.

P. S. The guns from Elk are arrived safely.

*Copy of a letter from Major Rivardi to the Secretary of War.*

NORFOLK, July 20, 1794.

SIR:

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th instant. It afforded me a great pleasure, as you were so good as to express your satisfaction of my conduct. Permit me to embrace this occasion to assure you once more, that whatever may occasion delays in the business I am intrusted with, it will never arise from my want of activity or attention, and that the pleasure of performing my task, like a man of honor, will be such, that, in spite of difficulties, I never shall renounce it.

Here I have a great many obstacles to surmount, which I never could have foreseen. I hope you will excuse me if I enter into some particulars on that head; the anxious desire which I feel to see the fortifications complete, will be my apology, and I never should trouble you with any complaints, if I personally only was suffering, some difficulties arising from others in the performance of my duty.

At my arrival here, the novelty of the object of my voyage, the presence of Governor Lee, and the good dispositions of some leading men, encouraged me to hope that a great deal could be done, by means of contributions and voluntary assistance, which, from the smallness of the sums allowed by Government, would have been impracticable otherwise. The first letters I had the honor of writing to you, sir, expressed that expectation which, I am very sorry now to inform you, has been much too sanguine; for I thought that, in a small community, where public welfare ought to be the chief aim of every individual, no jealousies, no parties, could be found. I do not think, however, that there exists, any where else, such ridiculous divisions as here. The inhabitants of Portsmouth expected all the means should be employed in protecting their side, and refuse their assistance at Fort Norfolk. The inhabitants at Norfolk, not to be behind hand, refuse their's at Portsmouth, and will not even do any thing on this side of the river, if every one does not work in turn. The consequences are obvious: money must purchase all the labor, and, even then, it is sometimes impossible to get more than thirty or forty hands. This is not the only inconvenience to be complained of. There is a large number of dissatisfied men who object altogether to fortification, from the same principle for which they object to every measure of Government. Some would rather *bush fight*, (as they call it) in case of a war, and the fact is, I fancy, that they had rather not fight at all. I drop this disagreeable subject: the only thing is to be deaf, and do what the safety of the country requires.

The sum allowed for this place was 3,737 dollars, to which adding the 1,200 that I requested in addition, we will have 4,937 dollars, 2,700 of which only have been sent. This sum has brought us so forward that the balance, or a very few hundred dollars more, will be enough. For the mounting of the cannon, Mr. Bedinger informs me you have sent 1,500 dollars, which are not yet arrived.

By the plans which I had the honor of transmitting to you, you will see, sir, that, instead of 24 guns, there will be at least 30, employed for the defence of Elizabeth river, which alone would require some addition of money, allowing even that the estimate which I have in my instructions is an accurate or sufficient one. I expect Governor Lee every day; his presence, I hope, and example, will rouse a little the sleeping patriotism of the people here; then I shall communicate immediately to you what is to be expected, and what further ought to be done. In the mean time, money is much wanted here, and we have suffered a little from the delay of the 1,500 dollars, which you ordered to be sent here. If I dare to mix my private concerns with the public ones, I should beg leave to tell you that a delay of the sum I requested in my last would likewise bring me into difficulties.

I present hereby to your inspection the plan of defence of Craney Island. Should Point Comfort be fortified, the battery of seven guns (drawn in the margin, fig. 2d.) would be sufficient, even without the outworks which I painted yellow on purpose; but, if the Government does not think proper to go to that expense, the same battery might do, with the addition of the outworks; but, in case there was a sufficiency of means, I would prefer the fort F. 1, as that place is very important from its nearness to the channel. I have sent a plan similar to the enclosed to Governor Lee, and I shall wait for his directions before I proceed any further.

J. J. U. RIVARDI.

*Extract of a letter from Major Rivardi to the Secretary of War, dated Norfolk, December 9, 1794.*

SIR:

"Since I had the honor of writing to you last, I mounted all the guns at Fort Norfolk, and unmasked, in a great measure, the battery, which is now completely turfed and in perfect order. The two forts would be now in a state of defence on the river side, had I not been disappointed by those who raise the carriages, which I so often mentioned in my letters. It is owing to that delay that Fort Nelson has no guns mounted toward the entrance of the harbor; that business, however, can be done in one day.

"The barracks are already framed, and provided some money for that purpose is soon forwarded, they will shortly be fit for the reception of the soldiers.

"Captain Blackburne being returned here, I shall leave it to him to inform you of the situation of his men.

"The weather has been, and continues to be, very favorable; as it is probable, however, that a change will take place, I shall henceforward employ the workmen at the ditch, a task which is not liable to accidents from the frost."

*From Samuel Dodge, Agent for procuring materials, &c. for the fortifications at Baltimore.*

BALTIMORE, July 8, 1794.

SIR:

The timber and plank, for the platforms, is all landed at the fort, with timber for eleven garrison and seven travelling carriages, ordered by the engineer, exclusive of one carriage for an eighteen, and four for twelve pound ordnance, which the engineer contracted for at fifty dollars per piece.

The carriage for the eighteen pounder, with the implements, I have paid for by the order of the engineer; since rendered useless, with one of the carriages for a twelve pounder, by the bursting of two guns. The travelling carriages will be eighty dollars per piece; but shall have neither one nor the other made until further orders from your Excellency, as no money has been placed in my hands for that purpose.

Your Excellency's instructions directs that I should forward you an abstract of the articles for which the first moiety of the sum contemplated was disbursed, which I should have done, but the second was wanted for the payment of the timber and plank, with the plank for the carriages; the amount being nearly that of the first moiety.

I have received eight carriages, directed to my care by Mr. Samuel Hodgdon, but am apprehensive that there must be a mistake, as they are ship carriages, being entirely too low. The works are constructed for carriages three feet ten inches high; and I expect the extra expense of laying a platform will be more than the price of a ship carriage.

It is impossible for me to give your Excellency an accurate statement of the proportion of the work, as the whole of the lower battery, with part of the upper line, has been raised by the citizens; and no account kept of the different days' works. The engineer ordered me twelve men, who have beaten the whole, and sodded about two-thirds of the lower battery, when finished, and the platforms laid, will be equal to one half of the plan.

Your Excellency will please to observe that the water battery is about six hundred feet in length, and twenty feet through, with embrasures for twenty-four pieces of ordnance.

It is with no small degree of pain that I inform your Excellency that the works, for want of a guard, are much injured by the citizens trampling on it; they have torn it to pieces in a most shameful manner; the cattle, likewise, do great damage to the sods.

I should be glad to know what were the wages given at the fortifications in Pennsylvania; I have hitherto got men for three-fourths of a dollar, but from Saturday night I shall give one dollar or lose the men.

SAMUEL DODGE.

His Excellency General Knox.

BALTIMORE, July 10, 1794.

SIR:

I have the honor to forward your Excellency, by this post, the statement mentioned in my letter of the 8th instant, which is as follows, to wit:

Timber, plank, and shingles, for the barracks,	-	-	-	-	-	\$150 33
124 Shovels,	-	-	-	-	-	110 08
11 Casks of powder,	-	-	-	-	-	95 27
Drayage,	-	-	-	-	-	50
2 Log lines to lay out the works,	-	-	-	-	-	2 00
1 Gun carriage, with the implements,	-	-	-	-	-	62 00
Plank for a sewer to the spring,	-	-	-	-	-	8 95
Shaving 4,000 shingles,	-	-	-	-	-	9 56
29 Picks, 6 axes, 1 crowbar, and spikes for the sewer and bridge,	-	-	-	-	-	46 86
Plank for stakes to lay out the works,	-	-	-	-	-	1 96
20 Wheel-barrows,	-	-	-	-	-	80 00
Nails for the barracks,	-	-	-	-	-	18 11
25 Bushels lime for the barracks,	-	-	-	-	-	8 33
1 Set of gin blocks,	-	-	-	-	-	6 33
1 Fall for ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	7 40
Locks, bolts, &c. for the barracks,	-	-	-	-	-	8 87
Timber and plank for the bridge,	-	-	-	-	-	31 37
One month's wages for two barge men attending on the fort,	-	-	-	-	-	36 00
Timber and plank for the platforms, with plank for the carriages,	-	-	-	-	-	1,499 78
175½ days' work of the artificers,	-	-	-	-	-	244 91
727½ days' work of the laborers,	-	-	-	-	-	569 43½
						<u>\$2,998 04½</u>

I have received from the United States \$3,200. The remaining fifteen carriages I understand arrived last night in town; shall have them, with the eight that arrived some time since, brought to the fort. There has none of the guns yet arrived.

I have the honor, &c.

SAMUEL DODGE.

His Excellency General Knox.

BALTIMORE, September 14, 1794.

SIR:

I have the honor to inform you that the lower work of the fortification, at this place, is complete to laying the platforms; three of them are made and one nearly laid. I did expect that the work would have been further advanced than it is, but the sickness and the loss of number of my men has prevented it. I have likewise been confined these six days, by which means the work has been greatly retarded. I am under the necessity of making and laying the platforms with the laborers, as no consideration can induce carpenters to work at the fort.

The moneys that have been sent on is expended, to about seventy dollars thirty cents, or thereabout, of which I have to pay for tools, &c. for laying the platforms.



I should have notified your Excellency of the situation of the fortification, and the expenditures, before this, but my indisposition has been such as rendered it out of my power. The platforms, from the largeness of the timber, and the form they are directed to be made, require a great deal of labor both in putting together and laying. I have the earth to raise very much, and that requires much ramming to make it sufficient to stand the firing of the guns. The number of men I have at present are fourteen; I was directed by the engineer to have eighteen, but it is almost impossible to get laborers.

SAMUEL DODGE.

FORTIFICATIONS AT ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND, AND ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA.

*Instructions to John Vermonnet.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1794.

SIR:

Some time since I had the honor of receiving a letter from you, expressive of your desire of being employed as an engineer in the service of the United States.

I should have been happy, had an earlier opportunity occurred for your employment; but an offer is now made to you, to direct the works at Alexandria and Annapolis, provided the law, which is now under consideration, should pass relatively to the latter place.

Alexandria has been previously assigned to Mr. Rivardi; and, therefore, in case you accept the offer now made, you will, in case of his coming to Alexandria, work under his orders, and in concurrence with them. Annapolis will be assigned to you entirely; although, if he should have time, it would not be amiss to take his judgment thereon.

Alexandria will claim your immediate attention. The President of the United States, who is well acquainted with the river Potomac, conceives that a certain bluff of land, on the Maryland side, near Mr. Digges's, (the point formed by the Eastern Branch and the Potomac,) would be a proper situation for the fortification to be erected. You will probably be able to obtain maps of the river at Alexandria.

The sum to be expended for the works to defend Alexandria, is not to exceed three thousand dollars, exclusively of the expense of the cannon. The labor, implements, and materials, will be obtained by Col. Fitzgerald.

It will be readily perceived, by the lowness of the estimate, that the parapets of the works intended to be erected, are to be of earth; or, where that cannot easily be obtained of an adhesive quality, the parapets may be faced with strong timber, and filled in with such earth as can be had.

It is, however, conceived that, in most cases, earth may be procured, and that a parapet made thereof, will not only form a solid defence, but even be durable, if the earth be tenacious and properly sloped and sodded inside and out, and the seed of knotgrass sown, so as to bind the sods and earth together.

It is, however, apprehended that the embrasures, made in this manner, would suffer from the explosion of the powder from the cannon; and that, therefore, where the batteries are not en barbette, that the embrasures ought to be framed with joist, and faced with plank, of two inches thick.

When the batteries are to be erected on points of land, islands, or other places at a distance from the towns intended to be defended, they ought to be covered or secured by a redoubt, or other enclosed work, in which the garrison should reside constantly, either in a barrack or a strong block house, as shall be judged most expedient. But, in general, as the garrisons will be weak in numbers, a block house, mounting one or two small pieces of cannon in its upper story, will be more secure, and therefore to be preferred. These, however, ought not to be much, if any, exposed to the fire of heavy cannon. A block house will not contain more than fifty men; if the garrison, therefore, should be enlarged, tents must be used.

The redoubts, in general, ought to be of a size to contain five hundred men, so as to resist a sudden enterprise of an enemy; and, perhaps, the idea ought to be embraced, in the first instance, that they should be of such extent as to admit timber casemates to be erected hereafter, so as to enable the garrison to resist, in some tolerable degree, a bombardment.

But it is not proposed at present to erect such casemates, excepting for a magazine, which must be formed of massy timber, and be six feet thick on the roof, exclusive of the earth, and jointed and calked in such a manner as to be perfectly tight. Care must be taken to have these magazines properly ventilated, and free from dampness. They are to be of a size sufficient to hold one hundred and fifty rounds of powder for each piece of cannon intended to be served from it. The spot at which a magazine of this nature shall be fixed, will require great judgment, so as to combine security against an enemy, either open or subtle, or any danger from common accidents.

Your judgment will also direct what parts of your works shall be protected by frieze, and what by palisadoes; or, whether your redoubts shall have embrasures, or fire en barbette, with small cannon. As the redoubts are to cover the batteries, they would certainly secure and resist better without embrasures. The batteries are to annoy.

The choice of the ground on which the batteries and works are to be erected, with all the combinations and effects depending thereon, will rest upon your judgment, under the directions of the Governor. It has not been intended, by any thing herein specified, to point out the particular manner in which the works should be executed. Outlines, only, have been given, to serve in regulating the expense, which is limited by the sums before mentioned.

Some person, in whose ingenuity and industry confidence can be placed, will be appointed at the said ports, respectively, to superintend the actual execution of the works, according to your directions. Arrangements will also be made by him, or some other person, to obtain the necessary workmen, implements, and materials, which will be required in this business. But every thing must be previously calculated and estimated by you.

Although the business, herein entrusted to your charge, is, in itself, of an highly honorable nature, and strongly evincive of the confidence of the President of the United States, which would, probably, enhance your reputation, yet it is explicitly to be understood by you, that the employment is only temporary, and not conferring or involving any military rank whatever.

For a compensation for your services and personal expenses, you will be allowed and paid at the rate of four dollars per day, while you shall be employed. For all reasonable extra expenses, such as necessary boat hire, and persons to assist in your surveys, you will be allowed; but for those you must keep regular accounts and take receipts.

You are to deliver to the Governor of Virginia, copies of all your plans, surveys, soundings, &c. and also transmit copies of the same to this office.

You are also to make a weekly report to this office of your proceedings.

A reverberatory furnace, for red hot balls, must be erected for each battery.

You are hereby authorized to have made, in all cases where your judgment shall direct, new semi-circle carriages for cannon, now used on the sea-coast of France, instead of the old garrison carriages. This improvement, in firing en barbette, will prevent the necessity of embrasures, which, in most cases, serve no other purpose but as a trap to catch the enemy's balls, and kill the defenders of a battery. It is true, the expense will be greatly enhanced by adopting this improvement, but this will be lessened, in some degree, by saving the expense of the embrasures and platforms.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this 12th day of May, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*A Copy of Letters from John Vermonnet to the Secretary of War, respecting Fortifications.*

ALEXANDRIA, June 17, 1794.

SIR:

Since I had the honor of receiving your favor of the 2d ultimo I have visited Jones' point, for which I have dressed a plan of defence, and of which I shall send you a draught on my return from Annapolis, where, in the meantime, Col. Fitzgerald will be collecting the materials, for which I have remitted him a bill.

I have also taken means for establishing a cross way through a marsh, which will enable the carrying of materials and earth, &c.

The logs, planks, and other timbers, are not to be had in the neighborhood without an enormous price, which has induced us to send to the Bay.

I have the honor to be, with respect, &amp;c.

VERMONNET.

ALEXANDRIA, July 5, 1794.

SIR:

Immediately after my return from Annapolis, I have the honor to acquaint you of my having set the works in train at that place, after having received the sanction of the Governor and his council.

I shall take the liberty to forward you a draught of the work as soon as in my power.

I also take the liberty to forward you a draught of the work that I have begun at Alexandria at Jones' point, according to your order, and which is the only place at this present time to be minded, the difficulty of collecting materials, as well as the difference there is between the activity of the people of the southern states with the northern, is the cause of a great difficulty in forwarding any public work, though I am very attentive in my duty.

As there is a marsh between this city and Jones' point, I have been obliged to establish a cross-way, as it is marked on the draught—that work is to be done partly at the expense of the owner of the marsh.

I have acquainted the Governor of Virginia of my appointment.

The Battery of Jones' point will be a barbette, and calculated for receiving 12 pieces of heavy cannon.

JNO. VERMONNET.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

ALEXANDRIA, July 18, 1794.

SIR:

By this I take the liberty to forward you a draught of the fortification of Annapolis, by which you will see that part of the redoubt which protects the battery is a work of the last war, and which will enable the complement of the present plan, the lines colored yellow being the additional works.

The fort on the opposite side is only proposed in case the fund, and the exertions of public, will enable the erecting it; but the population of the place being small, I do not put great dependence on it. I am after finishing the cross-way at Alexandria, which will be done next week, unless it rains constantly, as it has been mostly the case this year, in this part. I intend to open the ditches as soon as the crossway is finished, which will perhaps be done before the logs are up. Col. Fitzgerald has contracted for them, but I am afraid that they will be long before to appear.

JNO. VERMONNET.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

ALEXANDRIA, 3d August, 1794.

SIR:

Having waited near two months for the necessary materials to begin the work at Alexandria, I am still without them, and as the crossway is done, I found myself under the necessity of retiring to Annapolis to visit what has been done there during my absence.

I delivered on the 9th June the note following into the hands of Col. Fitzgerald, which was appointed to supply me with materials, but as much by the fault of the people, that he has contracted with, as by his infirmity, the business has not been so expeditious as it ought to have been. He is now going to Bath for a month, and has left the business in the hands of Mr. Gray, a clerk in the custom house.

I think it necessary to give you this account that I may not be blamed for delay by the War Office.

JNO. VERMONNET.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

ALEXANDRIA, 12th August, 1794.

It is after my return from Annapolis, that I inform you, that the works there are very much advanced, and I believe I shall be able to finish this year, if the march of the militia towards Hagerstown should not cause some delay. As well as those of Alexandria towards Winchester. All the materials are mostly supplied, for which, likewise for labour, I remit you the amount already paid. At the completement of work, you will receive a particular account of all the expenses.

The sickly season, likewise the absence of the militia, at both departments I have the honor to attend, shall be a cause of some delay, yet I remain in hopes of finishing this year.

JNO. VERMONNET.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

ALEXANDRIA, Aug. 20, 1794.

SIR:

I have the honor to acquaint you of my return from Annapolis, where I have found the works much forwarder than those at Alexandria, notwithstanding the former were begun a month later.

The materials that I requested for Alexandria are not come yet, but I daily expect them; the cross-way is finished, the ditches are all opened, and the palisades are begun.

JNO. VERMONNET.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

ALEXANDRIA, 16th Sept. 1794.

SIR:

I take the liberty to inform you, that most of the materials are arrived, and are preparing for the battery.

The palisade and frieze are also much advanced, the exertion of public has taken place, and I am in hopes to forward the work greatly by the end of October.

JOHN VERMONNET.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

ALEXANDRIA, Nov. 5, 1794.

SIR:

By the last letter that I wrote you, I had the honor to inform you of the state which the works were then in. The works will be closed by the 15th of this month, and will remain so till the 15th of April. The absence of part of the militia, has been the cause of not having the works finished. It is also to be observed that the appointments were made much later than in any part of the United States.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

JNO. VERMONNET.

## FORTIFICATIONS AT WILMINGTON AND OCRACOCK, NORTH CAROLINA.

*Instructions to Nicholas Francis Martinon, acting as temporary engineer in the service of the United States.*

SIR:

In pursuance of the directions of the President of the United States, you are hereby appointed an engineer for the purpose of fortifying the ports and harbors hereinafter mentioned, viz: Wilmington and Ocracock inlet, in the State of North Carolina.

You are, therefore, immediately to repair to the ports to be fortified in the said State; and, in case the Governor should be at any considerable distance from your route, you are respectfully to inform him of your appointment, enclose a copy of these instructions, and inform him that you have repaired to the ports aforesaid, in order to make the necessary surveys and investigations relatively to your mission, which you will submit to his consideration, and take his orders thereon.

As soon as you shall receive his approbation of your plans, you are to construct the works, and to execute them with all possible vigor and despatch.

The following is an extract of the estimate on which the appropriations for the fortifications have been founded. The proportions of expense, therefore, herein stated, for the ports aforesaid, must not be exceeded, viz:

WILMINGTON, *Twelve Pieces.*

Batteries, embrasures, and platforms, for 12 pieces,	-	-	-	\$863 76
Magazine, -	-	-	-	200 00
Redoubt with embrasures, -	-	-	-	810 00
Blockhouse or barracks, -	-	-	-	500 00
Contingencies, -	-	-	-	500 00
				<u>\$2,873 76</u>

OCRACOCK, *Sixteen Pieces.*

Batteries for 16 pieces,	-	-	-	\$1,147 68
Redoubt with embrasures, -	-	-	-	810 00
Magazine, -	-	-	-	200 00
Block house or barracks, -	-	-	-	500 00
Contingencies, -	-	-	-	500 00
				<u>\$3,157 68</u>

It will readily be perceived, by the lowness of the estimate, that the parapets of the works intended to be erected are to be of earth, or, where that cannot be easily obtained of an adhesive quality, the parapets may be faced with strong timber, and filled in with such earth as can be had.

It is, however, conceived that, in most cases, earth may be procured, and that a parapet made thereof will not only form a solid defence, but even be durable, if the earth be tenacious and properly sloped, and sodded inside and out, and the seed of knotgrass sown so as to bind the sods and earth together.

It is, however, apprehended that the embrasures made in this manner would suffer from the explosion of powder from the cannon, and that, therefore, where the batteries are not en barbette, that the embrasures ought to be framed with joist, and faced with plank of two inches thick.

Where the batteries are to be erected on points of land, islands, or other places at a distance from the towns intended to be defended, they ought to be covered or secured by a redoubt or other enclosed work, in which the garrison should reside constantly, either in a barrack or a strong block house, as shall be judged most expedient. But, in general, as the garrisons will be weak in numbers, a blockhouse, mounting one or two pieces of cannon in its upper story, will be more secure, and therefore to be preferred. These, however, ought not to be much, if any, exposed to the fire of heavy cannon. A block house will not contain more than fifty men. If the garrison, therefore, should be enlarged, tents must be used.

The redoubts, in general, ought to be of a size to contain five hundred men, so as to resist a sudden enterprise of an enemy. And perhaps this idea ought to be embraced in the first instance, that they should be of such extent as to admit timber casemates to be erected hereafter, so as to enable the garrison to resist, in some tolerable degree, a bombardment.

But it is not proposed, at present, to erect such casemates, excepting for a magazine, which must be formed of massy timber, and be six feet thick on the roof, exclusive of the earth, and jointed and calked in such a manner as to be perfectly tight. Care must be taken to have these magazines properly ventilated and free from dampness. They are to be of a size sufficient to hold one hundred and fifty pounds of powder for each piece of cannon intended to be served from it. The spot at which a magazine of this nature shall be fixed, will require great judgment, so as to combine security against an enemy either open or subtle, or any danger from common accidents.

Your judgment will also direct what part of your works shall be protected by freizes, and what by palisadoes, or whether your redoubts shall have embrasures, or fire en barbette with small cannon. As the redoubts are to cover the batteries, they would certainly secure and resist better without embrasures. The batteries are to annoy.

The choice of the ground on which the batteries and works are to be erected, whether to have embrasures, or to fire en barbette with the new sea coast carriages, with all the combinations and effects depending on them, will rest upon your judgment, under the directions of the Governor. It has not been intended, by any thing herein specified, to point out the particular manner in which the works should be erected. Outlines only have been given to serve in regulating the expense, which is limited by the sums before mentioned.

Some person, in whose ingenuity and industry confidence can be placed, will be appointed, at the said ports, respectively, to superintend the actual execution of the works, according to your directions. But every thing must be previously calculated and estimated by you.

Although the business herein entrusted to your charge, is in itself of an highly honorable nature, and strongly evincive of the confidence of the President of the United States, and which would probably enhance your reputation, yet it is explicitly to be understood by you, that the employment is only temporary, and not conferring or involving any military rank whatever.

For a compensation for your services, and personal expenses, you will be allowed and paid at the rate of four dollars per day, while you shall be employed. For all reasonable expenses, such as necessary boat hire and persons to assist in your surveys, you will be allowed; but for those you must keep regular accounts and take receipt.

You are to deliver to the Governor copies of all your plans, surveys, soundings, &c. and also transmit copies of the same to this office. You are also to make a weekly report to this office of your proceedings.

I have issued my warrant in your favor for two hundred dollars, as an advance on account of your compensation and personal expenses.

A reverberatory furnace for red hot balls must be erected for each battery.

All the plans must be accompanied with sections and elevations, so that a complete judgment may be formed thereof. An estimate of the expense must also be formed of each work, and the number and size of the cannon intended, must be specified.

Your requisition for labor and materials at Ocracock will be paid upon John Daves, collector at Newbern, or some person appointed by him, and at Wilmington, or Cape Fear, by some person who will be appointed by the collector at Wilmington.

This appointment to take place from the first of this instant, April.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this eleventh day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*Copy of a letter from Mr. Martinon to the Secretary of War, dated*

GENERAL:

NEWBERN, *May 31, 1794.*

I have the honor to enclose you the plans, profiles, and estimates, respecting the fort to be established at Ocracock, vested with the Governor's approbation. On sight of the annexed map, you will be convinced that there is no point but Beacon Island that may be occupied with any degree of advantage. Being hurried to Wilmington, it has not been in my power to color the plan, which I have only traced. Your draughtsman will easily furnish it. I was obliged to make four copies of the same.

As no ship, drawing more than thirteen feet of water, can pass over the bar, this fort will never be exposed to the fire of a frigate, and, for that reason, I have given only eight feet in thickness to the summit of the parapet, which will be fully adequate to resist any attack from a privateer ship. I have also contracted the fort as much as it has been in my power, in order to lessen the expense, the estimate of which will surprisè you. But the soil of the island is very low; it is essential to be defended against the high tides occasioned by northerly winds, and, in such circumstances, the greatest cautions ought to be taken. It is for that effect I have added a covert way, which will occasion a considerable expense. Shall it take place, or no?

The Governor of North Carolina will, no doubt, impart to you the dispositions he has made for that construction. Mr. John Wallace, the only inhabitant of the place, shall (under the conduct of a superintendent chosen, on my request, by the Governor) furnish laborers and materials, keeping a regular account of the same. These two persons have transported themselves on the spot on the 25th instant, and will be able to begin the work without any difficulty, as I have, in their presence, established the height of the different points, and traced the principal lines of the fort; I have, besides, furnished them plans and profiles. The solid fathom of earth which, in France, should cost about four livres tournois, will, perhaps, come very high in this place, as it will be necessary to take the greatest part of it at a distance of sixty fathoms, at least, in places covered by the tide. There will be a loss of time for the workmen until the sands be discovered. It is, however, to be expected that the superintendent will find a way to keep them at work somewhere else, and that this time will not be entirely lost. To make short, in such a situation, instead of digging ditches that would furnish earth for the parapets, it becomes necessary to raise the ground by materials brought from afar.

I propose, for to lodge the garrison, a plain building, that will not overtop the parapets, and such as is described after the estimate. The expense of that construction will not be so expensive as that in timber, mentioned in the instructions; and for what respects the defence of the fort, it will, in any case, more efficaciously draw from the rampart and the palisades of the covered way.

On my return from Wilmington I will give a plan of these barracks, if you approve of their construction, and likewise of the powder magazine; in the contrary case, I will act agreeably to your orders, which I shall have time to receive.

You will judge, General, that the funds appropriated for Ocracock will not prove sufficient, and that it is essential to obtain an augmentation of them; I hope it will not be the same for Wilmington, towards which I intend to direct my course the day after to-morrow, say second of June.

*Copy of a letter from M. Martinon to the Secretary of War, dated*

MY GENERAL:

NEWBERN, *2d August, 1794.*

Even as I have had the honor to observe to you of it, by my letter dated the ninth of last month, I arrived here the 24th, after much ado. Having found all the bridges spoiled by the heavy rains which fell in this country, and without my servant, our carriage was carried away by the current upon which it was swimming; at last we are arrived without any other accident.

I have the honor to send you enclosed the plans and papers relative to the works of the river Cape Fear. The indisposition of the Governor has occasioned a delay of some days for this sending; I am preparing the duplicates for him that I shall transmit to him as soon as possible.

I received an answer from Mr. Blanks, conductor of Beacon workings, by which he tells me that his work is not so advanced as he could hope for, he never having had but sixteen or eighteen laborers to work, who are continually absenting themselves. He is busied in cutting down nine hundred trees, of which four hundred are delivered upon the place, to make wheel barrows, and he tells me the platform will be done about the 9th of this month. At that time he will send for me to go upon the place, which I expect; it was better for him to be employed at the work, instead of employing other persons to work the timbers and wheelbarrows.

I observe to you, General, that the inhabitants of this country are but little inclined to the establishment of those forts. There are a great many, according to the information that I receive in New York and Charleston, who, instead of favoring the sending of workmen, on the contrary, augment their price of labor.

This work must be built with the activity I have recommended, could be continued a great while, particularly that of the beacon, and if it is not quickly raised, it will run the risk of being damaged by the inclemency of the winter.

The Governor had proposed to the general meeting which was lately sitting here, to make some funds for the construction of those forts, or only some advances; the answer has been negative. I think it necessary to give you this information.

The plans and instructions that I have delivered to Beacon, and for Cape Fear, would be sufficient to conduct the work to its end; nevertheless, the persons who are charged with it in Wilmington, depend that I will again take a journey, which I will do, if you judge it necessary. This I hope to be informed in the course of this month.

I observe also to you, General, that the longer I stay in this country the more money I shall expend, and should be sorry, as it would be of no utility; furthermore, my conduct will be subordinated to the orders that you will give to me.

CAPE FEAR RIVER FORT.—The levelling of the spot of ground in the interior circumference of the parapet, is related to an horizontal plan, which is supposed to be twenty-four feet above the level of high water, so that each red figure, which I call *cotte*, expresses the distance of each point from that horizontal plan which is called plan of comparison.

We might also imagine an inundation to the height of twenty-four feet above the level of the high water, and suppose the red figures to be the soundings of the different points.

Therefore, each *cotte*, or number, being taken off from the 24th one, which corresponds with the high water, the remainder will express the height of each point above the high water; and subtracting a number from another, the remainder will be the height of a point above another, for instance:

To have the height of the point A, above the point X, of the high water, ten feet must be taken off from twenty-four feet, the remainder being thirteen feet, is the height of the point A, above the high water.

To compare the point A with the point B, the number 9 feet 2 inches must be taken off from the number 11 feet, the remainder, 1 foot 10 inches, expresses the height of the point B above the point A, and so with the others.

*Observations for the construction.*

The battery may be finished before the remainder of the circumference of the fort is erected.

The battery will be carried on a level. The point A and the number 11 feet will be taken for the level of the berme, and the foundation or the under part of the first piece of timber will be fixed one foot lower than that point A, so that the beginning of the foundation will be in the levelling plan, the number 12 feet, the ground of the berme will be raised or lowered as wanted.

The parapets will be carried on the same level with the batteries, from the point C to the point H, in the lines *cd*, *de*, *ef*, *fg*, *gh*; the point K will be fourteen inches higher than the point H, and the lining, H K, of the curtain, will follow that slope; the flank, K L, will be carried on a level.

The flank angle M, of the bastion, will be on a level with the shoulder angle L, so that the flank, K L, and the face, L M, will be horizontal, and the angle M will be, by that mean, eight inches lower.

The shoulder angle N, will be six inches lower than the flank angle M; and the flank angle O, will be also six inches lower than the shoulder angle N; so that the face M N, and the flank N O, will have each a slope of six inches, and the foundation of timber, to the point O, will be one foot lower than that point, to the number 10, 8, 10.

The foundation of timber, to the point O, will be three inches higher than the one to the point *p*, of course nearly on a level; but the point *q*, middle of the line *po*, is two feet and a half lower than the point O, and is to be raised of so much; as, also, the berme and places near it, with remblais, taken with measure in the interior of the space, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, which will require to be carefully levelled, and lower the passage of the gate I, so that the waters may freely run out.

It would not be improper, in the demolition of the old fort, to preserve a certain quantity of stones to pave the entrance of the gate, and for other uses, in the interior of the fort.

The ditch of the battery will be four fathoms wide, besides its slopes; and though the ditches of the other sides of the fort are marked twenty feet wide, in the profile, they may be, with propriety, traced two feet wider, and in all twenty-two feet besides the slopes; it is a good way to obtain more earth with less depth.

*A Memoir relative to the defence of Cape Fear River, to which is added a Map of the place for its intelligence.*

The river of Cape Fear runs from north to south; it has two roads leading to the sea, the one to the west, the other to the north of Cape Fear.

The main bar inlet, west side, is two miles distant from the point of the island called Bald Head, where a light-house has been lately erected.

The sounding of that bar is fifteen feet at low water, and twenty-one at high water; of course, frigates may pass to it, and come to the harbor, which is six miles distant from the north side of that bar, and come to anchor in four and five fathoms.

This harbor is, perhaps, one of the best on the continent; the whole year may be spent there without the least danger, since all the vessels usually lay there in expectation of the wind, either to come up or go to sea.

The British were so well convinced of its importance, that they had erected there the Fort Johnston, which is now partly destroyed by the sea.

If this harbor should remain unguarded, there is no doubt but an enemy, in time of war, would not fail to take possession of it; he would make his station there; his privateers might preserve there all the prizes he would make on the north and south parts of the continent, till he had an opportunity of carrying them into his own ports; he would stop all the vessels attempting to go up or down the river; in a word, it would be to him a landing-place, to provide himself in the country, and do all the mischief in his power.

All these considerations having been an inducement to establish the intended fort, for the preservation of that place, it is intended for twelve pieces of cannon, which may be, without any inconvenience, of different size, from twenty-four to twelve pounders; however, the greatest number must be twenty-four pounders.

That quantity of guns is thought necessary for the security of the fort, which may be attacked by strong frigates; in that case, its strongest defence and annoyance will be in the establishment of a reverberatory furnace, red hot balls being the terror of vessels.

The access of the fort by land may be sufficiently defended with four field-pieces, to the flank angles of the two bastions. A landing could be effected at some leagues distance to the west, but it is very little to be feared; that part of the country being too marshy.

The sounding of the second inlet, called *New Inlet*, is seven feet at low water, and between eleven and twelve at high water; of course, there is none but small vessels and privateers that can come by it. It would be very well defended by a battery, with four pieces of cannon, at the north point of that inlet, called Federal Point; but the enemy having in his power to land all along the north side of that point, it would be necessary to erect a fort to protect that battery; which, requiring a guard in time of peace, as well as in time of war, would become very tiresome to the country. Another great inconvenience against that establishment is, the great rapidity of the inset's current, which would prevent the vessels from coming to without being exposed.

It is thought this inlet will be more powerfully and with less expense defended by a galley, or flat vessel, armed with eight pieces of twelve pounders; that vessels, which would be necessary only in time of war, could lay at anchor forward of *Snow Point*, in a place called *Five Fathoms Hole*, which is a good anchorage, and stop every vessel coming into the channel; it could go frequently to the New Inlet bar, and also serve the new fort and relieve its guard.

If it had been intended to defend only the upper part of the river, a single fort, at one of the Brunswick's points, might have been sufficient; but it was leaving in the enemy's possession the harbor, the two bars, and all the river shore below that point, and losing the power either to come in or go out of the river; of course, a very bad operation.

It would not be improper, in time of war, to place at Brunswick two pieces of cannon, with common carriages, to use them both against the river and against the land.

These considerations have been formerly presented to his Excellency the Governor of North Carolina, who has perceived all their consequences. It is in pursuance of his approbation, that the construction of the new fort is now at hand. It will be erected on a part of the seat of Fort Johnston, and on the ground round it; which ground is a part of the spot intended for a new town, called by the name of *Smithville*. That fort will defend the river and the access of the harbor. With regard to the New Inlet, it may be defended by one of the aforesaid means.

*Copy of a letter from M. Martinon to the Secretary of War, dated*

WILMINGTON, June 20, 1794.

GENERAL:

I have the honor to inform you of my arrival at Wilmington, on the 5th instant. It was not possible for me to go down the river before the 11th. I have spent five days in that voyage, to take the necessary information concerning the object of my mission.

The harbor, and excellent anchorage under Fort Johnston, appeared to me of such importance, that I propose the establishment of a battery and fort, in the proximity, and on part of Fort Johnston, which it becomes necessary to demolish.

Should the defence of the river be recoiled farther up, there would be a necessity of abandoning that post, which, in time of war, could not fail being taken hold of by an enemy, who, by settling there, would stop the entrance of the river. It would prove a sure retreat for their privateers to preserve their prizes in; they would have a footing on the continent, from whence they might draw provisions, spread in the country, and waste according to their pleasure. These considerations determine me to propose, that the establishment may be placed on that essential point of the principal passage of the river. By this means, the little northern channel, the sounding of which, at high water, gives eleven feet and a half on the bar, would be left open to the privateers, and give them an entrance in the river, unless guarded in some manner. Two ways are found, tending to that effect: the first is, to mount four or six eighteen pounders on one of Brunswick points, where the passage of the river shall be effectually defended. I would not advise to place that establishment on Federal Point, or even on the passage itself, because of the currents being so strong, that the safety of the vessels would prove endangered when obliged to stop for to be reconnoitred: this inconvenience will not take place at Brunswick. The second expedient, which, in my opinion, is the most advisable, would be an armed vessel, the strength of which might easily be calculated on that of the ships that may attempt passing over the bar. This vessel might anchor to the extremity of the harbor, or in different places between the harbor and Brunswick; and from thence protect the small vessels, whether entering or going out, and prevent privateers from coming up the river. Her object might be also to attend on the fort projected.

I have communicated these thoughts to the Governor, and expect to hear of his decision by the next post. I sent to him a plan; first, of a little fort, with two bastions, the ditch of which is tolerably well defended; secondly, of a simple redoubt, whose ditch has but a direct defence. These two forts may be manned, each of them, by five hundred men. I have enclosed, also, an estimate of these two objects, which amount much higher than the appropriated funds, because it is necessary to line the parapets with timber, as we cannot procure but a sand, which rains and wind would level very soon.

The cost of the fort, with bastions, will, agreeable to the estimate, amount to five thousand seven hundred and sixty dollars, comprehending the demolition of Fort Johnston, which, at any rate, must take place, as it is very small, partly destroyed by the sea, and what materials remain are rotten. The redoubt, whose ditch is ill defended, would cost four thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight dollars, including, likewise, the demolition of the old fort: the first is preferable on all accounts.

Until I receive the determination of the Governor, of which I expect to be apprized by next ordinary, I will have time enough to put in readiness the plans, so as to give them immediately to the appointed agent, or to the superintendent, agreeable to the orders which the Governor will think fit to issue. I shall have the honor to communicate them to you, when I direct you a copy of the project that will meet with the Governor's approbation.

*From M. Martinon to the Secretary of War.*

WILMINGTON, July 9, 1794.

GENERAL:

The Governor having approved of the dispositions I had directed to him on the 16th ultimo, and which I had the honor to communicate to you, in my letter dated June 20th, respecting the fort to be established on Cape Fear river, I have consequently transported myself on the spot, accompanied by Messrs. Potts and Atkins, the last gentleman having been appointed to direct the works. I have traced on part of Fort Johnston, and in the neighborhood of it, a small fort with two bastions, the parapet of which shall be lined with timber. I have taken the necessary levels to establish the foundations, and I have given to the gentlemen the plans, profiles, and memoirs, to direct the construction. Mr. Atkins told me he understood the whole perfectly well, and found no difficulty in it. Mr. Potts, who is at some trouble to procure workmen, has assured me, that on next Monday, say the 14th instant, he will send a sufficient number of them.

As I do not think that my presence will be of any necessity at this place, I will, towards the end of next week, transport myself to Newbern, and from thence I shall have the honor to forward you copies of the plans I am making, and which I will obtain the Governor to sanction.

I have proposed for to lodge the troops in a plain barrack as in Beacon. If you find it convenient I pray you be so good as to make it known to me as soon as possible.

Since I left Newbern I did not hear from Beacon Island's works, and I feel some anxiety on their account. This Island being very low, the work will be sometimes exposed to the attacks of the sea, swollen by northerly winds, which will expose the maintenance of them to be expensive. Had I foreseen that Congress should fix upon building ships for the protection of the sea coast, I would have advised to employ, for the defence of Newbern river, a galley, or vessel mounted with eight or ten twelve pounders, which would have proved sufficient, and might have saved the construction of a fort, its maintenance, garrison in time of peace and war, and the daily duty of that garrison, &c. I am going on the spot; I will examine the locality; confer with the Governor; and I shall give an account of it.

The Governor having desired my advice on the mode of mounting the cannon of the batteries, I have answered, that the parapets should have no embrasures, and that the essential point was to construct the carriages so as to elevate the cannon in order to point and fire over a parapet of five feet high; thus, I believe, will be mounted the cannon in Charleston, and in the other batteries.

I have now in hand the model made by Mr. Merlie, but, as there is no scale, I cannot know whether it has the necessary height. I remember Mr. Merlie told me in your room there were six inches wanting to the height, which might be made up without altering the inclination of the moving carriage, (which is important) by adding six inches to the last transom, and so much to the fixed frame. Respecting the model the Governor told me to be in Edenton, I know nothing of it. I hope I shall have the honor to hear from you when I arrive in Newbern.

*Copy of a letter from Mr. Martinon to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEWBERN, September 8, 1794.

MY GENERAL:

I have had the honor to transmit to you, the 2d of last month, the plans concerning the fort of the river of Cape Fear; I hope that you will have received them.

The journey I made to Beacon, to visit the works on the river of Cape Fear, was indispensable. The situation in which I found the works is not very satisfactory. There are three rows of timber works placed, three feet in height, all round the fort, but the main works very little filled in. The overseer of the works, instead of working

during the favorable weather, and carrying sand, has been busy cutting wood with the workmen at Cape Fear, but there have not been more than fourteen or fifteen hands at work for three months.

I have not seen Mr. Wallace at his house, nor at the works; and, as I was crossing the river, he was carrying to Newbern negro men, whom he had hired for three months. At my return, I met him in the instant of his departure with thirty negro men, whom he hired until the end of October; he assured me it was impossible to work upon the Island until the Spring. Such is the situation of the work, my General, which is very difficult to forward, as every thing is wanting. I have left Mr. Blanks, overseer, some necessary instructions, which have been translated into English by Mr. Leris.

I have been obliged to drive at Beacon, and brought here again in a vessel of the United States, Captain Cooke. I had made some provision to go with him to Cape Fear, but the wind having always been contrary, and my provision being done, I have been compelled to come back to Newbern, from whence I will set out, after to-morrow, for Wilmington by land.

The letters, that you will do me the honor to write to me, shall be thither directed.

*Mr. Martinon to General Knox, Secretary of War, Philadelphia, dated*

WILMINGTON, September 16, 1794.

GENERAL:

I have, at my arrival at Wilmington, received your most honored favor of the 8th of August last, in which you are advising me to contract the works of the fort of Ocracock, so that it may not exceed the sum mentioned in my instructions. I must confess, General, that I look upon it as impossible. I beg you will examine the plan I had the honor to forward; you will undoubtedly perceive that the space is not too large for the sixteen pieces of cannon it is intended for; be pleased, also, to take a view of the estimate and letters relating to it; in them you will find the reasons for which the estimate of the works amounts to three times the appointed sum; it would be too long to repeat them here.

I therefore think instant, if it be intended to continue on the works, that a sum of seven or eight thousand dollars should be disposed of for its expenses; and here follows the economical contraction which may take place: Having six pieces of cannon of the battery defending the small road over the river, mounted on embrasure carriages, the distance of 20 feet from a cannon, to another becoming useless, 12 feet will be sufficient; in that case 42 or 48 feet, or 6 or 7 fathoms, may be cut off from that battery; it will, of course, make a diminution of 15 or 16 current fathoms of rampart. The fort will then be very much flatten, and the remaining space will scarcely be large enough to contain the barrack, which must also be shortened; the two-thirds of the covert way may also be put aside, and have it made only on the north side of the fort, so as to secure it against the high waters. Notwithstanding all the contractions, which there is time enough to effectuate, I foresee that the expense will overgo the sum of six thousand dollars; what may account for it is the bad kind of workmen the country affords; the high price required by the owners of the negroes; the loss of time which a navigation of eighty miles occasions; the distance of the sand, which can be had but at low water; many other private expenses for the beginning of the establishment, and many other inconveniences, which so lonesome and so distant a place creates. I am, myself, at more than a month's distance from one fort to another, either to go or send letters, for want of vessels or of fair winds.

In all cases, General, the expenses being left to persons no doubt honest, and appointed by the Governor, they will settle their accounts; and, as the works at Beacon Island must be stopped at the end of October next, by comparing the expense with the work done at that time, we may acquire more certain notions of what the whole is to cost.

I pray you will recollect I informed you that I would prefer, for the defence of Newbern river, a kind of armed galley, which, at all events, might have been sufficient; and its invaluable advantage should be to save the trouble of the keeping of a fort and constant garrison in time of peace, which garrison will require a vessel to relieve the guards and to transport the stores, which must be brought from Newbern, &c.

You have no doubt received the works of Cape Fear river, where the fort is much larger than that of Beacon, because the twelve pieces of cannon, which are to be mounted on sea coast carriages, will stand in the same line. These twelve pieces are necessary to protect the fort against the fire of frigates which may come to attack it; it is also constructed to contain a greater number of men to defend it by land; the situation requires and permits it. As the parapets are to be lined with timber, on account of the sandy quality of the earth, the expense will be nearly double the sum granted, which you are already informed of as well as the Governor. It is not in my power to prevent such increase of expense; but, with regard to fortifications, what is necessary must be done; and, it may be said with propriety, that the person who has drawn the estimates, on which the funds have been obtained, has been greatly mistaken. They have been working at Cape Fear these two months past. I intend going there the day after to-morrow, in Captain Cooke's vessel, and I shall inform you of the state of the works.

In consequence of the diminution to be made to the fort of Beacon, I am informing Mr. Tredwell, Collector at Edenton, in my answer to his letter, that ten pieces of cannon must be mounted on sea coast carriages, for the battery of the main channel side, as it requires a more divergent fire; four or five of those cannons may be eighteen pounders, the rest must be thirty-four pounders; as for the battery of the second inlet, six pieces are to be mounted on embrasure carriages; four of these twenty-four pounders, and two eighteen pounders, if they cannot be all twenty-four pounders. These batteries do require heavy cannon, on account of the reach, which is somewhat distant.

As to the cannon of Cape Fear river, it may be of smaller size. 24, 18, and 12 pounders might be employed there, and must be all mounted on sea coast carriages, so that they may afford a more divergent fire; I must, however, observe, that a different size of cannon in a battery which is to have a reverberatory furnace, may be liable to some inconveniences; it is, therefore, much preferable that all the cannon should be of one size.

I believe, General, that in order to have the sea coast carriages mounted in the most uniform manner, it would not be improper, if Mr. Merlie is much advanced in his works to the South he should be sent to Edenton and Wilmington; he might in each of these two places construct a sea coast carriage which may serve as a model to construct the others.

I shall spend some days to the fort, and on my return here will start for Newbern.

I am, with respect, General, your most humble servant,

MARTINON.

*Mr. Martinon to General Knox, Secretary of War, (Philadelphia) dated*

WILMINGTON, September 30th, 1794.

GENERAL:

I have made a stay of eight days to the fort of Cape Fear. The job, after two months' work, is not very much advanced. The state in which I found it is such as follows: The barracks are almost ended, the demolition of the old fort very much advanced, and very little remains made. There is about two hundred logs on the spot; Mr. Atkins, superintendent of the works, had, in my presence, the first pieces of timber of the linings placed; I found the workmen in little activity. Behold the reasons, given to me by Mr. Potts! A warrant has been issued for the sum of one thousand dollars, which are expended; Mr. Potts has wrote to obtain new funds, and having received no answer, was upon the point of stopping the works; he has, however, continued on by the means of four hundred dollars, which, he told me, he was in advance of.

I must observe to you, General, that a too small number of workmen will increase the private expenses, which should, and can be avoided, to Cape Fear fort—the workmen being not scarce there, as they are at Ocracock; an overseer for ten workmen may do for a hundred.

With regard to the whole expense, you are already informed it will be double the sum granted; it is according to that information which I gave the Governor, that he has ordered the works to be begun: it has been so with the fort at Beacan, which I foretold would require three times the sum appointed. Without these proceedings the idea of erecting the forts must be dropped; for each of them, I have been obliged to draw four different plans, so as to find the smallest expense. I even perceive that my estimates are rather short, though carried to the highest, on account of the negroes being dearly paid, and doing very little work, if not constantly attended to.

A redoubt, with four pieces of cannon, and fifty or sixty men, might sufficiently defend the road of the new inset; if so, the river of Cape Fear will be sufficiently protected. If you think it proper, I will make a project for that purpose.

I have made use for my transportation in the river of Captain Cooke's vessel; he could not convey me to Ocracock, having to change the masts of the cutter, which are both sprung and rotten.

I shall go shortly to Newbern by land, and will prepare the contractions, which, as I have mentioned in my last, of the 16th instant, may take place, to diminish a part of the expense at Beacan.

If you judge my presence necessary in this country after October next, I beg you will direct me to some person to whom I may apply for money, mine diminishing, and Mr. Leris's being at an end. Out of the four hundred dollars I have received, two hundred and sixty have been expended to the Government's account. I shall direct you the state and receipts thereof, when you think it proper.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, General, your most obedient and most humble servant,  
MARTINON.

*Copy of a letter from Joshua Potts, agent for procuring materials, &c. to the Secretary of War, dated*

WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, October 2d, 1794.

SIR:

Conformably to instructions received, enclosed is an abstract of articles purchased for the fort at Cape Fear, which exhibits the amount of moneys actually disbursed and paid, one thousand and sixty-one dollars twenty cents. The articles purchased with the above sum, will be observed to consist principally of commissary's stores, camp equipage, tools for mechanics and laborers, machinery and materials for the barracks, &c.

The agent begs a moment of your honor's attention, while he informs you, that in the mean time of making preparation as above alluded to, it became expedient that contracts should be made for materials, labor, &c. to be in readiness at any stage of the work; accordingly agreements were made, and are still to be discharged.

1st. The pitch pine hewed timber, intended to build the walls of the parapet, (say \*three hundred and sixty tons of forty solid feet each, French measurement, at one dollar and eighty cents per ton, deliverable at the fort, is, \$648 00

2d. Building the barracks; the carpenter's work is contracted for by the square, and will require about 200 00

3d. Wages of laborers, and a mechanic since 14th July to 1st instant, say two months and a half, of about twenty-one persons, average six dollars per month, 315 00

4th. The butcher's bill for beef may be 80 00

\$1,243 00

The first mentioned sum, actually expended and paid, is accurately inserted, per abstract, 1,061 20

But the additional amount is set down only on a gross estimate, in order to give information on the subject, 1,243 00

\$2,304 20

The respective sums contracted for are as nearly computed as at present lies in the power of the agent, and shall, when discharged, be returned in a certain and proper manner.

By the enclosed abstract, and the foregoing estimate, the sum, as apportioned for this fort, is not half actually paid away, but more than the first moiety is contemplated, by adding the amount of contracts still to be paid.

The quantity of timber, of itself, to be used on the fort, as planned, would cost half the sum as first estimated for the completion of the entire fortification.

Peculiar circumstances unavoidably guided the manner of commencement, as also the progress of building the fort.

1st. The situation, distant from a settled neighborhood, the soil sandy, which, without hesitation, would require walls of firm substance to contain it, of course large timbers of pitch pine were by the engineer deemed the most convenient, and the cheapest material for that purpose.

2d. An old fort of lime mortar and shell cement walls was, in the first place, tedious and difficult to be demolished; the earth and terrace within to be levelled by removal, and the former ditches to be filled up. This last mentioned work has hitherto chiefly employed the laborers, and required to be effected, before a beginning of the new fort could be attempted. This part alone was a considerable object.

3d. The custom and disposition of laborers here, whether masters of slaves or otherwise, is, not to be employed, by a particular contract, to perform removal of earth, &c. by measurement, nor could any laborers be employed on condition of finding themselves either provisions or tools.

The only resource, therefore, either to begin, or continue, the erection of the fort, was to hire laborers by the month, and to find them rations, utensils of cooking, and tools to work with; the whole of which supply has been committed to the care of a superintendent.

Exclusively of levelling the former fort, the laborers have been employed, by intervals, in fixing ways and rollers to manage large timbers from the water up the hill, and around the fort; also, at times, in carrying up timbers, scantling, boards, shingles, &c.

You will please observe, that in order to forward the building of the fort, it became expedient that contracts for materials, &c. as before said, should be made, so as to be in readiness when required, and which should prevent any delay of operation that certainly otherwise would have happened, especially, as hitherto, only one thousand dollars have been ordered to the hands of the agent, it would have been greatly disadvantageous to have discontinued the work precisely at the expenditure of the said sum, and then to have recommenced the same on receiving an additional supply of money. The situation and nature of the undertaking was such as would by no means, consistent with the interest of the United States, admit of an interval.

Reliance is therefore had that the remaining part of \$2,873 76, say \$1,873 76, will be ordered for the purpose of discharging the necessary contracts already mentioned, and further to carry on the building of the fort.

The carpenter's work of the house for the barracks is now nearly done; but in regard to the fort, it can only be said, with propriety, to be begun, therefore it is impossible to say or to judge at this time, any proportion the present expenditure bears in comparison to the whole. Whenever the progress of the work will properly admit, the said proportion shall be transmitted.

Mr. Martinon, the engineer, informs me that he has wrote to you on the subject of the fort. I presume his letters contain information that the said \$2,873 76, will certainly be far inadequate to the completion of the fort. The

\* This is not more than half the quantity of timber estimated for that purpose.



peculiar and unfavorable circumstances, as aforementioned, render it an impossibility to finish the same with the sum first estimated.

Should a further sum be allowed, it would be to the interest of the United States that the same be timely ordered, to the end that a discontinuance of the work should not happen.

I have now to apologize for the length of this letter, by assuring you that it has been thus extensively continued with the intent of conveying to your idea a full view of all circumstances and parts of the premises.

*Copy of a letter from the Governor of North Carolina to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEWBERN, November 4, 1794.

SIR:

Mr. Blanks, the superintendent of the works of the fort at Beacon Island, returned a few days since from that place, and informs me that he has raised the foundation agreeable to the plan which was forwarded to you by the engineer, three feet nine inches above the surface. The time for which the hands, who were employed about this work, having expired, together with the disadvantages of the approaching season, has induced him to think it most for the interest of the United States, that nothing further should be done until the spring. The superintendent suggests as a reason why the works are not more advanced than they are, is owing to the particular situation of the place, he not being able only to work at such times as the tide would permit. He is of opinion that the most material part of the work is accomplished. He has applied to me to know from whom he is to receive his pay; and as you have been silent on the subject, I have to request that you will inform me on whom he is to call for it.

RICHARD DOBBS SPAIGHT.

FORTIFICATIONS AT CHARLESTON AND GEORGETOWN, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND AT SAVANNAH AND ST. MARY'S, GEORGIA.

*Instructions to Paul Hyacinte Perrault, acting as temporary Engineer, in the service of the United States.*

SIR:

In pursuance of the directions of the President of the United States, you are hereby appointed an engineer, for the purpose of fortifying the port and harbor of Charleston, in the State of South Carolina.

You are, therefore, immediately to repair to that place, and in case the Governor should be near the said port, you are to wait upon him and exhibit these instructions. But, if the Governor should be at any considerable distance from the said port, you are, respectfully, to notify him of your appointment, enclose a copy of these instructions, and inform him that you have repaired to the port aforesaid, in order to make the necessary surveys and investigations, relatively to your mission, which you will submit to his consideration and take his orders thereon.

As soon as you shall receive his approbation of your plan, you are to construct the works, and to execute them with all possible vigor and despatch.

The following is an extract of the estimate, on which the appropriations for the fortifications have been founded. The proportion of expenses, therefore, herein stated, for the port aforesaid, must not be exceeded, viz :

Charleston, to be fortified with 72 pieces, which may be divided into three sets of batteries and redoubts, \$11,212 33

It will be readily perceived, by the lowness of the estimate, that the parapets of the works intended to be erected, are to be of earth, or, where that cannot easily be obtained of an adhesive quality, the parapets may be faced with strong timber, and filled in with such earth as can be had.

It is, however, conceived that, in most cases, earth may be procured, and that a parapet made thereof will not only form a solid defence, but even be durable, if the earth be tenacious and properly sloped, and sodded inside and out, and the seed of knotgrass sown so as to bind the sods and earth together.

It is, however, apprehended that the embrasures made in this manner would suffer from the explosion of the powder from the cannon, and that, therefore, where the batteries are not *en barbette*, that the embrasures ought to be formed of joist, and faced with plank of two inches thick.

When the batteries are to be erected on points of land, islands, or other places, at a distance from the towns intended to be defended, they ought to be covered, or secured, by a redoubt or other enclosed work, in which the garrison should reside constantly, either in a barrack, or a strong block house, as shall be judged most expedient. But, in general, as the garrisons will be weak in numbers, a block house mounting one or two small pieces of cannon, in its upper story, will be more secure, and therefore to be preferred. These, however, ought not to be much, if any, exposed to the fire of heavy cannon. A block house will not contain more than fifty men. If the garrison, therefore, should be enlarged, tents must be used.

The redoubts, in general, ought to be of a size to contain five hundred men, so as to resist a sudden enterprise of an enemy, and perhaps the idea ought to be embraced, in the first instance, that they should be of such extent as to admit timber casemates, to be erected hereafter, so as to enable the garrison to resist, in some tolerable degree, a bombardment.

But it is not proposed, at present, to erect such casemates, excepting for a magazine, which must be formed of massy timber, and be six feet thick on the roof, exclusive of the earth, and jointed and calked in such a manner as to be perfectly tight. Care must be taken to have these magazines properly ventilated, and free from dampness. They are to be of a size sufficient to hold one hundred and fifty rounds of powder for each piece of cannon intended to be served from it. The spot at which a magazine of this nature shall be fixed, will require great judgment, so as to combine security against an enemy, either open or subtle, or any danger from common accidents.

Your judgment will also direct what parts of your works shall be protected by fraizes, and what by palisadoes, or whether your redoubts shall have embrasures, or fire *en barbette* with small cannon. As the redoubts are to cover the batteries they would certainly secure and resist better without embrasures. The batteries are to annoy.

The choice of the ground on which the batteries and works are to be erected, whether to have embrasures, or to fire *en barbette*, with the new sea coast carriages, with all the combinations and effects depending on them, will rest upon your judgment, under the directions of the Governor. It has not been intended, by any thing herein specified, to point out the particular manner in which the works should be erected. Outlines only have been given, to serve in regulating the expense, which is limited by the sums before mentioned.

Some person, in whose ingenuity and industry confidence can be placed, will be appointed, at the said port, to superintend the actual execution of the works according to your directions. Arrangements will also be made, by him, or some other person, to obtain the necessary workmen, implements, and materials, which will be required in this business. But every thing must be previously calculated and estimated by you.

Although the business, herein entrusted to your charge, is, in itself, of a highly honorable nature, and strongly evincive of the confidence of the President of the United States, and which would probably enhance your reputation, yet it is to be explicitly understood by you, that the employment is only temporary, and not conferring, or involving, any military rank whatever.

For a compensation for your services, and personal expenses, you will be allowed and paid at the rate of four dollars per day, while you shall be employed. For all reasonable extra expenses, such as necessary boat hire, and persons to assist in your surveys, you will be allowed; but for those you must keep regular accounts and take receipts.

You are to deliver to the Governor copies of all your plans, surveys, soundings, &c. and also transmit copies of the same to this office. You are also to make a weekly report to this office of your proceedings.

I have issued my warrant, in your favor, for two hundred dollars, as an advance on account of your extra expenses. For any sums you may require, on account of your compensation and personal expenses, you must apply to me, and I shall order the same to be paid in Charleston.

A reverberatory furnace for red hot balls must be erected for each battery.

All the plans must be accompanied with sections and elevations, so that a complete judgment may be formed thereof. An estimate of the expense must also be formed of each work, and the number and size of the cannon intended must be specified.

You will have under your immediate orders Jerome Merlie, as a director of artillery artificers, to mount the new gun carriages, and John James Lairis, as sub-engineer and interpreter. This appointment to take place from the first of this instant, April.

Given at the War Office of the United States, this eleventh day of April, 1794.

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

SIR:

You will please to understand, as you have Mr. Stouff under your orders, that your commission will now extend to the fortifications of Charleston and Georgetown, in South Carolina, and to Savannah and St. Mary's, in Georgia. The places first to be attended to are Charleston and Savannah. Upon your arrival at the former, you are to send Mr. Stouff to survey Savannah river.

WAR OFFICE, *April 19, 1794.*

H. KNOX, *Secretary of War.*

*Copy of a letter from P. H. Perrault to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, *May 4th, 1794.*

I have the honor respectfully to inform you, that, after a passage of fourteen days, I am just arrived at Charleston. I immediately waited on the Governor, and showed him my instructions, &c. His Excellency was to go the day following to Columbia. He informed me that he had already begun some work, under the direction of Colonel Senf, viz: a battery at one of the wharves of the city, and a little other work at Fort Johnston; the expenses of the first battery are very considerable; the purchase of wood only, being eight hundred and three dollars. You may judge from this the extravagant price of work here.

Mr. Stouff will sail for Savannah the first favorable wind. Mr. Merlie has made a state of the materials wanted for carriages, and given it to Mr. Desaussure, but this gentleman says he cannot immediately find dry wood, either of oak or ash, and that it will not be possible before the next year. At the same time it may be too expensive perhaps to complete all the work with Acajou wood. I think it would be better if you was to send from Philadelphia the wood necessary for the great chase; and in the mean time Mr. Merlie will employ himself in making the little, and Mobile carriages, of Acajou wood. Should you think it better, he will, on your subsequent order, make the great chase of pitch pine wood, but it will be very unsolid.

I soon visited the harbor and made several soundings. To-morrow I shall draw again the more important places where I suppose the batteries will be necessary, in order to fix exactly the just distance between them, and be able to calculate their effect, respectively.

I suppose that, with four fortifications, in addition to the battery of Col. Senf, the protection of Charleston harbor will be very complete; but I cannot help observing to you, that the money allowed is too inconsiderable, and I beg you to give me some directions in order to make something useful. You may be assured that I will conduct myself with all possible economy.

You forgot to include in my instructions, what money is appointed for Savannah, Cape St. Mary's, and Georgetown. I beg you to give me immediate information on that subject, in order that I may be able to regulate my projects and calculations on it.

Mr. Merlie has just now told me that he has found the necessary wood in Acajou to complete his work. This wood in my opinion is the better, and he will, with your leave, perform all his work with this wood, in the mean time he will make the Mobile carriages.

It is probable that Mr. Merlie will meet with the same difficulty at Savannah, and probably it will not be so easily got over as here; so that perhaps it might be better that Mr. Merlie should make all the carriages here, as well for Charleston as for Savannah, Cape St. Mary's, and Georgetown, and ship them, when finished, for the respective harbors.

*From P. H. Perrault to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, *May 12, 1794.*

I have the honor respectfully to inform you, that I have taken the plan of the whole of Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, and the plan of Fort Johnston. I shall pursue my operations without any interruption, and hope that they will be incessantly finished, and that I shall be able, in the course of next week, to submit all my plans of operation to the approbation of General Moultrie.

On the idea of adhering to the strictest economy, Mr. Merlie has not yet obtained a place for his works, and I cannot help observing how many difficulties are occasioned by the absence of the Governor; the loss of time resulting from it is inexpressible, and must necessarily hinder me for a long time from beginning my works. I wrote to his Excellency some time since, to obtain a place for Mr. Merlie; last Saturday I ought to have received an answer, for the want of which I shall lose another week. I wish to have notice of the money appointed for Savannah and Georgetown, before my departure from this place. Mr. Stouff has sailed for Savannah.

It will be necessary, likewise, that Mr. Desaussure should receive positive orders to give me all necessary supplies on my first requisition; his praiseworthy wishes to fulfil his appointment with the most complete economy, cause much discussion and loss of time. I had found a place for Mr. Merlie in the arsenal, but Mr. Desaussure was answered by Mr. Lenox, the arsenal keeper, that the Governor's consent must be first obtained, in consequence of which I wrote to his Excellency, but, as I said before, have not received an answer, and Mr. Desaussure tells me there is no other place but this arsenal, and a little market, for which place the Governor's consent is likewise necessary.

*From P. H. Perrault to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, *May 31st, 1794.*

I have had the honor to receive your letter, and am very glad to find that General Jackson is of the same opinion with myself and Mr. Stouff; I consequently wrote to the latter to make the necessary operations.

I have indeed found great hindrance, and Mr. Merlie has scarcely begun his work. It would be necessary, I believe, to tell Mr. Desaussure positively that nothing more is requisite than for me to ask, and for him to supply whatever may be wanting.

I had begun, and almost terminated my directions, when sounding and searching in every part of the harbor, I discovered a sand bank, largely dry at low water, and keeping one hundred and fifty fathoms long, and sixty wide

to high water; it was believed generally by the pilots, that this sand bank was discovered only at low water, and that its formation had taken place from fifteen to twenty years. This discovery necessarily altered my first disposition.

I send to you the map containing the exact position of this new place; the Governor was amazed when I told him of it, and (before any thing was concluded on) wished to see it; I cannot myself determine, before he has decided on so important a matter. You will find on the map an explanation of the great advantages of this situation. It is morally impossible that, with a fort on this sand bank, and with another on Sullivan's Island, provided with red hot bullets, any vessel can pass without being burnt, for they both cross one another at the distance of blank shot. The Governor is apprehensive of nothing, but for the solidity of the foundation, and the vehement fury of the waves.

He would have walked on the place last week, but his ill state of health would not permit it; he intends to examine it this week.

*From P. H. Perrault to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, June 16th, 1794.

I explained in my former letters the obstructions resulting from the Governor's absence and indisposition, and the economy of Mr. Desaussure. I have been indeed much perplexed, but hope all the works will be in as good a train as possible; the Governor has appointed the places to be fortified, and the direction of those fortifications. I will constantly send you copies of the draughts of them, with the estimation of their expense. The Governor not having agreed with my directions, I believe it will be proper, I send you, for my discharge, a memorial concerning that matter.

The Governor will, without doubt, write you on the subject of the patriotism and zealous endeavors of the citizens of Charleston. They opened a subscription for supplying the money directed by Congress, which was indeed too small for the nature of the work, absolutely necessary in this country, where nothing but sand can be found, and which necessitates us to make use of timber revetments both before and behind. On calculation, every twenty feet amount to five hundred dollars. The places designed to be fortified are Sullivan's Island, Fort Johnston, one battery on a wharf, and another on a little sand bank, opposite Shute's folly.

Mr. Merlie has begun his works. I think it would be convenient that he should make in this city the carriages for Savannah, for it would spare the resulting expense of a new establishment, and purchase of tools, which would indeed be very extravagant. It will be very easy to send the carriages by water to Savannah when they are finished.

*Extract from P. H. Perrault to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, July 28th, 1794.

The money appointed for the work of Mr. Merlie is spent—there are only four carriages done. You wish for sixty—with what money are they to be performed? I am obliged to stop this work from the first of August, until I receive new orders on your part—the other works are in train, and I hope that the additional money of the subscription, with that supplied by this State, will be sufficient for their accomplishment. The works at Georgetown and Savannah are likewise begun.

*Extract from P. H. Perrault to the Secretary of War, dated*

CHARLESTON, August 19th, 1794.

"The work is carrying on very actively, not only in Charleston, but in Savannah and Georgetown—the battery in the city of Charleston is almost finished."

*Copy of a letter from D. De Saussure to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, 7th July, 1794.

I wrote to you the — May last, enclosing copy of a requisition made by Mr. Merlie for sundry materials and workmen to set about making the gun carriages ordered on new construction, and I then stated the smallness of the sum for the object contemplated; and as I considered it imprudent to postpone commencing the work until I received your answer, I made a beginning, by procuring a proper place for a workshop, and collected some materials and workmen, and I enclose you an abstract of the actual expenditure in that work up to the 30th ult. amounting to seven hundred and seventy-one dollars, thirty cents. I refer you to a note I have made on the abstract, of several charges which will come into this account, and which cannot at present be ascertained; but will altogether form a considerable sum, perhaps such a one as will, in addition to the abstract, amount to more than one thousand dollars, the sum allotted. The workmen are still employed under Mr. Merlie, and will continue so to the end of this month, at which time they must cease, unless I receive new directions, with funds for supplies previous thereto, and at which time I do not suppose there will be more than five or six of the carriages completed.

You have, herewith, an abstract of the expenditures for the fortifications at Fort Darrell and Fort Johnston, amounting to three thousand four hundred and ninety-seven dollars twenty-nine cents, including materials and workmanship previous to Mr. Perrault's arrival. Those works I formerly stated to you were begun under the direction of Col. Senf, by order of the Governor, and as those works have been continued by Mr. Perrault, with such of the materials as remained, I deemed it proper to pay those accounts. Fort Darrell is far advanced in its completion, and for some time past it has been of no expense to the United States for mechanical labor—that part being done gratis by the carpenters of this city. We have a great number of negroes sent gratis, who are employed as common laborers to remove the timber from place to place, and filling in the earth as the wood work rises. I presume Mr. Perrault has informed you it is not possible to erect any works here with earth, unless first cased with timber, the earth being of a very light soil, nay, sand itself, consequently not adhesive.

Although negroes have been sent gratis, it was stipulated rations should be supplied to them. I consented to do so, on the principle of propriety; as we have the labor gratis, it is as little as we can do to feed them. Subscriptions for carrying on the fortifications have been liberal—eight thousand days' labor of negroes, four thousand feet of ranging timber, and between seven and eight hundred pounds, have been subscribed; in consequence of which the laborers have begun at Fort Johnston and Sullivan's Island, to prepare to begin the works. You will observe two canoes charged in the account; it is unavoidable, as we could not transport the timber from one place to another, and also the people employed at Fort Johnston and Sullivan's Island, without; and I found by experience, it would not do to hire them; there is also a charge for a horse, saddle, and bridle, furnished Mr. Perrault; he alleged he wanted a horse to go from one work to another here, and that he must be found one at the expense of the United States—he enforced his claim by an order from the Governor. I will thank you for your opinion on this article.

*From D. De Saussure to the Secretary of War, dated*

SIR:

CHARLESTON, 13th Sept. 1794.

I have received the two thousand dollars additional which you directed to be remitted on account of the artillery department. I now enclose you an abstract statement on that account up to 31st last month, amounting to two

thousand three hundred and forty-three dollars thirty-four cents, which leaves a balance of six hundred and fifty-six dollars sixty-six cents, which will be expended by the end of the present month, in completing six carriages on the new plan: these, however, are nearly finished, but the Governor has ordered Mr. Merlie twelve carriages for twenty-four pounders, on the old construction, six of which are about, but the above balance will fall short of the expense for the six on hand; besides, there will be a variety of charges which cannot be ascertained at present; consequently, if you choose the work to continue, it will be absolutely necessary to order me a further remittance. I can assure you, I spare no pains in procuring the materials with all the expedition possible, and I can aver that no part of the works have been delayed through my inattention. Although I have constantly had negroes on hire, and others sent gratis, we have not been able to get as many as could be employed.

Mr. Habersham has requested I would employ five hundred dollars (which he is to reimburse me) in making carriages for Savannah, as it was difficult to find the proper materials there, but this sum will scarcely be sufficient to make more than two. I am informed the fort built there is altogether en barbette; if so, two will be of little or no consequence. On a conversation with Mr. Merlie, he thinks it would be as well to have the whole made here, and then sent to Savannah; having the workshop already fixed here, there would be no new expense on that score, and it will not be more expensive to transport the carriages, than the mahogany, which must be got here. I have no doubt the iron work will be cheaper here than at Savannah. You will be so good as to give me the earliest instructions on this subject; for the present, the workmen will set about two carriages for Savannah, the expense of which shall be kept separate from those for this place.

Enclosed you have an abstract of the expenses incurred up to the 31st of August for the fortifications, amounting to seven thousand one hundred and eighty-five dollars, thirty-four cents; exclusively of the above amount there is nearly one thousand dollars' worth of ranging timber delivered at Fort Johnston and Sullivan's Island, for which I have not yet received the bill—those works being on a large scale, will require a considerable quantity of lumber and workmanship, which in my opinion will considerably exceed the sum appropriated by the President, and that subscribed by the citizens. My engagement, with individuals, either for materials or labor, is to pay monthly, which I have hitherto complied with when called upon; at present my funds are nearly exhausted, and unless the collector can make me an advance, before he receives directions to place money in my hands, I shall be disagreeably circumstanced.

#### FORTIFICATIONS AT WEST POINT.

*State of the Works ordered at West Point, stating their situation in the present day of the last of August. New York, August 31st, 1794. By COLONEL VINCENT.*

**FORT PUTNAM.**—The repairing of the enclosure of the fort is now going on; one part has been altered, according to the strong reasons reported in one memorial, which has not yet been seen by the minister; but, as that part of the enclosure to be changed was to be new built, it will be a very trifling expense to make the useful proposed alteration.

**FORT CLINTON.**—It will not be possible for this year to begin any works; and it will be sufficient to collect every necessary material, during this season, in order to be ready to begin very early in the beginning of the spring. It should be also very useful, to begin this year the digging of the foundations, in employing the diggers at the task by cubic fathoms. We think that this way is the only one to be used in the works ordered by the General Government, inasmuch as the laborer's day's work is very high.

**OBSERVATIONS.**—The works at West Point are directed by the Major Niven, who may hardly be sufficient for so great a business. It will be necessary to employ one engineer more, principally for the important masonry to be erected there, which will require great knowledge in that line. The manner of carrying on all the necessary diggings by task, requires also one man, accustomed to such works, and daily upon the spot. The able commander, and clever man, Mr. Fleming, ought also obtain the first superintendency upon these important works.

*Copy of the Report of Daniel Niven to the Secretary of War, relatively to the Fortifications at West Point; dated*

PHILADELPHIA, December 12, 1794.

SIR:

I conceive it my duty to make the following report: That, from the 20th of May to the 18th day of July last, I was employed in superintending lime-burning, collecting stone to Fort Clinton, making and repairing roads, making and repairing tools, and repairing such parts of the rear wall of Fort Putnam as I judged sufficient. On the said 18th day of July, Mr. Vincent, Captain Fleming, and myself concluded, that all the old wall of Fort Putnam, facing Fort Clinton, be taken down and rebuilt; enclosing the point, for the advantage of enlarging the battery facing the ridge, where Forts Webb and Willis stood. Accordingly, I proceeded, and employed as many miners, masons, laborers, and teams, as I could find, that would work to advantage, and have taken away the old wall and built a new one, with the foundation on the rock, agreeably to your instructions, on durable principles of masonry. The said new wall is raised from twenty to twenty-five feet high, except the gate-way, for want of free-stone to face the arch. Nine bomb proof arches are closed over the barracks and magazines. I had hopes to finish four more, but the days are so short and cold, and the frost would damage the masonry so much, if the mortar could be worked, that I judged it best to discharge the workmen on the 22d day of November, except a very few under the direction of Captain Fleming. It was impossible to carry on the works without great damage to the public service.

Several arrangements ought to be made this winter, that the works may be carried on to advantage the ensuing season; that the laborers be hired by the month, and forfeit something if they leave the works without timely notice; that a forage store be established; that the brick be moulded in the shape of a key stone, to turn the arches. This will make strong work, and save great labor.

Enclosed is a rough sketch of Fort Putnam, made in the manner I should recommend it to be finished.

D. NIVEN.

*Copy of a circular letter to the persons employed to obtain labor, implements, and materials, for the Fortifications.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 29, 1794.

SIR:

You having been appointed for the purpose of obtaining the labor, implements, and materials, for the fortifications which are to be erected at \_\_\_\_\_, in pursuance of a law of the United States, for that purpose, are to regard the following instructions as the general rule of your conduct.

First. Upon the engineer's or superintendent's of the works making a requisition upon you, in writing, for labor or workmen, to erect earth works, of the description which he shall give, you will consider well whether the object described could be accomplished, with more economy, by a contract with some responsible person or persons, at a certain rate per cubical yard, or by hiring individuals per day; in general, it is the most saving mode to remove earth by contract; if this, upon full investigation, should appear to be the case, you will of course adopt it.

Second. It will be expected that, for any mechanical work to be performed, whether relatively to the fortifications, or the mounting of artillery, that you will obtain every article upon the best terms possible. This will be essential, for the sake of your own reputation, as it is not improbable that all the accounts respecting this business may hereafter be published. Besides which, the accounting officers of the treasury will rigidly examine every charge, and, if exorbitant, or not well vouched, they will make the necessary deductions.

Third. It is to be understood by you, that the requisition in writing upon you, by the engineer, or by the superintendent, authorized by the engineer for that purpose, will be essential in the passing your accounts. It is possible, however, that some other person than the engineer may hereafter be appointed to mount the cannon; in that case, he will exhibit his appointment to you before you furnish any supplies.

The sum contemplated for the port of \_\_\_\_\_ is not to be exceeded without some pressing reason.

It will be necessary, therefore, at the time that the first moiety of the said sum should be expended, that you should enclose me an abstract of the articles for which it has been disbursed, together with a statement of the engineer or superintendent, of the proportion which the sum expended bears to the whole work, taking into consideration the purchase of any materials which are to serve for the general object.

The amount of the expenses for making new carriages for cannon, cannot now be ascertained; but the Secretary of the Treasury will place \_\_\_\_\_ dollars in your hands, to be appropriated to that object.

I am, &c.

H. KNOX.

*Copy of a circular letter to the Engineers, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 24, 1794.

SIR:

I request that you would, upon mature consideration, determine upon the quantity of ground which will be indispensably necessary for the accommodation of the fortifications of \_\_\_\_\_. You will please to report the said quantity in acres to \_\_\_\_\_, the agent at \_\_\_\_\_, in order that he may take the necessary measures for purchasing the same, and you will please, also, to make a duplicate report to this office.

Permit me to urge the season of the year, which is advancing, as a strong inducement to placing all the fortifications under your direction in a state of defence, and of completing them, as far as possible, with the funds which have been designated.

I am, &c.

H. KNOX.

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Treasury.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 29, 1794.

SIR:

The estimates herein enclosed, relatively to the fortifications, is a copy of the one presented to the committee of Congress, and is presumed to have been contemplated in the law making the appropriations upon the subject. Some places, however, are mentioned in the law which are not contained in the estimate.

It will be necessary to appoint some man of character for integrity and intelligence in each of the places to be fortified, for the purpose of obtaining the labor and materials necessary for the fortifications. I presume the appointment of such persons will belong to your department, and, under this impression, I have conceived it proper, on my part, to draught a letter according to the purport of No. 2.

As it will be perceived that garrisons are contemplated, it will be necessary that some arrangement be also made for furnishing the rations and other necessary supplies in the Quartermaster's department.

You will decide upon the proportions of the sums for the fortifications, to be placed in the hands of the agent to be appointed. They ought to be sufficient to obtain every thing which shall be wanted, so that the works may not languish for want of the necessary means.

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of War.*

July 7, 1794.

SIR:

The Congress of the United States having, by their act of the 9th of June, 1794, appropriated a further sum of thirty thousand dollars, in addition to the seventy-six thousand dollars heretofore granted for the purpose of fortifying certain ports and harbors in the United States, making together one hundred and six thousand dollars, I have to request you will be pleased to furnish me, as soon as convenient, with a memorandum of the manner in which the said sum of one hundred and six thousand dollars is to be apportioned among the several ports and harbors, designated to be fortified by the acts of Congress of the 20th March and 9th May, 1794, that I may be enabled to ascertain, with precision, what further sums remain to be remitted to the persons respectively appointed to disburse the moneys.

I have the honor to be, sir, &c.

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Treasury.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 9, 1794.

SIR:

Agreeably to your request of the 7th instant, I have the honor of transmitting you the sums to be expended upon the fortifications specified by the laws, the entire appropriation for which amounts to one hundred and six thousand dollars. The sums apportioned to the different places amount to one hundred and four thousand and twenty-five dollars and fifty-two cents, leaving a balance of one thousand nine hundred and seventy-four dollars and forty-eight cents, to be apportioned hereafter to such places as may be deemed necessary.

St. Mary's,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,423	84
Savannah,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,737	52
Charleston,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16,212	32
Georgetown,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,423	84
Wilmington, N. C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,873	76
Ocracock,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,157	68
Norfolk,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,737	52
Alexandria,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,000	00
Annapolis,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,000	00
Baltimore,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,225	44
Wilmington,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,000	00
Philadelphia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,913	82
New York,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,522	36
New London and Groton,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,000	00
Newport,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,500	00
Boston,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,749	28
Salem,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,423	84
Cape Ann,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,423	84
Marblehead,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,423	84
Portsmouth,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,527	34
Portland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,749	28
								<u>\$104,025</u>	<u>52</u>

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Treasury.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 24, 1794.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit you a copy of a circular letter to the several engineers employed for fortifying certain ports and harbors of the United States; and I beg leave to request that you will take such measures as you may deem proper for the purchase of such tracts of land at the places, respectively, as shall be designated by the engineers to the agents.

*Secretary of War to the Comptroller of the Treasury.*

October 16, 1794.

SIR:

I have the honor to represent to you, that it will be requisite to add to the sums heretofore apportioned for the fortifications of the following places, the sums herein specified:

Portland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900
Portsmouth,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Cape Ann,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Salem,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Marblehead,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900
Newport and Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
								<u>\$4,100</u>

Unless the sums shall be furnished, it is apprehended the works will be left unfinished, and all which has been done may be useless in a great degree. The sums now requested may be considered as deducted from the sum of eight thousand seven hundred and forty-nine dollars and twenty-eight cents, heretofore apportioned to Boston, and which will not be expended this year, owing to some difficulties which have arisen on the part of the State Government to the fortifying of that harbor.

I request you will be pleased to direct the sums before mentioned to be transmitted to the agents of the said places, respectively.

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of War.*

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, December 17, 1794.

SIR:

In reply to your letter of this date, I have the honor to inform you, that no general instructions have gone from this Department to the collectors, relative to the purchase of the lands on which fortifications might be erected, from an expectation that the information necessary for the government of the treasury would come in course through the channel designated in your letter to me of the 24th of July last.

The enclosed memorandum exhibits a view of all the cases in which cessions and purchases have been made, or measures taken to effect the object thereof. The treaty for the purchase of the land on which the fortifications are erecting at Baltimore is suspended for the present, on account of a very material difference in opinion with respect to the value of it.

I am, sir, respectfully, your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

The inhabitants of Marblehead have ceded to the United States the land on which the fortifications are erecting. Another piece of land adjoining thereto has, at the request of the engineer, been purchased from Russell Trevett, for two hundred and fifty dollars; to which sum, however, are to be added sixty dollars paid to a person to relinquish his right to the fishing flakes.

The inhabitants of Salem have ceded to the United States the land on which the fortifications are erecting.

The Governor of Virginia has been authorized to purchase the land at Norfolk, provided the cost does not exceed one thousand dollars.

The collector at Baltimore has been directed to take measures for ascertaining the value of the land at Whetstone Point, near Baltimore, whereon the fortifications are erecting.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, December 17, 1794.

*Statement of Moneys transmitted from the Treasury Department to be placed in the hands of the agents for the fortifications at the following places, to wit:*

Portland, Maine,	-	-	-	-	-	3,399 28
Portsmouth, New Hampshire,	-	-	-	-	-	2,877 34
Gloucester, Massachusetts,	-	-	-	-	-	1,773 84
Salem, do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,773 84
Marblehead, do.	-	-	-	-	-	2,013 84
Boston, do.	-	-	-	-	-	2,000 00
Newport, Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	-	4,500 00
New London, Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	-	3,000 00
New York,	-	-	-	-	-	12,522 36
Philadelphia,	-	-	-	-	-	11,913 82
Wilmington, Delaware,	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 00
Baltimore, Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	5,200 00
Annapolis, do.	-	-	-	-	-	2,750 00
Norfolk, Virginia,	-	-	-	-	-	7,797 52
Alexandria, do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 00
Cape Fear, North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	2,873 76
Ocracock, do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 00
Charleston, South Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	15,000 00
Georgetown, do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 00
Savannah, Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	3,537 52
St. Mary's, do.	-	-	-	-	-	1,173 84
						<u>\$88,106 96</u>

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 23.

[2d SESSION.]

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 29, 1794.

Mr. GILES, from the committee appointed to prepare a plan for the better organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia of the United States, made the following report:

That they are of opinion the plan for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, already adopted by law, may be made competent to all the purposes of an efficient militia, by remedying the difficulties and inconveniences which have occurred in the execution of the same.

That the principal difficulties and inconveniences which have occurred in the execution of the militia system, particularly respect the incompetent provisions for arming them, and for calling them forth to execute the laws of the United States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

It appears to the committee, that the principal defects in the existing provisions for arming the militia, consist in the want of a competent source of supplying the arms; the want of some provision for furnishing persons with arms, who may be deemed unable to furnish themselves; and the want of adequate and uniform penalties to enforce a compliance with the requisitions of the existing militia laws.

The committee not having that part of this subject committed to them, which respects the calling forth of the militia, recommend the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the act, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States," ought to be amended; and that further provision ought to be made, by law, for arming the militia of the United States, and for enforcing the execution of the existing militia laws, by adequate and uniform penalties.

3d CONGRESS.]

No. 24.\*

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 28, 1795.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH, from the committee to whom was recommitted the report of the committee to whom was referred the report of the Secretary of War, respecting the fortifications of the United States, made the following report:

That, by an estimate of the Secretary of War, during the last session, the following sums were considered as sufficient to fortify the following ports and harbors, viz:

Portland, in the District of Maine,	-	-	-	\$2,749 28
Portsmouth, in New Hampshire,	-	-	-	2,964 22
Gloucester, Massachusetts,	-	-	-	1,423 84

\* See No. 19.

Salem, Massachusetts,	-	-	-	1,423	84
Marblehead, Do.	-	-	-	1,423	84
Boston, Do.	-	-	-		
Newport, Rhode Island,	-	-	-	3,000	00
New London and Groton, Connecticut,	-	-	-	5,498	56
New York, -	-	-	-	12,522	26
Philadelphia, -	-	-	-	8,737	94
Wilmington, Delaware.	-	-	-		
Annapolis, } Maryland,	-	-	-	4,225	44
Baltimore, }	-	-	-		
Norfolk, Virginia,	-	-	-	3,737	58
Alexandria, Do.	-	-	-		
Cape Fear, }	-	-	-		
Ocracock Inlet, } North Carolina,	-	-	-	4,647	60
Charleston, South Carolina,	-	-	-	11,212	39
Georgetown, Do.	-	-	-		
Savannah, }	-	-	-		
St. Mary's, } Georgia,	-	-	-	3,737	52

The statements for Boston, and Wilmington, in Delaware, are not noted, in consequence of Castle William being held by the State of Massachusetts, and no proceeding having taken effect in respect to Wilmington. Alexandria is not estimated, and the committee are of opinion that it is not necessary now to complete the work. Annapolis stands by a particular act, and it is suggested no estimate may be made on that subject, as the President is already empowered to go on with the works, if he thinks necessary.

The committee are of opinion, that the following sums will be sufficient to complete the fortifications, agreeably to the original intention, viz:

Portland,	-	-	-	\$1,000
Portsmouth,	-	-	-	1,000
Gloucester,	-	-	-	1,000
Salem,	-	-	-	1,000
Marblehead,	-	-	-	1,000
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	3,000
Connecticut,	-	-	-	2,000
New York,	-	-	-	8,000
West Point,	-	-	-	7,500
Philadelphia,	-	-	-	5,000
Baltimore,	-	-	-	2,500
Norfolk and Portsmouth,	-	-	-	3,000
Ocracock,	-	-	-	1,000
Wilmington,	-	-	-	1,500
Charleston and Georgetown,	-	-	-	5,000
Savannah and St. Mary's,	-	-	-	3,000
				<u>\$46,500</u>

Your committee, taking into view every circumstance connected with this subject, submit the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That a sum, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, be appropriated for the purpose of completing the fortifications of certain ports and harbors in the United States.

4th CONGRESS.]

No. 25.

[1st SESSION

### MILITARY FORCE, ARSENALS, AND STORES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, DECEMBER 15, 1795.

WAR OFFICE, December 12, 1795.

SIR:

By the direction of the President of the United States, I have the honor to present, herewith, No. 1, A statement of the present military force of the United States; No. 2, A report of the measures which have been pursued to obtain proper sites for arsenals; and No. 3, A report of the measures which have been taken to replenish the magazines with military stores.

And am, most respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

The VICE PRESIDENT of the United States and President of the Senate.



*A Statement of the present Military Force of the United States.*

	Major General.	Brigadier General.	Adjutant General.	Quarter Master General.	Deputy Quarter Master General.	Paymaster.	Surgeon.	Chaplain.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Ensigns.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates,	Non-commissioned and privates.
General staff, - - -	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cavalry, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3	2	-	-	-	240
Artillery, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	15	27	-	-	1	4	731
Infantry, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	12	44	43	-	27	3	12	2,357
<b>Total, - - -</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3,228</b>
<b>With General Wayne, including the garrison on the lower parts of the Ohio, and in advance of Fort Washington, - - -</b>																	
																	2,039
<b>At Pittsburg, Fort Franklin, Presque isle, &amp;c. - - -</b>																	222
<b>In Georgia, - - -</b>																	78
<b>Sailed to Georgia, - - -</b>																	272
<b>In the Southwestern territory, - - -</b>																	33
<b>At West Point, fortifications of the harbors, and the several recruiting rendezvous, - - -</b>																	584
																	<b>3,228</b>

*A statement showing at what periods the enlistments of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers will expire.*

	In December, 1795.	From 1st January to 1st July 1796.	From 1st July, 1796, to 1st January, 1797.	From 1st January, 1797, to 1st July 1797.	From 1st July, 1797, to 1st January, 1798.	From 1st January, 1798, to 1st July, 1798.	From 1st July, 1798, to 31st December, 1798.	Not particularly known, supposed to expire in 1798.	Total.
Cavalry, -	3	15	1	8	17	164	32	-	240
Artillery, -	16	19	16	52	232	260	76	10	731
Infantry, -	27	224	235	288	229	833	359	62	2,257
<b>Total -</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>1,257</b>	<b>467</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>3,228</b>

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 12, 1795.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

*Report of the Secretary of War on the measures which have been pursued to obtain proper sites for Arsenals; which is respectfully submitted to the Senate of the United States:*

It having been determined to erect one arsenal on the Potomac, and another in South Carolina, the latter in a situation to and from which water transportation would be afforded, and the former in the vicinity of a number of iron works, the necessary orders were given in the year 1794 for exploring both countries. The agent, employed on the former, reported in the same year in favor of a situation about twenty-five miles below the blue ridge, where a number of circumstances invited the establishment. In an undertaking, however, of such importance and permanency, it was deemed expedient to make another examination. This was done last Spring. The engineer employed, pursuant to his instructions, reported the situation of various places, where it would be practicable to erect the necessary works and magazines, with their respective advantages and disadvantages; and at what prices they could probably be obtained. These were all extremely high; and one far exceeded the whole appropriation for all the arsenals proposed to be erected. For this reason another place, comprehending several lots of land, had the preference; and the requisite negotiations were begun for making the purchases. Before these were concluded, the attention of the Executive was called to another situation on the Potomac, possessing, with some difficulties to be encountered, apparently many important advantages. The engineer was again instructed to examine this place, from whence he has lately returned. The American gentleman, well acquainted with the country, and who assisted him in this examination, was to have transmitted a survey of the place referred to, and of the adjacent waters on which the engineer's report would be completed. The survey has not yet been received, and the determination of the Executive is consequently suspended.

The engineer employed, for the like purpose, in South Carolina, made a report, which was received early in the last Summer. He had explored that part of the country to which his attention had been directed by the Executive. He also examined another. The latter, independent of its being in a more healthful situation, was deemed by him to possess some other advantages over the former. However, he proposed to visit the seat of Government, and personally explain his ideas of the subject. This visit was waited for, but not made; no decision has, consequently, been taken on his report.

The prices of lands and mill seats, (for the latter must be comprehended in the plan of an arsenal,) so far exceeded those upon which the calculations were made, when the plan of erecting arsenals was projected, and rose so rapidly soon after, it is now found that the whole appropriation, for the three or four arsenals which the Executive was authorised by law to erect, would be inadequate for a single new establishment. Hence, the principal object, in the measures pursued during the last summer, was to ascertain and secure the most eligible site on the Potomac, where magazines could be erected, and certain military stores be collected and safely deposited; and where, afterwards, the works necessary, in the formation of all the implements of war, might be erected, as the requisite funds could be provided.

In a country where such establishments are unknown, and where the actual state of things admits of a suspension of some of them, consistently with the public safety, it would seem expedient to make an experiment with one

in a central position. The obvious principles of economy recommend this caution; and the avoiding of defects likely to appear in a first attempt, and the probability of solid improvements, which experience would suggest, in a second, strongly enforce it.

Springfield, in the State of Massachusetts, was at once fixed on as a proper situation for the arsenal to be established in the eastern division of the States. Magazines, for military stores, had been formerly erected at that place. Some additional buildings have been made, and a number of workmen collected for the purpose of repairing and manufacturing small arms. The former has been executed, and the latter commenced.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 12, 1795.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

*Report of the Secretary of War on the measures which have been taken to replenish the magazines with military stores.*

In respect to some of the most essential articles, the stock on hand is respectable; and, as to others, the magazines are now not ill supplied.

A contract has been made for a large quantity of saltpetre; and probably it is now on its way from India. This important article may, however, be obtained in the Western parts of the United States. The fact is ascertained. Forty or fifty tons have been brought from those parts to Philadelphia for sale, and it is said that several hundred tons might be procured, in the same way, in the course of the next summer, if needed.

To increase the stock of small arms, and to render serviceable those already in the public stores, two sets of armorers have been employed, to wit: at Springfield, Massachusetts, and at New London, in Virginia, in repairing arms, and preparing to manufacture the most essential parts of muskets; and some specimens have been produced which prove their capacity to equal, in that article, the manufacture of any country in the world. All the arms in the magazines in Philadelphia have been repaired, with some thousands at West Point, where the residue are now repairing.

In addition to these sources of supply, besides two thousand rifles which have been purchased, contracts have been made, and are executing, for seven thousand muskets, to be manufactured in the United States. The present period may be deemed an unfavorable one to carry on such manufactures, on account of the high price of labor; nevertheless, it seemed important to secure the services of the manufacturers, when they might be of the highest necessity, by continuing to furnish them employment. Such muskets as are manufactured are after the model of the French arms, which compose, by far, the greatest part of those in our magazines. For this reason, and because they are preferable to those of any other nation known in the United States, it was apparently inexpedient to make an importation of arms from Europe; seeing a supply was not to be expected from France, and the situation of the United States not rendering the measure of an immediate importation indispensable.

The casting of cannon has not been attended, hitherto, with the expected success. The foundries which formerly succeeded very well in the casting of small guns, were not well adapted to the casting of 24 and 32 pounders. A French gentleman, of some knowledge and experience in cannon foundries, has lately been employed to amend the process of casting, and to improve the machinery for boring; and there is room to hope that his projected improvements will be realized. Nevertheless, in an undertaking so important, and, at the same time, so expensive, it was desirable to obtain, if possible, a complete cannon founder; and, from the information received, it seemed probable that one might be procured from one of the first foundries in Europe. Measures, for that purpose, have accordingly been taken.

All which is respectfully submitted to the Senate of the United States.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 12, 1795.

[4th CONGRESS.]

No. 26.

[1st SESSION.]

FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, JANUARY 18, 1796.

*State of the Fortifications of the United States.*

WAR OFFICE, January 16th, 1796.

PORTLAND, in the District of Maine.—The works consist of a fort, a citadel, a battery for ten pieces of cannon, an artillery store, a guard house, an air furnace for heating shot, and a covered way from the fort to the battery.

The works are substantially executed, excepting the covered way; to complete this, the earth on the spot being of a bad quality, with the necessary supports of stones and sods, is estimated at four hundred dollars. Levelling the earth round the works, fencing the land pertaining to them, a pump for the well, painting the wood work, and rendering the whole perfectly complete, the estimate is four hundred and seventy-one dollars, in the whole eight hundred and seventy-one dollars.

PORTSMOUTH, New Hampshire.—The works consist of a fort, a citadel, an artillery store, and a reverberatory furnace. These are all completed, excepting a little carpenters' work, suspended to let the wood season, and which may cost about fifty dollars. But a small and unforeseen expense must be incurred, for a drain to carry the water from the magazine, and may cost one hundred dollars.

GLOUCESTER, (Cape Ann.)—The works consist of a battery and a citadel. These are completed. But to enclose the fort, towards the town, the cost is estimated at one thousand four hundred dollars. This, however, may be postponed till circumstances require it to be done.

SALEM.—The works, consisting of a fort and citadel, have been erected. A gate remains to be made, and some repairs to the walls.

MARBLEHEAD.—A battery and a citadel have been erected. Any other works may be suspended until circumstances shall change.

NEWPORT, in Rhode Island.—For the defence of this harbor there have been erected, on Goat Island, a fort, a citadel, and an air furnace. The excellency and importance of this harbor, in time of war, recommend a further expenditure, to render the defence complete. To finish the fort, erect an artillery store, and make a covered way round it, as in a regular fortification, the expense is estimated at about six thousand dollars.

There have also been erected a citadel on Tammany Hill, back of the town of Newport, for the protection of its inhabitants, and a battery and guard house, at Howland's Ferry, at the northern end of the island, to keep open a communication with the main, in case of an invasion. But, to secure effectually this communication, a citadel should be erected on Butts' Hill, that position commanding Howland's Ferry and Bristol Ferry. The cost of it is estimated at eighteen hundred dollars.

**NEW LONDON.**—The works consist of a fort and citadel, on the Groton side of the harbor, and of a fort, a citadel, and an air furnace, on the New London side. They remain incomplete. Under present circumstances, a small expenditure may be proper, merely to preserve what has been done.

**NEW YORK.**—Governor's Island has been fortified with a fort made of earth, and two batteries under its protection, partly lined with brick masonry, two air furnaces, a large powder magazine, and a barrack for the garrison; the whole completed.

**PHILADELPHIA.**—A large pier, as the foundation for a battery, on a sand bar, opposite Mud Island, to make a cross fire, has been completed. A fort, on Mud Island, is about half done, and a citadel has been erected to complete the fort, and on a plan much more circumscribed than was at first projected. The expense is estimated at fifteen thousand dollars.

**WILMINGTON, in the Delaware State.**—Nothing has been done. The project of erecting a fort there has been abandoned as useless.

**BALTIMORE.**—A battery and barracks have been constructed, and some guns are mounted.

**ANNAPOLIS.**—Some progress had been made in the construction of a fort and battery, and a barrack has been erected. But an examination of the works by an engineer, other than the one first employed, produced an unfavorable report of the plan of the works; and, under actual circumstances, induced a relinquishment of them.

A similar report as to the plan and situation of the work at

**ALEXANDRIA,** induced a like relinquishment.

**NORFOLK.**—Two forts, intended to cross their fire, are erected on the opposite sides of the harbor. The one on the Norfolk side, with barracks and a powder magazine, is completed. The other, Fort Nelson, on the Portsmouth side, is very far advanced, and a powder magazine has been erected. The principal work remaining to be done is the opening of seven embrasures, completing one ditch of three hundred and sixty feet long, cutting another eleven hundred feet long, completing the glacis, and removing the earth from within side of the fort, where it is two feet and an half too high. The expense of doing this, and completing the fortification, may be estimated at five thousand dollars.

**OCRACOKE, in North Carolina.**—The defence proposed was, to erect a fort on Beacon Island. The foundation was laid in 1794. The situation is so far removed (about ninety miles) from any inhabitants, and so exposes any works to injuries from storms, that nothing but an impending or actual war would seem to authorize the construction of a fort there, and furnishing it with a proper garrison.

**WILMINGTON, in North Carolina.**—The battery, on the whole front of the fort, has been completed, and a barrack and powder magazine have been erected.

**GEORGETOWN, South Carolina.**—A battery was begun, and materials collected, when the work was suspended, the owner of the land previously desiring to ascertain the terms on which it was to be occupied, for the fortification and for the road of communication with it. The unhealthiness of the situation and other circumstances authorize an abandonment of the work until war, actual or impending, shall require it to be resumed.

**CHARLESTON, South Carolina.**—The work planned for Sullivan's Island, of which the foundation only was laid, in 1794, being on a scale supposed too extensive for the funds destined to this service, was directed to be left as it was. For the same reason, a new work, proposed by the engineer, on a point on the opposite side of the harbor from Fort Johnston, was not attempted. A battery has been erected in the town, by the mechanics.

There remained only Fort Johnston, on which directions were given to make such repairs as would preserve the works already constructed, and render them serviceable. The engineer omitted the work.

The officer in command at the fort has undertaken to make the necessary repairs of the works and barracks, and his intelligence and experience leave no room to doubt but these will be done.

**SAVANNAH, in Georgia.**—The work consists of a battery, at present destined only for six guns, made of timber filled with earth, and enclosed behind with pickets, with a guard house for the garrison, which were in train to be completed early the last autumn.

**ST. MARY'S, in Georgia.**—The work consists of a battery made of timbers filled with earth, and enclosed with pickets. By the personal report of the superintendent it must have been completed.

**GENERAL REMARK.**—The few ports of the highest importance to the commerce of the United States, in situations to demand, for their security, fortifications of such kind and extent as cannot suddenly be erected, prudence may require to have fortified, in time of peace, and with durable materials.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

To the PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

[4th CONGRESS.]

No. 27.

[1st SESSION.]

## ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 25, 1796. •

Mr. BALDWIN, from the committee appointed to inquire whether any, and what, alterations ought to be made in the present military establishment of the United States, made the following report:

That, in their opinion, the events which have changed, and may be expected still further to change, the relative situations of our frontiers, render a review of the military establishment at this time expedient. It is the opinion of the committee, that the force to be provided for the defensive protection of the frontiers, need not be so great as what had been contemplated for carrying on the war against the different tribes of hostile Indians, and which is the basis of the present military establishment.

By the last act on this subject, of March 3d, 1795, the military force of the United States is to be composed of the corps of artilleryists and engineers, to consist of 992 non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians; and of a legion to consist of 4,800 non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians. Of these there will be still, in actual service, on the first of July next three thousand and four, which the committee suppose will be sufficient to be continued as the present military establishment; they therefore recommend the following resolutions:

*Resolved*, That these ought to consist of the corps of artilleryists and engineers, as established by the act of the 9th of May, 1794, and of four regiments of infantry, of eight companies each.

*Resolved*, That there be one Brigadier General, five Lieutenant Colonel Commandants, eleven Majors, one Brigade Quartermaster, and company officers, according to the rules and regulations for the discipline of the troops of the United States.

Colonel Pickering presents his respects to Mr. Baldwin, with the extract of a letter from Governor Blount, expressing an opinion connected with some ideas Colonel P. has suggested relative to the military establishment.

February 4, 1796.

*Extract of a letter from Governor William Blount to the Secretary of War, dated*

“KNOXVILLE, November 2d, 1795.

“Peace now *actually* exists between the United States and the Indian tribes, and, in my opinion, may be preserved by the establishment of strong military posts of regular troops upon the frontiers, at proper places, with cavalry of the same description, to patrol between them.

“I do not recommend posts for the preservation of peace, from any inclination that I at present discover or suspect in either party to disturb it; but peace between frontier people and Indians, when left unrestrained by the hand of Government, rests upon so many events, trivial in themselves, that, in my judgment, Government will consult its true interest in taking immediate measures to guard against such as may happen.”

A true abstract from the original, remaining in the War Office.

N. JONES, Clerk.

*Objects of the Military Establishment of the United States.*

1st. To occupy the posts already established on the line between the United States and Canada, from Lake Champlain to Michillimackinack. To appear respectable in the eyes of our British neighbors, the force with which we take possession of the posts should not be materially less than that with which they now occupy them. This measure is also important in relation to the Indians, on whom first impressions may have very beneficial effects.

2d. To occupy the posts established, and to be established, agreeably to the treaty lately concluded with the Indians, northwest of the Ohio; including also those from Pittsburg to Presque Isle.

3d. The treaty concluded with Spain, must, doubtless, give us the posts they now occupy at the Chickasaw bluff and the Natchez, which we must garrison. They will be proper stations for opening the trade with the Chickasaws and Choctaws, and very convenient stations to our citizens navigating the Mississippi.

4. To preserve peace between the southern Indians and the frontier citizens, from the Cumberland to St. Mary's, by restraining the latter from aggressions, particularly by settling on Indian lands.

5th. To accomplish the same object, northwest of the Ohio; with the addition of preserving the Indian territory, and the proper lands of the United States, from intrusions, and to remove the actual intruders; for they have already manifested their rapacity in seizing and possessing the public lands.

6th. To garrison the most important fortifications on the sea coast. The smaller ones in time of peace may be taken care of, each by an individual, such as an invalid, or other poor citizen, at a very small expense.

In applying the military force to these objects, I have thrown the posts to be occupied into divisions, in each of which there will be a principal station for the ordinary residence of the commandant of the division. One battalion will occupy one of these divisions, and a sub-legion three of them. The lieutenant colonel will take a station the most convenient for superintending his sub-legion. A general officer will find abundant employment in visiting and regulating all the posts.

Hence it will seem that I am of opinion, that the present form of our military establishment should be preserved, for 1st. A military force, not much short of that which now exists, must always be kept up, even in time of peace, in order to preserve peace with the Indians, and to protect theirs, and the public lands.

2d. Though detached so far from Europe, yet having for our neighbors the subjects of two European powers, and our extended and extending commerce making all the maritime powers of Europe in some sense our neighbors, we cannot expect for ever to escape from war with some of them. In this expectation, will it not be highly important to maintain a military arrangement which shall be a model, and furnish instructors, for all the additional corps, which a war shall compel us to form?

3d. Beyond question, the military posts we must occupy, on our vast frontiers, will be numerous, though the garrison will be small. But if such remote stations are established with an entire independence of each other, and without superior commanding officers to inspect and regulate them, every species of negligence and abuse may be expected to be indulged, and practised, in many of them, thus defeating the objects of their establishment. And as such visits will frequently be requisite, the higher officers, in their respective divisions, will be the proper inspectors. A just subordination being thus maintained, the commandants of posts will regularly be responsible, and report the condition of their commands to their immediate superiors, respectively; these to their respective superior inspecting officers; and the latter to the commanding general, who will in one view present the state of the military forces entire, and of the posts they occupy, to the supreme Executive of the United States.

It is very true, that the number of troops, now on foot, might be commanded by fewer officers; all the infantry and riflemen being only about equal to the sub-legions. If, then, the other two sub-legions were reduced, it would produce a saving for pay, subsistence, and forage for the officers, of about twenty thousand dollars a year. This, doubtless, merits attention; but, in the present moment, the reduction would seem to me inexpedient—

1st. Because the pacific arrangements entered into with Great Britain, and those believed to be formed with Spain, remain to be carried into effect.

2d. Because we do not yet know what will be the issue of fresh hostilities with the Creeks; they may bring on a general war with that nation, and alone demand a military force equal to our whole establishment.

For these reasons, I would submit to the committee, whether it is not prudent to suspend any decision on the military establishment to a later period in the season? Probably in a month or two, every fact that has relation to the two neighboring powers, and to the Creeks, will be ascertained in such a manner as to leave no further room for hesitation in regard to the extent of our military establishment. By inspecting the return, in the hands of the committee, they will perceive that the troops will be reducing, by the mere expiration of their enlistment, quite as fast as it will be prudent to discharge them.

If the committee shall think proper to suspend their report, they will have the advantage of the information that may be derived from General Wayne, (whose arrival is daily expected,) particularly in regard to the posts which it will be expedient to occupy.

The corps of artilleryists and engineers appears to be an important establishment. To become skilful in either branch of their profession, will require long attention, study, and practice; and because they can now acquire the knowledge of these arts advantageously only from the foreign officers, who have been appointed with a special reference to this object, it will be important to keep the corps together for the present, as far as the necessary actual service will permit. Its principal station may then become a school for the purpose mentioned. To render this school more complete, provision is wanting for a geographical engineer and draughtsman. Such a one may now be retained for the establishment of a captain.

February 3, 1796.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

*The Committee on the Military Establishment.*

MILITARY STATIONS.

		Infantry.	Riflemen.	Artillery.	Cavalry.
Niagara, - - -	{ Lake Champlain, Oswego, Niagara Fort, The Landing at the commencement of the portage, Fort Schlosser, at its end, Buffalo creek,	1 Battalion,	- -	1 Company.	
Pittsburg, - - -	{ Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, Franklin, Pittsburg, Fort McIntosh, Muskingum, Gallipolis,	1 Battalion.			
Fort Washington, -	{ Fort Washington, Hamilton, St. Clair, Steuben,	1 Battalion,	1 Battalion,	- -	1 Troop.
Greenville, - - -	{ Fort Jefferson, Greenville, Recovery, Loramie's Store, Fort Adams, Head of Au-Glaize,	1 Battalion,	1 Company.		
Fort Wayne, - - -	{ Fort Wayne, Defiance, Miami, Sandusky,	1 Battalion,	1 Company,	1 Company.	
Detroit, - - -	{ Detroit, Michillimackinack, Chicago, Old Rorias, Mouth of Illinois,	1 Battalion,	2 Companies,	1 Company.	
	{ Head of Wabash, Ouatanon, Post Vincennes, Fort Masac, Chickasaw Bluff, Natchez,	1 Battalion,	- -	1 Company.	
Georgia, - - -	{ Oconee, St. Mary's,	1 Battalion,	1 Battalion,	1 Company,	2 Troops.
South Western Territory,	{ Knoxville District, Nashville do.	- -	1 Battalion,	- -	1 Troop.
		8 Battalions,	4 Battalions,	5 Companies,	4 Troops.

WAR OFFICE, *March 14, 1796.*

SIR:

I have the honor to submit to the committee on the military establishment, the thoughts that have occurred to me on the questions respecting which they seemed to desire my opinion.

I am, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JAMES M'HENRY.

ABM. BALDWIN, Esq.

*Thoughts of the Secretary of War on the following questions, viz.:*

First. Ought the military force of the United States to be diminished?

Second. Can any saving be made in the Quartermaster's department?

Third. Ought a provision to be made for the appointment of a Judge Advocate to the establishment?

First. Ought the military force of the United States to be diminished?

The necessity for any military establishment seems to rest principally upon the following considerations, by which this question may be tested: 1st. As a military establishment secures from, or enables the United States to repel, insult and invasion, and maintain her dignity. 2d. As it counteracts the influence of the force kept up by Great Britain and Spain, over our northern and western boundaries, as the same applies to excite or keep alive Indian hostilities. 3d. As it preserves a model and school for an army, and experienced officers to form it, in case of war. 4th. From the sense of the inadequacy of a militia to answer those several purposes, without the aid of a regular force.

Declining a more detailed view of these general considerations, it will be taken for granted, that one or all of them render a certain military establishment essential to the interests and peace of the Union. The only point then that remains to be settled, is the quantum of force necessary to be kept up, so as to avoid useless expense, and at the same time secure the objects it contemplates.

To determine upon this force, or, rather, to enable one to make up an opinion respecting it, reference must be had to the force likely to be kept up by Great Britain and Spain, near to our boundaries. The force which they have at present in these quarters, may be stated in gross, and without aiming at precision, to be greater than the present effective force of the United States; while several reasons concur to induce a belief, that neither of these nations will contract it on evacuating the posts which they occupy within our limits. To mention some of them:

1st. Great Britain may wish, at least, not to hazard the loss of the influence she may possess over the northern Indians. She may therefore think, that to lessen her force in Canada, on the event of the delivery of the posts, (however desirous she might be to transfer it to the West Indies,) would be to incur its loss.

2d. Great Britain may also deem it indispensable to occupy other posts as near as may be to those to be evacuated, with a view to the preservation of this influence and security of the colony.

3d. Spain, like Great Britain, having posts to deliver to the United States, may, with similar views, follow the same course as Great Britain. She may also feel yet stronger motives for keeping up her present force, or even for increasing it, resulting from an apprehension that the treaty, lately negotiated with the United States, may approximate our citizens too near to her possessions.

4th. When we advert to the importance which Great Britain may give to Canada, as it respects her West India islands, as it forms a link in the great chain of her dependencies, and as it may weigh in her general system of power, it is further to be presumed, that she will, at all times, endeavor to maintain force there, equivalent, at least, to the present.

These considerations alone strongly indicate the necessity of a military force, competent to counteract that maintained by Great Britain and Spain, as to all those internal objects to which it may be applied. For such considerations, therefore, and the reasons assigned by the late Secretary of War, in his communication of the third of February, ultimo, it is thought that it will not be advisable to reduce the establishment of the United States below its present effective force. But, inasmuch as things have not yet taken their settled form, and as that form can only be guessed at, no absolute arrangement can be predicted in the premises. Perhaps, all circumstances considered, it would be the safest course of proceeding to leave the establishment as it stands for the present, with a discretion in the President to reduce the battalions to the effective number of privates.

2d. Can any saving be made in the Quartermaster's department?

If the western posts are to be taken possession of, the expense for transporting the troops, stores, artillery, and provisions, at the season in which they must be moved, will be very considerable. The expenses of furnishing the different posts, with provisions and other supplies, will be greater this year, than the last, on account of the rise in flour, &c. to which may be added, the difference in expense between a land and water transport, should it be found impracticable to contract in time to make use of the latter. The water transport, for example, from Pittsburg to the Miami of the lake, generally fails about the middle of May, and cannot, *communibus annis*, be used again till October. On the whole, no correct estimate can be formed, at this moment, on this subject.

3d. Ought a provision to be made for the appointment of a Judge Advocate to the establishment?

Considering what may be the distance, between the several posts, on a final arrangement, how inconvenient it must be for a Judge Advocate to travel, from one to another, as cases occur to require his presence, and the hardships that individuals must experience, by having their trial delayed till he could attend: it is, therefore, thought best not to decide the question till it can be further examined, or the necessity for such provision becomes more apparent.

JAMES MCHENRY, *Secretary of War.*

*The Committee on the Military Establishment.*

*Extract from the general order of 16th July, 1794.*

“Lieutenant Campbell Smith, of the 4th sub-legion, is appointed Judge Marshal and Advocate General, to the legion of the United States, and is to be considered and respected accordingly.”

JOHN MILLS, *Adjutant General.*

Niagara, and its immediate dependencies,	-	-	-	28 rank and file,	5 companies,
Presque Isle,	-	-	-	56 do.	1 company,
Two posts on Allegheny river,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Detroit,	-	-	-	112 do.	
Michillmackinack,	-	-	-	56 do.	
On Lake Michigan,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Fort Defiance,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Wayne,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Adams,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Recovery,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Miami,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Head of the Wabash,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Fort Washington,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Mouth of the Illinois,	-	-	-	56 do.	
On the Mississippi,	-	-	-	56 do.	
Territory South of the Ohio,	-	-	-	168 do.	
Frontiers of Georgia,	-	-	-	168 do.	
In the fortifications on the sea coast,	-	-	-	224 do.	
At other less important posts, in different places,	-	-	-	224 do.	

There will then remain, 384 rank and file, to be disposed of according to this system, allowing the regiment of artillery to consist of 1,000 rank and file, which, perhaps, is not the fact.

March 29, 1796.

4th CONGRESS.]

No. 28.

[1st SESSION.

### FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 9, 1796.

Mr. WILLIAM LYMAN, from the committee appointed to take into consideration the state of the fortifications of our harbors; the measures which have been pursued for obtaining proper sites for arsenals, and for replenishing our magazines with military stores; and to report whether any, and what, further measures are necessary respecting the same, made the following report:

That it appears from the report of the Secretary of War, referred to the committee, that measures are now pursuing by the executive for obtaining proper sites for arsenals, and for replenishing our magazines with military stores; but that the result thereof is not ascertained; the progress, however, is such as to warrant a belief, that the complete accomplishment of those objects will soon be effected. It is, therefore, the opinion of the committee, that no further legislative provision, relative thereto, is necessary at this time.

From the view of the present state of the fortifications of our harbors, exhibited in the report of the Secretary of War, the committee are induced to believe, that some further expenditures will be expedient to perfect and secure the works already constructed; otherwise, in some instances, they might be useless, and in many, would probably be exposed to very sudden decay and destruction; nevertheless, it does not appear to the committee to be necessary to extend the provisions for this object, any further, at the present time, as by a letter and statement from the secretary, to the committee, which accompany this report, there appears to be a very considerable sum of the former appropriations now unexpended.

These conclusions of the committee are formed without reference to the fortifications in the harbor of New York. At that place, the works have been laid out upon a plan very extensive, constructed with durable materials, and principally under the direction of the Government, and at the expense of that State. Although it does not appear to have been contemplated by the United States to fortify any harbor so extensively, and in a manner so expensive, it may, notwithstanding, be deserving their attention to consider how far the undertaking is entitled to their encouragement and support. The committee, therefore, beg leave to submit the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the sum of ----- dollars be appropriated and paid out of any moneys in the treasury of the United States, not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of completing and securing the fortifications in the harbor of New-York.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 17, 1796.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a statement of the sums appropriated for fortifying the harbors of the United States, of the sums expended at the respective places, and of the balance on hand. But there are some claims of the agents, for moneys advanced, which must be reimbursed: they may, perhaps, amount to six or eight thousand dollars.

In the course of the year 1795, the State of Pennsylvania ceded to the United States the island in the river Delaware, called Mud Island, where the fortifications are begun. The State, at the same time, ceded certain pieces of land at Presque Isle, for the purpose of being fortified, and for the accommodation of public vessels that might be used on Lake Erie: And,

A few acres of land, where the fortifications have been begun, for the defence of Baltimore, have been purchased.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

WILLIAM LYMAN, Esq.

Chairman of the Committee on Fortifications.

#### Sums expended in fortifying the harbors of the United States, in 1794 and 1795.

		APPROPRIATIONS.		
1794				
March 21.—Act of Congress,	-	-	-	76,000 dollars.
June 9. Do.	-	-	-	30,000
1795				
March 3. Do.	-	-	-	50,000
June repaid by E. Stevens, agent for New-York,	-	-	-	111 63
				\$156,111 63

EXPENDED.		Dolls.	Cts.
Portland,	-	3,899	28
Portsmouth,	-	2,877	34
Gloucester,	-	3,273	84
Salem,	-	2,773	84
Marblehead,	-	2,513	84
Newport,	-	9,500	00
New London,	-	5,288	21
New York,	-	17,522	36
Philadelphia,	-	25,888	30
Baltimore,	-	12,416	67
Annapolis,	-	2,997	75
Alexandria,	-	2,900	00
Norfolk,	-	10,797	52
Ocracock Inlet,	}	5,873	76
Cape Fear River,			
Georgetown, S. C.	-	1,000	00
Charleston,	-	18,000	00
Savannah,	-	3,537	52
St. Mary's,	-	1,173	84
			132,234 7
17th February, 1796.	Balance,	Dollars,	23,877 56

4th CONGRESS.]

No. 29.

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 10, 1797.

Mr. WILLIAM LYMAN, from the committee appointed to inquire into the factual state of the fortifications of the ports and harbors of the United States, and whether any, and what, further provision is necessary to be made on that subject, made the following report:

That the report from the Department of War to Congress, the twentieth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, will enable the House to form an opinion of the number and state of the forts and harbors at the period to which it refers.

The alterations in those forts, that have taken place since that period, consist chiefly in 'depredations made by time on such of them as have not been garrisoned, and in such repairs and additions as could be made by the garrisons where troops have been stationed, or that were wanting to their accommodation.

In the former description are comprehended, the works at Portland, in the district of Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Gloucester, Salem, and Marblehead, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New London, Connecticut; and Savannah and Point Petre, in Georgia.

In the latter description are comprised, the defences at Governor's Island, New York; Mud Island, Philadelphia; Whetstone Point, Baltimore; Norfolk, Virginia; Wilmington, North Carolina; and Fort Johnston, Charleston, South Carolina.

The forts which have been without troops, must be presumed to have suffered considerable injury by time alone, and will require, if the circumstances of the military establishment and frontiers should not admit of their being garrisoned, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, about three thousand five hundred dollars annually, to pay persons to live in and superintend them, and for certain repairs necessary to prevent them from becoming perfectly useless.

The forts that are garrisoned have been kept in repair, so far as the force stationed in them permitted; but it will require an additional grant of money to finish some necessary buildings, and complete certain works, indispensable to their defence and preservation.

The committee find, that, by an estimate from the Department of War, accompanying this report, it appears that the further sum of twenty-three thousand three hundred and ninety-four dollars and fifty-five cents, in addition to former appropriations, is necessary to be provided for the purposes aforesaid.

The committee further report, that they have received, from the board of commissioners, and the engineer for fortifying the port and harbor of New York, sundry statements relative to the defence of that place, which they beg leave to lay before the House.

No. 1. is a description of the fortifications erected on Governor's, Bedloe's, and Oyster Islands; what further is necessary to the completion thereof; with an estimate of the probable expense.

No. 2. A summary statement of the probable expenditures necessary for the construction of fortifications for the defence of New York.

No. 3. contains an explanation of, with observations upon, the several proposed plans for the complete defence of New York.

NOTE.—Papers, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, were returned to the Secretary of War, May 31, 1797, and are not now to be found.



4th CONGRESS.]

No. 30.

[2d SESSION.

OBJECTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN ACT TO REORGANIZE  
THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 28, 1797.

UNITED STATES, February 28, 1797.

*Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:*

Having maturely considered the bill to alter and amend an act, entitled "An act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States," which was presented to me on the twenty-second day of this month, I now return it to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, with my objections.

First. If the bill passes into a law, the two companies of light dragoons will be, from that moment, *legally* out of service, though they will afterwards continue *actually* in service; and for their services, during this interval, namely, from the time of *legal* to the time of *actual* discharge, it will not be lawful to pay them, unless some future provision be made by law. Though they may be discharged at the pleasure of Congress, in justice they ought to receive their pay, not only to the time of passing the law, but, at least, to the time of their actual discharge.

Secondly. It will be inconvenient and injurious to the public to dismiss the light dragoons, as soon as notice of the law can be conveyed to them, one of the companies having been lately destined to a necessary and important service.

Thirdly. The companies of light dragoons consist of one hundred and twenty-six non-commissioned officers and privates, who are bound to serve as dismounted dragoons when ordered so to do. They have received, in bounties, about two thousand dollars: one of them is completely equipped, and above half of the non-commissioned officers and privates have yet to serve more than one third of the time of their enlistment; and besides, there will, in the course of the year, be a considerable deficiency in the complement of infantry intended to be continued. Under these circumstances, to discharge the dragoons does not seem to comport with economy.

Fourthly. It is generally agreed that some cavalry, either militia or regular, will be necessary; and, according to the best information I have been able to obtain, it is my opinion that the latter will be less expensive and more useful than the former, in preserving peace between the frontier settlers and the Indians; and, therefore, a part of the military establishment should consist of cavalry.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

*"An act to alter and amend an act, entitled "An act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States."*

*"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: That the third section of the act passed the thirtieth of May, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, entitled "An act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States," together with all other parts thereof, which relate to provision made for the Major General and his staff, be repealed; and that all such parts of the said act which relate to the light dragoons, together with so much of the twenty-third section of the said act as may be construed to affect the Brigadier, and the whole of the eleventh section of the said act be, and are hereby, repealed.*

*"And be it further enacted: That there shall be one Brigadier General, who may choose his Brigade Major and inspector, from the captains and subalterns in the line, (to each of whom there shall be allowed the monthly pay of twenty-five dollars, in addition to his pay in the line, and two rations extraordinary per day; and whenever forage shall not be furnished by the public, to ten dollars per month, in lieu thereof.) That there shall be one Brigade Quartermaster, one Brigade Paymaster, and one Judge Advocate, who shall be taken from the commissioned officers of the line, and each of whom shall be entitled to receive two rations extra per day, and twenty-five dollars per month, in addition to his pay in the line; and whenever forage shall not be furnished by the public, to ten dollars per month, in lieu thereof.*

*"And be it further enacted: That, from and after the thirtieth day of June next, the monthly pay of the Lieutenants shall be thirty dollars, and that of the Ensign twenty-five dollars; that to the Brigadier, while Commander-in-Chief, and to each officer, while commanding a separate post, there shall be allowed twice the number of rations to which they would otherwise be entitled.*

*"And be it further enacted: That the Majors be entitled to receive four rations per day for their subsistence.*

*"And be it further enacted: That to each commissioned officer who may have been deranged under the act, "to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States," or who may be deranged under the present act, there shall be paid one hundred dollars.*

JONATHAN DAYTON,

*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

WILLIAM BINGHAM,

*President of the Senate, pro tempore."*

5th CONGRESS.]

No. 31.

[1st SESSION.

FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 10, 1797.

Mr. LIVINGSTON, from the committee appointed to bring in a bill for making further provision for the fortification of the ports and harbors of the United States, made the following report:

That no material alterations have taken place since the last session, in the state of the fortifications on the sea coast of the United States, as appears from a letter addressed to the committee of the Senate, on this subject, by the Secretary of War, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed, and that, from verbal information received from the said officer, it appears that only three thousand dollars, or thereabouts, of the sum appropriated in the last session, has been expended, leaving a balance of about twenty-one thousand dollars unexpended.

And your committee further report: That, from an estimate, hereunto also annexed, made by the Secretary of War, it appears that an additional appropriation will be requisite for completing the fortifications therein enumerated, of two hundred thousand dollars.

WAR OFFICE, 3d June, 1797.

SIR:

The committee of the Senate will find, in the annexed copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to a committee of the House of Representatives, and in the report it refers to, the state of the fortifications which have been erected on the seaboard, subsequent to the act of Congress of the 29th of March, 1794. Since the date of that letter, those forts have undergone very few repairs or alterations, that have not been made by their garrisons, except some at Fort Johnston, South Carolina, and to prevent the works there from being rendered useless by the encroachments of the sea.

You will also find, in the report of my predecessor, that above forty-six thousand dollars were thought requisite to complete certain of the defences mentioned in his report.

Will an appropriation be necessary at this juncture, and what particular ports stand most in need of immediate attention? It will, perhaps, be best to answer to these questions generally, as preserving to the Department of War more liberty to accommodate the disposal of an appropriation, according to exigencies and circumstances. As to the first, I conceive that about two hundred thousand dollars should be granted for the sea board fortifications. As to the second, the ports from New York to St. Mary's, (Georgia,) are those which stand in most need of immediate attention, more especially, in certain points of view, those on the southerly part of the line.

It is, however, to be observed, that the mere augmentation, or improving the forts in that quarter, will be of little utility, without the existence of regular troops to garrison them. These two objects, therefore, ought to be considered as inseparably united.

Upon the whole, I do not consider any other provision on the subject of our maritime fortifications, necessary at this time, than an appropriation of two hundred thousand dollars.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

RICHARD STOCKTON, Esq. *Chairman of the Committee.*

WAR OFFICE, 6th June, 1797.

*Memorandum for the Committee of the House of Representatives, on Fortifications, &c.*

Among the harbors, &c. which it may become proper to secure, by improving or adding to existing fortifications, may be particularly reckoned, viz: New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Ocracock, (North Carolina,) Charleston and Georgetown, (South Carolina,) and Savannah, and St. Mary's (Georgia.)

<i>New York.</i> To complete the works on Governor's Island, Bedloe's Island, and Oyster Island, say	\$90,000
<i>Philadelphia.</i> To complete a pier and battery, on a sand bar, opposite Mud Island, the works on Mud Island, and some auxiliary works,	40,000
<i>Virginia.</i> To improve and complete the works at Norfolk,	10,000
<i>North Carolina.</i> To erect works at Ocracock,	10,000
<i>South Carolina.</i> To complete and erect works on James's Island, Shooter's Point, Sullivan's Island, and Georgetown,	40,000
<i>Georgia.</i> To complete, &c. the works at Savannah and St. Mary's,	10,000
	\$200,000

The unconsumed part of the appropriation for 1796, for fortifications, to be applied to repair and complete the fortresses to the eastward of New York, say

The committee will be pleased to observe, that it is not meant, by the above enumeration, to exclude harbors not mentioned therein, from the benefit of the appropriation, or that the Secretary should be bound to make the expenditure according to the specifications.

JAMES MCHENRY.

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of War, to William Lyman, Esq. dated*

WAR OFFICE, January 10, 1797.

SIR:

The report from the Department of War, to Congress, dated the 20th day of January, 1796, will enable the committee to form an opinion of the number and state of the forts and harbors, at the period to which it refers.

The alterations in those forts, that have taken place since that period, consist, chiefly, in deprecations made by time, on such of them as have not been garrisoned; and in such repairs, and additions, as could be made by the garrisons where troops have been stationed, or that were wanting to their accommodation. In the former description are comprehended, the works at Portland, in the District of Maine; Portsmouth, in New Hampshire; Gloucester, Cape Ann, Salem, Marblehead, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New London, Connecticut; and Savannah, and Point Petre, Georgia.

In the latter description are comprised, the defences at Governor's Island, New York; Mud Island, Philadelphia; Whetstone Point, Baltimore; Norfolk, Virginia; Wilmington, North Carolina; and Fort Johnston, Charleston, South Carolina.

The forts which have been without troops, must be presumed to have suffered considerable injury from time alone, and will require, if the circumstances of the military establishment and frontiers should not admit of their being garrisoned, about three thousand five hundred dollars, annually, to pay persons to live in it, and superintend them, and for certain repairs necessary to prevent them from being perfectly useless.

The forts that are garrisoned have been kept in repairs, so far as the force stationed in them permitted; but it will require an additional grant of money to finish some necessary buildings, and complete certain works, indispensable to their defence and preservation.

I have subjoined an estimate of the expense which may probably be required for the before recited purposes, during the present year, and the balance, stated by the treasurer to be unexpended, of former appropriations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

*An estimate of the sums necessary, on account of the Fortifications of the ports and harbors of the United States, for the year 1797.*

Superintendents, and certain repairs to the forts at Portland, Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Gloucester, Cape Ann, Salem, Marblehead, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New London, Connecticut; and Savannah, and Point Petre, Georgia; in case of being without garrisons.

Repairs, or additions, to the forts at Governor's Island, New York; Mud Island, near Philadelphia; Whetstone Point, Baltimore; Norfolk, Virginia; Wilmington, North Carolina; and Fort Johnston, near Charleston, South Carolina,

\$4,000 00

24,000 00

Four temporary engineers,	-	-	-	-	-	3,832 00
						<u>\$31,832 00</u>
Balance unexpended of appropriations for 1794 and 1795,	-	-	-	-	-	8,437 45
To be provided for, for the year 1797,	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$23,394 55</u>
WAR OFFICE, <i>January 10, 1797.</i>						

## FORTIFICATIONS.

\*COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 8, 1798.

Mr. SEWALL, from the committee to whom was referred that part of the President's speech, which relates to the protection of commerce, and the defence of the country, further reported in part:

That, considering the increasing dangers which threaten the peace and security of the United States, and to which their extensive sea coast, and their domestic as well as foreign commerce, are alarmingly exposed, the necessary provisions of a maritime defence ought to receive the earnest and immediate attention of Congress; and especially recommend a concurrence, without delay, in the resolutions now before the House of Representatives, reported to them on the twelfth day of January last.

The committee further report, that, a considerable sum remains unexpended of the sums heretofore appropriated for fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States, as appears by the statement from the Department of War, exhibited herewith; and that, in the opinion of the committee, a further appropriation, and a more vigorous regard to this important object, has become immediately necessary.

They further report, that in the view which, on several occasions, this committee have taken of the subject of providing a naval armament, they have not failed to observe the apparently enormous expenses, and unaccountable delays, which have attended every attempt of this kind. It has appeared to them that a better economy might be introduced in this branch of the public expenditure, by establishing, in the War Department, some officer who should be employed in the immediate superintendance of the naval concerns of the United States.

The Department of War, as at present established, is unsuitable to this purpose, especially considering its stationary situation, and how much it is occupied by numerous cares of a nature very different.

On these subjects, they recommend the following resolutions to be adopted, viz:

*Resolved*, That the sum of \_\_\_\_\_, in addition to the sum of \_\_\_\_\_, remaining unexpended of former appropriations, be appropriated to fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States.

*Resolved*, That there be established in the Department of War, a Commissioner of Marine, who shall have charge of the construction, equipment, and supplies of the public vessels of the United States, and all other matters relating to their naval concerns, which shall be entrusted to him, according to law.

WAR OFFICE, *27th February, 1798.*

Sir:

The committee, to whom was referred "so much of the President's speech as relates to the protection of commerce, and the defence of the country," desire to know the amount of the moneys expended since the last session of Congress, on the maritime fortifications, and whether, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, any further appropriation is required for the same object. The following information and remarks are, therefore, respectfully submitted.

That there remained unexpended of preceding appropriations for maritime fortifications, on						
the 6th of June, 1797,	-	-	-	-	-	\$22,065 58
Appropriation of June 23, 1797,	-	-	-	-	-	115,000 00
						<u>\$137,065 58</u>

That of this sum there has been expended, viz:

At Mud Island,	-	-	-	-	-	\$23,640 37
Baltimore,	-	-	-	-	-	188 93
Charleston,	-	-	-	-	-	9,978 00
Portsmouth, N. H. (balance of account)	-	-	-	-	-	483 46
Newbern, (on account of balance)	-	-	-	-	-	800 00
Norfolk, (balance of account)	-	-	-	-	-	266 50
St. Mary's, Georgia, do.	-	-	-	-	-	4,018 89
						<u>\$39,331 65</u>
Balance unexpended the 27th February, 1797,	-	-	-	-	-	97,683 93
						<u>\$137,065 58</u>

The committee will perceive, that the principal sum expended since the last session of Congress, has been upon Fort Mifflin, in the State of Pennsylvania. This fortress, from several considerations, seemed entitled to particular attention. The ground on which it stands, and necessary to it, has been ceded to the United States. The works, as far as they have been erected, were composed of good materials, and put together in such a manner as to promise long duration and utility. An experiment had likewise shown where the works were most vulnerable, and that this fortress may be rendered competent, with certain auxiliary works, to afford essential protection to an important commercial city, against the operations of a powerful naval armament. It has, therefore, been deemed proper, under the trust committed to me by the President, to contemplate completing this fortress as expeditiously as possible.

The Secretary has suggested, on a former reference, that, to derive real advantage from any considerable expenditure of money for completing the seaboard fortresses, the military establishment should be such as to admit of their being occupied by garrisons equal to keeping them in a tenable situation, and to the preservation of their stores and artillery. It is certain that this cannot be done by militia, unless when called into actual service, and that no part of the regular force, employed on the Western frontiers, can be transferred from thence for such purposes, without endangering the peace of the Union, and opening the way, in that quarter, to the immediate execution of projects

and enterprises, contrary to law and treaties, and subversive of all order and government. It is but too evident, also, that the course of things and circumstances, peculiar to the frontiers, shuts out any well founded expectation, that we have approached near to the time when the military force may be safely diminished or withdrawn.

Independent, therefore, of considerations resulting from our present situation, with respect to foreign nations, it would appear necessary and proper, that the seaboard fortifications should be generally improved, and this defence of our country rendered respectable, and, also, that the army should be proportionably augmented. A regard to ultimate economy will require, that such of the fortifications as may be always important to the general defence should be constructed, like fort Mifflin, of the most durable materials.

It may be proper to mention, that, besides the want of men to garrison these forts, there is another difficulty which it is desirable should be removed. But few of the States have made cessions of land, on which forts have been, or ought to be, erected, for the protection of their harbors; a circumstance calculated to impede such undertakings, and embarrass the intentions of government to provide for their defence. Neither is it known to the Secretary that any of the States which were found indebted to the United States, on a settlement of the accounts between them and the respective States, have thought of availing themselves of the third section of the "act to provide for the further defence of the ports and harbors of the United States," passed the 23d June, 1797.

The committee will perceive, that many good causes have prevented a greater expenditure of the appropriations, and that while these continued to exist, they must interrupt the completion of our maritime defence by fortifications.

With respect to the last inquiry of the committee, a full consideration of all circumstances induces the Secretary to an opinion, that a further appropriation should be made, to be in readiness, and commensurate to meet such a state of things as may require our ports and harbors to be promptly and completely fortified, whether proper sites be ceded or not by the States more immediately concerned.

With great respect, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

SAMUEL SEWALL, Esq. *Chairman of the Committee, &c.*

5th CONGRESS.]

No. 33.

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS, MUNITIONS, AND INCREASE OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 9, 1798.

Mr. SEWALL, from the committee on that part of the President's speech, which regards the protection of commerce, and the defence of the country, further reported:

That it is expedient to authorize the President of the United States to erect fortifications in such ports and places, near the sea coast, as, in his judgment, shall be requisite, and advantageous, for the common defence.

That a considerable addition is requisite to be made to the corps of artilleryists and engineers already established, to be employed in the several fortifications which have been, and which shall be, erected on or near the sea coast.

That a large supply of cannon, arms, and ammunition, is necessary to be immediately provided for the service of the United States.

An addition to a resolve heretofore reported, and under the consideration of the House, will effect the first mentioned object.

For the others, the committee recommend the following resolutions:

*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be authorized to raise and establish ——— companies of artilleryists and engineers, in addition to the present establishment.

*Resolved*, That the sum of ——— dollars shall be appropriated by law for the purchase of cannon, arms, and ammunition, for the service of the United States.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 9, 1798.*

What measures are necessary and proper to be adopted by Congress, in the present conjuncture, to preserve character abroad, esteem for the Government at home, safety to our sea property, and protection to our territory and sovereignty?

France derives several important advantages from the system she is pursuing towards the United States. Besides the sweets of plunder, obtained by her privateers, she keeps in them a nursery of seamen, to be drawn upon, in all conjunctures, by her navy. She unfits, by the same means, the United States for energetic measures, and thereby prepares us for the last degree of humiliation and subjection.

To forbear, under such circumstances, from taking naval and military measures, to secure our trade, defend our territory in case of invasion, and prevent or suppress domestic insurrection, would be to offer up the United States a certain prey to France, and exhibit to the world a sad spectacle of national degradation and imbecility.

The United States possess an extensive trade, heavy expenses must be submitted to for its protection. The United States border upon the provinces of great and powerful kingdoms, heavy expenses must be incurred, that we may be at all times in a situation to assert our rights to our own territory. The measures which appear indispensably necessary for Congress to take, are as follows, viz:

1st. An increase of the naval force, to serve as convoys, protect our fisheries, coast, and harbors. 2d. An augmentation of the present military establishment. 3d. Arrangements which, in case of emergency, will give to the President the prompt command of a further and efficacious military force. 4th. The more complete defence of our principal ports by fortifications. 5th. A supply of ordnance, small arms, powder, saltpetre, copper, and military stores. 6th. Additional revenue.

To answer the 1st. Congress ought to provide for the building or purchasing, equipping, &c. of two vessels of twenty-two guns; eight vessels of twenty guns; and ten vessels of sixteen guns, in addition to the three frigates.

Congress ought also to vest the President with authority, in case of open rupture, to provide, equip, and by such means as he may judge best, a number of ships of the line, not exceeding six, or an equivalent force in frigates.

The first may be either built or purchased in the United States. The latter may, perhaps, be obtained in Europe; for which purpose the law should use general expressions, admitting this mode of procuring them.

To build the twenty vessels, equip, man, and provision them for twelve months, will require, as per annexed estimate, \$1,941,181

It may, under this head, be also advisable to make a provision for six galleys, carrying each one or two twenty-four pounders. This will require for galleys carrying one twenty-four pounder each, as per annexed estimate, \* \$68,826.

2d. An augmentation of the present military establishment. This ought to consist of one regiment of infantry; one regiment of artillery; and one regiment of cavalry. The artillery is considered as indispensable, and the cavalry may be highly useful in the Southern States. These will require, agreeably to the annexed estimate, \$517,998

3d. An arrangement which, in case of emergency, will give to the President the prompt command of a further and efficacious military force.

\* For this and the preceding estimate, see Naval Affairs, No. 11.

This ought to be a provisional army of 20,000 men, and may be organized agreeable to the principles of a bill proposed in the Senate, during the late extraordinary session, to which I beg leave to refer.

4th. The more complete defence of our principal ports by fortifications.

This may require \$1,000,000; but, should the naval force be rendered respectable, much of this sum may be saved.

5th. A supply of cannon, small arms, saltpetre, copper, &c. which, severally, will require—

For cannon, as per annexed estimate,	-	-	-	-	\$308,900
For small arms, say 50,000 stands, at twelve dollars,	-	-	-	-	600,000
For powder, saltpetre, copper for sheathing, &c.	-	-	-	-	200,000

In framing the law to furnish our magazines with ordnance, it will be proper to employ such expressions as will enable the President to procure brass cannon, mortars, &c. with the necessary quantities of ball, shells, &c. These have not been specified in the estimate; but the sum may, perhaps, be sufficient to comprehend them.

To render the regiment of infantry as useful as possible, it is proposed, that the men should be enlisted to act in the double capacity of marines and infantry. By an arrangement of this kind, and having the men stationed at the principal sea ports, they will be always ready to be put on board such vessels as want them, and when not so wanted, will serve to defend the coast, work upon the fortifications, or in dock yards, and guard the public property from thefts or embezzlement.

All which is respectfully submitted,

JAMES McHENRY.

HON. SAMUEL SEWALL,

Chairman of the Committee for the protection of Commerce and the defence of the country.

*Estimate of the pay, &c. of a Regiment of Infantry.*

PAY.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at \$75 per month,	900	2 Sergeant-majors, - at \$8 per month,	192
2 Majors, - - - 50 do	1,200	2 Quartermaster-sergeants,	8 do
1 Surgeon, - - - 45 do	540	32 Sergeants, - - - 7 do	2,688
2 Surgeon's mates, - - 30 do	720	32 Corporals, - - - 6 do	2,304
1 Adjutant, - - - 10 do	120	2 Senior musicians, - - 7 do	168
1 Quartermaster, - - - 10 do	120	16 Musicians, - - - 5 do	960
1 Paymaster, - - - 10 do	120	416 Privates, - - - 4 do	19,968
8 Captains, - - - 40 do	3,840		
8 Lieutenants, - - - 30 do	2,880		
3 Ensigns, - - - 25 do	2,400		
			<u>\$39,312</u>

SUBSISTENCE.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at 6 per day,	2,190	502 Non-commissioned and pri-	
2 Majors, - - - 4 do	2,920	vates, - - - 1 p'r day,	183,230
1 Surgeon, - - - 3 do	1,095	30 Women, - - - 1 do	10,950
2 Surgeon's mates, - - 2 do	1,460		
8 Captains, - - - 3 do	8,760		
16 Subalterns, - - - 2 do	11,680		
			<u>Rations, 222,285</u>
		At twenty cents each, is	\$44,457

FORAGE.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at \$12 per month,	144	1 Paymaster, - - - at \$6 per month,	72
2 Majors, - - - 10 do	240	1 Quartermaster, - - - 6 do	72
1 Surgeon, - - - 10 do	120		
4 Surgeon's mates, - - 6 do	288		
1 Adjutant, - - - 6 do	72		
			<u>\$1,008</u>

BOUNTY AND PREMIUM.

502 Non-commissioned officers and privates, at sixteen dollars each, is	-	-	<u>\$8,032</u>
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CLOTHING.

502 Suits, at twenty-five dollars per suit, is	-	-	<u>\$12,550</u>
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RECAPITULATION.

Pay, - - - - -	\$39,312	Clothing, - - - - -	12,550
Subsistence, - - - - -	44,450		
Forage, - - - - -	1,008		
Bounty and premium, - - - - -	8,032		<u>\$105,359</u>

*Estimate of the pay, &c. of a Regiment of Light Dragoons of six Companies.*

PAY.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at \$75 per month,	\$900	24 Sergeants, - - - at \$7 per month,	2,016
1 Major, - - - 55 do	660	24 Corporals, - - - 6 do	1,728
1 Surgeon, - - - 45 do	540	6 Farriers, - - - 9 do	648
1 Surgeon's mate, - - 30 do	360	6 Saddlers, - - - 9 do	648
6 Captains, - - - 40 do	2,880	6 Trumpeters, - - - 5 do	360
12 Lieutenants, - - - 30 do	4,320	312 Dragoons, - - - 4 do	14,976
6 Cornets, - - - 25 do	1,800		
1 Adjutant, - - - 10 do	120		
1 Quartermaster, - - - 10 do	120		
1 Paymaster, - - - 10 do	120		
			<u>\$32,196</u>

## SUBSISTENCE.

1 Lieut. colonel commandant, at 6 rations per day, - - - - 2,190	6 Cornets, 2 rations per day, 4,380
1 Major, at 4 rations per day, 1,460	378 Non-commissioned and privates, 1 ditto, 137,970
1 Surgeon, 3 ditto, 1,095	22 Women, 1 ditto, 8,030
1 Surgeon's mate, 2 ditto, 730	
6 Captains, 3 ditto, 6,570	<i>Rations, 171,185</i>
12 Lieutenants, 2 ditto, 8,760	At twenty cents each, is - - - <u>\$34,237</u>

## FORAGE.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at \$12 per month, \$144	1 Adjutant, - - - at \$6 per month, 72
1 Major, - - - 10 do. 120	1 Quartermaster, - - - 6 do. 72
1 Surgeon, - - - 10 do. 120	1 Paymaster, - - - 6 do. 72
1 Surgeon's mate, - - - 6 do. 72	378 Non-commissioned & privates, 6 do. 27,216
6 Captains, - - - 8 do. 576	
12 Lieutenants, - - - 6 do. 864	<u>\$29,760</u>
6 Cornets, - - - 6 do. 432	

## BOUNTY.

378 Non-commissioned and privates, at sixteen dollars each, is - - - -	<u>\$6,048</u>
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## CLOTHING.

378 Suits, at twenty-five dollars per suit, is - - - -	<u>\$9,450</u>
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## EQUIPMENTS.

Bridles, saddles, &c. - - - -	<u>\$12,840</u>
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## HORSES FOR THE CAVALRY.

378 Horses, at one hundred and fifty dollars each, is - - - -	<u>\$56,700</u>
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## RECAPITULATION.

Pay, - - - - \$32,196	Equipments, - - - - 12,840
Subsistence, - - - - 34,237	Horses for the Cavalry, - - - - 56,700
Forage, - - - - 29,760	
Bounty, - - - - 6,048	<u>\$181,231</u>
Clothing, - - - - 9,450	

*Estimate of the pay, &c. of a Regiment of Artillery.*

## PAY.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at \$75 per month, 900	4 Quartermaster-sergeants, at \$8 per month, 384
4 Majors, - - - 55 do. 2,640	2 Senior Musicians, - - - 7 do. 168
5 Adjutants, - - - 10 do. 600	64 Sergeants, - - - 7 do. 5,376
4 Quartermasters, - - - 10 do. 480	64 Corporals, - - - 6 do. 4,608
4 Paymasters, - - - 10 do. 480	160 Artificers, to act as privates, 9 do. 17,280
1 Surgeon, - - - 45 do. 540	32 Musicians, - - - 5 do. 1,920
4 Surgeon's mates, - - - 30 do. 1,440	672 Privates, - - - 4 do. 32,256
16 Captains, - - - 40 do. 7,680	
32 Lieutenants, - - - 30 do. 11,520	<u>\$91,344</u>
32 Cadets, - - - 7 do. 2,688	
4 Sergeant-majors, - - - 8 do. 384	

## SUBSISTENCE.

1 Lieut. colonel commandant, at 6 rations per day, 2,190	1,002 Non-commissioned and privates, at 1 ratio per day, 365,730
4 Majors, at 4 rations per day, 5,840	160 Artificers, extra $\frac{1}{2}$ ditto, 29,200
1 Surgeon, 3 ditto, 1,095	59 Women, 1 ditto, 21,535
4 Surgeon's mates, 3 ditto, 2,920	
16 Captains, 3 ditto, 17,520	<i>Rations, 481,070</i>
32 Lieutenants, 2 ditto, 23,360	At twenty cents each, is - - - <u>\$96,214</u>
32 Cadets, 1 ditto, 11,680	

## FORAGE.

1 Lieut. col. commandant, at \$12 per month, 144	4 Paymasters, - - - at \$6 per month, 288
4 Majors, - - - 10 do. 480	4 Quartermasters, - - - 6 do. 288
1 Surgeon, - - - 10 do. 120	
4 Surgeon's mates, - - - 6 do. 288	<u>\$1,968</u>
5 Adjutants, - - - 6 do. 360	

## BOUNTIES AND PREMIUM.

1,002 Non-commissioned and privates, at sixteen dollars each, - - - -	<u>\$16,032</u>
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## CLOTHING.

32 Cadets, and 1,002 non-commissioned and privates, at twenty-five dollars per suit, - - - -	<u>\$25,850</u>
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## RECAPITULATION.

Pay, - - - - -	\$91,344	Clothing, - - - - -	25,850
Subsistence, - - - - -	96,214		
Forage, - - - - -	1,968		\$231,408
Bounties and premium, - - - - -	16,032		

This differs from the existing corps of artillerists and engineers, by having Sergeant-majors, Quartermaster Sergeants, and Senior Musicians, which were supposed to be necessary.

*Estimate of the Cost of 1,300 Cannon.*

100 Cannon, 32 pounders, at \$420 each, is	-	-	-	-	-	\$42,000
200 do. 24 do. at 350 do.	-	-	-	-	-	72,000
200 do. 18 do. at 318 do.	-	-	-	-	-	63,600
300 do. 12 do. at 211 do.	-	-	-	-	-	63,300
300 do. 9 do. at 140 do.	-	-	-	-	-	42,000
200 do. 6 do. at 130 do.	-	-	-	-	-	26,000
						<u>\$308,900</u>

5th CONGRESS.]

No. 34.

[2d SESSION.]

## CONTRACTS FOR THE SUPPLY OF CANNON.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 12TH DAY OF APRIL, 1798.

By direction of the President of the United States, the Secretary of War has the honor to submit to the House of Representatives, the annexed statement, pursuant to a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed Wednesday, the 28th day of March, 1798.

That a contract was made on the 8th of August, 1794, by the Commissioner of the Revenue, with Messrs. Brown and Francis and others, owners of the Hope Furnace in Rhode Island, for the delivery of iron cannon, viz: 34 of caliber to carry 32 pound shot, and 34 of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for fortifications, and sixty of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for frigates, two-thirds of said cannon, by contract, to be delivered on the first day of January, 1795, and the remainder on the first day of May following. The United States to pay one hundred and six dollars and two-thirds, for every ton the cannon should weigh when delivered, and also an allowance for the extra expense of boring out the solid metal, beyond that which would arise from boring them, if cast with a cavity nearly of the size of the intended caliber.

That under this contract, there has been delivered and receipted for, on account of the United States, 34 cannon of caliber to carry 32 pound shot, and 34 of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for fortifications, and 59 of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for frigates; and the owners of Hope Furnace have been paid for the same, at the rate of one hundred and six dollars and two-thirds per ton, and also an allowance of five thousand nine hundred and fifty-three dollars and sixty-eight cents, for the extra expense of boring out of the solid.

That another contract was made on the 28th June, 1794, by the Commissioner of the Revenue, with Samuel Hughes on behalf of himself and others, owners of a furnace in Cecil county, Maryland, for the delivery of iron cannon, viz: 50 of caliber to carry 32 pound shot, and 50 of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for fortifications, and 90 of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for frigates or ships of war. Two-thirds of said cannon to be delivered on or before the first day of January, 1795, and the remainder on or before the first day of May, 1795. The United States to pay for cannon, conformably to, and delivered under, this contract, one hundred and six dollars and two-thirds, for every ton such cannon should weigh, and also an allowance for the extra expense of boring out of the solid metal.

That under this contract, there have been delivered and receipted for, on account of the United States, 18 cannon of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for fortifications, and 36 of caliber to carry 24 pound shot, suitable for frigates. No settlement having been made with Mr. Hughes, it cannot be determined what should be allowed for the extra expense of boring out of the solid.

That a third contract was made by the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 25th of October, 1796, with Samuel Hughes and others, owners of a furnace in Cecil county, Maryland, for the delivery of 40 iron cannon of caliber to carry 19 pound shot; all of which to be delivered on or before the first day of May, 1797. The United States to pay for the same one hundred and thirty-three dollars and one-quarter, for every ton they might weigh, without engaging to allow for the extra expense of boring out of the solid.

Only three cannon have been receipted for under this contract, for account of the United States.

For information on the subject of cannon purchased, employed, or contracted for, for the revenue cutters, the Secretary takes leave to refer to the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, dated the 7th December, 1797, addressed to the chairman of the committee to devise measures for the protection of commerce.

All which is respectfully submitted,

JAMES MCHENRY.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 12th April, 1798.

5th CONGRESS.]

No. 35.

3d SESSION.

## REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, DEC. 31, 1798.

*Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives,*

A Report of the Secretary of War, made to me on the twenty-fourth of this month, relative to the military establishment, I think it my duty to transmit to Congress, and recommend to their consideration.

JOHN ADAMS.

December 31st, 1798.

The Secretary of War respectfully reports to the President of the United States:

That, there are several subjects which, in his opinion, will deserve the attention of Congress, to render the military establishment more manageable and systematic; and procure to it the means of further improvement.

It is not presumed that Congress will think it prudent to relinquish any of the measures of security which have been so wisely adopted; nor need it be observed, that any relaxation in these may frustrate their object, by affording argument of weakness or irresolution. It may be true, that some late occurrences have rendered the prospect of invasion by France less probable, or more remote; yet, duly considering the rapid vicissitudes, at all times, of political and military events; the extraordinary fluctuations which have been peculiarly characteristic of the still subsisting contest in Europe; and the more extraordinary position of most of the principal nations of that quarter of the globe; it can never be wise to vary our measures of security, with the continually varying aspect of European affairs. On the contrary, a very obvious policy dictates to us, a strenuous endeavor, as far as may be practicable, to place our safety out of the reach of casualties which may befall the contending parties, and the powers more immediately within their vortices. Paying due respect to this state of things; regarding the overthrow of a large portion of Europe as not entirely chimerical, and standing as it were in the midst of falling empires, it will be our prudence to cultivate a spirit of self-dependence, and to endeavor, by unremitting vigilance and exertion, under the blessing of providence, to hold the scales of our destiny in our own hands. In offering these preliminary observations, the Secretary presents nothing new to the President; most, if not all of them, having received, directly or impliedly, in his communications to Congress, his deliberate sanction and authority.

Circumstanced as the United States now are, the progress of public danger may render an extension of military preparations indispensable, and a proper organization for the troops of the United States extremely beneficial.

In proportion as the policy of the country is adverse to extensive military establishments, it ought to be our care to render the principles of our military system as perfect as possible, our endeavors to turn to the best account, such force as we at any time may have on foot, and to provide an eligible standard for the augmentations to which particular emergencies may compel a resort.

In these views, it is conceived the organization of our military force would be much improved by modelling it according to the following plan:—

1st. That a regiment of infantry, composed, as at present, of two battalions, and each battalion of five companies, consist of one colonel; two majors, a first and second; one adjutant, one quartermaster, and one paymaster, each of whom shall be a lieutenant; one surgeon, and two surgeon's mates; ten captains; ten first lieutenants, and ten second lieutenants, besides the three lieutenants abovementioned; two cadets, with the pay and emoluments of sergeants; two sergeant majors; two quartermaster sergeants; two chief musicians, first and second; twenty other musicians; forty sergeants; forty corporals; and nine hundred and twenty privates.

2d. That a regiment of dragoons consist of ten troops, making five squadrons, and the following officers and men, viz: one colonel; two majors, a first and second; one adjutant, one quartermaster, and one paymaster, each of whom shall be a lieutenant; one surgeon, and two surgeon's mates; ten captains; ten first, and ten second lieutenants, besides the three lieutenants above mentioned; five cadets, with the pay and emoluments of sergeants; two sergeant majors; two quartermaster sergeants; two chief musicians, first and second. Ten other musicians; forty sergeants; forty corporals; and nine hundred and twenty privates. The privates, including to each troop one saddler, one blacksmith, and one bootmaker.

3d. That a regiment of artillery consist of four battalions, each battalion of four companies, and of the following officers and men, viz: one colonel; four majors; one adjutant, one quartermaster, and one paymaster, each of whom shall be a lieutenant. One surgeon, and two surgeon's mates; sixteen captains; sixteen first, and sixteen second lieutenants, besides the three lieutenants abovementioned; thirty-two cadets, with the pay and emoluments as at present established; four sergeant majors; four quartermaster sergeants; sixty-four sergeants; sixty-four corporals; one chief musician, and ten other musicians; and eight hundred and ninety-six privates, including to each company eight artificers.

The principal reasons for this organization will be briefly suggested and explained.

1st. It will be observed, that the proposed proportion of men to officers in the infantry and cavalry is considerably greater than by the present establishment. This presents, in the first place, the advantage of economy. By the proportional decrease of the officers, savings will result in their pay, subsistence, and the transportation of their baggage; and the last circumstance, by lessening the impediments of an army, is also favorable to the celerity of its movements.

2d. The command of each officer will become more respectable. This will be an inducement to respectable men to accept military appointments, and it will be an incentive to exertion among those who shall be engaged, by upholding that justifiable pride which is a necessary ingredient in the military character. A company will then admit of an eligible sub-division into platoons, sections, and demi-sections, each of a perfect front.

3d. Each battalion will be of the size judged proper for a manœuvring column in the field, and it is that portion of an army, which in the most approved system of tactics is destined to fulfil this object. A battalion, according to the best judges, sanctioned by experience, ought neither to be too unwieldy for rapid movements, nor so small as to multiply too much the sub-divisions, and render each incapable either of a vigorous impulse or resistance.

4th. The proportion of officers to men ought not to be greater than is adequate to the due management and command of them. A careful examination of this point will satisfy every judge, that the number now proposed will be adequate to both: and it is illustrated by the expectation, that our fundamental orders, in conformity with those of the nations of Europe generally, ought to place our infantry in three ranks, to oppose to an enemy, who shall be in the same order, an equal mass for attack or defence.

But it is not intended to recommend a present augmentation of the number of rank and file, to the proposed standard. It is only wished that it may be adopted provisionally, as that of the war establishment.

The regiments which have been authorized may continue in this respect upon the footing already prescribed; leaving the actual augmentation to depend on events which may create a necessity for the increase of our force.

The other alterations recommended have relation rather to systematic propriety, than to very important military effects.

1st. The term lieutenant-colonel, in our present establishment, has a relative signification, without any thing, in fact, to which it relates: it was introduced during our revolutionary war to facilitate exchanges of prisoners, as our then enemy united the grade of colonel with that of general. But the permanent forms of our military system ought to be regulated by principle, not by the changeable and arbitrary arrangement of a particular nation. The



title of colonel, which has greater respectability, is more proper for the commander of a regiment, because it does not, like the other, imply a relation having no existence.

2d. The term ensign is changed into that of lieutenant, as well because the latter, from usage, has additional respectability, offering an inducement to desirable candidates, as because the former, in its origin, signified a standard bearer, and supposed that each company had a distinct standard.

This, in practice, has ceased to be the case; and, for a variety of good reasons, a standard of colors to each battalion of infantry is deemed sufficient. This standard is intended to be confided to a cadet, in whom it may be expected to excite emulation and exertion. The multiplication of grades, inconvenient in exchanges, is thus avoided.

In the cavalry it is proper to allow a standard to each squadron consisting of two troops, and hence it is proposed to have five cadets to a regiment.

3d. The nature of the artillery service, being constantly in detachment, renders it proper to compose a regiment of a greater number of battalions than the other corps. This our present establishment has recognized. But there is now a want of uniformity, which leads to disorderly consequences; one regiment being composed of four battalions, the other of three. The same organization ought to be common to all. The diminution of the number of musicians, while it will save expense, is also warranted by the peculiar nature of the artillery service. They answer in this corps few of the purposes they are applied to in the infantry.

Existing laws contemplate, and with good reason, that the aids of general officers (except of the commander in chief) shall be taken from the regiments; but they do not provide, that, when so taken, their places in the regiment shall be supplied by others. It is conceived, that this ought to be the case. The principles of the establishment supposes, for example, that three officers to a company of a given number are the just and due proportion. If, when an officer be taken from a company to fill one of the stations alluded to, his place be not filled by another, so that the number of officers to a company may remain the same, it must follow, that the company will be deficient in officers. It is true, that the number of a company is continually diminishing, but it diminishes in officers as well as men; and it is not known that the proportion is varied. Practice, in every institution, ought to conform to principle, or there will result more or less of disorder. An army is, in many respects, a machine, of which the displacement of any of the organs, if permitted to continue, injures its symmetry and energy, and leads to disorder and weakness. The increase of the number of rank and file, while it strengthens the reasons for replacing the officers who may be removed, will more than compensate, in point of economy, for the addition of officers by the substitution. This may be submitted to the test of calculation. But, though the place of an officer in his regiment ought to be supplied upon any such removal, he ought not to lose his station in the regiment, but ought to rank, and rise, as if he had continued to serve in it.

I should do injustice to this subject, if I did not acknowledge this plan of organization had received the full and unequivocal approbation of the commander in chief, Lieutenant General Washington.

The annexed schedule (A) will show; in one view, the difference between the present and the proposed establishment.

The provision that aids-de-camp and the officers of inspection shall be drawn from the line of the army is not restricted as to grade: there ought to be such a restriction. The aids of major generals ought not to be taken from a rank superior to that of captain, nor those of the brigadiers from a rank superior to that of first lieutenant. The rank from which inspectors may be taken ought, in like manner, to be limited; those of brigades to the rank of captain; those of divisions to that of major. This will guard against the multiplication of the superior grades, by removals to fill such stations.

The two companies, which it is proposed to add to the actual number of the cavalry, it is desirable should be raised immediately. If this is agreed to, they might receive the denomination of hussar companies—a description of cavalry extremely serviceable in an army.

It is incidentally noticed, that the act of last session, augmenting the dragoon corps to eight companies, and assigning to it a lieutenant colonel and other officers, to constitute it a regiment, has not provided a surgeon or mate. This omission will require attention.

If there shall be occasion for the actual employment of military force, a corps of riflemen will be, for several purposes, extremely useful. The eligible proportion of riflemen to infantry of the line may be taken at a twentieth. It is submitted, whether a specific provision to this effect will not be proper, in arranging the army for a war establishment.

The only provision for the appointment of a quartermaster general is to be found in the act of the 28th of May, authorizing the President to raise a provisional army, which limits his rank and emoluments to those of lieutenant colonel; this provision is conceived to be entirely inadequate for a war establishment. The military duties of the office are of a nature to render it of the *first importance* in an army—demanding great and peculiar abilities, and a character every way worthy of trust; accordingly, it is the general practice, founded upon very substantial reasons, to confide it to an officer of high military rank. The probability is, that, without a similar arrangement on our part, we shall not be able to command a fit character, and, in taking one of inferior pretensions, we shall subject the service to disadvantages out of all proportion to any objections which may be supposed to militate against the conferring of such rank. It is feared that an appointment under such a provision will only create embarrassment, should there be real necessity for military exertions, and that the alternative must be, either to leave the army destitute of so necessary an organ, or to give it one likely, in the progress of things, to prove unequal to the task. A new provision on this subject appears absolutely indispensable.

The Secretary does not discover, in any of the acts, the necessary provisions for the appointment of hospital officers, or a hospital establishment. As military hospitals are indispensable to an army, especially in time of war, it is respectfully suggested, that provisions on the subject ought to be made by law, and that the regulations to be found in the resolutions of the old Congress, more particularly in those under date of September 30th, 1780, and 3d January, 1782, as containing the faithful results of much experience, may afford some important lights respecting this department.

The certain consequence of disregarding so essential a measure, in the event of war, and the encampments of our army, will be a train of diseases which must cut off a large proportion of our troops.

It is deeply to be lamented, that a very precious period of leisure was not improved, towards forming among ourselves engineers and artilleryists; and that, owing to this neglect, we are in danger of being overtaken by war, without a competent number of characters of these descriptions. To form them suddenly is impracticable: much previous study and experiment are essential. If possible to avoid it, a war ought not to find us unprovided. What has been done to facilitate this object, and the perfection of our artillery, will be seen by the annexed extract of a letter from the Secretary, marked (B), to the chairman of a committee of the House of Representatives, for the protection of commerce and the defence of the country, taken in connexion with the act providing for raising the corps of artilleryists and engineers, with the act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes, passed the 16th of July, 1798. What has resulted from the latter act will make the subject of a particular report. In the mean while, it is conceived to be advisable to endeavor to introduce, from abroad, at least one distinguished engineer, and one distinguished officer of artillery. They may be sought for preferably in the Austrian, and next in the Prussian, armies. The grade of colonels, with adequate pecuniary compensations, may attract officers of a rank inferior to that grade in those armies, who will be of distinguished abilities and merit. But, in this, as we know from past experience, nothing is more easy than to be imposed upon, nothing more difficult than to avoid imposition, and that, therefore, should the measure be sanctioned by a law, it will be requisite to commit the business of procuring such characters to some very judicious hand, under every precaution that can put him on his guard.

It is also suggested, that an inspector of fortifications is much wanted. In case of a legislative provision on this subject, the officer may be either drawn from the corps of artilleryists and engineers, or it may be left discretionary with the President to choose him where he pleases. If, however, the choice is to be restricted to that corps, it will be proper, that withdrawing him from it shall not prevent his right to rise in it, and that his place in the corps should be filled by an officer of the same grade.

It will be easily imagined, that without such an officer the service may essentially suffer. To obviate this, the Department of War has always found it necessary to employ a person who has been paid out of the contingencies for performing that and some other duties of a military nature.

The importance of a faithful representation of the real state of the fortifications, public buildings, and barracks, the qualifications of the commandants of forts, the police they observe, and degree of attention they bestow on the works, magazines, and the like, can stand in need of no comment.

It is further submitted, whether it will not be proper, and conduce to the improvement of our artillery, to enlarge the field from which to select a fit character for inspector of artillerists. As the law now is, the inspector must be chosen from the corps of artillerists and engineers, and would require one of its most experienced officers, all whose services are indispensable to the corps itself.

It has been often observed, by officers of the army, that the public would save by the measure, and more satisfaction be given to the soldiers, generally, if a regulation was adopted to insure his clothing shall be fitted to the soldier. It cannot fail to happen, that clothing, made at a distance from the army, will, in numerous instances, be ill fitted to the person to whom it is issued. This is an inconvenience, as it respects appearance, comfort, and ease, and causes the soldier to be careless of his dress. It of course merits consideration, whether it will not be remedied by making provision, by law, for the necessary alteration, at the cost of the soldier. As there are always to be found tailors in an army, the alterations may be made there during seasons of inactivity, and moderate compensation may be established, to be deducted out of the pay of the soldiers. The tailors, who, when so employed, will be exempted from military duty, will be satisfied with very small allowances; and the soldiery will, from the best information I can obtain, prefer this expense to the inconveniences of wearing clothes which do not fit them.

Another point, no less deserving of particular attention, is, the composition of the ration of provisions. It was, in the last session, augmented beyond all former example. It is not recollected that the ration which was allowed during the war with Great Britain was found insufficient by troops once formed to military habits, and acquainted with the best methods of managing their provisions. The present ration, estimating by price, is understood to be greater than the ration in that war, by above fifty per cent. This is evidently a very important augmentation: various disadvantages attend it; a great increase of expense; additional difficulty in furnishing, under all circumstances, the stipulated allowance; consequently, a multiplication of the possible causes of discontent, murmurs, and perhaps even mutiny; the necessity of a greater number of wagons for transportation; and, of course, the extension of this always serious source of embarrassment to military operations.

The quantity of spirituous liquors, which is a component part of the ration, is so large as to endanger, where there might not before exist, habits of intemperance, alike fatal to health and discipline. Experience has repeatedly shown, that many soldiers will exchange their rum for other articles, which is productive of the double mischief of subjecting those with whom the exchange is made to the loss of what is far more necessary, and to all the consequences of brutal intoxication.

These, and such considerations, have induced the Secretary to cause to be inserted in the contracts made under his orders a proviso, "that, if the quantities of the component articles of a ration shall be reduced, by law, the price to be allowed therefor shall be proportionably reduced." And, in the article of enlistment, a proviso, "that the soldier is to accept such ration as is, or shall be, established by law."

It is well understood, that the increase having been once made, a change is delicate; but it is believed to be indispensable, and that the temporary evils of a change can bear no proportion to the permanent and immense evils of a continuance of the error.

It may not, perhaps, be advisable to bring back the ration to the standard of the late war, but to modify it, in some respects, differently, so as not materially to affect the aggregate expense.

For example, it may consist of eighteen ounces of bread or flour, or an equivalent in rice, or Indian meal, when flour cannot be obtained; one pound and a quarter of fresh beef, or one pound of salted beef, or three quarters of a pound of salted pork; salt, when fresh meat is issued, at the rate of two quarts; and candles at the rate of a pound and an half for every hundred rations.

With regard to liquor, it may be best to exclude it from being a component part of the ration, allowing a discretion to commanding officers to cause it to be issued, in quantities not exceeding half a gill per day, except on extraordinary occasions.

Vinegar, also, ought to be furnished, when to be had, at the rate of two quarts, and soap at the rate of two pounds per hundred rations; but this ought to depend on circumstances, and ought not to make part of the established ration.

There are often difficulties in furnishing articles of the latter description, and the equivalent in money is frequently rather pernicious than beneficial. Where there is a contract, the promise of such articles is apt to prove more beneficial to the contractor than to any other person. He commonly so manages it that the substitute is not a real equivalent.

But it need not be remarked, that, whatever is to be done in this respect, must be so conducted, as not to infract the conditions on which the old troops, now in service, were enlisted.

The act which authorizes to raise the twelve regiments of infantry, and six troops of dragoons, provides, that they shall be kept in service during the continuance of the existing differences between the United States and the French republic, if not sooner discharged. Upon the disbanding of these troops, it is to be presumed by far the greatest number of both officers and men will find themselves at a considerable distance from their homes. The same thing also happens to officers on the establishment, whose age or time of life, or scanty fortune, does not admit of their continuance in the army, as well as to privates serving on the frontiers, whose engagements are successively expiring. These all have, or will have, to travel to their respective places of residence, at their own expense, if no provision is made by Congress to meet the case. This, to many of them, must be, and is, an extreme hardship, especially when it is considered, that the profession of arms, however important to the country, and noble in itself, is so far from furnishing to the officers, even of the highest grades, the means of making a tolerable provision out of the savings of their pay, for the future support of themselves and families, in advanced old age, or when their services may be dispensed with by the public, that it requires them to observe the greatest economy to be able to proceed in their career, and defray the expense of their necessary wants.

In the English service, the officer, when disbanded, receives half pay; the private soldier in the cavalry has his horse, and an allowance for his sword, with fourteen days' pay to carry him home; the infantry have likewise fourteen days' pay granted them for the same purpose.

It is respectfully suggested, whether it would not comport with justice, and have a tendency to encourage men to enter into the army, if a provision was made for an allowance to each officer and soldier, on quitting the service, or being disbanded, equivalent to the expense he must incur in returning home.

The act authorising the President of the United States to raise a provisional army, is too important to the peace and safety of the Union, not to require from Congress such a matured revision as may render it effectual to the purposes for which it was framed.

The first section, by which the President was vested with the power to raise ten thousand troops, has expired by its own limitation.

It is conceived advisable, and founded on the soundest policy, that the power to raise such troops as are contemplated by this clause should be extended at least to twenty thousand. To be on safe ground, our preparations and supplies ought to contemplate an army of fifty thousand men.

The act in question contemplates also an auxiliary force, under the denomination of volunteer companies, who shall be armed, clothed, and equipped at their own expense.

It is highly pleasing to mention, that sufficient evidence has appeared, that the patriotism of our independent citizens will not shrink from this measure of defence; the number of volunteer companies which have offered their services being already considerable.

As it may be questioned, whether the act enables the President to appoint all appropriate officers to these companies, when organized into regiments, brigades, and divisions, it is desirable that such power should be expressly given.

A specific provision for the pay and rations to volunteers, during the days it may be necessary to assemble them in bodies in each year, for the purpose of general discipline and manœuvres, would be very beneficial.

To form effective soldiers at this moment, and at so light an expense to the public, must be looked upon as an object of great national concern, especially when we take into view the difficulty of getting men, trained to arms, in time of actual war.

The value of those patriotic bands of volunteers, who destine themselves to the front of danger, is inappreciable. If well instructed and disciplined, they will, in the event of sudden invasion, be of immense utility and importance. Besides the direct effects of their own exertions in resisting the enemy, till they can be succored by the regular force, if at a distance, the militia, rallying to them, would derive, from their example and countenance, additional courage and perseverance. They would, thus disciplined and aided by the regular force, though small, give a consistency and stability to our first efforts, of which these would otherwise be destitute, and would tend powerfully to prevent great, though, perhaps, partial, calamities.

It is impossible to contemplate the duties of the office of inspector general, without perceiving that their due discharge will require the exercise of extraordinary skill and labor, and that the existing law has assigned no compensation whatever for the exercise of this skill and labor.

In the case of officers taken from the line to perform the specific duties of assistant inspectors, quartermasters, &c. we find the law has made a specific allowance. The principle applies, and with augmented force, to the inspector general, who has not only to create regulations, but to superintend their execution, in addition to his duties as a general officer.

To discharge, with effect, the duties of his office, he must make frequent journeys from one part of the army to another, when it is encamped in different and distant places. It must be conceived that the expenses of such journeys must quickly eat out the narrow allowance of a major general. If filled by a man of talents, without a fortune to meet such expenses, he must either compromise his reputation, and that of the Government, by not producing the results to be expected from his department, or he must ruin himself in performing services for which there is no adequate compensation. The precedent of last war establishes the propriety of an extra allowance for the extra services and expenses to this officer; and it would be infinitely more agreeable and less embarrassing to the Department of War, that the latter, or his expenses on journeys from one part of the army to another, should be settled by a fixed allowance by law, instead of being chargeable to the contingencies of the War Department. A further arrangement is necessary to give full effect to the inspector general's department. During our war with Great Britain, this officer was allowed secretaries, in addition to his aids as major general. It is thought that one secretary to the present officer is indispensable.

It is proper, before closing this reference, to mention a circumstance intimately connected with our military system.

Owing to the increase of the naval and military establishments, the business of purveyor of public supplies has been so augmented, as to require for the War Department alone the exclusive and uninterrupted services of such an officer.

It seems to be improper, that the head of the War Department should be obliged to employ himself in any other manner in the business of the purveyor, than merely to make requisitions for articles wanted; to prescribe the quantities, the times, and places of delivery; and that the whole responsibility for the execution of the order should rest upon the purveyor. A Secretary of War will always find ample employment in the general superintendence and direction of the great operations of his department. If a portion of his time is to be occupied in the details of lesser concerns, it is morally certain that the greater must languish or suffer.

Besides these duties, the purveyor should be charged exclusively with the disposing of all returns from the Indian factories, corresponding with these, keeping all accounts, and conducting all concerns relative to them, under the direction of the Secretary.

He might also be the agent and organ to procure the means of transportation for all supplies sent from the seat of Government, or elsewhere, to the army, agents, or quartermasters, to arsenals, and distant places of deposit.

The Secretary takes leave to recapitulate, for the purpose of presenting, in a concise view, the propositions respectfully recommended to attention, by the foregoing observations.

1st. A new modification of the military, so as to admit of an increase of numbers to the companies and regiments, in case of war; an alteration in the denomination of certain grades; and a perfect uniformity of arrangements in corps of the same species of troops.

2d. Regulations to preserve to the companies and regiments, their competent number of officers, in cases where any are taken from the line to act as aids-de-camp, inspectors, paymasters, quartermasters, &c.

3d. To designate the grades from which aids-de-camp and officers of inspection may be taken, in order to prevent the multiplication of the higher grades.

4th. To add to the existing establishment two companies of horse, to be denominated and act as hussars; and a surgeon and mate to the regiment of cavalry.

5th. To include, in the arrangement for the war establishment, a proportion of riflemen, estimated at one-twentieth of the whole number of infantry.

6th. An alteration in the provision for a quartermaster general, to ensure the procurement of a fit character to execute the duties of this important office.

7th. A provision for a hospital department for the army.

8th. A power to procure from abroad one distinguished engineer, and also an officer of artillery, and suitable appointments for the same.

9th. To provide for the appointment of an inspector of fortifications.

10th. That the choice of an inspector of artillery be left at large.

11th. A provision for altering and fitting the clothing issued to the soldiers.

12th. An alteration in the ration to be issued to the troops.

13th. A provision for the reasonable expenses of officers and soldiers in returning to their homes, when disbanded, or incapacitated by age or sickness, for further service.

14th. A revival and extension of the power to raise a provisional army.

15th. A specific provision for the appointment of appropriate officers for the volunteer companies, that are or may be accepted, when formed into regiments, brigades, or divisions; and for pay and rations to such volunteers, for those days in every year it may be necessary to assemble them in bodies, for the purposes of discipline and training.

16th. A further provision for the extra services and expenses of the inspector general, and to allow him, besides his aids, one secretary.

17th. The employment of a purveyor of public supplies, exclusively for the War Department.

All which the Secretary has the honor most respectfully to submit,

JAMES MCHENRY.

## A.

## A REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

*Present Establishment.*

1 lieutenant colonel commandant,  
 2 majors,  
 1 adjutant,  
 1 paymaster,  
 1 quartermaster, } to be taken from the line.  
 1 surgeon,  
 2 surgeon's mates,  
 10 captains,  
 10 lieutenants,  
 10 ensigns,  
 1 serjeant major,  
 1 quartermaster serjeant,  
 2 senior musicians,  
 40 sergeants,  
 40 corporals,  
 20 musicians,  
 600 privates.

*Proposed Establishment.*

1 colonel,  
 2 majors,  
 1 adjutant,  
 1 paymaster,  
 1 quartermaster, } to be lieutenants, and in addition to  
 the lieutenants hereinafter mention-  
 ed.  
 1 surgeon,  
 2 surgeon's mates,  
 10 captains,  
 10 first lieutenants,  
 10 second lieutenants,  
 2 cadets,  
 2 serjeant majors,  
 2 quartermaster sergeants,  
 2 senior musicians,  
 20 musicians,  
 40 sergeants,  
 40 corporals,  
 920 privates.

## REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS.

*Present Establishment.*

1 lieutenant colonel commandant,  
 2 majors,  
 1 adjutant,  
 1 paymaster,  
 1 quartermaster, } to be taken from the line.  
 No surgeon or mate provided by law.  
 8 captains,  
 16 lieutenants,  
 8 cornets,  
 1 serjeant major,  
 1 quartermaster serjeant,  
 32 sergeants,  
 32 corporals,  
 8 farriers,  
 8 saddlers,  
 8 trumpeters,  
 416 dragoons.

*Proposed Establishment.*

1 colonel,  
 2 majors,  
 1 adjutant,  
 1 paymaster,  
 1 quartermaster, } to be lieutenants, and in addition  
 to the lieutenants after mention-  
 ed.  
 1 surgeon,  
 2 surgeon's mates,  
 10 captains,  
 10 first lieutenants,  
 10 second lieutenants,  
 5 cadets,  
 2 serjeant majors,  
 2 quartermaster sergeants,  
 2 chief musicians,  
 40 sergeants,  
 40 corporals,  
 10 musicians,  
 10 saddlers,  
 10 blacksmiths,  
 10 boot makers,  
 890 privates.

## A REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

*Present Establishment.*

## FIRST REGIMENT.

1 lieutenant colonel commandant,  
 4 majors,  
 1 adjutant,  
 4 adjutants and paymasters, } to be taken from the  
 line.  
 1 surgeon,  
 4 surgeon's mates,  
 16 captains,  
 32 lieutenants,  
 32 cadets,  
 64 sergeants,  
 64 corporals,  
 32 musicians,  
 160 artificers,  
 672 privates.

*Proposed Establishment.*

1 colonel,  
 4 majors,  
 1 adjutant,  
 1 quartermaster,  
 1 paymaster, } to be lieutenants, and in addition  
 to the lieutenants hereinafter  
 mentioned.  
 1 surgeon,  
 2 surgeon's mates,  
 16 captains,  
 16 first lieutenants,  
 16 second lieutenants,  
 32 cadets,  
 4 serjeant majors,  
 4 quartermaster sergeants,  
 64 sergeants,  
 64 corporals,  
 1 senior musician,  
 10 musicians,  
 128 artificers,  
 768 privates.

## B.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War, to the Hon. Samuel Sewall, Chairman of the Committee of Defence, &c. dated*

“WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1798.

“3d. The act providing for raising and organizing a corps of artillerists and engineers, and the act to provide an additional regiment of the same, both enjoin the procurement, at the public expense, of all necessary books, instruments, and apparatus, for the benefit of the said respective regiments.

“The Secretary, without designing to derogate from the merits of the officers appointed to the corps established by the acts cited, feels it his duty to suggest, that other, and supplementary means of instruction, to the books and instruments to be provided, appear to be absolutely indispensable to enable them to acquire a due degree of knowledge in the objects of their corps. It is certain, that the best faculties and inclinations for the arts and sciences

cannot be unfolded and applied to useful purposes, when proper encouragement and assistance have been denied or neglected.

"The art of fortification is connected with so many others, is of such extent, and its operations dependent on, and affected by, circumstances so infinitely varied, that it is impossible any man can be rendered master of it by experience alone. Besides, the knowledge acquired by experience is often the result of our own faults, and acquired by a heavy, and, it may be, in this art, disastrous expense to the public.

"It is certainly to be wished, that more attention had been paid to this subject, and that past recommendations had found a favorable access to the ear of Congress.

"If the present moment does not admit of carrying into effect all that is desirable, and ought, under different circumstances, to be done, to create a body of qualified and scientific engineers, it may, notwithstanding, be advisable to advance towards this point by such measures as are compatible with our present situation.

"The knowledge of certain arts and sciences is absolutely necessary to the artilleryist and engineer; such are arithmetic, geometry, mechanics, hydraulics, and designing.

"Without a knowledge of arithmetic, an officer cannot calculate the expense incurred, or to be incurred, on any work, or any subject whatever.

"Without that of geometry, he cannot form a just plan or chart, regulate the design of a fortification, with its lines and angles, trace it upon the ground it is to occupy, nor estimate and measure the solidity and surface of its several parts.

"Without that of mechanics, he will not be able to appreciate the proportion of the machines used in war, the dimensions of carriages for artillery, nor to augment or diminish the force of the several kinds of machines, when it may be necessary.

"Without that of designing, he will not have it in his power, to give plans and profiles of works, nor to exhibit the topography of the environs of a work, or any part of a country.

"Without that of hydraulics, he will not be qualified to conduct water from one place to another, or to sustain and elevate it when there may be a necessity in sieges, or other military operations, for so doing.

"It is therefore submitted, whether provision ought not to be made for the employment of three or four teachers of the enumerated sciences, to be attached generally to the two corps of artilleryists and engineers, and obligated to give instructions and lessons, at such times, places, and under such regulations, as the President may direct.

"The employment of teachers would give the intended effect to the provision of the laws, for the appointment of two cadets to each company. It was supposed, that these cadets would form a nursery, from which qualified officers might be drawn to fill vacancies, &c. but it must occur, that without proper masters to teach them the sciences, necessary to the engineer and artilleryist, this nursery can produce no valuable plants.

"It is also submitted, whether it might not be proper to augment the pay of cadets to nine dollars per month, with two rations. This would excite their emulation, give them a consideration above sergeants, and enable them to appear in a more respectable dress.

"It is with infinite regret the Secretary is obliged to mention, that the ordnance of our country is by no means in a situation to command respect. That part of it was collected during a season of difficulty and necessity, from different countries, and consequently, the guns are, many of them, essentially defective, and those of the same class differ in length, weight, and caliber. The variance in these particulars occasions much trouble and inconvenience, in providing appropriate ammunition, stores, apparatus, and carriages, besides subjecting the military service to injurious delays, and the fatal consequences which might result from ammunition and implements being supplied which, in time of need, will be found not adapted to the piece.

"As there is no established standard, it has also happened, from a defect of knowledge in our founders, or some other cause, that most of the cannon that have been cast within, or on account of, the United States, are defective in very essential points, and exhibit varieties in those cast at the same furnace, and of the same class, with those procured from abroad.

"It is important that some arrangement should be immediately adopted, calculated to give efficacy to a proper system, and correct these evils. It is not enough that the President determine upon the size, weight, dimensions, and calibers of the different kinds of cannon, either to be made, or imported into the United States, for their use, unless an *inspector of artillery* can be appointed, to see that all regulations appertaining to the ordnance department be executed and observed with exactitude.

"We cannot presume that contracts, however carefully made, and conditioned, or even a national foundry, will produce cannon conformable to a given specific standard for each class, so long as the United States are without an officer of skill to inspect, and receive, or reject them.

"I cannot conceive any appointment more necessary to our military undertakings, and infant navy, than an *inspector of artillery*, and I must flatter myself that the committee will feel as I do upon this occasion.

"They will not, I am persuaded, imagine that it can be possible for a Secretary of War, to discharge the duties of his appointment, and, at the same time, to visit foundries, examine all kinds of ordnance, direct the dimensions of gun carriages and implements, order the proper moulds for casting shot, shells, &c. review and decide upon the qualities of every different production, and point out the means of remedying existing defects, and generally perform all the other duties attached to the office of inspector of artillery.

"The Secretary indulges the hope, that the committee will recommend, and the wisdom of Congress think proper to create, in the Department of War, the office of inspector of artillery, with a salary adequate to its nature and importance, and calculated to obtain a person qualified to fill it. On this important head he takes leave further to mention, that other countries owe the excellency of their ordnance to the establishment of such an officer, and that in England, particularly, and at a late day, the appointment of a scientific and experienced inspector has given a perfection to their ordnance never before known."

## POWERS AND EMOLUMENTS OF BREVET RANK.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 4, 1799.

Mr. DWIGHT FOSTER, from the committee of claims, to whom was referred the petition of Moses White, with the report of the former Secretary of the Treasury thereon, made the following report:

That the object of the petitioner was to obtain a settlement and allowance of his account against the United States, for services and expenditures on behalf of the public during the war.

The powers vested by law in the officers of the Treasury Department are competent to adjust and settle most of the items mentioned in the account of the petitioner; and, since his petition was originally referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, those items have been considered, and partially adjusted by the proper officers. The committee are

therefore of opinion, that with respect to that part of the petitioner's account, it would not be expedient or proper for the Legislature to interfere: but the item of the greatest magnitude, and of most importance to the petitioner, which is a claim for additional pay as aid-de-camp to Brigadier General Moses Hazen, from the first of August, 1781, to November 3d, 1783, not having been expressly authorized by an act of Congress, has not been allowed in the settlement of the account.

With respect to this part of the petitioner's claim, the committee report, that by the act of Congress of the 21st of June, 1775, the commander in chief was allowed three, and each major general two aids-de-camp, whose pay and rank were established by subsequent resolutions. By a resolution of Congress on the 30th of March, 1776, each brigadier general, when on command, was empowered to appoint a brigadier major, and, by another resolution, on the first day of July, in the same year, a brigadier general, acting in a separate department, was allowed an aid-de-camp.

On the 27th day of May, 1778, it was provided, "that the brigade major should be appointed as heretofore by the commander in chief, or commander in a separate department; out of the captains in the brigade to which he should be appointed"—and by a resolution of that date, the additional pay of aids-de-camp and of brigade majors was established. Upon the 28th of June, 1782, so much of the act of the 27th day of May, 1778, as relates to the additional pay given to captains and subalterns, acting as aids-de-camp and brigade majors, was repealed, and on the same day Congress resolved "that there should be such additional pay and emoluments to the pay of captains and subalterns, serving as aids-de-camp to major generals, or brigadier generals, and to brigade majors, as should make their pay and emoluments equal to the pay and emoluments of a major in the line of the army."

By a resolution of Congress, on the 29th day of June, 1781, General Hazen was "appointed a brigadier in the army of the United States, by brevet." It appears by a certificate from General Hazen, that the petitioner acted as his aid-de-camp during the time for which he prays compensation.

The only doubt which appears to have arisen respecting the propriety of allowing this claim is understood to have been because General Hazen held the rank of brigadier by brevet commission only.

Although brevet officers were not entitled to any additional pay in consequence of their brevet promotion, yet it gave them conditional rank—when on command of mixed corps, or on court martials, they took rank with the youngest officer of the grade to which they were promoted—hence, in the local command of his own regiment, General Hazen had no additional rank; but on command, &c. he took rank as the youngest brigadier. With respect to the circumstance of his receiving no additional pay, in consequence of the appointment, the committee conceive it will not apply to the question now under consideration. If a brigadier held the rank and command, whether he was a volunteer, or held it by courtesy, or received no pay, they apprehend, by established custom, he was entitled to his staff officers, and they to the customary allowance for their services. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report on this part of the petitioner's claim, states that he had not been able "to discover any resolution of Congress by which the claim could be decided; but that there were precedents in practice in favor of it as applied to brigadiers by commission; that, if this practice were to govern, the circumstance of a brevet appointment would not, in the opinion of the Secretary, constitute a ground of difference, to the prejudice of the petitioner, inasmuch as the brigadier is understood to have the actual command of a brigade at the time; in which case, the principles of service, with regard to an aid-de-camp, would apply as fully to him as to the brigadier by commission."

The committee concur with the Secretary of the Treasury in the opinion above expressed, and think that the petitioner ought to receive compensation for his services as aid-de-camp; they therefore submit to the consideration of the House the following resolutions, viz:

*Resolved*, That in the adjustment of the amount of Moses White, late a captain in the army of the United States, the accounting officers of the treasury be, and they are hereby, directed to credit and allow the account of the said Moses White, for his additional pay and emoluments as an aid-de-camp, during the time he acted in that capacity to Brigadier General Moses Hazen, upon the same principles which have heretofore prevailed in the settlement of accounts of officers acting as aids-de-camp to brigadier generals in the line of the army.

[6th CONGRESS.]

No. 37.

[1st SESSION.]

## ARMORY AT SPRINGFIELD.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 7, 1800.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 6, 1800.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit a report, exhibiting the expenses of the national armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, together with the fullest information I have been able to obtain, relative to the said establishment.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

The Hon. the VICE PRESIDENT of the United States.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 6, 1800.

The Secretary of War has the honor to lay before the Senate of the United States, an exhibit of the expenses of the national armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, together with the fullest information he has been able to obtain relative to the said establishment.

The following sums appear to comprise the annual expenditures at, and upon, this armory, from the commencement of the same, in the year 1795, down to the 1st of October, 1799.

In the year 1795, expended	-	-	-	-	\$12,095 25
Do. 1796, do.	-	-	-	-	12,286 49
Do. 1797, do.	-	-	-	-	11,175 28
Do. 1798, do.	-	-	-	-	22,245 00
From 1st January, to 1st October, 1799,	-	-	-	-	48,900 00
Cost of rations issued during the above periods,	-	-	-	-	20,663 00
Estimated value of musket stocks,	-	-	-	-	2,000 00

Making a total of,

\$129,365 2

The muskets annually fabricated, in the same period, were, viz:

In the year 1795,	-	-	-	245	To July 1st, 1799,	-	-	-	1,888
Do. 1796,	-	-	-	825	In July, August, and September, 1799,	-	-	-	1,184
Do. 1797,	-	-	-	1,028					
Do. 1798,	-	-	-	1,044					
					Total number,	-	-	-	<u>6,224</u>

In order to form a just opinion of the average price, or cost, of the muskets manufactured as aforesaid, it will be proper to distinguish, and deduct from the total amount, the sums which have been expended upon the buildings, machinery, tools, &c., and the value of the unfinished works, the tools and materials on hand, the 1st October, 1799; as well as of certain incidental work, in repairing French arms in store, and making or repairing cannon carriages.

Although it is stated by the superintendent of the armory to the Secretary, to be wholly out of his power to determine accurately, and with certainty, what proportion of the money expended was laid out on the works, and what on the arms; which, he observes, will be readily conceived on reflecting, that, at the commencement of the business, the public buildings were out of repair; that large sums were expended on them; that new buildings were erected; and that for want of proper assistants and system, he did not keep separate accounts; that, besides, the artificers were employed for some time on the buildings, instead of the manufactory, and in making the necessary pieces of machinery and tools; yet, according to the best judgment he can form, the cost of the workshops and other buildings for the armorers, water dam, and privilege, together with the machinery belonging thereto, and rations drawn by the men while employed in these incidental labors, may be estimated at

Value of parts of muskets on hand,	-	-	-	-	\$20,000 00
Stock on hand,	-	-	-	-	7,591 50
Expense of cleaning and repairing French arms in store, and work done to cannon carriages for five years,	-	-	-	-	3,800 00
Tools and utensils, estimated at	-	-	-	-	9,000 00
					<u>\$47,349 67</u>

This latter sum, deducted from the total amount of expenditures, leaves a balance of \$82,015 35, which, divided by 6,224, the number of muskets fabricated since the commencement of the armory down to the 1st of October, 1799, makes each musket to cost about \$13 17.

If we take into view the difficulties always attendant upon the first operations of an establishment, requiring so much skill as the fabrication of arms; that few or none of the workmen were, at first, masters of the business; that some unsuccessful attempts in the proper construction of the machinery, and formation of parts of the musket, must necessarily have occurred; that time and some experience was essential to adjust the various branches of the business to each other, and to ascertain to what branches the capacities and skill of the different persons employed were most appropriate; we shall find reason to be satisfied with the average cost of the muskets, and a sufficient explanation, should any defects appear in some of the earliest manufactured.

The works being now complete, and labor-saving machines operating to great advantage, the artificers, too, being generally well instructed, and the business better arranged, and carried on more systematically, what do muskets now cost the United States at Springfield?

There are, at this time, employed in the armory, 183 artificers, and 11 apprentices. The number employed for the months of August, September, and October ultimo, average 137 per month. In two of these months, there were completed, 884 muskets, being 17 to each working day, or 442 muskets per month.

The superintendent states, as the result of positive experience, the monthly expenditures of the armory to be as follows, viz:

Iron, 3 tons, 15 cwt. 2 qrs. cost	-	-	-	-	\$ 592 17
Wages of workmen, including the pay of the superintendent and master armorers,	-	-	-	-	2,180 69
Rations for the men,	-	-	-	-	546 00
Wear of grindstones,	-	-	-	-	50 00
Charcoal and sea coal,	-	-	-	-	250 00
Estimated cost of musket stocks,	-	-	-	-	150 00
Emery, oil, buff leather, &c.	-	-	-	-	36 00
Cast steel, brass, crucibles, and wire,	-	-	-	-	18 50
Screws, sand paper, and tallow,	-	-	-	-	38 00
Clothing apprentices, and team work,	-	-	-	-	45 00
Files,	-	-	-	-	100 00
Contingent charges,	-	-	-	-	100 00
					<u>\$4,106 36</u>

This sum, then, or the monthly expenditures apportioned on the number of muskets made monthly, shows their cost to the United States, to be about \$9 29 per musket.

This difference in the cost of the musket may be attributed to the price of the ration being less now than heretofore; to the workmen having become more expert; to the materials being bought in larger quantities, coming lower; to supplies being more regularly furnished; and, generally, to the improvements in the machinery and system for carrying on the manufactory.

The high prices offered artificers by private contractors for small arms, have obliged the superintendent to give higher wages since these contracts have been formed. This, however, cannot be long felt disadvantageously, and must operate to increase the number of workmen skilled in the business, and ultimately lower the price of wages. At present, the average wages to workmen at the armory is nearly fifteen dollars per month.

The superintendent, however, expresses himself confidently, that the cost of each musket to the Government, in future, cannot exceed ten dollars.

The progressive improvements in the manufactory will be best evidenced by the statement of the arms made in each year; and the following one, of the number made and turned into the store, during certain parts of the years 1798 and 1799:

In the month of September, 1798,	there were made and delivered to the store keeper,	-	80	muskets.
Do. October,	"	-	80	do.
Do. November,	"	-	150	do.
Do. December,	"	-	196	do.
In the month of January, 1799,		-	200	do.
Do. February,	"	-	250	do.
Do. March,	"	-	339	do.
Do. April,	"	-	338	do.
Do. May,	"	-	336	do.
Do. June,	"	-	425	do.
Do. July,	" (short, owing to a failure in stocks)	-	300	do.
Do. August,	"	-	442	do.
Do. September,	"	-	442	do.

During the last six months, there has been nearly the same number of hands employed, or between 130 and 150. In October, 1798, there were 118 men, and these made 80 muskets only; in November, 121 men, who made 150 muskets; which last is at the rate of near 21 days' work to each musket. The superintendent observes, on this head, that

the men can now do double, and, in some instances, treble the work, in the same time; and that a workman, at present, makes a complete musket in somewhat less than nine days; that he finds the workmen now make and complete, in every part, 17 muskets per day, in the usual working hours; and what is, perhaps, of more consequence, that the work, besides being sooner, is much better done.

Before closing this report, it will be proper to mention, that cogent considerations seem to require there should be a power vested in the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, to vary the compensation of the superintendents and master armors. Superintendents, in particular, are subjected to expenses which attaches to their station, and cannot be avoided by them.

It is essential also to notice, that it would greatly conduce to the success and improvement of our armories, were,

- 1st. The workmen, while employed in them, to be exempted from militia service; and, during the term of their engagement, from civil process for all debts or contracts.
2. Were they to be obliged, by a summary process, to fulfil their engagements with the armory.
3. Were a fine to be imposed upon any person who shall withdraw them from the armory, or in whose service they shall be found, after due notice shall be given of their engagements with the armory.

All which is respectfully submitted,

JAMES MCHENRY, *Secretary of War.*

6th CONGRESS.]

No. 38.

1st SESSION.

### SUSPENSION OF THE RECRUITING SERVICE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JAN. 13, 1800.

MR. HARRISON GRAY OTIS, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the speech of the President of the United States as relates to "a system of national defence, commensurate with our resources, and the situation of our country," reported in part:

That, in the opinion of the committee, no such material change in the state of the foreign relations of the United States has happened, as would justify a relinquishment of any of the means of defence heretofore adopted by Congress, but that the national honor and interest, in the present posture of affairs, make it prudent and necessary to continue prepared for the worst event; but while danger still threatens our country, yet circumstances having diminished the probability of an immediate invasion, the attention of the committee has been particularly directed to the state of the military establishment, with a view to reconcile safety with economy, to preserve the establishment, and retrench the expense. The annexed abstract, and letter from the Secretary of War, exhibit the state of the twelve new regiments of infantry according to the latest returns. As these men have received their bounty and clothing, and are daily improving in discipline; as they would be useful in any sudden emergency; and the greater part of them may also be usefully employed, until wanted for actual service, on the fortifications of ports and harbors; it is conceived proper to retain them, but to suspend the recruiting service until the approach of danger shall compel the Government to resume it. This project combines the advantage of an important reduction of the national expense, with that of having at command a body of officers ready for the service upon short notice, and a number of disciplined troops sufficient for the present occasion.

The committee, therefore, submit the following resolutions:

*Resolved*, That, from and after the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ next, all enlistments, under an act entitled "An act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," shall be suspended until the next session of Congress, unless war should break out between the United States and a foreign European power, or in case imminent danger of invasion of their territory, by any such power, shall, in the opinion of the President of the United States, be discovered to exist.

SIR:

WAR DEPARTMENT, 2d January, 1800.

I received your letter dated yesterday, and have the honor to inform the committee of defence, that I am preparing, and have nearly finished, a report to the President of the United States, on the subject of the military establishment, containing propositions which it is conceived would improve it, and detailing information from the latest documents, as far as they go, that have been transmitted to me, relative to the number of men that have been actually enlisted in the new regiments.

It will be conceived the report mentioned is intended to embrace the most material objects that have occurred to me, as promising amelioration to our military system. The President, I respectfully presume, will communicate the same to Congress.

The number of men enlisted, at the dates therein specified, as appears from the latest returns to the War Department, in the twelve new regiments of infantry, will be seen by the enclosed statements, which is respectfully submitted.

The other requisitions will require some time to prepare an accurate reply to. They shall claim my attention, and an answer be furnished as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient humble servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

H. G. OTIS, *Esquire, Chairman*

*of the Committee of Defence, of the House of Representatives of the United States.*

*Return of the non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, and Privates, enlisted for the twelve regiments, directed to be raised in pursuance of the act of July, 16, 1798.*

5th Regiment, to 12th April.	6th Regiment, to December, 1799.	7th Regiment, to November.	8th Regiment, to October.	9th Regiment, to September.	10th Regiment, to August.	11th Regiment, to October.	12th Regiment, to September.	13th Regiment, to November.	14th Regiment, to November.	15th Regiment, to November.	16th Regiment, to November.	Total.
No re- turn.	134	258	424	314	448	458	287	371	327	145	233	3,399

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 2d, 1800.



6th Congress.]

No. 39.

[1st Session.

## MILITARY ACADEMY, AND REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, JANUARY 14, 1800.

*Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:*

A report, made to me on the fifth of this month, by the Secretary of War, contains various matters, in which the honor and safety of the nation are deeply interested; I transmit it, therefore, to Congress, and recommend it to their serious consideration.

JOHN ADAMS.

UNITED STATES, *January 13th*, 1800.

The Secretary of War respectfully requests the attention of the President of the United States, to certain measures and arrangements, which appear to him to be indispensable to the improvement of our military system, and solicits, if it shall be thought proper, that the same may be submitted to Congress.

No sentiment is more just than this, that, in proportion as the circumstances and policy of a people are opposed to the maintenance of a large military force, it is important that as much perfection as possible be given to that which may at any time exist.

It is not, however, enough, that the troops it may be deemed proper to maintain be rendered as perfect as possible, in form, organization, and discipline; the dignity, the character to be supported, and the safety of the country, further require that it should have military institutions, should be capable of perpetuating the art of war, and of furnishing the means for forming a new and enlarged army, fit for service, in the shortest time possible, and at the least practicable expense to the State.

Let it not be presumed, that a country, however distantly situated from other nations, or favored by the courage and genius of its inhabitants, can neglect, with impunity, military institutions, or that it may, safely, consider all regular force to be useless, except when there is an enemy present to employ it. A country which acts upon such a maxim will invariably attract injuries and enemies, and, sooner or later, sink by internal discords, or see its noble spirit broke down by repeated humiliations, and the whole people thus prepared for the last stage of national degradation.

If the farmer would secure his flocks, he must go to the expense of shepherds; if preserve his crops, he must enclose his fields. In like manner, to ensure safety to the nation, it is necessary that the leading avenues into it be guarded by troops and fortifications. Before the invention of gunpowder, the smallest villages were invested with walls, so that a long siege was often requisite to reduce them. Since that epoch, the history of almost, if not every war, contains undeniable proofs of the utility of fortifications, and the necessity of disciplined troops, to the defence of a country. Would it be wise or expedient in us to pursue a different course, and shut our eyes against the innumerable facts on record, in favor of their essentiality. Are we without regular troops, we may soon lose the military art; are we without engineers, not a little of the money employed on fortifications will be always hazarded, if not actually thrown away, and generals of the most consummate genius forced to capitulate in the field, whose retreat might have been covered by a fortification, or the battle decided in his favor by a happily contrived in-  
trinchment.

Since, however, it seems to be agreed, that we are not to keep on foot numerous forces, and it would be impossible, on a sudden, to extend, to every essential point, our fortifications, military science, in its various branches, ought to be cultivated with peculiar care, in proper nurseries; so that a sufficient stock may always exist, ready to be imparted and diffused to any extent, and a competent number of persons be prepared and qualified to act as engineers, and others as instructors, to additional troops, which events may successively require to be raised. This will be to substitute the elements of an army to the thing itself, and will greatly tend to enable the Government to disperse with a large body of standing forces, from the facility which it will give of procuring officers, and forming soldiers promptly in all emergencies.

No sound mind, after a fair view of the subject, can doubt the essentiality of military science in time of war, any more than the moral certainty that the most pacific policy on the part of Government, and the most solemn and well observed treaties, will not preserve a country from being engaged in war more or less frequently. To avoid great evils, we must either have a respectable force always ready for service, or the means of preparing such a force with certainty and expedition. The latter, as most agreeable to the genius of our Government and nation, is the object of the following propositions.

*1st. A Military Academy.*

This object has repeatedly engaged the favorable attention of the Legislature, and some laws towards its consummation have been passed. These, however, being yet inadequate to afford the requisite instruction to officers, and others, in "the principles of war, the exercises it requires, and the sciences upon which they are founded," the adoption of a more perfect plan is conceived to be indispensable for these purposes. With this view, the following plan is respectfully suggested, formed upon those of institutions of a similar nature, from which the nations who have founded them derive the most decided advantages.

It is proposed, that this academy shall consist of four schools: one, to be called "The Fundamental School;" another, "The School of Engineers and Artillerists;" another, "The School of Cavalry and Infantry;" and a fourth, "The School of the Navy;" and be provided with the following officers, professors, and teachers.

- A Director General to superintend the three first schools.
- A Director of the Fundamental School.
- A Director of the School of Engineers and Artillerists.
- A Director of the School of Cavalry and Infantry.
- A Director of the School of the Navy.
- Six Professors of Mathematics.
- Four Professors of Geography and Natural Philosophy.
- Two Professors of Chemistry, including Mineralogy.
- Three Architects.
- Four Designing and Drawing Masters.
- One Riding Master.
- One Fencing Master.

To be thus distributed among the several schools:

*To the Fundamental School.*

- One Director.
- Four Professors of Mathematics.
- Two Professors of Geography and Natural Philosophy.
- One Designing and Drawing Master.
- One Professor of Chemistry.

*To the School of Engineers and Artillerists.*

One Director.  
 Two Professors of Mathematics.  
 Two Professors of Geography and Natural Philosophy.  
 One Professor of Chemistry.  
 Two Architects.  
 Three Designing and Drawing Masters.

*To the School of Cavalry and Infantry.*

A Director.  
 A Riding Master.  
 A Fencing Master.

*To the School of the Navy.*

A Director.  
 A Professor of Mathematics.  
 A Professor of Geography and Natural Philosophy.  
 An Architect.  
 One Designing and Drawing Master.

The Fundamental School is designed to form Engineers, including Geographical Engineers, Miners, and officers for the Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, and Navy; consequently, in this school is to be taught all the sciences necessary to a perfect knowledge of the different branches of the military art.

The School of Engineers and Artillerists, to teach those admitted therein, and appointed or designed for Engineers, the *application* of the theoretic knowledge which they had acquired in the Fundamental School, to the construction of all sorts of fortifications and military buildings appertaining thereto, to mines, and counter mines, sieges, attack and defence, to mineralogy, to the art of projecting and constructing bridges, roads, canals, and maritime posts, and all works relative thereto, to all geographic and topographic operations, the calculations relative to the same, to designing and drawing charts, &c.

To those appointed or designed for the artillery service, the application of the theoretic knowledge, acquired in the Fundamental School, to the construction of gun carriages, pontoons, the fabrication of cannon and fire arms, and to all the manœuvres of war which depend upon artillery.

The School of Cavalry and Infantry, to teach those admitted therein, and appointed to, or destined for, the cavalry, the tactics, exercise, and police of cavalry; those for the infantry, the tactics of infantry, and all that concerns the police of an army, in the field and in quarters.

The School of the Navy, to teach those appointed to, or destined for, this service, the application of the knowledge acquired in the Fundamental School in arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statics, and navigation. To this end, after having passed examination, they shall make voyages or cruises, under skilful officers, for certain periods, during which time they ought to be exercised in the manœuvres and observations most useful in service, and be instructed in whatever respects rigging of vessels of war, pilotage, and the management of cannon.

*Functions of the Principal Officers.*

The Director General to have the general superintendence of the schools, particularly of the Fundamental School; to occupy himself incessantly with the means of attaining the end of the institution, which is the greatest possible instruction to the pupils.

He will inform himself of their progress in the studies relative to the service to which they are destined, and collect all the facts proper to be laid before the President, to enable him to form an opinion of the fitness of any individual, who has not had one, for an appointment; or, in case he has, to judge how, and when, his talents can, upon occasion, be most beneficially employed.

He will attend, particularly, to the execution of whatever respects the admission of pupils; their transfer from the school of theory into that of practice; their passage from one class or division, in the same school, to another; and the examinations which they ought respectively to undergo.

He will propose a list of the officers of the army, proper to be received into the schools, and will furnish the Secretary of War with information, from time to time, relative to their progress, conduct, and capacity to fill stations to which their genius and knowledge may particularly point.

He will give such certificates to the officers, cadets, or pupils, as they shall have merited.

The directors of each of the military schools will receive from the Director General, instructions detailing their functions and powers; to him they will make their reports.

With respect to the School of the Navy, the director thereof will receive his instructions from the Secretary of the Navy.

The Director General, and the other directors, to be officers of the army or navy, according as the studies and exercises of the particular school shall be most intimately connected with either service.

These schools to be provided with proper apparatus and instruments, for philosophical and chemical experiments, for astronomical and nautical observations, for surveying, and such other processes as are requisite to the several topics and branches of instruction.

The site of schools of engineers and artillerists, and of the navy, ought to be on navigable water. For this purpose, a piece of ground ought to be purchased, sufficient for experiments in tactics, gunnery, and fortification. The situation upon a navigable water is also requisite, to admit of specimens of naval construction and naval exercises.

It would also tend greatly to the perfection of the plan, if the academy of artillerists and engineers was situated in the neighborhood of foundries of cannon and manufactories of small arms.

Barracks and other proper buildings must be erected, for the accommodation of the directors, professors, and students, and for the laboratories and other works to be carried on at the respective schools.

The cadets of the army, and a certain number of young persons, destined for military and naval service, ought to study at least two years in the Fundamental School; and if destined for the corps of engineers or artillerists, or for the navy, two years more in the appropriate school; if for the cavalry or infantry, one year more in the appropriate school. But persons who, by previous instruction elsewhere, may have become acquainted with some or all of the branches taught in the Fundamental School, may, after due examination by the directors and professors of that school, be either received then for a shorter time, or pass immediately to one or other of the schools of practice, according to the nature and extent of their acquirements and intended destination.

In addition to these, detachments of officers and non-commissioned officers of the army ought to attend one or other of the schools, in rotation, for the purposes of instruction and exercise, according to the nature of the corps to which they respectively belong.

It may be noticed also in this place, that it would be a wise addition if Government would authorize such a number of sergeants, supernumerary to those belonging to the regiments on the establishment, as would suffice with them for an army of fifty thousand men. All the supernumeraries to receive, according to their capacities, instruction at the academy, and occasionally sent to do duty with the army.

This outline of a Military Academy, which is conformable to that of similar institutions in other countries, particularly in France, is not meant to imply any thing conclusive: the plan may be modified, perhaps, to advantage. At all events, it ought to be left with the President to proportion the number of cadets, and others, to be admitted into the schools, and to prescribe, definitively, relative to the requisites to entitle to admission, the periods of noviciate, transfers from the schools to particular corps, and whatever respects organization, regulations, and police.

And here it may be proper to observe, that though provision should be made by law for the proposed establishment, in its full latitude, yet it may be left in the discretion of the President to appoint so many of the professors and masters only, as experience shall show to be necessary.

Will it be thought superfluous to remark, relative to the utility of this institution, that it is from the military schools of France have issued those general and other officers, whose skill and recent achievements in war have rendered them subjects for military history, and enabled the present governors of that nation, successively, and almost instantaneously, to form immense disciplined armies.

Is it not greatly desirable to be so provided and prepared for all emergencies?

An enemy who meditates invasion will naturally examine what he will have to encounter before he undertakes it. Acting with common prudence, he must proportion his military array to the obstacles in fortifications and disposable force it will have to overcome, and which may be so stationed and improved, as to require from him an army and apparatus, expensive beyond his resources to support. Our country, by a skilful application of very moderate means, may thus avert from its bosom the most expensive and calamitous wars.

In treating upon such an institution, it was encouraging to reflect, that, happily, it coincided with your uniform wish to see our country placed in a situation which would entitle the just maxims of its policy to be respected, and enable it to meet any adverse accidents it may be reserved to encounter.

The measure proposed has also the high sanction of our late venerated President, whose talents and services were devoted, not to produce personal results, but to render a whole people great, flourishing, and happy.

"The institution of a Military Academy," this great man observes, in his last impressive speech, "is also recommended by cogent reasons: however pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge, for emergencies. The first would impair the energy of its character; and both would hazard its safety, or expose it to greater evils, when war could not be avoided. Besides, that war might often not depend upon its own choice. In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practising the rules of the military art, ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting, by proper establishments, the knowledge of that art. Whatever argument may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is at once comprehensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study; and that the possession of it, in its most improved and perfect state, is always of great moment to the security of a nation. This, therefore, ought to be a serious care of every government; and, for this purpose, an academy, where a regular course of instruction is given, is an obvious expedient, which different nations have successfully employed."

Will not the patriotism and good sense of our country readily consent to found an institution, at a moderate expense, recommended by such authorities, and which must produce the happiest effects? And yet, it ought not to excite surprise, if, in a season of profound peace, the minds of a generality of a people, partaking of the public calm, should become inattentive to the storm that may be collecting at a distance. Are we in the midst of that profound calm, and can the eye perceive no cloud in the horizon? But, were the heavens without one threatening spot, and peace universal on earth, ought the watchmen of a nation to trust to such evanescent and deceptive appearances? And will not an intelligent people, instructed by the wisdom of ages, and having every reason to confide in those to whom they have assigned the direction of their affairs, gladly see establishments arise, and arrangements made, which shall render the thunder harmless when it shall burst over their heads. In such conjunctures, (and such must happen to the United States,) corps of well instructed officers and troops are to a country, what *anchors* are to a ship, driven by a tempest towards a rocky shore.

SECOND. *A modification of the two Regiments of Artillerists and Engineers, so as to create, instead thereof, one Regiment of Foot Artillerists, another of Horse Artillerists, and a third of Engineers.*

It is conceived, that the entire union of the officers of artillerists and engineers, in one corps, as in our present establishment, is not advisable. The art of fortification, and the service of artillery, though touching each other in many points, are, in the main, distinct branches, and each so comprehensive, that their separation is essential to perfection in either. This has been ascertained by long experience. Among the powers of Europe, there is not one recollected, which, at the present day, is not conscious of this truth. When any of them have attempted to unite these corps, the disadvantages which resulted were soon felt to be so momentous, as to produce conviction that each required a separate organization. Such an union was once attempted in France.

According to an ordinance of the 8th of December, 1755, the artillery and engineer corps of that nation, which had been separate, were combined into one. The experiment, however, was of short duration. In 1758, the engineer corps was disjoined from the corps of artillery, and called, as before, the corps of engineers; since which time these corps have remained separate.

The two regiments of artillerists and engineers consist of the following officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates; each of, viz:

1 Lieutenant Colonel Commandant,	32 Cadets,
4 Majors,	4 Sergeant Majors,
1 Adjutant,	4 Quartermaster Sergeants,
1 Quartermaster, } each being a Lieutenant,	64 Sergeants,
1 Paymaster,	64 Corporals,
1 Surgeon,	1 Chief Musician,
2 Surgeon's Mates,	10 Musicians,
16 Captains,	128 Artificers,
32 Lieutenants, besides the three above mentioned,	768 Privates.

Let the regiments of foot artillerists and horse artillerists consist each as follows, viz:

1 Lieutenant Colonel Commandant,	24 Cadets,
3 Majors,	3 Sergeant Majors,
1 Adjutant,	3 Quartermaster Sergeants,
1 Quartermaster, } each being a Lieutenant,	48 Sergeants,
1 Paymaster,	48 Corporals,
1 Surgeon,	1 Chief Musician,
2 Surgeon's Mates,	12 Musicians,
12 Captains,	780 Privates, including Artificers.
24 Lieutenants, besides the three above mentioned,	

The artificers forming a part of each company in the regiments as they now exist, to form two companies of miners, and two companies of artificers, to be arranged as will be hereafter noticed.

It is also proposed: First. In the event of a war, that these two regiments shall be augmented to the complement of officers and men, composing the existing regiments of artillerists and engineers. Second. That the regiment of horse-artillerists shall perform their service on horseback during war only. Third. That provision be made to enable the President of the United States, in case war shall break out between the United States and a foreign European power, or in case imminent danger of invasion of their territory, by any such power shall, in his opinion, be discovered to exist, to organize, and cause to be organized, two additional regiments of horse artillery. Fourth. That the officers which shall become supernumerary, by this aforesaid organization, shall, at the discretion of the President, be transferred to fill vacancies in other regiments, on the establishment, corresponding with their grades, or be retained to fill appropriate vacancies which shall happen in their respective regiments, by deaths, resignations, &c.

In addition to the economical effect of the latter arrangement, it may be mentioned, that the officers to one whole battalion of the Second Regiment of Artillerists and Engineers have not yet been appointed.

The regiment of engineers consisting entirely of officers, if we exclude the companies of miners, it remains to speak of its organization.

Let it consist of, viz:

Two Lieutenant Colonels, one first and one second, as already provided by law,	Twenty-four First Lieutenants,
Three Majors,	Twenty-four Second Lieutenants,
Twelve Captains,	Twenty-four Cadets.

The companies of miners and their labors to be under the direction and immediate command of officers of this corps, and to make a part thereof.

It will be perceived, and it is observed with regret, that, the engineer regiment cannot be immediately formed, by the mere act of transferring into it officers from any of the existing regiments. In order to answer its high destination, it must be filled slowly, and under the exercise of great caution and responsibility.

For this purpose, selections may be made from among the officers of the army, and others who shall have passed through the military schools, and prescribed examinations, and obtain certificates of their possessing the requisite knowledge and qualifications.

It may also be permitted, in cases of uncommon urgency, requiring the completion of the corps, to choose officers among our citizens, whose professions or functions are most analogous to those of engineers, after an examination made by a special commission named by the President.

But let it be remembered, that this corps is too essential to the success of military operations, to be hurried in its formation, or composed of other than persons qualified to discharge its high and important functions. Is authority necessary to support this truth? A general, of the first reputation as a commander, observes on this subject, in speaking to his Government of an officer, who had been killed in action, "He was the best officer of engineers, a body on which so much of the success of campaigns and the fate of a country depend, and where the least fault may be attended with the most fatal consequences."

The horse artillery being a subject that cannot fail to attract attention, it will not, it is conceived, be deemed superfluous to submit a few observations and facts, relative to its structure, advantages, and importance.

The Prussians were the first who employed horse artillery, invented by the great Frederick, at a time, when the league which was formed against him, called upon his genius to multiply his resources. It was then, that the same army, transported with a celerity and precision, till then unknown in war, was seen to triumph against superior forces during the same campaign, upon opposite frontiers, to the East and to the West of his states. It was then were seen horse artillery accompanying strong advanced bodies of cavalry without embarrassing, or retarding, their rapid marches and evolutions.

Horse artillery was introduced into the *Austrian* army during the reign of *Joseph II.*, but it was not made a principal object, and remained in a state of imperfection. The cannoneers were transported upon the ridges of covered caissons, stuffed in the attitude of men on horseback. These carriages were called *Wurst-wagen*.

Some attempts were made in *France* to introduce the horse artillery before the revolution there; the subject, however, was not well understood; the general officers, who were present at the attempt, proposed to place the cannoneers, like the *Austrians*, on *Wursts*.

In 1791, Mr. Duportail, Minister of War, authorized the commandant of the division of Mity to form two companies of horse artillery. The success of this experiment was decisive, and answerable to the minister's expectations. The officers and men were in a few weeks in a condition to manoeuvre with light troops.

In 1792, Mr. Narbonne, who succeeded to Mr. Duportail, composed a committee of the most enlightened officers of the army, to examine and decide upon the means of improving and extending, in the French army, the use of horse artillery.

As no better idea can be given of this new military arm, than what is reported of the result of this conference, the Secretary takes the liberty to introduce it.

These officers resolved, as fundamental points—

1. That a numerous horse artillery well served, and kept complete in cannoneers and horses, was the most certain mean to protect the evolutions of troops *indifferently instructed*, to support their attack with bayonets, and to render null, by positions seasonably taken and with celerity, the advantage which troops *better disciplined*, might confidently promise themselves from superiority in manoeuvres.
2. That with respect to the employment of this arm, the rules of service, instruction, &c. the horse artillery ought to differ from the field artillery only, in having its pieces so managed, as to be drawn with the utmost celerity wherever they can produce the greatest effect, and in the cannoneers being able to follow their guns, and commence action as soon as they are placed.
3. That to fulfil this object, it is more convenient to have the cannoneers all mounted on horses, than a part of them on *wursts*, because on horses they are less subject to accidents, their movement more rapid, their retreat more secure, and the replacing of horses easy.
4. That without excluding any caliber, it appears pieces carrying balls of eight and twelve pounds, and howitzers, may be most advantageously employed.
5. That it is unnecessary to discipline a horse artillerist in the manoeuvres of cavalry; that this would be a departure, without utility, from the principal object; that it is enough for him to know to sit firm on his horse, to mount and descend quickly, and conduct him boldly; that it is not requisite to oblige him to preserve any order in following his piece, leaving it to his intelligence to learn, if he chooses, to execute the manoeuvres of cavalry.
6. That the manoeuvre, *à la prolonge*, ought to be employed in every case in which it is practicable to use it. That the horses remaining attached while the pieces are firing, one gains thereby all the time which would be lost in removing or replacing the *avant train*, and thus one may pass fosses and rivers with the utmost celerity, and profit of positions.
7. That in order to form at once a requisite number of companies of horse artillery, without weakening the artillery regiments, it is sufficient to employ for every piece two skilful cannoneers, and to draw upon the infantry for the rest.

On these principles the French have organized an establishment in their armies, from which they have derived the most important advantages in most, if not all their campaigns.

The decisive agency of horse artillery in *offensive war* was manifested in the invasion of Belgium, by General Dumouriez, at the end of his campaign in 1792. The affair of *Waterloo* is equally in point, as to its superiority in *defensive operations*.

Whilst General *Pichegru* commanded the army of *Flanders*, four thousand cavalry, manoeuvring with his horse artillery, sustained the immense effort of an army of thirty thousand men, supporting an artillery chiefly of a different kind, of at least triple the force of that opposed to it.

*Bonaparte*, at the battle of *Castiglione*, after raising the siege of *Mantua*, having re-assembled several divisions of his horse artillery in a well chosen position, under General *Domartin*, broke, by their means, the Austrian line, and thus decided a victory upon which depended the most important consequences in his favor.

It is also certain, that the horse artillery contributed not a little to gain the battle of *Ettingen*, where General *Moreau*, very inferior in cavalry, maintained, by its means, his left wing against the whole cavalry of the Arch Duke. The application of the horse artillery procured to General *Hoche*, upon the Rhine, in the late affair of *Neuwied*, like success.

The Arch Duke Charles, instructed by such events, has greatly augmented and improved this arm of the Austrian army. The English, also, have lately introduced horse artillery into their service, but, it is supposed, too sparingly to derive therefrom its full effect.

Can an agent, so superior in all offensive and defensive operations, and so vastly important from its nature, as well as the use made of it by other nations, be dispensed with in the composition of our army, or neglected with impunity?

The author of a recent work, entitled "Précis des évènements militaires," published in numbers at Hamburg, from which most of the aforesaid facts respecting this powerful military agent have been taken, observes, "that it is become indispensable in all armies; it can accompany almost every where cavalry; it crosses rivers and morasses impassable to foot artillery; it thunders in mass and with great rapidity upon an unexpected point of attack; turns a body of the enemy; takes him in flank or rear; can perform the service of advance posts; of artillery position; of the rear guard; and, in fine, that of a corps of reserve, from which detachments may be made as wanted: it is free from the inconvenience ascribed to foot artillery, of retarding and restraining the manœuvres and marches of troops: the French have, therefore, already confined the use of foot artillery to the service of sieges, with the exception of four pounders, which they have yet left attached to battalions."

Horse artillery would seem to be peculiarly recommended to the United States by the reflection, that all attacks on the sea-board must be made by an enemy, water borne from a distant country, who will consequently be ill provided with horses, whereas, the United States, having a knowledge of this agent, and resorting to their resources in horses, might be able to oppose a horse artillery so superior and so promptly, as to give decided advantages in attack or defence, and relieve their territory from being ravaged, or long possessed in any part of it. If the United States shall prevent an enemy from procuring the horses of the country, and shall maintain a superiority in this forcible arm, they will have little to fear from invaders, however powerful in infantry.

The two regiments of artillerists and engineers, as they now stand on the establishment, cost the United States four hundred and twenty-seven thousand five hundred and fifty three dollars and eighty cents annually. There will result from the proposed arrangement of these regiments, as will appear by Schedule A. a difference in time of peace of twenty thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars and thirty cents annually, which sum may be applied to the expenses of the Military Academy.

When the preceding propositions are respectfully submitted, as essential to the improvement of our military establishment, it would be improper to overlook such other measures as may occur, and, it is believed, would conduce to perfect our preparations, for securing our rights.

The importance of the volunteer associations or companies, which may be accepted under "An Act authorizing the President to raise a provisional army," passed the 28th May, 1798, has heretofore been presented by the Secretary. They may be considered as a reserve body, from which prompt and efficient reinforcements can be drawn, to our regular army, and as rallying and supporting points, when completely organized into regiments, brigades, and divisions, for the militia, in all cases of great and comprehensive urgency or danger.

A revision of the law respecting these valuable associations, is earnestly recommended. No other force being so economical, will it not be proper, in order to derive full and permanent utility from the volunteer companies in all hazardous conjunctures, that the power of the President to accept their patriotic offers of service should no longer be confined to a limited period, and that the duration only of their engagements, after acceptance, should be defined by law. Can a time be fairly presumed to arrive, when we can have nothing to apprehend from either foreign or domestic enemies?

An omission in the law to provide the same compensation to the volunteer cavalry, for the use of their horses, that is allowed to militia cavalry, when in actual service, has been felt, with some sensibility, by the former, who were employed during the last insurrection in the same service with militia cavalry. It is, therefore, recommended that an appropriation be made for compensating the volunteer cavalry so employed, for the use of their horses, during their service, at the same rates of allowance, which have been paid to the militia cavalry on the same service; and that equal rates of compensation for the future shall be provided for both by law, for the use of their horses in actual service.

The militia of the United States ought to be considered as an essential arm of our defence, and a sure resource from which reinforcements may be drawn to supply deficiencies in the regular army, in the event of a sudden invasion, or the wasting progress of a long war.

To obtain their aid, however, with celerity and order, in such cases, other provisions are necessary than are to be found at present in the laws.

The act of the 28th of February, 1795, authorizes the President, whenever the United States shall be invaded, or in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, to call forth such numbers of militia of the state, or states adjoining, most convenient to the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for the purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper.

To give effect to this power, and enable the President to carry upon an enemy with promptitude the force nearest to, or best calculated to, annoy him, it is indispensable that he should know the number and species of militia in each county of a State, and the names and places of residence of their officers respectively.

If these particulars are not precisely known to the President, at the time the force is wanted, the delay which must necessarily intervene in the circuitous course of orders and instructions, will often, if not always, be productive of disastrous consequences. To avoid these, the proper officer of the militia in each State should be obliged, by heavy penalties, and high responsibility, to make quarterly returns to the Department of War, comprehending the aforesaid particulars.

The troops raised under, and conformably to the provisions of "An act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," passed the 16th July, 1798, demand, at this time, particular attention.

This additional force was to consist of twelve regiments of infantry, and six troops of cavalry, the latter intended, with the two troops of cavalry, heretofore, and now, in service, to form one regiment of cavalry. For the infantry, the officers have been appointed, and the recruiting service some time in operation. For the cavalry, the officers have also been appointed; but, to avoid the expense of this kind of troops, which is always much greater than that of any species of foot, the recruiting service has not been ordered, as yet, into operation, nor have horses been purchased, although preparatory measures have been taken.

For the twelve regiments of infantry, the enlistments amount as follows, according to the last returns which have been received by the department.

From the fifth regiment, which is the first of the twelve, there has been no returns.

Returned for the sixth regiment, enlisted in North Carolina, from August to December, 1799, viz: 134.

For the seventh, enlisted in Virginia, from May to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz: 258.

For the eighth, enlisted in Virginia, from May to October the 1st, 1799, viz: 424.

For the ninth, enlisted in Maryland, from May to September the 17th, 1799, viz: 314.

For the tenth, enlisted in Pennsylvania, from May to August the 1st, 1799, viz: 448.

For the eleventh, enlisted in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, from April to the first Monday in October, 1799, viz: 453.

For the twelfth, enlisted in New York, from May to the first Monday in September, 1799, viz: 287.

For the thirteenth, enlisted in Connecticut, from May to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz: 371.

For the fourteenth, enlisted in Massachusetts, from May to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz: 327.

For the fifteenth, enlisted in Massachusetts, Maine, from June to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz: 145.

For the sixteenth, enlisted in New Hampshire, from July to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz: 233.

Total enlisted, 3,399.

Agreeably to the provisions of the act of the 16th July, 1798, all these troops have been, by the terms of their respective enlistments, engaged "for and during the continuance of the existing differences between the United States and the French Republic."

The Secretary thinks it necessary to mention that, immediately upon the accommodation of the existing differences aforesaid, the engagements of all these troops will expire, and every man be entitled to demand his discharge. That, in consequence, if it shall be deemed expedient to keep up a peace establishment, more extended than here-

tofore, or any events should intervene to render a larger army indispensable, it will not be practicable to apply one of these men to the same, who have already received a bounty, without a re-enlistment, and the expense of a new bounty.

It is, therefore, thought advisable, that the terms of enlistment prescribed by the law be superceded by a provision in future to enlist for the term of five years, if not sooner discharged. This modification leaves with the President the power of reducing the numbers of the army at any time, to a prescribed establishment, and if the negotiations of our envoys to the French republic shall be successful, it will procure a number of men, who, without additional expense, can be retained, if necessary, in service, for the period mentioned, a measure which appears equally recommended by its policy and economy.

The Secretary has before observed, that if the United States shall prevent an enemy from procuring the horses of the country, and maintain a superiority in horse artillery, they will have little to fear from an invading enemy, however powerful in infantry. It certainly would be an important addition to our system of defence, was an arrangement devised, to deprive an enemy, as much as possible, after he had effected a landing upon our coast, of the means of subsistence, and especially to prevent him from possessing himself of horses, indispensable to the transport of his baggage, stores, and provisions, and for his artillery and cavalry.

An operation promising to be so efficient, and sanctioned by experience in other countries, will perhaps require, on the part of Government, a promise of indemnification to the individual, for the value of all stock and horses which may be removed in consequence of invasion, if not restored to their respective owners.

Provisions and restrictions, it is conceived, may be made, calculated to secure the public against frauds, and to encourage, at the same time, the aid of proprietors themselves in the execution of such a law. It should explicitly provide, that no compensation will ever be allowed for property of the kind described, destroyed either by the enemy, or by our own army, to prevent its falling into the hands of an enemy; in all cases, where it shall appear no previous preparation or exertion had been made use of to remove it, and authorize the destruction of all stock, and horses in particular, left in an exposed situation, when necessary, to prevent their being useful to an enemy, or employed against the armies of the United States.

The Government of a country, blessed with every convenience for an extensive foreign trade, and peopled with inhabitants distinguished for their commercial spirit, will, from the natural operation of circumstances, and the impulse given by its citizens, consider it a duty to prepare either gradually or promptly, as policy, interest, or necessity, may dictate, the means of affording protection to its property on the ocean.

We find accordingly the foundation of a navy already laid, and its advantages so far felt as to induce a belief its progress will be permitted to keep pace with the purposes for which it was instituted. This navy, however, which is specially intended to protect trade, will in its turn require to be protected, when in harbor, by suitable fortifications. Without a place of safety, to which it may retire from a superior fleet, the labors and resources of years may be destroyed in a single hour.

The fortifications erected for the defence of our cities and harbors cannot yet be considered competent to afford this security. Many new and extensive works, even at those places where the fortifications are advanced, will yet be required to render any of them a secure asylum for our navy.

Whenever, therefore, the harbors in which our dock yards and great naval depositories are to be established, and to which our navy may retire in time of war or danger, shall be determined upon, it will be indispensable to make them impregnable, if possible, to an enemy.

Schedule B will show the sums which have been appropriated and annually expended in fortifying our harbors, since the "act to provide for the defence of certain ports and harbors in the United States," passed the 20th March, 1794, and the balance remaining on the 1st October, 1799.

The Paymaster General of the Armies of the United States has been, agreeably to the provision of the 15th section of "an act for the better organization of the troops of the United States, and for other purposes," quartered by direction of the late commander in chief, at the seat of Government, it being the station deemed most proper, to enable him to perform his functions with convenience, facility, and the least probable risk of the public moneys.

The functions of this office are, by law, highly important: his trust is eminently responsible. All moneys for the pay of the armies pass through his hands, including military bounties, and the subsistence and forage of officers, and he is the auditor, in the first instance, of all accounts for such objects.

The compensation provided for him is eighty dollars per month, with the rations and forage of a major. This compensation the Secretary conceives, not merely inadequate to remunerate the duties and responsibilities attached to the office, but insufficient for the decent support of a respectable character, and certainly none other should fill it.

It is, therefore, respectfully suggested to increase the compensation to the Paymaster General of the Armies of the United States, and submitted whether it might not be attended with some beneficial effects to vest him with a suitable brevet rank in the army.

The regularity, discipline, and, of course, the efficiency of all armies have always depended very essentially upon the system provided for their government. Impressed with this conviction, the Secretary takes the liberty to bring into your view, "the rules and articles for the better government of the troops raised, or to be raised, and kept in pay, by and at the expense of the United States of America." This system contains many excellent provisions, but experience has produced a pretty general wish among military men, that it could be submitted to a complete revision, as in many particulars it is presumed to require amendments.

This revision would be a very serious work, and there is reason to fear could not be undertaken, with a prospect of being speedily finished. Some things, however, can be done, which would be important improvements.

A great obscurity envelopes the provisions of the existing articles, respecting the power to appoint or order general courts martial. One construction, by confining the power to the general or commander in chief only, is inconveniently narrow, and has occasioned too great delay, as well in instituting courts, as in giving effect to their sentences. Another construction, which has been practised upon, (commandants of posts, as such, of whatever grade, having assumed the power of constituting general courts martial) is too much diffused, and would place in too many hands a trust no less delicate than important.

To attempt to attain the proper medium by a more exact legislative definition, of the characters who may exercise the power, would perhaps be attended with difficulty, and might often not meet the new situations which are constantly occurring in the infinite combinations of military service. The expedient which has appeared most proper, is to give a discretionary authority to the President, to empower other officers, (than those the soundest interpretation has decided to be designated by the articles of war, viz. generals, or those on whom a general's command has devolved) to appoint general courts martial, under such circumstances, and with such limitations, as he may deem advisable.

The provisions which refer the determination on sentences extending to the loss of life, or the dismissal of a commissioned officer in time of peace, to the President, must no doubt have frequently been attended with perplexity to him, and are inconvenient, if not injurious to the service. It is scarcely possible, for any but the military commander, to appreciate duly the motives which, in such cases, demand severity, or recommend clemency. To this, an accurate view of all the circumstances of the army, in detail, is often necessary. The efficacy of punishment, when requisite in an army, depends much on its celerity, and must be greatly weakened by the unavoidable delay of a resort to the Executive: during which delay, the mischief it was intended to remedy, may, and sometimes most probably will, have happened. The reasons mentioned induce an opinion, that it is expedient to empower the commanding general of an army, to decide upon, and command to be executed when proper, all sentences of general courts martial, except only such as respect a general officer. The responsibility of the commanding general to the President, and to his country, must ensure a discreet exercise of the required authority, and its utility is manifest.

The best mode of treating the crime of desertion has been an embarrassing investigation in most countries. To fix upon a punishment, that gives the surest promise of checking or preventing the evil, or which, when it does happen, in its application will be most analogous to the generally received opinions of a country, and the habits of

military life, is indeed difficult. The same punishment ought not, perhaps, to be applied to this crime, the most injurious to armies, and complicated in its nature, at all times and under all circumstances.

To punish it with death in time of peace in all cases, would, in this country, do violence to the popular habits of thinking. Whipping is found to be ineffectual. Confinement to hard labor, it is supposed, will produce more beneficial results, and courts martial have, in their discretion, been lately much influenced by this belief. As, however, our soldiers are enlisted for given periods, when an engagement is nearly expired, confinement would be an inadequate punishment, for it could not continue beyond the term of service, and although a soldier may be supposed to have fewer inducements to withdraw from an engagement which is near terminating, yet, it has sometimes happened, and may be expected in future, that men, under such circumstances, have been the authors of combinations, to revolt, desert, and commit other crimes, consequently have been the most atrocious offenders; and it is known that they frequently have themselves deserted. To make this punishment, then, in time of peace, in all cases, commensurate with, and proportioned to, the crime, an auxiliary provision to extend the confinement and labor beyond the period of service the criminal had engaged for, would appear necessary. Such a provision would have a tendency to render the sentences of the courts less sanguinary.

The Secretary by no means designs to suggest, that it would be proper to abolish the punishment of death for desertion even in time of peace. He considers that in aggravated and complicated cases, it would always be proper, and that in time of war or civil commotion, it should always be applied to this crime. He also inclines to the opinion, that the power of pardoning ought never to be extended in any instance of desertion, or an attempt to desert to enemies or traitors.

Connected with the perfection of our military establishment, is a code of well digested rules for the formations, field exercise, movements, and police, of the different species of troops composing our army.

Major General Hamilton has, some time since, been specially charged with this work. As it was not, however, expected that so extensive an undertaking could be completed without a sub-division of labor, and the co-operation of various talents and experience, he informs, that he has assigned to Major General Pinckney an important portion of the task. The execution, it is also understood, will require the aid of other and subordinate officers, for whose extra service a special compensation is suggested, as being agreeable to usage, and essential to a cheerful and zealous performance of their duty. This, should it meet your approbation, demands no particular act of the Legislature.

There is another point relative to the army, which he has made the subject of a recent communication to the Department of War, to which it may be proper to request attention.

The General observes, that "the detaching from their corps soldiers as servants to the various officers of the general staff is productive of material inconvenience, by withdrawing altogether, from military service, a considerable number of persons; and occasioning dissatisfactions to the commandants of corps, who never see their men removed without uneasiness, and are sometimes much disgusted by the selection of those whom they are anxious to retain. There is no doubt, he adds, that it would operate beneficially, if, after fixing the number of servants to which the several characters of the general staff should be entitled, they were to be allowed an equivalent in money, regulated by the cost of a soldier to the public, and were to be required to provide their own servants."

Should this measure be adopted, which is agreeable to an obsolete regulation of the old Congress, penalties may be devised to secure a faithful execution, which, from the force of circumstances, would be very little liable to abuse.

When treating upon military subjects, it may not be improper to give a general view of the positions of the existing regular force, composing the armies of the United States, conformably to a disposition of the same by your approbation, and that of the late commander in chief.

The four regiments of infantry, and the two companies of cavalry, on the permanent establishment, are disposed of as follows:

One regiment is assigned to the frontiers of Tennessee and Georgia. There are also in that quarter the two companies of cavalry.

The three other regiments are distributed along the lakes from Niagara to Michillimackinac, upon the Miami, Ohio, Mississippi, and Tombigbee.

There is also one battalion of the artillery and engineers distributed with the aforesaid troops.

This entire force is manifestly inadequate to the purposes it is intended to answer on our Northern, Western, and Southern frontiers.

The twelve regiments of infantry now raising, have taken, or are to take, the following provisional positions, viz:

Three of the twelve regiments of infantry in the vicinity of Providence river, near Uxbridge, Massachusetts.

Three regiments in the vicinity of Brunswick, New Jersey.

Three regiments in the vicinity of Potomac, near Harper's Ferry, Virginia.

Three regiments in the vicinity of Augusta, above the Falls of Savannah.

This disposition, it is conceived, combines considerations relative to the discipline and health of the troops with the economical supply of their wants. It has, also, some military aspects, in the first instance, towards the security of Boston and Newport; in the second, towards that of New York and Philadelphia; in the third and fourth, towards that of Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and the Southern States generally, and in the third, particularly towards the reinforcement of the Western army.

The residue of the two regiments of artillery and engineers, except one battalion stated to be on our Northern, Western, and Southern frontiers, are stationed in our sea-board fortifications, from Portland, Massachusetts, to the St. Mary's, Georgia. From these are to be drawn two battalions in succession for the army, when in the field, with a view to a course of regular instruction.

Schedule C exhibits the actual force (according to the latest returns) of the four regiments of infantry, and two companies of cavalry on the old establishment, and the two regiments of artillery and engineers.

All which is respectfully submitted.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 5th January, 1800.

## A.

*Estimate of the Pay, Forage, Subsistence, and Clothing, of a regiment of Artillerists and Engineers, on the present establishment.*

	Pay per month.	Pay per year.	Forage per month.	Forage per year.	Rations per day.			
1 Lieut. Colonel Commandant,	75	\$900	\$12	\$144	6	Value of rations yearly, at seventeen cents per ration.	Value of clothing for cadets, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, at \$25 per suit.	Total amount of pay, subsistence, forage, and clothing, for one year.
4 Majors,	55	2,640	10	480	16			
1 Adjutant,	40	480	6	72	2			
1 Quartermaster,	40	480	6	72	2			
1 Paymaster,	40	480	6	72	2			
1 Surgeon,	45	540	10	120	3			
2 Surgeon's Mates,	30	720	6	144	4			
16 Captains,	40	7,680			120			
32 Lieutenants,	30	11,520			64			
32 Cadets,	10	3,840			64			
4 Sergeant Majors,	10	480			4			
4 Quartermaster Sergeants,	10	480			4			
64 Sergeants,	8	6,144			64			
64 Corporals,	7	5,376			64			
1 Chief Musician,	8	96			1			
10 Musicians,	6	720			10			
128 Artificers,	10	15,360			192			
768 Privates,	5	46,080			768			
		\$104,016		\$1,104	1,318			

For two regiments of artillerists and engineers, -

\$427,553 80

*Estimate of the Pay, Forage, Subsistence, and Clothing, of a regiment of Artillery, on the proposed peace establishment.*

	Pay per month.	Pay per year.	Forage per month.	Forage per year.	Rations per day.						
1 Lieut. Colonel Commandant,	\$75	\$900	\$12	\$144	6	Value of rations for one year, at seventeen cents per ration.	Value of clothing for cadets, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, at \$25.	Total amount of pay, subsistence, forage, and clothing, for one year.			
3 Majors,	55	1,980	10	360	12						
1 Adjutant,	40	480	6	72	2						
1 Quartermaster,	40	480	6	72	2						
1 Paymaster,	40	480	6	72	2						
1 Surgeon,	45	540	10	120	3						
2 Surgeon's Mates,	30	720	6	144	4						
12 Captains,	40	5,760			36						
24 Lieutenants,	30	8,640			48						
24 Cadets,	10	2,880			48						
3 Sergeant Majors,	10	360			3						
3 Quartermaster Sergeants,	10	360			3						
48 Sergeants,	8	4,608			48						
48 Corporals,	7	4,032			48						
1 Chief Musician,	8	96			1						
12 Musicians,	6	864			12						
130 Artificers,	10	15,600			195						
650 Privates,	5	39,000			650						
For one regiment,		\$67,780		\$984	1,123				\$69,682 15	\$22,975	\$181,421 15

For two regiments,

\$362,842 30



*Estimate of the Pay, Subsistence, and Forage, of the proposed corps of Engineers, including the Clothing for the Cadets.*

	Pay per month.	Pay per year.	Forage per month.	Forage per year.	Rations per day.	Yearly value of rations, at seventeen cents per ration.	Value of Cadets' clothing, at \$31 25 per suit.	Total.
2 Lieutenant Colonels, . . . . .	\$75	\$1,800	\$12	\$288	12			
3 Majors, . . . . .	55	1,980	10	360	12			
12 Captains, . . . . .	40	5,760	-	-	36			
48 Lieutenants, . . . . .	30	17,280	-	-	96			
24 Cadets, . . . . .	10	2,880	-	-	48			
	-	\$29,700	-	\$648	-	\$12,658 20	750	\$43,756 20

Cost of two regiments of artillery, on the present establishment, for one year,	\$427,553 80
Cost of two regiments, for one year, on the proposed establishment,	\$362,842 30
Annual expense of the proposed corps of engineers,	43,756 20
	<u>406,598 50</u>
Saving, in favor of the proposed establishment,	<u>\$20,955 30</u>

## B.

*Statement of moneys applied to the defence of certain ports in the United States, in pursuance of the act to provide for the defence of certain ports and harbors in the United States, passed the 20th March, 1794, distinguishing the moneys expended in each year, from and after the passing the said act, upon the fortifications of each harbor, to the 1st day of October, 1799.*

	1794.	1795.	1796.	1797.	1798.	1799.	
Portland, . . . . .	\$1,275 41	\$1,791 00	\$1,369 00	\$1,068 25	\$1,200 00	\$4,264 06	\$10,967 72
Portsmouth, . . . . .	1,615 80	2,266 00	316 00	.	1,000 00	.	5,197 80
Salem, . . . . .	1,723 08	1,000 00	.	.	.	2,000 00	4,723 08
Marblehead, . . . . .	1,963 78	2,011 68	1,508 87	114 84	.	6,000 00	11,599 17
Gloucester, . . . . .	2,258 39	1,000 00	1,280 27	.	.	.	4,538 66
Boston, . . . . .	496 27	1,342 50	.	.	.	.	1,838 77
Newport, . . . . .	6,383 33	5,231 22	198 91	.	5,900 00	50,000 00	67,763 46
New London, . . . . .	5,437 36	1,144 73	200 85	.	.	7,520 00	14,302 94
New York, . . . . .	13,737 73	11,866 54	1,124 00	.	30,117 24	30,116 18	86,961 69
Philadelphia, . . . . .	9,187 86	6,658 00	14,991 31	23,201 87	51,365 44	43,503 32	149,907 80
Baltimore, . . . . .	6,086 49	6,922 09	2,802 23	2,347 41	18,022 72	4,468 51	40,649 45
Annapolis, . . . . .	2,997 75	268 50	.	.	.	.	3,266 25
Norfolk, . . . . .	9,019 52	7,873 95	1,286 23	3,000 00	.	402 00	21,581 70
Alexandria, . . . . .	3,728 36	1,208 00	.	.	.	.	4,936 36
Cape Fear River and Ocracock, . . . . .	4,275 02	5,334 49	1,430 95	.	.	5,333 33	16,373 79
Beacon Island, . . . . .	1,816 49	.	.	.	.	.	1,816 49
Charleston, . . . . .	10,471 94	11,265 45	8,027 06	5,413 03	4,205 98	11,500 00	50,883 46
Georgetown, . . . . .	250 00	572 54	.	.	.	.	822 54
Savannah, . . . . .	2,641 74	2,086 00	3,330 30	.	.	.	8,058 04
St. Mary's, . . . . .	1,192 73	2,000 00	2,000 00	.	.	2,000 00	7,192 73
Remaining unexpended of the \$620,000 appropriated by the several acts of Congress, . . . . .	.	.	.	.	.	.	512,381 90
							<u>107,618 10</u>
							<u>\$620,000 00</u>

## C.

*Statement of the number of non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, in the two companies of cavalry, two regiments of artillerists and engineers, and four old regiments of infantry, taken from the last returns.*

Cavalry, . . . . .	.	.	.	.	.	116
Artillerists, . . . . .	.	.	.	.	.	1,501
Infantry, . . . . .	.	.	.	.	.	1,812
Total, . . . . .						<u>3,429</u>

6th CONGRESS.]

No. 40.

[1st Session.]

## MILITARY ACADEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 13, 1800.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 31, 1800.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit, in compliance with your requisition, a few supplementary observations, and a view of the probable expense of the military schools respectfully recommended to consideration in my report, communicated to Congress, by a message dated the 13th instant, from the President of the United States.

The report contemplates certain military schools as an essential mean, in conjunction with a small military establishment, to prepare for, and perpetuate to, the United States, at a very moderate expense, a body of scientific officers and engineers, adequate to any future exigency, qualified to discipline for the field, in the shortest time, the most extended armies, and to give the most decisive and useful effects to their operations.

It is not conceived the United States will ever think it expedient to employ militia upon their frontiers, or to garrison their fortified places in time of peace, nor that they will be disposed to place their reliance, for defence, against a foreign invading enemy, upon militia alone, but that they will, at all times, maintain a body of regular troops, commensurate with their ability to maintain them, and the necessity or policy that may demand such an establishment.

To qualify and keep our citizens, in general, of suitable bodily ability, prepared to take the field against regular forces, would demand the most radical changes in our militia system, and such an uninterrupted series of training, discipline, and instruction, to be applied, as well to the officers as to the men, as comports with regular troops only, while in its results the measure would be found, on account of the loss to the community, occasioned by the abstraction from labor or occupation, and direct cost, greatly to exceed in expense what would be required to support a moderate military establishment. This position, which is thought to be a sound one, does not bring into view the effects of the measure upon the morals, industry, and habits of the citizens.

Practically considered, may we not as well calculate to be commodiously lodged, and have the science of building improved, by employing every man in the community in the construction of houses, and by exploding from society, as useless, architects, masons, and carpenters, as expect to be defended efficiently from an invading enemy, by causing every citizen to endeavor to make himself master of the several branches of the art of war, and excluding engineers, scientific officers, and regular troops.

There is certainly, however, a system, as it respects our militia, which, if resorted to, and persevered in, may secure the utility of their services in times of danger, without much injury to the morals, or materially affecting the general industry of the nation.

When the perfect order, and exact discipline, which are essential to regular troops, are contemplated, and with what ease and precision they execute the different manœuvres indispensable to the success of offensive or defensive operations, the conviction cannot be resisted, that such troops will always have a decided advantage over more numerous forces composed of uninstructed militia or undisciplined recruits.

It cannot yet be forgotten, that, in our Revolutionary war, it was not until after several years practice in arms, and the extension of the periods for which our soldiers were at first enlisted, that we found them at all qualified to meet in the field of battle those to whom they were opposed. The occasional brilliant and justly celebrated acts of some of our militia, during that eventful period, detract nothing from this dear bought truth. With all the enthusiasm which marked those days, it was perceived, and universally felt, that regular and disciplined troops were indispensable, and that it was utterly unsafe for us to trust to militia alone the issue of the war. The position, therefore, is illustrated, that, even in times of the greatest danger, we cannot give to our militia that degree of discipline, or to their officers that degree of military science, upon which a nation may safely hazard its fate.

The great man who conducted the war of our Revolution was continually compelled to conform his conduct to the circumstances growing out of the experimental lessons just mentioned. What was the secret of his conduct? Must it be told? It may, and without exciting a blush or uneasy sensation in any of his surviving companions in arms. He had an army of men, but he had few officers or soldiers in that army. Both were to be formed, which could not be effected in a single campaign, or while his regiments were continually returning home, and, like the waves of the sea, each in their turn lost in the abyss, and succeeded by new ones. It was not till after he was furnished with a less fluctuating and more stable kind of force, that he could commence, with a prospect of advantage, military instructions, or enforce the ordinances of discipline; and, even then, he felt that *time and instructors* were required to render his labors useful, and enable his army to meet the enemy upon any thing like *equal terms*. Are we to profit by, or is this experience to be lost to our country?

The art of war, which gives to a small force the faculty to combat with advantage superior numbers, *indifferently instructed*, is subjected to mechanical, geometrical, moral, and physical rules; it calls for profound study; its theory is immense; the details infinite; and its principles rendered useful only by a happy adaptation of them to all the circumstances of place and ground, variously combined, to which they may be applicable. Is it possible for an officer of militia to obtain a competent knowledge of these things in the short space his usual avocations will permit him to devote to their acquisition? Is it possible for any officer, having acquired a knowledge of these details, this theory, and these principles, to carry them into useful practice with a handful of militia, in the few days in each year allotted by law to trainings and exercises? Is that perfect subordination and obedience of men to their officers, and of each *inferior* to his *superior officer*, through all the grades of rank from the corporal up to the commander in chief, which forms a vital principle essential to the energy and force of armies, to be acquired by, or communicated to, a body of militia organized and trained according to our laws? And does it consist with a humane and enlightened policy to march men so imperfectly instructed and disciplined, unless in cases of the last extremity, against veteran troops, (where this principle reigns in full activity) commanded by skilful and scientific officers? Admitting, however, that militia officers, during the few months the law permits their corps to be retained in *actual service*, could render their men, by incessant instruction, capable of fulfilling the object of their destination; yet, as that advantage is but momentary, as these borrowed instruments must be quickly returned to the depot which furnished them, as new ones must be resorted to, and successively instructed, what can be expected from such a system, but perpetual incoherence between the means and the end, and certain shipwreck to the best connected and combined military projects. This, to be sure, is the old story—it cannot, however, be too often repeated, because it can never be refuted.

The secret of discipline, and the importance of military science, were well known to those ancient Governments whose generals and troops have filled the world with the splendor of their victories. According to *Scipio*, nothing contributed to the success of enterprises so much as skill in the individual officers. The severity of the Roman discipline is well understood, and the estimation in which it was held by *Cæsar*. *Livy* has observed, that *science* does more in war than *force*. *Vegetius*, that it is neither *numbers* nor *blind valor* which ensures victory, but that it generally follows *capacity* and *science in war*. *Machiavel*, who has written upon military affairs, placed so much dependence on an *exact discipline* and *military science*, as to efface from his list of great generals all those who with *small armies* did not execute *great things*: but to the committee it is unnecessary to repeat the authorities of generals and writers of the first reputation, to show the high importance attached to military science and discipline in all ages of the world, or resort to history for evidence of its effects. They must be well acquainted with the facts, and, no doubt, will give them their due weight, in considering the subjects now before them.

There is, however, an authority, so much in point relative to the essentiality of the institution in question, that I cannot forbear to mention it.

The Marshal de *Puisegur*, who has left an excellent treatise on the art of war, the result of his experience, observes:

"I have been, perhaps, at as many sieges as any of those in service, and in all sorts of grades; as subaltern, I have commanded troops and working parties in a siege; as major, I have conducted to the trenches and posts to which they were destined, troops and laborers; I have been major of brigade, marshal de camp, and lieutenant general: however, as I have not learned fortification, my practice has not enabled me to acquit myself in conducting attacks, so that I should be obliged to suffer myself to be instructed in many things by the lights of engineers, their practice being founded upon principles which are known to them, an advantage I have not in this branch of war."

This is the candid acknowledgment of a man who had served sixty years in the army; who had learned the military art under a father; that, in forty years service, had been present at two hundred sieges; and who had himself passed through all the military grades, and arrived from an inferior to a superior rank, but after having deserved each successive promotion by some distinguished action.

A slight attention to circumstances, and the actual position of our country, must lead to the conviction, that a well connected series of fortifications is an object of the highest importance to the United States, not only as these will be conducive to the general security, but as a mean of lessening the necessity, and consequently the expense of a large military establishment.

By strongly fortifying our harbors and frontiers, we may reasonably expect, either to keep at a distance the calamities of war, or render it less injurious when it shall happen. It is behind these ponderous masses only, that a small number of men can maintain themselves, for a length of time, against superior forces. Imposing, therefore, upon an enemy, who may have every thing to transport across the Atlantic, the necessity of undertaking long and hazardous sieges, increases the chances against his undertaking them at all, or, if he does, in despite of such circumstances, insures to us the time he must consume in his operations, to rally our means to a point, and unite our efforts to resist him.

We must not conclude, from these brief observations, that the services of the engineer is limited to constructing, connecting, consolidating, and keeping in repair fortifications. This is but a single branch of their profession, though, indeed, a most important one. Their utility extends to almost every department of war, and every description of general officers, besides embracing whatever respects public buildings, roads, bridges, canals, and all such works of a civil nature. I consider it, therefore, of vast consequence to the United States, that it should form in its own bosom, and out of its own native materials, men qualified to place the country in a proper posture of defence, to infuse science into our army, and give to our fortifications that degree of force, connexion, and perfection, which can alone counterbalance the superiority of attack over defence.

With these advantages in prospect, is it not incumbent upon us to hasten, with all reasonable diligence, the commencement and completion of an institution essential to realise them. And are expenditures, which give such valuable results, to be otherwise viewed than as real economy? It is a well known fact, that England had neither native artillerymen nor engineers before the time of the Duke of Cumberland, and till after she established military schools.

I shall now, having respectfully submitted these observations, present an estimate of the expense of the military schools, which it appears to me ought to be immediately instituted.

Agreeably to the plan of the Military Academy, the directors thereof are to be officers taken from the army, consequently no expense will be incurred by such appointments.

The plan also contemplates that officers of the army, cadets, and non-commissioned officers, shall receive instruction in the academy. As the rations and fuel which these are entitled to in the army, will suffice for them in the academy, no additional expense will be required for these objects of maintenance while there.

The expenses of servants, and certain incidental charges relative to the police and administration, may be defrayed, by those who shall be admitted, out of their pay and emoluments.

According to the plan contemplated, fifty officers, cadets, or non-commissioned officers, may be annually instructed in the Fundamental School, and an equal number in the School of Artillerists and Engineers; the only schools which it is deemed expedient to bring into operation.

To instruct these may require, when both schools are in full activity, the following professors, viz:

*In the Fundamental School.*

2 Professors of mathematics, at 800 dollars per annum, and two rations per day,	-	\$1,848 20
2 do. geography and natural philosophy,	-	1,848 20
1 Professor of chemistry,	-	924 10
1 Designing and drawing master,	-	724 10
		5,344 60

*In the School of Artillerists and Engineers.*

1 Professor of mathematics, at 800 dollars per annum, and two rations per day,	-	924 10
1 do. geography and natural philosophy,	-	924 10
1 do. chemistry,	-	924 10
1 do. architecture,	-	924 10
2 Designing and drawing masters, at 600 dollars per annum, and two rations per day,	-	1,448 20
		5,144 60

Total, \$10,489 20

The cost of the buildings for these two schools, as the one or the other of the annexed plan shall be adopted, will be, viz:

*Plan by John Foncin, Engineer.*

For the Fundamental School,	-	19,423 00
The School of Artillerists and Engineers, supposed to cost an equal sum,	-	19,423 00
		\$38,846 00

*Plan by B. H. Latrobe, Civil Architect and Engineer.*

For the Fundamental School,	-	40,000 00
The School of Artillerists and Engineers, supposed to cost an equal sum,	-	40,000 00
		\$80,000 00

It may be proper to remind the committee, that no appropriation for the School of Engineers and Artillerists will be required perhaps these two years, or till after the completion of the Fundamental School.

The Secretary takes occasion also to mention, that the laws have already made provision for four teachers or professors to the artillerists and engineers, at a salary of eighty dollars per month, and two rations per day, which may be considered equivalent to four thousand three hundred and thirty-six dollars and forty-six cents per annum; and that the act providing for raising and organizing a corps of artillerists and engineers, passed the 9th May, 1794, makes it "the duty of the Secretary of War to provide, at the public expense, under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States, the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus, for the use and benefit of the said corps."

According to the plan and estimate of the buildings by Mr. Foncin, the two schools will cost thirty-eight thousand eight hundred and forty-six dollars.

According to the plan and estimate by Mr. Latrobe, the two schools will cost eighty thousand dollars.

The modification of the two regiments of artillerists and engineers will liberate twenty thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars annually.

The establishment of the two schools will liberate the salaries of the four teachers before mentioned, or four thousand three hundred and thirty-six dollars annually.

The books, apparatus, and instruments, directed to be provided for the use of the artillerists and engineers, are considered as an adequate offset for the books, apparatus, and instruments, required for the use of the schools; consequently, no charge has been stated in the estimate for these objects.

If, therefore, we oppose the sums thus annually liberated, to the annual salary of the professors, and original cost of the buildings; whichever of the plans is adopted, we shall find the measure proposed, viewed merely in the light of an operation of finance, to result in a considerable saving to the United States.

An individual would think it a good bargain to receive twenty-five thousand two hundred and ninety-one dollars, annually, the sum liberated, and to give, in lieu thereof, ten thousand four hundred and sixty-six dollars, annually, the salary of the professors, and a principal sum, equal to the cost of the buildings. In other words, he would receive fourteen thousand seven hundred and twenty-five dollars, annually, which is equivalent, at six per cent. to a capital, or principal, of two hundred and forty-five thousand four hundred and sixteen dollars; a sum greatly exceeding the estimated cost of the buildings, upon either estimate.

The committee, while they perceive that the seed, which it is now proposed to sow, is to yield a future harvest, will, at the same time, justly appreciate the various beneficial consequences which must result from the immediate adoption, and the striking inconveniences, and danger, to be apprehended from a postponement of the measure.

Whether our country is to be plunged into a war, or enjoy, for a length of time, the blessings of peace, and interior tranquillity; whether the portentous events which have afflicted Europe, and, in their progress, threatened the United States, are to subside into a settled state of things; whether the blessings of peace, and the customary relations, among the transatlantic powers, are to take place, or, hostilities shall be continued, protracted, and extended, beyond their present limits—in either view, it is equally a suggestion of policy, and wisdom, to improve our means of defence, and give as much perfection as possible to such establishments as may be conceived essential to the maintenance of our rights, and security from insults.

The unavoidable collisions growing out of trade, and the reciprocal restrictions of great commercial states; the apprehensions and jealousies natural to powers possessing contiguous territory; the inefficacy of religion and morality, to control the passions of men, or the interest and ambition of nations; the impossibility, at times, for governments to adjust their differences, or preserve their rights, without making sacrifices more to be dreaded than the hazards and calamities of war—all these considerations, illustrated by volumes of examples, teach the soundness of the axiom, *si vis pacem para bellum*. And what time more proper to prepare the materials for war, than a time of peace, or more urgent, than that in which a nation is threatened with war.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY, *Secretary of War.*

HARRISON G. OTIS, Esq. *Chairman of the Committee of Defence.*

6th CONGRESS.]

No. 41.

[1st Session.]

## APPOINTMENT AND EMOLUMENTS OF CERTAIN STAFF OFFICERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 21, 1800.

Mr. DWIGHT FOSTER, from the committee of claims, to whom was referred the petition of Campbell Smith, made the following report:

That the object of this petition is to obtain compensation for his services as "Judge Marshal and Advocate General to the legion of the United States," from the 16th of July, 1794, until the 13th of July, 1796; and as an extra aid-de camp to Brigadier General Wilkinson, from the 12th of August until the 5th of December in the same year 1794, and from the 16th of January, in the year 1796, until the 31st of December following.

With respect to the last mentioned claim for services as extra aid-de-camp, considering that during the whole of the period in which it is stated he acted in that capacity, Mr. Smith was an officer in the line of the army, and, as such, in the receipt of his pay and emoluments; and, considering that almost the whole of the same period is included within the term wherein it is understood he acted as Judge Advocate, the committee are of opinion, it would not be proper that any further or additional compensation should be made to him as an extra aid-de-camp.

With respect to the other part of the petitioner's claim to compensation as Judge Advocate, &c., the committee find, that, on the 16th of July, 1794, General Wayne, then commanding the troops of the United States, did, by his general orders of that date, give notice that the petitioner was "appointed Judge Marshal and Advocate General to the Legion of the United States, and that he was to be considered and respected accordingly;" and that the petitioner did accept the same appointment, and did discharge the duties thereof as stated in his petition.

Sundry documents tending to elucidate the nature and extent of his claims are hereunto subjoined, and submitted as a part of this report.

Upon a due and attentive consideration of the subject, the committee are of opinion, that the petitioner is justly entitled to relief, and therefore recommend to the House to agree to the following resolution, viz:

*Resolved*, That the proper accounting officers of the treasury liquidate and settle the account of Campbell Smith, for his services as Judge Advocate to the Legion of the United States, while he acted in that capacity, under an appointment made by General Wayne, on the 16th of July, 1794; and that he be allowed such pay and emoluments for said services, as are allowed by law to officers acting in that capacity.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 5th February, 1800.

SIR:

In compliance with the request contained in your letter of this date, I transmit, for the information of the committee of claims, copies of all the papers in my possession, relative to the claim of Lieutenant Campbell Smith.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

HON. DWIGHT FOSTER, *Chairman of the Committee of Claims.*

PHILADELPHIA, 10th February, 1798.

Sir:

Relative to the claim of Lieutenant Smith, who was appointed Judge Advocate to the army, by the commanding officer General Wilkinson, in general orders, and who for some time, as it is stated to me, rendered services in that capacity to the United States, it is my opinion he is equitably entitled to compensation for those services. Though General Wilkinson does not, in my opinion, possess the power of appointing the Judge Advocate, as I have seen no act of Congress vesting such power in him, yet as the President of the United States, with the advice of the Senate, has omitted to make the appointment, which omission has been supplied by the commanding officer for the good of the public service, I think the Judge Advocate should be paid for his services, as in any other case not expressly provided for by law, where in justice compensation is due from the United States. For adjusting the quantum payable to Lieutenant Smith for his services as Judge Advocate, no better rule can be suggested, than the allowance fixed by law to this office; and the contingent fund appears to me to be the proper fund for paying this claim.

These principles apply to the case of Lieutenant Webb of the cavalry, who, formerly a captain of the cavalry and deranged, took the command of a company of cavalry by the orders of General Wayne, when there was no other officer holding a commission where the company was. He ought to be paid as captain during the period of this extraordinary service out of the contingent fund.

The claim of Major Cushing is distinguishable from each of the former, as he was appointed Brigade Major and Inspector by General Wilkinson, who ought not to have appointed a field officer to either of these offices, but was directed by law to appoint to these offices out of the captains and subalterns of the line. Yet as these services were necessary, and were rendered, the United States owe a compensation to Major Cushing, which I think may also be paid out of the contingent fund, rather than he should go unpaid.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES LEE.

To the Secretary of War.

NEW YORK, October 25, 1799.

Sir:

Lieutenant Campbell Smith has made a representation to me, on the subject of some claims which he has pending in the Accountant's office, and has requested the interposition of my opinion.

Thinking it due to him as an officer now under my command, I trouble you with this letter.

He states that he has claims of two kinds: one for services rendered for more than two years as Judge Advocate, previous to the law authorizing that appointment, another for the legal emoluments of the office, in virtue of an appointment of the commanding General, on the cases of that law; that having been absent in consequence of ill health, induced by a severe wound received in the service, obstacles have occurred to the allowing of the compensation during the term of such absence; that the Attorney General has given an opinion, that the appointment was a regular one under the law, and that he understands this opinion to have been heretofore acted upon by your department.

Upon these data I submit my ideas.

I consider it to be a principle sanctioned by usage, that when an officer is called to exercise in a *permanent way* an office of skill in the army, (such as that of Judge Advocate,) for which provision is not made by law, he is to receive a *quantum meruit*, by special discretion, for the time he officiates, which in our present system would be paid out of the fund for the contingencies of the War Department.

This applies to the first claim.

As to the second, this is my opinion—that, considering the appointment as regularly made under the law, the emoluments continue of course, until the office has been abdicated or superseded, the non-exercise of it for any period to the contrary notwithstanding.

In the situation in which Lieutenant Smith was placed by his wound, he would seem entitled even to a liberal application of this rule of right.

With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

The Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 12th November, 1799.

Sir:

I received your letter of the 25th ultimo at Trenton, when the business of the office had closed there, and preparations were making to return to the seat of Government.

This letter relates to claims against the United States, for services rendered by Lieutenant Campbell Smith, which are stated to be of two kinds: 1st. For services as Judge Advocate for more than two years previous to the law authorizing that appointment. 2d. For the legal emoluments of the office of Judge Advocate, in virtue of an appointment of the commanding General, on the basis of that law.

The first claim I am not sufficiently informed respecting. No general or special order of appointment appears upon the files of the office. No certificates are presented to show that the duties of the office of Judge Advocate were permanently performed. The circumstances on which its equity is grounded are not before me. If the appointment was not permanent, but applied only to particular cases, and not to all, and did not oblige to perform the duties of the office at every military court, or at least every general court martial, held at or near the army where the officers served, I should apprehend no precedent authorizes the claim, and that its allowance would introduce a train of inconveniences; for, would not every officer who has acted, or shall act, in the same capacity on any military court, and how many have done and are daily doing so, become likewise entitled to the same measure of compensation, for the time he performed, or shall perform, the same duties? In such case, the whole amount of claims equally founded, I can form no estimate of.

As, however, no law sanctions this claim, as to do so would be contrary to past and present practice, unless the duties said to have been enjoined by the appointment were obligatory, permanent, and general; as no expectations have ever been indulged by other officers, who have heretofore or lately acted on military courts in the same office, and the balance of the claim, if for temporary services, would introduce serious inconvenience, I think proper to decline having any thing to do with it.

If, on the other hand, the appointment was intended to be permanent, and to enjoin general duties applicable to all military courts, held at or near the army with which this officer served, although I should then think the claim equitably founded, for compensation for the time services were performed under it, yet, as the appointment was not provided for, and no law established the office, I incline to suppose a legislative allowance would be most regular and conformable to the course heretofore pursued in similar cases, of which Captain Lewis's claim as volunteer aid is an instance.

The second claim is for the legal emoluments of the office of Judge Advocate, in virtue of an appointment of the commanding officer, on the basis of a law authorizing the appointment, relative to which you say it has been stated to you. The Attorney General has given an opinion that the appointment was a regular one, under the law, and that this opinion is understood to have been heretofore acted upon in this department, but that Lieutenant Smith having been absent in consequence of ill health, induced by a severe wound in the service, obstacles have occurred to the allowing of the compensation, during the term of such absence.

Proceeding on the statement made to you as your data, you give your opinion on the second claim as follows, viz: "Considering the appointment as regularly made under the law, the emoluments continue of course, until the office has been abdicated or superseded, the non-exercise of it, for any period to the contrary notwithstanding."

It will be proper to go into some detail respecting the second claim, and to show you that the opinion of the Attorney General by no means establishes the appointment of Lieutenant Smith, by the commanding General, on the basis of the law authorizing the appointment of a Judge Advocate as regular, but the contrary. It, however, considers

Lieutenant Smith, under all circumstances, as equitably entitled to compensation, for the services he had actually performed as Judge Advocate, although under an irregular appointment, and recommended the allowance, fixed by law, to this office as the best rule for the compensation, and the contingent as the proper fund out of which it should be paid.

When this claim was presented to me, I transmitted it, with those of two other gentlemen similarly circumstanced, to the Attorney General, and requested his opinion. A copy of this opinion, dated the 10th February, 1798, I now enclose.

On the 12th February, I wrote to the Accountant, "I enclose the opinions of the Attorney General of the United States, on the claims of Lieutenant Campbell Smith, Lieutenant Webb, and Major Cushing. I concur in them."

Referring to the Accountant's office, I find that Lieutenant Smith was settled with, upon the principles of, and agreeably to, the rule recommended by the Attorney General's opinion, from the first of March, 1797, to the 30th of April, 1798.

In consequence of a subsequent application, as I must suppose, by the same officer, referred to me by the Accountant, I wrote to the latter on the 26th of October, 1798—"Lieutenant Campbell Smith is considered, upon the principles of an opinion of the Attorney General, dated 10th February last, copy of which was transmitted to your office, to be entitled to all the emoluments attached to the office of Judge Advocate, for such time only as he was actually employed by Brigadier General Wilkinson, or by orders from the Secretary of War, since the 30th April last, in that capacity."

When I wrote thus, I knew Lieutenant Smith had been employed specially, by a warrant directed to him as Judge Advocate pro hac, on the trial of Lieutenant Parmele, and intended to avoid any expression which could be construed into a confirmation of his appointment to the office of Judge Advocate generally, and to confine his compensation to the time strictly for which he officiated in the capacity of Judge Advocate. No settlement was, however, made with him, after that which allowed him compensation to the 30th April: he probably declined any settlement other than one under his appointment by the General, and giving to him monthly emoluments."

An act to amend and repeal in part the act entitled "An act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States," passed the 3d March, 1797, "Provides, section 2d. That there shall be one Brigadier General, who may choose his Brigade Major and Inspector from the captains and subalterns in the line, (to each of whom there shall be allowed the monthly pay of twenty-five dollars in addition to his pay in the line, and two rations extraordinary per day, and whenever forage shall not be furnished by the public, to ten dollars per month in lieu thereof;) that there shall be one Judge Advocate, who shall be taken from the commissioned officers of the line, and shall be entitled to receive two rations extra per day, and twenty-five dollars per month, in addition to his pay in the line, and whenever forage shall not be furnished by the public, to ten dollars per month in lieu thereof."

It will be perceived, that the section of the law cited gives an express permission to the Brigadier General, to choose his Brigade Major and Inspector, but is silent respecting the appointment of the Judge Advocate, which is therefore conceived to rest in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The second clause of the second section of article second of the constitution, among other powers vested in the President, gives that, by and with the advice aforesaid, of appointing "all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of department."

It is proper to add that the nomination to the Senate of an officer to act in the capacity of Judge Advocate General, was declared from a conviction that the dispersed situation that the troops had or would assume, was incompatible with the attainment of much utility from such an officer, and that the same cause produced my disinclination to give any countenance to an expectation of permanent emoluments, under what I consider an irregular appointment.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JAMES MCHENRY.

Major General A. HAMILTON.

6th CONGRESS.]

No. 42.

[1st SESSION.]

OFFICERS APPOINTED UNDER THE ACT OF JULY 16, 1798, "TO AUGMENT THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, APRIL 17, 1800.

*Gentlemen of the Senate:*

In conformity with your request, I transmit you a return, from the War Office, of those officers who have been appointed under the act, entitled "An act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," designating such officers who have accepted their appointments, and those who have declined accepting, resigned their commissions, died, &c.

A report from the Secretary of War, which accompanied this return, as it contains observations which may throw some light upon the subject, I transmit with it.

UNITED STATES, April 17, 1800.

JOHN ADAMS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 15, 1800.

The Secretary of War, in obedience to the directions of the President, agreeably to a resolution of the Senate, "That the President of the United States be requested to direct the proper officer to lay before the Senate a return of all the officers who have been appointed under the act, entitled 'An act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes,' designating such officers who have accepted their appointments, and those who may have declined accepting, or resigned their commissions," has the honor to report the information required:

The Secretary respectfully takes the present occasion to mention, that there are a number of vacancies of the office of second lieutenants in the four old regiments of infantry, and to suggest, that it might be desirable, upon the disbanding of the twelve additional regiments, to fill these vacancies with the most deserving of the disbanded lieutenants. This measure would be particularly gratifying to such of the gentlemen contemplated, as look towards the military as a permanent profession, while it would carry into the old regiments, whatever military knowledge they may have already acquired. But it is proper also to observe, such necessary organs to companies and regiments as second lieutenants, can never long be dispensed with without injury to the service.

The Secretary takes the liberty to represent also, that there are a number of vacancies in the twelve additional regiments of infantry, occasioned by resignations and other incidents, to which the officers next in succession expect to be promoted, and that the uncertain duration of this force, and a principle of economy, has heretofore prevented the Secretary from proposing to the President, in the usual manner, to fill such vacancies by appointments.

As a general rule, the officer next in grade is entitled to a vacant post, and delay in promoting him to it, when not liable to special objection, is considered to be a violation of his right. It also prevents the rise or advance to promotion of all officers who stand below him.

Delay in permitting promotions to vacancies has injurious effects. The officers who are now kept out of their rights believe, that they suffer from the influence of a parsimonious spirit in the Government, and this has a strong tendency to disgust them with the service of their country. For, notwithstanding the officers of the twelve regiments are at least generally informed of the uniform practice of the Department of War, when an officer is advanced to a grade to which he is next in order, and entitled to date his commission on the day the vacancy occurred, and that he is always paid from the date of his commission, which is grounded upon the principle that the officer next in succession is always called upon the moment a vacancy happens, to do the same duty as the officer who before filled it; yet they consider their military career as of uncertain duration, and feel a well grounded apprehension that, if they shall never receive a new commission, the pay and emoluments of a higher grade will never attach to them, although now actually doing the duty of a higher grade.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

JAMES McHENRY.

*Return of the Officers who have been appointed under the act, entitled "An act to augment the Army of the United States, and for other purposes," designating such officers who have accepted their appointments, and those who have declined accepting, resigned their commissions, died, &c.*

*Lieutenant General.*

George Washington, (dead.)

*Major Generals.*

Alexander Hamilton, *Inspector General*,  
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,  
Henry Knox, *declined*.

*Brigadier Generals.*

John Brookes, *declined*,  
Jonathan Dayton, *do*,  
William Washington,  
William North, *Adjutant General*.

*Cavalry.*

John Watts, *Lieutenant Colonel Commandant*.

*Majors.*

Soloman Van Rensselaer,  
John Tayloe, *declined*.

*Captains.*

Richard Willing,  
Benjamin Williamson,  
Laurence Lewis, *declined*,  
John B. Armistead,  
William Spencer,  
Charles F. Mercer, *declined*,  
James Burn,  
James N. Ball.

*First Lieutenants.*

Robert Gray,  
John Wallback,  
George Washington Craik,  
Laurence Washington,  
Charles F. Mercer, *declined*,  
Richard Tilghman.

*Second Lieutenants.*

William C. Rogers,  
Alexander M'Comb, Jr.,  
Charles Tutt,  
George Washington P. Custis,  
Carter B. Fontaine,  
Richard Cook, *resigned*,  
\* Archibald Lee.

FIFTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

\* John Smith, *Lieutenant Colonel Commandant*.

*Majors.*

\* James Armstrong,  
\* Henry M. Rutledge.

*Captains.*

William Dangerfield,  
Fleming Woodridge,  
\* John Kershaw,  
\* James Hartley,  
\* Paul Thompson,  
\* Benjamin Easley,  
\* William Simons, *declined*,  
\* Benjamin Fossin Trasier,  
\* Noah Kelsey,  
\* Zecharia Nettles,  
\* John Mitchell.

*First Lieutenants.*

John Jameson,  
Charles Kilgore,  
\* John Brown,  
\* Charles Boyle,  
\* William Taylor,  
\* Josias Heyward,  
\* Peter Williamson,  
\* Stanmore Butler,  
\* George Clayton,  
\* William W. Trasier,  
\* Pierre Gaillard, *declined*.

*Second Lieutenants.*

Willis Morgan,  
Elijah Johnson,  
\* Samuel Taylor, *declined*,  
\* Thomas Osborne, Jr.,  
\* John Parker, son of William, *declined*,  
\* Charles Codnor Ash,  
\* Johnson Wellborn,  
\* Edward Croft, *declined*,  
\* William Darkey,  
\* Francis Rogers,  
\* Charles Jones Jenkins.

SIXTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

\* James Reed, *Lieutenant Colonel Commandant*.

*Majors.*

\* Alexander D. Moore,  
\* William Brickell.

*Captains.*

William P. Anderson, *resigned*,  
\* James Taylor,  
\* William Dickson,  
\* Eli Gaither,  
\* Edmund Smithwick,  
\* William Hall,  
\* John Williams,  
\* John Nicholas,  
\* Samuel Graves Barron,  
\* Maurice Moore.

*First Lieutenants.*

Lewis Tiner,  
 \* Robert Troy, *declined*,  
 \* James Mackay,  
 \* George W. Davidson, *declined*,  
 \* McKenny Long,  
 \* Benjamin Smith,  
 \* Joseph Alexander, *declined*,  
 \* Carleton Walker,  
 \* Edward Jones,  
 \* Hugh Newman, *declined*,  
 \* William Martin, ditto.

*Second Lieutenants.*

Edmund P. Gaines,  
 \* David T. W. Cook,  
 \* Mareus Sharpe,  
 \* James Morris,  
 \* John Wilkinson,  
 \* John Carroway,  
 \* Abner Pasteur,  
 \* Benjamin Forsyth,  
 \* Hugh Montgomery, (not heard from,)  
 \* Alexander Hunter.

\* Roger Cutler, *Surgeon*.

## SEVENTH REGIMENT.

Wm. Bentley, *Lieutenant Colonel Commandant*.

*Majors.*

Robert Beale,  
 James Baytop.

*Captains.*

Daniel Ball, *resigned*,  
 Edmund Clark,  
 John Davidson,  
 Archibald C. Randolph,  
 Bartholomew Dandridge, *declined*,  
 Thomas Turner, *declined*,  
 William Campbell,  
 Thomas Greene,  
 Robert King,  
 James Caldwell,  
 \* William K. Blue.

*First Lieutenants.*

Van Bennet,  
 John Brahan,  
 Robert Carrington, *declined*,  
 Brewer Godwin, *resigned*,  
 Felix Wilton,  
 Jesse Ewell, Jr.  
 Joseph Grigsby,  
 Robert Temple, *declined*,  
 Addison Armistead,  
 Samuel J. Winston,  
 Calvin Morgan,  
 \* John Heiskell,  
 \* Jesse Dold,  
 \* Horatio Stark,  
 \* Marquis Combs,  
 \* George Armistead,

*Second Lieutenants.*

John Heiskell, (promoted during recess)  
 Jesse Dold, ditto,  
 Horatio Stark, ditto,  
 Marquis Combs, ditto,  
 George Armistead, ditto,  
 William Potts,  
 Peter Lambkin,  
 Alexander Henderson, *declined*,  
 William Dean, do.  
 Andrew M. Lusk,  
 James Brown,  
 \* William Saunders,  
 \* John Crump, *declined*,  
 \* Bartlett Anderson,  
 \* Francis W. Cook,  
 \* Philip Roots,  
 \* John F. Powell,  
 \* Jacob Call.

\* Francis H. Peyton, *Surgeon*.

*Surgeon's Mates.*

\* Thaddeus Capron,  
 \* James W. Wallace, *resigned*.

## EIGHTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Thomas Parker, *Lieutenant Colonel Commandant*.

*Majors.*

Simon Morgan, *declined*,  
 \* Laurence Butler,  
 William Campbell.

*Captains.*

Presley Thornton,  
 Robert Gregg,  
 Henry Piercy,  
 George S. Washington,  
 Richard Chinn,  
 Garnet Peyton,  
 Daniel C. Lane,  
 Philip Lightfoot,  
 Edmund Taylor,  
 Nathaniel Henry.

*First Lieutenants.*

Francis Foushee, *resigned*,  
 James Duncanson,  
 Lemuel Bent,  
 Robert Gustin,  
 George Tate,  
 Charles J. Love,  
 John G. Brown,  
 John Williams,  
 Thomas Jameson,  
 John Campbell,  
 \* James Tutt,  
 \* Simon Owens.

*Second Lieutenants*

James Tutt, *promoted during recess*  
 Simon Owens, ditto,  
 Reuben Thornton, *declined*.  
 George W. Humphries,  
 Obadiah Clifford,  
 Strother Settle, *declined*,  
 John C. Williams, do.  
 Charles Shackelford,  
 John T. Fitzhugh, *declined*,  
 Willis Wells, do.  
 Hugh McCallister,  
 John Craine, Jr.  
 \* John Meredith,  
 \* John Stephens,  
 \* Robert Bell,  
 \* Uriah Blue,  
 \* Richard Taylor,  
 \* Robert Little.

\* Edward Conrad, *Surgeon*.

*Surgeon's Mates.*

\* Thomas Tiplett, *resigned*,  
 \* Samuel M. Griffith.

## NINTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Josiah C. Hall, *Lieutenant Colonel Commandant*.

*Majors.*

David Hopkins,  
 William D. Beall.

*Captains.*

John C. Beatty, *declined*,  
 Thomas Beatty,  
 Lloyd Beall,  
 Gerard Briscoe,  
 Rezin Davidge,  
 Bradley Beans, *declined*,  
 Isaac Spencer,  
 William Nicholson, *declined*,  
 Jacob Norris,  
 Valentine Brothers,  
 John W. Hackett,  
 Jonathan Hodgson,  
 Richard Earle.



*First Lieutenants.*

William Elliott,  
Edward A. Howard, *declined*,  
Richard W. West, do.  
John B. Barnes,  
Ninian Pinckney,  
Levi Alexander,  
Matthew Tilghman,  
Henry C. Neale,  
Aquila Beale,  
William Sarrn,  
Charles Clements,  
\* John Thompson,  
\* Robert Gover.

*Second Lieutenants.*

Alexander Cooper,  
John Brangle, *declined*,  
Enos Noland,  
Thomas Dent,  
Levi Hillary,  
John Warren, *declined*,  
William Swan,  
Levi G. Ford,  
Daniel Hughes,  
John Adlum,  
Edward Ford, *declined*,  
\* George Peter,  
\* Joseph Bentley,  
\* Benjamin Nowland.

\* Robert Geddes, *Surgeon*.

*Surgeon's Mates.*

\* Charles H. Winder, *declined*,  
\* Anderson Warfield, do.  
\* Dardan Brown,  
\* William Beatty, *declined*,  
\* Charles A. Beatty.

## TENTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

Thomas L. Moore.

*Majors.*

William Henderson,  
George Stevenson.

*Captains.*

Joseph McKinney,  
James Blaine,  
Andrew Johnson,  
Matthew Henry,  
William R. Atlee, *declined*,  
Hugh Brady,  
William Graham,  
David Duncan,  
Benjamin Gibbs,  
James Ashman,  
\* Robert Westcott.

*First Lieutenants.*

John Sharp, *dead*,  
Samuel B. Magaw,  
Henry G. Slough,  
Samuel Fulton, *declined*,  
Josiah McElwaine, do.  
James P. Nelson, do.  
Benjamin Wallace,  
Robert Laurence,  
Nelson Wade,  
Thomas Swearingen,  
Crumwell Pierce,  
Henry Westcott, *declined*,  
\* Alexander McNair,  
\* David Irving,  
\* Paul Weitzell,  
\* David Offley,  
\* Samuel R. Franklin,  
\* William Morrow.

*Second Lieutenants.*

William Morrow, *promoted during recess*,  
George Hamill,

Archibald Davis, *resigned*,  
John A. Douglass,  
Herman Witner, *declined*,  
Hugh H. Potts,  
John S. Porter, *declined*,  
John Smith,  
Robert Chambers,  
Alexander McNair, *declined*,  
Thomas Lee,  
\* John Hay,  
\* Robert George Barde,  
\* Joseph Knox.

*Surgeons.*

\* Henry Hall, *declined*,  
\* William Hurst.

*Surgeon's Mates.*

\* George Wilson,  
\* James Irvine.

## ELEVENTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

Aaron Ogden.

*Majors.*

William Shute,  
John Adlum.

*Captains.*

Robert Hunt, *resigned*,  
Charles Marles,  
Job Stockton,  
Denise Foreman,  
Almarine Brookes,  
Samuel White,  
Samuel Bowman,  
Peter Faulkner,  
Walter K. Cole, *resigned*,  
James Read,  
\* Samuel Erwin.

*First Lieutenants.*

Samuel Erwin, *promoted during recess*,  
Thomas Reading, Jr. *resigned*,  
Robert C. Thompson,  
Samuel C. Voorhes,  
Walter K. Cole, *declined*,  
George M. Ogden,  
John G. Macwhorter,  
William Potter,  
Henry Betz, *declined*,  
William Carson,  
Lewis Howard,  
James Battel,  
\* John Caldwell,  
\* Samuel Owen Smith, *declined*,  
\* Charles B. Green,  
\* William J. Anderson,  
\* Thomas Bullman,  
\* Henry Drake.

*Second Lieutenants.*

William Piatt,  
Charles Read, *resigned*,  
Thomas Bullman, *promoted during recess*,  
Henry Drake, *ditto*,  
Hethcote Johnson,  
James Rhea,  
James Clayton, junr. *declined*,  
John Milroy,  
Benjamin Worrell,  
John Montgomery,  
Jabez Caldwell,  
\* Thomas Y. How,  
\* Joseph Vancleve,  
\* Laurence Mulford.

*Surgeon.*

\* John Chetwood, junr.

*Surgeon's Mates.*

\* John Howell,  
\* John C. Wynans.

## TWELFTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

William S. Smith.

*Majors.*William Willcocks,  
Christopher Hutton, *declined*,  
\* Dowe J. Fondy.*Captains.*Dowe J. Fondy, *promoted during recess*,  
Philip Church,  
James Bennet,  
George W. Kirkland,  
Philip Cortland,  
Adrian Kissam, *resigned*,  
John W. Patterson, *resigned*,  
Justus B. Smith, *not heard from*,  
Jeremiah Landon,  
Andrew White.*First Lieutenants.*Philip S. Schuyler,  
Elhanan W. Wheeler,  
Moses Foster,  
Thomas Thompson,  
David Jones, *declined*,  
Robert Le Roy Livingston,  
Henry W. Ludlow,  
Nathaniel Paulding, *resigned*,  
James Smith,  
Richard Baldwin, *resigned*,  
\* William Cocks,  
\* William Cumming,  
\* Joseph C. Cooper,  
\* Thomas H. Williams,  
\* Samuel Hoffman, *dismissed*.*Second Lieutenants.*William Cocks, *promoted in recess*.  
William Cumming, ditto,  
Joseph C. Cooper, ditto,  
Thomas H. Williams, ditto,  
Samuel Hoffman, ditto,  
John Duer,  
William W. Wands,  
Prosper Brown, *dead*,  
Jacob C. Ten Eyck,  
George F. Harrison, *declined*,  
\* Israel Loring,  
\* Joseph Herkeimer,  
\* Jacob Mancius,  
\* Nathaniel Smith,  
\* Cornelius Kip,  
\* Tobias V. Cuyler, *resigned*,  
\* Walter B. Vrooman.*Surgeon.*\* Samuel Finley, *resigned*.*Surgeon's Mates.*\* John H. Douglas,  
\* Samuel Davis.

## THIRTEENTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

Timothy Taylor.

*Majors.*John Ripley,  
Jabez Huntington, *resigned*.*Captains.*John Benjamin,  
John Meigs,  
Elihu Sandford,  
Stephen Ranney,  
Samuel Blakeslee,  
Jonathan Root,  
John Bulford,  
Asa Copeland,  
William Young, junr.  
Coleby Chew, *declined*.*First Lieutenants.*Samuel Waugh,  
Lemuel Harrison,  
Bennet Bronson,  
Reuben Hurd,  
Trueman Mosely,  
John Knox,  
William W. Cheney,  
Ludowick Gallup,  
John Eels,  
Waters Clark,  
\* Nathaniel Ruggles,  
\* John Beers.*Second Lieutenants.*Salmon Clark,  
Peter N. Brinsmade,  
Trueman Hinman,  
Walter Smith,  
Joseph A. Wells, *declined*,  
James Gordon, junr.  
Ebenezer Learned, *declined*,  
Peter Richards, do.  
Robert Hosmer, *struck off the list, not being*  
Solomon Allen, [heard of].  
\* Austin Ledyard, *declined*,  
\* Nathaniel Noyes,  
\* Fanning Tracey,  
\* Abijah Fenn, *suspended and resigned*.*Surgeon.*

\* Joseph Trowbridge.

*Surgeon's Mates.*\* Timothy Pierce,  
\* John Spaulding, *declined*,  
\* John Orton, junr.

## FOURTEENTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

Nathan Rice.

*Majors.*John Walker,  
Isaac Winslow.*Captains.*William Jones, *declined*,  
Erasmus Babbet, junr.  
Ephraim Emmerly,  
John Tolman,  
Solomon Phelps,  
Ebenezer Thatcher, *declined*,  
Thomas Chandler, *resigned*,  
Nathaniel Thwing,  
John Burbeck, *declined*,  
Simeon Draper,  
Phineas Ashman,  
Joseph Peirce, junr. *declined*,  
Arthur Lithgow, do.  
\* Samuel Mackay,  
\* John Hastings.*First Lieutenants.*James Church,  
Nathaniel Soley, *declined*,  
Jacob Allen,  
William A. Baron, *declined*,  
Robert Duncan, junr.  
Phineas Ashman, *declined*,  
Alpheus Cheney,  
Samuel Flagg, junr. *resigned*,  
John Wheelwright,  
Isaac Rhand, junr.  
Benjamin Beale, junr. *declined*,  
\* Henry Sargent,  
\* Francis Barker,  
\* William Gardner,  
\* Rufus Child.*Second Lieutenants.*Thomas Heald, *declined*,  
Moses M. Bates, do.

Charles Hunt,  
James Gardner,  
Marshall Spring, *resigned*,  
Daniel Hastings,  
Duncan Ingraham, *resigned*,  
William Leverett,  
John Roulstone,  
Thomas Durant,  
Samuel W. Church, *resigned*,  
Peyton Gay,  
Thos. Hall,  
Charles Leonard, *declined*.

*Surgeon.*

\* Charles Blake.

*Surgeon's Mates.*\* Luther Stearns, *declined*,  
\* Josiah Dwight, *declined*.

## FIFTEENTH REGIMENT.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

Richard Hunnewell.

*Majors.*John Rowe,  
William Jones.*Captains.*James Brown,  
Nathaniel Balch, jun.  
Hall Tufts,  
John Pyncheon,  
John Blake,  
Samuel Jordan,  
William Heywood,  
Caleb Aspinwall,  
Stephen Peabody,  
Thomas Philips, *declined*,  
\* Eli Forbes.*First Lieutenants.*Charles Cutler,  
William Swan,  
Samuel P. Fay,  
Eleazer Williams, *declined*,  
Nathaniel Kidder,  
Thomas Bowman, *declined*,  
Ebenezer Bradish, jun.  
John Shepherd, *declined*,  
Joseph Lee, *declined*,  
David C. D. Forrest,  
Charles P. Phelps, *declined*,  
Edmund Soper,  
\* Thomas Stephens,  
\* Augustus Hunt,  
\* Daniel Morse, *declined*.*Second Lieutenants.*Abijah Harrington,  
Jonathan Nichols,  
Daniel Bell,  
John Page, jun.  
David Fales,  
Franklin Tinkham,Willard Fales,  
Warren Hall, *declined*,  
James D. Wheaton,  
Seth Bannister,  
\* Nathan Parks.*Surgeon.*

\* Oliver Mann.

*Surgeons' Mates.*\* Jonathan White,  
\* Ebenezer Laurence.

## SIXTEENTH REGIMENT.

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.*

\* Rufus Graves.

*Majors.*\* Timothy Darling, *resigned*,  
\* Cornelius Lynde.*Captains.*Josiah Dunham,  
Nathaniel Green,  
Robert Parker,  
Henry Tilton,  
William Woodward,  
Israel Elliot Trask,  
John Rogers, *declined*,  
George Tillinghast,  
Abraham R. Ellery,  
Jonathan Andrews,  
George Woodward.*First Lieutenants.*Francis Gardner, *declined*,  
Daniel M. Durell,  
Abel Hutchins, *declined*,  
Sylvester G. Whipple,  
Ephraim Whitney, *declined*,  
Whipple Lovett,  
Robert Overing,  
Thomas Brinley,  
Daniel Bissell,  
Isaac Putnam,  
\* Israel W. Kelly,  
\* Thaddeus Kendall,  
\* Marmaduke Wait.*Second Lieutenants.*Arthur Rogers, *declined*,  
Moses Sweat,  
Israel Bartlett,  
Samuel Parker,  
Jesse Lull,  
Daniel Baker,  
Cary Clarke,  
Ozeas Danforth,  
William E. Green, *declined*,  
Christopher Whipple,  
John W. Brownson,  
\* Benjamin F. Starke.

NOTE. The officers in the foregoing return having the mark \* affixed opposite to their names, are those which were appointed by the President during the recess of the Senate. Those where the contrary is not expressed, are now in service.

JAMES MCHENRY, *Secretary of War.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 15th, 1800.*

[6th CONGRESS.]

No. 43.

[1st SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 5, 1800.

Mr. NICHOLAS, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the President's speech as relates to "a system of national defence, commensurate with our resources and the situation of our country," made the following report:

That it is expedient to make a further appropriation for the fortification of the ports and harbors of the United States, and therefore recommend the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That there be appropriated, for the present year, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, to be applied to the fortifications of the ports and harbors of the United States, in aid of the sums heretofore appropriated for that purpose, and remaining unexpended.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 1st*, 1800.

SIR:

The schedule, which accompanied my report to the President of the United States, submitted by him to Congress, on the 13th of January, ultimo, exhibits a view of the appropriations and expenditures for the defence of certain ports and harbors of the United States.

There now remains, of the appropriations heretofore made, about thirty-eight thousand dollars, a sum wholly inadequate to complete the works which have been undertaken, and now are progressing.

Without pretending to an accurate estimate of the sums which will be indispensable to complete certain defences, for the harbors of Boston, those in Rhode Island, of Salem, Marblehead, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and the works on Beacon Island, North Carolina, &c. and not knowing what other ports there may be a demand and necessity for fortifying, may it not suffice, to confine the extended grant of moneys, for the purpose of fortifying our ports and harbors, to the probable amount which may be required within the present year, predicated on the average expenditures of the preceding years.

The Secretary, accordingly, respectfully submits an opinion, that it will be proper to appropriate, to the fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States, for the year 1800, one hundred thousand dollars,

And has the honor to be, with the greatest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MCHENRY.

The CHAIRMAN of the Committee of Defence.

[6th CONGRESS.]

No 44.

[2d SESSION.]

## GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 23, 1801.

*Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:*

The enclosed report to me, made by the acting Secretary of War, on the 14th of this month, appears to be so well founded, in all respects, that I recommend it to the consideration of Congress.

JOHN ADAMS.

UNITED STATES, *February 20th*, 1801.WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 14*, 1801.

SIR:

Great inconveniences being experienced in the army, from the want of a competent general staff, I conceive it to be my duty to submit the matter to your consideration.

Though the army is at present a small one, the duties of adjutant and inspector general must be performed, and, from the nature of our service, in small detachments, these duties become more laborious than in an army acting in one compact body. At present, an officer in the line of the army resides at the seat of Government for these purposes, but there is no law allowing him any compensation for these extra services. As he is obliged to keep an office, and be constantly employed himself, and also constantly to employ a clerk, it cannot be expected that he can continue to do the duties, without compensation beyond his pay in the line.

Perhaps a sufficient power rests in the Secretary of War to allow him an adequate sum for his extra labor and expenses. But, if this be true, it is a loose discretion, which I conceive ought to be directed by law. It is my opinion, that a law authorizing the appointing of a field officer in the line to perform the duties, and giving him additional compensation for his services, and also giving him an assistant from among the subaltern officers, would promote regularity in the department, discipline in the army, and public economy.

I have the honor to be, with profound respect, sir, your obedient and faithful servant,

SAMUEL DEXTER.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

[7th CONGRESS.]

No. 45.

[1st SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 8, 1801.

*By message of the President of the United States, of which the following is an extract:*

The fortifications of our harbors, more or less advanced, present considerations of great difficulty. While some of them are on a scale sufficiently proportioned to the advantages of their position, to the efficacy of their protection, and the importance of the points within it, others are so extensive, will cost so much in their first erection, so much in their maintenance, and require such a force to garrison them, as to make it questionable what is best now to be done. A statement of those commenced or projected, of the expenses already incurred, and estimates of their future cost, as far as it can be foreseen, shall be laid before you, that you may be enabled to judge whether any alteration is necessary in the laws respecting this subject.

Statement of Moneys applied for the defence of certain Ports and Harbors in the United States, in pursuance of the "Act to provide for the defence of certain Ports and Harbors in the United States," passed the 20th March, 1794, distinguishing the moneys expended for the Fortifications of each Harbor to the 16th November, 1801, inclusive.

NAMES OF PLACES FORTIFIED.	In 1794.		In 1795.		In 1796.		In 1797.		In 1798.		To 1st October, 1799.		From 1st October, 1799, to 31st Dec. 1800.		In 1801.		Total amount.		
	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	Dollars.	Cts.	
Portland, District Maine, - - - - -	-	-	791 00	-	369 00	-	68 25	-	1,200 00	-	4,264 06	-	1,449 48	-	357 46	-	8,499 25	-	
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, - - - - -	250 00	-	266 00	-	316 00	-	-	-	1,000 00	-	-	-	2,570 81	-	4,500 00	-	8,902 81	-	
Salem, Massachusetts, - - - - -	93 60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000 00	-	500 00	-	-	-	2,593 60	-	
Marblehead, - - - - -	300 00	-	1,011 68	-	508 87	-	114 84	-	-	-	6,000 00	-	5,060 47	-	639 05	-	13,634 91	-	
Boston, - - - - -	496 27	-	1,342 50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46,304 21	-	58,499 69	-	106,642 67	-	
Newport, Rhode Island, - - - - -	500 00	-	864 75	-	198 91	-	-	-	5,900 00	-	50,000 00	-	41,431 25	-	8,500 00	-	107,394 91	-	
New London, Connecticut, - - - - -	350 00	-	943 88	-	200 85	-	-	-	-	-	7,520 00	-	413 66	-	-	-	9,428 39	-	
New York, - - - - -	1,327 00	-	6,866 54	-	1,124 00	-	-	-	30,117 24	-	30,116 18	-	20,124 40	-	10,338 05	-	100,013 41	-	
Philadelphia, - - - - -	4,050 00	-	1,653 00	-	-	-	-	-	12,576 52	-	23,000 00	-	20,000 00.	-	1,100 00	-	62,384 52	-	
Baltimore, - - - - -	500 00	-	900 69	-	1,068 39	-	802 00	-	17,624 50	-	4,468 51	-	60,114 56	-	8,185 71	-	93,664 36	-	
Annapolis, - - - - -	-	-	268 50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	268 50	-	
Norfolk, - - - - -	3,210 85	-	1,193 50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	402 00	-	1,181 58	-	-	-	5,987 93	-	
Alexandria, - - - - -	800 00	-	1,208 00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,008 00	-	
Cape Fear River, - - - - -	2,418 00	-	1,463 50	-	1,430 95	-	-	-	-	-	5,333 33	-	10,426 66	-	3,569 69	-	24,642 13	-	
Charleston, S. C. - - - - -	3,850 00	-	4,625 45	-	1,149 00	-	912 00	-	4,205 98	-	11,500 00	-	-	-	48 68	-	25,931 11	-	
Georgetown, S. C. - - - - -	250 00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250 00	-	
Savannah, Georgia, - - - - -	1,050 00	-	86 00	-	426 00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,562 00	-	
St. Mary's, do. - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000 00	-	2,578 91	-	-	-	4,578 91	-	
																			578,387 41

In addition to the above sums expended by this department, large expenditures have been made through the Treasury Department.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, Accountant's Office, 16th November, 1801.

WM. SIMMONS.

[7th CONGRESS.]

No. 46.

[1st SESSION.]

## NUMERICAL FORCE OF THE ARMY,

*And an estimate of the number of men requisite for each garrison at the several posts and stations.*

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 24, 1801.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 23d December, 1801.

SIR:

In obedience to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d instant, I have the honor of transmitting, herewith, a statement of the present military establishment of the United States, marked A, and an estimate of all the posts and stations for which garrisons will be expedient, and of the number of men requisite, in my opinion, for each garrison, marked B, and request you to lay the same before the House.

I have the honor of being, with respectful consideration, sir, your very obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

## A.

*A general return of the Army of the United States, showing the effective strength of the General Staff, and of each regiment and corps; and also the number wanting in each grade to complete the Military Establishment.*

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.	General Staff Officers.											Field, Staff, and Commissioned Officers.								Cadets, and Non-commissioned staff officers.		Non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, Artificers, and Privates.								Total Cadets, Non-commissioned Staff Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, Artificers, and Privates.	Aggregate.			
	Brigadier General.	Quartermaster General.	Paymaster General.	Inspector of the Army.	Inspector of Artillery.	Inspector of Fortifications.	Division Quartermaster.	Brigade Inspectors.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Aid-de-Camp.	Judge Advocate.	Lieutenants Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Paymasters.	Quartermasters.	Adjutants.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Cadets.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Senior Musicians.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Fifers.			Trumpeters.	Artificers.	Privates.
General Staff officers,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	8	13	9	1	4	86	106	10
Dismounted Cavalry,													4	16	27	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	40	43	13	9	1	57	649	110	
First regiment of Artillerists and Engineers,												4	14	25	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	57	52	8	5	77	667	694		
Second do. do.												4	14	25	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	57	52	8	5	77	667	926		
First regiment of Infantry,												1	3	9	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	39	35	9	8	1	392	470		
Second do. do.												1	3	9	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	39	38	10	10	1	392	502		
Third do. do.												1	3	10	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	26	24	7	7	1	399	466		
Fourth do. do.												2	9	9	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	33	32	12	8	1	503	592	625		
<b>Total,</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>3065</b>	<b>3803</b>	<b>4051</b>	
Wanting to complete the establishment,	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	1	1	5	17	11	-	-	-	-	5	97	4	5	5	62	74	-	3	1	124	975	1341	1384	
Military establishment of the United States,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	6	16	74	106	42	6	6	6	6	12	106	16	16	10	296	296	50	50	2	262	4040	5144	5438	
Officers of the General Staff, for the filling of whose vacancies in the regiments no provision is made by law; and surplus musicians in service,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-

INSPECTOR'S OFFICE, City of Washington, December 19th, 1801.

T. H. CUSHING, Major and Inspector.

## B.

*Estimate of all the Posts and Stations where garrisons will be expedient, and of the number of men requisite for each garrison.*

NAMES OF POSTS.	WHERE SITUATED.	No. of companies of Artillery.	No. of companies of Infantry.
Michillimackinac, - - - -	Northwestern Territory, - - -	1	1
Detroit, - - - -	Ditto, - - - -	1	4
Niagara, - - - -	New York, - - - -	1	1
Fort Wayne, - - - -	Northwestern Territory, - - -	-	1
Pittsburg and Cincinnati, - - -	Pennsylvania and Northwestern Territory, - - -	-	1
St. Vincennes, - - - -	Indiana Territory, - - - -	-	1
Fort Massac, - - - -	Near the mouth of the Ohio, - - -	-	1
South West Point, &c. - - - -	Tennessee, - - - -	1	2
Chickasaw Bluffs, - - - -	On the Mississippi, - - - -	1	-
Fort Adams, - - - -	On ditto, near the Spanish boundary, - - -	1	4
Fort	On the Mobile river, near the Spanish boundary, - - -	-	1
Fort Greene, Fort Wilkinson, and (say)			
Cumberland Island, - - - -	Georgia, - - - -	1	3
Fort Moultrie, &c. and Fort Johnston, - - -	South Carolina and North Carolina, - - -	2	-
Fort Norfolk, &c. and Fort McHenry, - - -	Virginia and Maryland, - - -	2	-
Fort Mifflin and the arsenal, - - - -	Near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, - - -	2	-
Fort Jay and West Point, - - - -	New York, - - - -	2	-
Fort Wolcott and Fort Trumbull, - - - -	Rhode Island and Connecticut, - - -	2	-
Fort Independence, and the magazine at Springfield, - - - -	Massachusetts, - - - -	2	-
Fort Constitution, and Fort	New Hampshire and District of Maine, - - -	1	-

Total, twenty companies of Artillery, and twenty companies of Infantry, each company to consist of seventy-six men, exclusive of commissioned officers and cadets.

H. DEARBORN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, 23d December, 1801.

7th CONGRESS.]

No. 47.

[1st SESSION.]

ORDNANCE, ARMS, AND MILITARY STORES, AND AN ESTIMATE OF EXPENSES NECESSARY FOR FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 2, 1802.

*Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives :*

I now lay before you,

1. A return of ordnance, arms, and military stores, the property of the United States.
2. Returns of muskets and bayonets, fabricated at the armories of the United States, at Springfield and Harper's Ferry, and of the expenditures at those places; and,
3. An estimate of expenditures which may be necessary for fortifications and barracks, for the present year.

Besides the permanent magazines established at Springfield, West Point, and Harper's Ferry, it is thought one should be established in some point convenient for the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; such a point will probably be found near the border of the Carolinas, and some small provision by the Legislature, preparatory to the establishment, will be necessary for the present year.

We find the United States in possession of certain iron mines and works, in the county of Berkeley, and State of Virginia, purchased, as is presumable, on the idea of establishing works for the fabrication of cannon and other military articles by the public. Whether this method of supplying what may be wanted, will be most advisable, or that of purchasing at market, where competition brings every thing to its proper level of price and quality, is for the Legislature to decide; and if the latter alternative be preferred, it will rest for their further consideration, in what way the subjects of this purchase may be best employed or disposed of. The Attorney General's opinion on the subject of the title accompanies this.

There are, in various parts of the United States, small parcels of land which have been purchased, at different times, for cantonments and other military purposes. Several of them are in situations not likely to be accommodated to future purposes. The loss of the records prevents a detailed statement of these, until they can be supplied by inquiry; in the mean time, one of them, containing eighty-eight acres, in the county of Essex, in New Jersey, purchased in 1799, and sold the following year, to Cornelius Vermule and Andrew Codmas, though its price has been received, cannot be conveyed without authority from the Legislature.

I enclose, herewith, a letter from the Secretary of War on the subject of the islands in the lakes and rivers of our Northern boundary, and of certain lands in the neighborhood of some of our military posts, on which it may be expedient for the Legislature to make some provisions.

TH. JEFFERSON.

February 2, 1802.



*Return of Ordnance, Arms, &c. the property of the United States.*

<i>Brass Cannon.</i>				<i>Grape Shot unfixed.</i>					
2	-	-	-	2 pound.	3,094	for	-	-	3 pounders.
47	-	-	-	3 do.	1,469	-	-	-	4 do.
26	-	-	-	4 do.	2,450	-	-	-	6 do.
81	-	-	-	6 do.	4,789	-	-	-	9 do.
8	-	-	-	9 do.	9,153	-	-	-	12 do.
11	-	-	-	12 do.	161	-	-	-	18 do.
3	-	-	-	24 do.	7,037	-	-	-	24 do.
					115	-	-	-	32 do.
<i>Brass Howitzers.</i>				<i>Strapped Shot unfixed.</i>					
39	-	-	-	2 $\frac{3}{4}$ inch.	2,197	for	-	-	3 do.
60	-	-	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.	743	-	-	-	4 do.
30	-	-	-	8 do.	2,299	-	-	-	6 do.
					33	-	-	-	9 do.
					1,378	-	-	-	12 do.
					212	-	-	-	24 do.
<i>Brass Mortars.</i>				<i>Case Shot unfixed.</i>					
20	-	-	-	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.	39	for	-	-	1 do.
18	-	-	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.	775	-	-	-	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 3 do.
2	-	-	-	8 do.	1,886	-	-	-	4 do.
15	-	-	-	10 do.	2,040	-	-	-	6 do.
3	-	-	-	13 do.	116	-	-	-	9 do.
1	-	-	-	16 do.	898	-	-	-	12 do.
					163	-	-	-	18 do.
<i>Brass Swivels.</i>				<i>Cannon Balls.</i>					
4					195	-	-	-	24 do.
					110	-	-	-	2 $\frac{3}{4}$ inch.
<i>Iron Cannon.</i>				<i>Bar Shot.</i>					
6	-	-	-	1 pound.	116	-	-	-	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.
9	-	-	-	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 3 do.	664	-	-	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.
39	-	-	-	4 do.	175	-	-	-	8 do.
66	-	-	-	6 do.					
115	-	-	-	9 do.	8,032	-	-	-	1 pounder.
240	-	-	-	12 do.	16,052	-	-	-	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 3 do.
274	-	-	-	18 do.	34,242	-	-	-	4 do.
284	-	-	-	24 do.	18,463	-	-	-	6 do.
23	-	-	-	32 do.	15,223	-	-	-	9 do.
					17,840	-	-	-	12 do.
<i>Iron Carronades, of sizes.</i>				<i>Iron Mortars.</i>					
21					28,743	-	-	-	18 do.
<i>Iron Howitzers.</i>				<i>Shells.</i>					
30	-	-	-	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.	11,451	-	-	-	24 do.
202	Garrison	carriages.			6,739	-	-	-	32 do.
207	Travelling	carriages for cannon.			1,145	-	-	-	42 do.
64	do.	do. for howitzers.							
29	Mortar	beds.							
5	Travelling	forges.							
2	Ammunition	wagons.							
6	Tumbril	carts.							
14	Backs	for travelling forges.							
<i>Grape Shot fixed.</i>				<i>Pounds of Grape Shot.</i>					
342	-	for	-	3 pounders.	3,964	-	-	-	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch.
202	-	-	-	4 do.	6,175	-	-	-	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.
591	-	-	-	6 do.	14,319	-	-	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.
126	-	-	-	9 do.	14,361	-	-	-	7 & 8 do.
102	-	-	-	12 do.	13,170	-	-	-	9 & 10 do.
					913	-	-	-	13 & 16 do.
<i>Strapped Shot fixed.</i>				<i>Pounds of Musket Ball and Buckshot.</i>					
1,985	-	for	-	3 do.	224,570				
3,658	-	-	-	4 do.					
3,386	-	-	-	6 do.	55,577				
280	-	-	-	9 do.					
233	-	-	-	12 do.					
130	-	-	-	24 do.					
<i>Case Shot fixed.</i>				<i>Flannel Cartridges.</i>					
527	-	for	-	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 3 do.	970	Filled.			
2,050	-	-	-	4 do.	18,547	Empty.			
3,365	-	-	-	6 do.	129	Paper filled.			
613	-	-	-	9 do.	78,599	Do. empty.			
735	-	-	-	12 do.					
118	-	-	-	24 do.					
256	-	-	-	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch.					
253	-	-	-	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ do.					
	21	<i>m</i>							
				<i>Pounds of Cannon, Musket, and Rifle Powder.</i>					
					573,207				
					125,307	Pistol cartridges.			
					1,251,933	Musket do.			
					22,108	Blank do.			
					12,697	Fuzes primed.			
					22,288	Not primed.			

3,818 Portfires.  
 3½ Coils of slow match.  
 6,062 Pounds of do.  
 36,857 Tubes.

*Cannon Cartridge Paper.*

8,622 Quires of.  
 3,083 Pounds of.

*Musket Cartridge Paper.*

3,643 Quires of.

465 Rampart arms.  
 53 Blunderbusses.  
 947 Carbines.  
 1,536 Rifles.

32 Fuseses.  
 5,005 Muskets.  
 82,711 Muskets complete.  
 1,205 Pairs of pistols.  
 7,755 Swords.  
 15,966 Screwdrivers.  
 1,585,860 Musket flints.  
 22,991 Pistol do.  
 454 Cutlasses.  
 20,011 Gun worms.  
 1,327,254 Pounds of lead.  
 224,217 Pounds of sulphur.  
 13,623 Brushes and wires.  
 1,438,855 Pounds of saltpetre.  
 44,769 Cartouch boxes.  
 3,666 Powder horns.  
 816 Horseman's pikes.

H. DEARBORN.

The arms in possession of the army are not included in the foregoing return.

*Return of Muskets and Bayonets fabricated at the United States Armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, from and including the year 1795, to the 28th November, 1801.*

					Muskets.	Bayonets.
In the year	1795,	-	-	-	245	
Do.	1796,	-	-	-	835	
Do.	1797,	-	-	-	1,028	
Do.	1798,	-	-	-	1,434	390
Do.	1799,	-	-	-	4,595	4,595
Do.	1800,	-	-	-	5,304	5,304
To the 28th November, 1801,		-	-	-	2,679	2,679
					16,120	12,968

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 8, 1801.

Statement of expenditures at the armory of, Springfield, Massachusetts, from the 10th July, 1793, to the 31st December, 1800,					\$192,847	1
Do. from the 1st January to the 30th September, 1801,					37,404	22
					\$230,251	23

Statement of expenditures at the armory at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, from the 1st October, 1798, to the 31st December, 1800,					61,725	12
Do. from the 1st January to the 30th June, 1801,					13,489	86
					\$ 75,214	98

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *Accountant's Office*, December 8, 1801.

The above statement exhibits expenditures at the aforesaid armories, agreeably to accounts settled and entered on the books of this office.

WM. SIMMONS, *Acc't, Department of War.*

*Return of Muskets and Bayonets fabricated at the United States Armory at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, from the 1st of January to the 30th of September, 1801, inclusive.*

	Muskets.	Bayonets.
From the 1st of January to the 30th September, 1801,	260	260

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 8, 1801.

*Estimate of Expenditures necessary for erecting and completing Fortifications and Barracks for the year 1802.*

For repairs of platforms, and remounting cannon in Fort Constitution, in Portsmouth harbor, N. Hampshire,	\$1,000
For completing Fort Independence and Barracks, &c. on Castle Island, in the harbor of Boston,	38,000
For completing two fortifications, of six already commenced, in and about the harbor of Newport, R. Island,	1,500
For completing Fort Mifflin, near Philadelphia,	1,000
For erecting a battery and barracks near Norfolk, in Virginia,	12,000
For completing a battery near Wilmington, North Carolina,	4,000
For completing the works in Georgia,	6,000
For a new enclosed work at Niagara,	3,000
For sundry repairs at Detroit, Michillimackinac, Chickasaw Bluffs, and Fort Massac,	4,000

Dollars, 70,500

WASHINGTON, *January 25, 1803.*

Sir:

It appears that Potts, Wilson, and North, under the firm of George North & Co. having previously purchased of General Lee, on the 7th day of May, 1800, agreed with the United States, to convey to them, in consideration of 42,000 dollars, two hundred and thirty acres of land, or about that quantity, (describing it,) with a furnace, mill, corn mill, houses, improvements, with privileges, &c. and also the right of digging ore; which right they held under General Lee, from Friend's ore bank, the United States being subject to pay the rent of 1000 dollars, annually, to the said Lee, as a rent reserved to him. The consideration money was to be paid by the United States on their receiving a good title to the premises.

Lee, on the same day, by a similar agreement, engaged with the United States to convey to them, by good and sufficient deeds, all his iron ore in a tract of land of about 1600 acres, and on which is a bank of iron ore, called Friend's ore bank, with certain privileges of ways for carrying off the ore, &c. He also agreed to release, or convey, to the United States, his right to the above mentioned annual rent of 1000 dollars, which, by their agreement with North & Co. they were liable to pay to Lee. For, and in consideration of this conveyance, the United States were to pay 24,000 dollars.

On the next day, May the 8th, Lee made and executed to the United States, in pursuance of the agreement above stated, his deed of the premises, with a general warranty, to defend them to the United States against all persons.

In the same year, North & Co. conveyed, by a deed, regularly executed, in pursuance of their agreement, two hundred and twenty-one acres of land, more or less, with their right of digging ore from Friend's ore bank. Both these deeds, or instruments, appear to be properly made and authenticated, and sufficient to vest the premises in the United States, if the several grantors were respectively possessed and seised of the premises, free from incumbrances, at the time when the deeds were executed.

It appears, by the foregoing statements, that the United States have paid for the purchase of North & Co. \$42,000, in addition to an annual rent of \$1000, which they were to have paid to Lee: and that for the release from paying this annual rent, and the privilege of digging ore in a described 1600 acres of land, and the accommodation of one-half acre of land to build on for workmen, they have paid \$24,000 to General Lee.

Upon searching the records of the general court's office, at Richmond, it appears by a certificate of the clerk, that 3000 acres of land, including Friend's ore bank, was mortgaged June, 1794, to secure the payment of \$8000, by several instalments, the last of which ought to have been paid on the 1st day of May, 1798. This mortgage deed is not among the papers. It is said this money has not been paid; if so, and there is no reservation in the deed of this ore bank, the United States title is incumbered to the amount of the whole mortgage money which is now due.

It is said that the title is further incumbered by a mortgage to one Wilson, of Alexandria, on which some considerable part of the money has been paid. Nothing, however, of this appears from the papers you put into my hands. I have no information respecting this purchase, excepting what has appeared on the face of the documents.

I am, sir, with esteem, your humble servant,

LEVI LINCOLN.

HENRY DEARBORN, Esq. *Secretary of War.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 5, 1801.*

Sir:

I take the liberty of suggesting, for your consideration, the propriety of proposing to Congress that provision be made for designating the boundary line between the United States and the adjacent British possessions, in such manner as may prevent any disputes in future from the outlet of Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, if not further. There are many valuable islands in the lakes and rivers, some of which are already inhabited, which are claimed on each side: it is to be presumed that the sooner the line is ascertained, the more easily all disputes will be settled.

From Mr. Tracey's report, and from information obtained from other sources, it appears that many disputes now exist respecting titles to lands at and about Detroit, as well between the United States and individuals, as between many of the citizens; and also between citizens of the United States and subjects of Great Britain. Will it not be necessary for Congress to authorize the appointment of some board or tribunal for hearing and deciding these disputes?

H. DEARBORN.

The PRESIDENT of the *United States.*

7th CONGRESS.]

No. 48.

[2d SESSION.]

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 5, 1803.

*Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:*

Agreeably to the request of the House of Representatives, I now transmit a statement of the militia of those States from which any returns have been made to the War Office; they are, as you will perceive, but a small proportion of the whole. I send you also the copy of a circular letter, written some time since, for the purpose of obtaining returns from all the States; should any others, in consequence of this, be made during the session of Congress, they shall be immediately communicated.

TH. JEFFERSON.

[CIRCULAR.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ———.

Sir:

I have the honor, by direction of the President of the United States, to call your Excellency's attention to the 10th section of the act of Congress of the 8th of May, 1792, which provides that a return shall annually be made to the President, stating the military strength of each State, the actual situation of the arms, accoutrements, and ammunition of the several corps, within the same, and every other thing which may relate to their government, and the general advantage of good order and military discipline.

It would be very desirable, as it is highly important, to receive the information contemplated by the act alluded to. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting to your Excellency, the propriety of giving the necessary directions for carrying the said law into effect; and for the purpose of introducing and preserving uniformity in the returns, a form is herewith enclosed.

With high consideration, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

His Excellency ———.

Return of the Militia of the respective States in the Union, rendered agreeably to the resolution of the Honorable the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 20th day of December, 1802.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.														FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.						ARTILLERY.																			
	Majors General.	Brigadiers General.	Quartermasters General.	Adjutants General.	Aids-de-camp.	State Engineers.	Commissary General of Purchase.	Commissary General of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymasters General.	Surgeons General.	Physicians General.	Apothecary General.	Deputy Adjutants General.	Deputy Quartermasters General.	Wagon Masters General.	Forage Masters General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Quartermasters.	Adjutants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captains Lieutenants.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Alarm Men.	Matrosses.	
New Hampshire, . . . . .	9	22	1	1	18	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	80	149	-	72	54	77	88	-	13	45	-	90	-	-	-	182	-	90	-	-	-	-	1893
Massachusetts, . . . . .	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	78	-	42	35	40	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode-Island, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	13	26	-	-	22	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	138	286	111	91	38	124	121	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia, . . . . .	4	19	-	1	8	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	91	184	45	56	24	44	82	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
North Carolina, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina, . . . . .	2	9	1	1	-	1	1	9	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	46	91	43	24	4	35	41	1	3	14	3	16	12	-	-	46	16	22	40	62	676		
Georgia, . . . . .	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	47	9	3	2	9	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Kentucky, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Tennessee, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	10	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	4	4	-	-	-	24		

NOTE.—Those States which are left blank in the above return, have failed to furnish this Department with the annual statement, required by the act of the 8th of May, 1792. It may be proper further to remark, that the returns from some of the States, comprised in the above, from the want of regular regimental returns, do not exhibit the whole military strength of the State. Others are defective in not designating the different species of troops of which the militia of the State is composed, the whole being embraced in the column headed "Infantry."

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	CAVALRY.										GRENADIERS.						INFANTRY.										LIGHT INFANTRY.																	
	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Paymasters.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Farriers.	Saddlers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Rank and File.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants Major.	Quartermasters Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Pioneers.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Music.	Rank and File.				
New Hampshire, -	5	10	51	99	49	11	-	9	197	60	-	1,906	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	700	711	-	693	72	71	57	55	2,787	-	1,535	-	45,538	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Massachusetts, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	377	429	-	324	37	32	32	32	1,411	1,274	852	-	15,226	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Rhode Island, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,193	1,219	-	1,134	79	49	75	79	3,138	1,715	1,282	-	76,213	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
North Carolina, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina, -	7	15	46	51	40	1	1	1	128	31	7	2	1,743	2	2	2	6	3	2	105	385	378	-	356	11	3	9	7	1,200	139	365	245	28,483	4	5	3	12	5	2	133	-	-		
Georgia, -	-	-	22	42	21	-	-	-	36	17	1	2	780	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	284	285	-	233	-	-	-	754	563	144	-	16,154	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kentucky, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tennessee, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory, -	-	-	3	5	3	-	-	-	12	1	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	33	-	29	-	-	-	70	40	11	-	2,186	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	RIFLEMEN.										ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																											
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Music.	Rank and File.	Catawba Warriors.	Brass 12 Pounders.	Brass 6 Pounders.	Brass 4 Pounders.	Brass 3 Pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron 9 Pounders.	Iron 6 Pounders.	Iron 4 Pounders.	Iron 3 Pounders.	Artillery Side-arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Espontoons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Knapsacks.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Steel Rods.	Scabbards and Belts.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Drums and Fifes.	Stands of Colors.	Rifles.	Fuses.	Muskets.	
New Hampshire, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	12	15	62	-	10	2	4	6	-	-	-	-	4,084	97,214	355,951	31,563	76,601	20,481	31,225	31,831	33,687	27,131	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	39,764
Massachusetts, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,324	-	-	163	512	55	10,800	-	871	1	4,422	4,093	-	1,178	-	772	102	4,722	-	-	6,530	
Rhode Island, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	11	-	2	-	-	-	-	212	1,383	1,057	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,731	1,231	5,916	
Connecticut, . . . . .	-	-	9	33	21	12	464	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	577	-	-	-	50	367	500	-	765	398	552	367	-	301	-	-	-	1,807	-	1,663		
Vermont, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
North Carolina, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina, . . . . .	10	10	9	33	21	12	464	60	-	4	11	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Georgia, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kentucky, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tennessee, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	50	-	-	32	600	800	393	-	-	204	105	700	-	-	11	-	390	-	380	

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 29, 1862.

H. DEARBORN.

7th CONGRESS.]

No. 49.

[2d SESSION.

## COMPLAINT AGAINST CERTAIN OFFICERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 31, 1803.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 29, 1803.

SIR:

In obedience to the resolution of Congress of the 25th instant, the Secretary of War has made such inquiries, relative to the object\* of the resolution, as present circumstances would admit of, and respectfully reports, that no information has been lodged in this office, nor any procured relating thereto, excepting, that a military post, consisting of one company, has been established on the Mobile, and continued about three years, no complaints have come to the knowledge of the Secretary of War, excepting those communicated in that clause of the resolution, on which the report is requested from this department—the military post is between the junction of the Tombigbee and the Alabama rivers, and the boundary line between the United States and West Florida, and as near the said line as a suitable site could be found.

General Wilkinson having been, for a considerable time, in the course of the last autumn, on the river Tombigbee, in the vicinity of the post, it may be presumed that the citizens in that quarter had an opportunity of giving him information relative to any improper conduct of the troops; but as information has been received at this office on the subject, it is probable that no complaint was made to the General, or, if made, that he had taken such measures as, in his opinion, would remedy the evil complained of.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the United States.

\*This was an application to Congress, from the inhabitants of Washington county, in the Mississippi Territory, for the removal of two garrisons, on account of alleged misconduct of the officers.

7th CONGRESS.]

No. 50.

[2d SESSION.

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 7, 1803.

Mr. VARNUM, from the committee to whom was referred that part of the President's message of the 15th day of December last, which relates to the Militia institution of the United States, and a bill which was reported to the House at the last session of Congress, on the same subject, made the following report:

That, after a full investigation of the subject, they are of opinion, that a law which passed the eighth day of May, 1792, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States," embraceth all the objects of a militia institution, delegated to Congress. The principles of that law lay the foundation of a militia system, on the broad basis prescribed by the constitution, and are well calculated to ensure a complete national defence, if carried into effect by the State Governments, agreeably to the power reserved to the States respectively, by the constitution, and therefore ought not to be altered. But, although the committee are of opinion that the principles of the system established on the part of the United States ought to be adhered to, yet they believe that some small alterations in the details of these principles would render that system still more efficacious, and have reported a bill for that purpose.

In those States which have taken energetic measures for carrying into effect the system adopted by Congress, agreeably to the power constitutionally vested in them, the militia are making great proficiency in military discipline, and in the knowledge of tactics, which evinceth, that the deficiency in organization, arming, and discipline of the militia, which is too apparent in some of the States, does not arise from any defect in that part of the system which is under the control of Congress, but from omission on the part of the State Governments.

In order, therefore, to impress the State Governments with the importance of the subject, and the indispensable necessity of their vigorous co-operation with the General Government, to complete the militia institution, so as to ensure, from that source, a permanent national defence, they submit the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to write to the Executive of each State, urging the importance and indispensable necessity of vigorous exertions, on the part of the State Governments, to carry into effect the militia system adopted by the national Legislature, agreeably to the powers reserved to the States respectively, by the constitution of the United States, and in a manner the best calculated to ensure such a degree of military discipline and knowledge of tactics, as will, under the auspices of a benign providence, render the militia a sure and permanent bulwark of national defence.

7th CONGRESS.]

No. 51.

[2d SESSION.

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 1, 1803.

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

According to the request stated in your resolution of December 20th, I communicated to you such returns of the militia, of the different States, as had then been received. Since that date returns have been received from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky, which are now transmitted to you.

March 1, 1803.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Return of the Militia of those States from which Returns have been received at the War Office since the 30th of December, 1802.

STATES.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.													FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.													ARTILLERY.												
	Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Aid-de-Camps.	State Engineers.	Commissary Generals of Purchase.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster General.	Surgeon Generals.	Physician Generals.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjutant Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Wagon Master Generals.	Forage Master Generals.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Paymaster.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Quartermasters.	Adjutants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Alarm Men.
New Hampshire,	3	6	.	1	6	.	.	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	31	54	.	31	31	27	30	.	.	7	.	12	.	.	.	26	.	10	.	185
Massachusetts,	10	18	1	1	20	.	.	22	.	.	.	.	.	5	3	.	.	9	2	78	157	.	79	59	78	80	13	49	.	94	.	14	13	188	.	95	.	1,981	
Connecticut,	.	8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	43	78	.	42	35	40	42	.	16	.	35	.	1	1	61	49	29	62	340	
New York,	4	24	.	1	.	.	.	22	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	100	152	85	81	46	89	108	1	2	20	.	32	.	1	1	72	.	784		
North Carolina,	5	10	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	44	86	.	16	6	20	36	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Georgia,	3	7	.	1	11	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20	47	.	8	1	9	17	.	.	6	.	11	.	.	.	6	.	198		
Kentucky,	5	11	.	1	4	.	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	47	95	.	13	6	36	46	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	17		



RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES.	CAVALRY.											GRENADIERS.						INFANTRY.														
	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Paymasters.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Farriers.	Saddlers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Rank and File.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Pioneers.
New Hampshire,	-	-	21	42	21	-	-	82	33	-	-	1,123	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	244	244	-	243	31	31	23	28	958	-	-	-	16,025
Massachusetts,	5	12	51	102	52	11	-	207	64	-	-	2,009	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	726	735	-	733	75	71	61	59	2,877	-	1,575	-	48,421
Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	-	-	1,402	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	377	249	-	324	37	32	32	32	1,411	1,274	852	-	15,226
New York,	1	4	24	45	18	-	-	101	29	-	-	1,401	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	807	802	-	737	75	-	58	53	3,322	-	1,456	-	60,958
North Carolina,	2	4	8	14	6	-	-	16	-	-	-	216	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	586	555	-	552	23	-	40	40	2,131	-	-	-	37,597
Georgia,	-	-	22	42	21	-	-	36	17	-	-	677	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	251	228	-	199	3	-	4	4	697	-	140	-	15,557
Kentucky,	-	-	8	8	8	-	-	24	5	-	-	227	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	440	430	-	394	16	6	14	12	1,345	-	208	-	23,239

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES.	LIGHT INFANTRY.							RIFLEMEN.							ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.												
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Catawbow Warriors.	Brass Twelve Pounders.	Brass Six Pounders.	Brass Four Pounders.	Brass Three Pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron Nine Pounders.	Iron Six Pounders.	Iron Four Pounders.	Iron Three Pounders.	Artillery Side Arms.	Sabres.	
New Hampshire.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,064
Massachusetts.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	.	.	12	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2,278
Connecticut.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	19	7	11	72	.	8	.	4	4	2,914	
New York.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	18	.	.	.	.	3	.	4,071	
North Carolina.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32	
Georgia.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	499	
Kentucky.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	4	3	14	.	4	279	.	.	2	.	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	203	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																	
	Pairs of Pistols.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusees.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Knapsacks.	Steel Rods.	Espositoons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Drums and Fifes.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire, -	968	10,846	-	-	4,861	4,770	3,336	-	-	656	-	-	-	5,605	-	10,750	1,961	-
Massachusetts, -	2,313	42,848	371	-	34,231	31,056	28,715	36,721	-	4,203	404,837	-	-	52,286	40,483	85,004	30,984	-
Connecticut, -	2,747	13,862	-	-	13,471	13,324	4,934	-	807	-	198,773	58	-	-	-	29,681	12,982	-
New York, -	997	38,588	642	-	15,739	13,000	159	-	-	-	-	2	717	-	12,671	25,169	14,915	-
North Carolina, -	31	13,477	4,344	-	2,092	3,069	-	-	-	-	958	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia, -	285	1,668	1,782	-	557	367	398	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kentucky, -	212	2,923	11,157	-	126	142	-	-	-	50	1,100	14	-	500	-	776	301	-
										7,067	303	-	-	49,985	-	23,045	-	-

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 1st, 1863.

H. DEARBORN.

8th CONGRESS.]No. 52.[1st SESSION.]

## MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, MARCH 22, 1804.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I lay before Congress the last returns of the Militia of the United States. Their incompleteness is much to be regretted, and its remedy may at some future time be a subject worthy the attention of Congress.

TH: JEFFERSON.

*March 22, 1804.*

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.														FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.							ARTILLERY.																		
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Aid-de-camps.	State Engineers.	Commissary Generals of Purchase.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Physician Generals.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjutant Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Wagonmaster Generals.	Foragemaster Generals.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Quartermasters.	Adjutants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Alarm men.	Matrosses.
New Hampshire,	1803	3	6	1	1	6	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	28	59	-	31	29	30	31	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	32	-	-	16	-	-	221
Massachusetts,	1803	10	22	1	1	18	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	78	159	78	159	79	63	79	81	-	-	15	50	103	-	202	-	-	98	-	-	2,082			
Vermont,	1803	4	9	1	1	8	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	52	26	52	27	25	26	28	-	-	10	10	40	-	40	-	27	-	-	313				
Rhode Island,	1803	1	4	1	1	4	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	23	11	23	6	5	10	10	-	-	7	7	12	-	9	-	9	-	-	86				
Connecticut,	1803	4	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	69	35	69	43	35	33	35	-	-	16	16	63	-	57	-	34	-	-	481				
New York,	1802	4	24	-	1	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	152	100	152	85	81	46	89	103	1	2	20	32	-	1	1	72	-	38	-	784			
New Jersey,	1803	4	11	-	1	6	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	74	35	74	40	39	34	39	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	19	10	38	-	272			
Pennsylvania,	1803	14	28	-	1	27	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	136	267	132	108	40	119	126	-	1	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
*Delaware,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
*Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Virginia,	1802	4	19	-	1	8	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	169	86	169	51	24	41	73	4	8	13	-	25	-	-	-	59	-	11	-	-	763		
North Carolina,	1802	5	10	-	-	-	-	-	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	86	44	86	16	6	20	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	676		
South Carolina,	1802	2	9	1	1	1	1	1	46	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	46	91	43	24	4	35	41	1	3	14	3	16	12	-	-	-	46	16	22	40	62	105		
Georgia,	1803	3	7	-	1	13	-	-	20	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	51	11	11	13	28	28	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17		
Kentucky,	1802	5	11	-	1	4	-	-	47	95	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	95	-	12	6	36	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
*Tennessee,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Ohio,	1803	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	7	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	15	-	-	-	4	5	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70		
District of Columbia,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	2	-	-	81		
Mississippi Territory,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	81		
Indiana Territory,	1803	-	-	1	1	3	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24			

\* By direction of the President of the United States, letters were written by the Secretary of War to the Governors of each State, on the 8th day of December, 1802, requesting their attention to the tenth section of the law of Congress, respecting annual returns of the militia being made to the President of the United States, passed on the 8th day of May, 1792; and on the 31st day of December, 1803, similar letters were written to the Governors of the States of Delaware, Maryland, and Tennessee; but no returns of the militia of the last mentioned States have been received at this office.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	CAVALRY.												GRENADIERS.						LIGHT INFANTRY.										
		Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Paymasters.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Farriers.	Saddlers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.		
New Hampshire,	1803	-	-	22	44	22	-	-	-	88	39	-	-	1,183	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts,	1803	5	14	54	109	55	15	-	11	227	70	-	-	2,117	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont,	1803	1	-	28	56	27	-	-	-	110	34	-	-	1,040	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode Island,	1803	2	1	3	5	3	-	-	1	10	4	-	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut,	1803	3	3	35	66	33	8	-	8	130	54	-	-	1,843	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York,	1802	1	4	24	45	18	-	-	-	101	29	-	-	1,401	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey,	1803	2	9	19	50	26	9	-	-	90	17	12	12	1,257	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania,	1803	1	-	58	109	55	-	-	4	162	43	15	19	2,382	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
*Delaware,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
*Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia,	1802	4	8	47	92	43	-	-	-	133	19	-	-	2,318	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
North Carolina,	1802	2	4	8	14	6	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	216	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina,	1802	7	15	46	51	40	1	-	1	128	31	7	2	1,743	2	2	2	6	3	2	105	4	5	3	12	5	2	133		
Georgia,	1803	-	-	21	39	18	-	-	-	32	15	-	-	736	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kentucky,	1802	-	-	8	8	8	-	-	-	24	5	-	-	227	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
*Tennessee,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ohio,	1803	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
District of Columbia,	1803	-	-	2	3	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	43	1	1	-	-	-	-	22	2	2	2	6	-	2	-	100	
Mississippi Territory,	1803	-	-	3	6	3	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Indiana Territory,	1803	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.													ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																			
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Pioneers.	Privates.	Catabwaw Warriors.	Brass Twelve Pounders.	Brass Six Pounders.	Brass Four Pounders.	Brass Three Pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron Nine Pounders.	Iron Six Pounders.	Iron Four Pounders.	Iron Three Pounders.									
New Hampshire,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Massachusetts,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	245	242	-	241	30	30	25	27	973	-	416	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vermont,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	753	759	-	754	75	73	57	61	2,959	-	1,648	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rhode Island,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	259	264	-	264	38	27	24	24	862	-	649	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Connecticut,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	82	93	-	83	9	6	7	7	302	-	155	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New York,	1802	-	-	-	-	-	-	330	332	-	317	40	34	33	33	1,294	1,252	733	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Jersey,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	807	802	-	737	75	-	58	53	3,322	-	1,456	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	385	368	-	351	44	12	32	26	1,272	-	541	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
*Delaware,	1803	65	70	58	174	75	82	3,352	1,202	1,190	1,157	88	70	78	77	2,881	-	1,477	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
*Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia,	1802	-	-	-	-	-	-	886	853	-	790	23	4	30	22	3,247	-	734	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Carolina,	1802	-	-	-	-	-	-	586	555	-	552	23	-	40	40	2,131	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina,	1802	10	10	9	33	21	12	464	385	378	356	11	3	9	7	1,200	139	365	245	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Georgia,	1803	6	7	6	11	-	3	324	246	229	218	12	-	3	4	707	-	143	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kentucky,	1802	-	-	-	-	-	-	440	430	-	394	16	6	14	12	1,345	-	208	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Tennessee,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ohio,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	78	79	-	79	-	-	-	-	227	-	59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
District of Columbia,	1803	1	1	1	4	-	1	16	13	-	11	-	-	-	-	52	15	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mississippi Territory,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	33	-	29	-	-	-	-	91	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Indiana Territory,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	30	-	27	1	-	-	-	113	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																			
		Artillery Side Arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fuses.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Knapsacks.	Ram Rods.	Espositoons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Drums and Fifes.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire,	1803	-	1,313	1,213	11,170	-	-	4,625	6,316	3,650	11,170	-	950	-	-	-	8,710	-	13,200	2,710	-
Massachusetts,	1803	-	2,333	2,430	44,075	203	-	37,307	38,571	21,461	38,751	-	3,513	373,717	57	-	61,065	35,562	82,016	39,292	-
Vermont,	1803	-	1,065	1,034	8,153	-	-	2,958	3,378	728	2,308	-	1,104	-	3	-	66,348	4,335	6,695	1,745	-
Rhode Island,	1803	-	87	87	3,052	-	-	2,139	2,263	105	2,833	-	-	3,833	-	-	-	2,120	4,722	1,909	-
Connecticut,	1803	530	2,291	2,762	13,920	-	-	13,986	14,056	6,483	13,920	718	-	231,696	-	729	-	14,094	22,567	14,276	-
New York,	1802	-	1,071	997	38,588	642	-	15,739	13,000	159	-	-	-	958	-	-	-	-	25,169	14,915	-
New Jersey,	1803	-	82	-	9,504	6	-	2,511	2,354	13	9,504	-	10	8	-	-	78	-	2,919	-	77
Pennsylvania,	1803	-	1,708	1,583	20,000	9,604	-	20,000	1,494	-	20,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Delaware,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia,	1802	-	87	87	8,483	3,921	-	7,594	7,485	-	8,283	-	2253	-	-	-	5,472	56	503	2,825	-
North Carolina,	1802	-	32	31	13,477	4,344	-	2,092	3,069	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina,	1802	212	1,383	1,057	5,916	5,731	1,231	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	540	173	-
Georgia,	1803	-	434	254	1,155	1,233	-	203	553	25	784	-	18	4,073	7	-	3,278	-	23,045	-	-
Kentucky,	1802	-	203	212	2,923	11,157	-	126	142	-	-	-	7,067	303	-	-	49,935	-	-	-	-
*Tennessee,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ohio,	1803	-	29	22	431	1,770	-	63	109	-	-	-	454	-	2	14	8,370	-	1,443	44	-
District of Columbia,	1803	78	39	39	1,087	75	-	1,048	947	-	1,087	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	236	117	1
Mississippi Territory,	1803	-	74	74	160	586	-	85	159	-	160	-	-	-	-	-	-	700	740	-	-
Indiana Territory,	1803	-	-	-	976	976	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108	-	-

WAR DEPARTMENT, 20th March, 1804.

H. DEARBORN, Secretary of War.



8th CONGRESS.]

No. 53.

[2d SESSION.

## RATIONS COMMUTED.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 16, 1805.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 15th, 1805.*

SIR:

In obedience to the order of the House of Representatives of the 14th instant, I have examined the petition of sundry officers of the army of the United States on the subject of rations; and I beg leave to submit the following observations by way of report thereon.

The principle, as stated in the petition, has long been established, that the officers should receive, in lieu of their rations, when not drawn in kind, the contract price at the posts where they may respectively be stationed, upon the presumption that the price of rations would generally be in proportion to the expense of the necessaries of life at the respective posts. There may, however, be, and probably are, exceptions to the general principle: and as some inconveniences occur in settling the accounts of officers' subsistence, in consequence of their frequent removals from one post to another, it may not be improper to establish by law what sum of money each grade shall receive in lieu of rations. And as the prices of the necessaries and conveniences of life have considerably increased, since the establishment of the present pay and emoluments of the officers of the army, and although the average contract price for the two last years has not been more than fourteen and a half cents per ration, I take the liberty of suggesting the propriety of establishing the subsistence of the officers at the rate of twenty cents for each ration allowed to the respective grades; or of allowing to each subaltern, for his subsistence, in addition to his pay, twelve dollars per month; to each captain, eighteen dollars per month; and in like proportion to all other grades of commissioned officers, including surgeons and surgeons' mates.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

To the Honorable the SPEAKER of the  
*House of Representatives of the United States.*

8th CONGRESS.]

No. 54.

[2d SESSION.

## DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUND OF ILLEGALITY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 30, 1805.

*To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States. The remonstrance and petition of sundry citizens and officers of the militia in the State of Tennessee.*

Your remonstrants, having those respectful feelings for your honorable body, which citizens ought to possess, and which those bearing commissions in the militia ought ever to cherish, beg leave to represent—

That they have, with much concern, seen a veteran and meritorious officer in the army of the United States arrested for imaginary crimes, compelled to travel a distance of fifteen hundred miles to stand his trial, and that trial then postponed for several months, contrary not only to the rules and articles of war, but also to those natural rules of justice, to the benefit of which every member of society is entitled.

That the only *crime* of which he was found guilty, and the only one perhaps of which any serious expectation of convicting him was ever entertained, was a refusal to *crop his hair*, in conformity to an order which he conceived to be illegal, and which your remonstrants conceive to have been an arbitrary and useless exertion of authority; that, in the execution of the sentence of the court martial, which subjected him to a reprimand from the commanding General, your remonstrants have been able to discover, not the calmness and dignity to be expected from a person invested with so high an office, but a disposition to passion and invective, well calculated to make impressions unfavorable to the military character of the accused, and foreboding a renewal of persecution.

Your remonstrants have been prompted to an expression of these feelings, not only from a disposition to resist oppression from whatsoever quarter it may come, even if directed against the most humble and obscure member of the community, but also from a long acquaintance with the person injured in this instance, a knowledge of his virtue and integrity as a man, and his bravery and fidelity as a soldier. During a command of several years at a post where not only the greatest firmness and the strictest attention to discipline were necessary, but also the discharge of his duty in enforcing obedience to the laws had an almost unavoidable tendency to create numerous and implacable enemies; in this situation, the true state of which was but little known beyond the bounds of this State, we have seen him not only cause the laws to be respected and obeyed, but also, by the humanity and delicacy of his conduct, conciliate the esteem of the offenders, and cause those to refrain through affection, whom fear alone had been found insufficient to restrain. In other situations also, in all of which no glory or reputation in the view of the world could be acquired, and where no reward awaited him beyond the approbation of his own conscience, we have ever seen him patient, persevering, industrious, and obedient to all orders, which were in any way directed to the promotion of the public good. In fine, we declare that in the whole of his official conduct, which has fallen under our inspection, we have seen much commanding our approbation, and deserving our imitation, but nothing which, in our opinion, even malice itself could censure.

Your remonstrants further beg leave to call to the recollection of your honorable body, that the accused, Colonel Butler, entered into the service of his country early in the revolutionary war, during the whole of which depressing and perilous period he stood the firm and active officer—after its close, his desire to serve his country continued. The defeat at the site of Fort Recovery, which witnessed the death of General Butler, left his brother among the wounded. Search the history of the American army, you will often find the name of Butler; but where was it marked with disgrace? Was he ever accused of disobedience? Never, until the case occurred to which we now call your attention. When roused by the signal of danger, he was first at his post, and the first to refuse submission to indignity. The pride of a veteran of twenty-six years' service was roused by the order for cropping his venerable grey hairs, an order unsanctioned either by law, reason, or the usages of the army.

Your remonstrants further represent, that, possessing the principles of freemen, they shudder at the idea of being compelled to obey an illegal and arbitrary mandate—that, possessing the feelings of men, they can never passively stoop to such degradation. While the delegated powers of the Union are generally circumscribed by barriers, which they must not overleap, how long must it be regretted, that our fellow-citizens of the army are subject to an authority absolute and arbitrary. How much is it to be feared, that the uncontrolled power of a commander of your army shall, by the force of a general order, drive from your service the most experienced and most useful officers; oppress the bravest and most virtuous men; pursue with unrelenting persecution, under pretexts the most frivolous, those who have fought your battles, and spilled their blood in your defence; and finally degrade the military cha-

rafter of your army, by illegal and unnecessary orders, unmerited censures, malicious arrests, and reprimands, cruel if not ridiculous.

Your remonstrants are well aware of the necessity of discipline and subordination in an army; but they cannot conceive it the duty of a freeman to obey an order unanctioned by law, without meaning, without utility, capricious and absurd, irrelative to the duties of a soldier, degrading to a man, and destructive of that pride which constitutes the soul of an army.

If this despotic abuse of power is tolerated, when shall it cease? Shall your militia, when called out in defence of their country, partake of the humiliation? Shall they be compelled to sustain a mutilation to humour the caprice of an individual? Must they submit to a mark to render them unlike their fellow citizens? They hope not; and that when their country requires the calling out a military force from the body of its citizens, it will not be shackled with such humiliating conditions as to render it ineffectual.

Under the impressions excited by the transaction which has called forth an expression of these sentiments, your petitioners hope, with due submission and respect, that your honorable body will ordain and establish such articles and rules for the future regulation of the army, as will prevent abuses of power, and preserve from indignity and insult those who devote their lives to the service of their country.

Your remonstrants beg leave further to represent, that Colonel Thomas Butler, of the United States Army, is the character that has been thus illegally and improperly dealt with, and in consequence thereof, the feelings of your remonstrants have been raised to make that representation of facts which they have now done; and they also beg leave to represent, that the order alluded to in this remonstrance, is radically illegal and despotic, that the cause which gave to it birth is trifling, and unworthy the attention of a great General belonging to the United States army, and, therefore, as republicans, we feel ourselves justified and emboldened in bringing to the view of your honorable body his particular situation.

We, your remonstrants, further and lastly beg leave to make known to your honorable body, the second arrest of Colonel Thomas Butler, of the United States Army, for the simple crime of *not cropping his hair*, during his late command at New Orleans; and hope your honorable body will not only render such general relief as the nature of our Government requires, in its present peculiar state of good order and tranquillity, but that you will specifically relieve this worthy, aged, and respectable officer, Colonel Butler, from persecution.

Andrew Jackson, Major General,  
Shadrach Nye, Adjutant,  
Charles Donoho,  
James C. Wilson,  
W. J. Anderson, Aid-de-camp to Major General,  
Daniel Smith,  
J. Whiteside, Attorney General,  
Henry Bradford, Major,  
William Trigg, junr.  
G. O. Blackmore, Brigade Major,  
James Cryer, Justice of the Peace,  
Hinchey Pettway, Merchant,  
Thomas Mitchell,  
James Desha, Merchant,  
Robert B. Mitchel,  
B. Seawell, Attorney at Law and Colonel,  
Nathaniel W. Williams, Attorney at Law,  
Robert Whyte, Attorney at Law,  
John H. Bauen, Attorney at Law,  
J. Wharton, Attorney at Law,  
J. Hutchings, Merchant,  
H. G. Burton, Attorney at Law,  
Josephus H. Conn, Merchant,  
Thomas Master, Major,  
James Mannell, Senator,  
Griswald Latimer, Captain,  
Demey More, Major,  
William Gwin, Captain,  
Joseph T. Williams, Major,  
Isaac Lane, Captain,  
Archibald Marlin, Magistrate,  
J. C. Hamelton, Attorney at Law,  
David Shelby, Clerk S. C.  
Thos. Stuart, Attorney for West Tennessee dist.  
William W. Roose, Colonel,  
Isham T. Davis, Captain,  
William Montgomery, Justice of the Peace,  
J. Winchester, Brigadier General 4th Brigade,  
Edward Douglass, Lieut. Colonel, Sumner county,

William Hall,  
Stockley Donelson, Colonel,  
Thomas Harney,  
Robert Hays, Colonel,  
Robert Purdy, late Captain United States Army,  
Jno. Dickinson, Attorney at Law,  
Jno. Anderson, Merchant,  
Samuel Finney,  
John Gordon, Captain,  
Joseph Hays, Doctor,  
Thomas A. Claiborne, formerly of the Army of the United States,  
A. Foster, Merchant,  
John McNairy, Judge, &c.  
William Tait, Merchant,  
Deaderich & Tatum, Merchants, Nashville,  
Stephen Cantrell,  
James Tatum, Lieut. 3d N. C. R. late Revolutionary Army,  
J. Childress, jun. Marshal,  
King, Carson, & King, Merchants, Nashville,  
Tho. Dillahunty, J. P.  
Moses Fisk,  
Roger B. Sappington, Physician of Nashville,  
Beal Bossley,  
William Lytle,  
John Childress,  
Wm. Black,  
Jos. Erwin,  
Tho. Thopson,  
William Russell,  
R. C. Foster, Member of the Legislature,  
Robert and William Searcy, Merchants,  
Tho. Cruteher, Treasurer, Mero District,  
James Hennen, M. D.  
J. H. Parker,  
Jos. Colman,  
Ho. Tatieur, late Captain in the Revolutionary army of the United States.

8th CONGRESS.]

No. 55.

[2d SESSION.]

MILITARY FORCE, THE POSTS AT WHICH STATIONED, AND THE EXPENSES OF FORTIFICATIONS, ARSENALS, ARMORIES, AND MAGAZINES, IN THE YEARS 1803 AND 1804.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 15, 1805.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 13, 1805.*

SIR:

In obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 22d ultimo, I have the honor of transmitting, herewith, a statement of the number of officers and privates in the actual service of the United States, during the years one thousand eight hundred and three, and one thousand eight hundred and four; and also the names of the posts where soldiers were stationed during those periods, together with the number of privates and officers at such posts; and also a detailed statement of the sums expended during the years one thousand eight hundred and three, and one thousand eight hundred and four, on fortifications, arsenals, armories, and magazines.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

To the Honorable the SPEAKER of the  
*House of Representatives of the United States.*







Statement of the sums expended during the years one thousand eight hundred and three, and one thousand eight hundred and four, on Fortifications, Arsenals, Armories, and Magazines; made in conformity to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 22d January, 1805.

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NAMES.	RANK.	WARRANTS.		PURPOSES.	Amount.
		Date.	No.		
Samuel Annin, - - -	Paymaster and Storekeeper, at Harper's Ferry, - - -	Jan. 3, 1803.	6670	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, in January and February, 1803, -	4,400 00
William Blagden - - -	- - - - -	" 7, "	6683	For sundry articles furnished at Greenleaf's Point, Washington City, -	18 25
Joseph Williams, - - -	Paymaster and Storekeeper at Springfield, - - -	" 17, "	6702	On account of expenditures at the armory to 31st January, 1803. - - -	2,000 00
Do. do. - - -	Do. do. do. - - -	Feb. 22, "	6762	On account of do. do. do. to 28th February, 1803, - - -	1,900 00
Eli Whitney, - - -	Part of warrant - - -	" 28, "	6765	For travelling expenses from Raleigh, North Carolina, to Rocky Mount, South Carolina, to fix on a proper site for an arsenal, including his compensation while employed on that service, to 25th January, 1803, - - -	50 00
Thomas Sumpter, - - -	- - - - -	" " "	6688	For the purchase money of a tract of land in South Carolina, for an arsenal, - - -	3,138 00
Joseph Williams, - - -	Paymaster, &c. at Springfield, Mass. - - -	Mar. 16, "	6784	On account of expenditures at the armory at Springfield, from 1st of March to 1st of April, 1803, - - -	1,200 00
Samuel Annin, - - -	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry, - - -	" 17, "	6788	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, in March, April, and May, 1803, - - -	6,000 00
William Irvine, - - -	Superintendent of Military Stores, - - -	April 4, "	6810	For salaries of himself and the different persons employed by him to 31st March, 1803, - - -	1,625 00
James Byers, junr. - - -	Contractor, - - -	" 7, "	6820	For balance of his account, for rations and fuel, to the armorers, at Springfield, to 31st March, 1803, - - -	200 40
Do. do. - - -	Do. do. do. - - -	" " "	6821	On account of his contract, for supplies to the armorers, at Springfield, for 1803, - - -	1,000 00
C. P. Pourcheresse, - - -	Assistant Storekeeper at West Point, - - -	" 8, "	6824	For his salary from 1st of January to 31st of March, 1803, - - -	90 00
George Fleming, - - -	Storekeeper at West Point, - - -	" 12, "	6828	For his salary, for the quarter ending 31st of March, 1803, - - -	162 50
Robert Orr, - - -	Of Springfield, Massachusetts, - - -	" 15, "	6837	For his travelling expenses, while engaged in the inspection of arms, - - -	23 75
Joseph Williams, - - -	Paymaster, &c. - - -	" 18, "	6840	On account of expenditures, at Springfield armory, to 30th of April, 1803, - - -	1,900 00
Jonathan L. Austin, - - -	At Boston, - - -	Mar. 7, "	6776	On account of expenditures in erecting fortifications at Boston, - - -	7,500 00
John Foncin, - - -	Engineer, - - -	Apr. 13, "	6841	For his compensation from 1st to 31st January, 1803, - - -	107 41
Jonathan L. Austin, - - -	Of Boston, - - -	" 20, "	6822	On account of expenditures in erecting fortifications at that place, - - -	2,600 00
George Fleming, - - -	Military Storekeeper at West Point, - - -	" 21, "	6856	On account of repairs to the public buildings at West Point, - - -	500 00
John Saunders, - - -	Military Agent, - - -	" " "	6857	On account of the fortifications at Norfolk, Virginia, - - -	2,000 00
William Irvine, - - -	Superintendent of Military Stores, - - -	May 4, "	6875	On account of expenditures incident to Arsenals, Magazines, &c. - - -	800 00
William C. C. Claiborne, - - -	Governor, - - -	" 12, "	6888	On account of the consideration money for forty-three acres of land, for a site, &c. for a fortification; purchased by order of the Secretary of War, - - -	655 00
Christian Senf, - - -	Superintendent of the Arsenal at Rocky Mount, - - -	" 16, "	6891	On account of expenditures in erecting the arsenal, magazines, &c. at Rocky Mount, S. C. - - -	4,000 00
Do. do. - - -	Do. do. do. - - -	" " "	pt. 6892	For making a plan of the arsenal at Rocky Mount, and report thereon, including his travelling expenses, in January, 1803, - - -	60 00
Samuel Annin, - - -	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry, - - -	" 20, "	6902	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, for May and June, 1803, - - -	6,000 00
Jonathan L. Austin, - - -	- - - - -	" 26, "	6912	On account of the fortifications at Boston, - - -	250 00
Joseph Williams, - - -	Of Springfield, - - -	" 27, "	6915	On account of the armory at Springfield, for May, 1803, - - -	1,300 00
R. Chamberlin, - - -	- - - - -	" " "	6916	For sundry articles purchased and delivered at Greenleaf's Point, in Feb. and May, 1803, - - -	14 87
George Blagden, - - -	- - - - -	June 10, "	6927	For erecting a building adjoining the barracks at Greenleaf's Point, - - -	308 32
William Blagden, - - -	- - - - -	" " "	6928	For do. do. do. in 1803, - - -	336 69
John Livingston, - - -	Lient. and Assistant Military Agent, - - -	" " "	6929	On account of expenditures in completing the fortifications at Norfolk, Va. - - -	2,000 00
James Taylor, - - -	Of New Port, Kentucky, - - -	" 11, "	6931	On account of expenditures in erecting an arsenal at the mouth of Licking River, - - -	5,000 00
C. P. Pourcheresse, - - -	Assistant Storekeeper at West Point, - - -	" 13, "	6933	For his salary, from 1st April to 31st May, 1803, when discharged, - - -	60 00

MILITARY AFFAIRS.

1805.

## STATEMENT—Continued.

NAMES.	RANK.	WARRANTS.		PURPOSES.	Amount.
		Date.	No.		
Joseph Williams,	Paymaster and Storekeeper at Springfield,	June 21, 1803.	6947	On account of expenditures at the armory at Springfield, for June, 1803,	1,000 00
George Fleming,	Of West Point,	" 25, "	6956	On account of expenditures in repairing the public buildings at West Point,	1,200 00
Hezekiah Rogers,	Military Storekeeper at Washington,	" 30, "	6970	For his compensation from 1st January to 30th June, 1803,	100 00
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	July 1, "	6972	For the salaries of himself and the different persons under his direction, from 1st April to 30th June, 1803,	1,625 00
James Byers, jun.	Contractor,	" 8, "	6891	For balance of his account for supplies to the armorers, &c. at Springfield, in April, May, and June, 1803,	535 28
George Fleming,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	" 9, "	6985	For his salary from 1st April to 30th June, 1803,	162 50
George Merchant,	Military Storekeeper at Albany,	" 11, "	6992	For do. do. do. do.	169 39
George Hadfield,		" 11, "	6993	For drawing a plan for an arsenal, &c. at Washington City,	40 00
Israel Whelen,	Purveyor,	" 16, "	7006	On account of the armories for the year 1803,	1,000 00
Joseph Williams,	Of Springfield,	" 16, "	7010	For balance due him on his expenditures at that place, to 30th June, 1803,	287 37
Samuel P. Dyson,	Baltimore,	" 18, "	7016	For repairs to the barracks at Fort McHenry, in May, 1803,	316 18
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores, Philadelphia,	" 25, "	7032	On account of his expenditures for the third quarter of 1803,	815 98
George & William Blagden,		" 27, "	7034	For sundry repairs to the barracks at Greenleaf's Point, in July, 1803,	189 83
James Byers, jun.	Contractor,	" 28, "	7036	On account of supplies to the armorers at Springfield, for 1803,	1,000 00
James Callaway,	Of New London, Va.	Aug. 10, "	7050	For rent of his store at that place, from 1st January to 30th June, 1803,	87 50
Joseph Williams,	Paymaster, &c. Springfield,	" 19, "	7052	On account of expenditures at that place, for August, 1803,	2,600 00
Do. Do.	Do. do.	July 16, "	7007	Do. do. do. July, do.	3,000 00
Do. Do.	Do. do.	Sept. 23, "	7088	Do. do. do. September, do.	2,300 00
Samuel Annin,	Of Harper's Ferry,	Aug. 26, "	7055	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, for August, September, and October, 1803,	6,000 00
R. Chamberlin,		" 29, "	7059	For sundry disbursements at Greenleaf's Point, in June, July, and August, 1803,	37 04
John Livingston,	Lieutenant, and Military Agent at Norfolk, Va.	Sep. 1, "	7067	On account of expenditures in completing the fortifications near Norfolk, Virginia,	1,500 00
George Fleming,	Of West Point,	" 1, "	7068	On account of repairs to the public buildings at West Point,	200 00
Levis Deblois,	Washington City,	" 28, "	pt. 7094	For disbursements for freight, &c. of military stores, room hire, &c. to 30th Sept. 1803,	228 68
Hezekiah Rogers,	Military Storekeeper at Washington,	Oct. 1, "	7105	For his salary, from 1st July to 30th September, 1803,	50 00
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	" 4, "	7111	For the salaries of himself and the persons employed under his direction, to 30th Sept. 1803,	1,700 00
George Fleming,	Of West Point,	" 10, "	7122	For his salary, to 30th September, 1803,	162 50
James Byers, jun.	Contractor,	" 21, "	7138	On account of his contract for supplies to the armorers at Springfield, for the year 1803,	1,000 00
John Livingston,	Lieutenant, and Military Agent,	" 25, "	7151	On account of the fortifications near Norfolk, Virginia,	2,000 00
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	" 25, "	7155	On account of his expenditures at the arsenal on Schuylkill,	500 00
George Merchant,	Military Storekeeper at Albany,	" 25, "	7157	For his salary to 30th September, 1803, and disbursements for storage, &c.	173 62
James Byers, jun.	Paymaster, &c. Springfield,	" 29, "	7164	On account of expenditures at the armory of that place, for October, 1803,	3,000 00
Charles Scott,		Nov. 10, "	7186	On account of his services and expenses in establishing a site for a magazine at the mouth of Licking river,	312 00
Tench Coxe,	Purveyor,	" 16, "	7190	On account of expenses in the purchase of articles for Springfield armory, &c.	3,000 00
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry,	" 17, "	7194	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, in October, November, and December, 1803,	6,000 00
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c. at Springfield,	" 25, "	7212	On account of expenditures at Springfield, in November, 1803,	3,000 00
Thomas B. Steele,	Assistant Military Ag't, at Kaskaskias,	Dec. 7, "	7233	On account of expenditures at the public works at Kaskaskias,	200 00
Ambrose Whitlock,	Assistant Agent, at Vincennes,	" 7, "	7234	On account of expenditures at the public works at Vincennes,	200 00

## STATEMENT—Continued.

NAMES.	RANK.	WARRANTS.		PURPOSES.	Amount.	
		Date.	No.		Dollars.	Cts.
Wm. M. Duncanson,	- - - - -	Dec. 9, 1803.	7237	For three months' rent of a house, in Washington, for the use of a detachment of troops, to 15th June, 1803,	- - -	60 00
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 21, "	7253	On account of expenditures at Springfield armory, for December, 1803,	- - -	2,000 00
Hezekiah Rogers,	Military Storekeeper, Washington,	July 18, 1804,	7717	Part of warrant for his salary to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	50 00
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	Jan. 2, "	7232	For the salaries of himself and the different persons employed under his direction, to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	1,700 00
Ditto,	Do. do.	" 6, "	7306	For balance due him on settlement of his account, for disbursements at the arsenal on Schuylkill, from 1st October to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	10 13
Wm. H. Harrison, & Cornelius Lyman, Captain 1st regiment,	- - - - -	" 13, "	7324	On account of the purchase money, &c. of a tract of land, containing 100 arpents, (or French acres) for the purpose of erecting a fortification,	- - -	133 50
George Fleming,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	" 16, "	7327	For balance of his account of disbursements at West Point, to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	175 40
George Merchant,	Military Storekeeper at Albany,	" 27, "	7355	For his salary from 1st October to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	125 00
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry,	Feb. 2, "	7368	For balance of his account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	23 84
James Callaway,	Of New London, Virginia,	" 6, "	7376	For rent of his store at that place, to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	87 50
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c. Harper's Ferry,	Mar. 28, "	7486	Part of warrant. For services performed in superintending the public works at Harper's Ferry, from 1st June to 30th September, 1803,	- - -	140 00
Thomas Holt,	Military Storekeeper at New London,	May 30, "	7631	Part of warrant for his salary, from 1st June to 31st December, 1803.	- - -	58 33
John Bray,	Late Military Storekeeper at New Brunswick, New Jersey,	July 24, "	7739	Part of warrant for balance of his account for store rent, &c. from 1st Jan. to 9th Dec. 1803,	- - -	36 1
Wm. H. Harrison, and Cornelius Lyman, Captain,	- - - - -	Oct. 1, "	7842	For drawing the deeds of a tract of land whereon the fort, near Vincennes, is erected,	- - -	25 00
John Eccles,	Of Fayetteville, North Carolina,	" 10, "	7865	Part of warrant for rent of a warehouse for military stores at that place, from 1st January to 31st December, 1803.	- - -	120 00
John Winslow,	Of do. do.	" " "	7866	For his compensation for taking care of public stores deposited at Fayetteville, from 1st January to 31st December, 1803,	- - -	50 00
Christian Senf,	Superintendent of the works at Rocky Mount,	Dec. 27, 1803,	7265	On account of expenditures at the arsenal at Rocky Mount, South Carolina,	- - -	1,200 00
						\$108,887 77



## STATEMENT—Continued.

24	NAMES.	RANK.	WARRANTS.		PURPOSES.	AMOUNT.		
			Date.	No.		Expenditures in 1804.	1804.	1803.
							Dolls. Cts.	Dolls. Cts.
					Amount brought forward, - -	-	108,887 77	
<sup>10</sup> James Byers, junr.	Contractor,	Aug. 3, 1803,	7043	On account of supplies to the armorers at Springfield, in 1804,	-	1,350 00		
Ditto,	Do.	Jan. 17, 1804,	7332	On account of do. do. do.	-	200 00		
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	" 18, "	7334	On account of expenditures in the military store department, for the quarter ending 31st March, 1804,	-	700 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 20, "	7343	On account of expenditures at the armory at Springfield, for January, 1804,	-	2,800 00		
Braham and Byurs,	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry,	" 30, "	7357	For scantling furnished at Greenleaf's Point, for repairs to the barracks,	-	4 93		
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry,	Feb. 1, "	7363	On account of the armory at Harper's Ferry, for the quarter ending 31st March, 1804,	-	8,000 00		
Benjamin Smith,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	" 4, "	7374	On account of the fortifications at Fort Johnston, North Carolina,	-	2,900 00		
George Fleming,	Assistant Military Agent,	" 13, "	7392	On account of repairs to the public buildings at that place,	-	150 00		
Samuel P. Dyson,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	" 17, "	7406	On account of the fortifications at Fort McHenry, near Baltimore,	-	40 00		
James Taylor,	Assistant Military Agent,	" 22, "	7415	On account of expenditures at the mouth of Licking River,	-	1,000 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 18, "	7408	On account of expenditures at Springfield armory, for February, 1804,	-	3,200 00		
Nemehiah Freeman,	Captain,	Mar. 1, "	7433	On account of the repairs to the fortifications at Fort Independence,	-	2,000 00		
John Livingston,	Lieutenant, &c.	" 19, "	7455	On account of the fortifications at Fort Nelson, near Norfolk,	-	2,000 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 21, "	7459	On account of expenditures at the armory of Springfield,	-	2,800 00		
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry,	" 28, "	7487	On account of expenditures at the armory at Harper's Ferry, to March 31, 1804,	-	1,000 00		
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	April 2, "	7495	For the salary of himself, clerks, &c. for the quarter ending 31st March, 1804,	-	1,700 00		
Lemuel Gates,	Captain,	" 9, "	7512	For materials purchased for building officer's quarters at Fort Constitution, Portsmouth, New Hampshire,	-	100 00		
George Fleming,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	" 27, "	7556	For balance due him for repairs to the public buildings at that place, and for his salary to 31st March, 1804,	-	129 72		
George Merchant,	Do. do. at Albany,	May 9, "	7574	For his salary from 1st January to 31st March, 1804,	-	145 50		
Robert Orr,	Inspector of Arms,	" 14, "	7581	For services of said Orr, including his expenses while inspecting small arms in March, 1804,	-	26 25		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c. at Springfield,	" 16, "	7587	On account of armory at that place, for April, 1804,	-	2,000 00		
Ditto,	Do. do. do.	" " "	7588	On account of do. do. May, 1804,	-	3,700 00		
James Byers, junr.	Contractor,	" 18, "	7598	On account of his contract for supplies to the armorers at Springfield,	-	1,100 00		
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c. at Harper's Ferry,	" 19, "	7601	On account of expenditures at the armory, for the quarter ending June 30, 1804,	-	8,000 00		
Tench Coxe,	Purveyor,	" 21, "	7608	On account of expenditures incident to armories for 1804,	-	2,000 00		
James Byers, junr.	Contractor,	" " "	7631	On account of his contract for supplies to the armorers at Springfield, Mass.	-	1,200 00		
Thomas Holt,	Military Storekeeper, N. London, Va.	" 30, "	7631	Part of warrant for his salary from 1st January to 31st March, 1804,	-	25 00		
A. J. Villard,	Engineer,	" " "	7632	For his travelling expenses from Philadelphia to Washington, and his compensation to 31st May, 1804,	-	277 00		
Thomas B. Steele,	Assistant Military Agent at Kaskaskia,	June 6, "	7644	On account of expenditures on the public works at that place,	-	150 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c. at Springfield,	" 15, "	7658	On account of the armory at Springfield for June, 1804,	-	2,800 00		
Thomas Davis,	Paymaster, &c. at Springfield,	" " "	7659	On account of his contract for jack screws for mounting cannon,	-	300 00		
William Irvine,	Of Philadelphia,	" 18, "	7661	On account of his expenditures in 1804,	-	367 84		
A. J. Villard,	Of Philadelphia,	" 23, "	7672	For expenditures at Greenleaf's Point in 1804,	-	69 28		
Christian Sent,	Superintendent at Rocky Mount,	" 26, "	7678	On account of expenditures at Rocky Mount, South Carolina,	-	3,000 00		
William Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	July 2, "	7686	For salaries of himself and persons employed under his direction, to June 30,	-	1,700 00		
William Berry,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	" 7, "	7695	For coal supplied by him at Greenleaf's Point in 1804,	-	28 00		

## STATEMENT—Continued.

NAMES.	RANK.	WARRANTS.		PURPOSES.	AMOUNT.		
		Date.	No.		Expenditures in 1804.	1804.	1803.
						Dolls. Cts.	Dolls. Cts.
George Fleming,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	July 12, 1804,	7700	For his salary from 1st April to 30th June, 1804, and repairs to the barracks at West Point,	-	108,887 77	
James Byers, junr.	Contractor,	" " "	7703	On account of supplies to the armorers at Springfield, Massachusetts,	1,000 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 17, "	7708	On account of expenditures at Springfield armory for July, 1804,	6,000 00		
A. J. Villard,	" " "	" " "	7709	On account of disbursement at Greenleaf's Point, Washington City,	500 00		
Ditto,	" " "	" " "	7710	For sundry expenditures at do. do. do.	119 86		
Hezekiah Rogers,	Military Storekeeper at Washington,	" 18, "	7717	For part of warrant for his salary from 1st January to 30th June, 1804,	100 00		
James Calloway,	Of New London, Virginia,	" 19, "	7727	For rent of his store at that place, to 30th June, 1804,	87 50		
Griffith Coombe,	" " "	" 23, "	7734	For lumber furnished at Greenleaf's Point in June and July, 1804,	301 64		
George Merchant,	Military Storekeeper at Albany, N. Y.	Aug. 1, "	7754	For his salary from 1st April, to 30th June, 1804.	125 00		
Thomas Holt,	Military Storekeeper at N. London Va.	" 13, "	7775	For his pay from 1st April, to 30th June, 1804,	25 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 17, "	7782	On account of the armory at Springfield, for August 1804,	3,300 00		
James Taylor,	New Port, Kentucky,	" " "	7783	On account of the arsenal at the mouth of Licking river,	2,000 00		
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c.,	" 27, "	7800	On account of armory at Harper's Ferry, for quarter ending 30th Sept. 1804,	5,000 00		
George Ingels,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	Sept. 1, "	7804	On account of expenditures in the Military Store Department,	478 38		
A. J. Villard,	" " "	" " "	7805	For his pay from 1st June, to 31st August, 1804,	237 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 18, "	7824	On account of expenditures at the armory, at Springfield, for September 1804,	2,000 00		
George Ingels,	Acting Supt. of Military Stores,	Oct. 1, "	7844	For the salary of the late William Irvine, to 31st July, 1804, the day of his death, and of the clerks, &c. employed by him, to 30th September, 1804,	1,377 37		
James Byers, junr.	Contractor,	" 6, "	7854	For balance of his account for supplies to the armorers at Springfield,	147 80		
Ditto,	Do.	" " "	7855	On account of his contract for supplies to the armorers at Springfield,	700 00		
George Fleming,	Military Storekeeper at West Point,	" " "	7859	For stationary and repairs to public buildings at West Point, including his salary, to the 30th September, 1804,	171 80		
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c.	" 10, "	7862	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, to the 30th September, 1804,	900 00		
Daniel Hurly,	" " "	" " "	7864	On account of his contract for the supply of timber at Greenleaf's Point,	80 00		
John Eccles,	Of Fayetteville, North Carolina,	" " "	7865	Part of warrant for rent of a warehouse for military stores, from 1st January, to 31st October 1804,	93 91		
John Winslow,	Of do.	" " "	7866	Part of warrant for his compensation for the care of military stores at that place, from 1st January, to 15th October, 1804,	39 54		
Thomas Holt,	Storekeeper at New London,	" 15, "	7879	For his pay from 1st July, to 30th September, 1804,	25 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" " "	7880	On account of the armory at Springfield, for October 1804,	2,000 00		
A. J. Villard,	" " "	" 25, "	7898	For balance of his account for erecting sundry newly invented gun carriages,	18 28		
Ditto,	" " "	" " "	7899	On account of the erection of gun carriages,	500 00		
William Irvine,	Late Superintendent of Military Stores,	" 27, "	7904	For balance due his estate for disbursements at the Arsenal on Schuylkill, to 31st July, 1804, the day he died,	80 49		
Samuel Annin,	Paymaster, &c.	" 31, "	7917	On account of expenditures at Harper's Ferry, to 31st December, 1804,	8,500 00		
Tench Coxe,	Purveyor,	" " "	7918	On account of expenditures in constructing jack screws for gun carriages,	400 00		
Callender Irvine,	Superintendent of Military Stores,	Nov. 3, "	7922	On account of expenditures in the military store department,	617 43		
James Taylor,	Of New Port, Kentucky,	" " "	7926	On account of expenditures at the arsenal at the mouth of Licking river,	3,000 00		
Thomas B. Steele,	Assistant Military Agent,	" " "	7923	On account of expenditures at the public works at Kaskaskia,	220 00		
Thomas Martin,	Military Storekeeper at N. Port, Ky.	" 8, "	7938	On account of his salary,	200 00		
James Byers,	Paymaster, &c.	" 13, "	7947	On account of expenditures at Springfield armory, for November 1804,	2,800 00		

## STATEMENT—Continued.

NAMES.	RANK.	WARRANTS.		PURPOSES.	AMOUNT.		
		Date.	No.		Expenditures in 1804.	1804.	1803.
						Dolls. Cts.	Dollars. Cts.
George Merchant, - -	Military Storekeeper at Albany, - -	Nov. 14, 1804,	7948	For his salary &c. from 1st July, to 30th September, 1804, - - -	162 15		
Robert Orr, - -	- - - - -	" 17, "	7955	For his services inspecting small arms, in July 1804, - - -	23 75		
George Ingels, - -	Military Storekeeper, Philadelphia, - -	" 21, "	7960	For disbursements in the military store department, to 14th November, 1804, - -	357 10		
A. J. Villard, - -	- - - - -	Dec. 3, "	7977	For his compensation from 1st September, to 30th November, 1804, - -	237 00		
Griffith Coombe, - -	- - - - -	" 10, "	7989	For lumber furnished at Greenleaf's Point in 1804, - - -	333 96		
Christian Senf, - -	Supt. of the works, Rocky Mount, - -	" 12, "	7997	On account of expenditures on the works at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, -	3,000 00		
N. Fosdick, D. Coit, } J. Dewitt & Saml. Mott, }	Of New London, Connecticut, - -	" 15, "	8000	For their services and expenses in appraising the ground on which Fort Trum- bull is erected, - - - - -	132 00		
William O'Neale, - -	- - - - -	" 15, "	8001	For three hundred and nine bushels of coal delivered at Greenleaf's Point, for the use of the public workmen employed there, - - - - -	105 06		
James Byers, - -	Paymaster, &c. at Springfield, - -	" 17, "	8004	On account of expenditures at Springfield armory for December 1804, - -	5,100 00		
John Dorsey, - -	- - - - -	" 24, "	8010	For iron furnished at Greenleaf's Point, and other articles purchased of him for the works at that place, - - - - -	1,453 85		
A. J. Villard, - -	- - - - -	" 24, "	8011	On account of expenditures in erecting gun carriages, - - - - -	100 00		
Callender Irvine, - -	Superintendent of Military Stores, - -	" 31, "	8021	For salaries of himself and other persons under his direction to 31st Dec. 1804, -	940 16		
George Ingels, - -	Military Storekeeper at Philadelphia, - -	" 31, "	8022	For salary of himself and clerks, for the quarter ending 31st December, 1804, -	657 39		
Clarence Mulford, - -	Lieut. and assistant Military Agent. - -	Jan. 4, 1805,	8031	For a bill of exchange, dated St. Louis, November 13, 1804, drawn by said Mul- ford on account of rent for officers' quarters and materials, for public buildings,	500 00		
George Ingels, - -	Military Storekeeper at Philadelphia, - -	" 7, "	8036	For payment to laborers employed at the arsenal on Schuylkill, in November and December 1804, - - - - -	234 25		
Hezekiah Rogers, - -	Do. at Washington, - -	" 8, "	8040	For his salary from 1st July, to 31st December, 1804, - - - - -	100 00		
James Byers, junr. - -	Contractor, - - - - -	" 9, "	8045	For supplies to the armorers at Springfield, in the quarter ending 31st Dec. 1804,	471 47		
A. J. Villard, - -	- - - - -	" 10, "	8046	For disbursements made by him at Greenleaf's Point, in December 1804, - -	126 96		
George Fleming, - -	Military Storekeeper at West Point, - -	" 17, "	8061	For his salary from 1st October, to 31st December, 1804, including amount paid for stationary, - - - - -	166 50		
<i>Dollars,</i>					114,491 99	108,887 77	

RECAPITULATION.

	Expenditures in 1803.	Expenditures in 1804.	Total Amount.
<i>Fortifications.</i>			
Boston, . . . . .	\$10,457 41	\$2,000 00	\$12,457 41
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, . . . . .	-	100 00	100 00
New London, Connecticut, . . . . .	-	132 00	132 00
Baltimore, Maryland, . . . . .	316 18	40 00	356 18
Norfolk, Virginia, . . . . .	7,500 00	2,000 00	9,500 00
Fort Johnston, Wilmington, North Carolina, . . . . .	-	2,900 00	2,900 00
Vincennes, Indiana Territory, . . . . .	358 50	-	358 50
Kaskaskias, . . . . .	200 00	370 00	570 00
St. Louis, . . . . .	-	500 00	500 00
Washington, Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	655 00	-	655 00
<i>Armories.</i>			
Harper's Ferry, Virginia, . . . . .	28,563 84	33,400 00	61,963 84
Springfield, Massachusetts, . . . . .	33,246 80	44,719 27	77,966 07
<i>Arsenals and Magazines.</i>			
Albany, New York, . . . . .	468 01	432 65	900 66
West Point, do. . . . .	2,712 90	798 89	3,511 79
Schuylkill, Pennsylvania, . . . . .	8,776 11	9,615 34	18,391 45
Washington City, . . . . .	1,433 68	4,987 89	6,421 57
South Carolina, . . . . .	8,448 00	6,000 00	14,448 00
Kentucky, . . . . .	5,312 00	6,200 00	11,512 00
<i>Magazines.</i>			
Fayetteville, North Carolina, . . . . .	170 00	133 45	303 45
New London, Virginia, . . . . .	233 33	162 50	395 83
New Brunswick, New Jersey, . . . . .	36 01	-	36 01
Dollars, -	108,887 77	114,491 99	223,379 76

In addition to the above expenditures on fortifications, other charges will arise on the settlement of agents' accounts, which have not yet been rendered for adjustment.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *Accountant's Office, February 6, 1805.*

WM. SIMMONS,  
*Accountant Department of War.*

8th CONGRESS.]

No. 56.

[2d Session.

THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 28, 1805.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I now lay before Congress a statement of the Militia of the United States, according to the returns last received from the several States. It will be perceived that some of these are not of recent dates, and that, from the States of Maryland, Delaware, and Tennessee, no returns are stated. As far as appears from our records, none were ever rendered from either of these States.

*February 28, 1805.*

TH: JEFFERSON.

RETURN OF THE MILITIA OF THE UNITED STATES.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.															FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.							ARTILLERY.																			
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-Camp.	State Brigneeers.	Commissary Generals of Purchase.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Physician Generals.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjutant Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Wagonmaster Generals.	Foragmaster Generals.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels commandant.	Majors.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Quartermasters.	Adjutants.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Alarm-men.	Matrosses.			
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1804	3	6	.	1	6	.	.	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	28	59	42	31	29	30	31	.	.	16	12	24	.	16	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	278
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1804	10	22	1	1	18	.	.	22	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	84	166	.	81	71	79	82	.	.	1	10	19	9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2,035		
Vermont, . . . . .	1804	4	10	.	.	7	.	.	8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	26	53	.	27	21	27	27	.	.	1	4	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	288			
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1803	1	4	1	1	4	.	.	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	11	23	.	6	5	10	10	.	.	7	17	34	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	86				
Connecticut, . . . . .	1804	4	8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	42	34	34	35	34	34	35	.	.	17	20	32	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	482				
New Jersey, . . . . .	1802	4	24	.	.	.	.	.	22	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	100	152	85	81	46	89	108	.	.	2	9	17	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	784				
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1804	3	10	.	.	10	.	.	11	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	35	79	49	43	27	41	41	.	.	2	9	17	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	289				
Delaware,* . . . . .	1803	14	28	.	1	27	.	.	28	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	136	267	132	108	40	119	126	.	.	2	10	21	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	272				
Maryland,* . . . . .																																											
Virginia, . . . . .	1803	4	19	.	1	8	.	.	19	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	98	196	.	53	29	39	82	4	8	18	26	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	994			
North Carolina, . . . . .	1804	5	12	.	.	3	.	.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.	44	112	.	47	6	23	47	.	.	3	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	76			
South Carolina, . . . . .	1802	2	9	1	1	1	1	1	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	.	46	91	43	24	4	35	41	1	3	15	19	12	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	676				
Georgia, . . . . .	1804	3	7	1	1	6	.	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	22	53	17	19	5	18	25	.	.	1	1	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	130				
Kentucky, . . . . .	1802	5	11	.	1	4	.	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	47	95	.	12	6	36	46	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	17				
Tennessee,* . . . . .																																											
Ohio, . . . . .	1803	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	15	.	2	.	4	5	.	.	.	2	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	70			
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1803	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	.	.	2	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	81			
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1803	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	10	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	81			
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1803	.	.	1	1	3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24				

\*No returns have ever been received from Delaware, Maryland, or Tennessee.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	CAVALRY.												GRENADIERS.					LIGHT INFANTRY.					RIFLEMEN.												
		Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Paymasters.	Quatermasters.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Farriers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	
New Hampshire, -	1804	-	-	22	44	22	-	-	-	88	39	-	-	1,183	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts, -	1804	5	14	51	101	54	13	1	13	214	69	-	-	2,145	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont, -	1804	-	-	27	51	26	-	-	-	104	33	-	-	997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode Island, -	1803	2	1	3	5	3	-	-	-	1	10	4	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut, -	1804	8	8	34	66	34	8	6	8	119	60	-	-	1,067	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York, -	1802	1	4	24	45	18	-	-	-	101	29	-	-	1,401	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey, -	1804	4	7	29	42	33	-	-	-	100	22	5	8	1,038	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania, -	1803	-	-	58	109	55	-	-	4	162	43	19	15	2,332	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia, -	1803	4	8	62	117	57	-	-	-	166	19	-	-	2,874	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
North Carolina, -	1804	6	13	45	81	41	2	-	2	124	20	-	-	1,236	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina, -	1802	7	15	46	51	40	1	1	1	128	31	2	7	1,743	2	2	2	6	3	2	105	4	5	3	12	5	2	133	10	10	9	33	21	12	464	
Georgia, -	1804	-	-	26	45	24	-	-	-	38	17	1	-	698	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kentucky, -	1802	-	-	8	8	8	-	-	-	24	5	-	-	227	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Tennessee,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ohio, -	1803	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
District of Columbia, -	1803	-	-	2	3	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	43	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mississippi Territory, -	1803	-	-	3	6	3	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	2	2	2	6	-	2	100	1	1	1	4	-	1	83	
Indiana Territory, -	1803	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	From what year the return of each State was made.	INFANTRY.												ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.												
		Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Pioneers.	Privates.	Catawbaw Warriors.	Brass Twelve Pounders.	Brass Six Pounders.	Brass Four Pounders.	Brass Three Pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron Nine Pounders.	Iron Six Pounders.	Iron Four Pounders.	Iron Three Pounders.	Artillery Side-arms.	
New Hampshire, -	1804	245	242	.	241	30	30	25	37	973	.	.	.	16,390	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Massachusetts, -	1804	752	778	.	762	80	72	62	63	2,934	.	.	416	51,096	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Vermont, -	1804	246	249	.	236	26	27	23	26	907	.	.	1,698	13,398	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Rhode Island, -	1803	82	93	.	83	9	6	7	7	302	.	.	632	4,414	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Connecticut, -	1804	328	326	.	316	41	39	34	33	1,299	1,144	.	770	14,210	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	.
New York, -	1802	807	802	.	737	75	.	58	53	3,322	.	.	1,456	60,958	.	7	4	10	.	.	.	.	.	4	473	
New Jersey, -	1804	378	355	.	348	38	2	31	39	1,237	.	.	683	23,072	.	.	.	18	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Pennsylvania, -	1803	1,202	1,190	.	1,157	88	70	78	77	2,881	.	.	1,477	80,061	.	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Delaware,* -																										
Maryland,* -																										
Virginia, -																										
North Carolina, -	1803	1,011	912	.	843	23	.	28	25	3,393	.	.	784	61,665	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
South Carolina, -	1804	638	632	.	624	19	.	34	34	2,084	.	.	632	39,492	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Georgia, -	1802	385	378	.	356	11	3	9	7	1,200	.	.	365	28,483	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Kentucky, -	1804	259	237	.	211	11	.	2	2	825	.	.	140	16,309	.	4	11	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.
Tennessee,* -	1802	440	430	.	394	16	6	14	12	1,845	.	.	208	23,239	.	.	2	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ohio, -	1803	78	79	.	79	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
District of Columbia, -	1803	16	13	.	11	.	.	.	.	227	.	.	59	4,352	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Mississippi Territory, -	1803	32	33	.	29	.	.	.	.	52	.	.	8	1,690	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Indiana Territory, -	1803	31	30	.	27	1	.	.	.	91	.	.	12	2,254	.	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	78
										113	.	.	.	1,710	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																	
		Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusces.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Knapsacks.	Ramrods, Steel.	Espositoons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Ball.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire, 1804	1,313	1,213	11,170	-	-	4,625	6,316	3,650	1,500	-	950	-	-	-	8,710	-	13,200	2,710	-
Massachusetts, 1804	2,427	2,404	44,949	258	-	38,186	40,095	22,156	40,561	-	3,540	489,395	63	59,338	-	89,807	34,987	-	-
Vermont, 1804	1,071	998	8,368	-	-	3,305	4,141	1,114	1,930	-	593	-	3	-	4,436	10,210	1,975	-	-
Rhode Island, 1803	87	87	3,052	-	-	2,139	2,263	105	2,833	-	-	3,833	-	-	2,120	4,722	1,909	-	-
Connecticut, 1804	2,276	2,759	14,538	-	-	14,473	15,194	5,083	-	781	-	235,129	4	-	14,255	34,541	14,311	-	-
New York, 1802	1,071	997	38,588	642	-	15,739	13,000	159	-	92	-	958	-	-	-	25,169	14,915	-	-
New Jersey, 1804	1,441	690	12,915	3	-	3,302	3,360	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,034	3,524	105	-
Pennsylvania, 1803	1,708	1,583	20,000	9,604	-	20,000	1,494	-	20,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Delaware,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<i>lbs.</i>	-	-	-	-
Maryland,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,349½	186	506	3,730	-
Virginia, 1803	325	322	9,434	5,126	-	8,817	8,647	-	9,434	-	604	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Carolina, 1804	462	478	18,217	5,363	-	270	3,767	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina, 1802	1,383	1,057	5,916	5,731	1,231	-	-	-	-	5	-	3,658	12	-	-	674	229	16	-
Georgia, 1804	541	408	1,716	1,935	-	391	422	87	795	-	7,067	303	-	49,985	-	2,345	-	-	-
Kentucky, 1802	203	212	2,923	11,157	-	126	142	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tennessee,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	454	-	-	8,370	-	1,443	44	1	-
Ohio, 1803	29	22	431	1,770	-	63	109	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	236	117	-	-
District of Columbia, 1803	39	39	1,087	78	-	1,048	947	-	1,087	-	-	-	2	-	-	740	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory, 1803	74	74	160	586	-	85	159	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108	-	-	-
Indiana Territory, 1803	-	-	976	376	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

H. DEARBORN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 23, 1805.



## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 2, 1806.

Mr. VARNUM, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the message of the President of the United States, of the 3d of December, as relates to the organization and classification of the militia, and to the augmentation of the land forces, made the following report, in part:

In relation to a classification and new organization of the militia. The most extensive view of this part of the subject which has occurred to the committee is, a division of the militia into four classes, in the following manner, viz. those between eighteen and twenty-one years of age to compose one class; those between twenty-one and twenty-six to compose a second class; those between twenty-six and thirty-five to compose a third class; and those between thirty-five and forty-five to compose the fourth class; each class to be under a separate organization, and to be commanded by separate corps of officers. To this kind of organization, as it relates to the first class, we are met by a constitutional objection. By the Constitution of the United States, Congress are empowered "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers."

By some of the State constitutions it is provided, that the captains and subalterns of the militia shall be chosen by such of the persons who compose the respective companies as are upwards of twenty-one years of age, so that there is no constitutional provision by which such States can appoint officers to command a class of the militia composed of minors.

Knowledge of tactics, and an acquaintance with subordination and discipline, are acquirements of such importance to our national defence, that the promotion of them among the militia ought to be a primary object with the Government, and, no doubt, is exceedingly desirable in the minds of the individual citizens. But such means ought to be adopted by the Government as are best calculated to effect the object, with as little fatigue and expense to individuals as the nature of the case will admit. It is conceived, that the fatigue and expense of military discipline is, in a very great degree, proportionate to the population of the different parts of the country where the duty is performed, or, in other words, it is proportionate to the distance each individual composing the different corps is compelled to travel to reach his place of parade. Under the present organization of the militia, this idea is fully verified—the difference in the expense of militia meetings, in those parts of the country where the inhabitants are the most dispersed, when compared with similar meetings, in the more populous parts, is very apparent; and, besides, the nature of the case compels us to believe, that the same cause will produce a similar disparity in military acquirement.

These, however, are evils which grow out of the nature of the case, and cannot be remedied, but by the increase of population, because the principles of the organization are calculated to render the formation of the different corps as compact as is consistent with proper military arrangements.

By the organization and classification of the militia, in the manner which has been named, the limits of each corps must be extended over four times the quantity of territory it now occupies, and, consequently, would burthen the citizens with a proportionate additional expense in the acquisition of a competent portion of military information, or operate as a proportionate preventive to such acquisition. The subject has been viewed in another point of light, that is, to call on the two senior classes to exercise but once in a year, so as to proportion the quantum of exercise to the extension of the corps. In this case, all the evils attendant on the extension of the different corps over additional territory will attach to the junior classes which could attach to them in the other case, and the consequent hazard of a failure in discipline will remain.

Military knowledge, like that of every other science, without practice, is soon forgotten, and, although it is not probable that the whole of the militia will be needed in the field at any one time, yet, in case of invasion, it is very possible that all who are in the vicinity of the assailants may be necessary, and, as it is uncertain at what point an enemy may make his attack, all should be prepared to meet such an event; but, from a deficiency in discipline, or the want of a competent knowledge in tactics, in the two senior classes only, an important opportunity for a speedy extermination of an enemy might be lost, and the lives of many valuable citizens put in jeopardy. It is, therefore, believed, that this experiment is inadmissible.

Another view of this subject has suggested a classification of the militia by ages, under the existing organization, for the sole purpose of designating those persons who are under twenty-six years of age as the only proper objects of militia duty in the field, except in cases of great emergency, and in their particular vicinage. From eighteen to twenty-one years of age is a period of life in which the young men of the United States are employed in completing an education, in pursuit of mechanical information, or in acquiring a necessary acquaintance with some other branch of business, occupation, or profession, on the improvement of which they calculate to obtain a subsistence. From twenty-one to twenty-six, they are improving their previous acquirements in their various occupations and professions, and thereby laying a foundation for a decent support of themselves and families through life: this is a period, also, at which the young men of the United States generally engage in matrimony, and become chargeable with families, all which renders their time as dear to them, from eighteen to twenty-six years of age, as at any other period of life.

It would seem, therefore, that an arrangement which would compel this class of our citizens to bear the principal part of the burthen of national defence might justly be deemed a departure from that principle of distributive justice which ought to be a paramount characteristic of the Government of the United States.

That young men would better endure the fatigues of a long campaign than those more advanced in life is not doubted; but whether, on a sudden emergency, they would be more useful in repulsing an enemy than an equal number of enrolled militia, on an average from eighteen to forty-five, is a question of doubt; if, however, it should be considered that the advantage is in favor of the young men, it is confidently believed, that the advantage in that case to the public would not be of a sufficient magnitude to justify the Government in imposing on them such an unequal burthen.

If the proposed system should be adopted; the total derangement of the existing organization of the militia must be the consequence. It may be proper here again to remark, that, by the Constitution of the United States is vested in the General Government the power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States;" but the same article of the constitution is express in "reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." By this arrangement in the constitution, the powers necessary to produce an efficient militia are divided between the General Government and the State governments. In pursuance of the power vested in the General Government on this subject, Congress did, in the year 1792, pass an act to establish a uniform militia throughout the United States, which act seems to embrace all the principles in the case delegated to Congress. Soon after the passage of that law by Congress, a consideration of the subject was assumed by the Legislatures of all the States, and laws have been passed by all the States for carrying that system into effect, so that, by the co-operation of the General Government and the State governments, the militia are now completely organized and officered throughout the Union. It is now thirteen years since this system has been in operation; the people practising under it have, in a great degree, become acquainted with it, and attached to it; and, in many parts of the Union, military discipline is rapidly progressing under it, and it cannot with propriety be doubted, that the militia of the United States, under the existing organization, are amply competent to a defence against the intrusion of any invading enemy. To derange this system, then, and introduce one totally new and untried, one in which it is not certain that the State Legislatures will concur, and which is of doubtful aspect as it relates to the approbation of the body of the People, would, in the opinion of the committee, at this important crisis of our national affairs, be putting too much at risk.

They therefore recommend the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That it is inexpedient to adopt measures for the classification or new organization of the militia.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 58.

[1st Session.]

## FIRE ARMS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 11, 1806.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 10, 1806.

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States of the 8th instant, I have the honor, through you, to lay before the said House, a statement of the number of fire arms fit for use, the property of the United States, designating the places where they are deposited.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The Hon. the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the United States.

*A Statement of the Fire Arms fit for use, the property of the United States, designating the places where they are deposited, made by the Secretary of War, in obedience to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States of the 8th of January, 1806.*

PLACES WHERE DEPOSITED.	Muskets with Bayonets.	Rifles.	Fusees.	Pairs of Pistols.
Fort Constitution,	76			
Do. Sumner,	189			
Do. Wolcott,	83			
Do. Independence,	131			
Do. Trumbull,	31			
Do. Jay,	216			
Do. Detroit,	959	51	-	13
Do. Michillimackinac,	79	6	-	3
Do. McHenry,	5			
Do. Nelson,	100			
Do. Johnston, South Carolina,	31			
Do. Greene,	25			
Do. Claiborne,	28			
Do. St. Philip,	20			
Do. Johnston, North Carolina,	299			
Do. St. Stephens,	92	17		
Do. Wilkinson,	238			37
Southwest Point,	943			20
St. Vincennes,	31			
Natchitoches,	27			
New Orleans,	5,398	21		9
West Point,	2,276	28		18
Carlisle,	287			
Harper's Ferry,	9,486	2,488		58
Springfield,	39,668		20	245
Albany,	6,712			
Pittsburg,	853	100	4	
New Haven,	500			
On board Revenue Cutter Virginia,	12			
Due from McPherson's corps,	128			
Due from volunteer corps,	234			
Due from Navy Department,	809			246
Treasury Department,	12			6
War Office,	8		2	
Portland,	200			
State of Rhode Island,	500			
State of South Carolina,	2,000			
State of North Carolina,	1,550			
State of Georgia,	1,500			
City of Washington, &c.	3,347			
At the arsenal in Kentucky,	8,000			
Deposited by certain recruiting officers, with sundry persons,	250			
Philadelphia,	26,063	5	6	1,206
Fort Washington,	105	51		77
New London,			30	
Niagara,		2		
Loaned Captain John Turner,		75		
Loaned the Indian Department,		322		
Mississippi Territory,		500		
Total,	113,501	3,666	62	1,938

*Carbines.*

West Point,				590
Springfield,				249
Pittsburg,				19
Philadelphia,				60
				918

The arms now in the hands of the troops in the service of the United States are not included in the above return.

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 28, 1806.

Mr. MITCHELL, from the committee to whom was referred the memorial of the merchants of New York, submitted a report on that part of the same which relates to "the defenceless situation of the port of New York."

Early in the history of North America, the harbor of New York was discovered by the Dutch to be a convenient place of resort for ships. Subsequent experience has proved the judgment of the Hollanders to have been good. The place where the North river forms a junction with Long Island sound is as well, if not better, adapted to navigation and trade than any which the Atlantic coast affords.

The city, at the head of the harbor, is about twenty-seven miles from the ocean, the ebb and flow of the tide is about six feet. The saltness of the water is not much inferior to that of the neighboring sea.

The harbor is a bay or basin, surrounded chiefly by islands; though the space from the foot of the Neversunk hills, to the mouth of the river Raritan, and another space from Bergen point to Hoboken, are parts of the main land which skirt the shores between the insular positions. The land is mostly low, and is composed principally of gravel, sand, and loam, and, in certain spots, strata of solid granite appear.

The island of Sandy Hook, where the light house stands, is little more than a beach rising not far above the level of spring tides. Staten Island swells into moderate hills, and presents, especially on its eastern side, several bold elevations. Long Island, whose western extremity loses its ridges and hills in the plains of Flatlands and New-trecht, still retains at the Narrows, where its cliffs are somewhat abrupt and prominent, several positions of considerable strength. On these shores of the two last mentioned islands, the army of the enemy was landed in 1776, and a repetition of such an invasion might be discouraged by the erection of suitable works to oppose it. Governor's Island has already been much improved by military works, and is the spot on which Fort Jay and the principal other fortifications have been erected. Bedloe Island, though very small, has also been considered proper for defensive operations, and, in some degree, prepared to annoy an enemy. On Manhattan Island, where the city of New York stands, there was once a fort and battery. These have been demolished of late years, under a conviction of their unfitness, as have likewise some more recent breastworks and parapets, which, though constructed but eight or nine years ago, were, within a twelvemonth, destroyed by the people who made them.

Between these islands there are deep channels and rapid currents. Ships of large force may be brought in from sea and anchored in safety abreast of the town. And, having once reached that station, there is water enough to convey frigates or even larger ships quite to the city of Hudson.

To the saltness, depth, and swiftness of the current, is to be ascribed the openness of the harbor of New York during the winter. In 1780, its surface was covered by a thick and strong covering of ice. The like has never happened since, not even during the rigorous winter of 1805. And it is remarkable, that, while the Delaware, Patapsco, and Potomac are frozen, and Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Alexandria are secured thereby from the fleets of an invader, the bay of New York, though situated further to the northward, possesses commonly no such protection, but is accessible from the ocean, with but trifling impediment.

The insecurity of the city is evinced by other facts. With a small squadron of ships in 1674, the English took it from the Dutch. Shortly afterwards it was retaken with almost equal ease. No cause of attack occurring until the commencement of the revolutionary war, it was found utterly incapable of defence against a hostile fleet and army in 1776, and abandoned to the enemy by the troops arrayed for its protection. And that very foe, which then gained the possession, held it as a garrison until 1783, when, on its evacuation, the inhabitants were enabled to return to their homes, after an exile of seven long years.

Since the Revolution, New York has greatly increased in population, extent, capital, and enterprise. The memorialists state that *there* one third of the national revenue is collected. They hope so important a sea port may be thought worthy of an efficient defence; and they beg that a portion of the public treasure accumulated in that place, may be expended in rendering both that treasure and the city in which it is kept more secure.

For the further information of the Senate, the committee beg leave to observe, that a piece of land has been already purchased by the State, on Staten Island, comprehending the high point on which the signal poles of the merchants are erected. The greater part of Governor's Island is understood to be the property of the State—a small part of it only having been purchased by the nation. On these parcels of ground the labor of constructing works is the principal matter of expense. And it is in this posture of affairs that the memorialists, after the State has done so much, ask the nation to bear a proportional part of the charge, necessary to provide more formidable means of defence and offence.

Extravagant estimates have been made by certain jobbers and projectors. Artificial islands, and immense piers, and enormous floating batteries, and vast chevaux de frises, have been talked of; enough to absorb the whole revenue, and to terrify all sober calculators of the cost. The committee have dismissed those schemes, as savouring rather of the visionary and magnificent, than of the useful and feasible. They content themselves with recommending an appropriation to a moderate amount, for making further military improvements on the sites already purchased, and which the State may hereafter purchase and surrender; in full confidence, at the same time, that a due proportion of the heavy artillery, armed ships, and gun boats of the nation, will be stationed at the harbor of New York.

Under these impressions, the following proposition is submitted:

*Resolved*, That it is expedient to appropriate the sum of ——— dollars, to be laid out in such manner, and under such direction, as Congress shall judge proper, in fortifying the harbor and city of New York.

The committee have deemed it to be within the limits assigned them, to recommend another proposition, in favor of the capital of South Carolina:

*Resolved*, That it is expedient to appropriate the sum of ——— dollars, to be laid out in such manner, and under such regulations, as Congress shall judge proper, in fortifying the port of Charleston in South Carolina.

And, for the purpose of providing for other defenceless places, if any such there be, the committee submit another proposition:

*Resolved*, That it is expedient to appropriate the sum of ——— dollars, to be laid out in fortifying such ports and harbors, other than New York and Charleston, as the President of the United States shall think most conducive to the public security.

COMMITTEE ROOM, January 27, 1806.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 60.

[1st Session.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 18, 1806.

*To the House of Representatives of the United States:*

I now communicate to the House of Representatives the information desired by their resolutions of January 24, relative to the fortifications erected at the several ports and harbors of the United States, and their territories, and to the navy and navy yards of the United States.

February 18, 1806.

TH: JEFFERSON. ]

*Report of the Secretary of War, made by direction of the President of the United States, in pursuance of that part of a resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 24th ult. relating to fortifications within the United States, and the territories thereof.*

Ports & Harbors fortified.	Names of the Forts.	Sums expended on the Works.	Probable sums necessary for repairs and improvements.	A general description of the Works, with Remarks.	
Portland, Dist. of Maine.	Fort Sumner,	1795	\$791 00		A small enclosed work, with a block house, magazine, and barrack, and a detached battery, near the water, for heavy cannon, with a store house, and furnace for heating cannon ball; authorized by an act of Congress, of the 20th of March, 1794. The works generally require repairs.
		1796	369 00		
		1797	68 25		
		1798	1,200 00		
		1799	4,294 06		
		1800	1,419 48		
		1801	357 46		
		1802	60 00		
		Total,	\$8,559 25		
Portsmouth, N. Hampshire.	Fort Constitution,	1794	\$250 00	\$6,000 00	The remains of an ancient fortification, which have been repaired, at different periods, with some improvements; but still require considerable improvements and repairs.
		1795	266 00		
		1796	316 00		
		1798	1,000 00		
		1800	2,570 81		
		1801	6,699 87		
		1802	537 54		
		1804	100 00		
		Total,	\$14,740 22		
Cape Ann, Massachusetts.					Fortifications authorized by act of Congress, of the 20th of March, 1794. A site selected, and drawing made, by the engineer, of works contemplated; which were commenced but never completed.
Salem, Massachusetts.		1794	\$93 60		A block house, magazine, and battery; authorized by act of Congress, of March 20th, 1794. Wanting repairs.
		1799	2,000 00		
		1800	500 00		
		Total,	\$2,593 60		
Marblehead, Massachusetts.		1794	\$300 00		A block house, magazine, and battery; authorized by act of Congress, of March 20th, 1794. Wanting repairs.
		1795	1,011 68		
		1796	508 87		
		1797	114 84		
		1799	8,500 32		
		1800	2,560 15		
		1801	639 05		
		Total,	\$13,634 91		
Boston Harbor, Massachusetts.	Fort Independence.	1794	\$496 27		A regular, strong, enclosed work; the ramparts of stone and brick, with magazine, quarters, barracks, and other buildings; commenced in the year 1800, and completed in 1803. In good repair.
		1795	1,342 50		
		1800	46,304 21		
		1801	66,710 14		
		1802	58,844 42		
		1803	10,497 57		
		1804	2,000 00		
		Total,	\$186,195 11		

## REPORT—Continued.

Ports & Harbors fortified.	Names of the Forts.	Sums expended on the Works.	Probable sums necessary for repairs and improvements.	A general description of the Works, with Remarks.	
Newport, Rhode Island.	Forts Adams and Wolcott.	1794	\$500 00	\$60,000 00	Two enclosed works, with batteries, magazines, and barracks; and, in addition to a stone tower at the entrance of the harbor, and a block house and battery on Rhode Island, near the town of Newport, an extensive regular fort was commenced on a small island, but no part completed except a range of stone barracks. These works were principally erected in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800. To complete the whole would require very large expenditures; and, when completed, would not, in the smallest degree, annoy ships of war, but in one of three open and convenient passages by which Rhode Island may be approached.
		1795	864 75		
		1796	198 91		
		1798	5,900 00		
		1799	50,700 00		
		1800	40,731 25		
		1801	8,500 00		
		1802	240 33		
		Total,	\$107,635 24		
New London, Connecticut.	Fort Trumbull.	1794	\$350 00		Fortified in the course of our revolutionary war. Several repairs have been made, at different periods, since, with considerable improvements. No considerable repairs are now necessary.
		1795	943 88		
		1796	200 85		
		1799	7,520 00		
		1800	413 66		
		1802	204 14		
		1804	4,398 19		
New York Harbor.	Fort Jay.	1794	\$1,327 00	\$60,000 00	
		1795	6,866 54		
		1796	1,124 00		
		1798	30,117 24		
		1799	40,116 18		
		1800	10,124 40		
		1801	10,348 05		

*Remarks in relation to New York Harbor.*

In the years 1794, and 1795, considerable expenses were incurred in the harbor of New York, in fortifications on Governor's, Bedloe's, and Ellis's Islands, and in front of the city.

On Governor's Island, a regular enclosed work, with detached batteries for heavy cannon and mortars, was erected with a magazine and barracks, which require considerable repairs and improvements. On the other islands, there were batteries and magazines, with some barracks, which also require repairs.

A formidable battery of heavy cannon and mortars (which is now in ruins) was erected in front of the city. A heavy park of artillery was also mounted on travelling carriages, and placed in a building belonging to the State, within the city.

No considerable improvements have been made on the above mentioned works, or additional fortifications erected, for the defence of the harbor of New York, within the last five years; there having been no funds for those objects furnished by the State, as contemplated by the act of Congress of the 3d of May, 1798, and understood to have been intended by the State.

Engineers were employed by the Governor of the State to survey and examine the harbor, and to report the best practicable mode of defence. The report, accompanied by drawings and estimates, was transmitted to the President of the United States in the year 1801. By this project, the principal works were to be at Sandy Hook. The estimates, amounting to 3,968,658 dollars, were considered as a sufficient reason for rejecting the report; the debt of the State of New York (which was the limit of the sum authorized to be expended) being only \$1,852,035. In January, 1805, a report was also received from another engineer, accompanied by a letter from the mayor of the city, in which the Narrows were contemplated as the principal place of defence. The estimates for completing the works amounted to 2,000,000 of dollars, and the plan of defence proposed inspired no confidence.

Lieutenant Colonel Williams, of the corps of engineers, was, last autumn, directed to make such a survey of the harbor of New York, as would enable him to report, with accuracy, the width of the Narrows, from the water's edge on each side; the distances from Governor's Island to Bedloe's, to Ellis's Island, and to the battery in front of the city, and from the city to the nearest point on the Jersey shore. This duty he performed, and reported, accompanying his report with a drawing of the harbor, showing the relative situation of the several points alluded to in his instructions, with remarks on the subject generally, and particularly on fortifying the Narrows.

I will here take the liberty of offering some general remarks, on the subject of defending our ports and harbors.

Notwithstanding the experience of ages to the contrary, an opinion appears to have been prevalent, and in many cases relied upon, that fixed batteries, on the margins of channels not more than one mile in width, might, under the direction of skilful officers, render the passage of ships of war so difficult and unsafe, as to prevent their attempting such passages. It is the more remarkable, that such an opinion should have continued to prevail, after so many instances have occurred of ships of war not only having passed the best batteries within even point blank shot, (which is less than 500 yards) but of their presenting their broadsides to such batteries, with springs on their cables, and sustaining the fire for a considerable length of time, and even, in many cases, of silencing the batteries.

The action, in the year 1801, between a British squadron and several strong batteries, in the harbor of Copenhagen, where, probably, there was no want of skill or bravery on the side of the Danes, (the result of which is in the recollection of every one) proves, beyond any reasonable doubt, the incorrectness of the opinion alluded to. Many other instances might be adduced, as evidence of the impropriety of relying on fixed batteries for preventing ships of war, with a fair wind and tide, passing through a channel of one mile in width, or even within point blank shot of the batteries, especially where the course is nearly direct, as is the case at the Narrows, at the entrance of New York harbor. This passage cannot be reduced to less than seven-eighths of a mile in width, and that only by erecting works on a reef 500 yards from Long Island shore, where there are three feet of water at the lowest time of tide, and nine feet at high water.

It will be recollected by many, that in the summer of 1776, a British ship, of about forty guns, had been some distance up the Hudson, above New York; that it was known she would soon pass down by that city, and the batteries were prepared at several places on the bank of the river, in and above the city, with the most sanguine expectations of destroying the ship on her passage; but, although she descended in the day time, with a moderate breeze, which afforded full time for the batteries to act on her, and a tremendous cannonade commenced from the respective batteries as she passed, no apparent injury was received by the ship; and it was generally remarked, that she appeared to be no more incommoded by the batteries than if no shot had been fired. Her distance from the batteries was about half a mile, which is little more than the distance of the centre of the channel in the Narrows from any batteries which could be erected on either or both shores.

It now remains to be decided: 1st. Whether the Narrows, or any other points, are susceptible of being so fortified as to afford a sufficient defence to the harbor and city?

2dly. Whether any other practicable system of defence may be sufficiently relied upon? and,

3dly. What general or particular system ought to be adopted?

That the harbor of New York is not susceptible of such defence as ought to be relied on by permanent or fixed batteries, must be evident to every one who will reflect upon the subject; and, consequently, that some other system ought to be adopted. This, it is presumed, should consist of at least one regular enclosed work, capable of being defended against a sudden assault, together with such fixed batteries as may most effectually annoy ships of war on their approach to the city, and while in a situation to batter it; and also of a suitable weight of moving batteries, by land and water, such as a heavy park of cannon and howitzers, mounted on travelling carriages, and placed in the city, together with a sufficient number of well constructed gun-boats. Should such a system of defence not be considered as sufficient for the security of the harbor and city of New York, it will be difficult, if not impracticable, to propose any adequate to the object, short of heavy ships of war, in sufficient number to meet any force which an enemy may direct against that place.

Ports & Harbors fortified.	Names of the Ports.	Sums expended on the Works.	Probable sums necessary for repairs and improvements.	A general description of the Works, with Remarks.
Mud Island, below Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.	Fort Mifflin.	1794 \$5,142 00 1795 2,382 00 1798 12,576 52 1799 28,000 00 1800 15,000 00 1801 1,169 25 1803 91 32 Total, \$64,361 09	\$2,000	A regular enclosed work, with batteries, magazines, and barracks, principally erected in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800. Some repairs are necessary.
Wilmington, Delaware.				A selection and survey of a site for a fortification, authorized by the act of Congress of the 20th of March, 1794, but no works erected.
Baltimore Harbor, Maryland.	Fort M'Henry.	1794 \$500 00 1795 900 69 1796 1,068 39 1797 802 00 1798 17,624 50 1799 11,538 41 1800 53,044 66 1801 8,185 71 1802 1,052 58 1803 316 18 1804 40 00 Total, \$95,073 12		A regular fortification of mason work, with batteries, magazine, and barracks, erected principally in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800. No considerable repair necessary.
Annapolis, Maryland.		1795 \$268 50		An examination and a survey of a site for fortifications, but the works not completed.
Alexandria, District of Columbia.		1794 \$800 00 1795 1,208 00 Total, \$2,008 00		Temporary works erected in the year 1795, now in ruins.
Norfolk, Virginia.	Fort Nelson.	1794 \$3,210 85 1795 1,193 50 1799 402 00 1800 1,181 58 1802 4,000 00 1803 7,500 00 1804 2,000 00 1805 600 00 Total, \$20,087 93	\$8,000	Commenced in the year 1794, repaired and improved in the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, with extensive batteries, a magazine, and barracks. Considerable improvements and repairs yet necessary.

## REPORT—Continued.

Ports & Harbors fortified.	Names of the Forts.	Sums expended on the Works.	Probable sums necessary for repairs and improvements.	A general description of the Works, with Remarks.
Ocracock Harbor, North Carolina.				On an island, called Beacon Island, a work was commenced in the year 1795, but not completed; and in the year 1799 measures were directed for the erection of an enclosed work on the ruins of the former work, but from a belief that no work could be erected and supported at that place, which would afford any considerable protection to the harbor, none has been erected. It is presumed that two gun boats would more securely protect that harbor than any fixed batteries that might be erected.
Cape Fear river N. Carolina.	Fort Johnston,	1794   \$2,418 00 1795    1,463 50 1796    1,430 95 1799    6,333 33 1800    9,457 16 1801    3,823 79 1804    2,900 00 Total, \$27,826 73	\$4,000	The site of an ancient fortification. In the years 1799 and 1800 some progress was made in erecting new works on the old site, which, from unfortunate arrangements and delays, on the part of the gentleman who contracted to complete them, are yet unfinished, but will probably be completed the present year. They will, when finished, require the aid of some gun boats to afford sufficient protection to the river, and the town of Wilmington.
Georgetown, S. Carolina.		1794   \$250 00		Some cannon were mounted in the year 1794, but no works erected.
Charleston, S. Carolina.	Forts Moultrie, Pinckney and Johnston.	1794   \$3,850 00 1795    4,625 45 1796    1,149 00 1797       912 00 1798    4,205 98 1799   11,500 00 1801        48 68 Total, \$26,291 11	\$30,000	<p>Forts repaired and improved on the ruins of works erected in the course of our revolutionary war; but as the State of South Carolina has not considered it expedient, until the last session of its Legislature, to cede the sites of those works, or of any others, no considerable repairs have been made on them, or any new works commenced.</p> <p>The fortifications are now almost in ruins, principally occasioned by an unusual storm which happened in 1804.</p> <p>If the session recently made should meet the approbation of Congress, improvements on the fortifications in Charleston harbor ought, without delay, to be commenced.</p>
Savannah, Georgia,	Fort Green,	1794   \$1,050 00 1795       86 00 1796       426 00 Total, \$1,562 00	\$15,000, if suitable sites can be obtained.	On a small island called Cockspur, near the mouth of the river, irregular fortifications were erected in the year 1794, with a battery, magazine, and barracks. In the year 1804 the works and barracks were totally destroyed, and a part of the garrison drowned, by a storm which occasioned such a rise of the water as overflowed the island to a considerable depth; but as no cession has been made to the United States, by the State of Georgia, of any suitable site or sites, for permanent fortifications, and it not having been in the power of the Executive of the United States to procure any, on reasonable terms, either on the Savannah river or the St. Mary's, no considerable expense has been incurred on the sea coast of that State, for the last five years, and the garrison has been removed from the St. Mary's as well as from fort Green.
St. Mary's, Georgia,		1799   \$2,000 00 1800    2,578 91 1801    2,090 38 Total, \$6,669 29		<p>Suitable gun boats, with some heavy cannon, on travelling carriages, would, it is presumed, afford the safest protection to Savannah and St. Mary's, aided by some fixed batteries.</p>

## REPORT--Continued.

Ports & Harbors fortified.	Names of the Forts.	Sums expended on the Works.	Probable sums necessary for repairs and improvements.	A general description of the Works, with Remarks.
New Orleans,	Forts St. Louis, St. Charles, and St. Philip.		\$25,000, for New Orleans and its de- pendencies.	<p>The town of New Orleans is surrounded, except the front, by a mud wall, with three redoubts in the rear, and two in front; the two latter called forts. If the works were in repair they would be incapable of sustaining a siege, or of affording any considerable protection against an assault.</p> <p>About fifty miles below the town there is an ancient fortification called St. Philip, with a battery, magazine, and barracks, which require considerable repairs and improvements.</p> <p>At the junction of Bayau St. John with lake Ponchartrain, a small ancient work remains, intended to guard that communication with New Orleans, against the approach of an enemy, by way of the lake. This work is out of repair, and will probably require considerable improvement.</p> <p>Gun boats will be necessary for the defence of the river and lake, in addition to fixed batteries.</p>



REPORT—Continued.

In addition to the above expenditures, made through the Department of War, on account of fortifying Ports and Harbors within the United States, the following sums, for the same purpose, have been disbursed at the Treasury subsequent to the year 1793, (per statement from the Treasury.)			Total sums expended by the Department of War, for fortifying Ports and Harbors within the United States, since the 20th of March, 1794, to the 31st December, 1805.	Total sums disbursed by the United States, for fortifying Ports and Harbors within the same, since the 20th of March, 1794, to December 31st, 1805.
PORTS AND HARBORS.	PERIOD OF TIME.	TOTAL.		
Portsmouth New Hampshire, -	From July 8th, 1794, to 29th Nov. 1796, -	3,854 26	- - - 14,740 22	18,594 48
Gloucester, (Cape Ann,) Mass. -	August 25th, 1794, to August, 1796, -	4,538 66	- - - - 4,538 66	4,538 66
Marblehead, - - - do. -	August 25th, 1794, to Sept. 29th, 1796, -	3,663 78	- - - - 13,634 91	17,298 69
Salem, - - - - do. -	June, 1794, to December 30th, 1795, -	2,629 48	- - - - 2,593 60	5,223 08
Portland, - - - do. -	July 19th, 1794, to Nov. 29th, 1797, -	4,275 41	- - - - 8,559 25	12,834 66
			Boston Harbor, 186,195 11	186,195 11
Newport, Rhode Island, - -	May 22d, 1794, to Dec. 31st, 1795, -	10,299 80	- - - - 107,635 24	117,935 04
New London, Connecticut, - -	April 17th, 1794, to June 17th, 1795, -	5,288 21	- - - - 14,030 72	19,318 93
New York, - - - - -	April 15th, 1794, to February, 1796, -	17,410 73	- - - - 100,023 41	117,434 14
Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania, - -	May 8th, 1794, to Feb. 4th, 1799, -	107,623 28	- - - - 64,361 09	171,984 37
Baltimore, Maryland, - - - -	Nov. 18th, 1794, to Nov. 28th, 1799, -	15,285 36	- - - - 95,073 12	110,358 48
Annapolis, Maryland, - - - -	July to December, 1794, -	2,997 75	- - - - 268 50	3,266 25
Norfolk, Virginia, - - - - -	April 1st, 1794, to Nov. 11th, 1797, -	16,775 35	- - - - 20,087 93	36,863 28
Alexandria, Virginia, - - - -	April 23d, to Dec. 8th, 1794, -	2,928 36	- - - - 2,008 00	4,936 36
Cape Fear & Ocracock Inlet, N. C.	May 21st, 1794, to Dec. 24th, 1795, -	5,728 01	- - - - 27,826 73	33,554 74
Beacon Island, - - - - -	January to December, 1794, -	1,816 49	- - - - - - -	1,816 49
Charleston, South Carolina, - -	May 31st, 1794, to October 6, 1796, -	30,359 98	- - - - 26,291 11	56,651 09
Georgetown, South Carolina, - -	Jan. 15th, 1795, to May 23d, 1796, -	572 54	- - - - 250 00	822 54
Savannah, Georgia, - - - - -	May 19th, 1794, to Dec. 31, 1796, -	6,550 26	- - - - 1,562 00	8,112 26
Point Petre, (St. Marys,) Georgia,	May 9th, 1794, to August 1st, 1796, -	9,211 62	- - - - 6,669 29	15,880 91
		\$251,809 33	\$691,810 23	\$943,619 56

Exclusive of the sum of \$222,810 04 expended by the State, for which she has received a credit at the treasury, on account of the balance due by her to the United States.

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 13th, 1806.

H. DEARBORN.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 61.

[1st SESSION.]

## PAY OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 1, 1806.

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 29, 1806.

SIR:

The Secretary of War, to whom the petition of sundry officers of the army, serving in the territory of Louisiana, has been referred, by an order of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 25th instant, begs leave to remark thereon:

That he feels a delicacy in offering any opinion on the competency of the present pay of the army.

Whether the facts stated in the said petition, as to the relative value of money, or the prices of the necessities and comforts of life, between the year 1792 and the present time, are correct or not, it is presumed that it will not be necessary for the Secretary to give an opinion.

If, under existing circumstances, it should not be thought advisable to increase the monthly pay of the officers of the army, there may be a propriety in establishing a uniformity in the price or value of the ration allowed to the officers, at a rate at least equal to the highest price at present given for the supply of our troops, which is eighteen cents per ration; and Congress will consider whether the present necessary expenses of living will not render it advisable and just to increase the value of the officer's ration to twenty cents. An established uniformity in the value of their rations would prevent many inconveniences in the settlement of their accounts for pay and subsistence, as it is not uncommon for an officer to be at several posts in the course of a few months, at no two of which the price of the ration is the same.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The Hon. the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the United States.

To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, the memorial of the subscribers, officers of the army, serving in Louisiana, humbly sheweth:

That the pay of the officers of the army hath not been augmented or increased since the 5th of March, 1792, at which time the necessities of life, generally, could be purchased in any part of the United States for about one half of their present prices; that, in the territories of Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, and Orleans, the present price of almost every article necessary for their use, is threefold what it could be purchased for in the United States in 1792; and that, in this territory in particular, prices are much more exorbitant: as evidence of this fact your memorialists beg leave to state, that the common price of brown sugar is fifty cents, and of coffee from seventy-five to a hundred cents per pound, in the town of St. Louis, and that groceries and merchandise of every kind are proportionably high throughout the territory.

If it be true, as your memorialists believe it is, that the pay of the army, as established in 1792, was but a moderate and reasonable compensation, and so considered by the Government and people of the United States, and if that compensation has depreciated to less than half its original value, is it not reasonable and just that it should be so increased, as that each individual may receive for his services a sum equal in value to that originally intended for him, and established by law? Your memorialists presume it is; and relying on the principles of fair contract, and the justice of their country, for which all their blood is ready to flow, they respectfully approach your honorable body, and beg leave to submit their case to your consideration, in full confidence that you will grant such relief as may be deemed reasonable and just.

Thomas Hunt, Colonel.  
T. H. Cushing, Lieutenant Colonel.  
Jacob Kingsbury, Lieutenant Colonel.  
J. Bruff, Major artillery.  
B. Lockwood, Captain.  
James Richmond, Captain.  
E. B. Clemson, Lieutenant.

Daniel Hughes, Lieutenant.  
J. Rhea, Lieutenant.  
George Peter, Lieutenant.  
W. Carson, Lieutenant.  
William Richardson, Lieutenant.  
Joseph Kimball, Lieutenant.  
J. Roney, Ensign.

TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, November 8, 1805.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 62.

[1st SESSION.]

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 2, 1806.

Mr. VARNUM, from the committee instructed to inquire what measures are necessary to be adopted to complete the arming the militia of the United States, made the following report:

That, by the laws of the United States, each citizen enrolled in the militia is put under obligations to provide himself with a good musket or rifle, and all the other military equipments prescribed by law. From the best estimate which the committee have been able to form, there is upwards of 250,000 fire arms and rifles in the hands of the militia, which have, a few instances excepted, been provided by, and are the property of, the individuals who hold them. It is highly probable, that many more of the militia would have provided themselves with fire arms in the same way, if they had been for sale in those parts of the United States where the deficiencies have happened; but the wars in Europe have had a tendency to prevent the importation of fire arms from thence into the United States, which, together with the limited establishments for the manufacture of that implement in the United States, has rendered it impossible for individuals to procure them.

There are several State magazines of fire arms, but the amount of the number of stands has not been ascertained. There are in the magazines of the United States about 120,000 fire arms and rifles fit for use, and about 12,000 which need repairs. It is conceived that the number of fire arms in the public magazines is not greater than ought to remain there in time of peace.

And the committee are of opinion that, to provide for the exigency of war, it will be expedient to extend the manufacture of fire arms, in the armories of the United States, as far as can conveniently be done, without the erection of new buildings; to effect which, it will be necessary to appropriate, for that purpose, \$62,100 in addition to the sums reported in the general estimate.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 7th, 1806.*

Sir:

In answer to the queries contained in your letter of the 1st inst. I beg leave, through you, to submit the following statements and remarks to the consideration of the committee instructed to inquire "what measures are necessary to be adopted to complete the arming of the militia of the United States."

In the years 1802, 1803, 1804, and 1805, there have been manufactured 16,234 muskets with bayonets, at the armory in Springfield, Massachusetts.

The expense of this armory within the same time, exclusive of the expenditures incurred in consequence of the burning of one of the buildings attached to the establishment, has amounted to 145,214 dollars. The average expense, therefore, of each musket, within the aforesaid four years, is eight dollars ninety-four and a half cents.

In the armory at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, there have, within the same years, been manufactured, of muskets with bayonets,

Of rifles, 2,488, equal to muskets,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,676
Old arms repaired, estimated equal to the manufactory of muskets,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,732
										750
										<u>7,158</u>

The expenses of the armory, within the same time, exclusive of repairs of dam and canal, amount to 96,169 dollars.

The average expense of each musket, within the aforesaid term of four years, manufactured at this armory, appears consequently to be thirteen dollars forty-three and a half cents.

A defect in the dam and canal occasioning, in the year 1802, a want of water for the use of the machinery, and the prevalence of a bilious complaint among the workmen, in a subsequent year, considerably retarded, in those two years, the operation of the armory at Harper's Ferry. It will not be improper, moreover, to remark, that the muskets and rifles manufactured at this armory are superior in workmanship to any others intended for military purposes, which are manufactured either in this, or, I presume, in any other country.

Although the muskets manufactured at the Springfield armory are not as highly finished as those made at Harper's Ferry, they are still considered equal, if not superior, in workmanship, to the best muskets, manufactured for the use of soldiers, in either France or England.

To what extent the existing public armories may be increased in number of workmen, and how far the number of arms manufactured annually may be augmented, without increasing the average expense of the arms, it is difficult to determine. It is probable, however, that such an additional number of workmen may be employed, as would ensure the manufacturing of from ten to eleven thousand muskets annually, with but a small, if any, additional average expense on each musket.

The existing armories might be so extended, by additional buildings and apparatus, as to admit of a much greater number of workmen, and, of course, of the manufacturing of a proportional increase in the number of arms annually. But, for such an additional number of workmen, as is first above contemplated, it is presumed that no considerable augmentation of expense would be required for buildings or apparatus.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Honorable JOSEPH B. VARNUM.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 63.

[1st SESSION.]

### THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, APRIL 11, 1806.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I now lay before Congress a statement of the militia of the United States, according to the returns last received from the several States and territories. It will be perceived that some of these are not of recent dates; and that, from the States of Maryland and Delaware, no returns are stated. As far as appears from our records, none were ever rendered from either of these States. From the territories of Orleans, Louisiana, and Michigan, complete returns have not yet been received.

*April 11, 1806.*

TH: JEFFERSON.

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES:	For what year the Return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.													FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.											
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Gen'ls.	Adjutant Generals.	Aid-de-camps.	State Engineers.	Commissary Generals of Purchase.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Physician Generals.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjutant Gen'ls.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Wagonmaster Gen'ls.	Foragemaster Generals.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Quartermasters.
New Hampshire,	1805	3	6	1	1	6			6											34	68		34	34	33	34
Massachusetts,	1805	10	22	1	1	17			22											83	171		82	75	80	84
Rhode Island,	1803	1	4	1	1	4			4											11	23		6	5	10	10
Connecticut,	1805	4	8	1	1															35	58	32	43	36	34	34
Vermont,	1805	4	10	1	1	8			6											31	61		29	28	28	28
New York,	1804	7	31		1				28											108	208	98	121	69	111	111
New Jersey,	1805	4	6		1				10											33	72	40	34	26	36	36
Pennsylvania,	1803	14	28		1	27			28											136	267	132	108	40	119	126
Delaware,																										
Maryland,	1805	3	16		1	8			16											84	159		47	24	41	70
Virginia,	1805	5	12			3														55	121		23	2	22	32
North Carolina,	1802	2	9	1	1		1	1	9	1	1									46	91	43	24	4	35	41
South Carolina,	1805	3	7	1	1	6			7													37	6	6	18	30
Georgia,	1805	5	12		1	17			12											54	111	48	24	9	36	50
Kentucky,	1805	2	6		1	3			6											26	52					26
Tennessee,	1805	3	5	2	1				5											14	29		4	3	14	14
Ohio,	1803		1						1											2	4		2	1	1	3
District of Columbia,	1803																			4	8					2
Mississippi Territory,	1805					4														4	6					
Indiana Territory,	1803			1		3																				
Michigan Territory,																										
Orleans Territory,																										
Louisiana Territory,*																										

\* Governor Wilkinson reports the number of men liable to militia duty in the Territory of Louisiana, on the 30th January, 1806, to amount to 2,220.

By direction of the President of the United States, letters were written by the Secretary of War to the Governors of each State, on the 8th day of December, 1802, requesting their attention to the tenth section of the law of Congress, respecting annual returns of the militia being made to the President of the United States, passed on the 8th day of May, 1792, and on the 8th day of November, 1805: letters were written to the Governors of the several States and territories, requesting them to give directions for making a return of the militia to the Department of War, by the 1st day of January, 1806, if practicable, but if not, as soon thereafter as possible. An expectation of receiving returns from the States and territories, generally, in consequence of this request, has caused a delay in completing this return; still, however, it will be perceived that, from some, no returns have been received, and from others none have been made since 1802 and 1803.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	ARTILLERY.												CAVALRY.										GRENADIERS.										
		Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Alarm Men.	Matrosses.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Paymasters.	Quartermasters.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Farriers.	Saddlers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Rank and File.
New Hampshire,	1805	-	-	17	17	17	-	68	-	34	-	-	462	-	-	29	58	28	-	-	-	-	115	60	-	-	1,629	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts,	1805	-	17	51	53	53	-	209	-	108	-	-	2,109	5	14	53	109	56	13	-	10	230	75	-	-	2,126	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode Island,	1803	2	1	4	7	-	-	12	-	9	-	-	86	2	1	3	5	3	-	-	8	10	4	-	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut,	1805	-	-	15	35	-	-	62	49	-	-	-	324	-	-	29	66	30	8	6	-	119	60	-	-	1,290	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont,	1805	-	-	8	16	8	-	32	-	29	64	-	423	8	8	34	66	30	-	-	8	115	28	-	-	1,002	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York,	1804	6	13	22	29	22	2	89	-	78	-	-	1,143	4	10	41	74	32	-	1	-	139	48	-	-	1,784	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey,	1805	-	1	4	4	1	-	11	7	8	6	-	130	1	2	24	46	23	1	-	-	76	17	5	9	993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania,	1803	1	2	10	21	-	-	36	19	10	38	-	272	-	-	58	109	55	-	-	4	162	43	15	19	2,382	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia,	1805	4	8	42	41	41	-	146	-	33	-	-	1,050	4	8	64	122	57	-	-	-	174	24	-	-	3,096	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Carolina,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	8	13	6	1	1	1	17	3	-	-	238	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina,	1802	1	3	14	19	12	-	46	16	22	40	62	676	7	15	46	51	40	1	1	128	31	7	2	-	1,743	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Georgia,	1805	-	-	5	5	5	-	11	-	4	-	-	71	-	-	22	39	18	-	-	-	32	20	-	-	590	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kentucky,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	10	19	19	19	4	-	-	41	19	-	-	636	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Tennessee,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ohio,	1805	-	-	1	2	-	-	4	-	2	-	-	46	-	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	
District of Columbia,	1803	-	-	2	2	-	-	8	-	2	-	-	81	-	-	2	3	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mississippi Territory,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Indiana Territory,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Michigan Territory,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Orleans Territory,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Louisiana Territory,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	LIGHT INFANTRY.						RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.															
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Pioneers.	Privates.	Catawba Warriors.	
New Hampshire,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode Island,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York,	1804	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
North Carolina,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina,	1802	4	5	3	12	5	2	133	10	10	9	33	21	12	464	805	775	708	16	-	26	28	3,398	-	707	-	61,962	-	
Georgia,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	4	16	-	-	385	575	612	14	-	21	21	1,774	-	867	-	37,871	-		
Kentucky,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	254	231	216	11	3	9	7	1,200	139	365	245	28,483	60		
Tennessee,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	516	503	446	21	6	4	1	819	-	124	-	16,425	-		
Ohio,	1805	1	1	1	2	-	2	48	-	-	-	-	-	-	248	238	230	7	1	12	12	308	308	320	-	29,386	-		
District of Columbia,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	118	115	120	10	10	5	5	456	-	100	-	14,285	-		
Mississippi Territory,	1805	2	2	2	6	-	2	100	1	1	1	4	-	-	16	13	11	-	-	-	-	52	15	8	-	1,690	-		
Indiana Territory,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	27	26	1	-	-	-	79	53	3	-	1,623	-		
Michigan Territory,	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	30	27	1	-	-	-	113	-	-	-	1,710	-		
Orleans Territory,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Louisiana Territory,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	Brass 12 Pounders.	Brass 6 Pounders.	Brass 4 Pounders.	Brass 3 Pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron 9 Pounders.	Iron 6 Pounders.	Iron 4 Pounders.	Iron 3 Pounders.	Artillery Side Arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusees.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Knapsacks.	Ramrods, Steel.	Esportons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Standards of Colors.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	
		New Hampshire, 1805	6	26	9	18								1,808	1,763	12,520														
Massachusetts, 1805				88								2,387	2,357	46,218	397		5,600	7,143	4,160	3,260		2,000								
Rhode Island, 1803				4								87	87	3,052			2,139	2,263	105	2,833		4,607	405,539	69	65,858	1,800	23,000	3,960		
Connecticut, 1805				11								1,377	1,414	15,085			15,056	16,423	7,473	2,833			3,833			40,125	96,476	36,807		
Vermont, 1805				3								1,020	1,048	8,824			3,341	4,056	1,482	2,317			293,205			2,120	4,722	1,909		
New York, 1804				9				1				1,431	1,344	39,919	1,928		17,076	20,643	106	14,553		1,928				14,912	38,584	15,008		
New Jersey, 1805				1								695	381	12,423	86		2,681	5,201	6				2,201	12	5	80,696	4,676	6,859	2,318	
Pennsylvania, 1803											55	1,708	1,583	20,000	9,604		20,000	1,494		20,000	75	1		4	57		29,495	14,065		
Delaware, -																														
Maryland, -																														
Virginia, -	1805																													
North Carolina, 1805												407	333	10,490	2,734		9,650	9,537		10,490										
South Carolina, 1802												71	114	16,571	2,343		323	2,581				131				lb. 213	35	200	3,907	
Georgia, -	1805										212	1,383	157	5,916	5,731															
Kentucky, -	1805											371	239	1,782	1,955	1,231														
Tennessee, 1805														3,966	15,567		424	674	181	759	5									
Ohio, -	1805											75	95	4,647			37	140				64½	4,009	9	4	5,160		604	275	
District of Columbia, 1803												30	30	277	3,238		12					12,683			30	79,176		14,033		
Mississippi Territory, 1805												39	39	1,087	75			30				1,146				35,042	2,483	7,133	79	
Indiana Territory, 1803											78	39	39	386	409		1,048	947		1,087		173½				7,605	2,269	236		
Michigan Territory, -														976	976															117
Orleans Territory, -																														18
Louisiana Territory, -																														108

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 4, 1806.

H. DEARBORN, Secretary of War.

[9th CONGRESS.]

No. 64.

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS AND GUNBOATS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, DEC. 15, 1806.

Mr. MITCHELL, from the committee appointed on the 5th inst. to take into consideration that part of the message of the President of the United States, of December 2d, 1806, which relates to the protection of the seaports, harbors, and waters of the United States, made a report, as follows:

It appears from the communication of the Secretary of War, made to Congress on the 18th February, 1806,\* that several of the public works erected in different parts of the nation, for the purposes of defence, stood in need of finishing, or repairs. The condition of the fortifications at Fort Sumner, in Maine; Fort Constitution, in New Hampshire; Fort Independence, in Massachusetts; Forts Adams and Wolcott, in Rhode Island; Fort Trumbull, in Connecticut; Fort Jay, in New York; Fort Mifflin, in Pennsylvania; Fort McHenry, in Maryland; Fort Nelson, in Virginia; Fort Johnston, in North Carolina; Forts Moultrie, Pinckney, and Johnston, in South Carolina; Fort Green, in Georgia; and of Forts St. Louis, St. Charles, and St. Philip, in Orleans; and of the various other forts and military stations, is well known to the War Department, and only requires appropriations of money, from year to year, to enable the needful additions to be made.

It is, therefore, deemed unnecessary to enter into a detailed enumeration of their respective wants; but the committee cannot forbear to make mention of New York, Charleston, and New Orleans.

They are fully sensible of the great and growing importance of New York; its exposed situation is a subject of public and general concern. It is agreed that the national power ought to be employed in its protection. The attention of the Executive was, therefore, turned to that object during the summer and autumn of 1806, and upwards of \$25,000 were expended in repairing and enlarging, in the most substantial manner, the works on Governor's Island. These are progressing with all convenient speed; and, though at this moment suspended, on account of the rigor of the season, the committee has had the satisfaction to learn that the labor will be resumed with the cessation of the cold, and be steadily continued until both the city and harbor shall be put into a respectable state of defence. By the fortifications which it is intended to construct, upon the different favorable positions which the land affords, both above and below Governor's Island, skilful engineers conceive that so much will be done as to repel every ordinary assault of ships, and of all other force less than an invading army. The intended substitution of permanent structures of solid masonry, instead of wood and sand, will indeed require more time for their completion; but an ample compensation for this will be found eventually in their greater strength and durability.

The fortifications at Charleston, South Carolina, having been almost totally ruined by the severe hurricane of 1804, measures have been already adopted to rebuild them in the best manner that the situation of the ground admits.

Preparations are also making for the protection of New Orleans, and the mouth of the Mississippi, and evince a similar attention to the public interests in that quarter.

The committee, however, has not judged it necessary to particularize the specific sums which it may be needful to apply to each of these important objects. There would be considerable difficulty in this, for want of circumstantial and minute information. They, therefore, believe it will be sufficient to recommend an ample appropriation in gross, for the repair of existing fortifications, and the erection of such new ones as may be required; and to leave the expenditure of the same, where the general safety or local welfare shall demand it, to the ample information and sound discretion of the Executive.

Under these considerations the committee ask leave to report a bill making further appropriations for fortifying the ports and harbors of the United States and for building gun boats.

\* See No. 60.

[9th CONGRESS.]

No. 65.

[2d SESSION.]

## DEFENCE OF THE MISSISSIPPI AGAINST SPANISH INVASION.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 18, 1806.

Mr. JOHN RANDOLPH made the following report:

The committee to whom was referred so much of the message of the President of the United States as relates to the invasion of our territory by the troops of Spain, and to the adoption of measures for the protection thereof, respectfully recommend the following resolutions:

1. *Resolved*, That provision ought to be made by law to fortify and defend such position on the Mississippi, below the city of New Orleans, as the President of the United States shall designate, for the protection of that city; and that further provision ought to be made by law for guarding the approaches to the same from the east.

2. *Resolved*, That the President of the United States be authorized to accept of any company or companies of volunteers, either of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who may associate and offer themselves for the service, (not exceeding ——— thousand men) who shall be clothed and furnished with horses, at their own expense, and arms; and otherwise equipped at the expense of the United States, except such of them as may choose to furnish their own arms, and whose commissioned officers shall be appointed by the respective state and territorial authorities; who shall be liable to be called upon to do military duty, at any time the President shall judge proper, within ——— years after he shall accept the same; and when called into actual service, and whilst remaining in the same, shall be under the same rules and regulations, and be entitled to the same pay, rations, forage, and allowance for clothing, with the regular troops of the United States.

COMMITTEE ROOM, December 10, 1806.

SIR:

The committee appointed in pursuance of the enclosed resolution have instructed me to request that you will lay before them such information, touching the subject, as may be in possession of your Department.



The committee are desirous to be informed, What is the present state of the American and Spanish forces in the territory of Orleans and the adjacent provinces of Spain. To what extent the strength of the last may probably be increased; and the means on which Government relies for the protection of its citizens on that frontier.

I am, very respectfully, sir, yours,

JOHN RANDOLPH.

The SECRETARY of WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 15, 1806.

Sir:

Agreeably to the request of the committee, as expressed in your letter of the 10th instant, I herewith enclose such information on the subject referred to them, as is possessed by this Department, in addition to what was communicated to Congress, with the message of the President of the United States, at the commencement of the present session, viz:

A copy of Governor Cordero's answer to General Wilkinson's letter, of the 4th of October, marked No. 1, and an extract from Captain General Salcedo's answer to Governor Claiborne's first letter to Governor Herrera, marked No. 2.

To which I would beg leave to add the following statement and remarks:

The law fixing the military establishment of the United States being under the eye of the committee, it may only be necessary to remark that, of the force which it authorizes, eighteen companies are posted as follows, viz:

1 Company in Portland and Portsmouth harbors,	1 Company on frontiers of Tennessee,
1 ditto in Boston harbor and at the arsenal, Springfield.	1 ditto at Chickasaw Bluffs and Arkansas,
1 ditto in Rhode Island and Connecticut,	1 ditto at Massac and Vincennes,
1 ditto in New York harbor,	1 ditto at St. Louis,
1 ditto on the Delaware, below Philadelphia,	1 ditto at Chicago, south end of Lake Michigan,
1 ditto in Norfolk and Baltimore harbors,	1 ditto at Detroit,
1 ditto in Charleston harbor, South Carolina, and in North Carolina,	1 ditto at Michillimackinack,
2 ditto on frontiers of Georgia,	1 ditto at Niagara,
	1 ditto at Fort Wayne, on the portage between the Wabash and the Miami of the Lakes.

The remaining force is under the immediate command of the General in the Orleans and Mississippi territories.

The corps are nearly complete, including the recruits now on their passage for the Lower Mississippi.

In addition to the regular force, under the immediate command of the General, he is authorized to call on the Orleans and Mississippi territories for such reinforcements of militia as may be thought expedient.

Arms for infantry, and pistols and swords for a due proportion of cavalry, have been forwarded to New Orleans, for the use of such militia as might be called into service.

The Spanish force, which has lately crossed and recrossed the Sabine, has been represented as amounting to one thousand five hundred men, principally mounted militia; there is, however, reason for believing that their numbers have been over-rated. Their force at Pensacola, Mobile, and Baton Rouge, amounts, probably, to from five hundred to six hundred and fifty men.

It is not possible to form any thing like a correct opinion of the force which Spain could bring into the field from her extensive western and southern territories, or from beyond sea. It may be presumed, that the war in which she is at present engaged, and which endangers some of her valuable possessions, must render it difficult for her to draw a very considerable force to any point on our frontiers.

As to the protection of our citizens, I may be allowed to refer the committee to the message of the President of the United States to Congress, of the second instant; in which he has expressed his ideas of the means of protecting them, at the commencement of a war, and until a regular army may be raised. But as the right of deciding on this, as well as other questions, rests with Congress, the President must rely on the means they shall judge it most expedient to provide.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN RANDOLPH, *Chairman*, &c.

CAMP OF NACOGDOCHES, October 11, 1806.

Sir:

I informed your Excellency, by my letter of the 29th of last month, that I had sent that of your Excellency, of the 24th of the same month, to the Captain General Brigadier Don Nimesio Salcedo, on whom I depend, because I was not invested with a competent authority for its discussion, and as the answer belonged to said chief. I flatter myself that, in consideration of the good of humanity, which your Excellency professed to wish, and of the good harmony which reigns between our Governments, your Excellency would have expected his answer to determine on your operations, because I am not at liberty not to carry into execution the orders which command me to consider the Hondo run as the boundary line of the province.

I see, by the letter of your Excellency, of the 4th instant, which I have just received, that, against my hopes, you have marched your troops towards the Sabine; without any hostile views against the Spaniards, but with the intention only of maintaining the pretensions of the United States to that side of said river.

Your Excellency is very well acquainted with the sacred duties of a soldier: I must, in consequence, declare to your Excellency, that, though the result of the operations which your Excellency has undertaken, ought not, in any manner whatever, to be considered as an act of hostility provoked by my Government, I must oppose myself to it, in discharge of the obligation which I am under, to oppose myself to the aggressions of the United States, and to preserve entire, as far as lies in my power, the dominions of my sovereign.

I take the proper means that your Excellency may receive this letter, praying the Lord our God that he may preserve your life for many years.

I am, respectfully, &c.

ANTONIO CORDERO.

His Excellency General JAMES WILKINSON.

*Extract of a letter from the Captain General Don Nemesio Salcedo to Governor Claiborne, dated*

CHIHUAGUA, September 18, 1806.

By my orders, I am bound to maintain the best harmony with the Government of the United States; and to that end, I have directed all my views, as your Excellency may be convinced by the conduct which has been followed, and by the letter which, under my directions, the Governor of Texas wrote on the 7th of March last, to the commandant of the fort of Natchitoches, exhorting him not to repeat, on either side, any acts of hostility concerning the disputed territory. Of this letter, Major Porter acknowledged receipt, and gave assurances that he was on the point of sending an account of it to General Wilkinson, to whom he left the decision; which, however, has not as yet been verified.

After this intelligence, your Excellency will find no just motive to draw the sword on account of the movements of the troops on this frontier; especially after being assured, that neither those troops nor their chiefs have had, or at present have, any orders to make new establishments. Your Excellency may be assured, that all my actions are directed in compliance with my duties, and with a view that I may, at no period whatever, be reproached with hav-

ing suffered, in any manner, the usurpation of the smallest part of the dominions of my king under my charge. But in consideration of the assurance which your Excellency gives, that the subject is now in treaty between the two Governments, and the frankness with which you state the disputed claim as one that shall be amicably adjusted, without availing ourselves of our rights, the operations of our troops shall be limited (under the responsibility of your Excellency) to patrolling the disputed lands, to see and prevent any settlement from being made by citizens of either nation.

Your Excellency knows very well, that, whilst this is the most moderate behavior I can adopt, I must also repel all aggressions of the American Government, and act conformably to the strictest accomplishment of the first obligation of my station.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 66.

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS AND GUNBOATS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 12, 1807.

Mr. ROGER NELSON, from the committee to whom was referred, on the third ultimo, so much of the message of the President of the United States as relates to the repairs of fortifications and to the further protection of our ports, towns, and rivers, reported that they have taken the same into consideration, and beg leave to recommend the following resolutions:

*Resolved*, That a sum of money, not exceeding \_\_\_\_\_ dollars, be appropriated, to enable the President of the United States to cause our fortifications to be improved and repaired.

*Resolved*, That a further sum of money, not exceeding \_\_\_\_\_ dollars, be appropriated, to enable the President of the United States to cause to be built a number of gunboats, not exceeding \_\_\_\_\_, for the better protection of our ports, towns, and rivers.\*

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 9, 1806.

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the third instant, permit me to refer the committee, of which you are chairman, to the report of the Secretary of War, of the 13th of February last, on the subject of fortifications; and to add thereto, the following remarks, relative to the repairs, additional works, and expenditures, which have since been made:

At Portsmouth, New Hampshire, about three thousand dollars have been expended in erecting new barracks.

At Fort Trumbull, New London, Connecticut, repairs have been made on the barracks.

On Governor's Island, in the harbor of New York, a regular work in masonry has been commenced, and is far advanced. The expenses attending it have not yet been adjusted, but probably amount to between twenty-five and thirty thousand dollars.

At Fort Nelson, Virginia, twenty heavy cannon have been mounted on travelling carriages.

At Fort Johnston, North Carolina, further progress has been made in the works.

In South Carolina, every thing remains as heretofore, owing to a disappointment in fixing the proper sites.

Although Captain Macomb, of the Corps of Engineers, in pursuance of orders from this Department, proceeded, on the 20th of June last, to Charleston, and remained there until the 11th of July, nothing on this head could be done, in consequence of his being unable to procure from the office of the Deputy Secretary of State of South Carolina, the map on which the land and sites for fortifications, ceded to the United States, were particularly delineated.

Having been ordered a second time to Charleston, it is expected that he will be able to do something on the subject this winter.

In Georgia, a new military establishment has been made, on the Oakmulgee river.

At New Orleans, we have been disappointed in having suitable sites selected for proposed works; it is presumed, however, that some progress has lately been made in fortifications at that place, which will be continued.

Of the one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, appropriated the last session of Congress, for fortifying ports and harbors, not more than forty-eight thousand have probably been expended.

Arrangements have been made for the next year, which will likely exhaust the remainder of the aforesaid appropriation, together with the sum applicable to that object, in the estimate of this Department for the ensuing year.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

HON. ROGER NELSON.

\* For letter of the Secretary of the Navy, see Naval Affairs, No. 58.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 67.

[2d SESSION.]

## DEFENCE OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 15, 1807.

COMMITTEE ROOM, December 31, 1806.

GENTLEMEN:

The committee to whom have been referred the enclosed resolution of the House of Representatives, have instructed me to request that you will furnish them with information on the following points, and with such other remarks as you may deem material:

1. The protection which now is, or can be, afforded to the city of New Orleans, by the existing military and naval establishments.
2. The mode in which that city may be most effectually defended.
3. The probable expense of such a system of defence.

I am, with high respect, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

JOHN RANDOLPH.

*The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.*

*Resolved,* That provision ought to be made, by law, to fortify and defend such position on the Mississippi, below the city of New Orleans, as the President of the United States shall designate, for the protection of that city; and that further provision ought to be made, by law, for guarding the approaches to the same from the east.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 9, 1801.*

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the 31st ultimo, enclosing a resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 24th of the same month, I have the honor to remark, that, from the recent movements of the troops in Orleans territory, and its vicinity, I am unable to state, with correctness, the present strength of the regular force, now under General Wilkinson, at New Orleans, and must rely on an expression of the General, in a late communication of his to this Department, which stated the probable number at one thousand men, exclusive of the militia of Orleans, and the naval force under Captain Shaw. The number of militia is uncertain; probably not exceeding three or four hundred to be relied on.

The naval force not being under the direction of this Department, the committee will please to excuse my not being able to comply with their request in this respect. Many opinions have been received on the subject of defending the city of New Orleans and its vicinity, by fortifications; but the present prevailing opinion appears to be, that no system of fortification, within our power, at or about the city, could be of any essential use for its defence; and that an improvement of the old work at Plaquemines, an establishment of batteries at the English Turn, and a battery, with a suitable cover, at the junction of the Bayou St. John with Lake Pontchartrain, aided by a suitable number of gunboats, in the river and the lake, together with such a body of troops as circumstances may, from time to time, appear to require, must be relied on for the defence of that place.

The expense necessary to complete the works mentioned above, is the more difficult to be estimated, on account of the scarcity of suitable materials, and the uncertainty of what may be requisite to secure the foundations of the works.

From fifty to seventy thousand dollars may be sufficient; but no estimate, in my power to make, on this subject, can be depended on for its accuracy.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN RANDOLPH, *Chairman, &c.*

NOTE.—For letter of the Secretary of the Navy, see *Naval Affairs*, No. 59.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 68.

[2d SESSION.]

GRATUITIES TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN IN THE EXPEDITION TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN,  
UNDER LEWIS AND CLARKE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 23, 1807.

COMMITTEE ROOM, *January 12, 1807.*

SIR:

The committee to whom has been referred a resolution of the House of Representatives, to inquire what compensation ought to be made to Messrs. Lewis and Clarke, and their brave companions, for their late service in exploring the Western waters, have instructed me to request that you will furnish them with such information, in the possession of the Department of War, as you may deem necessary to guide the committee in establishing their rate of compensation; also a list of the names of the officers, and their respective grades, and the names of the soldiers under their command.

From your most obedient servant,

WILLIS ALSTON, Jun.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 14, 1807.*

SIR:

Agreeably to the request of the committee, as expressed in your letter of the 12th inst., I herewith transmit a list of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, who formed the party recently returned from an enterprise, which they commenced and prosecuted with a degree of boldness, perseverance, judgment, and success, that has rarely, if ever, occurred, in this or any other country.

The officers and soldiers will receive their usual compensations from this Department, up to the time of their return to St. Louis.

The quantum of gratuity, either in land or money, or in both, to which such meritorious and unusual services may be entitled, on the score of national justice, or on the principles of sound policy and national liberality, being principally a matter of opinion, it is with diffidence I take the liberty of proposing, for the consideration of the committee, a grant to each non-commissioned officer and private, of 320 acres of land; to Lieut. Clarke, of 1000; and to Captain Lewis, of 1,500; with the addition of double pay to each while engaged in the enterprise; and that each one should have permission to locate his grant on any lands that have been surveyed, and are now for sale by the United States.

It may be proper for me to remark, that, in a conversation with Captain Lewis, he observed, that whatever grant of land Congress might think proper to make to himself and Lieutenant Clarke, it was his wish there should be no distinction of rank so noticed as to make a difference in the quantity granted to each; and that he would prefer an equal division of whatever quantity might be granted to them.

I also transmit, herewith, the letter from Captain Lewis to the Secretary of War, which accompanied said list.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. WILLIS ALSTON, *Chairman, &c.*

CITY OF WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1807.*

SIR: Herewith enclosed I transmit you the roll of the men who accompanied me on my late tour to the Pacific Ocean, through the interior of the continent of North America.

In addition to the men whose names are entered on this roll, there are two others who have some claims to a gratuity, as connected with the expedition; but as I cannot consider them, in all respects, as of the permanent party, I have thought their pretensions more properly the subjects of this detached communication, than of the roll which accompanies it.

Richard Warfington was a corporal in the infantry of the United States' army, whom I had occasion to take with me on my voyage as far as the Mandan nation. His term of service expired on the 4th of August, 1804, nearly three months previous to my arrival at that place. Knowing that it would become necessary for me to send back my boat in the spring of 1805, with a party of soldiers, whose terms of service had not expired; that it was of some importance that the Government should receive, in safety, the despatches which I was about to transmit from thence; that there was not one of the party, destined to be returned from thence, in whom I could place the least confidence, except himself; and that, if he was discharged at the moment of the expiration of his term of service, he would necessarily lose his military standing, and thereby lessen the efficiency of his command among the soldiery; I was induced, under these considerations, to make an arrangement with him, by which it was agreed between us, that he should not receive his discharge from the military service until his return to St. Louis, and that he should, in the interim, retain his rank, and receive only for his services the accustomed compensation. Accordingly, he remained with me during the winter, and was, the next spring, in conformity to my plan, placed in command of the boat, and charged with my despatches to the Government. The duties assigned him, on this occasion, were performed with a punctuality which uniformly marked his conduct while under my command. Taking into view the cheerfulness with which he continued in the service after every obligation had ceased to exist from his enlistment; the fatigues, labor, and dangers, incident to that service; and, above all, the fidelity with which he discharged his duty; it would seem, that when rewards were about to be distributed among those of the party who were engaged in this enterprise, that his claim to something more than his pay of seven dollars per month, as corporal, cannot be considered unreasonable.

John Newman was a private in the infantry of the United States' army, who joined me as a volunteer, and entered into an enlistment, in common with others, by which he was held and mustered as one of the permanent party. In the course of the expedition, or shortly before we arrived at the Mandan village, he committed himself by using certain mutinous expressions, which caused me to arrest him, and to have him tried by a court martial, formed of his peers: they, finding him guilty, sentenced him to receive seventy-five lashes, and to be discharged from the permanent party. This sentence was confirmed by me, and the punishment took place. The conduct of this man, previous to this period, had been generally correct; and the zeal he afterwards displayed for the benefit of the service, was highly meritorious. In the course of the winter, while at Fort Mandan, from an ardent wish to atone for the crime which he had committed at an unguarded moment, he exerted himself, on every occasion, to become useful. This disposition induced him to expose himself too much to the intense cold of that climate, and on a hunting excursion, he had his hands and feet severely frozen, with which he suffered extreme pain, for some weeks. Having recovered from this accident by the 1st of April, 1805, he asked forgiveness for what had passed, and begged that I would permit him to continue with me through the voyage; but deeming it impolitic to relax from the sentence, although he stood acquitted in my mind, I determined to send him back, which was accordingly done. Since my return I have been informed that he was extremely serviceable as a hunter, on the voyage to St. Louis, and that the boat, on several occasions, owed her safety, in a great measure, to his personal exertions, being a man of uncommon activity and bodily strength. If, under these circumstances, it should be thought proper to give Newman the remaining third which will be deducted from the gratuity awarded Baptiste Le Page, who occupied his station in the after part of the voyage, I should feel myself much gratified.

I have the honor to be, with due consideration, and much respect, your obedient servant,

MERIWETHER LEWIS;

*Captain, 1st U. S. Reg't Infantry.*

Gen. H. DEARBORN, *Secretary of War.*

*A Roll of the men who accompanied Captains Lewis and Clarke on their late tour to the Pacific Ocean, through the interior of the continent of North America, showing their rank, with some remarks on their respective merits and services.*

No.	NAMES.	RANK.	REMARKS.	
1	John Ordway, - -	Sergeant.	Deceased the 20th of August, 1804. A young man of much merit. His father, who now resides in Kentucky, is a man much respected, though possessed of but moderate wealth. As the son has lost his life whilst on this service, I consider his father entitled to some gratuity, in consideration of his loss; and also, that the deceased being noticed in this way, will be a tribute but justly due to his merit.	
2	Nathaniel Pryor, - -	Do.		
3	Charles Floyd, - -	Do.	Promoted to sergeant, 20th of August, 1804, in the place of Charles Floyd, deceased; in which capacity he continued until discharged at St. Louis, November 10, 1806.	
4	Patrick Gass, - -	Do.		
5	William Bratton, - -	Private,	Two of the most active and enterprising young men who accompanied us. It was their peculiar fate to have been engaged in all the most dangerous and difficult scenes of the voyage, in which they uniformly acquitted themselves with much honor.	
6	John Collins, - -	Do.		
7	John Colter, - -	Do.		
8	Pierre Cruzatte, - -	Do.		
9	Joseph Field, - -	Do.		
10	Reuben Field, - -	Do.		
11	Robert Frazier, - -	Do.		
12	Silas Goodrich, - -	Do.		
13	George Gibson, - -	Do.		
14	Thomas P. Howard, - -	Do.		
15	Hugh Hall, - -	Do.		
16	Francis Labuicke, - -	Do.		He has received the pay only of a private, though, besides the duties performed as such, he has rendered me very essential services as a French and English interpreter, and sometimes also as an Indian interpreter; therefore, I should think it only just that some small addition to his pay, as a private, should be added, though no such addition has, at any time, been promised by me.
17	Hugh M'Neal, - -	Do.		
18	John Shields, - -	Do.		Has received the pay only of a private. Nothing was more peculiarly useful to us, in various situations, than the skill and ingenuity of this man as an artist, in repairing our guns, accoutrements, &c. and should it be thought proper to allow him something as an artificer, he has well deserved it.
19	George Shannon, - -	Do.		
20	John Potts, - -	Do.		
21	John Baptiste Le Page,	Do.	Entitled to no peculiar merit: was enlisted at Fort Mandan, on the 2d of November, 1804, in order to supply the deficiency in my permanent party, occasioned by the discharge of John Newman. He performed the tour to the Pacific Ocean, and returned to St. Louis, where he was discharged, in common with others, on the 10th of November last. As he did not perform the labors incident to the summer of 1804, it would be proper to give him the gratuity only of two-thirds as much as is given to others of his rank.	
22	John B. Thompson, - -	Do.		
23	William Werner, - -	Do.		
24	Richard Windsor, - -	Do.		
25	Peter Wiser, - -	Do.		
26	Alexander Willard, - -	Do.		
27	Joseph Whitehouse, - -	Do.		
28	George Druyard, - -	Interpreter.		A man of much merit; he has been peculiarly useful from his knowledge of the common language of gesticulation, and his uncommon skill as a hunter and woodsman; those several duties he performed in good faith, and with an ardor which deserves the highest commendation. It was his fate also to have encountered, on various occasions, with either Captain Clarke or myself, all the most dangerous and trying scenes of the voyage, in which he uniformly acquitted himself with honor. He has served the complete term of the whole tour, and received only 25 dollars per month, and one ration per day, while I am informed that it is not unusual for individuals, in similar employments, to receive 30 dollars per month.
29	Nouisant Carbono, - -	Do.	A man of no peculiar merit; was useful as an interpreter only, in which capacity he discharged his duties with good faith, from the moment of our departure from the Mandans, on the 7th of April, 1805, until our return to that place in August last, and received, as a compensation, 25 dollars per month, while in service.	

## GENERAL REMARK.

With respect to all those persons whose names are entered on this roll, I feel a peculiar pleasure in declaring, that the ample support which they gave me under every difficulty; the manly firmness which they evinced on every necessary occasion; and the patience and fortitude with which they submitted to, and bore, the fatigues and painful sufferings incident to my late tour to the Pacific Ocean, entitles them to my warmest approbation and thanks; nor will I suppress the expression of a hope, that the recollection of services, thus faithfully performed, will meet a just reward, in an ample remuneration on the part of our Government.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, January 15, 1807.

MERIWETHER LEWIS,  
Captain 1st U. S. Reg't Inf.

9th CONGRESS.]

No. 69.

[2d Session.

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 12, 1807.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I now lay before Congress a statement of the militia of the United States, according to the latest returns received by the Department of War. From two of the States no returns have ever been received.

*February 11, 1807.*

TH: JEFFERSON.

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.											FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.																	
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermast. Gen'ls.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-camp.	State Engineers.	Commissary Generals of Purchase.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Physicians General.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjt. Gen'ls.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Wagon Master Generals.	Brigade Quarterm's.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	
New Hampshire,	1806	3	6	-	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	72	36	36	-	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	32
Massachusetts,	1806	10	23	1	1	19	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	95	201	117	110	-	85	71	80	74	71	73		
Vermont,	1805	4	10	-	1	8	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	31	61	28	28	-	29	28	29	29	25	29		
Rhode Island,	1803	1	4	1	1	4	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	25	10	11	-	6	5	9	6	7	7		
Connecticut,	1806	4	8	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	80	42	42	40	43	32	41	38	34	33		
New York,	1805	7	31	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	107	238	124	105	97	93	66	96	96	84	81		
New Jersey,	1806	4	13	1	1	12	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	74	41	38	79	39	17	30	35	30			
Pennsylvania,	1803	14	28	-	1	28	-	-	28	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	12	137	269	126	119	132	108	40	88	70	78	77		
Delaware,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland,†	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Virginia,	1806	4	19	-	1	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	106	199	89	53	-	54	27	22	-	26	30		
North Carolina,	1806	5	12	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	111	44	15	-	15	7	17	-	26	26		
South Carolina,	1802	2	9	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	109	42	36	43	24	4	11	3	9	7		
Georgia,	1806	3	7	1	1	6	-	-	9	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	21	55	30	38	36	15	16	17	-	14	14		
Kentucky,	1806	6	12	1	1	3	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	115	56	39	37	25	7	17	8	25	17		
Tennessee,	1805	2	6	-	1	3	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	62	30	-	-	-	-	7	1	12	12		
Ohio,	1806	4	8	1	1	2	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	16	43	20	20	-	16	7	15	9	8	8		
District of Columbia,	1803	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	4	1	1	2	2	1	1	-	-	-		
Mississippi Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	10	4	-	1	1	1	1	-	-		
Indiana Territory,	1806	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	1	1	2	2	1	1	-	-	-		
Orleans Territory,‡	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	6	3	3	-	3	3	-	-	-	-		
Louisiana Territory,§	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	3	3	-	3	3	-	-	-	-		
Michigan Territory,	1806	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	5	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-		

\* No return has ever been received.

† No return has ever been received.

‡ Partial returns from one district only have been received.

§ The return received. states the number of men, liable to militia duty, to amount to 2,220.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	ARTILLERISTS.								CAVALRY.						GRENADIERS.					LIGHT INFANTRY.											
		Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Farriers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1806	17	34	.	68	.	.	477	32	64	32	125	63	.	.	1,792	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1806	56	56	57	223	.	114	2,318	56	114	59	236	78	.	.	2,226	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Vermont, . . . . .	1805	8	16	8	32	.	.	324	29	60	29	115	28	.	.	1,002	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1803	4	7	.	12	.	.	86	3	5	3	10	4	.	.	57	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Connecticut, . . . . .	1806	15	31	.	60	54	27	469	34	66	33	119	60	.	.	1,092	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
New York, . . . . .	1805	21	36	34	110	.	107	1,426	37	62	32	117	48	.	.	1,912	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
New Jersey, . . . . .	1806	8	11	6	29	24	15	240	32	60	29	99	26	8	14	1,359	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1803	10	21	.	36	19	10	272	58	109	55	162	43	19	15	2,382	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Delaware, . . . . .																																
Maryland, . . . . .																																
Virginia, . . . . .	1806	18	16	16	52	.	9	890	46	92	46	132	12	.	.	2,216	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
North Carolina, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	14	26	14	26	11	.	.	.	446	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
South Carolina, . . . . .	1802	14	19	12	46	16	22	738	46	51	40	128	31	2	7	1,743	2	2	2	6	3	2	105	4	5	3	12	5	2	133		
Georgia, . . . . .	1806	5	5	5	7	.	9	123	24	44	17	36	18	.	.	613	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Kentucky, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Tennessee, . . . . .	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ohio, . . . . .	1806	1	1	1	3	.	2	23	2	4	2	8	2	.	.	109	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	48
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1803	2	2	.	8	2	.	81	2	3	2	4	.	.	.	43	1	1	.	4	.	.	22	2	2	2	2	6	.	2	100	
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	2	1	4	.	.	.	27	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Orleans Territory, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	2	1	3	.	.	.	12	1	2	.	4	4	2	37	1	2	1	4	.	.	.	18	
Louisiana Territory, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Michigan Territory, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.



RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

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STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.						CATALPA WARRIORS.	ORDNANCE.											
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and file.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.		Musicians.	Rank and file.	Brass twelve pounders.	Brass nine pounders.	Brass six pounders.	Brass four pounders.	Brass three pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron nine pounders.	Iron six pounders.	Iron four pounders.	Iron three pounders.
New Hampshire, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	300	295	292	1,104	.	605	19,776	.	.	.	.	18	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Massachusetts, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	783	813	801	3,154	.	1,765	54,196	.	6	.	.	88	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Vermont, -	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	256	262	254	1,011	.	649	13,708	.	.	.	.	3	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Rhode Island, -	1803	.	.	.	.	.	.	82	93	83	302	.	155	4,414	.	.	.	.	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Connecticut, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	329	348	316	1,312	1,241	895	14,261	.	.	.	7	3	13	.	.	.	.	5	
New York, -	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	946	941	876	3,878	.	1,946	64,750	.	.	.	17	.	13	.	.	.	.	.	
New Jersey, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	366	358	322	1,217	715	309	26,599	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	3	
Pennsylvania, -	1803	65	70	58	174	75	82	3,352	1,202	1,190	1,157	2,881	1,477	80,061	.	2	.	.	4	1	.	.	.	.	.	
Delaware, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Maryland, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Virginia, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	973	944	914	3,483	.	774	62,017	.	.	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	
North Carolina, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	610	626	596	1,905	.	522	39,660	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
South Carolina, -	1802	10	10	9	33	21	12	464	385	378	1,200	139	365	28,828	60	.	.	4	11	2	.	.	.	.	.	
Georgia, -	1806	7	7	5	16	.	2	311	264	223	207	814	100	16,411	.	.	.	2	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Kentucky, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	530	497	465	1,653	.	290	28,366	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Tennessee, -	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	248	238	230	308	300	320	14,285	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Ohio, -	1806	4	4	4	15	.	4	157	189	183	174	685	182	13,345	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	
District of Columbia, -	1803	1	1	1	4	.	1	83	16	13	10	52	8	1,690	.	.	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Mississippi Territory, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	37	33	29	93	58	3	1,878	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Indiana Territory, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	31	33	30	76	.	.	1,846	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Orleans do. -	1806	1	2	1	4	4	.	31	29	54	6	103	100	1,097	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Louisiana do. -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Michigan do. -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	25	26	24	39	15	2	879	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	

1807.]

MILITIA.

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RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																	
		Artillery Side-arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Knapsacks.	Ramrods, steel.	Espontoons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with ball.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire, - - -	1806	-	2,022	2,012	13,350	-	6,700	6,100	5,310	3,756	-	3,410	-	6	17,820	2,650	28,110	5,200	-
Massachusetts, - - -	1806	-	2,434	2,226	47,551	440	40,654	43,620	23,768	43,646	-	6,510	499,447	68	71,089	41,069	102,303	39,039	-
Vermont, - - - - -	1805	-	1,020	1,048	8,824	-	3,341	4,056	1,482	2,317	-	1,928	-	3	80,696	4,676	6,859	2,318	-
Rhode Island, - - -	1803	-	87	87	3,052	-	2,139	2,263	105	2,833	-	-	3,833	-	-	2,120	4,722	1,909	-
Connecticut, - - -	1806	482	1,374	1,383	14,800	-	14,815	16,200	7,435	-	740	-	-	-	-	14,564	38,543	-	-
New York, - - - - -	1805	-	1,500	1,243	39,293	2,135	20,884	21,782	348	13,888	-	-	318,463	-	-	-	30,521	20,393	-
New Jersey, - - -	1806	-	1,803	436	14,530	238	4,061	3,602	6	3,308	58	9	1,017	2	-	226	4,769	309	44
Pennsylvania, - - -	1803	-	1,708	1,583	20,000	9,604	20,000	1,494	-	20,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Delaware, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maryland, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia, - - - - -	1806	-	407	333	12,344	4,461	11,548	11,138	6	12,341	-	377	66	-	427	94	214	2,859	-
North Carolina, - -	1806	-	285	232	20,426	4,412	205	3,642	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina, - -	1802	212	1,383	1,057	7,147	5,731	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia, - - - - -	1806	-	519	294	1,653	2,149	674	364	348	487	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,375	633	-
Kentucky, - - - - -	1806	-	-	-	4,130	14,203	136	226	-	-	-	-	-	-	88,475	-	43,087	-	-
Tennessee, - - - -	1805	-	75	95	4,647	-	12	-	-	2,146	-	1,146	-	-	35,542	2,483	7,133	154	-
Ohio, - - - - -	1806	-	70	77	943	4,926	108	99	-	-	-	561	-	-	15,832	-	5,613	-	-
District of Columbia,	1803	78	39	39	1,087	75	1,048	947	-	1,087	-	-	-	2	-	-	236	117	1
Mississippi Territory,	1806	-	-	-	460	460	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	236	-	-
Indiana Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	179	-	-	-	-	-	99	-	-	10,246	150	708	18	-
Orleans Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Louisiana Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Michigan Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 7, 1807.

H. DEARBORN, Secretary of War.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 70.

[1st SESSION.]

## DEFENCE OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 29TH OF OCTOBER, 1807.

ALBANY, *March 27, 1807.*

SIR:

Pursuant to the orders of the Senate and Assembly of this State, we have the honor to enclose you their joint resolutions, relative to the protection of the port of New York.

With sentiments of high consideration, we are, sir, your obedient humble servants,

JOHN BROOM,  
*President of the Senate.*

NATHANIEL MACON, Esq.

*Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States.*

A. M'CORD,  
*Speaker of the House of Assembly.*

STATE OF NEW YORK, *March 20, 1807.*

*Resolved*, As the sense of this Legislature, that every consideration of policy and duty requires, that adequate measures should be adopted by the National Government, for the protection of the port of New York,

That the agricultural, as well as commercial interests of the State, are deeply interested in this most desirable object.

That, in surrendering to the United States the revenue arising from imposts, this State anticipated, and has now a right to expect, that a competent portion of that revenue would be appropriated for its defence, and that the Congress of the United States are bound by their constitutional duties, as guardians of the common defence and general welfare, to satisfy this proper and reasonable expectation.

*Resolved*, That an application be made to the President of the United States, in behalf of this State, to fix upon a plan of durable and permanent defence for the port of New York, fully adequate to the importance of the object, and that he be also respectfully requested to appropriate, out of the moneys placed at his disposal, as large a sum as can be usefully expended for that purpose, until Congress shall have it in their power to make further provision in the premises.

*Resolved*, That the Legislature of this State fully approve of the conduct of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, in advocating and enforcing the claims of this State, in this respect, and that they be requested to support and enforce such further measures as may be necessary for the permanent defence of this State, and to obtain, either by annual appropriation, or by general provision, a sum competent to that important object.

*Resolved*, That three copies of the above resolutions be signed by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the Assembly, and that they be requested to transmit one of the said copies to the President of the United States, one to the President of the Senate, and one to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States.

By order of the Senate.

JOHN BROOM, *President.*

By order of the Assembly.

A. M'CORD, *Speaker.*

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 71.

[1st SESSION.]

## ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOUNDRY, AND THE SALE OF ARMS TO THE STATES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NOVEMBER 19, 1807.

Mr. DAWSON, from the committee to whom was referred that part of the message of the President of the United States which relates to our military and naval establishments, and a resolution directing them to inquire into the expediency of selling to individual States arms owned by the United States, made the following report, in part:\*

*Resolved*, That a sum of money, not exceeding ——— thousand dollars, be appropriated for the purpose of building a national foundry in the city of Washington, for casting ordnance.

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War be authorized, under the direction of the President of the United States, to sell to individual States, which may wish to purchase, any arms owned by the United States, and which may be parted with without injury to the public.

*Letter from Henry Foxall to the Secretary of War, dated Columbia Foundry, August, 1807, relative to a National Foundry.*

HONORED SIR:

I shall now endeavor to make some remarks on the substance of several conversations that have passed between us, on the subject of a large foundry and boring mill, intended solely for public use.

I find your wish is to have such an establishment erected as soon as the nature of the thing will admit of it. I also find, or at least I think I do, that it is not in any addition to the works I have already in operation in Georgetown that would be satisfactory, but one to be built on the public land on Greenleaf's Point, city of Washington.

Your wish for my establishing such a work in that place, at once presented to my view several difficulties, which did, and still do, appear insurmountable, at least to my becoming proprietor of such a concern, a few of which I shall candidly notice for your consideration.

Although I have been, for aught I know, successful in giving general satisfaction in my professional habits as a man of business, to every department for which I have been engaged, and cheerfully acknowledge the obligations I am under to the administrators thereof for the attention I have constantly received from them; yet, it is possible,

\* For the report, see No. 73.

this might not always be the case; I might not always be so fortunate as to please. Was I to erect so large an establishment as is contemplated, at my own expense, I should stand in an enviable situation (or it might be thought so) by gentlemen of my profession; an attempt no doubt would be made to wrest the business out of my hands, or leave it with me not worth following. But, if none of these difficulties, with many more I could mention, should take place, there is one which I earnestly hope will arise, which is this—that Government will not stand in need of such an establishment to be kept constantly in operation. Although it is absolutely necessary that a government like ours should have such an establishment under their control, independent of all private ones through the continent, (which can be called in to their aid on so much better terms in all cases of emergency) nevertheless it does not follow that this itself will be kept in continual operation.

I should suppose a few years would give you a sufficiency of ordnance for your forts, your garrisons, and your ships, and this before any adequate return could be made of the expense of building the works. Were I to build the works on my own land, and no longer wanted for the public, I might convert them into mills for making flour, or some other manufactory; but were they built on your land, that would be out of the question. No person could be found to purchase my right at a time you had no orders to give; and I suppose the public would find a disinclination to purchase properly they had no immediate use of. Under this view of the subject, the works would at times be useless to the United States, and, in the end, destructive to me; and at the time, I might have no just cause of complaint, yet should be left without remedy. When we were on the spot at Greenleaf's Point, looking at the situation, I saw it was good, and the conveniences for its adoption many. But how the plan could be effected by me, to mutual advantage, I was at a loss to understand: for no sooner was one difficulty overcome, than another presented itself to my mind; nor did this view of the subject, which I am about to lay before you, strike my mind till after I parted with you. The more I consider it, the more unexceptionable it appears to me. In it you will have all you contemplated answered, and, it may be, some new ideas brought into view.

To erect a cannon manufactory in the city will require the agency of a steam engine, for the several purposes of turning, boring, &c. &c. This, with all the necessary buildings, say foundry, furnaces, boring mill, and all the component parts, I will undertake to build on Greenleaf's Point, for the United States, their extent and magnitude to be determined by you. I will engage to make all the models in brass or iron of the different calibers of every kind of ordnance, with complete iron flasks to each caliber; the patterns completely turned, with all the moulding and joints from end to end; and in the same way prepare moulds and flasks for all sizes of mortars, together with shot moulds turned complete.

I will establish in your factory a brass furnace for brass cannon, with turning machines, such as I have now in use, and in every way make it worthy of the name of a *National Foundry*, on as large, or on as small a scale as you may determine. The utility of metal models for casting cannon from, is not inconsiderable. It not only prevents a continual making and repairing of patterns: for, when the size and form are correctly ascertained, and a metal pattern made therefrom, it may be cast from for years, and every cannon, in size and form shall be alike. No extension from damp weather, or contraction from heat, will take place, which is always the case where wood is used for patterns. This is a part of the business I never yet attended to. The reason has been, I did not consider you would be willing to go into the expense; but you may be assured that every nation has them, or, at least, ought to have them, of every caliber, thus prepared.

I will now mention an idea that has struck me with much force, the propriety of which, I must leave you to be the judge. Might you not, within the limits of this establishment, have all your shops for smiths, carpenters, &c. &c. which are now fixed on that contracted spot at the end of Greenleaf's Point? You might take as much power from the steam engine as would be necessary to turn your lathes, grind stones, blow your smiths' fires, and many things now done by manual labor, and your place of deposit for mounted and unmounted cannon much better arranged.

I have now pointed out some of the advantages that would unquestionably arise to Government by the establishment of such a work, and offer my services to them for the completion of it in all its parts, (the steam engine excepted, the building of which I do not pretend to understand) and all that I ask for erecting and putting into complete operation the establishment, is the use of the same, without rent or charge, with a contract sufficient to keep it at work for two years after its completion. It is proper for me to observe, that the plan I suggest does not go to necessitate or compel Government to manufacture their own ordnance because they are at the expense of erecting the works: for, after the two years are expired, should there be still a want of ordnance, I would gladly pay them a rent for the use of the works: that would be satisfactory, for as long a time as it might be necessary to keep them in operation.

I recollect you mentioned that it might possibly be the wish of the Government to have one or more young gentlemen instructed in the art of fabricating cannon, mortars, &c. I feel no objection of meeting your ideas on that score, under certain restrictions; what I mean is, for them not to be sent to me under the idea of power to control, but for the special purpose of being instructed.

Before I conclude this letter, permit me to make some few general observations on the whole. My reason for thinking the works ought to be built at the expense of the public in preference to any individual, is because they will derive much advantage therefrom, by having an establishment to resort to in case of emergency; but may I not say they ought in point of economy also: for they will have it in their power to ascertain the fair price that ought to be given for every article in that line, when they have to resort to contracts; and also, there can be an uniformity of artillery established by this means, which will be next to impossible in any other way. For, while officers are at liberty to give direction for ordnance according to their own ideas, the cannon will differ in size and shape in as many instances as there are officers empowered to give directions. And in this place, I will not only give it as an opinion, but state it as a fact, that we stand in the greatest need of a national regularity and uniformity with respect to ordnance.

I have been intimately acquainted with the heads of the Departments of War and Navy for about ten years past; not one of those gentlemen (till you came into office) ever pretended to depend on their own judgment what ought to be the dimension of any piece of ordnance; and the best it was possible for them to do, was to depend on the abilities of that officer in whom they had the greatest confidence. This has been the cause of the great diversity of size and shape of the same caliber which our arsenals, dock yards, and vessels of war present to the eye of the visiter.

Honored sir, I have to entreat you not to understand these remarks as reflections on the Government in general, or on any officer in particular, because that would be doing me injustice; but it is the importance of the subject I have now under consideration, which has called forth these remarks. But, lest I should tire your patience, I will here state but one more reason why I think it would be most proper for Government to build at their own expense; because they could then, without injury to an individual, set them in motion or let them stand unemployed, as suited their convenience.

I will now give you my opinion in point of the expense of erecting such an establishment. As there will be no land to purchase, I am of opinion that the works may be completed on a liberal scale, that is to say, the steam engine, foundry, boring mill, and the shops necessary thereto, for the sum of thirty thousand dollars. It may be extended to cost more, or one may be completed for less. The expense of patterns and flasks will be an additional charge, which will much depend on the materials, whether made of brass or iron, and the manner of finishing. As it regards the moneys necessary to carry on this work, I would observe, as the work would be for my use for a certain time after completed, I could wish the general impression was the same while building. If I make contracts in my own name, and become personally responsible for all engagements I enter into for materials bought, and men employed, I have no doubt but I shall get through the business with much less difficulty, in a shorter time, and with much less expense, than if it were built under the authority, and for the express purpose, of the United States' national works. All sums of money drawn from you on this account, I would hold myself accountable for, agreeable to a contract that should be entered into previous to the commencement of the undertaking.

I would cause to be kept a regular set of books of expenditures, together with taking care to have vouchers of all moneyed transactions, as far as practicable, which books and papers should be open at all times to the inspection of

any person you might appoint, and, at the completion of the works, the books and papers to be given up into your hands. This security, together with some confidence I flatter myself Government has in my integrity, will, I should suppose, be a sufficient guarantee for moneys advanced, particularly as they are to be expended on their own premises.

While I have been endeavoring to throw my ideas together on paper, and give my opinion at large on the necessity and utility of a national foundry, I think you will agree with me that I have done it like one that had no establishment of the kind of his own, and not like one who has an establishment of the kind, and has nearly his all invested in it, and this done at the particular request of Government, and at the time they shall withdraw their aid and patronage therefrom, as a manufactory, with all its expensive machinery, become useless and of little value to me its proprietor.

The above is submitted to your consideration by your obliged servant,

HENRY FOXALL.

Hon. HENRY DEARBORN, *Secretary of War.*

*Number of Brass Cannon, Mortars, and Howitzers, belonging to the United States' War Department.*

24 pounders,	-	-	-	13
18 do.	-	-	-	1
12 do.	-	-	-	35
9 do.	-	-	-	5
8 do.	-	-	-	4
6 do.	-	-	-	115
4 do.	-	-	-	40
3 do.	-	-	-	48
				<hr/>
				261

8 inch howitzers,	-	-	-	33
5½ do.	-	-	-	56
2¾ do.	-	-	-	35
				<hr/>
				385

*Light Iron Field Pieces.*

12 pounders,	-	-	-	60
6 do.	-	-	-	40
				<hr/>
				485

*Mortars.*

13 inch,	-	-	-	3
10 do.	-	-	-	18
8 do.	-	-	-	6
5½ do.	-	-	-	21
4½ do.	-	-	-	19
				<hr/>
				67

*Iron Cannon.*

42 pounders,	-	-	-	20
32 do.	-	-	-	116
24 do.	-	-	-	498

18 pounders,	-	-	-	293
12 do.	-	-	-	230
9 do.	-	-	-	130
				<hr/>
				1,287
				360
				<hr/>
				927

*Heavy Iron Cannon necessary for Forts, &c. from 18 to 42 pounders.*

For New Orleans,	-	-	-	44
Georgia,	-	-	-	32
South Carolina,	-	-	-	48
North Carolina,	-	-	-	32
Virginia,	-	-	-	80
Maryland,	-	-	-	30
Pennsylvania and Delaware river,	-	-	-	40
New York,	-	-	-	150
Connecticut,	-	-	-	32
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	36
Old Massachusetts,	-	-	-	80
New Hampshire,	-	-	-	26
District of Maine,	-	-	-	32
The Lakes,	-	-	-	30
				<hr/>
				692

Remaining for other services, 235

Forty 10 inch mortars are in forwardness by Foxall.

Muskets, about	-	-	-	130,000
Rifles,	-	-	-	5,000
Pistols,	-	-	-	3,000
Horseman's Swords,	-	-	-	3,000
3,000 pair more will be completed by April next.				
4,000 more are contracted for, which will probably be received within six months.				

The foregoing statement is believed to be correct.

H. DEARBORN.

FORTIFICATIONS AND GUNBOATS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NOVEMBER 24, 1807.

Mr. BLOUNT, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the message of the President of the United States, as relates to aggressions committed within our ports and waters by foreign armed vessels;\* to violations of our jurisdiction; and to measures necessary for the protection of our ports and harbors, made the following report, further, in part:

That the numerous aggressions and violations of our jurisdiction, recently committed within our ports and waters by British ships of war, whether they are to be regarded as the effects of positive orders from the British Government, or as proceeding from that unrestrained insolence and rapacity in British naval commanders which previously produced the murder of our citizen John Pearce, and the perpetration of many other well remembered, outrageous, and irritating acts, are convincing proofs of the necessity of placing our ports and harbors, as speedily as possible, in a situation to protect from insult and injury the persons and property of our citizens living in our sea-port towns, or sailing in our own waters, and to preserve therein the respect due to the constituted authorities of the nation.

That the committee, having maturely considered the subject, are of opinion, that the protection desired can be best and most expeditiously afforded by means of land batteries and gun boats; as they have been induced to believe,

\* See Foreign Relations, No. 26, page 7.

that, by a judicious combination and use of these two powers, effectual protection can be given, even to our most important seaport towns, against ships of any size unaccompanied by an army.

That our most important ports and harbors, and those requiring the earliest attention, and the most expensive fortifications, are, New Orleans, Savannah, Charleston, S. C. Wilmington, N. C. Norfolk, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New London, Newport, R. I. Boston, Salem, Newburyport, Portsmouth, N. H. and Portland. And that the ports, harbors, and places, of minor importance, requiring protection, and which may be protected by less expensive works, are, St. Mary's, Georgia, Beaufort and Georgetown, S. C. Ocracock, Albemarle Sound, James river, York and Rappahannock rivers, Potomac, Patuxent, Annapolis and Eastern Shore, Maryland, Delaware bay and river, Egg Harbor, N. J. Amboy, Long Island, Connecticut Shore, Tiverton, R. I. New Bedford, Marblehead and Cape Ann, York, Kennebunk and Saco, Kennebeck, Sheepscut, Damariscotta, Broad Bay and St. George's, Penobscot, Frenchman's Bay, and Passamaquoddy Bay.

Wherefore, your committee, holding themselves bound by the tenor of the resolution referred to them, to report hereafter their opinion of the expediency of interdicting the waters of the United States to foreign armed vessels, according as circumstances, now unknown, may, when known, seem to require, submit the following resolutions, viz:

*Resolved*, That it is expedient to authorize the President of the United States to cause such fortifications to be erected as, in addition to those heretofore built, will, with the assistance of gunboats, afford effectual protection to our ports and harbors, and preserve therein the respect due to the constituted authorities of the nation; and that there be, and hereby is, appropriated for that purpose, out of any moneys in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated, the sum of ——— dollars.

*Resolved*, That it is expedient to authorize the President of the United States to cause to be built an additional number of gunboats, not exceeding ———, and to arm, equip, man, fit, and employ the same for the protection of our ports and harbors; and that there be, and hereby is, appropriated for that purpose, out of any moneys in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated, the sum of ———.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 73.

1st SESSION.

## INCREASE OF THE ARMY, MARINE CORPS, AND NAVY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 2, 1807.

Mr. DAWSON, from the committee to whom was referred "that part of the President's message which relates to our military and naval establishments," made the following report, in part:\*

1. *Resolved*, That it is expedient to increase the military establishment of the United States, by raising ——— regiments of infantry, to consist of ——— men each; ——— regiments of artillery, of ——— men each; ——— regiments of riflemen, of ——— men each; and ——— regiments of cavalry, of ——— men each.

2. *Resolved*, That it is expedient to increase the marine corps, by raising ——— additional number of men.

3. *Resolved*, That provision ought to be made, by law, for the speedy equipment of all the frigates and other vessels of war belonging to the United States; and, to render the establishment more effectual, that ——— ships, of ——— guns each, be built.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 20th, 1807.

SIR:

The committee to whom was referred "that part of the message of the President of the United States which relates to our military and naval establishments," having already received from this Department such information as it possesses on the subject of a foundry for casting cannon in the city of Washington, it only remains for the Secretary of War to state, in answer to your letter of the 16th instant, that the military peace establishment of the United States is composed of one regiment of artillery, consisting of twenty companies, of eighty-one men each, including officers and cadets; and of two regiments of infantry, of ten companies each, each company consisting of eighty men, officers included. The companies on the sea-board, on the Lakes, and upper Mississippi, are complete, or very nearly so; those on the lower Mississippi were, from the latest information, from sixty to seventy strong. The number of recruits at the different rendezvous are not accurately known, but are believed to be nearly sufficient to complete the regiments.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Honorable JOHN DAWSON, *Chairman, &c.*

\* See No. 71.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 74.

[1st SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS AND GUNBOATS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, ON THE THIRD OF DECEMBER, 1807.

Mr. MITCHILL, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 16th of November last, "that part of the President's message which relates to the defence of our seaport towns and harbors, and the further provisions to be made for their security," made a further report, in part, of sundry documents on the subject; also, a bill making appropriation for the more effectual defence of the ports and harbors of the United States.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 20, 1807.

SIR:

In compliance with the request of the committee, as stated in your letter of the 15th instant, I herewith enclose a statement I had the honor of making, by direction, and for the consideration of the President of the United States, on the subject of defence for our ports and harbors.

The aggregate of such an estimate, as circumstances permitted, for erecting the contemplated works, amounts to \$750,000, in addition to former appropriations, and exclusive of the additional defence of New York, as noted under that head.

In considering the necessary defence for the respective ports and harbors, the aid of a suitable floating force was taken into view, but not into the estimate of expense, as that portion of the defence is not under the direction of the Department of War.

Should the committee desire any further information from this Department, either by a personal interview or otherwise, the Secretary will with pleasure attend them when requested, or furnish any documents or information in his possession, in relation to the object referred to the committee.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

HON. SAMUEL L. MITCHILL, *Chairman, &c.*

The following statement exhibits, 1st. A list of ports and harbors that, from their importance in a commercial view, and their exposed situation to the attacks of an enemy, require a primary attention in the event of actual war, with a general description of the existing and contemplated works for the protection of each, together with such estimates of the necessary expenditures for said works, and of the number of gunboats requisite in aid of them, as the information at present possessed will permit. The estimate of expenditures are not generally from minute calculations, but from such information as to induce a belief that they will not, in the aggregate, differ materially from the actual expense of the works contemplated.

2d. A list of ports and places of minor importance, with similar details.

1st. *The more important Ports and Harbors.*

NEW ORLEANS will require the erection and completion of the works heretofore contemplated, and now in a state of progress, viz: A strong work at Plaquemines, on the site of the present battery; a battery at the English Turn, (about twenty miles below New Orleans) with barracks; and a battery and block house at the mouth of Bayou St. John, on the margin of Lake Pontchartrain. The probable expense of which, in addition to the expense already incurred, will be ——. And, when completed, will, it is presumed, with a suitable number of cannon and men, and with the aid of — gunboats, afford a sufficient defence for that place.

SAVANNAH will require a regular enclosed work, with six heavy cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, and — gunboats. The probable expense of the works will not amount to less than —.

CHARLESTON, S. C.—It may not be improper to remark that, as soon as the commissioners of the State, and our engineer, shall have designated the sites as ceded by the Legislature, measures will be taken for the commencement of a strong work on the site of Fort Pinckney, and another at White Point, between the mouth of Ashley river and the city. Measures have been taken for procuring materials; and an engineer has been directed to forward these works with all practicable despatch. The probable expense, —.

An additional work is contemplated on Sullivan's Island, on or near the site of old Fort Moultrie. These works, and a train of heavy cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, (which has been directed to be placed in the town, under the immediate direction of the militia of the place) are, together with — gunboats, considered as capable of affording a sufficient defence for the town and harbor.

WILMINGTON, N. C.—Considerable sums of money have been expended on a new work on the site of old Fort Johnston, on Cape Fear river; it is yet unfinished, and will require an additional expense to complete the works.

A battery has been contemplated on Oak Point, near the mouth of the river, which will probably require an expenditure, including the completion of Fort Johnston, of —.

As no ship of force can approach the town, it is believed that the above works, with gunboats, would afford sufficient protection.

NORFOLK.—Fort Nelson is on a commanding site, and in good repair, but may require some additional support in the rear. A battery at Portsmouth, one on Hospital Point, and one on the site of the town, for the cover of heavy cannon on travelling carriages, aided by a suitable number of gunboats, are thought capable of affording a competent defence against any naval armament that can approach the town. The contemplated additional works will probably require —.

The number of gunboats for the defence of Hampton Roads, the mouth of the Chesapeake, and its immediate vicinity, should not be less than —.

In addition to the above contemplated works, it will probably be considered expedient to erect a strong enclosed work at or near the mouth of Lynnhaven creek.

BALTIMORE.—At the entrance of the harbor of Baltimore a regular enclosed fort of mason work was erected in 1798, 1799, and 1800, and will require but very little additional expense, except that of mounting an additional number of guns, which has been already directed, and will probably require an expenditure of —.

This work, with the aid of — gunboats, will, it is presumed, afford a sufficient protection for that port, especially while the floating force, proposed for the mouth of the bay, is in actual existence.

PHILADELPHIA.—Fort Mifflin, on an island in the Delaware, about eight miles below the city, is an enclosed work of masonry, and requires but little repair, except that of the gun carriages, which has been directed. But the strongest and most effectual defence of Philadelphia, against a naval force, has been established by nature, with some artificial aid. At a short distance below Fort Mifflin, a bar has been formed across the river, over which there

are but about fifteen or sixteen feet of water; of course no ship of war, superior to a twenty gun ship, can pass at high water with her guns on board.

In the city there is a number of heavy cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, sufficient, with the aid of — gunboats, to destroy any small vessels of war that might venture and succeed in the passage of the bar and fort. Repair of carriages, &c. will probably occasion an expense of —.

NEW YORK.—In addition to Fort Columbus, (on Governor's Island) which is in great forwardness, and will be a strong regular work of the best materials, it has been considered necessary to erect a strong circular battery for two tier of cannon, one above the other, at the extreme westerly point of Governor's Island. A battery of a circular kind on Ellis's Island, enclosed in rear, a strong circular battery adjoining the front of the bastion of the old battery in front of the city; and a circular battery for one tier of cannon on a large block or wharf, to be established on the North River, at the northerly part of the city; and a strong redoubt on Bedloe's Island, for mortars and some heavy cannon, with a large train of heavy cannon on travelling carriages, with all necessary apparatus, deposited in an arsenal in front of the city, from whence they may be removed, with facility, to any part where they may be required; and about two miles to the northward of the front of the city a magazine and laboratory will be established for powder, and for fixing ammunition, with a small magazine for cartridges near each battery. When the abovementioned works shall be completed, it is presumed that, with the aid of from — to — gunboats, the city may be defended against any naval force, unaccompanied with an army; but, as a further security, batteries ultimately at Robins's Reef, or the Narrows, or at both, may be of use. The probable expense of the works first contemplated (and for the immediate commencement of which, directions have been given to the principal engineer, and to the agent for furnishing materials and workmen) no accurate estimate has yet been made, but will, it is presumed, in addition to the completion of Fort Columbus, require a sum of not less than —.

NOTE.—If, in addition to the above works, a defence obstructing the channel by sinking blocks, as contemplated, with a strong work for covering the line of blocks, should be decided on, an additional sum will be necessary, of not less than —.

NEW LONDON is situated on the bank of the River Thames, three or four miles from its mouth. The town of Groton is on the opposite side of the river, and Norwich about fifteen or sixteen miles higher up. The harbor or mouth of the river is free from any obstructions, and has sufficient depth of water for large ships. About one mile below the town is Fort Trumbull, on a commanding point. This fort will require some repair; and, when aided by — gunboats, will probably afford a reasonable security to the towns on the river. The probable expense, —.

NEWPORT, R. I.—Large sums of money were expended in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, in fortifications for the defence of this port. Two enclosed works, for the more immediate defence of the town, were erected, and several others commenced, one of which was on an extensive scale; but, had the whole been completed, they could only afford protection against one line of approach, for ships of war, while two others, with sufficient depth of water, remained unguarded. In fact, the different channels by which ships of war can conveniently approach the Island of Rhode Island, renders it so nearly impracticable, without an army, to prevent their approach, as to necessarily reduce a system of defence to the mere front of the town of Newport, which is now covered with two enclosed works, and which, with the necessary repair of those works, some heavy cannon on travelling carriages, placed in the town, and the aid of — or — gunboats, may be sufficiently protected against ships of war, unaccompanied by an army. The same floating force contemplated for Newport may extend a protection to Providence, Bristol, and other places on the same waters.

The sum probably necessary for repairs, &c. at Newport, may be estimated at —.

BOSTON.—In defence of the harbor of Boston a regular fort, composed of the best materials, has been erected on the site of the old works, on Castle Island, about three miles below the town. In addition to this fort, it has been considered necessary, in the event of a war, to erect a small enclosed work on an island which bounds the opposite side of the channel to Fort Independence.

Temporary batteries may be necessary on some of the adjacent heights. With these several works, aided by — gunboats, it is presumed that the harbor and town could be defended against any naval force, unattended by an army, that may be reasonably expected.

SALEM AND NEWBURYPORT.—Batteries and block houses repaired and strengthened, with two cannons at each place, mounted on travelling carriages, aided by — gunboats; — for Salem and — for Newburyport. Probable expense, —.

PORTSMOUTH, N. H.—The harbor of Portsmouth is open, with a sufficient depth of water for ships of the line, to some distance above the town, which is situated but three miles from the entrance of the harbor, where is an ancient work, which has been repaired and improved from time to time, and now requires additional improvements. Between the fort and town there were, in the course of our Revolutionary war, two strong works erected on opposite sides of a narrow pass in the river; but, having been principally constructed of earth, are now in ruins. Batteries on the sites of those works will be necessary, as well as some moveable heavy cannon in the town, which, together with — gunboats, when completed, may be considered as a sufficient defence for that place. The expense for fortifications will probably amount to —.

PORTLAND.—The town of Portland is on the margin of an open capacious harbor, sufficient for the reception of an immense fleet, and at so small a distance from the ocean as to render the approach of an enemy easy and sudden. A battery and block house were erected for its defence (near the town) in the year 1795 or 1796. It being impracticable to defend the harbor by batteries, against the approach of ships of war, a defence for the town is all that can be contemplated; for which purpose some additional batteries, with the repairs of the existing works, may, with moveable heavy cannon, and some floating force, equal to — gunboats, be considered as sufficient.

The expense necessary for fortifications may be —.

2dly. *Ports and Harbors of minor importance.*

ST. MARY'S, GEO.—This place will require a small battery and block house, and two heavy cannon mounted on travelling carriages, aided by — gunboats. Probable expense, —.

Also, — additional gunboats may be necessary between St. Mary's and Savannah.

BEAUFORT will require a battery and block house. Probable expense, —.

GEORGETOWN, S. C.—This place is extremely difficult to approach by water, but it may be proper to erect a small battery for two heavy cannon on travelling carriages, to be aided by — gunboats.

OCRA COCK.—The passage over Ocracock bar is like the mouth of a funnel to the waters of North Carolina, except Cape Fear river, and several small inlets for shallops. On Ocracock bar there are twelve feet water, but a few miles from the bar, in the only channel for vessels of burthen; there is a place called the Swash, over which are only eight feet water, of course large vessels are obliged to take out a considerable part of their cargoes by the help of lighters, from which, after passing the Swash, they again receive them. Outward bound vessels being obliged to wait some time for receiving their cargoes from the lighters, in what is called Wallace's Channel, within two or three miles of the bar, it frequently happens that twenty or thirty vessels are lying together in that channel, waiting for a favorable time to go out; and, while so situated, might become an easy prey to a single privateer or small sloop of war. A battery on the shell flats, near the light house, for four or six cannon, aided by — gunboats, would



probably afford sufficient security. The expense of a battery in mason work, (for no other would stand any time) including a small magazine and guard house, will be, ———.

ALBEMARLE SOUND may require — light gunboats, to guard against small privateers that may enter Currituck or New Inlet, with a small battery at Edenton. Probable expense, ———.

JAMES RIVER.—At a place called Hood's Point (considered a commanding position) a strong battery, covered by a redoubt, may, perhaps, when aided by the floating force below, be considered a sufficient defence for the towns above. Probable expense, ———.

YORK RIVER AND RAPPAHANNOCK.—For each a battery and block house. Probable expense, ———.

POTOMAC.—Digges' Point, below Alexandria, is a commanding position; and, with a strong battery, covered by a redoubt and two block houses on the highest parts of the adjacent eminence, would, with — gunboats, render sufficient protection to Alexandria, the City of Washington, and Georgetown, against the approach of any such naval force as could be reasonably contemplated. Probable expense, ———.

PATUXENT.—A battery and block house. Probable expense, ———.

ANNAPOLIS, Md. and Eastern Shore of Maryland. Probable expense, ———.

DELAWARE BAY AND RIVER.—A battery and block house at some place on the Bay, as a cover for — gunboats; also batteries near Newcastle and Wilmington. Probable expense, ———.

EGG HARBOR, N. J.—This place will require a battery for a few cannon, and a block house, aided by — gunboats. Probable expense, ———.

AMBOY will require a battery, and probably two block houses, aided by — gunboats.

LONG ISLAND.—From Frog's Neck eastward, two or three small batteries and block houses, and some cannon on travelling carriages, aided by — gunboats. Probable expense, ———.

CONNECTICUT SHORE.—The ports in Connecticut, on the Sound, (exclusive of New London) may require five or six small batteries and block houses, aided by — gunboats. Expense, ———.

TYVERTON, R. I.—A small battery and block house, with one cannon on a travelling carriage, and — gunboats. Probable expense, ———.

NEW BEDFORD.—Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket, Barnstable, Plymouth, and Duxbury, each a battery, with — gunboats. Probable expense, ———.

MARBLEHEAD AND CAPE ANN.—Batteries of block houses repaired and strengthened, with two cannon, at each place, on travelling carriages, aided by — gunboats at each. Probable expense, ———.

YORK, KENNEBUNK, AND SAGO.—At each a small battery, — gunboats at each of the two latter places. Probable expense, ———.

KENNEBECK, SHEEPSHUT, DAMARIES, SCOTTA, BROAD BAY, AND ST. GEORGE'S, each a small battery and two cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, aided by — gunboats. Probable expense, ———.

PENOBSCOT.—A strong battery and block house, aided by — gunboats. Probable expense, ———.

FRENCHMAN'S BAY AND MACHIAS.—Two or three small batteries, and three cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, aided by — gunboats. Expense, ———.

PASSAMAQUODDY BAY.—Two batteries and a block house, aided by — gunboats on a large scale. Probable expense, ———.

GENERAL.—Other places, not mentioned, may require some defence, for which it may be proper to add ———.

*The following Statement exhibits the principal articles on hand necessary for military operations.*

Gunpowder,	-	-	-	-	lbs.	500,000
Saltpetre sufficient for powder,	-	-	-	-	lbs.	1,500,000
Sulphur sufficient for powder,	-	-	-	-	lbs.	2,330,000
Lead and lead balls, equal to	-	-	-	-	lbs.	1,350,000
Musket cartridges,	-	-	-	-		1,000,000
Pistol do.	-	-	-	-		100,000
Musket flints,	-	-	-	-		1,642,000
Pistol do.	-	-	-	-		17,800
Swords,	-	-	-	-		9,000
Pistols,	-	-	-	-		4,000
Rifles,	-	-	-	-		4,500
Muskets,	-	-	-	-		130,000
Carbines, wall pieces, and blunderbusses,	-	-	-	-		1,420
Brass field ordnance, (pieces)	-	-	-	-		372
Iron field pieces, (new)	-	-	-	-		100
Mortars, (small)	-	-	-	-		40
Do. 8 inch,	-	-	-	-		6
Do. 10 inch,	-	-	-	-		18
Do. 13 inch,	-	-	-	-		2
Iron battering cannon, from 18 to 42 pounders,	-	-	-	-		1,072
Smaller do.	-	-	-	-		460
Cannon balls of different kinds,	-	-	-	-	lbs.	175,000
Grape, canister, case, and strapped shot,	-	-	-	-	lbs.	341,000
18 and 24 pounders, mounted on travelling carriages,	-	-	-	-		82
Shells,	-	-	-	-		35,000
Cartridge boxes,	-	-	-	-		48,000

N. B. Marquees, tents, intrenching tools, carriages, harness, port fire, slow match, cartridge paper, worms and brushes, screw drivers, rammers and sponges, ladles and worms, fuzes for shells, &c. returned by the superintendent of military stores, but not enumerated in this list.

NOTE.—Forty 10 inch mortars have been engaged, and eight of them are nearly completed; the remainder will probably be completed within a few months.

From four to five thousand pairs of pistols will be finished within three or four months, in addition to those mentioned above.

Four thousand horsemen's swords, and two thousand rifles, are engaged, and will probably be delivered in the course of a few months.

Contracts have also been made for an additional supply of cannon ball.

H. DEARBORN.

November 26, 1807.

*Estimate of the number of Gunboats.*

For New Orleans,	-	-	-	16
“ Georgia, South and North Carolina,	-	-	-	31
“ Chesapeake and its waters,	-	-	-	65
“ Delaware bay and river, New Jersey and New York,	-	-	-	71
“ Connecticut and Rhode Island,	-	-	-	25
“ Old Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the District of Maine,	-	-	-	49
				Total, 257

*Estimate of Expenses for Fortifications.*

For New Orleans,	-	-	-	60,000
“ Georgia, South and North Carolina,	-	-	-	252,000
“ Chesapeake and its waters,	-	-	-	160,000
“ Delaware bay and river, New Jersey and New York,	-	-	-	211,000
“ Connecticut and Rhode Island,	-	-	-	31,000
“ Old Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the District of Maine,	-	-	-	135,000
				\$849,000
For other places, not mentioned,	-	-	-	25,000
				\$874,000

[10th CONGRESS.]

No. 75.

[1st SESSION.]

MILITARY FORCE IN 1807.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 3, 1807.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 2, 1807.

SIR:

I have the honor, in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th ult. to transmit, herewith, a statement of the respective numbers of officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, composing the army of the United States, noting the number wanting to complete the present establishment.

I beg leave also to state, that, in addition to the directions given in July last, letters were written on the 22d day of October, ult. to each of the Governors of the several States, from whom no reports had been received, urging the necessity of their forwarding to this Department, with as little delay as possible, the muster rolls and inspection returns of their respective quotas of one hundred thousand militia. A small proportion of the returns, however, have as yet been received: And, as the Governors were generally authorized by the President of the United States to accept, as a part of their respective quotas, such volunteer corps as might offer their services, in conformity to the act of Congress of the 24th of February last, the Secretary of War will not possess the necessary documents for forming the statement, directed to be laid before the House, by their resolution of the same date as the former, until he shall receive the returns before mentioned. There is reason, however, to expect, that they will generally be in his possession within a short time, as it appears, as far as answers have been received from the Governors to the letters addressed to them as above stated, that every exertion has been made, on their part, to have the returns completed and forwarded.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

To the Hon. the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

*A Statement of the respective numbers of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Soldiers, composing the Army of the United States, agreeably to the act fixing the military peace establishment, passed March 16, 1802, and to the several acts in addition thereto.*

GENERAL AND OTHER STAFF.

1 Brigadier General,	27 Assistant military agents, taken from the line,
1 Aid-de-Camp, taken from the line,	7 Paymasters of districts, do.
1 Adjutant and Inspector, do.	2 Assistant paymasters, do.
1 Paymaster of the army,	2 Surgeons; 1 wanting to complete the number,
3 Military agents,	31 Surgeons' mates; 4 do. do.

ONE REGIMENT OF ARTILLERISTS.

1 Colonel,	40 Cadets; 11 wanting to complete the number,
1 Lieutenant Colonel,	2 Teachers of music,
4 Majors,	80 Sergeants,
1 Adjutant, taken from the line,	80 Corporals,
20 Captains,	80 Musicians,
20 First Lieutenants,	160 Artificers,
20 Second Lieutenants,	1,120 Privates.

## TWO REGIMENTS OF INFANTRY.

2 Colonels,	20 Ensigns,
2 Lieutenant Colonels,	4 Teachers of music,
2 Majors,	2 Sergeant Majors,
2 Adjutants, taken from the line,	80 Sergeants,
20 Captains,	80 Corporals,
20 First Lieutenants,	80 Musicians,
20 Second Lieutenants,	1,280 Privates.

NOTE.—It appears from the latest returns, that about two hundred privates are wanted to complete the establishment. It is believed, however, although not accurately known, that the number of recruits at the different rendezvous is nearly sufficient to supply the deficiency.

## CORPS OF ENGINEERS AT PRESENT CONSISTS OF

1 Lieutenant Colonel,	6 Cadets,
1 Major,	1 Teacher of French language,
3 Captains,	1 Do. of drawing,
3 First Lieutenants,	1 Corporal,
4 Second Lieutenants,	18 Privates.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 2, 1807.

H. DEARBORN.

[10th CONGRESS.]

No. 76.

[1st SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 8, 1807.

*A report of the Secretary of War, in pursuance of a resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the first instant, directing him to lay before the House, an account of the state of the fortifications of the respective ports and harbors of the United States, with a statement of the moneys appropriated for fortifications, and remaining unexpended; and an estimate of the sums necessary for completing such fortifications, as may be deemed requisite for their defence.*

## DISTRICT OF MAINE.

FORT SUMNER, *Portland*.—A small enclosed work with a block house, magazine, and barracks, and a detached battery, near the water, for heavy cannon, with a store house and furnace for heating cannon ball; authorized by an act of Congress, of March, 1794. The sites of the works were injudiciously selected; new ones will be necessary.

## NEW HAMPSHIRE.

FORT CONSTITUTION, *Portsmouth*.—The remains of an ancient fortification, which have been repaired at different periods. Considerable progress has been made within the last three months in the improvement of the works.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

CAPE ANN.—Fortifications authorized by act of Congress, of the 20th of March, 1794. A block house and a battery were erected; but are now out of repair.

SALEM.—A block house, magazine, and battery, authorized by act of Congress, of March 20th, 1794; out of repair.

MARBLEHEAD.—A block house, magazine, and battery, authorized by act of Congress, of March 20th, 1794; wanting repairs.

FORT INDEPENDENCE, *Boston Harbor*.—A regular, strong, enclosed work of masonry, with magazine, quarters, barracks, and other buildings, commenced in the year 1800, and completed in 1803; in good repair.

## RHODE ISLAND.

FORTS ADAMS AND WOLCOTT, *Newport*.—Two enclosed works, with batteries, magazines, and barracks; and in addition to a stone tower at the entrance of the harbor, and a blockhouse and battery on Rhode Island, near the town of Newport, an extensive regular fort, was commenced on a small island, but no part completed, except a range of stone barracks. These works were principally erected in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800. To complete the whole would require very large expenditures; and when completed, would not, in the smallest degree, annoy ships of war, but in one of three open and convenient passages, by which Rhode Island may be approached. The two first mentioned works have recently been put into a tolerable state of defence.

## CONNECTICUT.

FORT TRUMBULL, *New London*.—Fortified in the course of our Revolutionary war. Several repairs have been made, at different periods, since, with considerable improvements; further repairs are necessary.

## NEW YORK.

FORT COLUMBUS, *New York Harbor*.—An enclosed work of earth and wood, on Governor's Island, has, within the two last years, been improved, and faced with permanent mason work, and is nearly completed, and may be considered as a strong, well constructed, regular fort. A strong, marine, casemated battery has been commenced on the extreme western point of the same island; and some progress has been made in forming foundations, for batteries, at other points in the vicinity of the city; a train of heavy cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, has been placed in the city.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

FORT MIFFLIN, *on Mud Island, below Philadelphia*.—A regular enclosed work, with batteries, magazines, and barracks, principally erected in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, and now in a good state of defence.

## DELAWARE.

WILMINGTON.—A selection and survey of a site for a fortification, authorized by the act of Congress, of the 20th March, 1794, but no works erected.

## MARYLAND.

FORT MCHENRY, *Baltimore Harbor*.—A regular fortification of mason work, with batteries, magazine, and barracks, erected principally in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800; no considerable repair necessary.

ANNAPOLIS.—An examination and survey of a site for fortifications, but the works not completed.

## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

ALEXANDRIA.—Temporary works, erected in the year 1795, now in ruins.

## VIRGINIA.

NORFOLK, *Fort Nelson*.—Commenced in the year 1794; repaired and improved in the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, with extensive batteries, a magazine, and barracks. Considerable improvements and repairs are now progressing.

## NORTH CAROLINA.

OCRACOCK HARBOR.—On an island called Beacon Island, a work was commenced in the year 1795, but not completed; and in the year 1799, measures were directed for the erection of an enclosed work, on the ruins of the former one; but from a belief that no work could be erected and supported at that place, which would afford any considerable protection to the harbor, none has been erected. It is presumed, that gun-boats would more securely protect that harbor than any fixed batteries which could be erected.

CAPE FEAR RIVER, *Fort Johnston*.—The site of an ancient fortification. In the years 1799, and 1800, some progress was made in erecting new works on the old site, which, from unfortunate arrangements and delays, on the part of the gentleman who contracted to complete them, are yet unfinished. When completed, they will be insufficient for the protection of the river, or the town of Wilmington, without the aid of gunboats, or other floating force.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

GEORGETOWN.—Some cannon were mounted in the year 1794, but no works erected.

CHARLESTON, *Forts Moultrie, Pinckney, and Johnston*.—The old forts are in a state of ruins; and, as no sites had been ceded and designated by the State for fortifications, until the month of August last, no effectual measures could, with propriety, be adopted, for the defence of the town and harbor, until within a few months past, in which time all necessary measures of preparation have been pursued for commencing and completing the contemplated works, on the most permanent and durable principles.

## GEORGIA.

SAVANNAH AND ST. MARY'S, *Fort Green*.—On a small island called Cockspur, near the mouth of the river, irregular fortifications were erected, in the year 1794, with a battery, magazine, and barracks. In the year 1804, the works and barracks were totally destroyed, and a part of the garrison drowned by a storm, which occasioned such a rise of the water, as overflowed the island to a considerable depth; but as no cession has been made to the United States by the State of Georgia, of any suitable site or sites for permanent fortifications, and it not having been in the power of the Executive of the United States to procure any, on reasonable terms, either on the Savannah river or the St. Mary's, no considerable expense has been incurred on the sea-coast of Georgia, for the last five years, and the garrison has been removed from St. Mary's as well as from Fort Green.

## NEW ORLEANS.

FORTS ST. LOUIS, ST. CHARLES, AND ST. PHILIP.—The town of New Orleans is surrounded, except the front, by a mud wall, with three redoubts in the rear, and two in front; the two latter called forts. About fifty miles below the town, there is an ancient fortification, called St. Philip, with a battery, magazine, and barracks, which require considerable repairs and improvements.

At the junction of Bayou St. John, with Lake Pontchartrain, a small ancient work remains, intended to guard that communication with New Orleans, against the approach of an enemy, by way of the Lake. This work is out of repair, and will probably require considerable improvement.

Within the last twelve months, a considerable sum of money has been expended in repairing the ancient works about the town, and for materials and workmen for repairing the other works and erecting new ones.

As a considerable proportion of the accounts for expenditures on fortifications, for the present year, have been received and adjusted, a correct statement, as to the sum remaining unexpended, of former appropriations, cannot at present be made; but from such information as is now possessed, it is believed that not more than from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty thousand dollars remain unexpended at this time.

For erecting and repairing fortifications as contemplated, exclusive of a line of blocks, for the more effectual defence of New York, the aggregate estimate is nine hundred thousand dollars.

What sum will be necessary for the line of blocks, and a work for covering them, has not been fully estimated: it is presumed that it would require from two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand dollars.

H. DEARBORN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 7, 1807.*

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 77.

[1st Session.]

## ESTIMATES FOR AN ARMY OF 32,800 MEN.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 9TH OF DECEMBER, 1807.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 7, 1807.*

SIR:

In compliance with your note of the 5th instant, I herewith enclose an estimate of the annual expense of pay, forage, subsistence, and clothing, for an army of 32,800 men, officers included; also, an estimate of the sums necessary for the hospital, quartermaster, and ordnance departments, for the first year,

And am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Honorable JOHN DAWSON, *Chairman, &c.*

*Estimate of the expenses of a Regiment of Infantry, per annum, consisting as follows, viz:*

	Pay per month.	Forage.	Pay per annum.	Forage.	No. of rations per day.
1 Colonel, - - - -	\$75	\$12	\$900	\$144	6
1 Lieutenant Colonel, - - - -	60	11	720	132	5
1 Major, - - - -	50	10	600	120	4
1 Surgeon, - - - -	45	10	540	120	3
1 Surgeon's Mate, - - - -	30	6	360	72	2
1 Adjutant, - - - -	10	6	120	72	
10 Captains, at \$40 per month, - - - -	400	-	4,800	-	30
10 First Lieutenants, at \$30 per month, - - - -	300	-	3,600	-	20
10 Second Lieutenants, at \$25 per month, - - - -	250	-	3,000	-	20
10 Ensigns, at \$20 per month, - - - -	200	-	2,400	-	20
1 Sergeant Major, - - - -	11	-	131	-	1
2 Teachers of music, at \$9 per month, - - - -	18	-	216	-	2
40 Sergeants, at \$10 per month, - - - -	400	-	4,800	-	40
40 Corporals, at \$8 per month, - - - -	320	-	3,840	-	40
40 Musicians, at \$8 per month, - - - -	320	-	3,840	-	40
840 Privates, at \$7 per month, - - - -	5,880	-	70,560	-	840
			\$100,427		

Pay per annum, - - - -	-	-	-	\$100,427 00
Forage do. - - - -	-	-	-	660 00
40,150 rations, to officers, at 25 cents, - - - -	-	-	-	10,037 50
351,495 rations, to non-commissioned, rank and file, at 16 cents, - - - -	-	-	-	56,239 20
Clothing, at \$30 per suit, - - - -	-	-	-	28,890 00

Total, \$196,253 70

*Estimate of the expenses of a Regiment of Artillerists, per annum, consisting as follows:*

	Pay per month.	Forage.	Pay per annum.	Forage.	No. of rations per day.
1 Colonel, - - - -	\$75	\$12	\$900	\$144	6
1 Lieutenant Colonel, - - - -	60	11	720	132	5
1 Major, - - - -	50	10	600	120	4
1 Surgeon, - - - -	45	10	540	120	3
1 Surgeon's Mate, - - - -	30	6	360	72	2
1 Adjutant, - - - -	10	6	120	72	
10 Captains, at \$40 per month, - - - -	400	-	4,800	-	30
10 First Lieutenants, at \$30 per month, - - - -	300	-	3,600	-	20
10 Second Lieutenants, at \$25 per month, - - - -	250	-	3,000	-	20
1 Sergeant Major, - - - -	11	-	131	-	1
2 Teachers of music, at \$9 per month, - - - -	18	-	216	-	2
40 Sergeants, at \$10 each, - - - -	400	-	4,800	-	40
40 Corporals, at \$8 each, - - - -	320	-	3,840	-	40
40 Musicians, at \$8 each, - - - -	320	-	3,840	-	40
80 Artificers, at \$12 per month, - - - -	960	-	11,520	-	80
570 Privates, at \$7 per month, - - - -	3,990	-	47,880	-	570
			\$86,167		

Pay per annum, - - - -	-	-	-	\$86,167 00
Forage per annum, - - - -	-	-	-	660 00
32,850 rations, to officers, at 25 cents, - - - -	-	-	-	8,212 50
282,145 rations, to non-commissioned, rank and file, at 16 cents, - - - -	-	-	-	45,143 20
Clothing, at \$32, per suit, - - - -	-	-	-	24,832 00

Total, \$165,014 70

*Estimate of the expenses of a Regiment of Cavalry, per annum, consisting as follows, viz:*

	Pay per month.	Forage per month.	Pay per annum.	Forage per annum.	No. of Rations per day.
1 Colonel,	\$75	\$12	\$900	\$144	6
1 Lieutenant Colonel,	60	11	720	132	5
1 Major,	50	10	600	120	4
1 Surgeon,	45	10	540	120	3
1 Surgeon's Mate,	30	6	360	72	2
1 Adjutant,	10	-	120	-	-
8 Captains, at \$40 per month,	320	64	3,840	768	24
8 Lieutenants, at \$30 per month,	240	48	2,880	576	16
8 Cornets, at \$25 per month,	200	48	2,400	576	16
1 Sergeant Major, at \$11 per month,	11	-	121	-	1
2 Teachers of Music, at \$9 per month,	18	-	216	-	2
32 Sergeants, at \$10 per month,	320	-	3,840	-	32
32 Corporals, at \$8 per month,	256	-	3,072	-	32
16 Musicians, at \$8 per month,	128	-	1,536	-	16
8 Saddlers, at \$12 per month,	96	-	1,152	-	8
8 Farriers, at \$12 per month,	96	-	1,152	-	8
384 Privates, at \$7	2,688	-	32,256	-	384
			\$55,705		

Pay per annum,	\$55,705 00
27,740 rations to officers, at 25 cents.	6,935 00
176,295 rations to non-commissioned, rank and file, at 16 cents,	28,207 20
Forage,	2,508 00
Clothing, at \$36 per suit,	16,988 00
<b>Total,</b>	<b>\$110,343 20</b>

The forage of officers horses only are included.

*Estimate of the expenses of a Regiment of Riflemen, per annum, consisting as follows, viz:*

	Pay per month.	Forage per month.	Pay per annum.	Forage per annum.	No. of rations per day.
1 Colonel,	\$75	\$12	\$900	\$144	6
1 Lieutenant Colonel,	60	11	720	132	5
1 Major,	50	10	600	120	4
1 Surgeon,	45	10	540	120	3
1 Surgeon's Mate,	30	6	360	72	2
1 Adjutant,	10	6	120	72	-
10 Captains, at \$40 per month,	400	-	4,800	-	30
10 First Lieutenants, at \$30 per month,	300	-	3,600	-	20
10 Second Lieutenants, at \$25 per month,	250	-	3,000	-	20
10 Ensigns, at \$20 per month,	200	-	2,400	-	20
1 Sergeant Major, at \$11 per month,	11	-	131	-	1
2 Teachers of music, at \$9 per month,	18	-	216	-	2
40 Sergeants, at \$10 per month,	400	-	4,800	-	40
40 Corporals, at \$8 per month,	320	-	3,840	-	40
20 Musicians, at \$8 per month,	360	-	1,920	-	20
660 Privates, at \$7 per month,	4,620	-	55,440	-	660
			\$83,380		

Pay per annum,	\$83,380 00
Forage per annum,	660 00
40,150 rations to officers, at 25 cents,	10,037 50
278,495 rations to non-commissioned, rank and file, at 16 cents,	44,559 20
Clothing, at \$30 per suit,	22,890 00
<b>Total,</b>	<b>\$161,526 70</b>

*Estimate of the expenses of a Corps of Sappers and Miners per annum, consisting as follows, viz:*

	Pay per month.	Forage.	Pay per annum.	Forage.	No. of rations per day.
1 Major,	\$50	10	600	120	4
4 Captains, at \$40 per month,	160	-	1,920	-	12
4 First Lieutenants, at \$30 per month,	120	-	1,440	-	8
4 Second Lieutenants, at \$25 per month,	100	-	1,200	-	8
16 Sergeants, at \$10 per month,	160	-	1,920	-	16
16 Corporals, at \$8 per month,	128	-	1,536	-	16
8 Musicians, at \$8 per month,	64	-	768	-	8
248 Privates, at \$7 per month,	1,736	-	20,832	-	248
			30,216		

Pay per annum,	\$30,216 00
11,680 rations to officers, at 25 cents,	2,920 00
105,120 rations to non-commissioned rank and file, at 16 cents,	16,819 20
Forage,	120 00
Clothing, at \$30 per suit,	8,640 00
<b>Total,</b>	<b>\$58,715 20</b>

*Annual expense of Pay, Forage, Subsistence, and Clothing.*

22 regiments of infantry, of 1,000 each,	22,000	-	-	-	\$4,317,582
3 regiments of artillery, of 800 each,	2,400	-	-	-	495,043
5 regiments of cavalry, of 500 each,	2,500	-	-	-	550,706
3 regiments of riflemen, of 800 each,	2,400	-	-	-	484,579
1 corps of sappers and miners,	300	-	-	-	58,715
The present peace establishment,	3,200	-	-	-	712,108
	<b>Number of men,</b>	<b>32,800</b>			
Forage for the cavalry,	-	-	-	-	197,210
					<b>\$6,815,943</b>
Hospital department,	-	-	-	-	100,000
Transportation,	-	-	-	-	250,000
Contingencies,	-	-	-	-	150,000
					<b>\$7,315,943</b>
6,000 common tents, at \$15 each, }	-	-	-	-	120,000
1,000 wall tents, at 30 }	-	-	-	-	20,000
8,000 camp kettles, at 1 50, }	-	-	-	-	150,000
100 covered wagons, at 200 }	-	-	-	-	170,000
Ordnance department,	-	-	-	-	300,000
For powder and ball,	-	-	-	-	
For horses, saddles, bridles, &c. for 5 regiments of cavalry,	-	-	-	-	
					<b>\$8,087,943</b>

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 7, 1807.

H. DEARBORN.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 78.

[1st SESSION.

INCREASE OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, ON THE 26TH OF FEBRUARY 1808.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

The dangers to our country, arising from the contests of other nations, and the urgency of making preparation for whatever events might affect our relations with them, have been intimated in preceding messages to Congress. To secure ourselves by due precautions, an augmentation of our military force, as well regular as of volunteer militia, seems to be expedient. The precise extent of that augmentation cannot as yet be satisfactorily suggested: but that no time may be lost, and especially at a season deemed favorable to the object, I submit to the wisdom of the Legislature whether they will authorize a commencement of this precautionary work, by a present provision for raising and organizing some additional force; reserving themselves to decide its ultimate extent on such views of our situation, as I may be enabled to present at a future day of the session.

If an increase of force be now approved, I submit to their consideration the outlines of a plan proposed in the enclosed letter from the Secretary of War.

I recommend also to the attention of Congress, the term at which the act of April 18, 1806, concerning the militia, will expire, and the effect of that expiration.

February 25, 1808.

TH: JEFFERSON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 24th, 1808.*

SIR:

I take the liberty of suggesting, whether, under existing circumstances, it would not be advisable to propose to Congress an augmentation of our regular troops, as soon as practicable; and also the engaging and organizing of twenty-four thousand volunteers, on the principles I have had the honor of proposing for your consideration; the general outlines of which are contained in the paper marked No. 1.

The number of regular troops I would propose being raised immediately, is six thousand, to be composed of suitable proportions of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen, and organized as stated in the enclosed paper, marked No. 2.

It may be presumed that, previous to the close of the present session, Congress will be possessed of such further information in regard to our foreign relations, as will be necessary for forming an ultimate opinion on the expediency or in expediency of a greater augmentation of our army than is now proposed; and, in the mean time, measures may be taken for the recruiting service in different parts of the United States.

In the event of war, it will, I presume, be considered necessary to arrange our military force into separate departments, and to have a commander to each department; and, of course, to have no such officer as a commander in chief; and, until a larger army shall be raised than is now proposed, it may not be advisable to have any officers above the rank of Brigadier Generals; of that grade it may be proper to have four or five, as soon as a suitable proportion of the troops is raised.

With sentiments of the highest respect, I am, sir, your humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The PRESIDENT of the *United States.*

No 1.

It is proposed to have engaged, in the several States and territories, twenty-four thousand volunteers, to be enlisted to serve twelve months in any twenty-four months within the term of five years, at such times and places as the President of the United States shall direct, to be armed and equipped by the United States, and to be regularly encamped in their respective States and territories, from two to three months in each year; and be exercised under the direction of inspectors to be appointed by the President of the United States, to receive pay and rations, and be furnished with camp equipage, and one suit of uniform clothing, once in three or four years; the officers, except the inspectors and paymasters, to be appointed by the respective States; the pay, annually, to commence the day they march for the respective encampments, and to continue until their return home, allowing one day for each twenty miles march to and from the encampment; no corporal punishments to be inflicted, but all offences to be punished by close confinement and short allowance or fines, or both; the commissioned officers to be governed by the rules and articles of war established for the regular army. The 24,000 to be apportioned on the States and territories in such proportion as circumstances may require, and in such proportions of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen, as the President of the United States shall direct, and organized into companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, or other corps, as shall be found expedient, according to the numbers in each State, respectively; and to be encamped in the respective States and territories, at such time and place, or places, as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, direct.

No. 2.

The six thousand regular troops may consist of five regiments of infantry, one regiment of riflemen, one regiment of light artillery, and one regiment of light cavalry. The regiments of infantry, riflemen, and artillery, to consist of ten companies each, and the regiment of cavalry of eight companies. The field and staff of each regiment to consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one paymaster, one surgeon, one surgeon's mate, one sergeant major, one quartermaster sergeant, and two principal musicians, and for the regiment of cavalry one riding master.

Each company of infantry and riflemen to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, four musicians, and sixty eight privates.

Each company of artillery to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, two cadets, four sergeants, four corporals, four musicians, eight artificers, and fifty-eight privates.

Each company of cavalry to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one cornet, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, one saddler, one farrier, and thirty-eight privates.

10th CONGRESS.]No. 79.[1st SESSION.

## MILITARY ACADEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, MARCH 18, 1808.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

The scale on which the Military Academy, at West Point, was originally established, is become too limited to furnish the number of well instructed subjects, in the different branches of artillery and engineering, which the public service calls for. The want of such characters is already sensibly felt, and will be increased with the enlargement of our plans of military preparation. The chief engineer having been instructed to consider the subject, and to propose an augmentation which might render the establishment commensurate with the present circumstances of our country, has made the report which I now transmit for the consideration of Congress.

The idea suggested by him of removing the institution to this place, is also worthy of attention. Besides the advantage of placing it under the immediate eye of the Government, it may render its benefits common to the Naval Department, and will furnish opportunities of selecting, on better information, the characters most qualified to fulfil the duties which the public service may call for.

TH: JEFFERSON.

*March 18, 1808.*WASHINGTON, *March 14, 1808.*

SIR:

In conformity to the commands of the President of the United States, I have the honor to transmit a report on the progress and present state of the Military Academy, with some suggested alterations, in which I have included those you had the goodness to point out.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

JONA. WILLIAMS, *Colonel of Engineers.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR.



WASHINGTON CITY, March 14, 1808.

In obedience to the verbal commands of the President of the United States, the subscriber has the honor to submit, to the Secretary of War, the following report on the progress and present state of the military academy:

This institution was established at West Point, in the year 1801, under the direction of a private citizen, and was nothing more than a mathematical school for the few cadets that were then in service. It was soon found that the government of young military men was incompatible with the ordinary system of schools, and, consequently, this institution ran into disorder, and the teacher into contempt.

When the peace establishment was made, the corps of engineers was created, and the twenty-seventh section enacts that the corps "shall be stationed at West Point, in the State of New York, and shall constitute a military academy, and the engineers, assistant engineers, and cadets, shall be subject to do duty at such places, and on such service, as the President of the United States may direct." It was not probably foreseen, that, although the head quarters of the corps might be at West Point, yet the duties of the individual officers necessarily spread them along our coast from one extremity of the United States to the other; and as the whole number of officers can be no more than sixteen, they could not, in their dispersed state, constitute a military academy. The incongruity of a stationary and errant existence, in the same corps, has been amply exemplified by experience. Indeed, it never can be supposed that engineers, as such, could be efficient elementary teachers; their capability, consistent with other duties, is confined to *practical* teaching, by combining example with precept, and carrying the rudiments of the art into practical execution; in the same manner that other professional men generally have youth under their tuition, *after* they have gone through every branch of elementary learning relating to their profession.

A part only of the officers were appointed soon after the passage of the act, of whom the major, who was ex-officio the chief engineer, and two captains, took charge of the academy, the students of which were the cadets belonging to the regiment of artillery. The major occasionally read lectures on fortifications, gave practical lessons in the field, and taught the use of instruments generally. The two captains taught mathematics; the one in the line of geometrical, the other in that of algebraical demonstrations.

As the corps was small, as it had little or nothing to do in its more appropriate professional duties, and as the students were few, the institution went on producing all the effect in its power, and all that could be expected on its limited scale. It was soon discovered that mere mathematics would not make either an artilleryist or an engineer, and a power was given, by law, to appoint a teacher of drawing and of the French language. Had this law, instead of absolutely limiting the number of teachers and designating their duties, left it general in the discretion of the President to appoint such and so many as he might find requisite to produce the effect contemplated by the establishment, and left the internal organization to him, who, from constant observation, could judge of the most expedient one, with a reasonable but ample appropriation, we should, at this day, have a greater number of well instructed young officers than we can boast of. From that time to this, however, the academy has progressed beyond what could have been expected from its means; but now the first mathematical teacher has resigned, and the second has, for several years, been employed as Surveyor General of the United States in the Western country.

During the last year, a citizen, of eminent talents as a mathematician, has been employed as principal teacher, and a first lieutenant of engineers performed the duties of assistant teacher, while the professor of French and drawing confined his abilities to these branches. So far as talents can go, nothing is wanting as to these teachers; they are all capable in the highest degree: the subscriber is only apprehensive that he shall not be able to retain them. Mr. Hassler, the chief mathematician, is already designated for a survey of the coast, when circumstances shall permit that business to be undertaken, and it could not be committed to more able hands. Mr. Mason, the professor of French and drawing, is a man of too great and too extensive abilities to be kept in a situation so much below his merit; this gentleman, being perfect master of the French and English languages, fully acquainted with all that has been written on the art of fortification, and eminently distinguished in science and general erudition, ought, in the opinion of the subscriber, to be placed at the head of what the French call *Le Genie*, which cannot be literally translated in its extensive sense. It signifies the art of an engineer, generally, in all its branches. Mr. Mason being the only teacher designated by the law, he is the only one that, exclusive of the corps of engineers, can be said to belong to the institution.

In short, the military academy, as it now stands, is like a foundling, barely existing among the mountains, and nurtured at a distance out of sight, and almost unknown to its legitimate parents. The questions that have been frequently put to the subscriber, by members of Congress, evidently show that the little interest the institution has excited arises solely from its being unknown to those who ought to be, and doubtless would willingly become, its generous guardians and powerful protectors. Had it been so attached to the Government (its real and only parent) as to be always with it, always in sight, and always in the way of its fostering care, it would probably have flourished, and have become an honorable and interesting appendage to the national family.

The question recurs, What ought to be done? The subscriber would wish the answer to arise out of the nature of the case, and carry with it a demonstration of its being founded in the most pure, though zealous regard for the public good. Actuated only by such motives, and without the stimulus of either ambition or interest, he begs leave to state, in the form of a proposition, what appears to him to be the natural and proper remedies.

First. Let the military academy be placed under the direction of the President of the United States in all that does or can relate to it, any thing contained in any former law to the contrary notwithstanding.

Second. Let an academical staff be created in manner following; and as the regulations must necessarily be military, let the professors, when not of army rank, take that of their denominations (as relates to the academy only) in the manner of brevets:

1. The commanding officer of the corps of engineers to be ex-officio superintendent of the institution, with the power of appointing one of the officers or professors to do the duties of superintendent in his absence.

2. Let there be a professor of natural and experimental philosophy in all its branches; if taken from the corps of engineers and of lesser grade, let him have as much, in addition to his pay and emoluments, as will equal those of a lieutenant colonel; and if not of the corps, let *these* be his emoluments, and *that* his denomination, without similar rank in the army.

3. Let there be a professor of mathematics generally, with the pay, emoluments, and denomination of a major, and allowed to have two teachers under him, with the pay, emoluments, and denominations of captains: to this branch will expressly belong nautical astronomy, geography, and navigation.

4. Let there be a professor of the art of an engineer in all its branches, expressly to include fortification, attack, and defence, gunnery, and castrametation, with the pay, emoluments, and denomination, of a major, and allowed to have a drawing teacher, with a French teacher, and a German teacher, under him, with the pay, emoluments, and denomination of captains.

To this academical staff he begs leave to suggest the addition of the following professors; they are thus separately named, because they are supposed to be citizens engaged in other pursuits, and could only give a portion of their professional labors to this institution.

5. A professor of architecture, to be occasionally at the academy, and to give lectures, accompanied with demonstrations by models and specimens of the nature of the materials, of cements, of the composition of works, of bridges, causeways, canals, &c. &c. to be paid per diem, when on duty, and to be allowed quarters in the academy.

6. A professor of chemistry and mineralogy, on the same terms and conditions.

7. A riding master and teacher of the broad and small sword.

Third. With respect to the corps of engineers, whose functions have become extensive, let the following additions be made to it.

Two Captains,  
Two first Lieutenants,  
Two second Lieutenants,  
Four Cadets,  
Nine Artificers,  
Thirty-one Men,

The officers to be appointed, and the men to be engaged, on the same conditions as those now composing the corps.

The whole will then consist of twenty-two officers, eight cadets, fifty men, and ten artificers.

It will appear necessary to make, in the first instance, an appropriation for the proper buildings, apparatus, library, &c.; this being done, (and it should be remembered that, being once well done, it will be but *one* expense, not subject to repetition) it is presumed the annual appropriation would be inconsiderable; it might indeed be so connected with the appropriation for the corps of engineers, that all the surplusage of one would fall into the other, and the extension of the sum would not be felt.

It might be well to make the plan upon such a scale as not only to take in the minor officers of the navy, but, also, any youths from any of the States, who might wish for such an education, whether designed for the army or navy, or neither, and to let these be assessed to the value of their education, which might form a fund for extra or contingent expenses. On this plan it might be proper to suppress the ration system while the students are at the academy, and oblige all but commissioned officers to board in commons as in other universities. The citizen youth, so adopted, should be required to sign the articles of war, (for the time being) since it would be impossible, and improper if it were possible, to make any exceptions to the rules and regulations of the academy. As these youths grow up and take their stations in society, they would naturally become militia officers, and, in a few years, in the ordinary course of events, we should see an uniformity in our militia, resulting from a spirit of emulation, which the reputation of having received a military education would naturally excite, and the same duties, which have often been considered a burthen, would become a pleasurable privilege. There is nothing more fascinating to youth than excellence in arms, and a little knowledge will create a desire to acquire more.

That Congress may have as little trouble as possible, and to avoid a frequent recurrence to its authority on matters of course, it might, perhaps, be expedient to pass one short act, naming the additions to be made to the corps of engineers, but placing the direction of the academy, external and internal, in the President of the United States, leaving the site, the buildings, the number and kind of professors, and all other matters connected with the institution, entirely to his judgment.

All which is most respectfully submitted,

JONA. WILLIAMS, *Colonel of Engineers.*

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 80.

[1st SESSION.]

### THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, MARCH 25, 1808.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I now lay before Congress a statement of the militia of the United States, according to the latest returns received by the Department of War. From the State of Delaware alone no return has ever been made.

MARCH 25, 1808.

TH: JEFFERSON.

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.												FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.																
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Gen'ls.	Adjutant Generals.	Aid-de-camps.	State Engineers.	Commissary Generals of Purchase.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Physician Generals.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjutant Gen'ls.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Wagonmaster Gen'ls.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Serg'ts.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.	
New Hampshire,	1807	3	6		1	6												36	72	36	36		36	36	36	36	35	36	36	
Massachusetts,	1807	10	23	1	1	19											23	99	212	126	118		86	77	83	84	79	73	73	
Vermont,	1807	4	10		1	5												30	60	31	31		31	31	31	29	26	27	27	
Rhode Island,	1807	1	4	1	1	4												17	29	13	13	7	11	11	12	10	9	8	8	
Connecticut,	1807	3	8		1													43	78	43	40	39	42	35	32	37	34	34	34	
New York,	1806	7	36		1	14												123	259	124	121	102	95	62	136		85	86	86	
New Jersey,	1807	4	13	1	1	4			1	1	1							40	84	51	46	88	49	26	24	1	32	30	30	
Pennsylvania,	1807	12	27			24												140	173	127	142	140	122	68	94	85	93	86	86	
Delaware,*																		50	104	54	54		54	50						
Maryland,	1807	3	12		1	8											3	107	208	91	61		62	35	29	8	42	41	41	
Virginia,	1807	4	19		1	8												69	139	64	26	30	27	14	22		34	29	29	
North Carolina,	1807	6	14		1	15												46	92	34	28	70	23	1	11		5	3	3	
South Carolina,	1807	2	9		1	17												28	59	30	16		17	10	9		2	2	2	
Georgia,	1807	3	7	1	1	6												60	115	56	39	37	25	7	17	8	25	17	17	
Kentucky,	1806	6	12		1	2												30	62	30					7	1	12	12	12	
Tennessee,	1805	2	6		1	3												16	43	20	20		16	7	16	9	8	8	8	
Ohio,	1806	4	8	1	1	2											4	2	4	1	1	2	2	1	1					
District of Columbia,	1803	1																5	10	4			1	1	1	1				
Mississippi Territory,	1806					4												5	5	7	2									
Indiana Territory,	1806				1													12	27	9	1		1							
Orleans Territory,	1807				1													5	12	4	3	3								
Louisiana Territory,	1807	1			1													7	5	2	1			2						
Michigan Territory,	1806				1																									

\* No return has ever been received.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARTILLERY.								CAVALRY.							GRENADIERS.						LIGHT INFANTRY.												
		Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Farriers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.				
New Hampshire,	1807	20	20	20	80	.	40	.	534	31	62	31	122	70	.	1,649	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.			
Massachusetts,	1807	58	58	59	234	.	117	.	2,342	58	122	60	249	81	.	2,223	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				
Vermont,	1807	8	8	16	29	.	18	.	209	30	60	30	118	34	.	1,076	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				
Rhode Island,	1807	4	4	3	16	16	12	.	142	4	7	4	21	3	.	148	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				
Connecticut,	1807	17	17	17	55	63	28	139	373	34	68	34	128	34	.	1,143	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				
New York,	1806	33	34	32	139	.	61	.	1,229	35	62	32	114	50	.	1,736	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				
New Jersey,	1807	10	12	9	38	33	13	25	304	33	57	27	96	22	5	1,364	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.				
Pennsylvania,	1807	3	6	.	12	.	3	.	101	59	105	58	156	38	8	2,382	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.			
Delaware,*																																			
Maryland,	1807	8	8	8	24	.	.	.	256	35	70	35	140	35	.	1,220	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
Virginia,	1807	4	4	4	13	.	6	.	202	16	28	14	52	2	.	588	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
North Carolina,	1807	.	.	1	4	1	2	.	21	39	65	39	77	17	3	997	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
South Carolina,	1807	13	27	.	47	.	10	86	528	34	61	30	97	20	17	1,202	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
Georgia,	1807	4	4	4	14	.	8	.	154	18	31	13	51	6	.	675	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
Kentucky,	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	19	19	19	41	19	.	595	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Tennessee,	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	4	2	8	2	.	109	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Ohio,	1806	1	1	1	3	.	2	.	23	2	4	2	4	.	43	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
District of Columbia,	1803	2	2	.	8	2	.	.	81	2	3	2	.	.	.	.	1	1	.	.	.	.	22	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	48			
Mississippi Territory,	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Indiana Territory,	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	2	1	4	.	.	27	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Orleans Territory,	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6	12	5	21	1	.	178	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Louisiana Territory,	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	6	4	14	1	.	154	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Michigan Territory,	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

\* No return has ever been received.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.						Total number, including Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Rank and File.	ORDNANCE.													
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.		Musicians.	Privates.	Brass 12 Pounds.	Brass 9 Pounds.	Brass 6 Pounds.	Brass 4 Pounds.	Brass 3 Pounds.	Howitzers.	Iron 12 Pounds.	Iron 9 Pounds.	Iron 6 Pounds.	Iron 4 Pounds.	Iron 3 Pounds.	
New Hampshire,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	301	301	297	1,152	-	-	706	19,660	25,478	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	813	829	835	3,253	-	-	1,880	55,857	70,323	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vermont,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	263	263	358	1,024	-	-	676	13,874	17,981	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rhode Island,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	93	105	92	323	-	310	177	5,654	7,307	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Connecticut,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	321	316	316	1,244	1,219	857	13,233	20,167	-	-	-	8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New York,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,039	1,007	958	4,345	-	2,098	69,194	83,591	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Jersey,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	379	362	337	1,193	690	512	27,321	33,360	-	-	11	2	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pennsylvania,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,253	1,188	1,131	2,066	1,258	1,228	81,038	90,670	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Delaware,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maryland,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	529	435	419	922	-	273	34,224	39,047	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	959	907	786	3,335	-	721	57,298	65,676	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Carolina,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	739	733	710	2,461	1,313	1,081	43,186	51,982	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	393	387	331	1,295	-	298	24,041	20,004	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia,	1807	8	8	5	26	-	348	270	235	209	887	-	123	17,610	20,878	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kentucky,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	530	497	465	1,653	-	290	28,366	32,236	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tennessee,	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	248	238	230	308	308	320	14,285	16,822	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ohio,	1806	4	4	4	15	4	157	189	183	174	685	-	182	13,345	15,351	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
District of Columbia,	1803	1	1	1	4	1	83	16	13	10	52	15	8	1,690	2,201	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	33	29	93	58	3	1,878	2,158	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indiana Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	33	30	76	-	-	1,846	2,067	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Orleans Territory,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	94	73	22	289	273	2	4,503	5,626	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Louisiana Territory,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	37	40	140	-	6	1,973	2,433	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Michigan Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	26	24	39	15	2	879	1,028	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

636,386

\*No return has ever been received.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																		
		Artillery Side Arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Rifles.	Fusces.	Muskets.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Ramrods, Steel.	Knapsacks.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	Espontoons.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1807		1,816	1,816			15,880	9,900	8,816	4,150	4,800	4,650	6,600	30,000	3,700	30,000	7,300		11	
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1807		2,504	2,479	561		47,631	43,646	46,701	45,286	24,709	4,850	557,148	74,855	44,168	109,696	42,358		76	
Vermont, . . . . .	1807		1,153	1,138			9,819	3,940	4,592	3,020	1,345	1,872		4,329	16,052	3,127		2		
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1807		121	120			4,302	3,377	3,828	4,088			21,311	3,642	9,701	4,158		3		
Connecticut, . . . . .	1807	612	1,409	1,562			14,768	14,746	16,119				326,204	14,573	37,460	14,749	801			
New York, . . . . .	1806		1,506	1,244	2,441		43,338	22,944	25,182	16,945	693		9,909		31,794	21,721				
New Jersey, . . . . .	1807	55	840	453	100	93	12,928	4,184	3,625	2,893		4	93	45	1,623	2,098	57	7	33	
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1807		1,359	1,300		9,841	14,553	6,933	1,161										201	
Delaware,* . . . . .					270		935	492	452	935	95				4,736	492				
Maryland, . . . . .	1807		147	73	2,238		11,266	10,630	10,127	9,609	50	932½	30	1,654	550	1,977	4,255		470	
Virginia, . . . . .	1807		486	282	6,580		23,738													
North Carolina, . . . . .	1807				3,838	4,389	1,312	1,312												
South Carolina, . . . . .	1807				2,221		1,798	373	790	383										
Georgia, . . . . .	1807		503	412			4,130	136	226			8,424		88,475	43,087	344	278	4		
Kentucky, . . . . .	1806				14,203		4,647	12		2,146		1,146		35,542	7,133	154				
Tennessee, . . . . .	1805		75	95			943	108	99			561		15,832	5,613					
Ohio, . . . . .	1806		70	77	4,926										236	117		2	1	
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1803	78	39	39	75		1,087	1,048	947	1,087				10,246	150	708	18			
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1806				460		460	1				99								
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1806				179															
Orleans Territory, . . . . .	1807																			
Louisiana Territory, . . . . .	1807				744		320													
Michigan Territory, . . . . .	1806																			

\* No return has ever been received.

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 15, 1808.

H. DEARBORN.

10th CONGRESS.]

No 81.

[1st Session.

## SITES FOR FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, ON THE 25TH OF MARCH, 1808.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

In proceeding to carry into execution the act for fortifying our ports and harbors, it is found that the sites most advantageous for their defence, and sometimes the only sites competent to that defence, are, in some cases, the property of minors, incapable of giving a valid consent to their alienation; in others, belong to persons who may refuse altogether to alienate, or demand a compensation far beyond the liberal justice allowable in such cases. From these causes the defence of our seaboard, so necessary to be pressed during the present season, will, in various parts, be defeated, unless a remedy can be applied. With a view to this, I submit the case to the consideration of Congress, who, estimating its importance, and reviewing the powers vested in them by the constitution, combined with the amendment providing that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, will decide on the course most proper to be pursued.

I am aware that, as the consent of the Legislature of the State, to the purchase of the site, may not, in some instances, have been previously obtained, exclusive legislation cannot be exercised therein by Congress, until that consent is given. But, in the mean time, it will be held under the same laws which protect the property of individuals, and other property of the United States, in the same State; and the Legislatures, at their next meetings, will have opportunities of doing what will be so evidently called for by the particular interest of their own State.

TH: JEFFERSON.

March 25, 1808.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 82.

[2d Session.

## FIFTY THOUSAND VOLUNTEERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 26, 1808.

Mr. NELSON, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the message of the President of the United States as relates to the Military and Naval Establishments, and to whom was referred, on the 17th instant, a resolution of the House of Representatives, in the words following, to wit: "Resolved, That means ought to be immediately taken for placing the country in a more complete state of defence," reported the following resolution, in part:

*Resolved*, That it is expedient immediately to raise, arm, and equip, fifty thousand volunteers, to serve for the term of two years.

Will it not be advisable to propose raising an army of fifty thousand volunteers, to be engaged for two years, and to serve, if required for actual service, any proportion of the term, not exceeding twelve months, within the term for which they shall be engaged; each non-commissioned officer, musician, and private, to receive ten dollars bounty, and each commissioned officer to receive one month's pay when appointed, and the whole to receive pay and rations when attending musters, as well as when in actual service. The non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, to be armed and equipped by the public, and to receive an uniform coat, vest, one pair of pantaloons, hat, two shirts, one pair of shoes and a blanket, and if called into actual service for any term over three months, to receive other articles of clothing in proportion to the term of service, not exceeding, in the whole, (including those first received) what are allowed to soldiers in the regular army for one year. The whole to be mustered and exercised in companies, four days within the first two months after being engaged, and six days in each succeeding year, and to meet and encamp in their respective States and territories, thirty days in each year; no man to be enlisted into any company whose place of residence shall not be within a reasonable distance from the company parade to which he shall belong. A suitable number of inspectors to be appointed by the President of the United States, to direct and inspect the exercise of the troops when encamped, and to give directions for the drilling and exercise of the companies, and to direct and receive all returns, muster and pay rolls, to be transmitted to an adjutant and inspector general, (to be appointed by the President of the United States) who shall give general instructions to all sub-inspectors for the drilling, exercise, discipline, and police, of the volunteers, when not in actual service. The officers to be appointed and commissioned by the President of the United States. The proposed corps to include as many of the volunteers who have offered their services under the act of 24th February, 1807, as shall engage in the volunteer army now proposed. The whole to consist of 44,000 infantry, 3,000 artillery, and 3,000 riflemen, to be organised into companies of one hundred each, including officers, regiments of 1,000, brigades of 5,000, and divisions of 10,000 each; to have the usual staff, including surgeons and mates; the surgeons and mates to attend the annual encampment, and actual service, and to receive pay only for their actual services, at the same rate as allowed to regimental surgeons and mates, in the other corps of the army.

5	Major Generals, pay per month,	-	-	-	-	\$166	\$830	
10	Brigadier Generals, "	-	-	-	-	104	1,040	
50	Colonels, "	-	-	-	-	75	3,750	
50	Lieutenant Colonels, "	-	-	-	-	60	3,000	
50	Majors, "	-	-	-	-	50	2,500	
500	Captains, "	-	-	-	-	40	20,000	
500	Lieutenants, "	-	-	-	-	30	15,000	
500	Ensigns, "	-	-	-	-	20	10,000	
50	Surgeons, "	-	-	-	-	45	2,250	
50	Surgeons' Mates, "	-	-	-	-	30	1,500	
								59,870
2,000	Sergeants, "	-	-	-	-	8	16,000	
2,000	Corporals, "	-	-	-	-	7	14,000	
1,000	Musicians, "	-	-	-	-	6	6,000	
43,500	Privates, "	-	-	-	-	5	217,500	
								253,500
						Pay per month	\$313,370	

2½	Months pay for the commissioned officers,	-	-	-	\$134,707 50
1½	do. non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates,	-	-	-	316,875
1½	do. Subsistence of the commissioned officers, at 20 cents per ration,	-	-	-	35,587 50
1½	do. do. non-commissioned officers, &c. at 15 cents per ration,	-	-	-	272,812 50
	Clothing for non-commissioned officers, &c. at 14 dollars each,	-	-	-	679,000
	Bounty for ditto do. 10 dollars each,	-	-	-	485,000
	Tents, and contingent expenses per year,	-	-	-	160,000
					\$2,083,982 50
	The first year's expense will be,	-	-	-	2,100,000
	The second year will be,	-	-	-	800,000
					\$2,900,000

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 83.

[2d SESSION.]

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 3, 1809.

Mr. MACON, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the message from the President of the United States as relates to revising and improving the militia system of the United States, made the following report:

That, having carefully examined the subject referred to them, are of opinion that it would not be proper, at this time, to make any alteration in the militia system of the United States.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 84.

[2d SESSION.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, JANUARY 6, 1809.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I now lay before Congress a statement of the works of defence which it has been thought necessary to provide, in the first instance, for the security of our seaport towns and harbors, and of the progress towards their completion. Their extent has been adapted to the scale of the appropriation, and to the circumstances of the several places.

The works undertaken at New York are calculated to annoy and endanger any naval force which shall enter the harbor, and still more one which should attempt to lie before the city. To prevent altogether the entrance of large vessels, a line of blocks across the harbor has been contemplated, and would, as is believed, with the auxiliary means already provided, render that city safe against naval enterprise. The expense as well as the importance of the work render it a subject proper for the special consideration of Congress.

At New Orleans two separate systems of defence are necessary, the one for the river, the other for the lake, which at present can give no aid to one another. The canal now leading from the lake, if continued into the river, would enable the armed vessels in both stations to unite, and to meet in conjunction an attack from either side. Half the aggregate force would then have the same effect as the whole: or the same force double the effect of what either can now have. It would also enable the vessels stationed in the lake, when attacked by superior force, to retire to a safer position in the river. The same considerations of expense and importance render this also a question for the special decision of Congress.

January 6, 1809.

TH. JEFFERSON.

## REPORT.

SIR:

I am now enabled, from the reports received from the respective engineers, to form a statement that will give you a general view of the works which have been erected or repaired, for the defence of our ports and harbors, and particularly of those which have been commenced the past season.

## TERRITORY OF ORLEANS.

*Fort St. Charles*, at the lower end of the city of New Orleans, and immediately on the bank of the river, is now in a good state of repair, with all its cannon mounted, with the necessary apparatus.

At the mouth of Bayou St. John, a strong new battery has been erected, which commands the passage from lake Pontchartrain to the city of New Orleans.

The battery of mason work, ordered to be erected at English Turn, is in such forwardness as to require but a few weeks for its completion.

A new fort of substantial mason work, has been commenced on the site of fort St. Philip at Plaquemines: the two main bastions are completed and the cannon mounted; and there is reason to believe that the fort will be completed in two or three months.

When the above works shall have been finished, it is believed that, with suitable garrisons and the number of gun boats destined for that quarter, they would afford such protection as had been contemplated.



## GEORGIA.

Unavoidable delays in procuring the necessary sites have very much impeded the progress of the fortifications in this State.

As soon as a site could be obtained, a strong battery of mason work was commenced a few miles below the town of Savannah, at Five Fathom Hole, where large vessels generally take in their cargoes. This work is in such forwardness that it will probably be completed in the course of a few weeks.

A regular enclosed fort of mason work was directed to be built on the site of old Fort Wayne, near the town of Savannah, with a battery in front; a battery and redoubt or strong block house on Point Petre, at the mouth of St. Mary's river; and a small battery near Sunbury. The site for the fort near the town being private property, except a small part owned by the corporation, has been obtained with great difficulty, through the friendly aid of Doctor Jones and other gentlemen. All the titles are not yet conveyed to the United States, but it is expected the business will soon be completed. The unavoidable delays occasioned by these circumstances have necessarily postponed the commencement of the fort to so late a period, that it will not probably be finished earlier than next summer. No sites have yet been obtained for the proposed works at Point Petre and Sunbury.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

The works in the harbor of Charleston are progressing with all possible despatch.

A new fort on the site of old Fort Mechanic, in the town of Charleston, was directed to be built of mason work. It is now completed and ready for the reception of a garrison: its situation is a commanding one.

The battery of Fort Johnston has been some time since finished, and is now completely mounted with heavy artillery.

*Fort Moultrie*, which is little inferior in magnitude and importance to any work in the United States, is now enclosed, and ready to receive a garrison.

A new fort of mason work on the site of old Fort Pinckney is commenced, and in a rapid state of progress.

A new brick arsenal in the town of Charleston has been built, and the public property moved into it.

It is believed, when the above works are completed and fully garrisoned, that they will, with the aid of the light and heavy artillery in the town, be adequate to such defence as has been contemplated.

A small battery for the immediate defence of Beaufort, S. C. with a magazine and barrack, had been ordered to be erected on the site of old Fort Lyttleton. But the land being the property of the State, and no cession having been made by her to the United States, nothing as yet has been done at this place.

A small battery, with a magazine and block house, was directed to be built at Georgetown, S. C. The works are progressing, and will soon be completed.

## NORTH CAROLINA.

A battery of mason work and barracks were ordered to be erected at Old Topsail Inlet, near Beaufort, N. C. Although no regular report of the progress made at this place has been received, it is believed that the works are nearly completed.

The works at Fort Johnston, on Cape Fear river, with the magazine and barracks, are finished.

## VIRGINIA.

*Fort Nelson* has been strengthened, and a large strong battery of mason work erected on the site of old Fort Norfolk, with brick barracks.

A site and materials for a strong battery at Hospital point, near Norfolk, have been procured, but too late for completing it the present season.

At Hoods, on James river, a strong battery of mason work has been erected, and a regular enclosed work, on an eminence commanding the battery, is in considerable forwardness, with barracks for two hundred men, nearly completed, including quarters for the officers.

## MARYLAND.

*Fort Washington*, on the Potomac, between Alexandria and Mount Vernon, is a new enclosed work, of stone and brick masonry, to which is attached a strong battery of like materials. The whole is so nearly completed as to be ready for the reception of the cannon and garrison, which have been ordered, and have arrived at the fort. A stone tower has also been commenced on an eminence that overlooks the fort, and is in considerable forwardness.

A circular battery of mason work at Windmill point, for the protection and defence of Annapolis, is nearly completed—the cannon are mounted. Another battery on the bank of the Severn, below the town, is also nearly finished.

*Fort McHenry*, near Baltimore, is in a good state of defence.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

The works at fort Mifflin have received considerable repair, and the cannon mounted. Some further repairs of carriages are said to be necessary, and have been directed.

## NEW YORK.

*Fort Jay*, on Governor's Island, with the whole of its buildings, was demolished in 1806, except the walled counterscarp, the gate, sallyport, magazine, and two barracks; all the rest was removed as rubbish, to give place for a work composed of durable materials. On the site of the old fort, a new one (fort Columbus) has been erected, of the same shape, on three of its sides, as the former, with the addition of fourteen feet on each side. On the north side a ravelin has been added, with two retired casemated flanks. The new fort, with two new brick barracks, is now nearly completed, and has fifty cannon mounted.

On a point of rocks, at the western extremity of Governor's Island, a circular castle, of durable mason work, to be connected with fort Columbus by a zig-zag covered defile, has been commenced and completed to the second floor, and is now ready to receive its first tier of guns, which are mounted, and ready to be placed. The exterior diameter of this castle is two hundred and ten feet, and, when finished, will mount one hundred pieces of heavy ordnance.

On Bedloe's Island, a mortar battery commanding all the anchoring ground between Red Hook and the quarantine, and affording a protection to Ellis's island, has been commenced, and the front wall carried up to the intended height. Part of the redoubt in the rear has been excavated, but, as the season is too far advanced to begin any new piece of mason work, nothing more than a continuance of excavation and a collection of materials will be attempted this winter. Two brick barracks, consisting of only the walls and roof, have been raised another story and rendered habitable.

On Ellis or Oyster Island, advantageously situated for defending the entrance of North River, an open barbette battery for heavy ordnance on one platform had been ordered to be erected, and is now nearly completed. The platform is ready for the guns and the carriages mostly finished. The barracks within the old fort on this island have, by some alterations, been made habitable.

In addition to the works already described, a battery in North river, two hundred feet without the permanent line of the city, off Hubert street, has been commenced.

The foundation is of stone, and has been carried up to high water mark, in which situation it will remain till spring. This battery is connected with Hubert street by a bridge 200 feet long and 30 wide.

Preparations have also been made for erecting a heavy battery on a stone foundation with a superstructure of solid mason work at the southwest point of the city. The point selected has a complete command from the whole

range of North river on one side to the complete width of East river on the other. Nothing more than the exterior blocks or counterguards for sinking the foundation can be effected this winter.

Connected with the plan of defence for the harbor and city of New York, the United States have purchased a house and yard in the rear of the custom house for the deposit and safe keeping of heavy artillery or travelling carriages, and all kinds of military stores, except powder. Since the purchase, a brick wall of nine feet in height has been erected round the yard. The United States have also obtained, at about two miles' distance from the city, a site containing nearly two acres, which has been enclosed with a wall nine feet high, and on which have been erected an arsenal, laboratory, and large powder magazine, from which the smaller deposits in the batteries can be supplied with ammunition.

At Sagg Harbor, on Long Island, a small battery, with a magazine and barracks, had been ordered to be erected, and an agent appointed and supplied with funds for procuring the necessary materials; but, from the want of a sufficient number of engineers, to superintend the numerous works contemplated for the defence of our ports and harbors, nothing more has been done than to survey this harbor, and select a proper site for the battery.

#### CONNECTICUT.

In this State directions were given, and agents appointed and furnished with funds, for the erection of a battery, magazine, and barracks, for the defence of the harbor of New Haven; for the repair, improvement, and completion of Fort Trumbull, near New London; and for the erection of a small battery for the defence of Stonington. But the same want of engineers which has delayed the prosecution of the works at Sagg Harbor and several other places, has also prevented any more being done in this State than merely to select the proper sites for the defence of New Haven and Stonington, and the examination of the state of the works at Fort Trumbull.

Heavy cannon, on travelling carriages, with apparatus and ammunition, have been ordered to these places.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

**NEWPORT HARBOR.**—At fort Wolcott and fort Adams some repairs have been made, and the works extended so as to admit some additional guns. The barracks at the latter have also been repaired.

On the main island, to the south of the town of Newport, a small battery has been erected, which commands the inner harbor between fort Wolcott and the town, and the channel between the two ports.

At Bristol, ten heavy cannon have been mounted on travelling carriages for the defence of that and other towns and harbors in its vicinity.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

At the entrance of the inner harbor of New Bedford, two miles below the town, a small enclosed work has been erected of stone, brick, and sod. It commands the entrance into the harbor for a mile and a half in a direct line, is completed, and has a brick magazine and wooden barracks.

The old work on Gurnet head, near Plymouth, has been repaired, and platforms in front. A barrack and brick magazine have been built.

**BOSTON HARBOR.**—In addition to fort Independence, the following works have been erected for the defence of this harbor.

*Fort Warren.*—On the summit of Governor's Island an enclosed star fort, of mason work, with a brick barrack and quarters, magazine and guard house, has been completed. Fort Warren battery, on the south point of the same island, is completed of stone, brick, and sod, with a brick guard house and magazine. It is contemplated to erect a block house in the rear of this battery.

*Westhead battery* is staked out and materials collected. On a point formed by Charles and Mystic rivers, a battery has been built of sod, on a stone foundation.

**SALEM.**—The fort and block house, with a magazine under it, on a point at the entrance of this harbor, have been repaired and a new barrack erected.

**MARBLEHEAD.**—The fort at this place, with the magazine, barracks, and block house, has been repaired.

**GLOUCESTER, CAPE ANN.**—The old fort of stone, in front of this place, with the block house and magazine, has been repaired.

**NEWBURYPORT.**—On the point of Plum Island, at the mouth of Merrimack river, a battery of wood, filled in with sand and surmounted with sod, has been erected. It contains a barrack and brick magazine, and was constructed of wood on account of the shifting sands.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**PORTSMOUTH HARBOR.**—*Fort Constitution*, on New Castle point, at the entrance of this harbor, is an enclosed work, built principally of stone masonry. It is now complete with the necessary buildings.

*Fort McClary*, a new strong work of masonry, has been erected on Kittery point, opposite fort Constitution. It is now finished with new barracks, magazine, and guard house.

#### DISTRICT OF MAINE.

**PORTLAND HARBOR.**—*Fort Preble*, a new enclosed work of stone and brick masonry, with a brick barrack, quarters, and magazine, is completed. This work is erected on Spring point, and commands the entrance of this harbor, through the main channel.

*Fort Scammel*, also a new work of similar materials, is erected on House island, opposite fort Preble, and commands the main and other channels. It is now completed with its block house and other buildings.

*Fort Sumner battery*, to the north of the town, has been repaired.

**KENNEBECK.**—At Shaw's point, on the west side and at the mouth of this river, a battery and brick magazine are completed, with a brick barrack ready for the accommodation of a small garrison.

**SHEEPSCUTT.**—On Davis's point, on the east side of this river, and about one mile below the town of Wiscasset, a strong battery, brick magazine, and a block house, are ready for immediate use.

**DAMARISCOTTA.**—On the southeastern angle of Narrow Island, in this river, and in the town of Boothbay, a battery and brick magazine are completed. A block house is begun, but not finished.

**ST. GEORGE'S RIVER.**—At Robinson's point, on the east side of this river, a small battery is begun, and materials provided for proceeding with the work as soon as the season will permit.

**PENOBSCOTT AND BAGGADUCE RIVER.**—Nothing more has been done on this river, than select a site and procure materials for a battery, which is on Perkins's point, on the north side of the river, opposite the northwest end of Noddles' Island.

**MACHIAS.**—A small battery has been erected at this place.

**PASSAMAQUODDY.**—A battery and block house have been erected, and a garrison placed in the works. Cannon have generally been mounted on the works now prepared for their reception, and will be ready for mounting on the others, as soon as they are in sufficient forwardness for the purpose.

Upwards of one hundred travelling carriages have been completed for heavy cannon; and a large proportion of them, with cannon and necessary apparatus, have been distributed in the various seaports.

The following sums have been advanced for the erection and repair of fortifications, and the construction of gun carriages, during the year 1808, viz:

For New Orleans, - - - - -	\$80,373
Georgia, North and South Carolina, - - - - -	204,289
Virginia and Maryland, - - - - -	111,432
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, - - - - -	5,000
New York, - - - - -	379,133
Connecticut and Rhode Island, - - - - -	11,000
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, - - - - -	223,475
	<u>\$1,014,702</u>

For completing the works already commenced, and for erecting such others as have been contemplated, or may be deemed expedient, it is believed that an additional appropriation, to the amount of four hundred and fifty thousand dollars, will be necessary, exclusive of the expense of a line of block chains, &c. across the harbor of New York. The chain and timber for these blocks have been already procured, at an expense of upwards of 40,000 dollars; but, by the latest calculation made by persons considered as competent for the purpose, it appears that, to complete this plan, as heretofore proposed, would require an expenditure of one million of dollars.

For affording facility to that part of the contemplated defence of New Orleans, which depends on gunboats, a canal, from the river near the city to Lake Pontchartrain, of sufficient width and depth to admit, at all times, a passage for the gunboats stationed in the river and lake, would be highly important.

And as a company has been formed for the purpose of opening a canal from the lake to the city, by the way of the Bayou St. John, and proceeded far towards its completion, it is believed, from information received from said company, that, with the aid of ———, the canal may be extended, so as to open the communication as proposed above.

It is therefore submitted for consideration, whether an appropriation should be made to enable the President of the United States to effect so important an object.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 85.

[2d SESSION.

### FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 9, 1809.

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 7th, 1809.

SIR:

In obedience to the resolution of the honorable Senate, of the 2d instant, requiring the Secretary of War to inquire and report to the Senate, whether it be expedient that one or more batteries or fortifications should be erected at or near Wilmington, at or near New Castle, at or near Port Penn, and at or near Lewis, in the State of Delaware, the Secretary begs leave to remark, that, from the general information obtained in relation to suitable sites for batteries, or other works, in the State of Delaware, it had been considered expedient to erect a battery of mason work, at or near the town of New Castle, and a similar one on the communication between the Delaware river and the town of Wilmington. The particular sites for these batteries were to have been designated by an engineer, and it was intended to have had the works erected in the course of the past year; but the principal engineer, under whose direction they were to have been constructed, not having a sufficient number of subordinate engineers to superintend the whole of the works contemplated within the district assigned him, was compelled to postpone the construction of those in Delaware, as well as others within his district. They will, however, be undoubtedly attended to in the course of the present year. The expense for these works was included in the general estimate; and it is presumed that no additional appropriation for them will be necessary. Whether it will be expedient to erect other works in the State of Delaware than those above mentioned, the information at present possessed by the Secretary of War will not enable him to decide.

All which is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,

The Hon. the PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

H. DEARBORN.

10th CONGRESS.]

No. 86.

[2d SESSION.

### THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 25, 1809.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I now lay before Congress a statement of the Militia of the United States, according to the latest returns received by the Department of War.

February 25, 1809.

TH: JEFFERSON.

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.												FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.															
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-Camp.	State Engineers.	Commissary Generals of Purchases.	Commissary Generals of Issues.	Brigade Majors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Physician Generals.	Apothecary Generals.	Deputy Adjutant Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster Gen'ls.	Wagonmaster Generals.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.
New Hampshire,	1808	3	6	.	1	6	.	.	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	37	74	37	37	.	37	36	37	36	36	37	
Massachusetts,	1808	11	24	1	1	19	.	.	24	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	24	100	218	128	123	.	37	85	80	85	82	75	74
Vermont,	1807	4	10	.	1	.	.	.	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30	60	31	31	.	31	31	31	29	26	27	
Rhode Island,	1808	1	4	1	1	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21	33	14	15	13	14	11	14	11	12	12	
Connecticut,	1808	4	8	.	1	.	.	.	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	43	82	43	41	42	40	36	42	36	35	35	
New York,	1807	7	40	1	1	4	.	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	140	283	136	127	121	119	78	124	.	100	95	95	
New Jersey,	1808	4	12	1	1	8	.	.	1	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	44	90	47	49	78	50	32	25	3	34	32		
Pennsylvania,	1808	16	31	.	.	32	.	.	31	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	156	317	144	145	148	140	64	105	100	86	70	70	
Delaware,	1808	1	3	1	1	6	.	.	3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	10	.	10	10		
Maryland,	1807	3	12	.	1	8	.	.	12	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	50	104	54	54	.	54	50	50	.	.	.		
Virginia,	1807	4	19	.	1	8	.	.	19	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	107	208	91	61	.	62	35	28	8	42	41		
North Carolina,	1808	6	13	.	1	16	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	67	132	49	26	30	24	12	18	.	23	16		
South Carolina,	1807	2	9	1	1	17	.	.	9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	46	92	34	28	70	23	1	11	.	5	3		
Georgia,	1808	4	8	1	1	8	.	.	8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	39	74	34	32	21	32	17	18	.	17	17		
Kentucky,	1806	6	12	1	1	2	.	.	8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	60	115	56	39	37	25	7	17	8	25	17		
Tennessee,	1805	2	6	.	1	3	.	.	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30	62	30	.	.	.	.	7	1	12	12		
Ohio,	1807	3	7	2	1	6	.	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	16	43	20	22	.	20	9	21	16	14	13		
District of Columbia,	1808	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	.	.	.	.	
Mississippi Territory,	1807	.	.	.	.	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	5	10	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Indiana Territory,	1806	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	5	7	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Orleans Territory,	1807	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	7	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Louisiana Territory,	1807	.	1	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	12	27	9	1	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Michigan Territory,	1806	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	12	4	3	3	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	
	1806	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	7	2	1	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARTILLERISTS.							CAVALRY.							GRENADIERS.						LIGHT INFANTRY.										
		Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Farriers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	
		New Hampshire, -	1808	23	23	23	92	-	49	-	576	33	66	30	125	70	-	-	1,673	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts, -	1808	60	60	61	242	-	111	-	2,519	60	125	64	254	86	-	-	2,238	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont, -	1807	8	16	8	29	-	18	-	209	30	60	30	118	34	-	-	1,076	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode Island, -	1808	2	2	1	8	4	7	8	58	5	5	9	5	22	-	-	198	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut, -	1808	17	18	18	62	62	38	74	446	33	66	30	123	60	-	-	1,150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York, -	1807	48	46	48	184	164	100	-	1,663	61	105	57	234	72	-	-	2,884	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey, -	1808	12	12	9	42	32	17	23	494	30	58	27	79	28	3	5	1,439	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania, -	1808	12	12	14	48	49	22	79	479	28	56	27	89	25	11	11	1,151	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware, -	1808	4	4	4	16	16	8	24	132	5	10	5	20	3	3	4	1,151	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maryland, -	1807	8	8	8	24	-	-	-	256	35	70	35	140	35	-	-	1,220	2	2	2	8	4	4	72	59	58	59	196	190	95	3,187	
Virginia, -	1807	4	4	4	13	-	6	-	202	16	28	14	52	2	-	-	175	17	17	17	68	68	30	17	17	17	68	68	30	644		
North Carolina, -	1808	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	14	49	80	44	81	13	1	2	588	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
South Carolina, -	1807	13	13	13	47	-	10	86	528	34	61	30	97	20	17	12	1,265	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Georgia, -	1808	6	6	5	16	-	6	-	178	17	33	12	39	6	-	-	1,202	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	15	36	-	15	626	
Kentucky, -	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	504	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Tennessee, -	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ohio, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	19	19	41	19	-	-	595	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
District of Columbia, -	1808	3	3	3	2	2	-	-	40	3	6	3	12	3	-	-	134	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mississippi Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92	3	6	3	9	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Indiana Territory, -	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	4	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	8	7	24	4	1	327	
Orleans Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	4	-	-	-	178	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Louisiana Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	12	5	21	1	-	-	178	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Michigan Territory, -	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	4	14	1	-	-	154	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

## RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.						Total number, including officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file.	ORDNANCE.											
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.		Musicians.	Rank and File.	Brass Twelve Pounders.	Brass Nine Pounders.	Brass Six Pounders.	Brass Four Pounders.	Brass Three Pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron Nine Pounders.	Iron Six Pounders.	Iron Four Pounders.	Iron Three Pounders.
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1808							299	298	298	1,126	-	710	18,956	24,896					23						
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1808							853	858	848	3,331	-	1,914	56,421	71,259	6				88		8	2			2
Vermont, . . . . .	1807							263	263	258	1,024	-	676	13,874	17,981					33						1
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1808							101	110	100	380	379	214	6,039	7,848					6						4
Connecticut, . . . . .	1808							329	320	314	1,279	1,243	883	14,164	20,917					9						4
New York, . . . . .	1807							1,146	1,128	1,065	4,578	-	2,332	75,232	92,554				19	13	13					3
New Jersey, . . . . .	1808							403	397	366	1,294	725	477	31,437	37,925					2	1					
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1808	65	75	58	174	75	82	2,821	1,322	1,253	1,189	2,377	2,048	1,286	83,882	104,248	2			15						
Delaware, . . . . .	1808	1	1	1	4	4	2	73	64	61	296	292	66	6,155	8,579								4	1		3
Maryland, . . . . .	1807							529	435	419	922	-	273	34,224	39,047					1		3				
Virginia, . . . . .	1807							959	907	786	3,335	-	721	57,298	65,676											
North Carolina, . . . . .	1808							686	688	725	2,167	1,921	1,050	42,089	51,117									1		
South Carolina, . . . . .	1807							393	387	331	1,295	-	298	24,041	29,604			6	10	9						
Georgia, . . . . .	1808							331	299	288	1,105	-	55	19,486	22,697									4		
Kentucky, . . . . .	1806							530	497	465	1,653	-	290	28,366	32,236											
Tennessee, . . . . .	1805							248	238	230	308	308	320	14,285	16,822											
Ohio, . . . . .	1807	21	20	19	78		20	938	182	184	180	574	290	12,383	15,324											1
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1808	2	2	2	8	4	2	107	9	12	3	23	1	2	1,502	2,245			2							
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1807							37	33	29	93	58	3	1,878	2,158											
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1806							31	33	30	76	-	-	1,846	2,067											
Orleans Territory, . . . . .	1807							94	73	22	289	273	2	4,503	5,626											
Louisiana Territory, . . . . .	1807							39	37	40	140	-	6	1,973	2,433											
Michigan Territory, . . . . .	1806							25	26	24	39	15	2	879	1,028											

Total militia of the United States, . . . . .

674,287

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																		
		Artillery Side Arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusces.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Knapsacks.	Ramrods, Steel.	Espositoons.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Flints.	Scabbards and Belts.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire,	1808	-	1,680	1,680	15,820	-	-	9,800	9,380	4,990	4,850	-	4,515	-	7	29,600	3,600	37,500	7,650	-
Massachusetts,	1808	-	2,470	2,435	50,302	837	-	45,843	49,209	25,955	47,360	-	2,934	595,117	77	92,279	47,215	114,699	44,797	-
Vermont,	1807	-	1,153	1,138	9,819	-	-	3,940	4,592	1,345	3,020	-	1,872	-	-	69,776	4,329	16,052	3,127	-
Rhode Island,	1808	-	174	182	4,630	-	-	3,508	3,920	155	4,284	-	-	5	-	-	4,177	9,166	3,776	-
Connecticut,	1808	-	3,024	2,752	13,825	-	-	15,106	16,427	10,574	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,931	38,597	-	-
New York,	1807	-	2,260	2,097	41,326	2,645	-	22,686	26,522	438	18,751	-	-	-	3	-	-	34,521	24,855	-
New Jersey,	1808	-	1,911	674	16,034	148	57	4,173	3,614	12	2,247	67	4	-	6	-	69	1,727	1,332	97
Pennsylvania,	1808	-	907	925	13,635	11,465	13,327	5,905	1,684	-	40,238	-	700	7	-	-	-	-	907	221
Delaware,	1808	-	126	127	241	-	124	1	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
Maryland,	1807	-	-	-	935	270	-	492	452	95	935	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,736	492
Virginia,	1807	-	147	73	11,266	2,238	-	10,630	10,127	50	9,609	-	932½	30	-	1,654	550	-	1,977	4,255
North Carolina,	1808	-	2,019	475	20,816	7,059	-	14	74	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	394
South Carolina,	1807	-	-	-	1,312	3,838	4,389	1,312	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia,	1808	-	386	294	5,000	1,348	-	5,000	5,200	-	5,000	-	66	-	8	955	-	286	-	-
Kentucky,	1806	-	-	-	4,130	14,203	-	136	226	-	-	-	8,424	-	-	88,475	-	43,087	-	-
Tennessee,	1805	-	75	95	4,647	12	-	12	-	-	2,146	-	1,146	-	-	35,542	2,483	7,133	154	-
Ohio,	1807	-	253	89	969	5,234	-	100	160	1	58	-	371½	1	-	12,068	235	4,447	166	-
District of Columbia,	1808	113	55	55	807	141	-	681	676	-	-	-	99	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Mississippi Territory,	1807	-	-	-	460	460	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	708	18	-
Indiana Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	179	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Orleans Territory,	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Louisiana Territory,	1807	-	-	-	320	744	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Michigan Territory,	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 23, 1809.

JOHN SMITH, C. C. Acting Secretary of War.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 87.

[1st SESSION.

## MODIFICATION OF THE LAWS RELATIVE TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JUNE 6, 1809.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 31, 1809.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th instant, requesting information on the following points:

"Is it expedient, in the present state of our foreign relations, and the threatening aspect upon our Western frontiers, to reduce the present military establishment?"

"If not, is it expedient to arrest the recruiting service; or, is it probable, from the progress that has heretofore been made in recruiting, that the number which may be enlisted before the next session of Congress, will be more than sufficient to fill up the vacancies which will probably arise from *different* casualties happening in the old and new regiments?"

"Is it expedient, at this time, to make any modifications of the laws relative to the military establishment?"

The enclosed statement contains the substance of the latest information which has been received from the Western frontiers.

This information encourages a belief that the precautions which have been taken will prevent the meditated attack on the post at Belle Vue, as well as discourage an execution of the hostile intentions of the Prophet and his allies. At the same time, it may be proper to observe, that this movement and hostile attitude of the savages, brings to view, and confirms, the correctness of the opinion of well informed men, and of the Legislature of the State of Kentucky, as expressed in certain resolutions adopted by that honorable body on the 29th of January, 1809, that the posts at St. Louis and Detroit ought to be permanently strengthened.

Should the honorable committee be of opinion that the state of our foreign relations, taken in connexion with the information herein contained, renders it inexpedient to reduce the military establishment at this time, and that the recruiting service may be suspended, a discretionary power to renew it being vested in the President, will be an effectual security against any vacancies which may arise from *different casualties*, before the next session of Congress.

In answer to the last interrogatory, experience has shown that improvements may be made in the military establishment. That branch of business, which falls, properly, within the quartermaster's department, requires a new arrangement. Should the committee be disposed to bestow their consideration on this subject, I shall be happy in an opportunity of attending on them, or giving information respecting it, in any manner which they may be pleased to point out.

I am, with respectful consideration, your most obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Honorable JOSEPH ANDERSON,  
Chairman of the Committee of the honorable Senate.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 88.

[1st SESSION.

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 6, 1809.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 2, 1809.

SIR:

In obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 27th of May, requesting the President of the United States to cause the Secretary of War to lay before the House an estimate of the sums necessary to complete the fortifications commenced or contemplated; and also the amount of any deficiency of former appropriations for this object, I have the honor to state that, of the \$450,000, appropriated by the act of February 10th, 1809, there are expended \$265,000, leaving a balance of \$185,000.

The difficulty of forming a correct opinion of the sums which will be required for each work, must be obvious, from the nature and extent of the business, and from the deficiency of all former calculations and estimates. From the best judgment which can be formed on the information and evidence in possession of this Department, the sum of \$750,000, in addition to the balance before mentioned, will be sufficient, certainly, to cover the expenditures of the present year, and most probably to complete the system of defence contemplated by Government.

For the States East of New York,	-	-	-	-	\$75,000
For the State of New York,	-	-	-	-	340,000
For the States South of New York, including New Orleans,	-	-	-	-	335,000
					<u>\$750,000</u>

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.



11th CONGRESS.]

No. 89.

[2d Session.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 21, 1809.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 19th, 1809.

SIR:

I have the honor herewith to transmit to you a report of the state of the fortifications for the defence of the ports and harbors of the United States,

And am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

*Report of Fortifications for the defence of the ports and harbors of the United States.*

## DISTRICT OF MAINE.

PASSAMAQUODDY.—A circular battery of six guns, mounted, covered by a block house, with barracks for fifty men.

MACHIAS.—A circular battery of four guns, mounted, covered by a block house, with barracks for forty men.

PENOBSCOT.—A small enclosed work of four guns, mounted.

ST. GEORGE'S RIVER.—A small enclosed work of three guns, mounted.

BOOTH BAY, on *Damariscotta*.—A battery with three guns, mounted, covered by a block house.

EDGECOMB, on *Sheepscoot*.—A battery with six guns, mounted, covered by a block house.

GEORGETOWN, mouth of *Kennebec*.—A small enclosed battery of six guns, mounted.

PORTLAND HARBOR.—*Fort Preble*, on Spring's point, at the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed star fort of masonry, with an elliptical battery in front, mounting fifteen guns, with brick barracks, for one company, officers included; a brick magazine. *Fort Scammel*, on the opposite side, three quarters of a mile distant; an enclosed semi-circular work, with two circular flanks of masonry, mounting eighteen guns, covered by a block house which will contain 40 men; a brick magazine. In the town of Portland, a battery of masonry, mounting five guns; also, a brick gun-house with four pieces mounted on travelling carriages.

## NEW HAMPSHIRE.

*Fort Constitution*, at the entrance of the harbor at the mouth of Piscataqua river, three miles below Portsmouth; an enclosed work of masonry, mounting thirty-seven guns, with brick barracks, for one hundred and fifty men including officers; also two brick magazines.

PORTSMOUTH HARBOR.—At Kittery Point, an enclosed elliptical battery of masonry, mounting ten guns, covered with a redoubt of earth, with barracks for one company, including officers; also, a brick magazine. In the town of Portsmouth, a brick gun-house, containing six guns on travelling carriages, with harness complete.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

NEWBURYPORT.—On the east point of Plum Island, at the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed battery of timber and earth, mounting five guns, with a brick magazine, and barracks of wood for twenty-five men.

CAPE ANN, *Gloucester*.—At the head of the harbor, a battery with seven guns, mounted, covered by a block house, which will contain twenty men.

SALEM.—*Fort Pickering*, on the west side of the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry and earth, mounting six guns, covered by a block-house, with barracks for thirty men, including officers and a magazine.

MARBLEHEAD.—*Fort Sewall*, at the west point of the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry and earth, mounting eight guns, covered by a block house, with barracks for forty men, including officers, and a magazine.

BOSTON HARBOR.—*Fort Warren*, on Governor's Island; a star fort, of masonry, with twelve guns mounted; a brick barrack for one company, including officers; also, a brick magazine and guard-house; on the south point and west head of the island, semicircular batteries of masonry, calculated for ten guns each, ten guns mounted in the west head. *Fort Independence*, on Castle Island, south side of the inner harbor; an enclosed pentagon of five bastions of masonry, calculated for fifty guns; thirty-nine mounted, with two batteries to contain twenty-five guns; brick barracks for four hundred men including officers; also, a large brick magazine, built in 1801.

AT CHARLESTOWN.—Near the Navy Yard a small circular battery of six guns, with a brick gun-house, containing — guns, on travelling carriages; also, a stone and brick magazine.

PLYMOUTH HARBOR.—At Garnet head, the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work, repaired with stone and earth, mounting five guns, with a brick magazine, and barracks for thirty men.

NEW BEDFORD.—At Eldridge's point, commanding the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry, mounting six guns, with a brick magazine, and barracks for forty men, including officers.

## RHODE ISLAND.

NEWPORT.—*Fort Adams*, on Brenton's point, entrance of the harbor; an enclosed indented work of masonry, calculated for twelve guns, six mounted, with a brick magazine, and barracks for one company, including officers. *Fort Wolcott*, on Goat Island, in the centre of the harbor; a star fort of stone, brick, and timber, mounting twelve guns, with flank batteries mounting eighteen guns; a brick magazine, and barracks for one company, including officers. On the Dumpling rocks, on the west side entrance of the harbor, a battery unfinished; on Rose Island, an enclosed work of four bastions of masonry, calculated for sixty guns, unfinished: all the works in this harbor were begun in the year 1798 and 1800. At Newport and Bristol, guns mounted on travelling carriages.

## CONNECTICUT.

STONINGTON.—A gun house of brick, to contain four pieces of cannon on travelling carriages.

NEW LONDON.—An enclosed work, of masonry and earth, calculated for twenty-five guns, twelve mounted; with a magazine, and barracks for forty men, including officers, called *Fort Trumbull*.

NEW HAVEN.—A small work for the defence of the harbor, mounting six guns, with barracks for forty men.

## NEW YORK.

NEW YORK HARBOR.—*Fort Columbus*, on Governor's Island; an enclosed pentagonal work, with four bastions of masonry, calculated for one hundred guns, fifty-five mounted, with brick barracks for two hundred and thirty men, including officers. A stone and brick magazine; a castle, or stone tower, of three tiers, on a projecting point of the island, calculated for fifty-two heavy guns, under a bomb-proof cover, and forty-eight on the terrace; the lower tier finished, calculated for twenty-six guns, twelve mounted; guns may be placed in the second tier in case of necessity. The bomb-proof will serve as barracks for two or three hundred men.

On Bedloe's Island, on the opposite side of the harbor; an enclosed indented work of masonry, calculated for forty guns, unfinished.

On Ellis's Island, opposite Fort Columbus; an enclosed battery of masonry, calculated for twenty guns, eight mounted, with barracks for one company, including officers. At the West point of the city, near the old battery, a circular battery, calculated for thirty guns, has been commenced.

On Hudson river, at the termination of Hubert street, a battery of masonry, calculated for sixteen guns, finished. In the city of New York, an arsenal and store house of brick, with twenty-four guns, mounted on travelling carriages. Three miles above the city of New York, an arsenal, magazine, and laboratory, all of brick.

By the report received, it appears that seventy-one guns are actually mounted; one hundred and fifty may be actually brought into action on an emergency; and that the works for the defence of the city of New York are calculated for three hundred guns, and ten mortars, exclusive of those mounted on travelling carriages, and of the works on Staten Island, erected by the State of New York, calculated for eighty guns.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

DELAWARE RIVER.—*Fort Mifflin*, on Delaware river, seven miles below Philadelphia; an enclosed work of masonry, defended by bastions, calculated for sixty guns, twenty-nine mounted; a water battery of eight guns mounted, with a brick magazine, and barracks for one hundred men, including officers.

## DELAWARE.

WILMINGTON.—An arsenal of 96 by 26 feet, one and a half stories high; intended for cannon on travelling carriages, with their equipments.

NEW CASTLE.—The same as Wilmington.

## MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE.—*Fort McHenry*, at the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed pentagon, with five bastions of masonry, calculated for forty guns, ten mounted; a water battery, of ten guns, mounted; a brick magazine; gun house, and barracks for two companies, including officers.

ANNAPOLIS.—*Fort Madison*, an enclosed work of masonry, comprehending a semi-elliptical face, with circular flanks, calculated for thirteen guns; with a brick magazine, and barracks for one company, including officers.

At Windmill point a circular battery of masonry, calculated for eleven guns, eight mounted. In the rear of the work quarters for two companies.

POTOMAC RIVER.—*Fort Washington*, an enclosed work of masonry, comprehending a semi-elliptical face, with circular flanks on the side next to the Potomac, mounting thirteen guns, commanded by a tower of masonry, calculated to mount six guns; with a brick magazine, and barracks for one hundred and twenty men, including officers.

## VIRGINIA.

NORFOLK HARBOR.—*Fort Nelson*, on the west side of the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work of brick and earth, defended by half bastions, calculated for forty guns, thirty-three mounted; with a brick magazine, and barracks for two companies, including officers.

*Fort Norfolk*, on the opposite side; an enclosed work of masonry, calculated for thirty guns, ten mounted; with a brick magazine, and barracks for two companies, including officers.

## NORTH CAROLINA.

WILMINGTON.—*Fort Johnston*, on Cape Fear river, — miles below Wilmington; an enclosed work and battery, calculated for twelve guns, four mounted; and barracks for forty men, unfinished.

BEAUFORT.—A small enclosed work, with five guns, mounted; and barracks for fifty men.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

CHARLESTON HARBOR.—*Fort Johnston*, an enclosed work defended by bastions and batteries of masonry, calculated for forty guns, twenty-six mounted; with a brick magazine, and barracks for two companies.

*Fort Moultrie*, near the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work defended by bastions and batteries of masonry, calculated for thirty guns, seven mounted; with a brick magazine, and barracks for two companies.

*Fort Pinckney*, an enclosed work of masonry for two tier of guns, nearly completed.

*Fort Mchanie*, in the town of Charleston; an enclosed work, and battery of masonry, with barracks; an arsenal for guns on travelling carriages.

BEAUFORT.—An enclosed work, and battery, unfinished.

## GEORGIA.

SAVANNAH.—At Five Fathom Hole, three miles below the town; a battery of masonry, calculated for eight guns. Works have not been commenced in the town of Savannah, or at St. Mary's, the title to the lands selected for the sites at those places not having been obtained.

## MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

NEW ORLEANS.—*Fort St. Philip*, at Plaquemine, near the mouth of the river; an enclosed work of masonry and wood, calculated for twenty guns; with a magazine, and barracks for one company.

English Turn, an enclosed work with two bastions, and a battery of masonry for nine guns; with a magazine, and barracks for one company, nearly finished.

*Fort St. Charles*, in the city of New Orleans; an enclosed redoubt of five sides, of masonry and earth, mounting nineteen guns; a magazine, and barracks for thirty men.

At the Bayou St. John, a strong battery of six guns, which commands the passage of Lake Pontchartrain; with barracks for thirty men.

NOTE.—The foregoing report was referred to a select committee, to whom the Secretary of War made the following communication:

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 5, 1810.

Sir:

Conformably to the request contained in your letter of the 26th of January, I have the honor, herewith, to transmit to you the enclosed statement of the Accountant of this Department, exhibiting "the sums which have been expended out of the appropriations for fortifications, by the acts of February 10, and of June 14, 1809, and the particular sums expended on each fortification." It is not practicable to ascertain, with precision, the particular sum expended on each work respectively, as materials have, in some instances, been purchased by the agents and applied to different works in the same harbor, and, in some instances, to works not considered appurtenant to the port or place at which the disbursements have been charged.

The fortifications embraced in the report made to Congress at the present session, with the addition of those at Georgetown, S. C. (of which the return had not been received, but which are now reported as completed) and of those at Wilmington, N. C. not completed, comprehend the principal works projected by the former Secretary of War. They are considered permanent works, which are to be kept up.

To these should be added West Point, on Hudson river, and additional works on the island of Rhode Island:

During the revolutionary war, the naturally strong post of West Point formed the point nearest to the ocean, which connected the Eastern and Southern States. The relation of this post to the city of New York, with its importance to the continent as a barrier station, in case a hostile fleet should be able to pass New York, render it highly expedient that the present works should be repaired, or that others, on an improved plan, should be constructed.

Rhode Island, from its insular and peculiarly exposed situation, offering to an invading fleet advantages not combined in any other port, requires additional means of defence.

The extensive fortifications projected, and in part constructed, by the State of New York, at the entrance of the harbor of New York, when ceded to the United States, will likewise be considered permanent works, and require a further appropriation.

Other fortifications, on a smaller scale, have been projected on the western frontier, and in several of the States. A want of satisfactory title to the ground which had been selected has occasioned delay in some instances. In others, they have not been commenced, for other reasons. A part of them are, at this time, in execution.

The sum already appropriated by law being deemed sufficient to complete the fortifications which have been projected, no further appropriation on account of fortifications has been suggested in the estimate of this Department for the year 1810.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Honorable JOHN CLOPTON.

*Statement of the sums expended out of the appropriations for Fortifications, per acts of the 10th February, and 14th June, 1809, showing the particular Fortifications for which the expenditures have accrued, and the sums expended on each, respectively.*

Castine, - Maine, - - - - -	\$8,000 00
Thomastown, - Do. - - - - -	2,085 90
Damariscotta river, Do. - - - - -	2,029 71
Machias, - Do. - - - - -	3,399 80
Georgetown, - Do. - - - - -	2,193 28
Portland, - Do. - - - - -	11,597 20
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, - - - - -	10,714 12
Salem, Massachusetts, - - - - -	11,729 37
Boston, - Do. - - - - -	24,173 59
New Bedford, Do. - - - - -	1,119 57
Newburyport, Do. - - - - -	962 66
Newport, Rhode Island, - - - - -	789 12
New Haven, Connecticut, - - - - -	6,295 96
New London, Do. - - - - -	9,837 29
New York, - - - - -	225,609 09
New Castle and Wilmington, Delaware, - - - - -	13,119 71
Fort McHenry, Baltimore, - - - - -	100 00
Annapolis, Maryland, - - - - -	18,371 12
Fort Washington, Potomac river, - - - - -	9,781 15
Fort Powhattan, James River, - - - - -	10,000 00
Norfolk, Virginia, - - - - -	36,800 00
Wilmington, North Carolina, - - - - -	1,253 20
Beaufort, Do. - - - - -	8,863 82
Highwassee, Tennessee, - - - - -	1,000 00
South Carolina, - - - - -	101,000 00
Savannah, Georgia, - - - - -	26,936 74
Fort Hawkins, Do. - - - - -	64 09
Fort Madison, Mississippi, - - - - -	332 02
New Orleans, - - - - -	91,769 17
	\$639,954 68
Amount appropriated per act of 10th February, - - - - -	\$450,000 00
Do. per act of 14th June, 1809, - - - - -	750,000 00
	\$1,200,000 00
Expended, - - - - -	639,954 68
	\$560,045 32
Balance of appropriations unexpended, - - - - -	

[11th CONGRESS.]

No. 90.

[2d SESSION.]

## 20,000 VOLUNTEERS AND A DETACHMENT OF 100,000 MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, JANUARY 3, 1810.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

The act authorizing a detachment of one hundred thousand men from the militia, will expire on the 30th of March next. Its early revival is recommended, in order that timely steps may be taken for arrangements, such as the act contemplated.

Without interfering with the modifications rendered necessary by the defects, or the inefficacy, of the laws restrictive of commerce and navigation, or with the policy of disallowing to foreign armed vessels the use of our waters, it falls within my duty to recommend, also, that, in addition to the precautionary measure authorized by that act, and to the regular troops, for completing the legal establishment of which enlistments are renewed, every necessary provision may be made for a volunteer force of twenty thousand men, to be enlisted for a short period, and held in a state of organization and readiness for actual service, at the shortest warning.

I submit to the consideration of Congress, moreover, the expediency of such a classification and organization of the militia, as will best ensure prompt and successive aids, from that source, adequate to emergencies which may call for them.

It will rest with them, also, to determine how far further provision may be expedient, for putting into actual service, if necessary, any part of the naval armament not now employed.

At a period presenting features in the conduct of foreign Powers towards the United States, which impose on them the necessity of precautionary measures involving expense, it is a happy consideration, that such is the solid state of the public credit, that reliance may be justly placed on any legal provision that may be made for resorting to it, in a convenient form, and to an adequate amount.

JAMES MADISON.

January 3, 1810.

[11th CONGRESS.]

No. 91.

[2d SESSION.]

## OFFICERS AND CADETS OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 8, 1810.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 5, 1810.

SIR:

In obedience to a resolution of the Senate, of the 4th instant, I have the honor to transmit, herewith, a return of the Corps of Engineers and Cadets belonging to the Military Academy,

And am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

*Return of the Corps of Engineers and Cadets belonging to the Military Academy.*

One Colonel,  
One Lieutenant Colonel,  
Two Majors,  
Four Captains,  
Four First Lieutenants,  
Four Second Lieutenants,

One Professor of French,  
One Professor of Drawing,  
Four Cadets of Engineers,  
Forty-three Cadets of Artillery,  
One Artificer,  
Eighteen Privates.—Total, 84.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 5, 1810.

W. EUSTIS.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 92.

[2d SESSION.]

## MILITARY FORCE AND ITS DISPOSITION IN 1810.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 1, 1810.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 30, 1810.*

SIR:

In obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 22d inst. I have the honor to transmit you the following returns, marked A, B, and C.

A. Exhibits a general return of the troops of the United States, composing the military peace establishment and the additional military force, specifying the particular force of each regiment and corps, taken from the latest returns received by the adjutant and inspector of the army, to the 28th of November, 1809; to which is subjoined the present disposition of the general and field officers.

B. A return of the regular forces allotted for the defence of New Orleans, comprehending those of the military peace establishment on that station, and the additional military force ordered there on the 2d December, 1808.

C. The disposition and effective strength of the additional military force ordered for the defence of New Orleans, taken from the latest reports received at the office of the adjutant and inspector of the army; to which is subjoined a list of resignations, dismissals, and deaths, of officers of the army, since the 1st of January, 1809.

The additional force ordered for the defence of New Orleans, was detached from the several corps as they had been recruited, and arrived at that place between the tenth of March and 20th of April, 1809. Leaving a detachment in the city of New Orleans, this army moved and encamped at Terre au Bœuf, on the Mississippi, fifteen miles below New Orleans, on the eighth of June, where they remained until the month of September. In September they embarked for Natchez, and in the month of October encamped near Washington, six miles in the rear of Natchez, at which place they huted for the winter.

It must have been expected, that the sickness and mortality incident to new troops in the summer and autumnal months, would be aggravated by their removal to a more southern climate. The whole of this detachment has been affected with disease; and the number of deaths will be found eventually to exceed those stated in the returns.

Since their removal to their present station, the latest advices state that they are convalescent.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

*A General Return of the Troops of the United States, composing the "Military Peace Establishment," "specifying the particular force of each Regiment and Corps," taken from the latest returns received at this Office, the 28th of November, 1809; to which is subjoined the present disposition of the General and Field Officers, the 29th January, 1810.*

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.	GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS.					FIELD AND COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.					SUBORDINATE STAFF OFFICERS.							CADETS, AND NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF OFFICERS.				NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, ARTIFICERS, AND PRIVATES.					Total Cadets, non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, Artificers, and Privates.	Aggregate, exclusive of the Aid-de-camp, Adjutant and Inspector, Adjutants, Dist. Paymasters, Assist. Dist. Paymasters, and Assist. Military Agents, who are included as officers in the line.							
	Brigadier Generals.	Adjutant and Inspector.	Paymaster.	Aid-de-camp.	Military Agents.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	District Paymasters.	Assist. Dist. Paymasters.	Assist. Military Agents.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Teacher of French Language.	Teacher of Mathematics.	Teacher of Drawing.	Cadets of Engineers.	Cadets of Artillerists.	Sergeant Majors.	Teachers of Music.	Sergeants.			Corporals.	Musicians.	Artificers.	Privates.			
General and subordinate staff officers, Corps of engineers, . . . . .	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	10	2	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
Regiment of artillerists, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	17	24	43	43		
First regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	4	19	19	20	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	-	-	-	73	75	74	131	1,026	1,421	1,485	491		
Second regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	10	8	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	26	26	22	-	381	456	491	491			
Recruits not attached to regiments, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	10	9	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	32	28	26	-	553	442	680	32			
Total "Military Peace Establishment,"	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	8	43	40	14	3	5	1	10	2	29	1	1	1	4	42	2	2	133	131	124	132	2,005	2,575	2,765	2,765			

*Present disposition of the General and Field Officers of the Peace Establishment.*

Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Washington, Mississippi Territory.  
 Colonel Jonathan Williams, Engineers, New York.  
 Lieutenant Colonel Jared Mansfield, Engineers, Cincinnati.  
 Major Alexander Macomb, Engineers, Charleston, South Carolina.  
 Major Joseph G. Swift, Engineers, North Carolina.  
 Colonel Henry Burbeck, Artillerists, City of Washington.  
 Lieutenant Colonel Constant Freeman, Artillerists, Natchitoches.  
 Major Moses Porter, Artillerists, Boston.  
 Major William Mac Rea, Artillerists, Fort St. Philip.

Major A. Y. Nicoll, Adjutant and Inspector, Artillerists, City of Washington.  
 Major Amos Stoddard, do. New York.  
 Colonel Jacob Kingsbury, 1st Infantry, Detroit.  
 Lieutenant Daniel Bissell, 1st Infantry, Belle Fontaine.  
 Major Zebulon Pike, 1st Infantry, invalid, on furlough.  
 Colonel Thomas H. Cushing, 2d Infantry, Columbian Spring, Mississippi Territory.  
 Lieutenant Colonel Richard Sparks, 2d Infantry, Fort Stoddert.  
 Major John Bowyer, 2d Infantry, Columbian Spring.

INSPECTOR'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON CITY, January 29, 1810.

A. Y. NICOLL,  
 Major Artillerists, and Adjutant and Inspector of the Army.

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.	GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS.				FIELD AND COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.									SUBALTERN STAFF OFFICERS.					CADETS AND NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF OFFICERS.				NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, ARTIFICERS, AND PRIVATES.							Total Cadets and Non-commissioned Officers, Saddlers, Farriers, Artificers, and Privates.	Aggregate, exclusive of the Brigade Inspectors, Brigade Quartermasters, Aids-de-Camp, Adjutants, Regimental Pay and Quartermasters, who are included as officers in the line.				
	Brigadier Generals.	Brigade Inspectors.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Aid-de Camp.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Regimental Paymasters.	Regimental Quartermasters.	Hospital Surgeons.	Hospital Surgeons' Mates.	Regimental Surgeons.	Regimental Surgeons' Mates.	Cadets.	Ridingmasters.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Principal Musicians.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Farriers.			Artificers.	Privates.		
General and subaltern Staff Officers, . . . . .	2	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Regiment of light dragoons, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6	6	8	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	24	27	8	-	-	-	-	360	423	451	
Regiment of light artillery, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	9	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	22	13	-	-	-	413	506	533		
Third regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	1	1	10	9	8	8	8	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	2	-	31	28	6	-	-	-	379	448	487		
Fourth regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	7	7	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	30	20	-	-	-	453	535	570		
Fifth regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	1	1	10	8	8	-	7	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	35	32	8	-	-	-	522	600	637		
Sixth regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	9	8	-	7	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	2	35	32	13	-	-	-	428	512	548			
Seventh regiment of infantry, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	10	8	-	7	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	19	21	8	-	-	-	275	325	362		
Regiment of riflemen, . . . . .	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	8	9	-	5	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	28	13	-	-	-	491	564	597		
Total "Additional Military Force," . . . . .	2	2	2	1	6	7	7	61	66	68	8	43	5	2	5	1	1	7	4	-	-	6	6	5	236	220	89	-	1	29	3,321	3,913	4,189		

*Present disposition of the General and Field Officers of the additional Military Force.*

Brigadier General Wade Hampton relieved Brigadier General Wilkinson in the command of the troops in the Territories of Orleans and Mississippi, the 18th December, 1809, Brigadier General Wilkinson being ordered to repair to the seat of Government.

Brigadier General Gansevoort, Albany, New York.

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Covington, light dragoons, Washington, Mississippi Territory.

Major Electus Backus, do. do.

Major John Saunders, light artillery, Norfolk, Virginia.

Colonel Edward Pasteur, 3d infantry, Fort Powhatan, James river, Virginia.

Lieutenant Colonel John Smith, do. Charleston harbor, South Carolina.

Major H. V. Milton, do. Washington, Mississippi Territory.

Colonel John P. Boyd, 4th do. Boston harbor.

Lieut. Colonel John Whiting do. inspecting the armory at Springfield, Massachusetts.

Major James Miller, 4th infantry, Boston.

Lieut. Col. Wm. D. Beall, 5th do. Washington, Mississippi Territory, now on furlough at the city of Washington.

Colonel Jonas Simonds, 6th do. Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Lieut. Col. Joseph Constant, do. do.

Major Zebulon M. Pike, do. New Orleans.

Colonel William Russell, 7th do. Washington, Mississippi Territory.

Lieut. Col. Robert Purdy, do. Highwassee, Tennessee.

Major Elijah Strong, do. Washington, Mississippi Territory.

Colonel Alexander Smith, regiment of riflemen, do. do.

Lieutenant Colonel William Duane, do. Philadelphia.

Major John Fuller, do. Washington, Mississippi Territory.

INSPECTOR'S OFFICE, *Washington City, January 29, 1810.*

A. Y. NICOLL,  
*Major Artillerists, and Adjutant and Inspector of the Army.*







## C—Continued.

*Resignations of Officers since 1st January, 1809.*

NAMES.	RANK.	REGIMENT.	DATE OF RESIGNATION.
William A. Murray,	Captain,	Artillerists,	October 1, 1809.
Joseph Kimball,	1st Lieutenant,	Do.	August 1, "
George Peter,	Captain,	Light Artillery,	June 11, "
Joseph Chandler,	Do.	Do.	Sept. 1, "
Daniel Gano,	Do.	Do.	April 20, "
Samuel Watson,	1st Lieutenant,	Do.	Sept. 11, "
Samuel H. Holley,	2d do.	Do.	January 1, 1810.
Alexander F. Rose,	Captain,	Light Dragoons,	Nov. 10, 1809.
Clement Biddle,	Do.	Do.	Sept. 30, "
Isaac A. Coles,	Do.	Do.	January 18, 1810.
John M. Barclay,	1st Lieutenant,	Do.	Sept. 1, 1809.
George Nichols,	2d do.	Do.	July 4, "
Jonas Munroe,	Do.	Do.	Sept. 15, "
Ferdinand Ludlow,	Do.	Do.	Decem. 15, "
John Read,	Do.	1st Infantry,	January 31, "
John Brahan,	Captain,	2d Infantry,	Do. 1, 1810.
Benjamin S. Smoot,	1st Lieutenant,	Do.	April 1, 1809.
John Hackett,	Do.	Do.	January 31, "
Abner Pasteur,	Captain,	3d Infantry,	Do. 1, 1810.
Charles C. McKenzie,	2d Lieutenant,	Do.	October 15, 1809.
Nicoll Fosdic,	1st do.	4th Infantry,	Decem. 1, "
Samuel Haines,	Do.	Do.	June 15, "
Lewis Harrington,	2d do.	Do.	October 15, "
Timothy Gerrish,	Ensign,	Do.	Sept. 1, "
Alexander Parker,	Colonel,	5th Infantry,	Decem. 31, "
Tully Robinson,	Major,	Do.	May 9, "
Roger A. Jones,	1st Lieutenant,	Do.	Sept. 1, "
James Fonerdon,	Do.	Do.	April 16, "
Mordecai Griffith,	Do.	Do.	July 10, "
Jeremiah Yancy,	Ensign,	Do.	October 20, "
Ebenezer Cross,	Captain,	6th Infantry,	June 10, "
Thomas Davis,	Do.	Do.	January 1, 1810.
William Cock,	Do.	Do.	Decem. 31, 1809.
William Pennell,	Do.	Do.	Sept. 1, "
Abel Morse,	2d Lieutenant,	Do.	Nov. 10, "
John Gaillard,	Do.	Do.	Do. 11, "
William Gamble,	Ensign,	Do.	April 30, "
Asa Grimes,	Do.	Do.	May 31, "
Edward Hord,	Captain,	7th Infantry,	January 1, 1810.
James Desha,	Do.	Do.	Decem. 1, 1809.
Duff Green,	2d Lieutenant,	Do.	October 6, "
Alexander Smith,	Do.	Do.	Nov. 1, "
John Hughes,	Ensign,	Do.	May 2, "
William S. Allen,	Do.	Do.	October 20, "
Horace S. White,	2d Lieutenant,	Riflemen,	July 1, "
Joseph S. Pepper,	Ensign,	Do.	Unknown.
Angus Langham,	Do.	Do.	April 15, "
John Logan,	Do.	Do.	October, 1, "
Edmund Foster,	Do.	Do.	July 1, "
Enos Lewis,	Surgeon's mate,	Do.	Sept. 1, "
Thomas H. Holland,	Do.	Peace Establishment,	Do. 1, "

*Dismissal of Officers, by sentence of General Courts Martial, since 1st January, 1809.*

NAMES.	RANK.	REGIMENT.	DATE OF DISMISSAL.
Robert McDougal,	1st Lieutenant,	3d Infantry,	August 7, 1809.
Isaiah Doane,	Captain,	4th Infantry,	June 12, "
David Byers,	Do.	Do.	Oct. 31, "
Alden G. Cushman,	1st Lieutenant,	Do.	July 3, "
Alexander S. Walker,	Captain,	Riflemen,	January 1, 1810.
Matthew Cannan,	2d Lieutenant,	Do.	Do. 1, "

## C—Continued.

*Deaths of Officers since 1st January, 1809.*

NAMES.	RANK.	REGIMENT.	DATE OF DECEASE.	AT WHAT PLACE.
Alpheus Roberts, . . . .	2d Lieutenant, . . . .	Light Artillery, . . . .	August 27, 1809, . . . .	New Orleans.
James I. Bowie, . . . .	1st Lieutenant, . . . .	Light Dragoons, . . . .	May 27, " . . . .	Do.
Milton Haxton, . . . .	Cornet, . . . .	Do. . . .	Dec. 29, " . . . .	Carlisle, Penn.
William Lithgow, . . . .	Ensign, . . . .	1st Infantry, . . . .	June 19, " . . . .	New Orleans.
Francis Johnson, . . . .	Captain, . . . .	2d Infantry, . . . .	Feb. 17, " . . . .	Columbian
John C. Carter, . . . .	2d Lieutenant, . . . .	Do. . . .	April 2, " . . . .	[Spring-
Edward Mason, . . . .	Do. . . .	3d Infantry, . . . .	June 19, " . . . .	New Orleans.
Robert Watson, . . . .	Ensign, . . . .	Do. . . .	Unknown. . . .	Point Coupée.
John T. Bentley, . . . .	Captain, . . . .	6th Infantry, . . . .	Oct. 20, 1809, . . . .	New Orleans.
James Chambers, . . . .	1st Lieutenant, . . . .	Do. . . .	Oct. 10, " . . . .	New York.
Lewis P. Ducros, . . . .	Ensign, . . . .	7th Infantry, . . . .	June 20, " . . . .	New Orleans.
David Findley, . . . .	Captain, . . . .	Riflemen, . . . .	July 1, " . . . .	Fort Adams,
George Morrison, . . . .	1st Lieutenant, . . . .	Do. . . .	May 21, " . . . .	[M. T.
William D. Jones, . . . .	Ensign, . . . .	Do. . . .	August 22, " . . . .	New Orleans.
Samuel McKee, . . . .	Surgeon's mate, . . . .	Peace Establishment, . . . .	Nov. 5, " . . . .	Vincennes.
John Biglow, . . . .	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Unknown. . . .	

INSPECTOR'S OFFICE, *Washington City, January 29, 1810.*A. Y. NICOLL,  
*Major Artillerists and Adjutant and Inspector of the Army.*

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 93.

[2d SESSION.

## ARMS SOLD TO THE STATES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 20, 1810.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 17, 1810.*

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit to Congress an account of sales of public arms, as authorized by the act of the 2d of April, 1808, entitled "An act authorizing the sale of public arms,"

And have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the United States.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ACCOUNTANT'S OFFICE, *February 16, 1810.**Account of sales of public arms sold to individual States, as authorized by the act of the 2d of April, 1808, entitled "An act authorizing the sale of public arms," as far as the same are entered on the books of this office.*

Sold to the State of Georgia, and charged to her account, on the books of this office, 31st May, 1808, 4,000 stands, at ten dollars, . . . .	\$40,000
Sold to the State of Maryland, the money for which has been paid into the treasury of the United States, 24th May, 1809, 4,000 stands, at ten dollars, . . . .	40,000
	<u>\$80,000</u>

WM. SIMMONS.

NOTE. There has also been sold, and charged to the account of the State of Georgia, on the books of this office, the following articles, viz:

160 arm chests and expenses packing, . . . .	\$283 70
4,000 cartouch boxes and expenses packing, . . . .	6,049 00
	<u>\$6,332 70</u>

W. S.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 94.

[2d SESSION.

## ARMORY AND ARSENAL AT SPRINGFIELD.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 28TH OF FEBRUARY, 1810.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 27, 1810.*

In obedience to a resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives, of the 25th January, the Secretary of War has the honor to report:

That the public armory and arsenal, at Springfield, in the State of Massachusetts, have been recently inspected, by an officer selected for that duty, who was directed to make strict and particular examination into the quality of the muskets manufactured at that place.

From the report of this officer, on whose judgment and fidelity reliance is placed, it appears that, in the early stages of that manufactory, muskets of an inferior quality were made; that improvements have been gradually making; and that those manufactured within the last year are of superior quality.

From the statement made by this officer, and from an inspection made by himself, in the summer past, the Secretary of War is of opinion, that the muskets manufactured at this time are of good quality, and that the public works at Springfield are well conducted.

All which is respectfully submitted.

W. EUSTIS.

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 95.

[2d SESSION.]

### THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, MARCH 6, 1810.

Mr. SMITH, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the message of the President as relates to an effectual organization of the militia of the United States, reported:

That, in considering the subject submitted to them, impediments of various and insuperable kinds presented themselves to view. The constitution of the United States gives to Congress only a qualified agency on the subject of the militia, and authorizes them only "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." As, under this provision, no authority is delegated to Congress to regulate fines for non-attendance, nor to fix the days for training, the only efficient means seem to be wanting to give force and skill to this establishment. The act of 1792 already provides for organizing and disciplining the militia; and a subsequent act makes provision for arming them. All, therefore, within the power of Congress, seems to have been already done, unless it should be deemed expedient to make a new organization, by a classification which shall constitute a select and a reserve militia.

The prejudices against such a mode of organization in many parts of the Union, and the difficulties to be surmounted, at a moment like the present, have deterred the committee from submitting such a project.

If the States are anxious for an effective militia, to them belong the power, and to them too belong the means of rendering the militia truly our bulwark in war, and our safeguard in peace; and as the committee are willing to hope that the States will not be unmindful of the great duty of providing for the national safety by a well ordered and effective militia, and as the committee are unwilling to derive any powers to Congress, not expressly given by the constitution, nor necessarily incident to the powers delegated, they submit the following resolution, viz:

*Resolved*, That the committee be discharged from further consideration of this subject.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 96.

[2d SESSION.]

### DEFECTS IN THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, MARCH 12, 1810.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 1st, 1810.

SIR:

The inconveniences and embarrassments to the service, together with the neglect and loss of property, arising from the irregular and unprecedented manner in which the Quartermaster's Department is conducted, render it my duty to suggest the propriety of some further legal provision on the subject. The defects of the present system originate in the laws. By the law fixing the military peace establishment, provision is made for the appointment of three Military Agents, and as many Assistant Military Agents, not exceeding one to each military post, as the President shall deem expedient. The law authorizing an additional military force, provides for two Brigade and eight Regimental Quartermasters. The Military Agents and Assistant Military Agents are appointed by the President. The Brigade Quartermasters by the Brigadiers, and the Regimental Quartermasters by the Colonels of regiments.

The result of this organization is, that the Assistant Military Agents, who ought to account for, and make returns to, the Military Agents, of all property delivered to them, are not held by a proper responsibility, the Military Agents having no power or influence in their appointment, nor authority to call them to account for mal-practices or neglect of duty. The Brigade and Regimental Quartermasters are as little under their control.

It will also be perceived that no provision is made for the appointment of an officer whose duty it should be to have charge of, and be responsible for, the property appertaining to that department, to regulate and superintend the distribution of all supplies, and to whom all subordinate officers should be accountable.

In want of such an officer, the Secretary of War has been obliged to perform the duties of Quartermaster General. Under the military peace establishment, those duties were laborious. Since raising the additional military force, they have necessarily increased, until it is suggested by experience that, if they were compatible with other duties required of him, the Secretary of War cannot continue to discharge them, either satisfactorily to himself, or with justice to the public.

It is, therefore, respectfully suggested, that the President be authorized by law to appoint a Quartermaster General, with rank in the army not exceeding the rank of \_\_\_\_\_, with pay and emoluments not exceeding those of \_\_\_\_\_.

An Assistant Quartermaster General, to be taken from the line of Captains, whose compensation shall not exceed one half his monthly pay and emoluments.

As many Deputy Quartermasters General, not exceeding four, as the service may require.

If taken from the line, their compensation not to exceed one half their monthly pay and emoluments; if not of the line, not to exceed the present compensation of the Military Agents.

As many Assistant Deputy Quartermasters, not exceeding one to each military post, as the service may require, to be taken from the line, and allowed eight dollars per month, (as provided by law for the present Assistant Military Agents.)

Under this arrangement the Deputy Quartermasters General would perform the duties at present performed by the Military Agents: the Assistant Deputy Quartermasters, those performed by the Assistant Military Agents. Their compensation being the same, the additional expense to be incurred will consist principally in the pay and emoluments of the Quartermaster General, with the incidental expenses of his office, and in one additional Deputy Quartermaster General, if the service should require his appointment.

In time of peace, the proposed system being less complicated, and possessing a more regular and rigid accountability, would be far less expensive in its consequences: at the same time that it would instruct the officers in a branch of service acknowledged by military men to be of the first importance.

To meet a state of war without such an establishment, which has been justly denominated the right hand of an army, would be to disregard the practice and experience of our own and every other nation, and expose to hazard and defeat every military operation.

With respectful consideration, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. W. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

COMMITTEE CHAMBER, *January 13, 1810.*

SIR:

In obedience to the instructions of the committee of the Senate, to whom was referred the message of the President of the United States of the 3d instant, I now have the honor of requesting you to submit a plan to the committee for establishing a General Staff, or Quartermaster's Department, for the Army of the United States. I am also instructed to intimate to you, sir, that it would be agreeable to the committee to have the plan as much in detail as your convenience will permit.

I have it also in charge from the committee, to ask of you a statement of military munitions, which may be required by the present exigencies of the country; together with an estimate of the sum of money which may be necessary for providing the same.

Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my high consideration, &c.

WM. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

The Honorable WILLIAM EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1810.*

SIR:

Your favor of the 1st instant, respecting the establishment of a Quartermaster's Department for the Army of the United States, addressed to me, as chairman of a committee of the Senate, &c. was not put into my hands until late last evening.

It is probable, if it had been sooner received, a part of my letter of the 13th instant, addressed to you in relation to that subject, might have been deemed unnecessary by the committee.

Be pleased, sir, to accept my respectful compliments, &c.

WM. B. GILES.

The Honorable WILLIAM EUSTIS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 15, 1810.*

SIR:

I take the liberty of submitting for perusal and consideration, the enclosed extracts from the letters of Mr. William Linnard, (a faithful and indefatigable Military Agent) which letters were accompanied with the names of several Assistant Military Agents to whom he had made disbursements, and from whom he had not been able to procure satisfactory statements and settlements.

They are among the evidences daily occurring which evince the necessity of a reformation in the Quartermaster's Department.

With respectful consideration, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Hon. W. B. GILES, *Chairman Committee of the Senate.*

*Extract of a letter from William Linnard, Military Agent, dated*

PHILADELPHIA, *September 15th, 1809.*

"With respect to instructing the assistant agents to forward requisitions and other evidence, to show on what authority expenditures have been made, I beg leave to observe, that, whenever I have had occasion to write to a newly appointed agent, I have never failed to inform him that such documents were indispensably necessary to accompany their vouchers; and although I have been very particular in those instructions, little or no regard has been paid to them; and, in fact, in some instances, where the commanding officer was assistant agent, they have ridiculed the idea as extremely absurd to make requisitions on themselves. I do believe it to be impracticable to obtain those documents in every instance, unless the assistant agents were more stationary, and the principals clothed with more authority than they possess. I shall, however, not lose sight of the object, but continue to use my endeavors to obtain them; and, if I fail, it ought not to add to my duties, already too much multiplied."

*Extract of a letter from William Linnard, Military Agent, dated*

PHILADELPHIA, *December 7th, 1809.*

"On receipt of your instructions relative to the accounts, I wrote circular letters to all the assistant agents, and in order to enforce your injunctions, and that I might not be misunderstood, I enclosed copies of your instructions to me. To press the necessity of a particular attention to the vouchers, I introduced the following quotation from your letter: 'That, in all their disbursements, the authority of the commanding officer should accompany the voucher, particularly stating the object of the expenditure.' Some of the assistant agents and officers have strangely construed those expressions to require the authority the commanding officer had to make the requisition; and instead of writing to me for an explanation, they have delayed their accounts until the commanding officer could write to the Secretary of War for his authority, or an explanation."

WASHINGTON CITY, *November 29th, 1809.*

SIR:

On the eve of leaving the army, (unless a prospect of active service should forbid it) permit me to address you on the important necessity of the Quartermaster's Department being restored, if it was only on the ground of economy: for, to that department, belongs the care of all stores belonging to the army. By the derangement of that department, were strict inquiry made, it would be found that more than 100,000 dollars have been lost, in the course of a few years, by the abolition of the Quartermaster's Department, and the introduction of a system of military agency. Instances may be found of characters being employed as agents, perfectly ignorant of military affairs, and the great duties imposed on them, and at times unsupplied with the means necessary of performance.

The Quartermaster General of an army is an officer of great importance, and should be of high rank, active, persevering, and experienced, perfectly acquainted with the geographical situation and advantages of the country in

which an army is to act, so as always to draw his supplies at the least possible injury and expense. He is primarily charged with all the articles belonging to his department; on him requisitions are to be made by the division quartermasters for such stores as may be required for their divisions; which stores are to be issued on the returns of the brigade quartermasters, and so to the regimental quartermasters, who are to make and deliver returns of all stores on hands and delivered once in three months, to the brigade quartermasters, who will consolidate and transmit them to the division quartermasters, who, in like manner, are to consolidate and transmit them to the Quartermaster General, who will transmit them to the Secretary of War. Pursuing this principle it can always be ascertained in what division, brigade, or regiment, there may be delinquency.

You will please excuse the liberty I have taken in addressing you on a subject of great importance to the army, either on a peace or war establishment. The importance of this subject will perhaps be more fully impressed by an application to military gentlemen who have experienced the inadequacy of the present system to the general welfare of our country.

Accept the assurances of my perfect esteem.

A. PARKER, *Col. 5th Infantry.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 20, 1810.*

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the 13th instant, requesting "a statement of military munitions which may be required by the present exigencies of the country, with an estimate of the sums which may be necessary for providing the same," I must ask the indulgence of the honorable committee in stating to them, that, as the sums already appropriated by law, for completing the fortifications for the defence of the ports and harbors, which had been commenced or projected, were deemed sufficient for the object, no further appropriation on account of fortifications was proposed in the estimate for the present year. But, in case of war, additional works will be required. Their situation, nature, and extent, depending on the emergencies which may require them, cannot be ascertained. In many instances, they will probably be of a temporary nature, and constructed principally by the troops.

The island of Rhode Island, from the peculiarity of its local situation, bordering on the ocean, accessible at all seasons of the year, affording a safe and commodious harbor, fertile in itself, commanding other islands, well stocked with provisions, and as a central station from which to harass the trade of the continent, offers to an enemy advantages not combined in any other port, and requires additional means of defence.

To meet the expenditures required at this and other places, it is therefore respectfully suggested that the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars be appropriated on account of fortifications.

For supplying the several works with additional cannon, ammunition, and implements; for mounting on travelling carriages, with proper equipments, a train of heavy ordnance, for the defence of such points or places as are not protected by batteries; to mount and equip a train of field artillery; to provide arsenals for the deposite of small arms and artillery, with laboratories for preparing ammunition; and for procuring additional supplies of sulphur and saltpetre and other articles in the ordnance department, the sum of five hundred thousand dollars will be required.

The purchase of knapsacks, cartridge boxes, scabbards, belts, and other equipments for infantry and cavalry, of tents and other articles in the Quartermaster's department, with suitable store houses for their preservation, may be estimated at four hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

The munitions embraced in the foregoing estimates are considered as preparatory, requiring time to provide them, and admitting of such extension and additions as exigencies may require.

For future supplies of cannon, with their implements, of small arms and accoutrements, and of clothing, if suitable encouragement was given, great reliance may be placed on the public and private armories, and on the foundries and manufactories already in operation, the crude materials being the growth and produce of our own country.

Should the public exigencies render it necessary to call into actual service an additional military force, provision should be made in season for furnishing each non-commissioned officer and private with clothing for one year.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. W. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 4, 1810.*

SIR:

The precarious state of foreign commerce, together with other considerations equally important, renders it extremely desirable that provision should be made for clothing the army of the United States from our own manufactures.

On the contracts for provisions made annually by this Department, and on other contracts requiring a large capital, it has been customary to make advances of money in order to enable the contractors to fulfil their engagements.

An extension of this practice to supplies of clothing would enable the purveyor to publish proposals and make his contracts in the same manner as the provision contracts are made. From the encouragement which would thus be given to the several manufactories, a spirit of competition would be excited, improvements would be made in the works and in the several fabrics, and there can be no doubt that ample supplies would be offered, on terms equally advantageous with those attending imported cloths, while the necessity of having recourse to importations in future would be finally removed.

In order to ensure success to this desirable object, it will be necessary that the appropriation for clothing should be made in the year preceding that in which the clothing is to be delivered.

I have thought the subject of sufficient importance to be communicated to the honorable committee of which you are chairman,

And am, with respectful consideration, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Hon. W. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, MARCH 21, 1810.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I lay before Congress a return of the militia of the United States, as received by the Department of War from the several States and territories.

March 20, 1810.

JAMES MADISON.

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.											FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.											
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Gen'ls.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-camp.	Brigade Majors and Inspectors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Chaplains.	Deputy Adjutant Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Judge Advocates.	Brigade Quarterm'rs.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1809	3	6	1	1	6	6						6	37	74	37	37		37	34	37	35	36	35
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1809	11	22	1	1	16	23						23	104	227	131	122		84	38	93	88	79	75
Vermont, . . . . .	1809	4	10		1	9	7							33	64	34	34		33	32	29	29	29	28
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1808	1	4	1	1	6	4							21	33	14	15	13	14	11	14	11	12	12
Connecticut, . . . . .	1809	4	8	1	1								4	44	79	43	44	42	40	34	43	39	34	35
New York, . . . . .	1807	7	40		1	4	32							140	283	136	127	121	119	78	124		100	95
New Jersey, . . . . .	1809	4	13	1	1	4	12						8	43	90	46	39	85	53	27	36	2	35	32
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1809	16	31		1	31	62						11	156	313	140	145	145	133	63	110	108	89	74
Delaware, . . . . .	1808	1	3	1	1	6	3							10	20	10	10	10	10	10	10		10	10
Maryland, . . . . .	1807	2	12		1	8	12							50	104	54	54		54	50				
Virginia, . . . . .	1808	4	19		1	8	19							122	234	108	86		93	57	48	21	48	43
North Carolina, . . . . .	1809	6	15		1	10							1	62	121	46	27	32	25	15	23		23	19
South Carolina, . . . . .	1807	2	9		1	17	9							46	92	34	28	70	23	1	11		5	3
Georgia, . . . . .	1809	4	9	1	1	17	9							9	38	77	33	24	21	32	27	15		4
Kentucky, . . . . .	1809	8	17		1	12	16							4	73	139	71	53	62	40	16	40	19	36
Tennessee, . . . . .	1805	2	6		1	3	6							1	30	62	30				7	1	12	12
Ohio, . . . . .	1807	3	7	2	1	6	7							6	16	43	22		20	9	21	16	14	13
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1808		1				1							2	4	1	1	1	1	1	1			
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1807						4							5	10	4			1	1		1		
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1806				1									5	7	2								
Orleans Territory, . . . . .	1807				1									12	27	9	1		1	1				
Louisiana Territory, . . . . .	1809		1		1									12	27	9	1		1	1				
Michigan Territory, . . . . .	1806				1									4	12	5	2	8	1	1				
														7	5	2	1		2	1				

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARTILLERISTS.						CAVALRY.						GRENADIERS.						LIGHT INFANTRY.												
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Farmers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.		
New Hampshire,	1809	24	48	96	.	48	.	637	33	65	31	123	65	.	.	1,776	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Massachusetts,	1809	62	124	247	.	127	.	2,561	66	129	63	264	89	.	.	2,261	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
Vermont,	1809	10	28	35	.	27	.	303	28	56	27	105	31	.	.	1,035	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
Rhode Island,	1808	2	3	8	4	7	8	58	5	9	5	22	5	.	.	198	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
Connecticut,	1809	17	36	65	58	39	76	424	33	66	31	123	51	.	.	1,100	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.		
New York,	1807	48	94	184	164	100	.	1,663	61	105	57	234	72	.	.	2,884	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
New Jersey,	1809	16	29	57	45	20	38	514	37	68	32	115	33	6	7	1,307	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Pennsylvania,	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	*468	32	64	30	105	27	15	16	1,302	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Delaware,	1808	4	8	16	16	8	24	132	5	10	5	20	3	3	4	175	2	2	2	8	4	4	72	17	17	17	68	68	30	644		
Maryland,	1807	8	16	24	.	.	.	256	35	70	35	140	35	.	.	1,220	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Virginia,	1808	23	47	94	.	14	.	1,040	61	118	55	211	15	.	.	2,866	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
North Carolina,	1809	1	1	.	.	.	.	25	23	40	22	60	15	3	6	709	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
South Carolina,	1807	13	27	47	.	10	86	528	34	61	30	97	20	17	12	1,202	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	16	16	15	36	.	15	626		
Georgia,	1809	5	9	13	.	8	.	149	22	38	18	58	2	.	.	564	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6	6	6	19	.	8	254		
Kentucky,	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	12	24	12	40	8	.	.	439	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Tennessee,	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	19	19	19	41	19	.	.	595	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ohio,	1807	.	2	4	.	2	.	40	3	6	3	12	3	.	.	134	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
District of Columbia,	1808	3	5	2	2	.	.	92	3	6	3	9	.	.	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	8	7	24	4	1	327		
Mississippi Territory,	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	2	1	4	.	.	.	27	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Indiana Territory,	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6	12	5	21	1	.	.	178	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Orleans Territory,	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22	4	.	.	225	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Louisiana Territory,	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Michigan Territory,	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

\* Total number returned.

† Included in the Infantry.



RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

44

STATES AND TERRITORIES.

	For what year the Return of each State was made.	RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.						Total number, including Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Rank & File.	ORDNANCE.												
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and file.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.		Musicians.	Rank and file.	Brass twelve pounders.	Brass nine pounders.	Brass six pounders.	Brass four pounders.	Brass three pounders.	Howitzers.	Iron twelve pounders.	Iron nine pounders.	Iron six pounders.	Iron four pounders.	Iron three pounders.
New Hampshire, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	297	297	289	1,107	.	716	18,201	24,281	.	.	.	.	24	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Massachusetts, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	842	851	841	3,277	.	1,923	54,574	69,553	6	.	42	2	92	.	2	.	.	8	2	2
Vermont, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	283	287	285	1,063	.	739	15,543	20,439	.	.	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	1	1	1
Rhode Island, -	1808	.	.	.	.	.	.	101	110	100	380	379	214	6,039	7,848	.	.	.	6	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Connecticut, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	319	309	315	1,252	1,238	841	13,252	20,176	.	.	2	4	11	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
New York, -	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,146	1,128	1,065	4,578	.	2,332	75,232	92,554	.	.	19	13	13	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
New Jersey, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	390	367	356	1,227	770	515	26,994	33,505	.	.	.	27	.	.	.	.	.	.	24	4
Pennsylvania, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,362	1,323	1,214	2,912	2,001	1,364	82,604	96,467	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	2
Delaware, -	1808	*1	*1	*1	*4	*4	*2	73	64	61	296	292	66	6,155	8,579	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	1
Maryland, -	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	529	435	419	922	.	273	34,224	39,047	.	.	.	2	1	.	.	.	.	.	3	2
Virginia, -	1808	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,187	1,158	1,089	4,322	.	853	66,798	80,863	.	.	2	1	3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
North Carolina, -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	700	690	662	2,258	1,451	1,063	39,766	47,922	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
South Carolina, -	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	393	387	331	1,295	.	298	24,041	29,604	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Georgia, -	1809	9	10	9	22	.	.	311	359	327	1,316	.	52	21,160	25,088	.	.	2	3	.	.	.	.	.	2	.	.
Kentucky, -	1809	24	24	24	84	.	11	1,150	592	571	518	2,136	506	33,481	40,599	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Tennessee, -	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	248	238	230	308	308	320	14,285	16,822	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ohio, -	1807	21	20	19	78	.	20	938	182	184	180	574	290	12,333	15,324	.	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
District of Columbia, -	1808	2	2	2	8	4	2	107	9	12	3	23	2	1,502	2,245	.	.	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Mississippi Territory, -	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	37	33	29	93	58	3	1,878	2,158	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Indiana Territory, -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	31	33	30	76	.	.	1,846	2,067	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Orleans do. -	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	94	73	22	289	273	2	4,503	5,626	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Louisiana do. -	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	45	49	44	148	.	13	1,948	2,540	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Michigan do. -	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	25	26	24	39	15	2	879	1,028	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Total number of militia, - 684,335

\* Included in the Infantry.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																										
		Artillery Side-arms.	Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Espositoons.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusees, or Fire Arms.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Ramrods, steel.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with ball.	Flints.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Scabbards and Belts.	Knapsacks.	Tumbrils & Wagons.	Stands of Colors.	Shot Pouches and Powder Horns.							
New Hampshire,	1809		1,720	1,720		15,378			10,300	9,680	4,820	2,656																
Massachusetts,	1809		2,484	2,483		49,452			45,779	48,052	46,544	3,484																
Vermont,	1809		1,099	1,041		11,523			5,273	6,302	5,657	2,137																
Rhode Island,	1808		174	182		4,630			3,508	3,920	4,284																	
Connecticut,	1809	661	1,310	1,358	738	14,528			14,650	16,035																		
New York,	1807		2,260	2,097		41,326	2,645		22,686	26,522	18,751																	
New Jersey,	1809	95	1,119	702	73	15,021		129	4,623	3,475	2,592																	
Pennsylvania,	1809		1,018	996		13,228	10,812	13,916	6,993	1,715		650																
Delaware,	1808		126	127		241		124	1	21																		
Maryland,	1807					935	270		492	452	935																	
Virginia,	1808		1,171	645		14,852	3,200		13,643	13,342	12,422																	
North Carolina,	1809		433	416		5,151	8,135	16,128																				
South Carolina,	1807				5	1,312	3,838	4,389	1,312																	457	17,455	
Georgia,	1809		316	221		5,182	3,448		5,182	5,182	5,182																	
Kentucky,	1809		265	274	276	3,819	15,642		161	243	103	4,686	2,138	42,756	118,025	213	596	204	10	98								392
Tennessee,	1805		75	95		4,647			12		2,146																	
Ohio,	1807		253	89		969	5,234		100	160	58	1,146																
District of Columbia,	1808					807	141		681	676																		
Mississippi Territory,	1807	113	55	55		460	460		1																			
Indiana Territory,	1806						179																					
Orleans Territory,	1807																											
Louisiana Territory,	1809																											
Michigan Territory,	1806		57	57		56	883	253																				

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 16, 1810.

W. EUSTIS, Secretary of War.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 98.

[2d SESSION.]

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 29, 1810.

Mr. CLAY, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the message of the President as relates to the organization of the militia of the United States, reported "That the committee, in considering the several subjects to them referred, are of opinion, that it would be improper, at this time, to innovate on the present system of organization of the militia of the United States."

WASHINGTON, December 18th, 1809.

SIR:

The organization of the militia of the United States has long been deemed a subject of primary importance by those who have been conversant with public affairs. Various systems have been proposed and rejected, and, indeed, it is not an easy matter to make any regulation which shall be adapted to the laws and the habits of the different States. Being a member of the committee to whom was referred that part of the President's message which relates to the organization of the militia of the United States, I take the liberty to inquire of you, what are the prominent defects of the present system. The act of Congress under which the militia are formed, was passed on the 8th of May, 1792, and must be perfectly familiar to you. By conversing with gentlemen from different parts of the United States, I find that all the Governors have not given that law the same construction: for instance, in the formation of corps of horse, artillery, light infantry, and grenadiers, in some States, the Executive authority has supposed that the act of Congress aforesaid, authorized the formation only of *troops* and *companies*; while in other States, regiments and even brigades are formed, and the officers have been duly commissioned.

A question hence arises, whether the orders of such general and field officers would be obeyed by officers from those States where no such system had obtained, if they should be called into service together. What has been the practice in this respect in your State? How are your dragoon and artillery corps formed; whether into troops and companies only, or into regiments and brigades, and if into the latter, under the sanction of what law?

Would it not be advisable, for the sake of uniformity, either to authorize by law the formation of regiments, especially of dragoons, or else to reduce the regiments now formed and attach one troop to each regiment or brigade of infantry.

In some States it has become a practice to obtain commissions, and resign them immediately, only for the sake of being exempt from militia duty. What inconvenience would result from limiting the shortest period of service to a commissioned officer, (extraordinary cases excepted) and if he should resign before the expiration of that period, to be liable to be called into the ranks? This is now the case in some States.

What are the objections to embodying a corps, to be composed of all such able bodied men as have reached the age of 45, and under 60, and who are exempt from military duty, *only by age*, under the present law, to be called the *alarm list*, and never liable to march out of the State, nor to perform military duty or parade; but to be obliged once a year to appear on parade armed, and, in case of invasion, or insurrection, to march with the other militia?

It has been a favorite theme with the Southern members, to class the militia so as that the burthen of active duty, if needed, should fall on that portion of our citizens who are between twenty-one and twenty-five years of age. The Northern members have pretty uniformly opposed such an innovation upon our system. What objections to such a measure have occurred to your mind?

Would it be advisable for the General Government to attempt to arm the militia? and if so, in what mode? whether by giving them the arms, or to apportion them to the States, to be preserved in magazines against time of need?

Is there any thing, in the present mode of discipline, which needs the interference of the General Government? Would it be advisable to call out any portion of the militia yearly, to take the field? and if so, on what principles should such a system be adopted?

These, sir, are some of the prominent points on which, perhaps, some amendments may be made to our present militia system. Other improvements may undoubtedly have occurred to your mind. Any reflections which you may please to bestow upon this subject, and any amendments which you may propose to our present system, if communicated to me, shall be submitted to the committee who now have this subject under consideration.

This letter will be enclosed to Governor Treadwell, that he may make any remarks, or communicate such instructions to you, as he may deem necessary.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

BENJ. TALLMADGE.

General E. HUNTINGTON.

NORWICH, 5th January, 1810.

DEAR SIR:

In answering your letter of the 18th ultimo, which came to hand on the 29th, I find a task which, on opening and reading, I did not anticipate; but if, in the course of it, I shall give you *one* new idea worth preserving, I shall be more than satisfied.

The subject matter has frequently presented itself to my mind as attended with serious difficulty, as well as of great national importance; but, owing to the diversity of habits which are to be included, and probably in many respects, *subdued*, by a militia system pervading the United States, (without any knowledge of the respective State systems to which the men have been accustomed) I feel myself inadequate to form a plan which would be acceptable. Indeed I frankly own I have never seen any system proposed, in which I had confidence, nor do I believe any system, *commensurate to the object*, will ever be adopted by the Government, or, if adopted, be submitted to by the sovereign people. A man possessing so little confidence in militia to oppose regular troops, except for the moment, and on the spur of the occasion, and who absolutely knows, so fully as I do, the enormous waste and expense attending their every movement, is not capable of affording much aid in the completion of a militia system. Too much has already been done with the militia, if they are not to be a substitute for standing troops, and too little will *always* be done if they are made a substitute. The song which has been incessantly sung, ever since the constitution was adopted, that the militia are the sure bulwark of our nation, the safe-guardians of our liberties, is now in the mouth of every one, and he who doubts the truth of it is deemed a political infidel; yet, with all the odium attached, I acknowledge myself no convert to such doctrine. Let the Government proceed to regulate the militia to the utmost length their masters, the sovereign people, will bear—it will be just so far as to make them food for powder in the day of battle; and death, or what is worse, loss of honor, must be expected by every officer of spirit connected with them. General Knox's system (a copy of which he was pleased to send me) is the only system which I have seen, that can be considered as possessing any efficiency.

That system was rejected by the Government as being too expensive; it was approaching the mark, but, in my opinion, short, and not altogether correct in detail. Less energy than what that system contained is a downright fraud on the public mind. You observe that all the Governors have not given the act of Congress of 1792 the same construction in the formation of cavalry, &c. I reply that the act of 1792 was laid before the Legislature of this State, and a law passed to carry the same into effect, but some things to be effected, which the Legislature could not conveniently do, were submitted to his Excellency Governor Huntington, the then chief magistrate, to execute: among

those referred, was the arrangement of the cavalry, which then consisted, if I recollect, of twenty-nine companies or troops, unequally divided into five or six regiments, one regiment containing seven companies. His Excellency the Governor, knowing that some of the troops had been raised under the immediate patronage of particular officers, and whose limits were not recorded in the office of the Secretary of State, though the officers had been commissioned, and the companies recognised by the Government, deemed it expedient to call to his counsel the general officers throughout the State; and when met, it was discovered that an uniformity of opinion did not prevail respecting retaining the cavalry in regiments. A majority of the gentlemen, however, considering the privileges which had been granted in raising the companies of cavalry, with the custom and usage of being regimented, brought the corps within the letter and spirit of the 3d section, and of the last clause of the 10th section of the law of 1792, and recommended that the cavalry should be formed into eight regiments, one of which to be attached to each brigade, and that his Excellency the Governor be requested to grant permission to raise three more companies to complete the eight regiments to four troops each. (The above detailed account I believe correct; I give it from recollection, and it is possible that, in some respects, my recollection may not have served me.) His Excellency, in conformity to such advice, did alter and new form the limits of the regiments of cavalry, did raise three more companies, and completed the eight regiments, and assigned them to the respective brigades of infantry. I cannot conceive that any collision can possibly arise respecting rank in any one State, among the cavalry officers; for the commissions issuing from the same source are of equal validity in the eyes of the officers; but it is possible, if the before mentioned exposition of the law is not correct, that collisions may arise when portions of militia from different States are called into the field together. The power of forming artillery companies is, by law, placed under the direction of the Captain General of this State; such companies as were in existence at the time of passing the act of 1792, with such as have been since raised, have been attached to the regiments of infantry from whence they enlisted.

Whether it is advisable to have the cavalry in regiments, or only in companies attached to infantry regiments, or what relative proportion is best, I cannot determine. The number of cavalry which might be employed to advantage in the Southern or Middle States, would, in a great degree, be useless in the New England States. For a sudden irruption into an enemy's country, or in a retreat, cavalry have a decided superiority over infantry, and if you could have them disciplined and instructed in the duties of an artillerist, they would become highly useful to operate with the artillery; but, under any general law for the government of the militia, I cannot persuade myself that they could be useful but in small numbers to clear a tract of country before an invading foe.

In an army where you can provide magazines, you can have large bodies of cavalry, but, in case of invasion, infantry, principally, are more to be relied on than large bodies of cavalry—they cannot be supported. I think the officers, commanding in the higher grades in the cavalry, require experience, and *that* experience which can be obtained only by serving with cavalry. Although you may frequently find an officer in the infantry, who would command a body of cavalry with honor to himself, still I believe that you must have your field officers used to, and familiar with, the cavalry discipline, which is not expected from an infantry officer. In this place, I would suggest, that the enormous expense of cavalry ought to have its influence to lessen its number. I am decidedly of opinion, that one company of cavalry to a brigade of infantry is a large proportion. If the number of cavalry were diminished to one company to a brigade of infantry, you might, with propriety, expect your men better mounted and equipped, and, in fact, be more efficient than a larger number. You might require the men to be of a certain size, of a certain age, and hold themselves owners of the horses, which horses should be inspected, accepted, and registered, and not borrowed, on a muster day, as, at present, is very common. The men might be enlisted under an express condition that they should always hold themselves liable to march, completely equipped and mounted, on the earliest notice. You well know that a great proportion of the horses used at present in our cavalry corps are totally unfit for field service.

You mention that, in some States, it is not unfrequent to accept commissions, and then resign, merely accepting the appointment to avoid service. The observation applies to every State, I presume, in a greater or less degree, and must always be expected, where the profession of arms is so little encouraged as in the United States, and where the honor of serving his country is held in so cheap estimation.

The length of time which an officer ought to serve, to entitle him to an honorable discharge, is difficult to ascertain; but I think if an officer was obliged to do duty in the ranks, who should not serve four years in the commission or grade from which he wished a discharge, it would be the mean of bringing forward a class of men, better calculated to do the public justice, than permitting so easy an evasion of military duty; perhaps, if above — years of age, and under — years of age, he might have his election, whether to pay an annual sum to the regimental purse, rather than be subjected to do duty in the ranks, would be desirable. Ought not the act of Congress to define exemptions from military duty, and the States be permitted to add none to that number, except the persons exempted be liable to an annual composition in money, to be paid into the military chest, for supplying the regiment with blank cartridges, colors, drums, fifes, &c., and for any use to which an expense now arises to the regiment.

The experience which this State had of alarm list companies, as they were called, during the revolutionary war, which were composed of those exempt from military duty in the common militia companies, and, I think, under seventy years of age, has induced me to reject the idea of such men being embodied as soldiers; they may be useful as men, with their families, and some few of them may be employed about an army, but as *soldiers* they are not worth their rations. The sparsely settled state of our country, even in Connecticut, throws obstacles in the way of classing the militia, which have much weight in my mind; a great part of this State spreads the limits of a military company over an extended district of nearly nine miles in circumference, to obtain sixty-four, liable by law to do military duty, and many of the companies embrace a district of double that extent; which company, if brought into classes, would live so remote from a common centre, that the duties on ordinary trainings would be an unreasonable tax on the men, as a large proportion of those liable to do duty are of that class who neither own horses, nor are able to hire on such occasions. To avoid that inconvenience you must have small companies, and the whole *worth* of the company would be inadequate to furnish officers and non-commissioned officers. If ever classing of the militia should be thought essential, or a substitute *must* be found, I should prefer that every battalion should be obliged to have its flank company kept full, and that the flank companies, the artillery companies, and the cavalry, should have some incitements from the public treasury, to be in complete readiness on any and every emergency, and should be called for in the first instance, and without any previous notice, leaving to the Adjutants General to detail from the militia such a number of field and staff officers as to completely officer them, which detailed field and staff should be considered under requisitions for a certain length of time, and, if not called into the field in twelve months, then other officers to be detailed for the same duty and relieve them; and, if called into the field, to be relieved, on returning, after the tour of duty was performed. Such a corps, as abovementioned, would be more efficient than double their numbers, detached in the usual manner; it would take from this State about six thousand men, officers included, which is nearly our proportion of two hundred thousand men from the United States, making the last detail by the Secretary of War our guide. In respect to arming the militia by the General Government, I cannot believe it expedient in any point of view. If the public should be willing to place their arms in the hands of the soldiery, they would, under every care which would be taken, be nearly rendered useless in a very short period. If they should be placed under the care of the officers, they would soon be destroyed with rust, without a regular armorer to take care of them; if they should be put into the hands of the men on their responsibility, they would be sold by them in many instances, and loaned, and used for gunning in others, and, I have no doubt might be considered a total loss in five years; besides, if the public were to furnish arms for the militia, the arms, now in our country, and many of them very fine pieces, would be totally neglected, which are now kept in some kind of order by the owners, while they are impressed with the necessity of taking care of their property, and that, possibly, they may be called to take the field, and hazard their lives on the goodness of their arms. I should consider a magazine in each State, supplied with field pieces, arms, ammunition, and all the equipments necessary for a thousand men, and under the care of a suitable man paid for the purpose, more to be relied on than a supply for three thousand, dealt out to the men, or placed under the care of militia officers, at the close of every training day. If our liberties are worth preserving, and we will not pay enlisted troops to preserve them, we must be willing to pay a little out of the common stock, to support a system which is relied on as a substitute. I have no confidence in the mode of detaching the

militia, as heretofore practised by our Government; I presume it has been calculated for its effect abroad, but you may rest assured its effects have been confined to ourselves—we have been imposed on—we have relied on the militia; without this detachment we should have considered ourselves neglected, but I firmly believe our country hath obtained, by the different detachments, nothing but the expense. You cannot find an European officer, and but few American officers, who hold the militia in much estimation; they do not respect them, only as they hold an enemy in bay for a moment, until other troops may be called in.

It is our parsimony which makes us too highly estimate militia; if the militia were more expensive than enlisted troops, there is not an American but would reprobate the idea. Having remarked on each of the points mentioned in your letter, I shall take the liberty to remark on the act of 1792, the consideration of which gave rise to your letter.

The first section, which respects enrolling the inhabitants, I wish to see altered in such a manner as to embrace all above the age of sixteen and under forty years of age. The experience I had, in the year 1777, of the exertions of our light infantry company, which was composed generally of lads under eighteen, and some under sixteen, satisfied me fully that, for nearly all and every service, the lads at sixteen were as much to be relied on as those above that age. On the approach of action they were always in spirits, calculating on the honor they should acquire. I had rather risk my reputation on the exertions of the class of young men, from sixteen to twenty, than on all those above that age. The young court danger from motives of honor and love of country combined; the elder class, on the approach of danger, are ruminating on their wives and children; the bodily strength of those of sixteen is equal to all the duties ordinarily required to be performed by the militia; they will be more ambitious in their acquiring the use of arms, and laying the foundation for promotion, which those with families, and more advanced in life, hold in much less estimation. In our Northern States, our military days of parade are generally considered holidays, and the class of citizens from sixteen to eighteen, are always found about the parade, and their amusements as laborious as the duties of a soldier, and frequently more injurious to their health and morals. By embodying all able bodied from sixteen to eighteen, will, in this State, I presume, add one-fifth, if not one third, to the number of militia.

I think the notice of six months to be equipped ought to be given, before the person arrives at the age of sixteen, so as to be obliged to do duty at that time; and I humbly conceive, that, if the law required no notice to be given by the officer enrolling, it would not be a hardship: for it is universally known by the boys among us when they are to be enrolled for duty. I am not very tenacious of that part of the law which requires the men to furnish themselves, and carry their ammunition to the field; if, on an emergency, they could receive ammunition from some common stock, more reliance could be placed on their being properly furnished, than in the present mode. I think no exemptions ought to be made from militia duty, but by act of Congress, and that such list of exemptions ought not to embrace so large a class of citizens as at present. By so many exemptions, the militia duty is rendered less popular, and the exempts are frequently those very characters who would make the best officers. Every man whose public duty will permit him to do military duty, and is under forty years of age, I could wish to see become a citizen soldier, whilst the defence of our country is entrusted to the militia. If you will consent to embody those citizens from sixteen to eighteen, I firmly believe you may enlarge your companies to one hundred, without extending their limits, and I can see no inconvenience resulting from such an enlargement; it will excite more emulation among the officers. I think brigade majors should uniformly be taken from the line of Captains, and should have no additional rank thereby; all other staff officers, for the brigades or regiments, should be taken from the commissioned officers; indeed, I would allow no staff officer, except aides-de-camp, and the adjutant and quartermaster general, and their staff and hospital officers, to be taken from those not liable to military duty, and I would restrain the appointment of surgeons and surgeons' mates to regular bred licensed physicians and surgeons, and to those above years of age. It is highly exceptionable, in my view, to have such appointments made from favoritism; I have known some appointments to those important offices, made from boys under eighteen years of age, whom I would not have entrusted to open a vein, or extract a tooth. It is worse than murder to employ and depend on such creatures to attend the sick and wounded defenders of their country, when called to the field.

Instead of the uniform in any instance to be regulated by the brigadiers, as in the third section, I would have it established by Congress, that, when the militia of the different States are called to perform service together, they may be in uniform.

If the uniform should be established by Congress, to take place at a short future period, I have no doubt the troops would be completely clad in the course of two years, if not in one, and, having one fixed uniform, would be attended with economy. The State and regimental colors, mentioned in the fifth section, I would have provided from the funds of the regiment, into which, as a fund, I would have paid all fines collected for absence on days of muster or review, and the sums paid for exemptions from military duty before suggested, and all other fines; and I think, whenever a regiment is under arms, the Colonel or commanding officer should possess power to inflict fines on those who absent themselves, after the muster has commenced, or for improper conduct, to the amount of — dollars. Confinement on such a day is not a pleasant mode to be adopted, with some of those liable to do duty, whose feelings are not alive to such punishment, but would feel the effects of a fine; it should be left optional with the commandant to fine, confine, or both. To the duties of an adjutant general in each State, I would annex the duties of inspector general, and make it his duty personally to inspect the troops, (taking to his aid, whilst inspecting each brigade, the brigade majors of such brigades respectively.) He ought to examine every article, required by law to be part of the equipment, the ability of the horses belonging to the cavalry, and occasionally to exercise the troops, if he deems it expedient and necessary. To this officer, from whom I would require so much duty, I would have annexed a compensation, sufficient to call into such service suitable persons to perform the duty. I do not hazard any thing, in my opinion, when I say, that more can and will be effected by such an officer, to make your militia efficient, and be constantly in readiness for service, than from any other cause whatever. No provision is made by the law of 1792 for furnishing field artillery; I ask you whether it is the duty of the State to furnish pieces for their militia, when called out of the State? and whose duty it is to furnish horses to drag the artillery, when detached, and to find ammunition, &c.? and whether the respective States would permit their brass pieces to be removed out of the State, without, or with, a provision for payment in case of losses? This subject may be worth consideration, and, if the pieces are damaged, whose duty is it to repair them? I think whenever a fine is placed on a man by a military tribunal, having cognizance of the crime, it should not be within another tribunal to re-examine and review; many of our officers neglect laying fines, more through fear of a law suit, than from a willingness to neglect their duty. I would have all fines, laid by the company officers, reported to the field officers, who should compose a court, to review and judge of the propriety of collection, or remitting, and their judgment should not be reviewed or reversed by any civil court. If a man, by his age, is liable to be enrolled in the first instance, (until he arrives at the age of exemption) he shall have no other tribunal, before whom he may bring his claim, but the board of field officers. If Congress should leave to the respective States to make exemptions, they ought to provide that the person who had been dismissed, or exempted from militia duty in his native State, or place of residence, for services which he had performed as an officer in the line or staff, should not be liable to be enrolled in another State, to which he may remove, provided he produces evidence of his former service and exemptions. A person who may have served as a staff officer in Connecticut, is, by the law of New York, liable to do duty in the ranks, if he moves into that State, which ought not to be the case. Courtesy dictates otherwise.

The manner of appointing officers to take command of the militia in this State, and, perhaps, in many other States, is a subject which I doubt whether the United States would think expedient to meddle with. It is one of those points respecting which advocates may be found for and against regulating the same; but, if it should be thought within the constitution, and expedient to meddle with the subject, a question will arise, whether the appointment of commissioned and non-commissioned officers to companies may not be placed in better hands than in the hands of the soldiers? But, as it is doubtful in my mind exactly where the constitution intended to limit the arrangement of the militia, by the word *organize*, and as taking the appointment of the officers and non-commissioned officers from the soldiers, is rather aristocratic and anti-republican, I will not extend my remarks on that subject. Permit me

to suggest that the bestowment of rank *by brevet*, to persons not in the line, was a source of inconvenience in the Revolutionary war, and requires great caution and care. Having so largely remarked on the subject of the militia as I have done, you will permit me to observe, that I have not prepared the same for criticism; I have suggested my ideas with freedom to you as a friend, and in compliance with your request; I hope they will not be exposed to much inspection but by my friend. The gentlemen who compose the military committee are unknown to me, but presume they are strangers, and will not highly appreciate my remarks; but to you I submit them.

I am, with much esteem and respect, your obedient and very humble servant,

EBEN. HUNTINGTON.

The Honorable BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

TRENTON, 29th December, 1809.

SIR:

I do not presume I can add to the information of an officer of your experience; it is, however, proper to pay respectful attention to the subject of the letter you did me the honor to write on the 20th (received the 26th) inst. You will therefore please accept of the following answers given to your questions, relative to the organization of the militia of the United States, as the result of my observations:

First. How are your dragoon and artillery corps formed?

Answer. Previous to the Western expedition, in 1794, the companies of cavalry and artillery, in New Jersey, were attached to the regiments within whose bounds they were formed.

Besides a brigade of upwards of 1,500 infantry, including two companies of artillery thereto attached, in requisition, 537 cavalry marched as volunteers to Pittsburg. Governor Howell appointed General White, then adjutant general of New Jersey, to the command of the cavalry, arranged in squadrons under the command of senior captains. The like formation into squadrons was made of the cavalry of Pennsylvania, by Governor Mifflin.

Upon the return of the cavalry to New Jersey, application was made to the Legislature, and by the militia law of New Jersey were formed into ten squadrons, making five regiments, and composed one brigade, under the command of a brigadier general, five lieutenant colonels, and ten majors, and have so continued.

The artillery of the State was also formed into two battalions, making one regiment, and officered accordingly.

It was found absolutely necessary to organize such a body of cavalry as 500 into squadrons and regiments, for subordination and discipline.

It will therefore be advisable, as well for the sake of uniformity, throughout the United States, as for their better military regulation and discipline, to direct the organization of the cavalry in squadrons and regiments. It will be more satisfactory, where the cavalry have been thus organized, and prevent offence by their being reduced.

Second. What inconvenience would result from limiting the shortest period of service to a commissioned officer?

Answer. It would be an improvement of the militia law of the United States to restrain the resignation of officers, until they shall have served seven years, unless in cases of necessity; and after-service of seven years, to be exempted from service in the ranks, nevertheless, to be embodied and mustered with the *senior* class.

There are no exemptions in New Jersey but those exempted by the militia law of the United States. If an officer resigns, he must return to the ranks or be fined.

Third. What are the objections to embodying a corps of between the ages of forty-five and sixty?

Answer. There is no reasonable objection. The militia law of the United States ought to require the muster of all able bodied men, between the ages of forty-five and sixty, for review, properly armed, but not to perform military duty, only in case of invasion; nor to be required to march out of the State; to be denominated the *Senior Corps*, or *Senior Class*, of militia.

Permit me here to ask, what objections can be made to class *minors*, between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one?

These youths to put on their frocks, or other regimentals, and be exercised in their several *towns*, two hours before sunset, on the last Saturday in April, May, June, July, August, and September, under officers above the age of twenty-one.

Great complaints are made in New Jersey by parents and masters having their children and apprentices put in requisition; in many cases, inability to equip, pay fines, &c. which operates as a heavy tax on poor parents, and particularly on mechanics, who have from five to twenty apprentices. I wish to see such a corps well disciplined in their non-age.

There was some objection made to the enrolling of minors when this business of classification, between twenty-one and twenty-six, was before Congress, in 1806. Yet I have never heard of a constitutional objection against that part of the present militia law of the United States, which directs the enrolment of those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years. And why not enrol *minors* of sixteen, as well as those of eighteen, &c. If it is unconstitutional in any of the States to enrol minors, what becomes of those between eighteen and twenty-one? If the objection arises from the constitution of any of the States, on account of the appointment of the officers to command minors, this can be accommodated in those States, by incorporating the *minor* with the *senior* class, and let the *seniors* exclusively elect the officers to command both classes.

There ought to be some amelioration made in favor of those between eighteen and twenty-one, as to the equipments, fines, penalties, and particularly on requisitions of the Government.

The *Junior Corps*, of course, will be those between twenty-one and forty-five, compose the great body and active militia force of the nation; be put in requisition as heretofore, to march out of the State, &c.; nor do I wish to see this corps paralyzed by the classification, of men between twenty-one and twenty-five, as has been proposed.

Fourth. What are your objections against classing the militia, so that the burthen of active duty shall fall on men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five years?

Answer. Doubts are entertained:

I. Whether this would not infringe the constitution of the United States, art. 1, sec. 8, page 16, "reserving to the States, respectively, the *appointment* of the officers, and the authority of training the militia," &c. And the article of amendment to the constitution of the United States, "a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Although I sincerely wish this reservation and amendment were stricken out of the constitution of the United States, yet, whilst they remain, no good, energetic, general, uniform, national system of organization, of the militia of the United States, can be effected. In the administration of President Adams, it was alleged that the act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional army, passed 22d May, 1798, particularly section 3, and the supplementary act thereto of 22d June, 1798, were infringements of these articles of the constitution of the United States, inasmuch as it was unconstitutional—

1st. To separate a part of the militia within the State.

2d. Exempted these volunteer corps, whilst within the State, from the government of the militia laws of the State.

3d. The appointment of the officers by the President.

II. The impolicy of such a corps at this time:

1st. It would derange, at one stroke, the system of organization of the militia of the several States, adopted near eighteen years, under the militia law of the United States.

2d. It would annul, or operate as a repeal, of the several militia laws of the United States, passed in conformity to the law of the United States, of 8th May, 1792.

- 3d. It would require at least a year for the passing of the militia laws, in the several States, conforming to the proposed alteration, and perhaps some of the States would not concur.
- 4th. The extended residence of men, between twenty-one and twenty-six, in the country, will make their assembling, for exercise, &c. very burthensome and unequal with those in the cities and populous parts of the United States.
- 5th. The exercise under officers (as it must be) of their own choice *will not improve* these corps in military knowledge, better than the great body of the militia under the present system.
- 6th. It will be an insupportable expense to allow this *select* corps pay and rations.
- 7th. It will weaken the natural defence of the nation, composed of the great body of the people, by placing entire dependence on this select corps.
- 8th. In requisitions, substitutes are usually obtained of the poorer classes of men above twenty-six, and, indeed, many only "fit food for powder and ball." If these select corps are established, the nation cannot be purified of these gross materials above twenty-six.

*If such corps should be selected, and separated from the militia, to allow them rations would be sufficient, to be exercised by their officers, under the direction and inspection of an inspector in each State, distinguished for military acquirements; to be paid by the United States.*

Fifth. Would it be advisable for the Government to arm the militia?

Answer. That article of the constitution of the United States, respecting the militia, expressly directs, that Congress shall "provide for *arming*" the militia. They have not done it. The National Legislature have neglected what they ought have done the moment it was in their power, to have apportioned arms, accoutrements, &c. to the amount, at least, of one-sixth of the number of the enrolled militia; established arsenals for their preservation, with magazines of powder and ball, and camp equipage, &c. But, instead of doing this, Congress, by their militia law of 1792, order every citizen enrolled to provide *himself* with arms, &c. and in five years require all muskets to have bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound. The Legislatures of some of the States have passed militia laws directing this to be done. Seventeen years have elapsed, and it has not been effected, it is believed, by any State in the Union. In New Jersey, only one regiment have (from fines collected from the Quakers within its bounds) purchased six hundred stand of arms and accoutrements.

The supply of arms, ammunition, camp equipage, arsenals, &c. in every State ready for the militia, particularly for one-sixth thereof, being, perhaps, sufficient for any requisition of the United States, would give spirit and confidence to the great body of the militia.

The amendment of the constitution of the United States, cited, secures "the right of the people to keep and bear arms;" nor will the constitution of the United States, or the rights of the States, or of the people, be infringed, and I am very confident not endangered, if the concurrent authority of the National Government is exercised to provide arms, establish magazines, &c. and to arm indeed the great body of the militia of the United States.

Sixth. Would it be advisable to call out any portion of the militia, yearly, to take the field? and if so, on what principle would it be advisable to adopt such a system?

Answer. Before this can be done to any advantage, arms, accoutrements, tents, and camp equipage must be furnished by the Government of the United States; after the national Legislature shall have provided and delivered into the magazines established in every State, sufficient for a requisition of, say, 100,000 men, to be enrolled for three years' service, from the *junior* class of militia, that is, between twenty-one and forty-five, according to the quotas of the several States, who shall meet once a year in the vicinity of the arsenal, and perform, for fifteen days, all the duties incident to a camp, to be exercised by their officers, and inspected by their respective State adjutant general, who will perform similar duties to those prescribed in the sixth section of the militia law of the United States.

Neither officers or men to receive pay, but to be furnished with rations and clothing, of a frock, pantaloons, &c. from the magazines, to be returned on breaking up the camp, &c.

Seventh. What are the prominent defects of the present system?

Answer. The answer to this question has been, in a manner, anticipated by the observations already made, particularly respecting the *neglect of the Government of the United States in not making provision to supply arms, tents, &c.*; establishing magazines in the several States: for *the making of militia laws, will not avail, without arms, ammunition, camp equipage, &c. ready to take the field.*

Whether the classification of the *senior* and *minor*, or either of these corps, be adopted; that, in preference to the proposed select corps, between twenty-one and twenty-six, the *junior* corps of men, between eighteen and forty five, or twenty-one and forty-five, be put in requisition, without discrimination, whenever a call is made by the Government.

The returns of militia being very incorrect, the quotas on the several States ought to be according to the representation in the House of Representatives in Congress.

I beg leave to suggest here, that the law to take the *census* provides for the enumeration of all males under sixteen; between sixteen and twenty-one; between twenty-one and forty-five; and between the ages of forty-five and sixty; and from sixty upwards; at any rate, *of the number of males between eighteen and forty-five, if the present militia system shall be continued.*

Sincerely wishing you health, and many returns of this season of joy and festivity,

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOSEPH BLOOMFIELD.

The Honorable Colonel B. TALLMADGE.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 99.

[2d SESSION.]

MILITARY AND NAVAL EXPENSES, FROM 1789 TO 1810.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 5, 1810.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, April 3, 1810.

SIR:

I have the honor, in obedience to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 31st ult., to transmit a statement of the annual amount of expenditure, in relation to the military and naval establishments, from the 4th of March, 1789, to the end of the year 1809.

The sums paid for military pensions, and for the Indian department, are not included in the statement; but it embraces all other expenses, including those for fortifications, arms, and military stores, purchase of navy yards, and building of vessels.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

ALBERT GALLATIN

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

*A Statement exhibiting the gross annual amount of Expenditure, in relation to the Military and Naval Establishments, from the 4th of March, 1789, to the end of the year 1809.*

Years.	Military Establishment.	Naval Establishment.	Total.
From March 4, 1789, to Dec. 31, 1791,	\$632,804 03	- -	\$632,804 03
Do. do. 1792,	1,103,038 47	- -	1,103,038 47
Do. do. 1793,	1,132,443 91	- -	1,132,443 91
Do. do. 1794,	2,589,097 59	\$61,408 97	2,650,506 56
Do. do. 1795,	2,422,385 81	410,562 03	2,832,947 84
Do. do. 1796,	1,246,227 82	274,784 04	1,521,111 86
Do. do. 1797,	1,002,299 04	382,631 89	1,384,930 93
Do. do. 1798,	1,939,692 39	1,331,347 76	3,321,040 15
Do. do. 1799,	2,405,669 17	2,858,081 84	5,263,751 01
Do. do. 1800,	2,517,409 99	3,448,716 03	5,966,126 02
Do. do. 1801,	1,600,944 08	2,111,424 00	3,712,368 08
Do. do. 1802,	1,179,148 25	915,810 87	2,094,960 12
Do. do. 1803,	822,055 85	1,246,317 89	2,068,373 74
Do. do. 1804,	875,923 93	1,273,860 25	2,149,784 18
Do. do. 1805,	712,781 28	1,597,500 00	2,310,281 28
Do. do. 1806,	1,224,355 35	1,649,641 44	2,873,996 82
Do. do. 1807,	1,288,685 91	1,722,064 47	3,010,750 38
Do. do. 1808,	2,900,834 40	1,884,067 80	4,784,902 20
Do. do. 1809,	3,345,772 17	2,427,758 80	5,773,530 97
	\$30,941,669 47	\$23,645,979 08	\$54,587,648 55

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Register's Office*, April 3, 1810.

JOSEPH NOURSE, *Register*.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 100.

[2d SESSION.

### MORTALITY IN THE TROOPS AT NEW ORLEANS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 27, 1810.

Mr. NEWTON, from the committee, in obedience to a resolution which passed the House of Representatives of the United States, on the thirteenth of March last, instructing them to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in the detachment of the army of the United States, ordered for the defence of New Orleans, submitted the following report:

The committee perceived, at the instant their attention was directed to the subject referred to them, its importance, difficulty, and extent. The solicitude which was expressed for the acquisition of accurate information, and the manner in which the inquiries of the committee were pointed to a specific object, stimulated them to fulfil, to the utmost of their power, the expectation and desire of the House. In performing the duties assigned to them, they necessarily had many difficulties to encounter; these consisted in collecting, collating, and arranging a multitude of facts and circumstances, which had their origin in a distant territory, and the dissimilar aspects in which the same object would be represented, according to the medium through which it had been seen. Not discouraged at the prospect of such labors, they proceeded to commence them with every disposition and with all the patience so essential to ensure a fair, candid, and impartial disclosure of the state of the detachment of the army ordered to New Orleans. To accomplish a purpose every way so desirable and interesting, and likewise to obviate objections, the committee, on mature deliberation and reflection, determined to make a plain and succinct statement of facts, as the method best calculated to impart information, and to guide the understanding in the formation of a current judgment.

In pursuing this plan, which the committee early laid down for their observance, they are led to present to the House, in a narrow compass, the correspondence which passed between the Department of War and the commanding officer.

Next in order, the number of troops sent to New Orleans, and the present effective force.

The measures taken for paying the troops, and the precautions observed for ensuring a prompt supply of sound and wholesome provisions for their subsistence.

The instructions given to the military agent by the Department of War, and the authority invested in the commanding officer over the military agent, as gathered from the instructions. Under this head will be included whatever relates to clothing and medical and hospital stores.

The depositions taken by the committee.

Lastly, the causes which, in the opinion of the committee, produced the mortality in that detachment of the army.

#### A No. 1.

A letter from the Secretary of War, dated February 24, 1810, in answer to one addressed to him in obedience to the direction of the committee, requesting information on the subject submitted to them.

The Secretary says, "I have the honor accordingly herewith to submit to their inspection a transcript of the original order, bearing date December 2, 1803, designating the force destined for the defence of New Orleans, and of the subsequent orders from this Department, together with such extracts from the letters of the commanding general as relate to the selection and occupancy of, and the removal of the troops from, the encampment at Terre au Boeuf."



## A No. 2.

On the 2d of December, 1808, the Secretary of War, (General Henry Dearborn) in a letter to General James Wilkinson, says, "I am directed by the President of the United States to have the necessary measures taken, without delay, for assembling as large a proportion of our regular troops at New Orleans and its vicinity, as circumstances will permit." Immediately following this extract, the regiments and companies destined for New Orleans are designated, and the previous preparatory arrangements connected with the movements are directed to be made. The letter then concludes: "You will please to take measures for being at New Orleans in season to take command of the army in that department as early as practicable, and to have such a disposition of the troops in that department formed, as will most effectually enable you to defend New Orleans and its dependencies against any invading force. In case of emergency, you are authorized by the President of the United States to call on the Governors of the Orleans and Mississippi territories, for such detachments of the militia as may be deemed necessary."

On the 30th of April, 1809, the Secretary of War (William Eustis, Esquire,) addressed a letter to General James Wilkinson, expressing great anxiety and solicitude for the health of the troops. "Alive to apprehensions on this important point, he proceeds to say, "on inspecting the general instructions given by this Department, 2d of December, 1808, it appears that the troops were to be assembled at New Orleans: an apprehension that the letter of this instruction may be construed to limit any measures which your own judgment might suggest respecting a change of position, induces me to remove any such obstacle, if it shall have had an influence. By the returns of the 24th of March, it appears that more than one-fourth part of the troops were sick. Without a knowledge of this fact, the removal of the army from New Orleans, during the summer and autumnal months, is suggested by every consideration of prudence and experience. If, therefore, such removal shall not, on receipt of this letter, have been already commenced, you will be pleased to give the necessary orders to have it effected immediately. After leaving the necessary garrison, consisting of old troops, at New Orleans, it will be desirable that all the others should be transported either to the high ground in the rear of Fort Adams, or a part of them in the rear of the Natchez; perhaps both these stations should be occupied, a division of the troops being more favorable to their health than quartering the whole together in one body: of this you will judge. The primary object will be to preserve the health and lives of the men; next, to have them so quartered as will best admit of a regular system of order, government, and discipline, with as much economy as is practicable."

On the 29th of May, 1809, General James Wilkinson addressed a letter to the Secretary of War. He says, "after much inquiry, I have determined on a spot for the encampment of the troops. It was a difficult matter, from the localities of the country, to adjust; and being an object of primary importance in relation to economy, discipline, and health, it has truly occupied all my cares and attentions, and will, I hope, be my excuse for inattention to minor objects." In the part immediately succeeding this extract, the General mentions that he had abandoned the idea of encamping on the site spoken of by General Henry Dearborn, called Galvestown, on the Amite river, on account of its being the most sickly spot in the territory. The General then says: "with the general voice of the Americans and Creoles in favor of it, I have selected a piece of ground on the left bank of the Mississippi, below this city about four leagues, which I find perfectly dry at this moment, although the surface of the river, restrained by its dykes, is in general three feet above the level of the country. You will put your finger on the spot at the head of the English Turn, just where the route to the settlements on the Terre au Bœuf leaves the river. The disadvantages of the position are private ground, private wood, and its vicinity to New Orleans. But its advantages are, promised health, the best water of the country, the accommodation and comforts of a market, the immediate protection of the city, and the prompt defence of the river and lakes against an invading force. Under such considerations, and the rapid advance of the season, I could pause no longer; but shall proceed to take the position, and make the necessary establishments for the reception and safe keeping of the stores and provisions, necessary to supply and support the troops, and for the comfortable lodgement of the sick and well."

*Letter from General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, June 18, 1809.

"Your letters of the 30th April, and 4th ultimo did not reach New Orleans until the last mail, the 14th instant, though we received at the same time the President's speech. I am happy that I have so far anticipated your wishes as to have encamped the troops, though I have not sought the position you recommended; nor should I have done so while permitted to exercise my discretion, and for the following reasons: The movement to Fort Adams or to Natchez must have been made by water, as the Spaniards will not permit our passage through West Florida: the toil, the time, and exposition to the sun, in ascending the river one hundred leagues, with a corps of two thousand, would probably have deceased nine-tenths of the men, many of whom were in a convalescent state, and as many sick." The General then states the expense of transportation; that the position is too remote for the seasonable protection of New Orleans against external attack or internal commotion; that the upper country might prove more sickly than the bank of the Mississippi; that the movement to Terre au Bœuf was made without inconvenience to the well, or injury to the sick, and at no expense, because the chalons which transported them will be employed in erecting the necessary temporary buildings, and for flooring the tents. The General further states, that the position taken is refreshed by sea breezes, and that although more than five hundred sick and convalescent were brought to the ground which had been previously occupied by five hundred and sixty men, from the 1st instant not more than three men died, and one of these of an apoplexy; that the morning reports of the 13th and 16th will exhibit a frightful return of the sick; "yet, says he, you are to understand that nine-tenths are strongly convalescent, and are returned sick to prevent their being detailed for the general fatigues, to which we are now, and shall be for some time to come, necessarily exposed." After mentioning that the safety of those who are entrusted to his charge impress him with an awful sense of responsibility, and will occupy all his attention, he proceeds to say: "It is a source of pleasurable reflection to me, that the aspects and accommodation of the position have prepossessed every man and officer in its favor. We have a good market of vegetables, milk, eggs, and fowls, from the settlements of Terre au Bœuf." He then speaks of arrangements in the sutling department; wishes to be advised whether it is the intention of Government to erect a cantonment, as one would be necessary; either at Natchez or Terre au Bœuf: for the latter, expenses of such establishment are set forth. He then says, "I submit these observations to you for your consideration, as it is my duty to aid your judgment, and shall be ready to execute the Presidential will."

*The Secretary of War to General James Wilkinson, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1809.

Being unable to perceive any advantages in the position which you have selected for an encampment, as stated in your letter of the 29th of May, which give it a preference over the high ground in the rear of Fort Adams, or its vicinity, to which my letter of the 30th of April directed, conditionally, the removal of the troops, I am left to presume either that my letter has not been received, or that some causes unknown to me and reconcilable with the object stated in that letter have governed your decision. On receiving this letter you will be pleased immediately to embark all the troops, leaving a sufficient garrison of old troops at New Orleans and at Fort St. Philip, and proceed with them to the high ground in the rear of Fort Adams, and to the high ground in the rear of Natchez, (the public ground) and form encampments; dividing them equally, or in such proportions between the two places, as your own

judgment shall direct. The enclosed copy of an order from the Navy Department will present you the means of transportation. The movement of the troops will be committed entirely to your direction."

By a letter bearing date Camp Terre au Bœuf, July 23d, 1809, General Wilkinson acknowledges that the preceding order had come to his hand: he says, "your duplicate of the 22d ultimo reached New Orleans by last mail on the 19th, and came to my hands on the night of the 20th, at ten o'clock: the original has not yet arrived. The peremptory tenor of your order for the removal of the troops has relieved me from an oppressive load of responsibility, and I have not lost a moment in entering on the execution." He states the impossibility of controlling the effects of the climate; that it will be in vain to seek refuge from disease in that region, with unseasoned recruits. He also states, that, when possession was taken of the present healthful site at Columbia Springs, near Fort Adams, two hundred and forty-six men were down at one time out of about five hundred. After mentioning some things relating to the movement of the detachment up the river, he says, "you will discover, from my letter of the 18th ult., the causes which opposed our ascent of the river: the employment of the gun boats removes the expense, and the labor of the sailors will save that of the troops, but the tardiness of the movement and the heat of the sun in dog days must endanger our health."

After expressing his sense of the necessity of economy, and stating that the establishment had cost something, but that the cost will bear comparison with antecedent expenses, he then mentions that the public cost, in future, would not exceed six or eight hundred dollars per month, the year round, for every incidental expense, wood, pasturage, and quarters, included; and concludes thus: "under all circumstances, I must frankly say, that, was my discretion permitted, I should stay here and hazard the consequences; but as there would be hazard, I am glad of your order to move, not only as it lessens my responsibility, but because the change of place may prove salutary to our men; in all events you may depend on whatever my judgment, experience, personal exposition, and attention, can effect."

### A No. 3.

The following letter, dated Camp, Terre au Bœuf, August 19, 1809, is addressed to the Secretary of War, by General Wilkinson: he says, "I have not received the scrip of a pen from you since the 30th of June, but am progressing rapidly in my arrangements for moving the troops, an object near my heart, and which occupies all my attentions."

The General then states, that not one of the gunboats had been reported in readiness; that the preparation was difficult, owing to the general sickness of their crews, and the impracticability of shipping men; that the condemned barges at Fort Adams had been ordered down, and were repairing at a small expense; that if the gun boats fail him, he should hire three or four barges, and that in twenty days he expected to make good his landing at Natchez, or in that vicinity. He then states, "our sick have increased considerably, but our maladies are confined almost universally to the ague and fever; nearly all the officers had it, but we have not lost one, nor do I expect we shall." He states the difficulties which occurred in the department of provisions: he says, "the clamors of the troops had been loud and just; that he had offered one hundred dollars for a small cow, without effect; that the flour was affected by the climate immediately after landing; and that, on the utter failure of the contractor to furnish bread or flour, for two or three days successively, he had purchased a hundred barrels of flour, and had the same distributed." He attributes to the absence of the contractor, and the consequent management of his business being entrusted to a young man, without knowledge or experience, and, apparently, of an obstinate, perverse disposition, all the difficulties they had to encounter on the subject of provisions. He then says, "I wish, indeed, that he may not oblige me to take the whole business out of his hands, and to appoint a commissary to purchase and supply; but, in the last extremity only, shall I resort to this step." After stating "that the inhabitants were down with the prevailing disease of the camp, a thing which, according to them, had never before occurred," he concludes thus: "I am alarmed for our medical and hospital expenses, but I do not understand that a particle of either has yet arrived for the new levies, and of course I have no alternative but to submit to the requisitions of the surgeons. We shall not, however, press your appropriations for this department, although the consumption of five or six hundred sick must be considerable."

### *Detachment of the Army ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

Aggregate, according to the returns which have been printed,	2,036
B. Absentees accounted for.	
C. A return of the troops commanded by Brigadier General Hampton, for December, 1809.	
D. Do. of the troops at the cantonment, Washington, M. T. for January, 1810.	
E. Do. of the troops at the last mentioned cantonment, for February, 1810.	
F. Do. of deaths, desertions, and discharges of the "additional military force," allotted for the defence of New Orleans, from 1st May, 1809, to 28th February, 1810, viz:	
Deaths,	686
Desertions,	108
Discharges,	58
	852
G. Do. of the effective strength of the "additional military force," allotted for the defence of New Orleans, taken from the latest reports which have been received at the inspector's office, Washington city, April 16, 1810, aggregate,	1,184
H. Do. of a detachment of the United States' marines, stationed at New Orleans, from the 1st of March, 1809, to the 31st of December, 1809. Exhibiting the monthly force of the detachment, and the number of deaths, respectively.	

### I.

### *Funds placed at the disposition of the Paymaster of the Army of the United States, for the pay of the detachment ordered to New Orleans.*

Sum estimated for this object for the year 1809,	\$250,000
Lieut. Simeon Knight, the District Paymaster at New Orleans, was, in the early part of the year 1809, furnished with the sum of	100,000
In June, 1809, Lieut. Simeon Knight was authorized to draw for fifty thousand dollars, of which sum, he drew	40,000
July, 1809, there was remitted to Lieut. Simeon Knight, and received by him before the 7th of August following, the sum of	100,000
Authority was given, in order to enable him to commence the payment of the troops for the year 1810, to draw for	60,000

## K.

## PROVISIONS.

These are furnished by contract. By the second article of the contract for supplying provisions to the troops, it is provided, "that it shall be in the option of the general or officer commanding an army on a great military district, to direct when and how often fresh or salted meat shall be issued by general orders, to be promulgated a reasonable time before the issue is to commence."

By the fourth article, "whenever, in the opinion of the commanding officer, the provisions offered to be issued are unsound, unfit for use, or of an unmerchantable quality, a survey shall be held thereon by two disinterested persons, one to be chosen by the commanding officer, and the other by the contractor, or his agent; and, in case of disagreement, a third person, to be chosen by mutual consent, who shall have power to condemn such part of the provisions as to them may appear unfit for use." If the contractor, "or his agent, fail, or neglect to appoint a person to inspect the provisions, after reasonable notice in writing, the commanding officer may appoint such persons as he may think proper."

The fifth article authorizes the commanding general, "in case of absolute failure, or deficiency in quantity, of provisions contracted to be delivered and issued, to supply the deficiency by purchase, at the risk of the contractor." The power conferred by the last article was, in one instance, exercised. That those granted by the fourth and fifth articles were not exercised, can be accounted for, by this Department, on the presumption only, that, in the opinion of the general, the country could not furnish the supplies.

## L No. 1.

*Instructions to the Military Agent at New Orleans, and amount of disbursements in that department.*

The following instruction to A. D. Abrahams, the military agent at New Orleans, "to procure and deliver, on the orders of the commanding officer, such articles as he may deem necessary for the public service," was given by the Secretary of War, (Gen. Henry Dearborn) on the 12th of December, 1808.

## L No. 2.

The Secretary of War, (William Eustis, Esq.) May 4, 1809, wrote to A. M'Culloch, and informed him of his appointment as military agent, A. D. Abrahams having resigned. This letter contains many regulations for the agent's observance in executing the duties of his office. The abovementioned instruction is repeated, and the following additional one given: "The expenditures should be as economical as the good of the service will permit. No article, it is presumed, will be required of you, but such as the nature and good of the service actually demand. Should it happen, however, at any time, that demands are made upon you to a large amount, the propriety of complying with which you may doubt, and where delay may not, in your judgment, prove injurious to the public interest, you are to consult this Department." It appears Mr. M'Culloch died in a few days after his arrival at New Orleans; on which Major Zebulon M. Pike, of the 6th regiment, was appointed, by Gen. Wilkinson, as successor to Mr. M'Culloch, and continued to discharge the duties of that office under the instructions given to Mr. M'Culloch, until the removal of the troops from the encampment at Terre au Bœuf.

## L Nos. 7 and 3.

The Secretary of War, in a letter addressed to the committee, bearing date the 16th of April, 1810, says, "Representation being made by the Accountant of this Department, that many articles in the accounts rendered by Mr. A. D. Abrahams, the military agent, were charged at extravagant prices, the necessity of some of which did not appear, and the prices of others being deemed exorbitant, the military agent was informed, on the 10th of August last, that he was not authorized to comply with such requisitions in future. This is the only limitation of the instructions beforementioned, which has been made by this Department." This last instruction to the military agent could not have reached him until some time in September last. The military agent, whenever he wanted funds, drew bills on the Department of War, which were regularly paid.

## L Nos. 4, 5, and 6.

*Disbursements in the Quartermaster and Medical and Hospital Departments, by A. D. Abrahams, Military Agent.*

On account of that part of the army stationed at New Orleans, and in its vicinity, between the 1st of January and 20th of July, 1809, including payments made for the charter of a part of the vessel employed to transport the troops to that place.—See document K,	\$55,188 43
Disbursements made by Major Pike, on same account, from 21st July to 31st of December, 1809,	27,474 73
	\$82,663 16

NOTE. The above sums embrace no part of the expenditures made on the fortifications erecting at New Orleans.

William Linnard, military agent, at Philadelphia, in his letter of the 31st of March, 1810, states, that medical and hospital stores were shipped on board the schooner Hillsman; that she sailed from Philadelphia the 7th of January, 1809; was detained by ice; sailed again the 5th of March following, and arrived at New Orleans the 5th of April, and delivered the stores on the 7th and 8th.

## M Nos. 1 and 2.

## CLOTHING.

By the same letter from William Linnard, military agent, it appears, that the brig North Star sailed from Philadelphia the 6th of July, 1809, with clothing for the troops; arrived at New Orleans the 22d of August, and delivered the same in three days after her arrival; which was within twelve months of the time that the men of that detachment had generally received their clothing for the preceding year.

## THE DEPOSITIONS:

Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

The committee, from a knowledge which they have acquired of the climate of New Orleans, and of the country surrounding it, and from the facts stated in the depositions, are of opinion, that the mortality in the detachment ordered to New Orleans is to be ascribed to the following causes:

1. The detachment consisting of new levies;
2. The insalubrity of the climate—the summer and autumn of the year 1809 being unusually sickly.
3. To the nature of the ground on which the detachment was encamped at Terre au Bœuf, and the detention of it at that place during the whole of the summer, contrary, as the committee conceive, to the instructions contained in the letter of the Secretary of War, bearing date the 30th of April, 1809.
4. To the want of sound and wholesome provisions and of vegetables; the want of an hospital, and hospital stores and medicines.
5. The excessive fatigues to which the troops were subjected in clearing, ditching, and draining, the ground on which they were encamped.
6. To the want of repose during the night, owing to the troops not being provided with bars or nets to protect them from the annoyance of musquitoes.
7. The want of cleanliness in the camp, the nature of the position rendering it almost impracticable to preserve it.
8. The sick and well being confined to the same tents, which neither protected them sufficiently from the heat of the sun, nor kept them dry from the dews and rains.

## A No. 1.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 24, 1810.*

SIR:

In answering your letter of the 19th instant, requesting information on the following heads, viz:

- 1st. Whether the detachment from the army of the United States sent to New Orleans was encamped at Terre au Bœuf, on the Mississippi, in pursuance of orders given to the commanding officer of that detachment?
- 2d. The object of the encampment of that detachment at Terre au Bœuf?
- 3d. Whether the detachment during the encampment at Terre au Bœuf, suffered in any respect for want of regular and necessary supplies?
- 4th. Whether the detachment was encamped in contravention to orders: if in contravention to orders, the time it so continued at that place?

I have adopted the course which has appeared to me most becoming the occasion, and best calculated to convey to the honorable committee, of which you are chairman, the information they have requested. I have the honor, accordingly, herewith to submit to their inspection a transcript of the original order, bearing date December 2d, 1808, designating the force destined for the defence of New Orleans, and of the subsequent orders from this Department, together with such extracts from the letters of the commanding general as relate to the selection and occupancy of, and the removal of the troops from, the encampment at Terre au Bœuf.

Previous to the issuing of the order of the 22d of June, a consultation was had with the Secretary of the Navy, the result of which justified an expectation that the necessary transports for the troops might be derived from the naval flotilla on the Orleans station; an order for that purpose was accordingly given.

On receiving the order of the 22d of June, it is believed that the General made every possible effort to procure the transports for his army; but the sickness which afflicted the army, and the whole country, had also extended itself to the marine: owing to this circumstance, and the distance of the vessels from New Orleans, unexpected delays occurred; in addition to which, it being found necessary to have the assistance of the public boats at Fort Adams, which required repairs, the General found himself unable to embark the army until the month of September, as stated in my letter of the 30th of January last.

At such time as the honorable committee may be pleased to appoint, I shall be ready to attend on them, and to give such further information as may be required.

With respectful consideration, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Honorable THOMAS NEWTON, *Chairman.*

## A No. 2.

*Letter from the Secretary of War to General James Wilkinson.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 2, 1808.*

SIR:

I am directed, by the President of the United States to have the necessary measures taken, without delay, for assembling as large a proportion of our regular troops, at New Orleans and its vicinity, as circumstances will permit. You will please, therefore, to issue preparatory orders for the transportation to New Orleans of the 3d, 5th, and 7th regiments of infantry, with a battalion consisting of four companies from the 6th regiment, together with the companies of light dragoons, light artillery, and riflemen, raised in the States and territories to the southward of New Jersey. The troops, generally, in the Atlantic States, should be assembled at Savannah, Charleston, South Carolina, Washington, North Carolina, Norfolk and Hoods, Fort M<sup>h</sup>Henry and Fort Mifflin, where suitable vessels will be provided for their transportation.

The troops raised in the Western States, together with the late Captain Bissell's company, will be provided with suitable boats for descending the Ohio and Mississippi. Captain Boote's company should march by land, from the Ocmulgee to Fort Stoddert or Fort St. Stephens. The field officers of each regiment of infantry, and one field officer of the respective corps of light dragoons, light artillery, and riflemen, should be marched with their corps; and a major, with the battalion from the 6th regiment of infantry, together with the surgeons and mates of the regiments of infantry; a surgeon to the respective corps of dragoons, artillery, and riflemen; and a mate with the battalion of the 6th regiment of infantry. Provisions for seventy-five days, with a supply of water for thirty-five days, should be put on board of each vessel for the men on board. Medicine and hospital stores, camp kettles, &c., &c. will be forwarded, with ammunition and tents.

In giving your orders for the assemblage of the troops at the different points, it will not be necessary to give any indications of their ultimate destination.

One subaltern of each company, best qualified for the recruiting service, should remain at the respective rendezvous, with instructions to continue that service with all possible celerity: and to have their recruits assembled at the garrisons on the sea-boards of the respective Atlantic States; and at Newport, in Kentucky, and Massac, from the Western States. It may, however, be advisable to direct the recruits, enlisted in the interior of Pennsylvania and Virginia, to assemble on the Western waters.

You will please to take measures for being at New Orleans in season to take command of the army, in that department, as early as practicable; and to have such a disposition of the troops, in that department, formed, as will most effectually enable you to defend New Orleans, and its dependencies, against any invading force.

In case of emergency, you are authorized, by the President of the United States, to call on the Governors of the Orleans and Mississippi territories, for such detachments of the militia as may be deemed necessary.

I am, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

*Letter from the Secretary of War to General James Wilkinson.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 30, 1809.

SIR:

In my letter of the 27th instant, a concern was expressed for the health of the troops, together with a confidence in your experience, knowledge of country, and entire competency and disposition to adopt every necessary measure respecting that very important object.

On inspecting the general instructions given by this department 2d December, 1808, it appears that the troops were to be assembled at New Orleans; an apprehension that the letter of this instruction may be construed to limit any measures which your own judgment might suggest, respecting a change of position, induces me to remove any such obstacle, if it shall have had an influence.

By the returns of the 24th March, it appears that more than one-fourth part of the troops were sick.

Without a knowledge of this fact, the removal of the army from New Orleans, during the summer and autumnal months, is suggested by every consideration of prudence and experience.

If, therefore, such removal shall not, on receipt of this letter, have been already commenced, you will be pleased to give the necessary orders to have it effected immediately.

After leaving the necessary garrison, consisting of old troops, at New Orleans, it will be desirable that all the others should be transported either to the high ground, in the rear of Fort Adams, or a part of them in the rear of Natchez; perhaps both these stations should be occupied, a division of the troops being more favorable to their health, than quartering the whole together in one body; of this you will judge. The primary objects will be to preserve the health and lives of the men; next, to have them so quartered as will best admit of a regular system of order, government, and discipline, with as much economy as is practicable.

I am, &amp;c.

W. EUSTIS.

*Extract of a letter from General James Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEW ORLEANS, May 29, 1809.

SIR:

After much inquiry, I have determined on a spot for the encampment of the troops. It was a difficult matter, from the localities of the country, to adjust; and being an object of primary importance, in relation to economy, discipline, and health, it has truly occupied all my cares and attentions, and will, I hope, be my excuse for inattention to minor objects.

Your predecessor had spoken with me respecting the site of Galveztown, on the Amite river, about sixty miles north of this place, and I proposed reconnoitering; but the idea was no sooner promulgated than some of the most ancient inhabitants called to inform me that it was the most sickly spot in the territory, and that the Spaniards had actually abandoned it on that account.

The advantages of this position would have been public ground, public wood, and the removal of our recruits from the allurements and sinister seductions of this licentious place. Its disadvantages, the proximity of the Spanish occupancy, and its distance from the most assailable points of the coast. Its character, and the prejudices which prevail against it, I believe on just grounds, are decisive on my determination; and with the general voice of the American and Creole in favor of it, I have selected a piece of ground on the left bank of the Mississippi, below this city about four leagues, which I find perfectly dry at this moment, although the surface of the river, restrained by its dykes, is, in general, three feet above the level of the country; you will put your finger on the spot, at the head of the English Turn, just where the route to the settlements on the Terre au Bœuf leaves the river.

The disadvantages of this position are, private ground, private wood, and its vicinity to this city; the attractions of which will divert our green officers from due attention to their profession, and will expose them, as well as the men, to the arts, intrigues, dissipation, and corruption, of my personal enemies, and the enemies of the administration and the Government, who are as busy, under the management of Clark and his cabal, as fiends of hell, to corrupt and seduce men and officers from their duty, and to excite discontent and sedition. But its advantages are, promised health, the best water of the country, the accommodation and comforts of a market, the immediate protection of the city, and the prompt defence of the river and the lakes against an invading force. Under such considerations, and the rapid advance of the season, I could pause no longer, but shall proceed to take the position, and make the necessary establishments for the reception and safe keeping of the stores and provisions necessary to supply and support the troops, and for the comfortable lodgement of the sick and well.

*Extract of a letter from General James Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, June 19, 1809.

Your letters, of the 30th April and 4th ultimo, did not reach New Orleans until the last mail, the 14th instant, though we received, at the same time, the President's speech.

I am happy that I have so far anticipated your wishes as to have encamped the troops, though I have not sought the position you recommended; nor should I have done so, while permitted to exercise my discretion, and for the following reasons: The movement to Fort Adams, or to Natchez, must have been made by water, as the Spaniards will not permit our passage through West Florida; the toil, the time, and exposition to the sun, in ascending the river one hundred leagues, with a corps of two thousand, would probably have diseased nine-tenths of the men, many of whom were in a convalescent state, and as many sick; the expense of transportation would have exceeded twelve, or might have reached twenty thousand dollars; the position is too remote for the seasonable protection of New Orleans against external attack or internal commotion; and, after all, we might have found the upper country more sickly than the bank of the Mississippi, which frequently occurs. The movement to this place, on the contrary, was done without incommoation to the well, or injury to the sick, and at no expense, because the chalons which transported them will be employed in erecting the necessary temporary buildings, and for flooring the men's tents. It is impossible to decide whether we shall have a sickly or healthy season, but our proximity to the waters of the ocean, from which we have a breeze, together with appearances, so far, encourage us to believe in the latter; for, although we brought more than five hundred sick and convalescents to this ground, which had been previously occupied by five hundred and sixty men, from the 1st instant we have lost three men only, and one of these by an apoplexy. The morning reports of the 13th and 16th will speak for our convalescence, but will exhibit, at the same time, a frightful return of sick; yet you are to understand that nine-tenths of these are strongly convalescent, and are returned sick by order, to prevent their being detailed for the general fatigues, to which we are now, and shall be for some time to come, necessarily exposed. Whatever may be the result, rest assured, sir, that the safety of those who are entrusted to my charge impress me with an awful sense of responsibility, and will occupy my first attentions, assiduities, and cares; and it is a source of pleasurable reflection to me, that the aspects and accommodation of the position have prepossessed every man and officer in its favor. We have a good market of vegetables, milk, eggs, and fowls, from the settlements of Terre au Bœuf, and I shall make such arrangements in the sutling department as entirely to exclude the use of ardent spirits, which have been the bane of the service, and has destroyed more men than every other cause. I shall, at the same time, encourage the use of malt liquors, and small red wines, which may be had almost as cheap as whiskey.

As the troops must not return to New Orleans, one hundred and fifty men being sufficient for the garrison of that place, it would appear as a necessary consequence that we must erect a cantonment somewhere, of which I cannot be too early advised, whether it be here or at Natchez. If here, the proprietor will sell a site to the Government; or he will give the use of the ground, with pasturage enclosures for our horses and cattle, and fire wood the year round, for two thousand men, at five hundred dollars per month; and I do not believe better terms could be had in the Mississippi territory. Our wood would cost in New Orleans, one thousand one hundred dollars per month in summer, and three thousand five hundred dollars in winter. Should our force be kept up, and this place be fixed on, the huts can be put up by the men in a short period, and at a trifling expense; and the circumstance of receiving our subsistence on the river, instead of the interior of the upper country, will save two cents per ration.

I submit these observations to you for your consideration, as is my duty, to aid your judgment, and shall be ready to execute the Presidential will.

*Extracts of a letter from the Secretary of War to General James Wilkinson, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1809.

Being unable to perceive any advantages in the position which you have selected for an encampment, as stated in your letter of the 29th May, which give it a preference over the high grounds in the rear of Fort Adams, or its vicinity, to which my letter of the 30th April directed, conditionally, the removal of the troops, I am left to presume, either that my letter has not been received, or that some causes unknown to me, and reconcilable with the objects stated in that letter, have governed your decision.

On receiving this letter, you will be pleased immediately to embark all the troops, leaving a sufficient garrison of old troops at New Orleans and Fort St. Philip, and proceed with them to the high ground in the rear of Fort Adams, and to the high ground in the rear of Natchez, (the public ground) and form encampments, dividing them equally, or in such proportions, between the two places, as your own judgment shall direct. The enclosed copy of an order from the Navy Department will present to you the means of transportation. The movement of the troops will be committed entirely to your direction.

W. EUSTIS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1809.

SIR:

The Secretary of War having made application for the use of the gunboats under your command, for the purpose of removing the troops, under the command of General Wilkinson, up the Mississippi, you may retain as many of the boats as you may think absolutely necessary at your present station, and detach the remainder of them on this service, which I contemplate to be simply of the transport kind. The boats so detached are to continue on that service until the removal of the troops shall have been completed, unless contingencies shall arise which may require their being recalled previously; of which you are to judge. You are, yourself, to remain, during this service, at your station; and the boats having returned, you will be at liberty to avail yourself of the permission already forwarded you, "to come to the Atlantic States." You will inculcate on the officers commanding this detachment, the necessity of harmonizing with the military in every matter necessary to the most speedy attainment of the object intended to be effected.

Respectfully yours,

PAUL HAMILTON.

Captain DAVID PORTER, *New Orleans.*

*Extracts of a letter from General James Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, July 23, 1809.

SIR:

Your duplicate, of the 22d ultimo, reached New Orleans by the last mail, on the 19th, and came to my hands on the night of the 20th, at 10 o'clock, P. M.; the original has not yet arrived.

The peremptory tenor of your order for the removal of the troops has relieved me from an oppressive load of responsibility, and I have lost not a moment in entering on the execution. Nothing on my part shall be wanting to effect the transition, in the manner the most favorable and least afflicting to the troops; though, as it is impossible to control the effects of the climate, I fear it will be in vain for us to fly from disease in this region with our unseasoned recruits: for it occurs to me, that, when we took possession of the present healthful site at Columbian Springs, near Fort Adams, we had two hundred and forty-six men down at one time, out of about five hundred.

I am undetermined whether to move in a body or by detachment, but shall pursue that course which promises the greatest expedition. I fear delay on the part of the gunboats, because I know from experience the gentlemen of the navy abhor the idea of converting their vessels of war into transports; and, from the report of Lieutenant Carroll, it would appear that twenty-four gunboats, the number on this station, would not carry more than nine hundred and sixty men, little more than half our force. I have, however, a remedy for this difficulty, and if the gunboats are furnished, shall leave behind none but those who are too ill to be removed.

You will discover from my letter, of the 18th ultimo, the causes which opposed our ascent of the river; the employ of the gunboats removes the expense, and the labor of the sailors will save that of the troops, but the tardiness of the movement, and the heat of the sun in dog-days, must endanger our health.

I am so sensible of the necessity of economy, that I tremble at the idea of putting my name to paper for any thing; but my obligations to the service leave me no alternative. You shall not, however, have cause of complaint from my administration.

This establishment has cost something; but that cost will bear a comparison with antecedent expenses, and our camp, with the necessary accommodations, is nearly completed; after which we should not have cost the public more than six or eight hundred dollars per month, the year round, for every incidental expense, wood, pasturage, and quarters, included.

Under all circumstances, I must frankly say, that, was my discretion permitted, I should stay here and hazard the consequences; but, as there would be hazard, I am glad of your order to move, not only as it lessens my responsibility, but because the change of place may prove salutary to our men. In all events, you may depend on whatever my judgment, experience, personal exposition, and attention, can effect.

A No. 3.

CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, August 19, 1809.

SIR:

I have not received the scrip of a pen from you since the 30th of June, but am progressing rapidly in my arrangements for moving the troops, an object near my heart, and which occupies all my attentions.

Our prospects from the gunboats are bad indeed; not one of them has, as yet, been reported to me in readiness to commence the voyage, and the preparation is a difficult one, owing to the general sickness of their crews, and the impracticability of shipping men: but I have ordered certain condemned barges from Fort Adams, which have been lying there since 1807, and are now repairing and equipping them, at the expense of a few nails and a small

quantity of oakum and tar for the voyage. To these I shall add, if the gunboats fail me, three or four hired barges to take a full company each. And with this transport, I hope I may, by marching the well, be able to move every man from hence whose health may permit, and that I shall make good my landing at Natchez, or in that vicinity, in twenty days after we get under way. The operation is a laborious one, and somewhat hazardous; but you may rest assured that whatever zeal, activity, and attention, can accomplish, shall be done on my part.

Our sick have increased considerably; but our maladies are confined almost universally to the fever and ague. Nearly all the officers have had it; but we have not lost one, nor do I expect we shall.

Among the thousand difficulties I have had to combat, that of the department of provisions is not the least considerable. The clamors of the troops have been loud and just, and I have not been able to remedy their complaints. I have offered as high as a hundred dollars for a small cow, without effect; and the flour, generally, in New Orleans, from some unknown cause, has this season been affected by the climate immediately after landing. But, in consequence of the utter failure of the contractor to furnish bread or flour to the troops, for two or three days successively, I yesterday ordered a purchase, on any terms, of one hundred barrels, which arrived this morning, but has been refused by the contractor's agent, who got down a few barrels the last night, and, of consequence, I am compelled to order the issue to be made by the brigade quartermaster, for account of the contractor, which adds to my pains and perplexities.

Were the contractor here, from my knowledge of his character, I know these difficulties would not occur; but unfortunately his business is confined to a young man without knowledge or experience, and apparently of an obstinate, perverse disposition. I wish, indeed, that he may not oblige me to take the whole business out of his hands, and appoint a commissary to purchase and supply; but in the last extremity only shall I resort to this step.

The inhabitants of this whole country are now down with the prevailing disease of the camp—a thing which, according to them, has never before occurred; and the town is afflicted by bilious affections.

I am alarmed for our medical and hospital expenses; but I do not understand that a particle of either has yet arrived for the new levies, and, of course, I have no alternative but to submit to the requisitions of the surgeons: we shall not, however, press your appropriations for this department, although the consumption of five or six hundred sick must be considerable.

With perfect respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

The Hon. WILLIAM EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*

I.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, *Pay Office, April 10, 1810.*

SIR:

In compliance with the requisition which you have communicated to me, as made to you by the committee of Congress, "whether the paymaster of the detachment of the army of the United States, ordered for the defence of Orleans, had in his hands the funds necessary for the payment of the troops," I have the honor to state that, from the best estimate I could form, the sum of \$250,000 appeared sufficient for that object, for the year 1809; and that Lieutenant Simeon Knight, the district paymaster in that quarter, was furnished with \$100,000 in the early part of that year, on his bills in favor of the receiver of public moneys at Orleans; that \$100,000 were remitted him in July last, and received by him before the 7th of August; and he was, moreover, authorized, on the 14th of June last, to draw on me for \$50,000—\$40,000 of which he has since drawn for, which, I presume, he considered as sufficient to pay the troops in his district, to the 31st of December last.

In addition to the foregoing, he has authority to draw for \$60,000, to commence the payment of the troops for the present year.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ROBERT BRENT, *Paymaster U. S. Army.*

The Hon. WM. EUSTIS, Esq. *Secretary of War.*

K.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 4, 1810.*

SIR:

In addition to the information which I had the honor to communicate, in person, to the committee, relative to the 3d head of inquiry, contained in your letter of the 19th of February, viz: "Whether the detachment, during the encampment at Terre au Bœuf, suffered, in any respect, for the want of regular and necessary supplies?" I have the honor to state, that, it appears, from the enclosed copy of a letter from the General, dated August 19, 1809, that much dissatisfaction existed in respect to the quality of the provisions furnished by the contractor; that the supply was not at all times regular, and that the difficulty of procuring fresh meat was almost insurmountable. These representations have been corroborated from other sources of intelligence. By the 2d article of the contract for supplying provisions to the troops, it is provided: "That it shall be in the option of the general, or officer commanding an army or a great military district, to direct when, and how often, fresh or salted meat shall be issued, by general orders, to be promulgated a reasonable time before that issue is to commence."

By the 4th article, "whenever, in the opinion of the commanding officer, the provisions offered to be issued are unsound, unfit for use, or of an unmerchantable quality, a survey shall be held thereon by two disinterested persons, one to be chosen by the commanding officer, and the other by the contractor, or his agent; and, in case of disagreement, a third person to be chosen by mutual consent, who shall have power to condemn such part of the provisions as to them may appear unfit for use." If the contractor or his agent fail or neglect to appoint a person to inspect the provisions, after reasonable notice in writing, the commanding officer may appoint such persons as he may think proper.

The 5th article authorizes the commanding general, "in case of absolute failure or deficiency in the quantity of provisions, contracted to be delivered and issued," to supply the deficiency by purchase, at the risk of the contractor. The power conferred by the last article was, in one instance, exercised; that those granted by the 4th and 5th articles were not exercised, can be accounted for by this Department, on the presumption only, that, in the opinion of the General, the country could not furnish the supplies.

Complaints have also been made of a want of medicine and hospital stores. It appears from the enclosed extract of a letter from Mr. Linnard, military agent at Philadelphia, of the 31st ultimo, that a stock of medical and hospital stores, for two thousand men, for three months, which were ordered for New Orleans by this Department, in December, 1808, arrived at their place of destination on the 5th of April following; (at this period the whole of the additional force had not reached that place) and that the brig North Star, which transported the clothing and the annual supply of medicine and hospital stores, for the new troops on that station, arrived on or about the 22d of August last.

In addition to these supplies it appears, from the accounts of the military agent at New Orleans, rendered to the accountant of this Department, that, between the months of March, 1809, and January, 1810, medical and hospital stores, and other articles for the use of the sick, were purchased, and paid for to the amount of 11,800 dollars. When to this it is added, that the agent was at all times subject to the order of the commanding officer, and bound to comply with his requisitions for all articles necessary, in his opinion, for the health and accommodation of the troops, the causes of any alleged deficiencies are inexplicable by this Department.

With perfect consideration, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. THOMAS NEWTON, *Chairman, &c.*

L. No. 1.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Décember 12, 1808.*

SIR:

On account of the troops it will be proper for you to procure, and deliver, on the orders of the commanding officer, such articles as he may deem necessary for the public service.

You will, at all times, charge all articles so delivered to the proper head of expenditure; and to prevent any mistakes in your accounts, when the orders to you are not so explicit as to enable you to decide under what head the article should be charged, you will request the commanding officer to give you such information as the case may require. You will advance no money except for articles actually received, or for services performed. The expenditures should be as economical as the good of the service will permit. No articles will, I trust, be required of you but such as the nature and good of the service actually demand: such as workmen, and materials for fortifications for quarters; transportation and camp equipage; tents, and other articles for barracks or camp, will be sent from this quarter to your care, as well as cannon and ammunition.

I am, &amp;c.

H. DEARBORN.

A. D. ABRAHAMIS, Esq. *New Orleans.*

L. No. 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 4, 1809.*

SIR:

A. D. Abrahams, Esq. military agent for the Southern department, being solicitous to relinquish that office, the President of the United States has appointed you to succeed him; and, should the Senate, at their next session, advise and consent to said appointment, you will be commissioned accordingly.

Your office, as military agent, is considered as a substitute for what has generally been called a deputy quartermaster general; and your department includes all the military posts within the territory of Orleans, and in that part of the Mississippi territory lying south of the 32d degree of north latitude, including all those on the Mobile and its waters.

Before you enter on the duties of your agency, you will execute the enclosed bond, with two or more sufficient securities, and will take and subscribe the oath of office, and the oath prescribed by the act, entitled "An act fixing the military peace establishment." As soon as the bond is duly executed, you will forward it, with the oaths, to this Department.

You will consider the assistant military agents, and the quartermasters, whether brigade or regimental, within your department, as under your direction; you will furnish them with funds, for which they will be accountable to you. They will correspond with, and make regular returns to you of all articles received by them, with proper vouchers for all deliveries and expenditures. They are not to make any purchases or expenditures, excepting what shall be absolutely necessary, without your particular direction.

You will receive herewith a copy of the rules and articles of war for your government; and of the regulations of this Department; to which, as far as they regard your duties, and are not inconsistent with these instructions, you will, in all respects, conform.

You will, with promptness, and in the most safe and economical manner, cause all military, medical, and hospital stores, and all goods for Indians, which you may receive for transportation, to be forwarded to their respective destinations.

You will procure, and deliver, on the order of the commanding officer in your department, such articles as he may deem necessary for the public service. You will, at all times, charge all articles so delivered to the proper head of expenditures; and to prevent any mistakes in your accounts, when the orders to you are not so explicit as to enable you to decide under what head the articles should be charged, you will request the commanding officer to give you such explanation as the case may require. You will advance no money except as before directed, or for articles actually received, or for services performed. The expenditures should be as economical as the good of the service will permit. No article, it is presumed, will be required of you, but such as the nature and good of the service actually demand. Should it happen, however, at any time, that demands are made upon you to a large amount, the propriety of complying with which you may doubt, and where delay may not, in your judgment, prove injurious to the public interest, you are to consult this Department.

If Mr. Cox, the purveyor of public supplies, shall request you to purchase any articles which may be procured in your vicinity, at less expense than at Philadelphia, you will please to make such purchases, he furnishing you with the money.

In addition to the duties of military agent, you will procure such materials, and hire such laborers and mechanics, as may be required of you by the engineer, for erecting, completing, and repairing such works as have, or may be ordered for the defence and protection of New Orleans and its vicinity. Your accounts, for expenditures under this head, you will keep in conformity with the enclosed instructions from the accountant of this Department.

You will be allowed one clerk for your office of military agent, at the rate of \$750 per annum.

For your services, as agent for fortifications, you will receive a reasonable commission on the moneys necessarily expended in the performance of its duties.

You will, from time to time, seasonably transmit to this Department estimates of the moneys that may be required to meet the expenditures in your agencies; on the receipt of which the requisite funds will be ordered to your credit in the office of discount and deposit at New Orleans.

Should you accept of the military agency for the Southern department, you will please to proceed to New Orleans without delay, and there take upon yourself the duties of your appointment. Major Pike, the acting military agent, is instructed, by the enclosed letter, to deliver to you all the public papers, documents, and property, in his possession, and to pay over to you the balance of public moneys remaining in his hands, which you will please to receive, giving him your duplicate receipts for the same.

I am, &amp;c.

W. EUSTIS.

A. McCULLOCH, Esq.

L. No. 3.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 16, 1810.*

SIR:

In compliance with your request, made this morning, I have the honor herewith to transmit No. 1, a copy of the instructions given to Mr. A. D. Abrahams, military agent at New Orleans, dated December 12, 1808.

On the resignation of Mr. Abrahams, Mr. Andrew McCulloch was appointed to succeed him, under instructions, a copy of which, No. 2, is herewith enclosed, bearing date May 4, 1809. Mr. McCulloch died in a few days after his arrival, on which Major Zebulon M. Pike, of the 6th regiment, was appointed by General Wilkinson as successor to Mr. McCulloch, and continued to discharge the duties of that office, under the instructions given to Mr. McCulloch, until after the removal of the troops from the encampment at Terre au Boeuf.

Representation being made by the accountant of this Department, that many articles in the accounts rendered by Mr. A. D. Abrahams, the military agent, were charged at extravagant prices, the necessity of some of which did not appear, and the prices of others being deemed exorbitant, the military agent was informed on the 10th of August last, that he was not authorized to comply with such requisitions in future. This is the only limitation of the instructions before mentioned, which has been made by this Department.

It appears, from the instructions to Mr. McCulloch, that he was required to render, from time to time, to this Department, estimates of the probable expenditures in his agency; on the receipt of which, moneys were to be ordered to his credit in the office of discount and deposit at New Orleans. In practice, this arrangement was found incon-



venient, and not calculated to meet occurring emergencies. The military agent therefore continued to draw bills on this Department, which were regularly paid on being presented.

The enclosed statement will exhibit their amount for the year 1809.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. THOMAS NEWTON, *Chairman, &c.*

L No. 4.

Amount of disbursements in the quartermaster's, and medical and hospital departments, made by A. D. Abrahams, military agent, on account of that part of the army stationed at Orleans and in its vicinity, between the 1st of January and the 20th of July, 1809, including payments made for the charter of a part of the vessels employed to transport the troops to that place, \$55,188 43  
 Estimate of disbursements, made by Major Pike, on same account, from the 21st July, to 31st December 1809, 27,474 73  
 Dollars, - 82,663 16

NOTE.—The above sums embrace no part of the expenditures made on account of the fortifications erecting at Orleans.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Accountant's Office, April 16, 1810.*

WM. SIMMONS.

L No. 5.

*Amount of disbursements made by A. D. Abrahams, Military Agent at New Orleans, in the medical and hospital department, between the 1st of April and 22d of July, 1809.*

In April, for 135 dollars and 68 cents' worth of medicine; for 14 bed sacks, at 6 dollars each; 7 pair blankets, at 5 dollars each; 2 water buckets, at 5 dollars each; 22 pair of sheets, at 5½ dollars each; and other articles; amounting together to, \$417 93  
 In May, for 60 sheets, at 6 dollars each; 95 musquito bars, at 4½ and 7 dollars each; a bathing tub, at 12 dollars; 16 dozen fowls, at 7½ dollars per dozen; 44 dozen eggs, at 31¼ cents per dozen; a pigeon, at 2 dollars; 60 gallons molasses, at 62½ cents; 500 lbs. rice, at 5 cents per lb; 450 lbs. sugar, at 11 cents; and sundry small articles; amounting together to 1,425 24  
 And also 20 bunks at 3¼ dollars each.  
 In June, for 6 barrels of Indian meal, at 3¼ dollars each; 21 lbs. tea, at 1¼ dollars each; 1 dozen towels, 15 dollars; 4 foot mats, at 3 dollars and 50 cents each; 2 dozen port wine, at 12 dollars each; 3 dozen porter, at 4½ dollars each; 5 gallons Madeira wine, at 5 dollars each; 30 gallons Sherry wine, at 2 and 2½ dollars each; 11 dozen fowls, at 7½ dollars each; 66 dozen eggs, at 31¼ cents; 32 gallons milk, at 56 cents each; molasses, vinegar, sugar, coffee, and sundry small articles, washing for the hospital, &c. amounting together to 665 23  
 In July, for services of a nurse; for washing; for 9 dozen porter, at 5 dollars; 14 dozen fowls, at 7 dollars per dozen; 60 dozen eggs, at 37½ cents; 60 gallons milk, at 56 cents; molasses, sugar, rice, butter, coffee, glauber salts, a large syringe, jalap, antimonial wine, and sundry small articles; amounting together to 579 52  
 Dollars, - 3,087 92

L No. 6.

*Abstract of disbursements made by Major Z. M. Pike, acting Military Agent, in the Medical and Hospital Department, between — September and 21st December, 1809.*

Payments made to the 30th of September, 1809, for 1,136 dollars and 47 cents worth of medicine, purchased between the 1st of April and 30th of September, 1809; for 605 lbs. of mutton, purchased in July and August, 1809, at 18¼ cents per lb.; for washing in September; for 100 lbs. mutton, in September; for vegetables, sugar, milk, salt, coffee, hay, and other small articles, in September; amounting together to, \$1,497 82.  
 Payments in October, for 1,000 dollars' worth of medicine, furnished in July, August, and September; for sheep, at 1 dollar; for calves, at 9 dollars; for wood, vegetables, every kind of groceries, milk, eggs, fowls, meat, butter, lard, crackers, hay, and a great variety of small articles, between July and the 31st of October, 1809, corresponding in price with the purchases of Mr. Abrahams, and amounting to 5,535 71  
 Payments in November, for 138 dollars' worth of medicine; for washing; for meat, vegetables and groceries of all kinds, amounting together to 964 98  
 Payments in December, for services of nurses and attendants; for 105 dollars and 95 cents worth of medicine; and for a variety of groceries, amounting together to 722 60  
 Dollars, - 8,721 11

L No. 7.

*Item of articles, with their prices, which appeared objectionable in the account of the Military Agent at New Orleans.*

May,	16	dozen fowls,	-	-	-	\$7 50 per dozen,	-	-	\$120
	44	do. eggs,	-	-	-	31¼ do.	-	-	13 75
June,	1	do. towels,	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
	4	foot mats,	-	-	-	3 50 each,	-	-	14.
	2	dozen port wine,	-	-	-	12 per dozen,	-	-	24
	3	do. porter,	-	-	-	4 50. do.	-	-	13 50
	5	gallons Madeira wine,	-	-	-	5 per gallon,	-	-	25
	11	dozen fowls,	-	-	-	7 50 per dozen,	-	-	82 10
	66	do. eggs,	-	-	-	31¼ do.	-	-	20 62½
July,	9	do. porter	-	-	-	5 do.	-	-	45
	14	do. fowls,	-	-	-	7 do.	-	-	98
	60	do. eggs,	-	-	-	37½ do.	-	-	22 50

## M No. 1.

*Extract of a letter from William Linnard, Esquire, Military Agent, to the Secretary of War, dated*

PHILADELPHIA, March 31, 1810.

SIR:

"Your favor of the 28th inst. has been received. In answer to your inquiries, I have the honor to state, that the medicine and hospital stores, shipped on board the schooner Hilman, were those ordered on the 26th of December, 1808; three months' stock for 2000 men. The schooner sailed from Philadelphia, the 7th of January, 1809. The day she sailed, the frost set in extremely severe, and so much ice was made in the course of the night, the captain was obliged to make a harbor, where she remained all winter; she sailed again on the 6th of March, and arrived at New Orleans the 5th of April, and delivered the stores the 7th and 8th.

"The brig North Star sailed from Philadelphia the 6th of July, 1809, had a long passage, arrived at New Orleans about the 22nd of August, and delivered the stores in three days after her arrival. ANXIOUS to send the goods by this vessel, the only one in port destined for that place, I detained her six days waiting for the clothing; the last was put on board the day she sailed."

## M No. 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 10, 1810.

SIR:

In reply to the inquiry of the committee, "whether the paymaster of that detachment of the army of the United States, ordered for the defence of New Orleans, had in his hands the funds necessary for the payment of the troops?" I beg leave to refer them to the enclosed statement of this date, from the paymaster of the army.

In answer to your other inquiry of the 9th instant, I have the honor to state, for the information of the committee, that the brig North Star, which transported the clothing for that detachment, appears (from the extract of Mr. Linnard's letter now before the committee, to have sailed from Philadelphia on the 6th of July, 1809, and to have arrived at New Orleans, on or about the 22d of August following, which was within twelve months of the time that the men of that detachment had generally received their clothing for the preceding year.

With perfect consideration, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Honorable THOMAS NEWTON, *Chairman, &c.*

## DEPOSITIONS.

## No. 1.

*Esaias Preble's deposition, March 16, 1810:*

Esaias Preble, of the United States' regiment of artificers, deposes, that, about the last of April, 1809, a detachment of the United States' troops, under the command of Captain Peter, attached to different regiments, descended the river Mississippi for New Orleans; they halted at Fort Adams, at which place I was stationed: at that time they appeared to be young, able for any duty, and well clothed. A number of smaller detachments afterwards passed down said river in a similar situation.

About the middle of October following, that part of the additional army that had been stationed in the neighborhood of New Orleans, halted at Fort Adams, on their way up the river for Washington, Mississippi territory, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Beall. After being encamped two or more days on the bank of the river, a party, consisting of one hundred and twenty non-commissioned officers and privates, from the regiment of light artillery, light dragoons, 3d, 5th, and 7th regiments of infantry, and regiment of riflemen, was sent into Fort Adams and buildings attached to the fort. On, or about the 23d of October, 1809, I was directed by the commanding officer of the post, to take charge of said troops and report their situation. I applied to Doctor Thruston, the surgeon of the seventh infantry, in whose charge they were left, and the only officer left with them, for a list of said men. I then made an examination, and found seventeen had died; the residue, except twenty, were very sick; eight or ten were in an open room in which they could have no fire, some of them no blanket, and almost naked; and all, with one or two exceptions, extremely dirty. The last of November following, fourteen more of the said troops were left sick at Fort Adams, which, together with those left in October, amounted to one hundred and thirty-four, from which sixty-eight died at said fort.

During the last three years, there have been moored at Fort Adams, from eight to eighteen boats, that would carry, on an average, thirty men, public property, under the direction of the commanding officer of the post. In August 1809, eight or ten of said boats were despatched to New Orleans, one of which sunk on its passage. During the last year, from the company stationed at Fort Adams, not more than five men died; from seven companies of the 2d regiment of infantry stationed at Columbian Springs, not more than eight died the last year.

In the vicinity of Fort Adams and Columbian Springs, beef, poultry, butter, eggs, and vegetables, such as the country produces, may be obtained at any season of the year. During my residence in the army, clothing for the troops has been forwarded to the commanding officers of companies six months in advance, and issued to the troops in the same manner. The clothing for the companies at Fort Adams and Columbian Springs arrived at said fort by the way of New Orleans, in July, 1809.

March 16, 1810, Sworn to before me,

E. PREBLE.

S. H. SMITH.

## No. 2.

*Deposition of William D. Beall, lieutenant colonel of the 5th infantry of the army of the United States, taken by the committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

I arrived at Camp, Terre au Bœuf, 12 or 15 miles below New Orleans, on the river Mississippi, on the 12th of June, 1809.

The troops were regularly encamped in tents, in two lines, covering ground about 800 yards in length, and 75 in depth, (the depth of the encampment was about 175 yards.) The tents, after a while, were raised and floored with plank taken from the Kentucky boats which were used to transport the army from Orleans. The ground was low, as is the case of all in the vicinity of Orleans, and, particularly after rain, wet, and a part being cleared of the bushes, weeds, &c. by the troops, was muddy, and the back part, during the wet season, a little marshy. To remedy the disadvantage of such ground, ditches were cut in every direction; indeed every precaution was taken to render the camp comfortable; the General seeming to have an eye to every circumstance, being absent from the camp not more than six or eight days from the 12th of June to 10th of September following. Little arbors, covered with palmetto, were erected at the necessary distance from each other, on the line of sentinels, that each man, in his place, might be screened from the piercing rays of the sun, and sheltered from the rain; and these arbors were also erected from right to left of the line between the front and rear, that the men might set and mess in comfort

and cleanliness. A ditch was dug parallel with the encampment, in the rear, to afford a dry walk to the sentinels, and on which to erect the before mentioned arbors.

I do not think half the ground used for the camp was cleared by the troops; this must have been an advantage to the proprietor, but I rather apprehend the ditches were a disadvantage.

A tolerable large hospital was erected of materials partly from the boats before mentioned, and partly from the neighboring woods, into which the most reduced men were put, under the care of a very attentive and experienced surgeon: some of the sick, as occasion required, were sent to the hospital at Orleans; the vessel containing medicine and hospital stores not arriving until August: as the want of these articles occurred, the general directed them to be procured at Orleans, as also poultry, to be given to the men most in need, at the discretion of the surgeons, but the supply of this last article was not regular. A captain of the line, (captain Dale) of medical profession, was ordered to procure medicine, and take upon himself the usual duties of a surgeon.

Strict attention to the sick, and their accommodation, was enjoined on the officers; care taken to separate those ill from the duty men, and a police officer daily appointed to scrutinize into the regularity of the camp, and the quality of the provision, and to report every defect, neglect, or impropriety.

Provisions of flour, or bread, and pork, were regularly supplied, and, after a little time, beef; and when these were bad, remonstrances, protests, and condemnation were resorted to; and, in one instance, a purchase of 100 barrels of flour was made by the General. Flour, in the Southern country, is apt to sour, and, at a certain season, it is very difficult to get good.

On the 4th of July, a general review was made, and the troops fired and performed some evolutions tolerably well; after this, symptoms of mutiny were manifested, not by an assembling of men, but a secret preparing for such an event, and a threat, which was overheard by some of the more orderly men, reported. There appeared much dissatisfaction among many of the men, and some officers, proceeding, as I supposed, from the encampment. An expectation that this army would be discharged by the extra session of Congress, being disappointed, I presume, served to heighten discontent.

There being no regular established armory or armorers, some of the arms were useless for want of repair; these, together with those of the sick and dead men, were delivered to the brigade quartermaster, except some instances where the officers chose to pack them themselves, were packed in boxes, and either transported with the troops, or deposited in New Orleans.

The boats employed in conveying the troops and baggage up the river were four gunboats, carrying about 40 men each, four keel boats, borrowed of the inhabitants of New Orleans, and 9 out of 11 brought down from Fort Adams, and repaired by the troops; one quartermaster's boat, and one contractor's, attending the movement.

Previous to the embarkation, 3 companies, of the 6th infantry, under the command of Major Pike, were ordered to the garrison of Orleans, and between the 1st and 12th of September, the army embarked, and, making some delay nearly opposite the city, owing, I think, very probably, to a defect in one of the artillery boats, proceeded, on the 23d, up the river, under the command of Major Backus, of the light dragoons. I had been taken sick about the 5th of September, and was moved up to Orleans the 10th, and, recovering sufficient strength, followed the army, and reached the troops about 50 miles up the river, and, after two or three days, took command, the General being ill in Orleans. Every preparation for this movement was made, which the General could command, or thought sufficient, and yet the sufferings were such as would excite pity in the most callous heart. The men, unable to bear fatigue, had been left at Orleans; those able, were marched on the river bank, while the boats, with the weaker part, managed by able men, under the direction of officers, ascended from 8 to 15 miles a day, as the wind and current would permit, to the best ground to be found for the accommodation of a camp. Sickness and deaths increasing as we progressed, a consultation of the surgeons and officers was held: the surgeons declared it useless to administer medicine in the unsettled state of the troops, and the officers urging all reasonable haste to a place of rest, where the skill of the physician, and effect of medicine, might have a fair trial. Under these impressions, two hospitals were established, one at Point Coupee, and one at Fort Adams, where the weakest of the men were left, under the care of surgeons, guards, and attendants, with medicines, and hospital stores, and provisions. The loss of men in the time of this movement, (from the 1st to the 12th September, to the 31st of October) including the two hospitals, was near 300 in deaths, and some desertions.

As the boats arrived at Natchez, carriages were procured to move the sick and baggage to the intended cantonment, near the town of Washington, and now, the men a little rested from their late unexampled fatigue, began to clean their arms, rendered rusty from the unavoidable neglect of them while on the march, and the necessary tools being provided, the effective men, joined by those most able of the convalescents, under the superintendance of their officers, began to erect huts on the ground chosen by the General, a place healthy, elegant, and convenient to springs of fine water.

My knowledge of the country about Orleans is very limited, but am of opinion the ground at Terre au Bœuf was as eligible for a camp as any in the vicinity of the city.

Of the propriety of continuing in the vicinity of Orleans for defence, it does not become me to speak, not having the information which suggested the measure.

I doubt not the low situation of the ground about Orleans contributed to the mortality of the troops, but it is not improbable but the higher ground would have proved fatal too: for it is a remark, very generally received, that Northern constitutions undergo sickness, more or less, when subject to a fixed residence in a climate so Southern; and to this may be added, an almost universal acknowledgment, that the year 1809 was much more sickly than any for many years.

When I left the army at Washington, about the 27th of November, I thought the men were recovering in a good degree.

The clothing was delivered out to the officers commanding companies, on our arrival at Washington, and, in necessary cases, the men were supplied, but generally, I think, it was judged best to retain it till the dirty and fatiguing job of building was accomplished.

I conjectured, from some expressions in one of the General's letters to the Secretary of War, that an order for removing the camp had been given; but where to I did not understand.

#### WASHINGTON COUNTY, SS.

Be it remembered, that, on this 21st day of March, 1810, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for said county, appeared William D. Beall, and made oath, in due form of law, that the above and foregoing facts, as stated, are just and true, to the best of his knowledge.

DANIEL RAPINE.

No. 3.

*Deposition of Doctor Alexander Macauley, March 21, 1810.*

In respect to the local situation of the camp at Terre au Bœuf, I believe it to be more healthy than the city of New Orleans, as I knew several officers and soldiers, who came from camp to town, get sick after being a short time in the latter. I have also been told by a respectable inhabitant of that neighborhood, that Terre au Bœuf was reported the most healthy country in the vicinity of New Orleans. In regard to the mortality of the troops, it may be observed, that new soldiers are apt to sicken, when first embodied, although in much healthier situations; that a large portion of the troops were sick before the army moved from New Orleans; that many of those who are enlisted are of debauched habits, and weakened constitutions, and that such constitutions are little able to resist the violent attacks of the diseases on the Lower Mississippi, where the most robust habits so frequently sink; also, that the mortality amongst the citizens was very great; and I have been informed by those who had resided in that country for ten years, that they had never before witnessed such a fatal season. The General had issued orders authorizing

Doctors Spencer and Claude to make requisitions on the military agent for proper accommodations and necessaries for the sick, under which orders, the sick in the hospital in New Orleans, where I was, received such articles as could render them comfortable, and conduce to their recovery. I was stationed at New Orleans, and only visited the camp occasionally; but from what I have heard of the mortality at camp, I do believe that the army would have lost as many, if not more men, had they remained in New Orleans, and I thought the situation of the camp at Terre au Bœuf as good as any I had ever seen in that country; and from what I have heard, I do not suppose a better could have been selected on the territory of the United States, within one hundred and fifty miles of New Orleans. As far as I have been able to observe the conduct of General Wilkinson, I have ever thought him actuated by a zeal for the welfare of the army, and promotion of the public service; and I have frequently witnessed his humanity and attention to sick officers, in having them removed to his own quarters until they were out of danger.

I certify that the foregoing statement is correct, according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

A. MACAULEY.

WASHINGTON CITY, *March 21st, 1810.*

Sworn and subscribed before me, a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this 21st day of March, 1810.

DANIEL RAPINE.

*Deposition of Doctor Alexander Macauley, March 22, 1810.*

In addition to my deposition of yesterday, I must state, that considerable supplies of medicines and hospital stores were purchased at New Orleans, from time to time, as well for the use of the sick in the city, as for those at camp at Terre au Bœuf; and never, to my knowledge, did any difficulty exist as to procuring them. Also, that a considerable supply of hospital stores and medicines arrived from the United States (I think) in the month of August, and that Doctors Spencer and Claude divided them: according to the best of my recollection, Doctor Claude took four-fifths for the use of the troops who ascended the river, and Doctor Spencer the other fifth, for the use of the troops at New Orleans, and in the general hospital at that place. The supply consisted of several large pipes and casks (or hogsheads) of wine, brandy, molasses, &c. and boxes, &c. of medicine. This division took place about the time of the removal of the troops from the camp below New Orleans, and the medicines, stores, &c. alluded to above, were embarked on board of the boats which ascended by or from New Orleans.

The facts above are true, according to the best of my memory and belief.

A. MACAULEY.

WASHINGTON CITY, *March 22, 1810.*

Sworn to before me, this 22d day of March, 1810.

W. THORNTON.

No. 4.

*Deposition of Major Electus Backus, of the army of the United States, taken by the committee appointed by the House of Representatives of the United States to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

I arrived in New Orleans about the tenth of May, 1809, at which place I found that General Wilkinson, and most of the troops destined to that station, had arrived.

In the beginning of the month of June, the troops were ordered to leave New Orleans, and to proceed down the river to Terre au Bœuf, where they were directed to encamp. At this time the waters of the Mississippi were so high that at many places it was overflowing the levee, which rendered the ground of our encampment wet and muddy; and was so surrounded with marshes and swamps, as to render it an inhospitable place for an encampment. The duty and labor required to put the place in order was too great to be endured in so hot a climate.

The lands on which the troops encamped belonged to Mr. Lasuse, to whom the Brigade Quartermaster informed me he had paid several hundred dollars, after the removal of the army, for the use of the lands, house rent, pasturage, and firewood; and that no allowance was made for any improvements made on the lands by the army, and that he had sold the buildings erected on the place for the benefit of the United States.

In the month of July, General Wilkinson became alarmed at some improper expressions dropping from some of the soldiers, which, on examination, appeared to have been uttered from a belief that the sickness and deaths the army had experienced was to be attributed to the local position of the camp, and to the unremitting fatigues and hardships they were compelled to endure.

The police of the camp was well attended to, and great exertions made use of to keep it clean, until the sickness of the soldiers became so general as to render it impracticable.

The provisions were such, in particular the flour, that medical men declared it sufficient to injure the health of, and destroy the soldier, independent of any other cause.

The soldiers were from four to six months without their pay, (which they are entitled to every two months.) This put it out of their power to purchase fowls or vegetables, which would have contributed much to their comfort, particularly when sickly. The reasons assigned for their not being paid were various, one of which was, that the Paymaster of the district did not consider it his duty to go from New Orleans to pay the troops, and there being no Paymasters to many of the regiments, payments could not be made; and one cause assigned by General Wilkinson was, that if the men were paid off before they ascended the river many would desert.

The want of clothing was so great that many of the soldiers were almost naked; this was owing to the new clothing not arriving until a short time before the army moved up the river, and was not delivered to the company officers until after they had arrived at Washington, Mississippi Territory. Medicines and medical men some of the regiments were at times destitute of, in consequence of which many of the soldiers perished without having received little, if any, medical assistance.

When the troops took the field in the month of June, they were well provided with tents, but the frequent rains to which they were exposed soon rendered them but a miserable shelter either against the effects of the rain or sun. A few of the most dangerous cases of the sick were at first put in tents pitched in the rear of their respective regiments, but before we left the encampment, the increase of sickness was so great that it was impossible (situated as we were) to separate the sick from the well, and they were to be found, more or less, in every tent in the line.

In consequence of the sickness and deaths of the soldiers, the arms and accoutrements belonging to them were much injured, and in some instances lost, owing to there being no place in which they could be deposited or sheltered from the weather.

Shelters were erected to cover the sentinels from the rays of the sun and frequent showers of rain, but were not completed until the month of August, prior to which time the soldiers suffered much for the want of them. About the first of September, orders were issued for the troops to prepare to embark on board of boats and other craft for Natchez, in the Mississippi Territory. The public boats were collected from different quarters and repaired, some of which, proving unfit for service, were turned in, and private boats taken, which the owners were glad of an opportunity of getting conveyed to Natchez free of charges, and others might have been obtained on the same terms. Nothing could have exceeded the joy expressed by the soldiers on this occasion: it seemed for a time to relieve the drooping spirits of those who were, to appearance, past all hopes of recovery.

At the time the troops commenced their march, General Wilkinson became so indisposed that he could not proceed with them, and remained at New Orleans. I being the only field officer with the troops, the command of

them devolved upon me; in which command I continued until the army arrived nearly opposite West Florida. Between the 20th and 31st of October, the troops arrived at Natchez, leaving upwards of one hundred of their sick at Point Coupee, and many others at Fort Adams, at both of which places the greater part died. After the army arrived at their place of destination, the weather became cool; and those that were in a low state of health died, and the remainder became convalescent.

The troops were much relieved at this place by a plentiful market, both in fresh provisions and vegetables, which sold one hundred per cent. cheaper than in New Orleans, or its territory.

The inhabitants of Washington and its vicinity received the army with much affection, and treated them with more attention and friendship than they had hitherto experienced on that southern station. The complaints of the officers did not differ from that of the men, except the scurvy.

A supply of fresh provisions and vegetables were not to be procured in the neighborhood of the camp at Terre au Bœuf, or not short of the New Orleans market.

Question. Could boats have been procured at New Orleans sufficient to convey the troops to Fort Adams or Natchez at any time between the 14th of June and the 10th of September?

Answer. I think they could.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions, particularly the flour, with which the army were supplied during the encampment at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. Bad, generally, particularly the flour, which was frequently sour, mouldy, in lumps, and sometimes full of bugs and worms.

Question. Was the army in a sickly state at the time of removal from New Orleans to Terre au Bœuf, and were the sick removed?

Answer. There was some sickness. Those who were most ill were left in the hospital at New Orleans.

Question. Do you believe that, at the time the troops were using the bad provisions a sufficient supply of good and wholesome provisions could have been procured at New Orleans?

Answer. I believe they could. The General did procure one hundred barrels of good flour for the army.

Question. What proportion of the army were generally ordered on fatigue duty?

Answer. One half of those in health were generally on fatigue duty. Sometimes it was necessary to take men who were not in health to furnish the details of guard duty.

Question. At what time did the fatigue duty cease?

Answer. Not until the latter part of August.

Question. What kind of labor were the last fatigue parties engaged in?

Answer. Building guard houses, shelters for the sentries, and clearing the ground.

Question. During how long a period were the men obliged to sleep on the ground?

Answer. Many of them from three to four weeks; during which time, there being no straw, they had but a single blanket and such palmetto leaves as they could collect to keep them from the damp ground, after which the tents were generally floored with boards from the boats which had conveyed the troops from New Orleans.

Question. At what time was it first known in the camp that orders had been received for the removal of the army?

Answer. Sometime in the month of August.

Question. What other inconveniences besides those specified in the deposition were experienced in the encampment at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. The troops experienced great annoyance from the innumerable quantity of mosquitoes, which were particularly afflicting to the sick. They suffered also very much from the continual rains.

Question. Were you not informed by the Paymaster that he had sufficient funds in his hands to pay off the men?

Answer. I was informed by Mr. Knight that he had the funds, and that, if the men would stop opposite New Orleans on their way up the river, he would pay them off.

Question. Did you not halt opposite New Orleans, and make application for that purpose?

Answer. The troops halted there three days, and I spoke to General Wilkinson on the subject: he replied that the men could not be paid, as, if they were paid off, they would desert.

Question. Was there an acting military agent at New Orleans at the time the troops were there on their way up the river?

Answer. I believe the Brigade Quartermaster did that duty.

Question. Were you provided with funds to defray incidental expenses in conveying the troops up to Natchez?

Answer. We were not. General Wilkinson directed me to take the army up the river, informing me, at the same time, that there was not a dollar in the Quartermaster's Department to defray any extra expenses; that I must take them as they were. On our arrival at Point Coupee an hospital was formed, and about one hundred of the sick left there. There being no necessary supplies to leave with them, a subscription was made by the officers, and upwards of one hundred dollars raised and left with the surgeon, for the purpose of supplying the sick with those articles of which they stood in need, such as fowls, vegetables, &c.

Question. Did General Wilkinson consult any of his officers in selecting Terre au Bœuf as the place of encampment?

Answer. Colonel Smyth and some other officers went down with General Wilkinson to see Terre au Bœuf, but I cannot say how far he consulted them.

Question. Was there dissatisfaction among the officers and men at Terre au Bœuf, and from what cause did it arise?

Answer. There was. It appeared to arise from the unhealthiness of the place, the sufferings of the troops, and the badness of the supplies. Many of the officers signed a petition in the month of July to the General, to remove the army, which was withheld in consequence of his disapproving of it, and declaring he would not remove the troops until he received orders so to do.

Question. When you mention that the last fatigue parties were employed in clearing up the ground, in what manner were they so employed?

Answer. In smoothing the ground by taking up stumps, and filling up holes and ditches.

Question. What quantity of wood land was cleared by the troops?

Answer. I should judge that there were between twenty and thirty acres of new land cleared by them.

#### WASHINGTON COUNTY, ss.

On this 5th day of April, 1810, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for said county, appeared Electus Backus, and made oath, in due form of law, that the facts stated in the foregoing instrument of writing, which came within his personal knowledge, are true, and those related from the information of others he believes to be true.

Sworn before me,

DANIEL RAPINE.

No. 5.

*Examination of Captain George Peter, before the committee appointed "to inquire into the cause or causes of the mortality in that detachment of the army ordered for the defence of New Orleans," taken April 9th, 1810.*

Question. At what time did you arrive at New Orleans?

Answer. I think it was between the 26th and 28th of March, 1809, that I arrived there with five companies.

Question. What was the condition of the army during their stay in New Orleans, both as it respects their health and accommodations?

Answer. A part of the troops were quartered in the barracks, a part in the fauxbourg St. Mary, and a part in the city. The number of the sick increased daily during their stay, which I attributed to their intemperance, to the badness of their provisions, and to the want of discipline and subordination.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions with which the troops were supplied?

Answer. Of the most inferior kinds, of every description: the bread musty, the fresh beef so poor that it was not fit to be issued, and the pork rusty. I have frequently known the troops to throw the pork away. The complaints respecting the provisions were so frequent that I made a representation to General Wilkinson on the subject. He informed me that he would take measures to have better provisions provided; but during my stay I saw little or no improvement.

Question. What appeared to be the most prevalent diseases during the stay of the troops in New Orleans?

Answer. The dysentery, but not of a very malignant nature, and fevers. Of the corps of light artillery I believe only two men died during their stay in New Orleans.

Question. To what cause or causes did you attribute the want of discipline and subordination to which you have alluded?

Answer. To the dispersed situation of the troops in the city of New Orleans, and the impossibility of keeping them within proper bounds.

Question. Is it your opinion that, on the arrival of the troops and during their stay at New Orleans, such a disposition of them could have been made as would have been more favorable to discipline and subordination, and without incurring any additional expense?

Answer. I think a greater number of the troops might have been quartered in the barracks, and the remainder in the fauxbourg of St. Mary, which would have enabled the officers to have kept their men in better order, but would not have curtailed the expenses much: or, if the troops had been encamped on the plains of the fauxbourg St. Mary, with proper flooring to their tents, the officers would have had an opportunity of keeping up subordination and discipline, preventing intemperance, and would have saved to the Government a prodigious expense.

Question. Is it your opinion that the encampment of the troops, agreeably to your last suggestion, would have been equally, or more eligible, than their encampment at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. I think it would have been more eligible. Drier ground might have been selected, having the swamp at a much greater distance; vegetables might have been procured in abundance, also milk and fresh provisions, with hospitals sufficiently commodious for the accommodation of the sick.

Question. What time did you leave New Orleans for Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. About the 1st of June an order directing a detachment of the troops consisting of three companies of light artillery, one of dragoons, one of riflemen, one of the third, one of the fifth, and one of the sixth infantry, under the command of Major Pike, was issued. Between the 3d and 5th of June, this detachment fell down to the head of the English Turn, for the purpose of preparing the ground for the accommodation of the corps of light artillery, the regiment of dragoons, regiment of riflemen, the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh regiments of infantry, consisting in the whole of about two thousand men.

Question. In what state did you find the ground intended for the encampment?

Answer. From the right to the centre the ground was as dry as it is generally below the city of New Orleans; but from the centre to the left it was swampy. The first part had been cleared, but the last was covered with willows and palmettos.

Question. At what time did the main body arrive at the encampment?

Answer. Between the 9th and 11th of June.

Question. Was the ground prepared for their encampment when they arrived?

Answer. A part of the left was not cleared, and but little ditching done. A part of the officers and two or three companies of the men had flooring for their tents, the remainder were pitched upon the ground.

Question. What was the reason that a part of the men had flooring for their tents, and the remainder had not?

Answer. I recollect but two companies that were so provided, and the plank for those were procured at New Orleans by the officers, in part at their own expense.

Question. At what time did you leave the camp at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. On the morning of the 12th of June.

Question. How long did you serve in the army of the United States?

Answer. I entered the army in 1799, as a lieutenant of infantry; in 1801, was appointed a lieutenant in the second regiment of artillerists and engineers; in 1802, at the organization of the peace establishment, arranged to the corps of artillerists as a lieutenant; in 1807, promoted to a captaincy in the same corps; and in 1808, at the request of the Secretary of War, transferred to the regiment of light artillery. I resigned my commission on the 11th of June, 1809.

Question. Where have you generally served during the time you have been in the army?

Answer. On the sea-board; on the northern lakes; on the Ohio, Missouri, and at New Orleans, in 1807 and 1809.

#### COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, to wit:

On the 11th day of April, 1810, Captain George Peter came before me, a justice of the peace for the county aforesaid, and made oath on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God that the foregoing answers is a correct statement of facts, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

THOMAS CORCORAN.

#### No. 6.

*Deposition of Captain John Darrington, of the United States' army, taken by the committee appointed by the House of Representatives of the United States, to inquire into the causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

I joined the army in New Orleans about the first of April, 1809, and was never absent from it until February, 1810. Soon after my arrival in New Orleans, I discovered that the number of our sick began rapidly to increase. The prevalent complaint appeared to be the diarrhoea; it attacked indiscriminately both officers and privates; at this time the deaths were but few in proportion to the number sick. The most dangerous among the sick were provided with hospitals, in which they were well attended to. This diarrhoea was ascribed by our physicians to medicinal effects of the waters of the Mississippi.

The last of May we were directed to prepare for leaving New Orleans. On the 3d of June a camp forming party, consisting of the whole of the light artillery, and the strongest company of the remaining corps, was despatched for Terre au Bœuf. On the 10th of the same month the whole army followed, and on that and the succeeding day arrived at Terre au Bœuf; at this time I conjectured that about one-third of our army were on the sick reports. Although our camp forming party had used every industry, the ground was not in readiness. The tents were pitched in front in the skirt of an old field. From the centre of our encampment to the right had originally been cleared, but was then mostly overgrown with small trees, weeds, &c.; the ground damp; from the centre to the left still remained in its primitive state, and having never been ditched was as yet a marsh. Immediately in the rear was an impassable swamp. The left of the encampment was on the bank of the river, and partly parallel with it, but the river turning nearly at right angles threw the right at a considerable distance. To render this place suitable as soon as possible for the purpose intended, a fatigue of two hundred and twenty men was ordered; this party soon cleared off the trees on the line marked out. When the tents were permanently pitched, the General informed us, that, after having employed several days in inspecting the country in the vicinity of New Orleans, he had selected

this place as the most eligible for the encampment. Our fatigue party continued to clear the land at the distance of one hundred yards in the rear; after which they were employed in digging ditches in the intervals between the regiments, into which ditches were run drains leading from the front of the tents. This labor I conceived indispensable, from motives of self defence; otherwise, during the rainy seasons a portion of our encampment would have been inundated. The severest duty performed by our fatigue was the digging of a canal in the rear, extending the whole length of the line, on the banks of which canal was thrown up a permanent levee. This labor, to the best of my recollection, was not commenced until the middle of July, and not finished until in August. Had it been the intention of Government, (as General Wilkinson suggested as probable) to have made this place a permanent cantonment, the canal, together with its levee, would have been of utility as a safeguard against the ensuing season; but if, on the contrary, the place had been selected for a temporary purpose, I should say this labor was not necessary. The provisions were at no time such as could be esteemed good, and frequently so inferior, that nothing but necessity could justify the use of them. On this subject frequent complaints were made to General Wilkinson. At first he attended to them; the provisions were inspected and condemned; it was also said he purchased a hundred barrels of flour; the evil, however, still continued; complaints were again made, but without producing any effect; the General replying, that better provisions could not be had; after this, further complaints were deemed useless. The constant use of damaged provisions was no doubt the primitive cause of that horrid and destructive disease termed the scurvy. Our market furnished but a scanty supply of either fresh provisions or vegetables, which sold from a hundred to a hundred and fifty per cent. higher than at our present cantonment, (Washington, Mississippi territory.) Besides, the men did not derive as much advantage from this scanty and exorbitant market as they might, had they been regularly paid.

Our details were so arranged that one third of the army were on duty each day. This arrangement continuing, without a diminution in proportion to the increase of sickness, soon brought those reported for duty, on duty every other day, and it not unfrequently happened, that, to supply the details, sick men were furnished. For the first month most of the tents were without floors; and as the army was not furnished with straw, the bedding of the soldiers consisted in a single blanket. In this situation they were obliged to sleep on the ground, which, during the month of June and the greater part of July, was constantly damp, and in places for a short time inundated by water. If I recollect accurately, from the middle of June to the last of July, there were but few days without rain, and generally several showers in the same day; during this period and for some time after, the sentinels were unprovided with any description of shelter to protect them either against the rain or sun. The sentinels in the rear of the encampment, until the middle of July, were over their shoes in mud and water, and the fatigue party employed in the same place, in digging the canal, constantly worked in mud and water.

On our first arrival at Terre au Bœuf, General Wilkinson gave directions for the erection of a hospital; but, from what cause I am not able to say, the work progressed slowly, and was not finished until a short time before our movement, and when finished was not capable of holding more than sixty or eighty men. We were generally without hospital stores, and when we had them they were in such small quantities as to be of little service. The number of our sick was so great, that it became impossible for the few physicians we had to attend to them, and it sometimes occurred, that men died without ever having received any description of medical assistance. The physicians complained much of the want of medicines, and also, that, from the exposed situation of their patients, the medicine administered frequently proved injurious. The sick and the well lived in the same tents; they generally subsisted on the same provisions; were equally exposed to the constant and incessant torrents of rain, to the scorching heat of the sun, and during the night to the attacks of numberless mosquitoes. They manifested the pains and sufferings they experienced by shrieks and groans, which, during the silence of the night, were distinctly to be heard from one end of the line to the other. It is my candid belief the mosquitoes produced more misery than any other cause. In the night the air was filled with them, and not a man was provided with any thing like a bar or net. Thus situated, the sufferings of the unfortunate sick, who were too weak to defend themselves, can perhaps be better imagined than described.

Between the 5th and 10th of July, the officers, impelled by motives of humanity, from the lamentable and distressing situations of the camp, petitioned the General for its removal. I was the bearer of the petition. I met with him on the parade and informed him of my business. At first he appeared to be much astonished; observed that a removal was impossible; that there he had been sent, and there he should remain until ordered away by competent authority. He afterwards made use of a few harsh expressions, such as that the officers were crazy, &c. I did not put into his hands the petition, because I perceived it would have no effect. I then returned, and reported the result. After this all prospect of a removal ceased. In the latter end of July it was rumored that orders had been received from the Secretary of War for our removal, and in the latter end of August, these orders were made public. On this occasion the troops manifested the greatest joy; they seemed to have forgotten all that was passed, and became impatient for the arrival of the day on which they were to leave Terre au Bœuf. The first of September, orders were issued to prepare for ascending the river, and between the seventh and eighteenth commenced their ascent by detachments.

On the 20th the army was concentrated opposite New Orleans. Here a halt of two days ensued, to repair the boats. A few of the boats were found unfit for the voyage; but their places were immediately supplied by others belonging to citizens, who, it was said, charged nothing, being glad of an opportunity of getting them to Natchez. On the 23d, after sending a few of our sick to New Orleans, a general movement took place; many more of the sick could have been sent, but we were informed the hospitals could not contain them. The men were crowded in such numbers in the boats, as to preclude every thing like comfort. In many of the boats were two and three companies. This was an evil which could not be remedied: for, had our boats been multiplied, I do not think we should have been able to manage them. In the boat in which I ascended, were three companies, and it was with difficulty I could ever get more than twelve or fifteen men at the oars. For the first few days after we commenced our ascent, the number of deaths were not more than usual. Afterwards they began to increase, and before we arrived at Point Coupee, it became a first duty at our nightly encampments to bury those who had died during the day, and in the morning to bury those who had died during the night. This last rite consisted in wrapping them in their blankets and covering them with two or three feet of earth. On the 3d of October, we arrived at Point Coupee. At this place the establishment of a hospital was deemed indispensable; there being no public funds, the hospital was erected by the voluntary donations of the officers. At this place upwards of a hundred men were left. On the 17th, the army reached fort Adams; here another hospital was established. The last of October they arrived at Natchez, and were immediately removed to their intended encampment. As no arrangement had been made for the procuring of a hospital, the situation of the sick still continued to be miserable; they were crowded together in tents, and lay on the bare ground, exposed to the rain and cold. A small quantity of straw was procured, but not sufficient for the twentieth part. In this situation numbers died daily. The last of November a few of the most dangerous were sent to Washington, where houses had been rented as hospitals. About the middle of December deaths began to decrease, as the greater part of those, who, on their arrival, were much reduced, had died, and the others had become convalescent. On the 18th of December, General Wilkinson was relieved by General Hampton, who adopted the most prompt measures to render the situation of the army as desirable as possible. The police of the camp, which before had been neglected, and for the want of which the camp had become extremely offensive, was immediately attended to; measures were also taken for the erection of a large and commodious hospital, and also for the payment of the troops. He advanced from his own pocket one month's pay. The troops had from four to six months' due them. Why payment had thus been delayed I cannot say. Had the men been paid on their arrival, it certainly would have been of immense advantage, as the country furnished ample supplies of vegetables and fresh provisions, which sold on reasonable terms. By returns received from the hospitals established on our ascent, it appears that most of the sick left in them died. Another cause of suffering which I before omitted to mention was the want of clothing; this was because the new clothing did not arrive till late in August, and was not delivered to the company officers until after their arrival at Washington. It will not perhaps be improper to state, that when we were opposite New Orleans, a paper was presented by a friend of General Wilkinson for the signa-

tures of the officers. From my own impressions at that time, and I believe the impressions of others were similar to my own, I did not hesitate to sign it; the purport of this paper was the approving of the General's conduct. The General was the first military officer in the United States, of long standing, and of course carried with him the confidence of the Government. Besides, he had impressed on our minds a belief, that the misfortunes we had experienced were alone attributable to Government; that he had ever acted in conformity to orders. We could not doubt the words of our General. Many signed it.

JOHN DARRINGTON, *Captain 3d Regiment Infantry.*

*Interrogatories put to Captain John Darrington, by the Committee, with his answers.*

Question. Could boats have been procured at New Orleans sufficient to convey the troops to Fort Adams or Natchez, at any time between the 14th of June and 10th of September?

Answer. I suppose that boats could have been had. There are many boats employed in the river, and I think they might have been procured on reasonable terms.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions, particularly the flour, with which the army were supplied during the encampment at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. The flour was always bad, with the exception of one hundred barrels purchased by General Wilkinson. It was generally mouldy, sour, and frequently filled with bugs and worms. A small proportion of the pork was good; and also a small proportion of the fresh beef.

Question. Do you believe that, at the time the troops were using the bad provisions, a sufficient supply of good and wholesome provisions could have been procured at New Orleans?

Answer. I suppose it might.

Question. At what time did the fatigue duty cease?

Answer. The records of the army show it ceased on the 7th of September.

Question. Had you reason to believe there were funds in the hands of the paymaster at New Orleans, sufficient for paying off the troops?

Answer. Yes. I had command of the third regiment, and issued an order to the paymaster of that regiment, to meet us when we should arrive opposite New Orleans, and pay off the men, which he complied with.

Question. Were you provided with funds to defray incidental expenses in conveying the troops up to Natchez?

Answer. We were not. The expenses incurred whilst I had command of the army, I was obliged to defray from my own pocket.

Question. What quantity of wood-land was cleared by the troops?

Answer. I suppose about thirty acres.

Question. Do you not suppose the value of the land was enhanced by the labor done on it by the troops?

Answer. Yes. The cleared land was prepared for cultivation, and the uncleared land in the vicinity was drained by the canal and ditches in the rear of the camp.

Question. How many men did you lose out of your company during your encampment at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. None.

Question. Were your men encamped on more favorable ground than the other part of the army generally?

Answer. They were not; my company occupied its proper place in the line.

Question. How many of your men were generally fit for duty while at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. The number of those in my company fit for duty seldom exceeded five.

Question. How many of the men died on board of your boat, while ascending the river?

Answer. Of the three companies on board my boat, I think about one third died, including those left in the hospitals established on our way up.

Question. Did you receive the necessary clothing for your company?

Answer. The clothing for my company arrived at Camden, in South Carolina, during my absence. I received for it at Charleston, but being ordered for New Orleans, and not being able to get it from Camden in time, I was obliged to sail for New Orleans, leaving it behind. After my arrival at New Orleans, I wrote to the assistant military agent at Charleston, stating the situation of my company, and requesting him to forward on my clothing. He sent one cask, which I received in the month of July.

Question. Was the General attentive to the sick at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. He was particularly attentive to my company; with respect to the remainder of the army, I cannot say.

Question. Was your company provided with quarters on their arrival at New Orleans?

Answer. They were not. On my arrival, I reported myself to the commanding officer; he referred me to the military agent for quarters. I went in search of the agent, but could not find him. I sent my ensign in search of him; he informed me that he had found the agent, who directed him to look out for quarters wherever they could be procured, and he would pay for them. The ensign accordingly found quarters, and the troops were removed from the transport after a detention on board for two or three days.

Question. From the state of the army at Terre au Bœuf on the 20th of July, if preparations had immediately commenced for a removal, how soon do you believe a movement of the army up the river might have commenced?

Answer. I am of the opinion, that, if proper measures had been immediately adopted, a movement might have been made in five or six days.

Question. What were the arrangements ultimately adopted?

Answer. I think the public boats arrived from Fort Adams early in August. They were at first ordered to be repaired by general detail, but the repairs went on slowly: about the last of August, or the beginning of September, they were divided among the commanding officers of corps, who undertook to finish their repairs, which were soon completed. I reported myself ready for moving in two days after receiving my boats.

WASHINGTON COUNTY, ss.

On this 11th day of April, 1810, appeared before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for said county, Captain John Darrington, and made oath, in due form of law, that the foregoing depositions and answers to the interrogatories, are just and accurate, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

DANIEL RAPINE.

No. 7.

*Deposition of Colonel Alexander Parker, taken by the Committee appointed by the House of Representatives of the United States, to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

January 30, 1809, I received orders from Gen. Wilkinson, to sail from Norfolk to New Orleans, and report myself, or take command, as the rank of the officer I found there would justify.

On the third of February, did sail with two transport ships, with about 300 troops on board; arrived and took command at New Orleans, on the 26th of March; the troops generally in good health. The General did not arrive until the 20th of April, the command, of course, then devolved on him.

A general order was issued, on the 31st of May, for the brigade quartermaster to have 50 axes, 50 spades, 50 picks, 50 mattocks, 50 hatchets, 6 briar scythes, 4 mauls, 4 pair of iron wedges, 12 handbarrows, and the same quantity of rakes, ready for service on Friday morning.



On the 1st of June, shallots were ordered to be in readiness to remove a detachment from the army, consisting of 500 men, under the command of Major Pike, with fifteen days' provisions, and all the tools mentioned in the foregoing orders, to prepare an encampment at Terre au Bœuf, for the reception of the army, as a general movement would take place in the course of a week. Accordingly, on the 9th, the troops did embark, and proceeded down the river about twelve miles, to this new encampment. On the 11th, a general order was issued at Terre au Bœuf, for a fatigue party to be daily furnished, consisting of one field officer, two captains, four subalterns, eight sergeants, eight corporals, and two hundred privates. The 5th of July, I left the encampment of Terre au Bœuf to return to the city of Washington; at which time I think there were 600 soldiers returned on the sick list—reference to the inspector's return will ascertain the exact number. The causes of such numbers being sick I attribute to the following reasons: 1st. The impurity of the waters of the Mississippi, which the soldiers were obliged to use without being filtered. 2d. The camp being mostly inundated by heavy rains and the waters from the Mississippi. 3d. The great fatigue the soldiers underwent in reclaiming that encampment, and lying on the wet ground, they not being furnished with a sufficiency either of straw or boards. 4th. The provisions that were issued by the Commissary were generally damaged and unfit for use. 5th. The great scarcity of vegetables, so conducive to the health and comfort of soldiers in that warm climate.

A. PARKER.

*Interrogatories put to Colonel Alexander Parker, by the Committee appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the mortality in that detachment of the army ordered for the defence of New Orleans, with his answers.*

Question. What rank did you hold in the army at New Orleans?

Answer. I commanded the army from the time of my arrival until the arrival of Gen. Wilkinson; from which time, until I left the army at Terre au Bœuf, I was second in command.

Question. What was the condition of the army during their stay at New Orleans, both as it respects their health and accommodations?

Answer. The troops generally arrived there in good health, but sickness soon commenced, and rapidly increased amongst them; their accommodations, as to barracks and quarters, were comfortable; the provisions, flour, pork, and beef, were generally bad, of the meanest kind, and unfit for use.

Question. Was there a sufficiency of sound and wholesome provisions in New Orleans, which might have been procured for the support of the troops?

Answer. There was generally a supply in the market of good and wholesome provisions, particularly flour and pork.

Question. Did the market of New Orleans furnish an abundance of fresh provisions and vegetables?

Answer. The fresh provisions were generally poor, the vegetables were abundant.

Question. Did you examine the site of encampment at Terre au Bœuf before the troops removed there?

Answer. I had passed by the place in going up the river, but never examined it with a view to an encampment.

Question. Were you, or any other of the officers within your knowledge, ever consulted as to the propriety of fixing on Terre au Bœuf as the place of encampment?

Answer. I was not, nor do I believe that any of the officers were.

Question. Did you consider Terre au Bœuf as an eligible position for an encampment with a view to the defence of New Orleans, if the position had been a healthy one?

Answer. The position is not a military one, but is as much so as any other in that low country.

Question. Do you believe a healthy situation might have been selected in the high lands, and which would have been equally or more advantageous with a view to the defence of New Orleans?

Answer. I believe the situation of the present encampment at Washington may be considered, as a military position, in every point of view, more eligible, and better calculated, for the defence of New Orleans, than Terre au Bœuf, or any other in that country, within the jurisdiction of the United States. I have many reasons for thinking so, among which the following may be considered as the principal: an invading army landing on the Mobile and taking possession of the heights of the Mississippi, could easily cut off all supplies from New Orleans, and, with a small naval force at the mouth of the Mississippi, would block up the low country so completely, as to render it wholly impossible for an army to subsist there. The health of the troops would be much better preserved, and they could, at any time, move down the river in three days with great facility in case of necessity.

Question. Do you recollect whether any opinions were expressed among the officers, previous to the removal at Terre au Bœuf, relative to the superior advantages of the upper country over that position, and whether those opinions were communicated to the General?

Answer. The officers frequently conversed among themselves on that subject, but I do not know that they communicated their opinions to the General. I pointed out the advantages which I conceived the upper country possessed to the General; he replied that he was fully apprised of the situation, but that he was limited in his orders, and could not leave New Orleans uncovered.

Question. Do you recollect whether any opinions were expressed among the officers, while at Terre au Bœuf, in favor of the removal of the troops up the river, and whether those opinions were communicated to the General, and at what time?

Answer. They were daily expressing such a wish to me, and often desired me to communicate their wishes to the General, and press him for a removal. I did mention to the General, about the last of June, or the first of July, the necessity of removing the troops from that encampment to the upper country; his reply was nearly similar to the one he gave me before—that he was restricted in his powers, and could not leave New Orleans uncovered.

Question. When you left the encampment, were the troops regularly paid up?

Answer. According to the best of my recollection, there was not more than two months' pay due the troops generally when I left there.

Question. Do you know whether the paymaster at New Orleans had funds in his hands for the payment of the troops?

Answer. He informed me, some time in the month of June, that he had received a draft, and had funds in his hands. He had been in a very low state of health for some time, and remained so when I left there, which disabled him from transacting any kind of business.

Question. Do you not think the fatigue parties were too large in proportion to the strength of the army, and that the excessive fatigue thereby imposed on the troops, contributed very much to increase the sickness and deaths?

Answer. It is my opinion that the details for fatigue and camp duty were much too great for the well part of the troops to perform, and that it was one great cause of the mortality.

Question. Were the ditches and other improvements made in the camp absolutely necessary for the accommodation of the troops?

Answer. They were certainly of great service in draining the ground, and making it more dry and comfortable.

Question. Do you think the work done by the troops rendered the land more valuable to the proprietor?

Answer. There can be no doubt but its value was improved by draining and clearing it.

Question. In what state did you find the ground intended for the encampment?

Answer. The ground on which the right wing of the army was encamped had once been cleared, but was covered with brambles and underwood. On the left it was a perfect bog, and uncleared.

Question. Was there time sufficient for the camp forming party, under Major Pike, to have completed the preparations for encampment, previous to the removal of the main body to Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. I think there was not. He moved with his party on the first of June, and the main body moved on the ninth. It would have taken the party under his command a month or six weeks to put the ground in any tolerable order.

- Question. Was not the place chosen for encampment much infested with mosquitoes, &c.?  
 Answer. It was. The mosquitoes, gnats, and reptiles, were so numerous, as to be very distressing to the men, and was a great aggravation of their other sufferings.
- Question. Were the troops supplied with the necessary hospital stores?  
 Answer. They were not, and the troops suffered much in consequence of the want of them. Many of the men died without having received any aid from hospital stores.
- Question. Was it not within the power of the General to order the military agent to furnish the necessary hospital stores and other supplies for the use of the troops?  
 Answer. The General may at all times draw on the military agent for any quantity of stores that may be found necessary for the use of the troops.
- Question. Do you know whether the military agent had funds in his hands to meet such drafts?  
 Answer. About the last of April, he had considerable funds in his hands. I cannot say what his disbursements were after that period.
- Question. What were the most prevalent diseases in the army while you were there?  
 Answer. Dysenteries and diarrhoea. These disorders were increased by the dampness of the ground on which the troops were encamped.
- Question. Were the waters of the Mississippi considered as wholesome?  
 Answer. When filtered, the water is considered as wholesome, but, in the state in which the men were obliged to use it, it was considered by medical men as very unwholesome.
- Question. Could not the men have been supplied with a sufficient quantity of filtered water?  
 Answer. A sufficient quantity of filtering stones could not have been had, but a good substitute might have been found in sand or charcoal.
- Question. Were the sentries provided with the necessary shelters to preserve them from the effects of the sun, rain, and dews?  
 Answer. They were not, during my stay there. There were sentinels who fell on their posts from the effects of the sun, or other cause, and expired very suddenly.
- Question. Is it your opinion that a sufficient number of boats could at any time have been procured at New Orleans, for the purpose of conveying the troops up the river?  
 Answer. At all times, a number of boats might have been procured, but whether in sufficient numbers to have removed all the troops at once, I am not able to say.
- Question. Is it your opinion that the troops might have been encamped on the plains of the Fauxbourg St. Mary, and that, if they had been so encamped, their situation would have been more eligible than it was at Terre au Bœuf.  
 Answer. I am under the impression that the ground would not have been sufficiently extensive for an encampment. If it would, it possessed many advantages, such as its being drier, and the facility of procuring vegetables and other necessary supplies; but I am under the impression, that, from its vicinity to the town, it would have been impossible to have restrained the men, and prevented them from entering into all the vices common in large towns.
- Question. Was the police of the camp such as to keep it sufficiently clean?  
 Answer. The police officers were sufficiently strict; but the low situation of the ground caused a frequent overflowing of the sinks, and produced a very great stench, which was extremely offensive throughout the camp.
- Question. In the state in which the army was, at Terre au Bœuf, do you believe it could have made any serious opposition against even a small invading force?  
 Answer. It is my opinion that our troops were so emaciated and reduced by sickness, the climate, and the want of proper nourishment, that they could have made but a very feeble opposition, against even a small military force, in good health and well organized.
- Question. Were the mosquito bars or nets necessary for the troops, particularly for the sick, and were they provided?  
 Answer. Nets were absolutely necessary for the accommodation of the army. When I left that country a few nets were provided for the sick at the New Orleans Hospital. I was informed by the military agent, that he either had in hand ten thousand dollars, for the purpose of purchasing mosquito nets, or that he was ordered by the Secretary of War to provide for the army, at New Orleans, to the amount of ten thousand dollars.
- Question. What was the price of mosquito nets?  
 Answer. Good nets for the soldiers might have been purchased for two dollars and fifty cents.
- Question. Did any cause or causes exist, within your knowledge, to impose an imperative duty on the commander to encamp in the vicinity of New Orleans?  
 Answer. None within my knowledge.
- Question. Were there any symptoms of discontent manifested at New Orleans, which could require the detention of the army at Terre au Bœuf?  
 Answer. The citizens of New Orleans were peaceable, and appeared to be well disposed to the Government. I heard of no dissatisfaction, nor murmurs of any kind.
- Question. Did any reasonable apprehensions exist, from the influx of refugees from Cuba, that could require the presence of an army?  
 Answer. No apprehensions were entertained that I heard of. I had none.
- Question. Admitting that symptoms of discontent had been manifested, would not an encampment of the army in the high lands have given to the Government the surest and most certain means of overthrowing any thing like opposition?  
 Answer. I am decidedly of opinion, that, as a military position, the high lands, in every point of view, may be considered as the most eligible for the protection and defence of New Orleans, and that the encampment of the army, in the higher country, would afford the most certain means of quelling any thing like opposition to the Government.
- Question. Were you informed that an order had been given by the Secretary of War, on the 30th of April, 1809, for the removal of the troops to the rear of Fort Adams, or Natchez?  
 Answer. I heard of no such order; nor was information of such an order communicated to the army.
- Question. Is it not customary for the commanding officer of an army to consult his officers of highest rank upon matters of importance, respecting the disposition of the army under his command?  
 Answer. It is.
- On this 14th day of April, 1810, appeared before the subscriber, a justice of the peace of Washington County, Colonel Alexander Parker, and made oath, in due form of law, that the foregoing deposition, and answers to interrogatories, are just and accurate, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Sworn before,

DANIEL RAPINE.

No. 8.

*Interrogatories put to Captain E. Williams, by the committee appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army ordered for the defence of New Orleans, with his answers.*

Question. What rank did you hold in the army at New Orleans?

Answer. I held the rank of captain, and acted as an aid-de-camp to General Wilkinson, from the 16th of January, 1809, to the 30th of June following. I arrived at New Orleans on the 19th of April, 1809.

Question. What was the condition of the army during their stay at New Orleans, both as it respected their health and accommodations?

Answer. The accommodations were good and comfortable. Soon after the arrival of the troops they were afflicted with diarrhoea, supposed to be owing to the medicinal properties of the water of the Mississippi. The water

generally produces such effects on strangers. The sickness increased during the continuance of the troops at New Orleans.

Question. Was there a sufficiency of sound and wholesome provisions at New Orleans, which might have been procured for the support of the troops?

Answer. No doubt but that a sufficiency of sound and wholesome provisions might have been purchased there at any time.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions furnished the army?

Answer. Whilst at New Orleans I was uninformed of any thing relating to this question, as I then acted as an aid-de-camp to the commander of the army. When I took my station in the line, I had frequent occasion to complain of the provisions; they were often unfit for use: our complaints were known to the General. In some instances the provisions were condemned, and others purchased by order of the General. One hundred barrels of flour were purchased by the General.

Question. Do you believe a healthy situation might have been selected in the high lands, and which would have been equally, or more, advantageous with a view to the defence of New Orleans?

Answer. A more healthy situation might have been taken in the high lands, but not so eligible for the defence of New Orleans.

Question. Are you well acquainted with the country above New Orleans, and the positions best calculated for military sites?

Answer. I am not.

Question. Do you recollect whether any opinions were expressed among the officers, while at Terre au Bœuf, in favor of the removal of the troops up the river, and whether those opinions were communicated to the General, and at what time?

Answer. The officers frequently expressed opinions in favor of a removal to the high country. Their opinions were known to the General.

Question. Were the troops regularly paid?

Answer. They were not regularly paid. When I left the detachment at Washington, Mississippi territory, on the 27th of November, the regiment to which I was attached had arrears due for five months.

Question. Do you think the fatigue parties were too large, in proportion to the strength of the army, and that the excessive fatigue thereby imposed on the troops contributed very much to increase the sickness and deaths?

Answer. I do think they were.

Question. Were the ditches, and other improvements made in the camp, absolutely necessary for the accommodation of the troops?

Answer. Ditches were absolutely necessary for the comfort of the troops; the ditches made were unnecessarily large for a temporary cantonment.

Question. Do you think that the work done by the troops rendered the land more valuable to the proprietor?

Answer. I do; inasmuch as it rendered a portion of the land, on which we encamped, fit for cultivation, which land, previous to our encampment, was in its primitive state—wet and marshy.

Question. In what state did you find the ground intended for encampment?

Answer. Part of it had been cultivated, but was overgrown with weeds and brush; the remainder was in its primitive state—low, wet, and marshy, which, when ditched and cleared, became dry.

Question. Was there time sufficient for the camp forming party, under Major Pike, to have completed the preparations for encampment, previous to the removal of the main body to Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. I do not think the time was sufficient. When the main body of the army arrived, more than half of the work was to be done.

Question. Was not this place chosen for encampment much infested with mosquitoes, &c.?

Answer. Yes, it was; but not more so than that country generally is.

Question. Were the troops supplied with the necessary hospital stores?

Answer. The troops were, in my opinion, at no time sufficiently supplied with hospital stores.

Question. What were the most prevalent diseases in the army while you were there?

Answer. Dysenteries, bilious fevers, agues and fevers, and the scurvy.

Question. Could not the men have been supplied with a sufficient quantity of filtered water?

Answer. The men could have been supplied with a sufficient quantity of filtered water; the means of filtering it being in abundance.

Question. Were the sentries provided with the necessary shelters to preserve them from the effects of the sun, rain, and dews?

Answer. The sentries were at no time properly protected from the weather; about the middle of July, sheds were erected, but they afforded little protection.

Question. Is it your opinion that a sufficient number of boats could, at any time, have been procured at New Orleans, for the purpose of conveying the troops up the river?

Answer. Comfortable boats could have been procured, at any time, at New Orleans for the conveyance of the troops.

Question. Is it your opinion that the troops might have been encamped on the plains of the Fauxbourg St. Mary, and that if they had been so encamped, their situation would have been more eligible than it was at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. I do not think they could have been encamped there so advantageously as at Terre au Bœuf; the vicinity to New Orleans tempting the men to dissipation and other vices.

Question. Was the police of the camp such as to keep it sufficiently clean?

Answer. The detail for police was sufficient, and the camp kept as clean as the nature of the ground would admit; the frequent rains causing the sinks to overflow contributed to the diseases of the camp.

Question. In the state in which the army was, at Terre au Bœuf, do you believe it could have made any serious opposition against a small invading force?

Answer. The extreme disease of our camp would have made it impossible for us efficiently to oppose even a small force.

Question. Were mosquito bars or nets necessary for the troops, particularly the sick, and were they provided?

Answer. I consider mosquito bars absolutely necessary for both the sick and the well. A few were supplied, at a late season, for the sick.

Question. Did any cause, or causes, exist, within your knowledge, to impose an imperious duty on the commander to encamp in the vicinity of New Orleans?

Answer. I do not know any cause why the troops were kept in the vicinity of New Orleans. The idea generally prevailed among the officers, that it was in conformity to the wishes of Government.

Question. Were there any symptoms of discontent manifested at New Orleans, which would require the detention of the army at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. I know of none that could require the detention of the whole detachment. In my opinion it was politic to leave a small portion of the army there, as the influx of people from Cuba excited disquiet in the town.

Question. Were you informed that an order had been given, by the Secretary of War, on the 30th of April, 1809, for the removal of the troops to the rear of Fort Adams, or Natchez?

Answer. I knew of no order for the removal of the troops until about the 20th of August, 1809.

In addition to the interrogatories, put by the committee, it may be proper to add, that, on or about the 1st of September, the troops were ordered, by General James Wilkinson, to prepare for a removal to the high lands up the river Mississippi. The troops left Terre au Bœuf by detachments, between the 8th and 18th of September. On the 20th they were concentrated opposite New Orleans; many of the boats, furnished for our conveyance, were found to be in a leaky condition, some few totally unfit for service; on the 23d we halted about a mile above the city to repair, and in order to remove such of the sick to the hospital at New Orleans as were too ill to be moved. Many

were forced to proceed from a want of room in the hospital, and who might have been recovered could they have had rest and comfortable lodgings. At no time was there a sufficiency of hospital stores during our route. Our surgeons often complained of a want of the proper medicines, and such as they had frequently proved inefficacious, as the sick were necessarily exposed to the heat of the sun, and the heavy dews at night, together with every variety of weather. Straw not being furnished, as expressly ordered by the War Department, the sick and the well lay on the ground with a single blanket. The sufferings of the men may be better imagined than related. The number of sick continued to increase—deaths became more numerous. At Point Coupee it was judged necessary to establish an hospital, in which were left the most dangerous of our sick, (who, for their necessaries and comforts, were dependent on the charity of the officers, as the detachments were without public funds) in number about one hundred. At Fort Adams a similar step was found necessary; as the diseases of the climate affected all, we were often deprived of the services of our surgeons, and men were known to die without the smallest medical assistance. The troops arrived at Natchez, about the 1st of November, and were immediately removed to Washington, where the change of air was soon observed to have a happy effect on the health of the men. General Wilkinson was generally attentive to the sick, particularly to my company.

WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS,  
*Captain of the fifth regiment of Infantry.*

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, *City of Washington, April 17, 1810.*

Captain William E. Williams made oath before me, that the foregoing statement, in answer to the queries put to him, so far as he states them on his own personal knowledge, is true, and so far as he states it to have been derived from the information of others, he believes to be true.

ROBERT BRENT, *Mayor of the City of Washington.*

No. 9.

*Interrogatories put to Lieutenant Enos Cutler, by the committee appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army appointed for the defence of New Orleans, with his answers.*

Question. What rank did you hold in the army?

Answer. First lieutenant in the seventh regiment of infantry.

Question. How long have you been in the army?

Answer. I have been in service since the 3d of May, 1808.

Question. At what time did you arrive at New Orleans?

Answer. I arrived there on the last day of March, 1809.

Question. What was the condition of the army during their stay at New Orleans, both as it respects their health and accommodations?

Answer. After we arrived at New Orleans the dysentery soon became very prevalent among the troops. The accommodations were good. The company under my command (the captain being sick and absent) arrived in good health, but soon became sickly, and six or seven men died before we removed to Terre au Bœuf.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions with which the troops were supplied while at New Orleans?

Answer. Our meat was good; the flour sometimes good, and sometimes bad.

Question. Was there a sufficiency of sound and wholesome provisions in New Orleans, which might have been procured for the support of the troops?

Answer. I knew very little respecting the state of the provisions in the market at New Orleans, but I do not think that a supply of good flour could at all times have been had.

Question. Did the market of New Orleans furnish a sufficient supply of fresh provisions and vegetables?

Answer. It furnished, I believe, at all times a sufficiency of vegetables, but whether a sufficiency of fresh provisions could at all times have been had, I cannot say.

Question. At what time did you remove from New Orleans to Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. It was on the third day of June. I went with the first detachment under the command of Major Pike.

Question. In what condition did you find the ground allotted for the encampment?

Answer. The ground on the right was dry and covered with weeds; towards the left it was lower, and somewhat wet, and covered with brush, blackberry bushes, &c. The party under Major Pike encamped on the right, and, when the other troops came down, the line was extended to the left.

Question. At what time did the main body of troops arrive at Terre au Bœuf, and was the encampment prepared for their reception?

Answer. I believe it was eight or ten days after our arrival. The ground was as well prepared as the time would permit.

Question. How long after their arrival was it before the troops were provided with flooring for their tents?

Answer. They were provided immediately after the arrival of the main body; the boats in which they descended were broken up for that purpose.

Question. Was the place at which the troops were encamped much infested by mosquitoes?

Answer. It was, like the rest of that country, very much infested by them.

Question. Were the troops supplied with the necessary hospital stores and medicines?

Answer. I heard no complaint for the want of medicine, but there was a want of hospital stores.

Question. Do you not suppose the fatigue parties were too large in proportion to the strength of the army, and that the fatigue thereby imposed on the troops tended to increase the sickness and deaths?

Answer. On our first arrival the fatigue parties were large; they were afterwards reduced. I do not know that the sickness or deaths were increased by the fatigue.

Question. At what time were the fatigue parties reduced?

Answer. I cannot remember.

Question. Were the sentries provided with the necessary shelters to protect them from the sun, rain, and dews?

Answer. Yes, they were provided with shelters covered with palmettoes, sufficiently tight to protect them from common rains.

Question. At what time were they so provided?

Answer. I think it was probably toward the last of July, but I am not certain as to the time.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions with which the troops were supplied while encamped at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. Our meat was generally fresh, and generally good; our flour sometimes bad. A purchase of flour was once made by order of the General, in consequence of the failure of the contractor to supply the troops.

Question. Was the police of the camp such as to keep it sufficiently clean?

Answer. Great attention was paid to the police of the camp, by the officers, but the troops being new, the camp did not preserve that clean appearance which a camp of old soldiers probably would.

Question. Were the ditches which were made by the army necessary for the accommodation of the troops?

Answer. I conceived them to be so.

Question. Do you recollect whether any opinions were expressed among the officers, while at Terre au Bœuf, in favor of the removal of the troops up the river, and whether those opinions were communicated to the General, and at what time?

Answer. There were opinions of that kind expressed, and I believe they were communicated to the General early in July.

Question. Were the troops well clothed while at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. My company had received their year's clothing, which year did not expire with those first enlisted, until the first of July, but, being new recruits, their clothing had become much worn; and I believe this was the case with the troops generally. Some clothing was drawn in advance, by some of the officers, while at Terre au Bœuf.

Question. Do you conceive that Terre au Bœuf is the most eligible place in that country for an encampment?

Answer. I believe it was as much so as any place in the neighborhood of New Orleans.

Question. What were the diseases with which the troops were afflicted while at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. The dysentery continued; in addition to which, they were afflicted with ague and fever, fever, and a disorder in the mouth, which was called by some physicians the scurvy, and by others by some other name.

Question. Were the troops regularly paid?

Answer. The law provides that, in ordinary cases, the troops shall be paid every two months. We were paid in New Orleans, up to the last of April; and in August we were paid up to the last of June. At Washington we were paid in January up to the last of December.

Question. At what time did you hear that the General had received orders to remove the troops up the river?

Answer. I did not hear it until a short time before we removed.

Question. Could boats have been procured, at New Orleans, sufficient to convey the troops to Fort Adams or Natchez, at any time between the 14th of June and the 10th of September?

Answer. I doubt whether a sufficient number of boats could have been procured, at any one time, to convey the whole of the troops at once.

Question. How many men died out of your company while at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. One man only, and he went sick from New Orleans to that place.

Question. How many men had you generally fit for duty, in your company, while at Terre au Bœuf?

Answer. The report of duty men arose from twelve, when we first arrived there, up, I believe, as high as twenty-six, about the last of June. In July they became sickly again, and, for some time before we left the encampment, we did not report more than nine or ten.

ENOS CUTLER, 1st Lieutenant 7th Infantry.

WASHINGTON COUNTY, ss.

On this 24th day of April, 1810, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for said county, appeared Enos Cutler, and made oath, in due form, that the facts stated in the foregoing affidavit are true to the best of his knowledge.

DANIEL RAPINE.

No. 10.

*Deposition of Captain Ninian Pinkney, in the first regiment of infantry, taken by the committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

I have been in the army of the United States since February, 1801.

I was appointed brigade inspector, and ordered to New Orleans, where I arrived on the 31st of March, 1809.

The public buildings not being sufficient for the accommodation of but a small proportion of the troops which had arrived, and was daily arriving, they were quartered in all parts of the city and faubourgs, in comfortable houses. The sick reports soon became very considerable; and I understood the diseases to be chiefly the dysentery, which attacks all strangers, and of which a number of the men died. The provisions issued to the troops were salted pork and beef, bread, and flour, which I have understood was not of the best quality; nor do I believe good flour or fresh beef, in large quantities, could have been procured in the country.

A detachment of troops, under the command of Major Pike, left New Orleans, on the 3d of June, for Terre au Bœuf, to prepare the ground for an encampment, and the remainder of the army went down on the 9th and 10th of the same month; at which time I went, and found the ground as well prepared as the short time given them would permit, but some small underwood, briars, and weeds, remained to be removed on each flank of the line, and ditches to be cut to carry off the water when the rainy season should come on. And, for this purpose, a general fatigue was detailed, consisting of two captains, four subalterns, and two hundred men, which was reduced in proportion as those objects were accomplished, and was entirely taken off by the 1st of August.

The tents of the men and officers were made comfortable, by flooring them with the plank taken from the boats in which they ascended the river, and erecting sheds, covered with palmettoes, to protect them from the sun and rain; and every exertion was made by the General to establish and keep up a strict police, as can be seen by the general orders issued at that camp.

I have heard the surgeons and surgeons' mates frequently complain of the want of hospital stores and medicines; and I have understood that the greater part of those articles used at camp Terre au Bœuf was purchased at New Orleans. The regular supply from Philadelphia did not arrive in Orleans until about the 1st of September; at which time the clothing arrived also. Some of the companies were at this time much in want of clothing; not that they had much due them, but because they had spoiled and worn it out before the expiration of the year. And it is a fact, well known in the army, that the clothing of recruits will not last them the first year, unless the officers take much care.

I do conceive Terre au Bœuf the most eligible place for an encampment I have seen on the Mississippi, within fifty miles of New Orleans.

The diseases with which the troops at camp Terre au Bœuf were afflicted were complicated, and of various kinds, and the physicians differed very much as to their mode of treatment.

The troops were not paid so frequently as the law directs, but I believe as often as the nature of the service would permit.

I do not recollect to have heard that the General had received orders to move the troops up the river, until he was making arrangements to carry it into effect, and that was about the 1st of August.

I do not think a sufficient number of boats could have been had, at any one time, between the 14th of June and the 10th of September, to transport the troops to Natchez; indeed, I am satisfied they could not.

*Questions by the Committee.*

Question. In what situation did you find the ground at Terre au Bœuf, on your arrival at that place?

Answer. The ground at Terre au Bœuf, on which the encampment was making, had the appearance of having once been cultivated as far as the centre, from the extreme right of the line; the other part had never been cleared before, and was covered with underwood and briars, and required to be trenched to take off the rain water.

Question. How long after your arrival at the camp was it before the tents were generally floored?

Answer. The tents of the men were all, or nearly all, floored in eight or ten days after my arrival.

Question. What was the quality of the provisions with which the troops were supplied at Terre au Bœuf, and what measures were taken to procure those of a better quality?

Answer. The meat part of the ration was generally fresh beef, and as good as the country commonly affords. The bread and flour was not good, and the General made a purchase of, I think, one hundred barrels, on account of the contractor, of the best flour that could be had in the city of Orleans; but when it was issued, it was found very little better than what the contractor's agent was issuing.

Question. Were mosquito nets, or bars, necessary for the troops, and were they provided?

Answer. Mosquito nets are necessary at all points and places on the Mississippi, from the Bluff of Natchez to the Balize, at least four months in the year; but the troops were not furnished with them, except for the sick in the hospital.

Question. Are you acquainted with the country generally in the neighborhood of New Orleans?

Answer. I have no knowledge of the country in the neighborhood of New Orleans, at any considerable distance from the river banks, except what I have learned from others.

Question. Do you not believe the sickness and deaths were increased by the badness of the provisions, and the want of hospital stores and medicines?

Answer. I have no doubt of it.

Question. Are you acquainted with the country above New Orleans, and the positions best calculated for military sites?

Answer. I am not acquainted with the country between New Orleans and Fort Adams, back from the river. The best sites for military positions are in the neighborhood of Fort Adams and Natchez.

Question. Do you know whether any opinions were expressed among the officers in favor of a removal of the troops from Terre au Bœuf up the river, and whether those opinions were made known to the General, and at what time?

Answer. I know that opinions were expressed among the officers in favor of a removal of the troops, from camp Terre au Bœuf, up the river; and I believe those opinions were partially made known to the General, but at what time, or by whom, I cannot say.

N. PINKNEY.

WASHINGTON COUNTY, ss.

On this 24th of April, 1810, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for the said county, appeared Ninian Pinkney, and made oath, in due form, that the facts stated in the foregoing affidavit are true to the best of his knowledge.

DANIEL RAPINE.

No. 11.

*Deposition of John Chrystie, First Lieutenant 6th Infantry, taken by the Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.*

I arrived at New Orleans on the 15th of March, 1809. The accommodations of the troops were as good as the town could afford; and the provisions were, in general, such as are usually furnished, I believe, though I recollect complaints were once or twice made and surveys held.

The market abounded with vegetables; but I do not know whether fresh provisions could have been procured in large quantities.

About a third of the troops were on the sick report some time before our movement to camp, principally with dysenteries.

About the first of June, nine strong companies (being a third of the whole) moved under the command of Major Pike, to the position at Terre au Bœuf, selected for the encampment, and the main body followed in six or eight days after.

On my arrival, about the 10th of June, I found the ground, from the extreme right to some distance to the left of the centre, dry and hard, and great part of the front covered with a firm sod, and I believe clover. Every one seemed pleased with the situation, and the men in general were highly gratified with the change.

The camp was not more infested with mosquitoes, in my opinion, than the city of New Orleans, and they were never troublesome there during the day.

The importance of having the trenches completed before the rains set in occasioned large details at first, but they decreased with the progress of the work. No labor was bestowed on them further than was necessary to the comfort of the soldiers and neatness of the camp; and I do believe, that those trenches were rather hurtful than otherwise to the plantation. Sheds for the sentries, other sheds capable of turning rain, extended between the lines of tents, from one extremity of the camp to the other; a guard house, and a large hospital, were erected with all possible despatch. The tents were floored immediately on our arrival.

The hospital department did not appear to meet perfectly the exigencies of the occasion. I do remember to have heard, at one time, considerable complaints on the score of hospital stores, and medical attendance. It must be well known, however, I believe, to every officer then in camp, that the greatest exertions were made to remedy these evils.

The provisions were generally fresh and good, except the flour; and I believe good flour was very scarce, at that time, in New Orleans.

The clothing of the troops was not in good condition, but I understood that none was due until a short time before their departure for Natchez, when it was thought best not to issue.

The most unwearied attention was paid by the General to the police of the camp; and, though, for some time, its condition showed us to be but young soldiers, it soon became perfectly neat and clean.

Of the company to which I was attached, four men died at camp; two of them of the dysentery, which, I believe, they had taken at New Orleans.

Vegetables and milk were to be had in abundance, till within a very short time before our departure, but, in general, the market did not answer expectation; a circumstance which may probably be attributed to these causes: certain articles found to be unhealthy were prohibited; prices were at one time restricted; the inhabitants, not understanding the language, frequently had difficulties with the men, and sometimes, when imposed on, could not be redressed; at the same time, the great accession of population to New Orleans, from the Spanish Islands, &c. gave them there a ready market.

I consider the position at Terre au Bœuf the most eligible for an encampment, within 100 miles of New Orleans, on the Mississippi. It is between two large well cultivated plantations; has the advantage of being immediately at the junction of the road from the Terre au Bœuf neighborhood, with the main levee road—a circumstance manifestly favorable to the market; and, at the same time, its nearness to New Orleans gave every facility of procuring extraordinary supplies.

The rear and extreme left were, on our first arrival, exceedingly wet, and covered with brushwood; but the small growth being cleared away, and the trenches dug, it soon became dry and firm.

JOHN CHRYSSTIE, 1st Lieutenant 6th Infantry.

WASHINGTON COUNTY, ss.

On the 24th day of April, 1810, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for said county, appeared John Chrystie, and made oath, in due form, that the above and foregoing facts, in this affidavit, are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

DANIEL RAPINE.

## No. 12.

*Deposition of General James Wilkinson, April 24, 1810.*

To the Honorable the committee appointed to inquire into the cause or causes of the great mortality in that detachment of the army of the United States ordered for the defence of New Orleans.

GENTLEMEN:

I deeply regret my incapacity to comprise, in this hasty report, all the causes which have induced the inquiry before you. But the circumstances of the moment will not permit that broad exposition which it is my desire to present you. Hurried from Baltimore, I left the records of my command for the last season, with other papers of consequence, on ship-board, and they have reached me too late for critical examination and comparison.

I beg leave to premise, that military history, ancient and modern, will show, that in new levied armies more men are lost by disease than by the sword. I quote the authority of Marshal Saxe, and General Washington, to justify this position; and it may also be supported by a recurrence to the mortality which attended our armies at Ticonderoga, under Major General Gates, in the year 1776, and under Major General Wayne, at his camp of Greenville, in the year 1803, in high latitudes, and salubrious climes. It is also a fact, that as great a mortality as we experienced last season, in proportion to numbers, did take place in 1801, at the camp near the mouth of the Ohio, to which Colonel Williams, of the Engineers, now in this city, can testify.

Were I required to say, in a few words, what were the chief causes of the mortality among the troops, under my command, on the waters of the Mississippi, the last season, I should ascribe much to the peculiar visitation of Providence, much to the time and manner of assembling the troops at New Orleans, and more to the sudden change from the habits of domestic life to those of the camp; from the ease and comforts of the citizen, to the hardships and exposure of the soldier; to these, however, must be added other subordinate causes, which, doubtless, contributed to exasperate our sufferings. Such were the defects of the medical and provision department, defects which I found it impossible to control, although every exertion was made to remedy them. It was in vain I sought for competent medical aid; the country did not afford it. Extravagant prices were offered for fresh beef, without effect; and flour of the best quality in New Orleans was purchased for account of the contractor, which, on examination, could scarcely be distinguished from that of our daily issues. The professional standing of the troops, too, was unfavorable to that police, which is indispensable to health in aggregated bodies. Both officers and men were green from the bosom of civil life, and had reached that stage between the armed yeomanry and the disciplined soldier, when the promptitude and enthusiasm of the citizen is lost, and a sense of veteran punctuality and subordination has not been acquired.

On the second of December, 1809, I received orders for the assembly of the troops at New Orleans, by the route of the ocean and of the western waters; and the corps were assembling at that city from the month of February until May. I arrived there the 19th of April; the vernal heat was then extreme, and I found five hundred and ninety-eight sick, nearly one-third of the whole. At that stage of the season, with such a body of sick, sound discretion and common humanity would, to an observer, have opposed the idea of attempting to mount the river, three hundred miles, under a vertical sun, and against an impetuous current; and if the sick had been left behind, the whole medical staff must also have been left to take care of them, which would have exposed the marching body to disease and death, without succor—a circumstance at once inhuman and unwarrantable.

I perceived at first glance the necessity of removing from New Orleans; but my orders being expressly to “make such a disposition of the troops as would most effectually enable me to defend that city, and its dependencies, against any invading force,” it became my primary duty to seek for the position best adapted to this end, and which combined the fairest prospects of health. At this period, and for two or three weeks after, continued showers of rain kept the flat surface of the country (the earth being saturated by the spring flood) too wet for the formation of an encampment.

The interval was occupied in reconnoitering at all points for a suitable position; and, at the pressing instance of the governor of the territory, I visited Terre au Bœuf, near the English Turn, accompanied by himself, Colonel Smyth, of the rifle corps, (Colonel Parker being indisposed) and some gentlemen of the vicinity, who gave every assurance of the salubrity of the spot, founded on the experience of years, and promised us a competent market from the adjacent settlements, which extended down the river, and at right angles from it, in a direction to the eastward, for several leagues. I beg leave to refer to my letter to Governor Claiborne, and his answer, marked No. 1 and 2, for illustration of the preceding facts.

Under these circumstances, with the concurrence of those who examined the ground with me, it was fixed on for our encampment, and measures were immediately taken to remove the troops from the city. Orders were accordingly given for the march of nine companies, out of twenty-eight, on the first of June; the main body followed on the ninth, and the whole were encamped on the tenth. I wrote the Secretary of War on the 29th May, advising him of my determination, and apprising him at large of my reasons for preferring this spot. After the establishment of my camp, and on the 14th of June, I received a “conditional” order from the Secretary of War, under date of the 30th April, directing a removal of the troops from New Orleans, if they had not been removed, and recommending a position in the vicinity of Fort Adams; but, as the order was not imperative, as the mode of transport was not provided, as the movement, by the ordinary means, would have been greatly expensive, as the operation, under existing circumstances, menaced the lives of the men, and more particularly as the troops were gaining health, and general satisfaction, appeared to prevail, I replied to the Secretary, under date of the 18th June, repeating the motives which had induced the selection of the spot I occupied, and assigning reasons why the troops should be continued there. Indeed, so strongly did I apprehend the consequences which must attend the transfer of a body of men, a majority of whom were either sick or convalescent, from my camp to Fort Adams, under the heats and dews of the summer, that, had the order of the 30th April been imperative, I think I should have paused over it, until I could have reported our real condition, and received further instructions. Humanity, policy, and justice, to those entrusted to my charge, as well as to my country, would have enjoined it on me to hazard this responsibility. The event justified my fears; and it will ever be my opinion, that, if we had moved to the salt waters in our vicinity, or to the sea shore, which was not distant, we should not have suffered one-third the loss we sustained in ascending the river, and that our continuance at the encampment of Terre au Bœuf, would have been less fatal than the movement we made. The best informed inhabitants anticipated the consequences, and the opinions of our ablest surgeons were in unison with my own, as will appear from the reports of Doctors Upshaw, Thruston, and Goodlet, exhibited in the documents Nos. 3, 4, and 5.

On the 20th of July, I received a letter from the Secretary of War, bearing date the 22d of June, in answer to my letter of the 29th of May. In this letter the Secretary makes reference to his “conditional” order of the 30th of April, and directed me to embark immediately “all the troops” on board the public vessels (excepting the garrisons of New Orleans and Fort St. Philip) and proceed to the high ground in the rear of Fort Adams, and the public ground in the rear of Natchez. This letter covered the copy of an order from the Secretary of the Navy to Captain Porter, directing him to furnish such vessels as could be spared from the service, for the transport of the troops. Every exertion depending on myself was instantly entered upon to carry this order into effect. But finding that the transport specifically assigned was utterly inadequate to the object; to supply the deficiency, I hired some boats, borrowed others, and repaired several belonging to the public, which had been condemned as unfit for service, and were accidentally discovered to be lying at Fort Adams. Four gunboats fell down to my camp on the eighth of September, embarked one hundred and ninety one men, and sailed the next day; and excepting a small detachment, to raise and repair a sunken boat, the last man left the ground on the 13th, on board the craft which had been employed and repaired. At this time a fever, by which I had suffered, became so violent as to confine me to my bed, and put it out of my power to accompany the troops. I followed them under a severe malady, but it was not until November that my health was restored.

The position of Terre au Bœuf, in relation to the defence of New Orleans, is the best which can be found in the country. It covers our batteries at the English Turn, and, by a sudden transition, our force may be employed to resist any approach by the Lakes on the east or west of the river. The plan submitted to the committee will, I flatter myself, give them satisfaction on this point; and, in addition to other testimony respecting the character of the spot for salubrity, and of the improvements made on it by the troops, I beg leave to offer the deposition of Mr. Delassize, No. 6, the proprietor, and a man of great respectability.

When the troops embarked, the whole of them had been paid up to the last of June, and some of them to the first of September. After that period my orders had no effect on the paymaster, who pled ill health, and his instructions to remain in New Orleans. When General Hampton relieved me, he advanced some pay to the troops from his private purse, (a thing impossible to a man who had been twenty-five years in service) and directed the Paymaster to be arrested, and sent up in custody of an officer, if he should refuse to march at forty-eight hours' notice. This step had the desired effect, but it was too strong a one for me to take.

No question can be made as to the correctness of the motives which directed the transfer of the troops to the upper country. It will occur to every man's observation, that, in general, a high country must be healthier than a low one; yet every person must be sensible that this, like all other rules, is liable to exception. This observation is sanctioned by the authority of Doctor Seip, a respectable man and able physician at Natchez, whose report, under cover, No. 7, will prove that district of country to have been more sickly the last season than for twenty years past. Upon the whole, we have been unfortunate, not culpable. The best evidence I can offer of my conduct, in what concerned the sick, will be found in the enclosed testimonial of the medical staff, No. 8, which was handed to me after I had transferred the command of the department to Brigadier General Hampton, and was about to leave the country. I throw myself upon the candor and the justice of the committee to pardon me for observing, that I have seen, from the public prints, that the arts and intrigues of my enemies, co-operating with a current of prejudice, have perverted and misrepresented, to my injury, the scenes to which this report has reference. The tales of ignorant, discontented, seditious, and worthless subalterns, and the fictions and falsehoods of my personal and political enemies, have been industriously circulated to wound my character; but being conscious that, in this, as in every other instance of public service, I have done, and more than done my duty, I court inquiry, and defy investigation.

To these facts and statements I am willing to depose; and with the highest consideration and respect for those whom I address,

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

WASHINGTON CITY, April 24, 1810.

WASHINGTON COUNTY, ss.

On this 24th of April, 1810, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for said county, appeared James Wilkinson, and made oath, in due form, that the foregoing facts, as stated, are true, to the best of his knowledge, recollection, and belief.

DANIEL RAPINE.

PAPERS ACCOMPANYING THE DEPOSITION OF GENERAL WILKINSON.

No. 1.

*Extract of a letter from General Wilkinson to Governor Claiborne.*

"CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, July 27, 1809.

"SIR:

"As much clamor has been made with respect to the merits of this position, in point of its health and fitness, I take the liberty to address you on the subject.

"And as you offered me the first suggestion in its favor, I will thank you to inform me whether you did not reconnoitre the site before I determined to adopt it for my encampment, and afterwards reiterate to me your recommendation of it? In addition to the sanction of your opinion, I believe it is within your knowledge, that the most ancient and respectable inhabitants of the country concur with you in sentiment. But as you have also seen the encampment since it was formed and improved, I shall be obliged by the avowal of your opinion of its present appearance and salubrity."

True extract.

N. PINKNEY, *Captain.*

No. 2.

*Extract of a letter from Governor Claiborne to General Wilkinson, dated*

"NEW ORLEANS, July 28, 1809.

"I received your letter of yesterday. My opinion is now, and always has been, that the position you occupy, at the commencement of the English Turn, is the most eligible one, for such troops as may be designed, to give protection to the city of New Orleans. It has, moreover, been represented to me, by several of the old inhabitants, (and from my own observation, I do not doubt the fact) to be as healthy as any site on the Mississippi, between Baton Rouge and the Balize.

"I did, therefore, after having myself viewed the spot, which I found to be more elevated than the land on the Mississippi generally is, advise you to fix your summer cantonment at that place; and I am now persuaded, from the great care which is taken to keep the ground dry, to defend the men from the influence of the sun, and to lodge them comfortably, that the number of your sick will daily diminish."

True extract.

N. PINKNEY, *Captain.*

No. 3.

*By order of General Wilkinson.*

*A report on the diseases of the camp Terre au Bœuf, their causes, characters, and mode of treatment.*

CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, July 20, 1809.

The diseases which are now prevalent among the men in camp, are chronic diseases, bilious and intermitting fevers, some cases of scurvy. The chronic diarrhoea was first introduced by the change of aliment, and the use of the Mississippi water; which water is strongly impregnated with calcareous earth and carbonate of lime. Many of the men were violently attacked before their arrival at New Orleans with diarrhoea, from the use of the water when on their route up the river. On the first arrival of the troops at New Orleans this disease was common, almost universal; generally speaking, the disease proved fatal, or yielded to treatment, before our encampment was



formed; but, even now, many are found lingering in the last stage of cold diarrhoea, of from three to four months standing. It may safely be affirmed that three-fourths of the deaths in camp have been from this disease.

The bilious and intermitting fevers are more common in camp than they were in Orleans; but of the number of cases I have seen there has been *no one* attended with violent or fatal symptoms in the first stage, and appear to yield readily to the depleting plan of treatment. These diseases belong to the climate and territory of Orleans; and are, I believe, less violent in this camp than at Orleans. The bills of mortality are greater at Orleans, in proportion to the population, than *here*, notwithstanding the disadvantages we are of necessity compelled to encounter.

The scurvy exists in a few cases, but is not to be feared, as we can command vegetable food and acids. The men, when sick, living on the rations, is, no doubt, the cause of the scurvy.

Ample reason will be found, in the imperfect state of the medical staff, and want of capacity in many who compose that staff; in the want of a hospital, hospital stores, and medicines, for the mortality of the soldiery. When the hospital, which is now building, shall be finished, when each medical man shall have his duties well defined, and those of the best capacity placed in situations the most responsible and dangerous, if the military agent should receive such instructions as would enable him to supply the sick with such hospital stores and medicines as are necessary, I feel assured of the truth I now assert, that our deaths would be lessened three-fourths.

The additional expense ought not to be calculated, where the lives and health of the troops are concerned; but, by stopping the ration of the sick man this expense will be very small. It is a distressing sight, and truly unpleasant to the feelings of the medical man, to be in attendance on the sick soldier, and see him die for the want of proper food and medicines; humanity mourns over such a sight. Justice, policy, and patriotism, require this allowance and liberality from Government. It is a fact that there is not one dollar of public money which can be had to purchase milk or vegetables in camp; many are, of course, suffering for necessities, which might be bought for a few shillings. The commutation of the ration would be sufficient for this purpose.

There are many sick men in camp who cannot be moved, however desirable it might be, even to the hospital in Orleans. They came here sick, have grown worse, and are now on the brink of the grave. Transporting them, in this hot climate, would be certain death.

WM. UPSHAW, *Surgeon 5th Infantry.*

No. 4.

CAMP, TERRE AU BŒUF, July 29, 1809.

Sir:

In pursuance of your request, I proceed to give you a report of the sick at this place, together with the several diseases, and my opinion as respects the site of this encampment. I feel a difficulty in draughting this report, as no doubt there must be contained in it many subjects which require a more *full and free* investigation than my health and time will allow me to allot to the performance. Should any inaccuracies appear on the face of it, I trust your goodness of heart, and your good sense, will lead you to pass them over in silence.

On the 4th of July I arrived at this camp, and found great numbers on the sick reports; some laboring under dysentery, some with bilious remitting fevers, and others with scurvy, though small in proportion. Those afflicted with dysentery were very much reduced when I first saw them, and almost all of them died. I was induced to make inquiry into the circumstances of this disease; I found it was generally subsequent to bilious fever, and that very few cases of this complaint commenced with the usual symptoms which attend it in the first instance. Some new cases of dysentery have come immediately under my care, which, when taken in time, have nearly yielded to medicine and such diet as was proper for them. I think the disease on the decline, and I do not dread the recurrence, unless some material change in the *season* should predispose the constitution of the soldiery to take it. There are circumstances that might render this fatal disease epidemic; and I dread them much. But a good market, with such hospital and medical stores as may be necessary, not too many of the men confined together, avoiding the night air and dews, will, in a great measure, obviate the apprehensions and danger.

There are but few cases of bilious remitting fever now under my care. They are very obstinate, and when they do yield to medicine, the patient is often attacked when extremely debilitated by diarrhoea, and carried off without fever or any other distressing symptom.

The intermitting fever is now the most prevalent complaint in camp. Some, when apparently on the recovery, are suddenly taken with dysentery and diarrhoea, which terminates in death or extreme debility. This disease often alternates (as I have often seen) from fever to dysentery and diarrhoea, and from the two latter to the former, many times in the week. Such cases are dangerous, and I find great difficulty in their treatment. The bark loses its effect in a few days, and, indeed, often produces nausea and disgust very disagreeable to the patient. I find antimonials in small doses, and repeated blisterings to the extremities, of great service. I, this day, commenced with different preparations of arsenic, and have great hopes of the success. The scurvy has made its appearance; several have died with it. It has increased considerably within ten days, and I fear that the progress will be difficult to arrest. In some cases, the rapid march astonished me. Every effort that I made towards relief and cure was fruitless, (though this was not always the case) and my prescriptions appeared to have no effect in alleviating the miseries of the suffering patient. This disease wears a peculiar character, and differs, in my estimation, from *that* disease described in different authors. The continuance of fresh provision, constant supplies of vegetables, and a strict adherence to cleanliness, will prevent its spreading through camp. I feel the more confident in the opinion, from the circumstance that no officer in the line has had it. The sick reports of four companies, which I attend, have enlarged considerably, though, in the increase, but few dangerous cases have occurred. I see no reason to believe that any thing like an epidemic rages in camp. I fear the approaching season will bring upon us some distressing and fatal disorders, that will pay no respect to persons. My fears on this head, I trust, may be imaginary.

The situation of this camp I believe to be the best on the Mississippi, in any part of *this* country: I draw this opinion, not from an acquaintance with the sites, but from the judgment and opinions of the best informed men with whom I have conversed on the subject. I do not think our situation could be bettered at this season of the year. The danger of a removal at this period, I think hazardous in the extreme—I mean a removal to any distance where the troops would be obliged to be conveyed in small vessels by water, and contending against a strong and difficult current. When I give this opinion, I wish to be understood that I allude to a removal in the *hot* months. As soon as the weather will permit, I do think it would be endangering the lives of the soldiery to continue them here.

The above sketch is given upon mature reflection, backed upon some experience, and not biased by party or prejudice. I trust it will meet your approbation, and accord with your sentiments.

I have the honor to remain, with high regard, esteem, and respect, your very obedient humble servant, &c.

ALFRED THRUSTON, *Surgeon 7th Infantry.*

General JAMES WILKINSON, *Commanding.*

No. 5.

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1810.

Sir:

I should do injustice to yourself, and violence to my own feelings, were I to permit your Excellency to leave this territory without giving you my sentiments, as respects Camp Terre au Bœuf, and the march from that place to our present situation. Circumstances relative to my professional calls precluded the possibility of affording this testimonial to your Excellency, at, perhaps, a more seasonable time.

The calls of my worthy friend Colonel Russell, then lying on the bed of sickness at New Orleans, prevented my doing the task which I now present for your perusal.

As a member of the medical staff, and who was amongst the earliest of those who arrived at New Orleans, I could not fail to observe the different and varied changes of the diseases which have occurred in the army. From dire necessity I was obliged to attend to every corps in the line, save the light artillery, and I trust you will excuse me when I say I could not fail to have an accurate knowledge of the situation of every company in the line. At the period when our movement was spoken of and contemplated, I do not for a moment hesitate to declare, that the men were on the recovery. The thoughts of a remove or ascent up the Mississippi, made me tremble for their fate, and the more so, when I recognized the debilitated situation of the soldiery, consequent to the climate in which they were exposed. Let me here observe (and I flatter myself I am correct in the assertion) that the troops were evidently on the recovery, and at that time, too, which was all important to every individual who composed our army. It has always been my opinion (and I have seen nothing to induce me to alter it) that hundreds of men were lost by the movement from the Camp Terre au Bœuf, that otherwise might have now been alive. Believe me, sir, when I tell you, our march was premature by many, very many weeks: for, as the men were evidently on the recovery, a little time would have rendered them more capable to undertake and brave the hardships which stared them in the face. These hardships have occurred, they have been experienced and sorely felt, under circumstances, when affliction and disease had enervated every fibre in their system. But the soldiery were not the only people in this territory who had the prevailing diseases of our camp. From careful inquiry I find the citizens on the Mississippi in the same unhappy situation; and it was observed by many old and well informed inhabitants, that the country had not been so sickly for a number of years. In truth I believe that the same fate would have attended us had our situation been any where else on the river. The despondency of mind attending necessarily young troops, adding to that the distance from relatives and friends, and the very bad fare from inexperience in the culinary way, was at least as injurious to the men as the local situation of the camp.

The limits of a letter will not permit me to enlarge on this subject. I now, sir, bid you farewell. May the services you have rendered your country be long remembered by a grateful people, and be a solace and comfort to you in your last moments.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

A. G. GOODLET.

General WILKINSON.

No. 6.

*Deposition of Mr. Delassize.*

MARCH 10, 1810.

The undersigned, Jean Delassize, a native and inhabitant of Louisiana, being forty-three years of age, on his oath declareth, that he is, and has been for four years, the proprietor of the ground at Terre au Bœuf, which was occupied by the troops under the command of General Wilkinson the past season: that no proposition was ever made to him, by or for General Wilkinson, directly or indirectly, respecting the purchase of said place, or any part of it; that no levee, or any part of one, was erected by the troops encamped on said ground, nor any other works made on it, but such as appeared necessary to the comfort of said troops; that said ground adjoined the cane field of this deponent, and that no clearing or other improvements was made on said ground to prepare it for cultivation; that the trenches and ditches, cut to keep the camp dry, were rather injurious than beneficial to the tillage of the ground, a large proportion of which was covered by clover, far before the troops came to it: that the accommodations made and materials brought to the ground for the use of the troops, were sold at public vendue for the account of the United States; and that, for the pasturage furnished the public horses, for the timber and fuel used, and damages sustained during the occupancy of three months, the deponent received the sum of six hundred and forty dollars and thirty-four cents only.

The undersigned further declares that he has resided at the same place, and adjacent to the said camp, with a population of more than sixty souls, during the space of years, and that, from his observation and experience, he considers it as healthy a spot as any in the vicinity of New Orleans.

JEAN DELASSIZE.

A true copy from the original.

Sworn before me, this 10th day of March, 1810.

J. DUCHANYU, *Justice of the Peace.*

No. 7.

NATCHEZ, February 15, 1810.

General Wilkinson will please excuse the delay of my reply to his favor of the ninth instant, when I assure him that nothing but want of time prevented it sooner.

Very respectfully, sir, yours, &c.

F. SEIP.

The diseases most predominant during the last and preceding seasons, in this country, as far as it has come within my knowledge, were fevers of the intermitting and remitting kind, cholera, dysentery, and catarrh. The mortality attending these complaints is by no means great, in comparison with the numbers attacked. A cause of this, no doubt, is the tendency most diseases here have to run into the intermitting state; a form of all others most immediately under the control of medicine, and one by which time is allowed to obviate a recurrence of the diseases. The violence of intermitting diseases at the same time being chiefly exerted upon the spleen and other abdominal viscera, unless arrested in time, impair the constitution, and thereby lay the foundation for other disorders, which, though slow, eventually destroy life.

The aptitude every form of disease has to run into that state, is so great, that peripneumonia, catarrh, ophthalmia, and even rheumatic affections, frequently partake of it, and very often require bark and other tonics to complete the cure.

The last epidemic we experienced in this country, was the influenza of the autumn of 1807, which commenced with the month of November, and continued during the greater part of that winter. Pleuritic symptoms combining with the influenza, contribute much to increase its mortality. A remarkable change in the character of that disease (pleurisy) took place at that period; cases occurring where it became necessary to use the lancet as freely as it ever is done in the Eastern States. Something of the same nature I think I have remarked in this disease often since, depletion being necessary to a much greater extent than I had seen it used previous to that year, and some of them in newly arrived Africans. Catarrhs have prevailed at different periods since, but not to so great a degree in force or extent. Some few cases, it ought to be observed, of that complaint, the last autumn, were strongly marked in their symptoms, such as accompanied the influenza of the year 1807. These were collections of matter in the antrum and frontal sinus; symptoms most characteristic of that disease, followed by the peculiar foetid discharge from those cavities. Some instances have occurred, when the abscess was seated in the lungs; unattended, however, with hectic fever; the discharge as foetid, soon, as in the other cases, relieved itself, and a speedy convalescence followed.

The only endemic disease of the past season was the intermitting fever; and so prevalent was it, that I have been frequently assured that nothing equal to it has been experienced for twenty years. This is ascribed, and with much probability, to the extreme rise of the Mississippi, covering the low grounds, and retiring during the summer.

How far the influence of its banks and the adjacent low grounds on the western side of that river extends eastward, is yet undecided; but that it does, for a great distance, is evident from the similarity of the diseases of both countries. The diseases, in fact, of all the high lands in this neighborhood, are properly such as are generated upon low and marshy situations; many artificial causes, it is true, increase the evil, such as clearing the low grounds, erecting ponds, &c. During the last summer those situations which, in former seasons, were most exempt, became very subject to the prevailing diseases. The character of this endemic differed somewhat from the same disease of other years; a deep sighing was a very constant symptom of the remitting and intermitting fevers of the present year, with great pain at the pit of the stomach, and copious discharges of a dark color from the stomach and alimentary canal.

The access of the above diseases was, for the most part, preceded by a lassitude, slight rigor or chill, one or two days previous to the attack, recurring at regular periods daily, or every other day, and increasing in violence until the disease became fully marked. The chill varied in different cases, and was mostly attended by an exceeding irritable state of the stomach, or vomiting. To this succeeded the fever, which continued from six to twenty-four hours, with excruciating pain of the head, back, and pit of the stomach. When the patient was robust and of a plethoric habit, the fever frequently set in with a very slight chill, and continued for two or three days before a complete intermission took place.

What the general effect of this climate might be upon a body of men subject to military habits, &c. I could not venture to say from experience, but am inclined to think, must be very similar to that experienced by the poorer class of emigrants, who annually visit this country from above. The first effect, occasioned by intense heat, and other remote causes, upon persons of that description, discovers itself early in an attack of cholera morbus, remitting and intermitting fever, diarrhoea, or dysentery: the former are by much the most favorable forms of seasoning, as it is usually termed; the diarrhoea or dysentery are invariably the worst, and at all times, a most serious complaint. This last form of disease, no doubt, would be the one most likely to occur, where improper diet, intemperance, and frequent exposure to the sudden changes of air, take place. The difficulty of restoring the tone of the bowels after an attack of that complaint, is such, that it not unfrequently baffles every attempt of medicine, and requires a change of climate to effect it.

To guard a large body of men against the occurrence of disease, from such numerous sources, would, without doubt, be a very difficult thing to accomplish, unless their arrival could be so managed as to inure, in some measure, the constitution gradually to the change of climate. This has been sometimes attempted in introducing fresh gangs of negroes into the territory, and apparently with the happiest effect. Depletion here was substituted, and lenient exercise, for some time, together with a proper regimen, observed.

## No. 8.

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1810.

SIR:

As you have resigned the command of the troops to which we are attached, this letter cannot, by the most malignant, be ascribed to any improper motives, and we beg you to be assured that it proceeds from the most disinterested source, and is produced by a temper of justice only.

In offering to you our best wishes for your future health and happiness, we should not do justice to our feelings, nor your conduct, if we omitted to acknowledge your incessant attention to the department of which we are members, or failed to give testimony to your solicitude, your tenderness for, and fostering care of, the sick; for it was, sir, to the supplies of extraordinary comforts and necessaries which you from time to time have ordered, that we owe the lives of many men; and whatever may have been the misrepresentations or misapprehensions which have gone forth on this subject, we have no doubt the consciousness of your own good conduct will afford you the richest reward under heaven.

We have the honor to remain, your very obedient and humble servants,

J. W. DANIEL, *Hospital Surgeon, United States' Army.*

D. CLAUDE, *Surgeon Light Artillery.*

ALFRED THRUSTON, *Surgeon 7th Infantry.*

WM. UPSHAW, *Surgeon 5th Infantry.*

SMITH CUTTER, *Surgeon Rifle Corps.*

LEWIS DUNHAM, *Surgeon Dragoons.*

THOMAS PINKERTON, *Surgeon's Mate United States' Army.*

A. G. GOODLET, *Surgeon's Mate 7th Infantry.*

THOMAS LAWSON, *Surgeon's Mate.*

General WILKINSON.

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 101.

[3d SESSION.

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, DECEMBER 14, 1810.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 13th, 1810.

SIR:

In obedience to a resolution of the honorable the Senate, passed April 7th, 1810, "directing the Secretary of War to prepare a system of regulations for improving the discipline of the militia of the United States, comprehending the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and to report the same to the Senate at the next session of Congress," the following regulations for the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are herewith respectfully presented.

In determining on the regulations which it may be most eligible to establish for the government of the infantry, several considerations present themselves: first, the organization of companies, battalions, and regiments, as ordained by existing laws; secondly, the proficiency already made, with the experience acquired under the present system. Were the militia to be organized at this time from the population of the United States, and regulations to be adopted for their government and discipline, without regard to their present organization and discipline, the system of organization and tactics of the French armies would claim a preference. But the adoption of this system would require an entire new organization of companies, battalions, and regiments; and it is at least doubtful whether the officers of the militia would bestow gratuitously the time and attention necessary for their own, and the instruction of the men under their command, in the new and additional duties thus devolving on them.

The regulations prepared by the late Baron de Steuben, and ordered for the government of the troops of the United States by the Continental Congress, March 29th, 1779, are acknowledged to contain the necessary instructions and directions for the discipline and government of an army, and have been the general rule of practice observed by the militia as well as by the army of the United States. It has, therefore, been judged expedient to continue these regulations as a basis, and to add to them such amendments and alterations as have been suggested by experience, with some manœuvres which make a part of more modern tactics. Should this proposal be adopted, the ordinance of March, 1779, as altered and amended, will require to be reprinted.

*For the government of the Cavalry.*—The ordinance for the exercise and manœuvres of the light cavalry of the French armies having all the advantages and improvements derived from long experience and actual service, appears to be well calculated. In order that a judgment may be formed of its merits, a translation of the whole of that ordinance, together with a volume of plates, explanatory of the directions, is herewith transmitted. In case it shall be approved, a revision of the work, by a person conversant with military science, will be necessary, in which the terms will be rendered analogous to our language; the whole may be abbreviated, and such parts as are not applicable to light cavalry may be entirely omitted.

*For the Artillery.*—“A compendious exercise for garrison and field ordnance,” selected from the most approved authorities, by officers of experience, is proposed, and herewith reported for consideration.

All which is respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM EUSTIS.

The Hon. the PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

NOTE.—The papers referred to in this report are not now to be found.

[11th CONGRESS.]

No. 102.

[3d SESSION.]

ESTIMATE FOR FORTIFICATIONS FOR THE YEAR 1811.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 18, 1811.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 8, 1811.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit to the committee appointed on that part of the President's message relating to the land forces and fortifications, an estimate of moneys required on account of fortifications for the year 1811.

With respectful consideration, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Honorable JOHN DAWSON, *Chairman.*

*Estimate of moneys required on account of Fortifications, for the year 1811.*

For completing fortifications in Georgia and South Carolina, including eleven thousand five hundred and seventy-one dollars and forty-two cents for the land on which Fort Mechanic, in the harbor of Charleston, is erected,	-	-	-	-	\$55,000 00
Harbor of New York, (as per estimate enclosed)	-	-	-	-	83,303 86
Harbor of Newport, Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	10,000 00
For general repairs of fortifications,	-	-	-	-	12,000 00
					<u>160,303 86</u>
Deduct balance unexpended of former appropriations,	-	-	-	-	29,257 56
					<u>\$131,046 30</u>

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 8, 1811.

W. EUSTIS.

NEW YORK, December 29, 1810.

SIR:

I should have transmitted the enclosed estimates at an earlier day, if I could have obtained the requisite information from the several mechanics, it being my wish to come as near the real charges as the case would admit, and even now it should be considered that many requisites may occur at the finishing the work, which are not foreseen; for this reason I have omitted any allowance for the materials on hand. The several amounts are, viz:

For the work at West Head,	-	-	-	-	\$51,531 71
For Castle William,	-	-	-	-	8,500 00
For Bedloe's Island,	-	-	-	-	18,965 14
Making, in the whole,	-	-	-	-	<u>\$78,996 85</u>

To this should be added, in case the work at West Head is to be carried up two tiers,	-	-	-	-	<u>\$82,303 86</u>
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You will believe me when I assure you that, estimating future expenditures, (especially when this species of work is new and uncommon) is not only the most arduous, but the most unpleasant business belonging to an engineer.

In the present estimate I have endeavored to go into a minute detail, and have formed the aggregate from the best data I could obtain, and I hope the real expenditure will not exceed what is stated; but I beg your leave to solicit, for myself, those allowances which candor should make, in every case where the best means have been used to come at the real truth.

You will please to observe the difference between carrying the battery up to a second tier.

This is the difference between a perfect work of fifty-six guns, with ample accommodations for a garrison, and an imperfect work of twenty-eight guns, without any accommodation for the men when not on duty.

I have made no estimate for the battery on Ellis's Island, because I consider every thing there as temporary; to make a proper defence, these old works should be obliterated, and begun *de novo*.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the greatest respect, your most obedient servant,

JONA. WILLIAMS.

*Estimate of appropriation requisite to complete the works in the harbor of New York, exclusive of Ordnance.*

WEST HEAD.

To complete this work as a battery, mounting twenty-eight guns, of the heaviest metal, in one tier, protected from small shot from ships' tops, by a roof, covered with slate, including materials and labor, but exclusive of carpenter's and smith's work, and also exclusive of materials on hand, \$39,340 79  
Carpenter's and smith's work, 12,190 92

\$51,531 71

To complete the above battery, so as to mount twenty-eight guns, under bomb proof casements, with a terrace of masonry, and parapet, so as to mount a second tier of columbiads carrying shot of 50 lb. weight, including materials and labor, but exclusive of carpenter's and smith's work, and, also, exclusive of materials on hand, \$124,582 31  
Carpenter's and smith's work, 10,253 26

\$134,835 57

Deduct the estimate for one tier, which is included in this estimate, 51,531 71

Difference, \$83,303 86

N. B. This difference is between a battery of one tier, with a wooden roof, without barracks, and unprotected from shells, and a battery of two tiers, with ample barracks for all the men requisite to defend it, and with a bomb proof protection for one of the tiers. The magazine, furnace, and officers' barracks, are nearly the same in both cases; but the roof, and piers to support it, will be a total loss, in case the battery should be first completed as for one, and, afterwards, be raised for two tier.

CASTLE WILLIAM.

To complete this castle, as originally planned, but without officers' quarters, mason work, and materials for exterior and interior gateway, magazine, wall around it, the interior wall, furnaces, and a small remnant of flagging on the top, \$7,500

Carpenter's and smith's work, to complete the men's barracks, and the interior of the magazine; also for putting up the iron railing round the interior edge of the terrace, making due allowance for the workmanship of army artificers, 1,000

\$8,500

BEDLOE'S ISLAND.

To complete the fort, exclusive of any further building for barracks, and including the guard house, mason work, and materials for magazine and gateway, and completing those parts of the counter scarp which had been left open for the passage of materials, and for carts employed in excavating the ditch, and raising the wall on the Southern side of the island, which has been found too low to support the requisite slope of the glacis, \$8,211 88

Carpenter's and smith's work, for completing the platform on every side, making the drawbridge, and building the guard house, 10,753 26

\$18,965 14

N. B. There remains much labor to be performed, to clear out the ditch and form the glacis, which is not included in the above estimate, supposing it to be done by army fatigues.

THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 20, 1811.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I lay before Congress a return of the Militia of the United States, as received by the Department of War, from the several States and Territories.

JAMES MADISON.

February 19, 1811.

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made	GENERAL AND FIELD STAFF.												FIELD OFFICERS AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.											
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-Camp.	Brigade Majors & Inspectors.	Paymaster Generals.	Surgeon Generals.	Chaplains.	Deputy Adjutant Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster Generals.	Judge Advocates.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife Majors.
New Hampshire, -	1810	3	6	1	1	6	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	6	37	74	37	37	.	37	34	37	35	36	35
Massachusetts, -	1810	11	25	1	1	22	25	.	81	.	.	.	.	25	107	219	133	131	.	93	91	88	86	80	78
Vermont, -	1809	4	10	.	1	9	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	33	64	34	34	3	33	32	29	29	29	28
Rhode Island, -	1809	1	4	1	1	6	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	43	80	43	44	3	40	32	43	41	34	35
Connecticut, -	1810	2	8	1	1	.	.	.	43	.	.	.	.	6	155	304	156	151	137	130	80	.	.	116	113
New York, -	1809	6	38	.	1	11	13	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	41	97	38	38	87	51	26	30	2	33	25
New Jersey, -	1810	4	13	1	1	13	13	.	1	.	.	.	12	14	152	310	138	152	148	138	86	109	112	100	96
Pennsylvania, -	1810	16	31	.	1	31	62	.	.	.	.	.	.	14	10	19	9	8	8	9	8	.	.	10	10
Delaware, -	1810	1	3	1	1	5	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	40	83	42	33	.	40	33	.	.	.	.
Maryland, -	1810	3	12	.	1	6	12	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	118	224	106	89	2	89	67	50	17	57	44
Virginia, -	1809	4	19	.	1	8	19	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	55	127	57	28	35	35	9	16	.	27	23
North Carolina, -	1810	6	14	.	1	13	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	48	97	41	41	111	22	4	8	.	4	7
South Carolina, -	1810	2	9	1	1	20	9	1	1	.	.	.	.	8	38	89	35	27	22	33	32	19	8	9	
Georgia, -	1810	4	8	1	1	16	8	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	73	139	71	53	62	40	16	40	19	36	37
Kentucky, -	1809	8	17	.	1	12	16	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	30	62	30	.	.	.	.	7	1	12	12
Tennessee, -	1805	2	6	.	1	3	6	.	.	.	.	.	.	14	38	87	41	34	37	38	21	34	31	35	32
Ohio, -	1809	4	15	3	1	7	16	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	.	.	.	.
District of Columbia, -	1808	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	5	4	4	.	1	1	1	1	.	.
Mississippi Territory, -	1807	.	.	.	.	.	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	10	7	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Indiana Territory, -	1806	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	11	23	8	3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Orleans Territory, -	1807	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	12	5	2	8	1	.	.	.	.	.
Louisiana Territory, -	1809	.	1	.	1	1	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	5	2	1	.	2	.	.	.	.	.
Michigan Territory, -	1806	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Illinois Territory,*		.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

\* No return.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARTILLERISTS.						CAVALRY.						GRENADIERS.					LIGHT INFANTRY.												
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Ferriers.	Dragoons.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	
New Hampshire, -	1810	25	50	100	-	33	-	680	33	65	31	123	65	-	-	1,776	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts, -	1810	66	125	250	-	126	-	2,416	64	127	67	268	88	-	-	2,048	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vermont, -	1809	10	28	35	-	27	-	303	28	56	27	105	31	-	-	1,035	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Rhode Island, -	1809	1	2	10	-	3	-	29	2	4	2	10	2	-	-	86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Connecticut, -	1810	18	40	72	56	45	66	464	31	62	31	124	50	-	-	1,061	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New York, -	1809	58	109	218	210	186	-	2,302	72	133	70	282	78	-	-	2,976	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
New Jersey, -	1810	16	28	51	40	20	38	590	34	69	32	118	32	3	7	1,348	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pennsylvania, -	1810	-	-	-	-	-	-	†463	38	76	38	129	33	16	18	1,552	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delaware, -	1810	2	4	7	8	4	6	67	4	8	4	12	3	37	2	77	2	2	2	8	4	4	87	16	16	16	64	60	32	584	
Maryland, -	1810	12	29	36	-	6	-	403	32	62	32	106	18	-	-	1,135	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia, -	1809	33	66	138	-	33	-	1,714	78	151	74	279	29	-	-	4,007	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Carolina, -	1810	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	65	36	81	26	7	7	7	1,097	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina, -	1810	19	38	55	-	18	48	822	45	90	43	3	22	9	4	1,501	2	2	2	8	8	2	60	14	14	14	28	-	20	420	
Georgia, -	1810	4	8	12	-	8	-	117	22	28	22	71	7	-	-	625	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	6	19	-	8	254
Kentucky, -	1809	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	24	12	40	8	-	-	439	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tennessee, -	1805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	19	19	41	19	-	-	595	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	4	11	40	12	21	398	
Ohio, -	1809	3	4	10	6	3	16	42	14	30	16	54	14	8	7	555	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	8	7	24	4	1	327	
District of Columbia, -	1808	3	5	2	2	-	-	92	3	6	3	9	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	4	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indiana Territory, -	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	11	5	16	-	-	-	162	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Orleans Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	4	-	-	225	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Louisiana Territory, -	1809	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Michigan Territory, -	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Illinois Territory,*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\* No return.

† Total Artillery.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	RIFLEMEN.						INFANTRY.						Total number, including officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file.	ORDNANCE.													
		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.		Musicians.	Rank and File.	Brass Twelve Pounders.	Brass Nine Pounders.	Brass Six Pounders.	Brass Four Pounders.	Brass Three Pounders.	Iron Eighteen pounders.	Iron Twelve pounders.	Iron Nine Pounders.	Iron Six Pounders.	Iron Four Pounders.	Iron Three Pounders.	Artillery Side Arms.
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1810	.	.	.	.	.	.	297	297	289	1,107	.	716	18,650	24,805	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1810	.	.	.	.	.	.	835	841	844	3,296	.	1,858	56,090	70,710	.	.	.	.	26	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Vermont, . . . . .	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	283	287	285	1,063	.	739	15,543	20,439	6	.	.	46	94	6	2	.	.	.	.	.	
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	48	55	50	318	.	104	3,272	4,200	.	.	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Connecticut, . . . . .	1810	.	.	.	.	.	.	338	361	309	1,338	1,312	866	13,208	20,384	.	.	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
New York, . . . . .	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,262	1,235	1,218	6,080	4,910	2,911	76,195	95,324	.	.	.	8	4	10	.	.	.	.	.	.	
New Jersey, . . . . .	1810	2	3	.	6	4	1	54	380	365	366	1,281	792	27,046	33,740	.	.	.	19	13	13	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1810	2	.	.	.	.	.	1,340	1,281	1,195	2,642	1,880	1,466	80,211	94,074	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Delaware, . . . . .	1810	1	1	1	4	4	2	28	73	71	280	282	82	6,189	8,346	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Maryland, . . . . .	1810	.	.	.	.	.	.	447	460	411	1,633	.	448	28,123	33,410	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Virginia, . . . . .	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,124	1,088	1,025	4,110	.	807	63,766	79,429	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
North Carolina, . . . . .	1810	.	.	.	.	.	.	695	694	652	2,189	1,175	1,047	40,595	50,177	.	.	.	4	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	
South Carolina, . . . . .	1810	12	12	12	45	4	20	360	414	399	367	1,328	.	468	25,777	32,958	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Georgia, . . . . .	1810	9	12	10	27	.	2	333	365	326	300	1,339	.	53	21,070	25,243	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Kentucky, . . . . .	1809	24	24	24	84	.	.	1,150	592	571	518	2,136	.	506	33,481	40,599	.	.	.	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Tennessee, . . . . .	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	248	238	230	308	308	320	14,285	16,822	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ohio, . . . . .	1805	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	248	238	230	308	308	320	14,285	16,822	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1809	31	33	33	126	60	36	1,523	386	394	378	1,417	720	408	20,793	28,099	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1808	2	2	2	8	4	2	107	9	12	3	23	1	2	1,502	2,245	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	37	33	29	93	58	3	1,878	2,151	.	.	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Orleans Territory, . . . . .	1807	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	31	33	30	76	.	.	1,846	2,067	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Louisiana Territory, . . . . .	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	86	180	22	264	238	2	4,906	5,945	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Michigan Territory, . . . . .	1809	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	45	49	44	148	.	13	1,948	2,540	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Illinois Territory,* . . . . .	1806	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	25	26	24	39	15	2	879	1,028	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Total militia of the United States, - 694,735

\* No return.



RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

39

STATES AND TERRITORIES.

ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	For what year the Return of each State was made.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.																		
		Sabres.	Pairs of Pistols.	Espositoons.	Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusees, or Fire Arms.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Ramrods, Steel.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Balls.	Flints.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Scabbards and Belts.	Knapsacks.	Shot Pouches and Powder Horns.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire, -	1810	1,720	1,720	-	15,670	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Massachusetts, -	1810	2,345	2,376	-	48,908	-	-	10,600	8,200	4,820	2,900	-	44,500	28,800	3,670	7,670	5,800	-	13	-
Vermont, -	1809	1,099	1,041	-	11,523	1,076	-	45,967	48,869	46,924	2,139	-	105,605	80,982	47,120	49,216	26,804	-	81	-
Rhode Island, -	1809	90	91	-	2,464	-	-	5,273	6,302	5,657	2,137	-	12,906	115,632	6,647	4,902	2,470	-	2	-
Connecticut, -	1810	2,394	1,303	693	13,935	-	-	2,157	2,243	2,377	-	2,745	5,435	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New York, -	1809	2,337	3,278	-	45,232	4,100	-	14,280	15,563	-	-	-	319,335	37,170	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Jersey, -	1810	2,063	766	238	14,500	42	-	28,211	35,565	24,599	-	-	7,866	42,618	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pennsylvania, -	1810	1,410	1,283	-	13,228	10,812	13,916	4,842	3,601	3,044	12	-	-	844	-	-	433	-	3	-
Delaware, -	1810	59	59	-	340	-	154	6,993	975	-	650	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maryland, -	1810	478	462	-	3,889	530	-	83	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia, -	1809	1,762	1,134	-	13,417	2,965	-	3,169	3,449	935	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Carolina, -	1810	956	693	238	10,151	7,490	15,721	12,407	13,419	11,097	427½	14,462	1,648	1,804	475	3,183	95	-	-	30
South Carolina, -	1810	1,306	1,223	10	325	5,140	9,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	266	-	1	-
Georgia, -	1810	330	255	-	5,182	3,479	-	5,182	5,182	5,182	13,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,504	-	461
Kentucky, -	1809	265	274	276	3,819	15,642	-	161	243	103	4,686	2,138	42,756	118,025	213	596	64	-	9	-
Tennessee, -	1805	75	95	-	4,647	-	-	12	-	2,146	1,146	-	7,133	35,542	2,483	154	-	-	-	-
Ohio, -	1809	249	260	215	3,052	8,107	15	235	390	-	679½	2,276	11,521	12,902	453	235	295	392	-	78
District of Columbia, -	1808	55	55	-	807	141	-	681	676	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	460	460	-	1	-	-	99	10,246	708	-	150	18	-	-	1	1
Indiana Territory, -	1806	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Orleans Territory, -	1807	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Louisiana Territory, -	1809	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Michigan Territory, -	1809	57	57	-	56	283	252	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Illinois Territory,* -	1806	-	-	-	-	883	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 15, 1811.

W. EUSTIS.

\*No return.

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MILITIA

301

11th CONGRESS.]

No. 104.

[3d Session.]

## EXPENSES OF ARMORIES, AND ARMS MANUFACTURED IN 1810.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 2, 1811.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 23, 1811.*

SIR:

In obedience to the fifth section of an act, entitled "An act to provide for the erecting and repairing of arsenals and magazines, and for other purposes," I have the honor of transmitting to Congress an account of the expenses of the national armories at Springfield and Harper's Ferry, together with a return of the arms made and repaired at each, during the year 1810.

It will appear from the report, that the amount of the expenditures at the armory at Harper's Ferry, for the last six months of the year 1810, are founded on estimates—the accounts for that period not having been received.

It may be proper also to state, that the account of the expenses at Harper's Ferry includes disbursements to a considerable amount, made at that place in 1810, for the erection of additional buildings.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

*Statement of the expenses of the National Armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, for one year, commencing the 1st of January, 1810, viz:*

## ARMORY AT SPRINGFIELD.

For amount of money expended at that place in the manufacture of arms, and expenses incident thereto, from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1810, - - - - - \$122,774 08

## ARMORY AT HARPER'S FERRY.

For amount of moneys expended at that place, in the manufacture of arms, and expenses incident thereto, to 30th June, 1810, to which period the accounts have been settled,	78,576 50
To which add the amount of moneys advanced on estimate, being the probable expenses of the armory, to the 30th November, 1810,	61,680 36
Probable expenses for December, 1810, - - - - -	14,833 33
	76,513 69
	155,090 19
	Dollars, - 277,864 27

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Accountant's Office, February 22, 1810.*

WILLIAM SIMMONS, *Accountant.*

*Return of Arms manufactured and repaired at the United States' armory at this place, that have been received from the superintendent, and deposited in the military stores in the year 1810.*

New muskets with bayonets, - - - - -	9,700
New carbines or Indian guns, - - - - -	601
	Total, new arms, - 10,301
French, English, American, &c., muskets, with bayonets, that have been repaired, - - - - -	1,406

SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, *December 31, 1810.*

JAMES BYERS, *Storekeeper.*

The Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR.

*Statement showing the number of Arms manufactured at the armory at Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, and received into the store in the year 1810; also, of arms repaired and received during the same period.*

	Harpoon Guns.	Muskets.	Muskets repaired.
Received for January, - - - - -	-	700	
February, - - - - -	-	700	
March, - - - - -	-	800	
April, - - - - -	-	800	
May, - - - - -	2	800	
June, - - - - -	2	800	42
July, - - - - -	-	800	45
August, - - - - -	-	800	112
September, - - - - -	-	800	117
October, - - - - -	-	800	133
November, - - - - -	-	800	157
December, - - - - -	-	-	-
	4	8,600	606

SAMUEL ANNIN, *Military Storekeeper.*

[12th CONGRESS.]

No. 105.

[1st Session.]

## CANNON, SMALL ARMS, AND OTHER MUNITIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 16, 1811.

Mr. SEYBERT, from the committee to whom was referred "so much of the President's message as relates to the manufacture of cannon and small arms, and the providing munitions of war,"\* after having, according to order, considered the several subjects submitted, made the following report, in part:

That it is, at all times, expedient for a nation to be supplied with an ample stock of all such articles and materials as are requisite for defensive or offensive operations. Such provisions will make its citizens confident at home, whilst they, at the same time, guarantee respect on the part of foreign nations. No one, it is presumed, will deny that an extensive supply of the implements of war is preferable to the amount of their cost lying buried in the vaults of the treasury, more especially when it is considered that, on occasions of the first importance, they are indispensably necessary, and that for the greater part they are imperishable from their nature. The proposition just laid down will appear evident, when it is recollected that the least rumor of a war will immediately add to the value of such articles, very generally, from 50 to 100 per centum; nay, this declaration might have been carried much further; and it may not be out of place to notice the fact, that, under circumstances far from being the most unfavorable, refined saltpetre has commanded the enormous price of one dollar and fifty cents per pound; whereas, its ordinary value is about thirty cents per pound in our markets.

It is also well known, that all manufactured articles, which are made in haste, are generally very defective; this should be particularly guarded against in the case of fire arms of every description. When it becomes absolutely necessary to provide such equipments, contractors always insist upon their own terms. Experience has proved that contracts under such circumstances, on national account, (we do not confine this assertion to our own country) have been made to a great disadvantage. Regular annual supplies, in times of peace, should always be preferred. It would be unwarrantable in the extreme to hazard a want of this kind until the last moment—until the enemy may be at our doors. It will be in vain to look for additions from Europe at a period when the extensive naval force of an enemy, aided by many private armed ships, shall swarm on the ocean. Who could then be so hardy as to entertain the expectation of frequent arrivals in our ports?

It is with peculiar satisfaction your committee finds itself enabled, under the warranty of the proper departments, to state, that many of the most necessary, are articles of which there is a considerable stock on hand, and that others of them are abundant in our territories. Or, in the words of the message, we may be permitted to repeat that "the manufacture of cannon and small arms, and the stock and resources of all the necessary munitions are adequate to emergencies."

The flourishing state of the foundries throughout the United States; they have been heretofore successfully employed, on Government account, in Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, the District of Columbia, &c. The regular supplies of small arms of every description, from the establishments which are now under the control of the Government, and these seconded by the several contracts which have been already made with individuals in various parts of the Union, together with the ease with which they may be multiplied so as to meet any demands which circumstances may require, independent of the arrangements made on the part of the States, individually, are some of the many proofs which demonstrate the great resources of this republic. What nation can boast of more or better iron than the United States? Our foundries have not only been in successful operation; they are far from being *infantile*, and have arrived at perfection. Upon the best authority, we state the furnaces, forges, and bloomeries, in the United States, to be five hundred and thirty. The art of boring cannon is, in many places in Europe, deemed a secret of great importance; they there keep their *cutters* concealed from strangers in leathern bags. In the United States this process is so well understood, that an inspector of our artillery has declared to the world "he never was compelled to reject a gun on account of a defect in the bore," though he examined "upwards of two thousand cannon of different calibers."

It is notorious that we may have lead, from the mines in our country, to any amount. Our resources for saltpetre in the Western States are said to be inexhaustible. Of sulphur we have a considerable stock in store. Each of the States can furnish an extensive catalogue of powder mills; their number in the United States amounts to two hundred and seven, and many of them are celebrated for the excellence of their powder. Notwithstanding these facts, it is necessary to repeat, that, under the present aspect of affairs, it is proper a further provision of all the munitions of war be forthwith made. Expenditures to a considerable amount, when applied to such purposes, will ultimately be found to be economy in the true sense and meaning of the term, by the saving of the difference between the present prices and such as will be demanded when we shall be at war. In conformity with these views, your committee beg leave to report a bill.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 9th, 1811.

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the 28th November, requesting "a statement of the cannon and small arms, and of the munitions of war, generally, now on hand; and whether any, and, if any, to what extent, further purchases should be made, under the present aspect of affairs, and the amount of the appropriation necessary," I have the honor to transmit, herewith, a summary, marked A, of the most important articles in the Ordnance Department, now on hand, as taken from the returns of the superintendent of military stores, dated 1st November, 1811.

The manufacture of cannon and shot is progressing at the established foundries in the United States, increasing the supply on hand and admitting of any extension which circumstances may require.

A reference to the explanatory note on the summary marked A, will show that great deductions must be made from the number of stands of arms reported "fit for service." The number in store, fit for immediate use, may, however, be safely relied on as competent to supply any number of troops that will be brought into the field.

The public armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, furnish annually 20,000 stands. Those delivered on private contract amounted, in the year ending the 30th September, 1811, to 11,801.

From these sources, which may be extended as circumstances may require, a supply of arms of increasing superiority in fabric, competent to meet the emergencies of a war, however protracted, may with certainty be relied on.

The estimate for ordnance and ordnance stores, marked B, shows the quantity of such articles in that department as are, "under the present aspect of affairs," deemed expedient to be procured, in addition to those now on hand.

The estimate for camp equipage, and other quartermaster's stores, marked C, embraces a competent supply for 50,000 men for one year.

From these estimates, it will appear that the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars will be required to make the purchases.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. ADAM SEYBERT, *Chairman*.

\*See Foreign Relations, No. 32, page 79.

## A.

*Summary of the most important articles in the Ordnance Department, as exhibited in the report of the Superintendent of Military Stores, 1st November, 1811.*

Pieces of brass ordnance, of kinds,	-	-	-	-	-	-	462
“ iron do. do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,876
Gun carriages do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,066
Grape, strap, and canister shot, fixed, and unfixed, of sizes,	-	-	-	-	-	-	46,677
Hand grenades,	-	-	-	-	-	-	514
Cannon balls of sizes,	-	-	-	-	-	-	217,652
Shells, of sizes,	-	-	-	-	-	-	48,246
Grape shot, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	378,719
do. barrels	-	-	-	-	-	-	18½
do. bunches “	-	-	-	-	-	-	121
do. boxes, “	-	-	-	-	-	-	214
Musket balls and buck shot, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	64,575
do. do. barrels,	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Powder, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	486,064
Cartridge paper, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,338
do. quires,	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,385
Stands of arms fit for service,	-	-	-	-	-	-	202,621
Muskets with and without bayonets, wanting repairs,	-	-	-	-	-	-	21,781
Pairs of pistols,	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,655
Rampart arms, carbines, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,666
Rifles,	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,911
Swords and cutlasses,	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,403
do. do. boxes of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Flints, of kinds,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,038,308
do. boxes of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Spears and espartoons, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,846
Cartouch boxes,	-	-	-	-	-	-	67,138
Stocks, of kinds,	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,806
Sulphur, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	234,292
Nitre, crude, pounds of,	315,342	}	-	-	-	-	-
do. refined, do.	782,691		-	-	-	-	1,098,033
Lead, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,210,731
Tents, of kinds,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,098
Canteens,	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,106
Knapsacks and haversacks,	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,533
Camp kettles,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,797
Steel, pounds of,	-	-	-	-	-	-	38,706
Iron do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	113,987
Forage bags, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,624
Saddles,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,392

NOTE.—The cannon are generally good, sufficiently proved, and may be relied on. From the number of small arms reported “fit for service” it is presumed that a deduction of one-third should be made for those which may be found to want repairs, and for British, German, and other arms, of calibers different from the standard of the United States.

From the quantity of nitre returned, a deduction must be made of 242,175 pounds, loaned the Navy Department, and of 71,740 pounds due from the estate of Wheelen and Miller. From the quantity of sulphur returned, a deduction of 39,813 pounds, loaned the Navy Department.

General View of the Ordnance, Shot, Small Arms, Powder, &c. in Store, belonging to the Navy of the United States; taken from the last returns, by the respective Agents to the Navy Department.

	ROUND SHOT.							GRAPE SHOT.						
	Four Pound.	Six Pound.	Nine Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.	Different sizes.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.
At Boston, -	.	1,482	1,446	248	56	.	155	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
At New York, -	2	74	266	566	688	2,244	1,260	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
At Philadelphia, -	.	255	.	.	.	400	4,634	6	.	.	.	.	.	.
At Baltimore, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
At Norfolk, -	.	.	150	784	1,037	7,680	1,665	600	10,800	178	18	.	40	12,000
At Washington, -	4,437	16,336	29,932	28,839	7,959	410	4,857	2,068	.	.	.	3,433	3,715	.
At Marine Barracks at Washington, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Total on hand, -	4,439	18,147	31,794	30,437	9,740	10,734	12,571	2,668	10,800	178	18	3,433	4,115	12,000

	STANDS OF GRAPE SHOT.						CANISTER SHOT.								
	Six Pound.	Nine Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.	Four Pound.	Six Pound.	Nine Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.
At Boston, -	.	.	.	.	26	850	.	.	.	.	88	204	635	546	19
At New York, -	40	41	425	70	480	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
At Philadelphia, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
At Baltimore, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
At Norfolk, -	.	.	.	106	160	895	.	.	50	62	.	.	.	.	.
At Washington, -	.	164	942	700	1,038	1,022	1,150	328	486	914	1,014	999	12	238	250
At Marine Barracks at Washington, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Total on hand, -	40	205	1,367	770	1,650	2,032	2,045	328	486	964	1,164	1,203	647	784	269

	DOUBLE-HEADED SHOT.							STAR SHOT.				STOOLS FOR GRAPE SHOT.				
	Different sizes.	Six Pound.	Nine Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.
At Boston, -	.	498	365	763	463	877	219	.	.	11	20	.	.	.	.	
At New York, -	.	286	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
At Philadelphia, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
At Baltimore, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
At Norfolk, -	400	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
At Washington, -	.	2,796	5,527	5,584	4,048	4,156	60	150	11	.	.	28	5	1,268	808	87
At Marine Barracks at Washington, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Total on hand, -	400	3,580	5,892	6,347	4,532	5,033	279	150	11	11	20	32	5	1,268	808	87

GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORDNANCE—Continued.

	LANGRAGE.			Pounds Lead Cammister Shot.	Pounds Musket Balls.	Pounds Pistol Balls.	IRON CANNON.										Twenty-six Pound Brass Cannon.*
	Nine Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.				Two Pound.	Three Pound.	Four Pound.	Six Pound.	Nine Pound.	Twelve Pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.		
At Boston, - - -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	22	21	.	2	10	1	2	
At New York, - - -	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	2	37	9	38	78	27	89	62		
At Philadelphia, - - -	.	.	.	4,711	1,541	1,147	.	.	78	34	155	58	122	56	71		
At Baltimore, - - -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	16	.	.	.	.	.		
At Norfolk, - - -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	21	38	61	24	26	.	22		
At Washington, - - -	447	128	111	.	.	.	.	.	8	.	95	139	151	46	121		
At Marine Barracks at Washington, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Total on hand, -	447	128	111	4,711	1,541	1,147	1	2	151	119	370	299	328	201	277	2	

	CARRONADES.										Muskets.†	Pistols.	Rifles.	Blunderbusses.	Cutlasses.	Boarding Pikes.	Battle Axes.	Gunpowder, barrels.‡	Pounds Refined Saltpetre.	Pounds Sulphur.	
	Twelve pound.	Eighteen Pound.	Twenty-four Pound.	Thirty-two Pound.	Forty-two Pound.	Mortar, thirteen inch.	Shells, thirteen inch.	Bayonets.													
At Boston, - - -	2	4	4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	181	.	.	.
At New York, - - -	6	8	.	.	.	103	372	905	1,448	.	28	.	1,916	2,287	658	143	50,146	110,000	.	.	
At Philadelphia, - - -	.	4	.	2	1	234	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	222	314,752½	20,939	.	.	
At Baltimore, - - -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	29	.	.	.	.	
At Norfolk, - - -	.	.	.	.	1	260	28	486	230	.	.	.	486	500	180	105	.	.	.	.	
At Washington, - - -	.	.	10	6	15	.	.	23	25	.	.	.	577	412	411	.	.	.	.	.	
At Marine Barracks at Washington, -	.	.	.	.	.	.	201	262	158	22	40	1,086	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Total on hand, -	8	16	14	8	16	1	597	601	1,676	1,861	22	68	3,488	3,364	1,250	691	364,898½	130,939	.	.	

\* Trophies taken from the Tripolitans, and intended as a present to the Bashaw of Tripoli.  
 † Indifferent; the greater portion require repairs; vary in caliber.  
 ‡ About one-third of this powder is of inferior quality, being old.

B.

Estimate for Ordnance and Ordnance Stores.

100 Eighteen pounder cannon, 27 cwt. each, at \$133 33 per ton,	-	-	-	\$17,999
150 Travelling carriages for ditto, at \$400 each,	-	-	-	60,000
200 Six pounder cannon, at \$72,	-	-	-	14,400
300 Travelling carriages of 27 cwt. each, at \$250,	-	-	-	75,000
3,600 Tons of cannon balls, of sizes, at \$90 per ton,	-	-	-	324,000
1,000,000 Pounds of nitre, at 40 cents,	-	-	-	400,000
200,000 Do. of sulphur, at 6 cents,	-	-	-	12,000
500 Tons of Lead, at \$160 per ton,	-	-	-	80,000
5,000 Reams of cartridge paper, at \$6 per ream,	-	-	-	30,000
Ammunition and baggage wagons,	-	-	-	75,000
Tools and implements requisite,	-	-	-	15,000
Laboratories and laboratory apparatus,	-	-	-	12,000
				<u>\$1,115,399</u>

NOTE.—Harness and other equipage, which are perishable articles, and such as may be procured when occasion requires, are omitted in this estimate.

## C.

*Estimate for Camp Equipage and other Quartermaster's Stores, competent to supply 50,000 men for one year.*

10,000 Common tents, (at the present price of duck) at \$15 each,	-	-	-	\$150,000
1,200 Wall tents, at \$25,	-	-	-	30,000
50,000 Knapsacks, at \$1,	-	-	-	50,000
50,000 Canteens, at 25 cents,	-	-	-	12,500
10,000 Camp kettles, at \$2,	-	-	-	20,000
50,000 Cartouch boxes and belts, at \$1 50,	-	-	-	75,000
50,000 Bayonet scabbards and belts, at \$1,	-	-	-	50,000
For tools and implements requisite,	-	-	-	6,500
				\$394,000

NOTE.—Wagons, as also harness, which is a perishable article, being such as can readily be supplied, if found necessary, are not included in this estimate.

[12th CONGRESS.]

No. 106.

[1st Session.]

## FORTIFICATIONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 17, 1811.

Mr. CHEVES, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the President's message, of the 5th of November, 1811,\* as relates to the defence of our maritime frontier, made the following report, in part:

That two communications, from the Secretary of War, which accompany this report, which were made in reply to queries propounded by the committee, contain the best information on this subject which they have been able to collect. That one of them contains an enumeration of the several permanent fortifications, which have been completed or commenced, with remarks on the troops necessary to garrison them. That, for the completion of works already commenced, no further appropriation is requisite. But that some additional works are deemed necessary, the precise extent of which cannot at present be determined: for which, and for contingent objects of defence on our maritime frontier, in the event of hostilities, the committee recommend an appropriation of one million of dollars; and the committee, for that purpose, beg leave to report a bill, entitled "A bill making a further appropriation for the defence of our maritime frontier."

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 3, 1811.

SIR:

In answer to the following inquiries of the honorable committee, "to whom was referred so much of the President's message as relates to the defence of our maritime frontier," viz:

"Is any, and, if any, what, additional appropriation necessary to complete the fortifications which have been already directed and commenced?"

"Are any, and, if any, what, additional fortifications necessary for the effectual defence of the maritime frontier of the United States?"

"Are any, and, if any, what, other means of defence necessary for the effectual protection of that frontier?"

"If any additional fortifications, or other means of defence, be necessary, what appropriation, distinguishing the sum required for each particular object, will be requisite?"

I have the honor to state, that the permanent works which have been directed and commenced, for the protection of our maritime frontier, are so far completed, on the plan originally laid down (with some additions) that the unexpended balance of the appropriation for that purpose is deemed sufficient to finish them.

"For the effectual defence of the maritime frontier of the United States," the fortifications which have been erected, in some ports, must be extended; in others, new and additional works will be necessary. The harbor of New York, from its exposed situation, and relative importance to the Union, together with the harbor of Newport, in Rhode Island, claim particular attention, and require additional means of defence.

As auxiliary to the fortifications, cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, have been deposited at the most convenient and important posts, which can be directed to such points as the movements and operations of an enemy may require. An additional number will be provided, but, as the expenditure incident to such additions comes within the ordnance department, the estimate will be submitted to the committee who have that subject under consideration.

As it is impossible to ascertain the extent of the additional fortifications which may become necessary in the event of war, no precise estimate can be offered of the expense of erecting them: it is, however, respectfully proposed, for the consideration of the honorable committee, that one million of dollars be appropriated for that purpose.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM EUSTIS.

Honorable LANGDON CHEVES, *Chairman.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 10, 1811.

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, requesting "what are the number, nature, and state of repair, of the fortifications of the maritime frontier of the United States, and what will be the number and character of the troops necessary for their defence." I have the honor to transmit, herewith, a general report, exhibiting the nature, extent, and condition, of the fortifications which have been constructed for the defence of the maritime frontier of the United States, together with the full complement of artillerists, necessary to man the number of guns therein specified.

Part of the cannon, mounted on travelling carriages, not being included in the accompanying report, no estimate is offered of the number of artillerists necessary to man them.

The first intention, of annexing to this report the number of infantry which may be required for the defence of each work, is found to be impracticable.

\* See Foreign Relations, No. 32, page 79.

The description of an enemy's force, and the nature of his attack, may be such, that no corps of the army, except artillerists, will be requisite; they may be such as to require a body of infantry equal to the artillerists; and they may be such, that the number of infantry and other troops, necessary to cover the artillery and defend the works, must exceed, by a great proportion, that of the artillerists.

In this statement, the honorable committee will perceive the reasons which render it impossible to give a more precise and definite reply to this branch of their inquiry.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM EUSTIS.

The Honorable LANGDON CHEVES, *Chairman.*

*of Report the Fortifications for the defence of the ports and harbors of the United States, exhibiting the number and description of troops necessary for their defence, viz.*

		Number and description of troops.
		Artillerists.
<b>DISTRICT OF MAINE.</b>		
Passamaquoddy, - - -	A circular battery of stone; with four heavy guns mounted, covered by a block house, with wooden barracks for fifty men and officers,	52
Machias, - - -	A circular battery of stone; with four heavy guns mounted, covered by a block house, with wooden barracks for forty men and officers,	52
Penobscot, - - -	A small enclosed battery; with four heavy guns mounted,	52
Georges, on Georges river, - - -	A small enclosed battery; with three heavy guns mounted,	39
On Damariscotta river, - - -	A small enclosed battery; with three heavy guns mounted, covered by a block house, which answers for barracks for one officer and twenty men,	39
Edgecomb, on Sheepscot river, - - -	A small enclosed battery; with six heavy guns mounted, covered by a block house, which answers for barracks for one officer and twenty men,	78
Georgetown, Kennebec river, - - -	An enclosed work; with a battery of six heavy guns mounted, a small magazine, and wooden barracks for forty men and officers,	78
Portland harbor, - - -	Fort Preble, situated on Spring Point, at the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed star fort of masonry, with a circular battery with flanks, mounting fourteen heavy guns, two brick magazines, and brick barracks for one company of men and officers,	182
	Fort Scammel; (opposite) a circular battery of masonry with circular flanks, mounting fifteen heavy guns, is covered in the rear with a wooden block house, mounting six guns, and serves for quarters for one officer and twenty men, a brick magazine, &c.	273
	At the north end of the town is a battery of five guns mounted, also a good brick gun house, with four and eighteen pounders mounted on travelling carriages,	117
<b>NEW HAMPSHIRE.</b>		
Portsmouth harbor, - - -	Fort Constitution, situated on the eastern point of New Castle Island at the entrance of Piscataqua river, three miles below Portsmouth; an enclosed irregular work of masonry, mounting thirty-six heavy guns, two brick magazines, that will contain one hundred and fifty barrels of powder, and brick barracks for two companies of men and officers,	468
	Fort McClary, (opposite) on the Kittery side; a circular battery of masonry, enclosed by earth and palisades, mounting ten heavy guns; a brick magazine, and barracks of brick and wood for one company of men and officers,	130
	In the town of Portsmouth; a brick arsenal with three twenty-four and three eighteen pounders, mounted on field carriages, with horse harness and other implements complete, &c.	78
<b>MASSACHUSETTS.</b>		
Newburyport, - - -	On the east point of Plum Island, at the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed battery, built of earth and timber, mounting five heavy guns, with a small brick magazine, and a barrack of wood for one officer and twenty-five men,	65
Cape Ann, Gloucester, - - -	At the head of the harbor; an enclosed battery, mounting seven heavy guns, covered by a block house, which will answer for barracks for twenty men and one officer,	91
Salem, - - -	Fort Pickering, situated on the west side of the entrance into the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry and sods, mounting six heavy guns, covered by a block house, a brick magazine, and barracks for one officer and thirty men,	78
Marblehead, - - -	Fort Sewall; situated on the west point of the entrance into the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry and sods, mounting eight heavy cannon, covered by a block house, a brick magazine, and barracks for forty men and officers,	94
Boston harbor, - - -	Fort Independence, situated on Castle Island, on the South side of the inner harbor; a regular pentagon, with bastions of masonry, mounting forty two heavy cannon, with two batteries for six guns, a large brick magazine, which will contain four hundred barrels of powder, and brick barracks for two companies of men and officers, also an old wooden barrack, which has quartered six companies of the 4th regiment,	624
	Fort Warren, opposite, on Governor's Island; a star fort of masonry, mounting twelve guns, a brick magazine, and brick barracks for forty men and officers,	157



## REPORT OF FORTIFICATIONS, &amp;c.—Continued.

		Number and description of troops.
		Artillerists.
MASSACHUSETTS—Boston harbor.	On the West head, a circular battery of ten guns mounted with a brick magazine,	130
	Also on the South point, a circular battery, calculated for ten guns, a small brick magazine, and a brick barrack for twenty men,	130
	Also at Charlestown, near the navy yard; a circular battery of earth for eight heavy guns, a brick arsenal, one hundred feet long and thirty wide, a large brick magazine, which will contain seven hundred barrels of powder, with a gun shed, eighty feet by twenty, for gun carriages, and a small wooden barrack for sixteen men,	104
Plymouth harbor, - - -	At the Gurnet Point, the entrance of the harbor; the old enclosed fort has been repaired with stone and sods, mounting five heavy guns, with a brick magazine, and barracks for thirty men,	65
New Bedford, - - -	At Eldridge Point, which commands the entrance of the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry, mounting six heavy guns, with a brick magazine, and brick barracks for forty men and officers,	78
RHODE ISLAND.		
Harbor of Newport, - - -	Fort Adams, situated on Briton Point, east side of the entrance of the harbor; an irregular star fort of masonry, with an irregular indented work of masonry adjoining it, mounting seventeen heavy guns, a brick magazine, which is too damp for powder. The barracks are of wood and bricks, for one company of men and officers; also a gun house,	291
	Fort Wolcott, situated on Goat Island, in the centre of the harbor; a small enclosed irregular work, with open batteries, extending from two opposite flanks, of stone, earth sods, &c. mounting thirty-eight heavy guns, a brick magazine, that will contain two hundred barrels of powder. The barracks are of bricks and wood, for one company of men and officers, with a wooden gunhouse, one hundred and five by twenty-five feet,	594
	Rose Island, situated to defend the north and south passages of the harbor; a regular unfinished work of masonry of four bastions, two of which are circular. Within the works are a range of stone barracks, of arched rooms, sufficient for three hundred men; the officers' quarters are two small wooden buildings, twenty-nine by twenty-five feet. There is no magazine or store house. The works were commenced in 1798—unfinished.	
	At the north point of the town, on a piece of ground rented by the United States, called Easton's Point, an elliptical stone battery has been erected, but now in a state of ruin, part of the walls having fallen down.	
	On a bluff of rocks, called the Dumplings, on Conanicut Island, nearly opposite to Fort Adams; a circular tower of stone, with casemates, which will contain thirty or forty men; and, with a small expense, there can be mounted six or eight heavy guns; and now in an unfinished state.	
CONNECTICUT.		
New London Harbor, - - -	Fort Trumbull, situated on the west side of the harbor; an irregular enclosed work of masonry and sod, mounting eighteen heavy guns; a brick magazine, that will contain eighty barrels of powder, and a brick barrack, for one company of men and officers,	234
	Fort Hale, situated on the eastern side of the harbor of New Haven; an elliptical enclosed battery of masonry; mounting six heavy guns; a small brick magazine, and brick barracks for fifty men and officers,	78
	At Stonington; a brick arsenal, with four eighteen pounders mounted on travelling carriages,	52
STATE OF NEW YORK.		
New York Harbor, - - -	Fort Columbus, situated on Governor's Island, within half a mile of the city; a regular enclosed work of masonry, comprehending four bastions and a ravelin, with sixty heavy guns mounted, a brick magazine that will contain five hundred barrels of powder, and brick barracks for two companies of men and officers, and a furnace for heating shot,	760
	On a projecting point of the island stands a stone tower, called Castle Williams, with fifty-two, forty-two, and thirty-two pounders, mounted on two tiers, under a bomb roof, and on the terrace above is intended to mount twenty-six fifty pound Columbiads. Two stone magazines, which will contain two hundred and fifty barrels of powder, and the arches of the second tier will answer for barracks for three hundred men; also, on the island, a stone magazine, which will hold two hundred barrels of powder, a brick arsenal; a wooden gunhouse, and a wooden barrack for three hundred men and officers,	1,014
	Bedloe's Island, nearly opposite; a star fort of masonry, mounting twenty-four heavy guns, a stone magazine, which will contain two hundred barrels of powder; a brick barrack for one company of men and officers, and a brick arsenal,	312
	Ellis's Island, opposite Fort Columbus; an enclosed circular battery of masonry, mounting fourteen heavy guns, with barracks of stone and wood for one company of men and officers,	182

## REPORT OF FORTIFICATIONS, &amp;c.—Continued.

		Number and description of troops.
		Artillerists.
New York Harbor—Continued.	About one hundred yards in front of the west head of the grand battery, in the city of New York, an enclosed circular battery of stone, with twenty-eight heavy guns mounted, with two magazines, and barracks for officers,	364
	North battery, one mile up North river; an enclosed circular stone battery, with sixteen heavy guns mounted, a stone magazine, a small wooden barrack for officers, and furnace for heating shot,	208
	In the city of New York; a brick arsenal, with one brass twenty-four, seven twelve pounders, four brass howitzers, and twenty-two iron eighteen pounders, all mounted on travelling or field carriages, with implements, &c. also a three story brick store house,	442
	Three miles out of the city; a brick arsenal; a stone magazine which will contain five hundred barrels of powder, for supplying the works in the harbor, and a brick laboratory for the making and repairing of ammunition, &c.	
	At Sagg Harbor, on Long Island, a brick arsenal, with four eighteen pounders mounted on field carriages, with implements,	52
PENNSYLVANIA,	Fort Mifflin, situated on the west side of the Delaware river, seven miles below Philadelphia; an irregular enclosed work of masonry, defended by bastions, demi-bastions, &c. mounting twenty-nine heavy guns, with a water battery without the works, mounting eight heavy guns, a good brick magazine that will contain one hundred and eighty barrels of powder, with brick barracks for one hundred men and officers; within three quarters of a mile are public buildings, called the Lazaretto, which are good barracks for four hundred men,	481
DELAWARE—		
Wilmington,	An arsenal of brick, one and a half stories high, and ninety-six by twenty-six feet interior, with four twelve pounders mounted on field carriages, with implements and equipages complete,	52
	Newcastle; an arsenal of brick, the same as at Wilmington, with four heavy cannon mounted on field carriages, with implements,	52
MARYLAND.		
Harbor of Baltimore,	Fort M <sup>h</sup> Henry, situated at the entrance of the harbor; a regular pentagon of masonry, calculated for thirty guns, a water battery, with ten heavy guns mounted, a brick magazine that will contain three hundred barrels of powder, with brick barracks for two companies of men and officers; without the fort, a wooden barrack for one company, also a brick store and gun house,	520
Annapolis,	Fort Madison, situated at the western entrance into the harbor; an enclosed work of masonry, comprehending a semi-elliptical face, with circular flanks, calculated for thirteen guns, with a brick magazine, and brick barracks for one company of men and officers,	169
	At the Windmill point, a circular battery of masonry, for eight heavy guns; in the rear of the works are quarters for two companies,	104
On Potomac,	Fort Washington, situated at Warburton, on the east side of the river; an enclosed work of masonry, comprehending a semi-elliptical face, with circular flanks, mounting thirteen heavy guns; it is defended in the rear by an octagon tower of masonry, mounting six cannon; a brick magazine, and brick barracks for one company of men and officers,	247
VIRGINIA.		
Norfolk Harbor,	Fort Nelson, situated on the western side of Elizabeth river, and opposite that part of Norfolk called the Point; an irregular work, defended by whole and half bastions, &c., built of bricks and sods, and enclosed in the rear by a brick parapet, mounting thirty-seven guns, a brick magazine, which will contain two hundred barrels of powder; brick barracks for one company of men and officers, a large brick gun house, and a brick store house, which answers for a laboratory and other stores,	481
	Fort Norfolk, situated on the northeastern side of Elizabeth river, one thousand yards distant from Fort Nelson; an irregular enclosed work of masonry, comprehending a semi-elliptical battery, defended on the flanks and rear by irregular bastions, mounting thirty heavy guns; a brick magazine, which will contain one hundred barrels of powder, and brick barracks for two companies of men and officers,	390
On James River,	Hood's Bluffs; an unfinished work of masonry, intended for thirteen cannon, &c.; there are now barracks for one company of men and officers,	169
NORTH CAROLINA.		
Wilmington,	Fort Johnston, situated on the right bank of Cape Fear river, twenty-eight miles from Wilmington; a flank battery of tapier, mounting eight heavy guns, a brick magazine, a brick barrack for one company of men and officers, and a store house,	104

## REPORT OF FORTIFICATIONS, &amp;c.—Continued.

		Number and description of troops.
		Artillerists.
Beaufort, N. C.	Fort Hampton, of a circular form in front, and enclosed with a straight line in the rear, mounting five guns, a brick magazine, and brick barracks for one company of men and officers,	65
SOUTH CAROLINA.		
Harbor of Charleston,	Fort Johnston, situated in the harbor of Charleston; properly a marine battery of an irregular form, built of brick and wood, mounting sixteen guns; two brick magazines that will contain one hundred barrels each. The barracks are built of wood and tapier, and are sufficient for two hundred men and officers,	208
	Fort Moultrie, situated at the entrance of the harbor; an irregular form, built of brick, presenting a battery of three sides on the sea front, and the whole is enclosed with ramparts, parapets, &c. mounting forty guns; the magazine is brick, dry, and calculated to hold five hundred barrels of powder. The barracks are of brick, and sufficient for five hundred men and officers,	520
	Castle Pinckney, of an elliptical form, built of brick; has two tiers of guns, and has thirty mounted. There is also in the castle a good magazine, which will contain two hundred barrels of powder, and quarters for two hundred men and officers. The work is considered the most important in the harbor,	390
In Charleston,	Fort Mechanic; a temporary battery, built on the point of the city; it makes a cross fire with the Castle at a distance of nine hundred yards; it mounts seven guns; has a small magazine for forty barrels of powder, and barracks for forty men and officers,	91
Beaufort,	The site not ceded to the United States, and is falling to decay. Also a brick arsenal in the city, one hundred feet long and forty broad; the lower part for artillery carriages, &c.; in the upper is a rack for small arms, and other articles of various kinds,	
GEORGIA.		
Savannah,	This work is of a circular form in front, and a straight line in the rear. It is, at present, only in its foundation four feet high above the ground. There is a comfortable house on the public ground, containing two rooms and a kitchen. The work itself is entirely of tapier.	
	Fort Jackson, situated in a marsh on the west side of Savannah river, three miles below the town, and twelve hundred yards from the nearest dry land; an enclosed work of masonry and mud, mounting six heavy guns; two small brick magazines, and a wooden barrack for one company of men and officers. The work is in an unfinished state. There is in the town of Savannah a range of two story wooden barracks, sufficient for two hundred men and officers,	78
MISSISSIPPI.		
	Fort St. Philip, at Plaquemines, near the mouth of the river; an enclosed work of masonry and wood, calculated for twenty guns, with a magazine and barracks for one company,	260
	English Turn; an enclosed work, with two bastions and a battery of masonry, for nine guns, with a magazine, and barracks for one company; nearly finished,	117
New Orleans,	Fort St. Charles, in the city of New Orleans; an enclosed redoubt of five sides of masonry and earth; mounting nineteen guns; a magazine and barracks for thirty men,	247
	At the Bayou St. John; a strong battery of six guns, which commands the passage of Lake Pontchartrain, with barracks for thirty men,	78
	Total,	12,610

[12th CONGRESS.]

No. 107.

[1st SESSION.]

PROVISION FOR THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS WOUNDED, AND THE FAMILIES OF THOSE  
KILLED, IN THE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INDIANS ON THE WABASH, IN 1811.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 8, 1812:

Mr. M'KEE, from the committee to whom was referred the message of the President of the United States, transmitting two letters from Governor Harrison, of the Indiana territory, reporting the particulars\* and the issue of the expedition under his command, against the hostile Indians on the Wabash; and to whom also was referred the memorial of the General Assembly of the Indiana territory, and the memorial of the officers and soldiers of the militia of Knox county, in the Indiana territory, who served in the late campaign under the command of Governor Harrison, made the following report:

That they have had the several matters to them referred under their consideration, and have given to them that attention which their importance seems to merit.

It appears to the committee that the troops under the command of Governor Harrison may very properly be termed raw troops; very few of the officers, and almost none of the men, had ever been in actual service, and a considerable proportion of them had been only a few weeks withdrawn from the pursuits of civil life. The attack made on this quickly assembled army, by the hostile Indians on the Wabash, when viewed, either as it relates to the nature of the enemy, the time, or the violence with which the attack was made, cannot but be considered of such a character as would have severely tested the collected firmness of the most able and experienced troops. This attack, violent and unexpected as it seems to have been, was repelled by the troops under the command of Governor Harrison, with a gallantry and good conduct worthy of future imitation. The whole transaction, in the opinion of the committee, presents to the American people a new proof that the dauntless spirit of our ancestors, by whom the war of the Revolution was so ably and successfully maintained, has not been diminished by more than thirty years of almost uninterrupted peace, but that it has been handed down unimpaired to their posterity.

In estimating the claims of the army on the Government of the United States, it is worthy of remark, that the nature of the country, as well as of the enemy to be encountered, subjected the army to many extreme hardships and equal dangers, where every thing was hazarded, and but little could be gained except the regard of their country.

The volunteers and militia (to whose claims the memorials referred to the committee particularly relate) were in actual service but a short time, for which alone they are entitled to pay by law; the compensation, therefore, to which they are entitled, is not at all commensurate to the services rendered and the dangers incurred; besides, many of the officers and men who fell, or were wounded, in the battle of the 7th of November, 1811, were purchasers of the public lands, for which they were indebted to the United States, which debt falls due in a short time, and the penalty of forfeiture will be incurred, if the debt is not paid. It would be unjust to inflict a penalty so severe on the disconsolate widows and orphans of those officers and soldiers of the volunteers and militia, who, in common with their brother officers and soldiers of the regular troops, fell in their country's cause in a manner so distinguished that nothing was wanting but a great occasion, interesting to the feelings of the American people, to have crowned their names with unfading laurels.

As an evidence, therefore, of the regard due to the bravery and ability displayed by the troops under the command of Governor Harrison, in the battle of the 7th of November, 1811, as well as to relieve the representatives of those who were killed in the action, from the pecuniary losses incurred in consequence thereof, the committee respectfully submit the following resolutions:

1st. *Resolved*, That one month's pay ought to be allowed, in addition to the common allowance, to the officers, (according to the rank which they held) the non-commissioned officers and privates of the regulars, volunteers, and militia, and to the legal representatives of those who were killed, or have since died of their wounds, composing the army under the command of Governor Harrison, in the late campaign on the Wabash.

2d. *Resolved*, That five years' half-pay ought to be allowed to the legal representatives of the officers, (according to the rank which they held) the non-commissioned officers and privates of the volunteers and militia who were killed in the battle of the 7th of November, 1811, or who have since died of their wounds.

3d. *Resolved*, That provision ought to be made by law to place on the pension list the officers (according to the rank which they held) the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the volunteers and militia who served in the late campaign on the Wabash, under the command of Governor Harrison, and who have been wounded or disabled in the said campaign.

4th. *Resolved*, That provision ought to be made by law to pay for the horses and other property of individuals, lost in, or in consequence of, the said battle.

5th. *Resolved*, That the further time of \_\_\_\_\_ years ought to be allowed to the officers and soldiers who were wounded, and to the legal representatives of those who were killed, in the said battle, to complete the payments due, or which may fall due, to the United States, on any purchase of the public lands made by them before the said battle.

\* For these letters, see Indian Affairs, No. 131.

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 108.

[1st Session.

## ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 31, 1812.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 23, 1812.*

Sir:

In answer to your letter of the 16th instant, requesting "an estimate of the appropriation necessary for the service of the year 1812, to carry into effect the act passed at the present session, entitled 'An act to raise, for a limited time, an additional military force,'" I have the honor to transmit, herewith, the estimates marked A, B, C, D, and E, as also a recapitulation of the whole, marked F, amounting to six millions six hundred and ninety-seven thousand eight hundred and ninety-two dollars and fifty-four cents. But, as a part of the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars, appropriated by the act of the 14th of January, of the present year, for the purchase of ordnance, ordnance stores, camp equipage, and other quartermaster's stores, may be applied to the purchase of several items contained in the estimates, a deduction may be made—

On account of wagons,	-	-	-	-	-	\$47,640
Do. camp equipage,	-	-	-	-	-	206,100
Do. tools and implements,	-	-	-	-	-	13,900

making in the whole, a deduction of two hundred and sixty-seven thousand six hundred and forty dollars, and leaving a balance of six millions four hundred and thirty thousand two hundred and fifty-two dollars and fifty-four cents, to be appropriated for the service of the present year.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Honorable Ez. BACON, *Chairman.*

A.

*Estimate of the annual Pay, Subsistence, Forage, &c. for the General, Field, and Staff Officers, authorized by the act of the 11th January, 1812.*

RANK.	Monthly Pay.	Total amount of Pay.	Total amount of Forage.	Total amount of rations at 20 cents.	Total amount.	Aggregate amount.
2 Major Generals,	\$200	\$4,800	\$480	\$2,190	\$7,470	
5 Brigadier Generals,	104	6,240	960	4,380	11,580	
1 Adjutant General,	104	1,248	192	876	2,316	
1 Inspector General,	104	1,248	192	876	2,316	
3 Assistants to Adjutant General,	60	2,160	396	1,095	3,651	
2 do. Inspector General,	60	1,440	264	730	2,434	
4 Major Generals' Aids,	64	3,072	480	876	4,428	
5 Brigade Majors,	70	4,200	600	1,095	5,895	
5 Brigadier Generals' Aids,	50	3,000	360	730	4,090	
2 Judge Advocates,	50	1,200	240	584	2,024	
4 Hospital Surgeons,	75	3,600	576	1,752	5,928	
4 do. Surgeons' Mates,	40	1,920	288	584	2,792	
4 do. Stewards,	20	960	-	584	1,544	
						\$56,468 00
Medicines and hospital stores,	-	-	-	-	-	125,000 00
Contingent expenses,	-	-	-	-	-	7,058 50
						<u>\$188,526 50</u>
					Total,	



## C.

*Estimate of the expenses of raising and continuing in service one year ten Regiments of Infantry, authorized by the act of the 11th January, 1812.*

REGIMENTAL, FIELD, AND STAFF OFFICERS.							
NUMBER AND RANK.	Monthly pay.	Total am't of pay.	Total am't of forage.	Total am't of rations at 20 cts.	Total am't of rations at 15 cts.	Total amount.	Aggregate amount.
10 Colonels, - - -	\$75	\$9,000	\$1,440 00	\$4,380	-	\$14,820 00	
20 Lieutenant Colonels, - - -	60	14,400	2,640 00	7,300	-	24,340 00	
20 Majors, - - -	50	12,000	2,400 00	5,840	-	20,240 00	
20 Adjutants, - - -	40	9,600	1,440 00	2,920	-	13,960 00	
10 Quartermasters, - - -	40	4,800	720 00	1,460	-	6,980 00	
10 Paymasters, - - -	40	4,800	720 00	1,460	-	6,980 00	
10 Surgeons, - - -	45	5,400	1,200 00	2,190	-	8,790 00	
20 Surgeons' Mates, - - -	30	7,200	1,440 00	2,920	-	11,560 00	
							\$107,670 00
NON-COMMISSIONED REGIMENTAL STAFF.							
20 Sergeant Majors, - - -	9	2,160	1,359 60	-	1,095	4,614 60	
20 Quartermaster Sergeants, - - -	9	2,160	1,359 60	-	1,095	4,614 60	
20 Senior Musicians, - - -	8	1,920	-	-	1,095	3,015 00	
							12,244 20
PLATOON AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES.							
180 Captains, - - -	40	86,400	-	39,420	-	125,820 00	
180 First Lieutenants, - - -	30	64,800	-	26,280	-	91,080 00	
180 Second Lieutenants, - - -	25	54,000	-	26,280	-	80,280 00	
180 Ensigns, - - -	20	43,200	-	26,280	-	69,480 00	
720 Sergeants, - - -	8	69,120	-	-	39,420	108,540 00	
720 Corporals, - - -	7	60,480	-	-	39,420	99,900 00	
360 Musicians, - - -	6	25,920	-	-	19,710	45,630 00	
18,000 Privates, - - -	5	1,180,000	-	-	985,500	2,165,500 00	
720 Women, - - -	-	-	-	-	39,420	39,420 00	
							2,825,650 00
CLOTHING.							
Clothing for 19,860 non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, - - -					at \$35 each,		695,100 00
BOUNTIES AND PREMIUMS.							
Bounties for 19,860 recruits, - - -					at \$16 each,		317,760 00
Premiums to recruiting officers, for enlisting 19,860 men, - - -					at 2 each,		39,720 00
HORSES, BAGGAGE WAGONS, HARNESS, &c.							
720 Horses for transportation of baggage, - - -					at \$80 00 each,		57,600 00
180 Baggage wagons, - - -					at 120 00 each,		21,600 00
Harness for 720 horses, - - -					at 20 00 each,		14,400 00
Forage for 720 horses, - - -					at 67 98 each,		48,945 00
Contingencies, - - -							517,586 15
						Dollars,	4,658,275 35

## D.

Estimate for raising and continuing in service one year a Regiment of Light Dragoons, authorized by the act of the 11th of January, 1812.

## REGIMENTAL, FIELD, AND STAFF OFFICERS.

NUMBER AND RANK.	Monthly pay.	Total am't of pay.	Total am't of forage.	Total am't of rations at 20 cts.	Total am't of rations at 15 cts.	Total amount.	Aggregate amount.
1 Colonel, - - -	\$90	\$1,080 00	\$339 90	\$438 00	-	\$1,857 90	\$13,254 11
2 Lieutenant Colonels, - - -	75	1,800 00	543 85	730 00	-	3,073 85	
2 Majors, - - -	60	1,440 00	543 85	584 00	-	2,567 85	
2 Adjutants, - - -	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,039 92	271 91	292 00	-	1,603 83	
1 Quartermaster, - - -	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	519 96	135 95	146 00	-	801 91	
1 Paymaster, - - -	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	519 96	135 95	146 00	-	801 91	
1 Surgeon, - - -	50	600 00	203 95	219 00	-	1,022 95	
2 Surgeon's Mates, - - -	40	960 00	271 91	292 00	-	1,523 91	

## NON-COMMISSIONED REGIMENTAL STAFF.

2 Sergeant Majors, - - -	10	240 00	135 96	-	109 50	485 46	1,456 38
2 Quartermaster Sergeants, - - -	10	240 00	135 96	-	109 50	485 46	
2 Senior Musicians, - - -	10	240 00	135 96	-	109 50	485 46	

## PLATOON OFFICERS, CADETS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, PRIVATES, &amp;c.

12 Captains, - - -	50	7,200 00	2,447 28	2,628 00	-	12,275 28	250,512 60
12 First Lieutenants, - - -	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,799 52	1,631 52	1,752 00	-	8,183 04	
12 Second Lieutenants, - - -	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,799 52	1,631 52	1,752 00	-	8,183 04	
12 Cornets, - - -	26 $\frac{2}{3}$	3,839 04	1,631 52	1,752 00	-	7,222 56	
24 Cadets, - - -	10	2,880 00	1,631 52	3,504 00	-	8,015 52	
48 Sergeants, - - -	8	4,608 00	3,263 04	-	2,628 00	10,499 04	
48 Corporals, - - -	7	4,032 00	3,263 04	-	2,628 00	9,923 04	
12 Musicians, - - -	6	864 00	815 76	-	657 00	2,336 76	
12 Saddlers, - - -	10	1,440 00	815 76	-	657 00	2,912 76	
12 Farriers, - - -	10	1,440 00	815 76	-	657 00	2,912 76	
960 Privates, - - -	5	57,600 00	65,260 80	-	52,560 00	175,420 80	
48 Women, - - -	-	-	-	-	2,628 00	2,628 00	

## CLOTHING.

Clothing for 1,098 non-commissioned officers, musicians, privates, &c. at 38 dollars each, - - - 41,724 00

## BOUNTIES AND PREMIUMS.

Bounties for 1,098 recruits, at 16 dollars each, - - - 17,568 00  
 Premiums to recruiting officers for enlisting 1,098 recruits, at two dollars each, - - - 2,196 00

## HORSES AND EQUIPMENTS.

1,122 Horses for cadets, non-commissioned officers, musicians, privates, &c. at \$120 00 each, - 134,640 00  
 1,122 Saddles, bridles, and other equipage, - - - at 20 00 per horse, 22,440 00  
 12 Wagons for transportation of baggage, - - - at 120 00 each, 1,440 00  
 48 Horses for do. - - - at 120 00 do. 5,760 00  
 Harness for 48 horses, - - - at 20 00 do. 960 00  
 Forage for 48 horses, - - - at 67 98 do. 3,263 04  
 Annual contingencies, - - - - - 61,901 76

\$557,115 89



## E.

*Estimate of Camp Equipage, &c. to supply the troops authorized by the act of the 11th January, 1812.*

5,000 common tents, - - - - -	at 15 dollars each, - - -	\$75,000
40 marquees, - - - - -	at 120 " " - - -	4,800
1,000 wall and horsemen's tents, -	at 25 " " - - -	25,000
24,300 knapsacks, - - - - -	at 1 " " - - -	24,300
25,000 canteens, - - - - -	at 25 cents, " - - -	6,250
5,000 camp kettles, - - - - -	at 200 " " - - -	10,000
24,300 cartouch boxes and belts, -	at 150 " " - - -	36,450
24,300 bayonet scabbards and belts,	at 100 " " - - -	24,300
Contingent expenses for tools, implements, &c. -	- - - - -	12,900
	Dollars, -	220,000

## F.

*Recapitulation of the Estimates of the Expenses of raising, and continuing in service one year, the troops authorized by the act of the 11th of January, 1812.*

Pay, - - - - -	2,110,277 92
Forage, - - - - -	231,652 95
Subsistence, - - - - -	1,611,146 50
Clothing, - - - - -	863,244 00
Bounties and premiums, - - - - -	442,260 00
Horses for dragoons, and the transportation of cannon, baggage, &c. -	282,000 00
Wagons, - - - - -	47,640 00
Harness and other equipage, - - - - -	58,760 00
Camp equipage, - - - - -	206,100 00
Medicines and hospital stores, - - - - -	125,000 00
Contingent expenses, viz: For the recruiting service, quarters, fuel, straw, tools and implements, transportation, officers, &c. employed on extra duty, &c. -	719,811 17
	Dollars, - 6,697,892 54

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 109.

[1st SESSION.]

## ARMORIES, AND ARMS MANUFACTURED THEREIN.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 19, 1812.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 17th, 1812.*

SIR:

In conformity to the fifth section of the act of the 2d April, 1794, I have the honor to transmit to Congress, a statement of the amount of expenditures on account of the national armories at Springfield and Harper's Ferry, during the year 1811, and of the number of arms made and repaired at each place during the same period.

With the greatest respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

*A Statement of the expenditures on account of the National Armories, and of the number of arms manufactured and repaired at the same, in the year 1811.*

At Harper's Ferry, expended, - - - - -	\$141,357 00
At Springfield, Massachusetts, do. - - - - -	103,785 77
	Total expended, \$245,142 77
At Harper's Ferry, muskets made, - - - - -	10,000
At do. do. repaired, - - - - -	1,505
At Springfield, do. made, - - - - -	12,020
	Total made and repaired, 23,525

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 110.

[1st Session.]

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 6, 1812.

*Resolved by the General Assembly for the State of Kentucky,* That, whereas the subject of our national militia, at all times important, seems, from the aspect of our foreign relations, to be peculiarly so at the present time; and experience having shown that the present system has great defects, producing much inconvenience without many of those benefits which a better arrangement would ensure; and the Legislature of this State being impressed with a belief that an adequate remedy for the evil rests in the hands of the General Government alone, which has a constitutional power to provide for the organization, arming, and disciplining our national force; this Legislature, in behalf of their constituents, with every deference to the wisdom of those whose power and duty it is to act finally on the subject, will proceed to suggest their ideas on some of the inconveniences which attend the present militia system, together with the mode in which they might be obviated, with a view of their being submitted to the competent authority.

1. Although a well organized militia is the greatest safeguard of a free people, because the soldiers being the citizens, their military interest is to secure their civil rights; yet the safeguard can only be available, in proportion to the capacity of the militia to act with effect.

2. This capacity seems to be composed of numbers, organization, discipline, and arms; which latter may include camp equipage and the necessary munitions of war.

3. Number is but one ingredient of military capacity, because a small number, well armed and disciplined, will defeat a larger one, which is inferior in these two respects.

4. Organization seems to be the mean by which any given number of troops may be disposed of, so as to act; and the more perfect this is, with so much more facility can that number be brought into action to the extent of its force, upon any emergency.

5. The extent of the force of a given number of troops, when brought into action, will be, in the general, in proportion to its discipline and armature; these two, therefore, seem to compose the hand that is to execute; and the more perfect they are when in action, in that proportion will the force of any given number of men be greater; and, as it is seen that the perfection of this force, the reverse of that of a standing army, turns to the advantage of the State against her enemies, without threatening the rights of her citizens; the object, then, which highly interests every portion of the Union, seems evidently to be so to organize the national force, that it can be used with the greatest facility and effect, for legitimate purposes, while the soldier shall be still so far a citizen, as to have an interest in respecting the rights of the latter, which are, in fact, his own; so as never to cause an abuse or diversion of that force from its true end.

If, therefore, every individual in the United States, capable of bearing arms, were to be so organized, disciplined, armed, and accoutred, as to act when required, it would certainly present the spectacle of a perfect militia of the whole, which no age or country ever witnessed, and, most probably, in a country or government like ours, never will be seen. And, if a general draught were to be made—and we ought to calculate on the effect of this—to be equal, it must be impartial; and how many who would have neither arms, accoutrements, or discipline, would be thus designated?—men who might be useful at home, but who would scarcely find employment for our enemies, even if armed; and whose rout and slaughter would only serve to mark our calamity, and spread dismay amongst our friends; and experience has proved that substitutes are seldom worth any thing. But does not the circumstance of a general draught show forcibly the defect of our militia organization? How much time is lost in mustering all the militia in the United States? How much will it require to hunt up arms, and to get those of a proper description? The latter, we much suspect, could not be easily procured. Thus it has happened, as it is thence to be inferred, will again happen, that the season for action has passed away in preparation, giving, in many cases, advantages to the enemy, not easily regained.

6. But it is seen from experience that habits of discipline are most effectually acquired in youth. The youth, too, of every country, seem to be, from their vigor and alertness, best calculated for military service; their very ardor, itself, seems to be the guarantee of successful enterprise; and certainly they can be spared for this service, with much less inconvenience to the avocations of civil life, than the heads of families; and these pursuits must still be attended to, or the very sinews of war will be dried up or broken.

7. The remedy, therefore, which this Legislature would beg leave to submit for the consideration of Congress, is, to class the militia between certain ages, and, without intending the slightest disrespect to the wisdom of that honorable body, they would, by way of example, submit, that the militia might be divided into three classes: The first, to be composed of all capable of bearing arms, and not exempted by law, between fifteen and twenty-one years of age; the second, between twenty-one and twenty-seven years of age; the third between twenty-seven and forty-five years of age. The principal object of the first class would be to acquire a knowledge of tactics and discipline; of the second, which might be denominated the effective one, to be completely armed and equipped to march whenever required; of the third, to form a reserve, and which need not be compelled to attend musters, unless when they were called upon to render actual service.

It is not deemed proper to enter into a detail of measures for keeping the middle or effective class properly armed and equipped; that it should be so, is evident.

The progress of all capable of bearing arms, through the several classes, would promise a greater perfection in discipline, than can be effected under the present plan; all would, in fact, have thus passed through a school, in which it would have been taught, and, perhaps, more than a million of dollars be annually saved to the community in the labor of those excused from uselessly attending musters. But the greatest advantage which would result from it, would be the keeping an effective, disposable, and competent military force, at all times ready for service, without the danger and inconvenience resulting from a standing army. These ideas are submitted merely with the view that the attention of the National Legislature should be called to the subject, and it appears that none can be of higher moment.

*Resolved,* That copies of these resolutions be transmitted, one to the President of the United States, and one to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, for the purpose of being submitted to that body.

JOHN SIMPSON,  
*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

GABRIEL SLAUGHTER,  
*Speaker of the Senate.*

CHARLES SCOTT, *Governor.*

Approved, February 8, 1812:

By the Governor:

J. BLEDSOE, *Secretary.*

SECRETARY'S OFFICE, FRANKFORT, February 15, 1812.

I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of enrolled resolutions, filed in this office.

J. BLEDSOE, *Secretary.*

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 111.

[1st SESSION.

## QUOTAS OF MILITIA FROM THE SEVERAL STATES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JUNE 1, 1812.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 29th*, 1812.

In obedience to a resolution of the honorable the Senate of the United States, of the 27th instant, directing a report of "the number of men ordered to be supplied by each State for the purpose of completing their respective quotas under the act of the present session, entitled 'An act to authorize a detachment of the militia of the United States,' the Secretary of War has the honor herewith to transmit a schedule showing the number of men required from each State, by virtue of the act before mentioned,

Which is respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM EUSTIS.

To the PRESIDENT of the Senate, &amp;c.

*Schedule of the apportionment of 100,000 Militia required by virtue of the act of Congress of the 10th of April, 1812, entitled "An act to authorize a detachment from the Militia of the United States."*

New Hampshire, - - - -	3,500	Virginia, - - - -	12,000
Massachusetts, - - - -	10,000	North Carolina, - - - -	7,000
Connecticut, - - - -	3,000	South Carolina, - - - -	5,000
Rhode Island, - - - -	500	Georgia, - - - -	3,500
Vermont, - - - -	3,000	Kentucky, - - - -	5,500
New York, - - - -	13,500	Ohio, - - - -	5,000
New Jersey, - - - -	5,000	Tennessee, - - - -	2,500
Pennsylvania, - - - -	14,000		
Delaware, - - - -	1,000		
Maryland, - - - -	6,000		
			<u>\$100,000</u>

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 112.

[1st SESSION.

## MILITARY FORCE IN JUNE, 1812.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JUNE 9, 1812.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 6*, 1812.

SIR:

By the consent of the President, I have the honor herewith to enclose, in the same confidence in which the information was required, statements from the proper officers, which, it is presumed, will answer satisfactorily the inquiries contained in your letter of the fifth instant, relative to the present state of the army.

The regular troops reported at several of the most important maritime posts receive continual reinforcements from the recruits, and in calculating the force for this defence, the aid of the militia of the vicinity is relied on in cases of emergency. Sixteen hundred militia have marched for the defence of the northern frontier of the State of New York, and six companies of militia artillery have been detached for the works in the city and harbor of New York. Twelve hundred volunteers and militia have marched for Detroit; two companies have been ordered to Sandusky; and the six companies of rangers, authorized by law, to the frontiers of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Louisiana. The Governors of other States have been directed to furnish detachments of militia, on the requisitions of the Generals charged with the defence of the maritime frontier.

When the extent of country, the disadvantages under which the recruiting service was commenced, and the uncertainty which has prevailed in the public mind relative to the ulterior measures which would be adopted, are considered, the success which has attended this service will be found to have equalled any reasonable expectations.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Hon. JOSEPH ANDERSON, *Chairman*.INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *June 5*, 1812.

SIR:

You have been pleased to address to this office the following inquiries:

1. What is the amount of the force raised under the act, entitled "An act to raise an additional military force?"

2. Are the troops newly raised sufficiently equipped and disciplined to fit them for immediate service?

With relation to the first inquiry, I would state, that the recruiting instructions, which issued from this office on the 28th of March last, it was directed, that "the commanding officers of recruiting districts shall monthly make returns to the commanding officer of the department, who will make monthly returns to the Department of War."

No returns were made for the month of April, from any of the recruiting departments, except No. 5, including the States of New York and Connecticut; and the return from that department only exhibited the number of recruits in *three* of the *six* recruiting districts which it contains.

No return has yet been received from any of the recruiting departments for the month of May.

Some imperfect reports and estimates of the number of recruits, dated on various days in the month of May, have been received from *nine* of the *forty-eight* districts into which the United States and their territories were divided; but the information they contain is not sufficient whereon to found a probable conjecture of the whole amount of the force raised under the act aforesaid.

To your second inquiry I cannot directly reply, not having inspected the troops newly raised. Orders have issued for delivering arms to a part of them; and by communications, received at this office, it appears that seven thousand three hundred and ninety-seven suits of clothing, deficient in some articles, were issued at Philadelphia, and forwarded, during the months of April and May, for the recruits of the additional army.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH,  
*Acting Inspector General*.

Hon. WILLIAM EUSTIS.

*Return of the number of Troops in service on the Peace Establishment, and Additional Military Force of 1808; number on the Southern and Western frontier, and where stationed; number at Detroit, and on the march to that place; number in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina; number in the harbors of New York, Rhode Island, and Boston, and the number at Fort Mifflin; also, the number required for the defence of the harbor of New York.*

Number of troops in service on the Peace Establishment, and Additional Military force of 1808, including recruits,	6,744
Point Petre, St. Mary's river, Georgia,	194
Fort Hawkins, Georgia,	73
Fort Stoddart, Mississippi territory,	469
Fort St. Philip,	72
New Orleans and Fort St. John,	143
Pass Christian and Baton Rouge,	1,244
Natchitoches,	89
Fort Hampton and Highwassee,	169
Fort Massac,	36
Belle Fontaine,	134
Fort Osage,	63
Fort Madison,	44
Vincennes, and vicinity,	117
Michillimackinack,	88
Fort Dearborn,	53
Fort Wayne,	85
Detroit,	119
On the march to Detroit,	430
Harbor of Charleston, South Carolina,	175
Harbor of New York,	901
Harbor of Newport, Rhode Island,	193
Boston harbor,	131
Fort Mifflin,	65

It is computed that three thousand men are sufficient to man the works in the city and harbor of New York, exclusive of the works at the Narrows, and of the cannon on travelling carriages; and that seven hundred and fifty men are sufficient for the works in the harbor of Newport, Rhode Island.

The returns of recruits for May, with one or two exceptions, have not been received. The increase may be estimated at one thousand men.

From the first of January to the 30th of April, 1812, have been enlisted eleven hundred and twenty-five recruits.

INSPECTOR'S OFFICE, June 6, 1812.

A. Y. NICOLL,  
*Adjutant and Inspector.*

SENATE CHAMBER, June 8, 1812.

SIR:

The committee of the Senate, to whom was referred the confidential message of the President,\* have directed me to ask of you an explanation of the detailed report received from your office, signed by Mr. Nicoll, Adjutant and Inspector.

The return states the whole number of troops in service on the Peace Establishment, and additional military force of 1808, to be 6,744; the specification amounting to 5,087. It is desirable to know where the different number of 1,657 are stationed, and whether the 1,125 recruits, referred to as having been enlisted to April 30th, and the recruits since April, supposed to amount to 1,000 men, are both, or either, included in the aggregate first mentioned of 6,744 men; and whether the 1,000 men, supposed to be enlisted in the month of May, are exclusively for the Peace Establishment and additional military force of 1808. It would also be desirable to know, as far as you are able to form an opinion, from any *probable data* you are in possession of, or informal information, the number of recruits which you may have reason to suppose are at this time enlisted for the additional military force of 25,000.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 8, 1812.

SIR:

On considering again your letter of this morning, which was answered in haste, I perceive a desire on the part of the honorable committee, that an opinion should be expressed of the number of recruits, raised under the late act providing an additional military force; and although there are no official data on which to ground a correct opinion of their numbers, I have no hesitancy in giving an unofficial opinion, that they may be safely estimated at five thousand.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. JOSEPH ANDERSON.

WAR OFFICE, June 9, 1812.

SIR:

Letters received from Generals Dearborn and Bloomfield, by the mail of yesterday, confirm the opinion given of the number of recruits raised at this time. General Bloomfield, from the numbers which have already joined him, has considered it unnecessary to call into actual service the companies of militia artillery, which have been detached, and are in readiness to repair to the batteries in New York. General Dearborn reports the recruiting service as going on very well, and speaks of "completing" his corps much sooner than was expected.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Hon. JOSEPH ANDERSON.

\* For this message, see Foreign Relations, June 1, 1812.

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 113.

[1st Session.]

## OFFICERS OF VOLUNTEER CORPS TO BE COMMISSIONED BY THE UNITED STATES, AND PROVIDING FOR ADDITIONAL GENERAL AND STAFF OFFICERS AND ENGINEERS.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, JUNE 30, 1812.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

With a view the better to adapt to the public service the volunteer force contemplated by the act passed on the 6th day of February, I recommend to the consideration of Congress the expediency of making the requisite provision for the officers thereof being commissioned by the authority of the United States.

Considering the distribution of the military forces of the United States, required by the circumstances of our country, I recommend also to the consideration of Congress the expediency of providing for the appointment of an additional number of general officers, and of deputies in the Adjutant's, Quartermaster's, Inspectors, and Paymaster's departments of the army, and for the employment, in cases of emergency, of additional Engineers.

JAMES MADISON.

June 30th, 1812.

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 114.

[1st Session.]

## DEFENCE OF NEW CASTLE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, ON THE 30TH OF JUNE, 1812.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29th, 1812.

The Secretary of War, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of 26th instant, on the memorial of the citizens of New Castle, in the State of Delaware, has the honor respectfully to report:

That an extensive arsenal of brick has been erected at New Castle, in which four heavy cannon have been deposited, mounted on field carriages, and furnished with the necessary implements, calculated for such temporary batteries, or other defence, as the exigency of the moment might require. Orders have been given for supplying them with fixed ammunition, and preparing them in other respects for immediate service.

In the general arrangements for the defence of the sea coast, the town of New Castle will continue to receive the attention of the President.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 115.

[2d Session.]

## REFUSAL OF THE GOVERNORS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND CONNECTICUT TO FURNISH THEIR QUOTAS OF MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 6, 1812.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I transmit to Congress copies of the correspondence between the Department of War and the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut, referred to in my message\* of the fourth instant.

JAMES MADISON.

November 6, 1812.

[CIRCULAR.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 15, 1812.

SIR:

I am instructed by the President of the United States to call upon the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, their respective proportions of one hundred thousand militia, officers included, by virtue of an act of Congress, passed the 10th instant, entitled "An act to authorize a detachment from the militia of the United States."

This, therefore, is to require your Excellency to take effectual measures for having ten thousand of the militia of Massachusetts (being her quota) detached, and duly organized in companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions, within the shortest period that circumstances will permit, and, as nearly as possible, in the following proportions of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, viz: One-twentieth part of artillery, one-twentieth part of cavalry, and the residue infantry. There will, however, be no objection, on the part of the President of the United States, to the admission of a proportion of riflemen, duly organized in distinct corps, and not exceeding one-tenth part of the whole quota of the States, respectively. Each corps should be properly armed and equipped for actual service.

When the detachment and organization shall have been effected, the respective corps will be exercised under the officers set over them, but will not remain embodied, or be considered as in actual service, until, by subsequent orders, they shall be directed to take the field.

\* See Foreign Relations, No. 33.

Your Excellency will please to direct that correct muster rolls and inspection returns be made of the several corps, and that copies thereof be transmitted to this Department, as early as possible.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

W. EUSTIS.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR of *Massachusetts*.

[A similar letter was addressed to the Governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 12, 1812.*

SIR:

I am directed by the President to request your Excellency to order into the service of the United States, on the requisition of Major General Dearborn, such part of the quota of militia from the State of Massachusetts, detached conformably to the act of April 10th, 1812, as he may deem necessary for the defence of the sea coast.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. EUSTIS.

His Excellency CALEB STRONG, *Governor of Massachusetts.*

HEAD QUARTERS, BOSTON, *June 22d, 1812.*

SIR:

I have received instructions from the President of the United States to call on your Excellency for such part of the quota of militia from the State of Massachusetts, detached conformably to the act of Congress of April 10th, 1812, as I may deem necessary for the defence of the sea coast; and I now have the honor of requesting your Excellency to order fourteen companies of artillery, and twenty-seven companies of infantry, into the service of the United States, for the defence of the ports and harbors in this State, and the harbor of Newport.

The companies are intended for the following ports and harbors, viz: Passamaquoddy, one company of artillery, and four companies of infantry, with a full complement of officers, to be commanded by a major; Marblehead, Salem, Cape Ann, and Newburyport, two companies of artillery and two companies of infantry; Boston, four companies of artillery and eight companies of infantry, with one lieutenant colonel commandant and one major; and eight companies of infantry for the defence of Rhode Island.

Having received official information that war has been declared by Congress against Great Britain, your Excellency will perceive the expediency of giving facility to such measures as the crisis demands; and, as the defence of the sea coast of New England is, at present, confided to my direction, I shall, with confidence, rely on all the aid and support that the respective Governors can afford, and more especially on that of the Governor of the important State of Massachusetts; and I shall, at all times, receive, with the greatest pleasure, any advice or information that your Excellency may be pleased to communicate.

With respectful consideration, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

His Excellency CALEB STRONG, *Governor of Massachusetts.*

Omitted in the above.—Machias, one company of artillery; Penobscot, one company of artillery and two companies of infantry, to be commanded by a major; Wiscasset and Damariscotta, two companies of artillery, one each; Kennebunk, one company of artillery; Portland, two companies of artillery and three companies of infantry, to be commanded by a major.

BOSTON, *June 26, 1812.*

SIR:

Not having received any notice from your Excellency, or the Adjutant General, of what measures have been taken for calling into the service of the United States, for the defence of our sea coast, the companies of detached militia, proposed in a note I had the honor of addressing to your Excellency, on the 22d instant, a sense of duty compels me to solicit such information on the subject, as the urgency of the case demands; and I am persuaded that no unnecessary delay will disappoint my anxious desire for as early information as circumstances will admit.

With great respect, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

His Excellency CALEB STRONG, &c.

BOSTON, *June 26, 1812.*

SIR:

I have received your letter, of this day, in which you request information of the measures which have been taken for calling the militia into the service of the United States.

I find that Governor Gerry, on the 25th of April last, ordered that ten thousand men should be detached from the militia of this State; but, I am informed by the adjutant general, that the returns of those detachments have not come to hand, except in a very few instances.

I am, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

CALEB STRONG.

To Major General DEARBORN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 21st, 1812.*

SIR:

By information received from Major General Dearborn, it appears that the detachments from the militia of Massachusetts, for the defence of the maritime frontier, required by him under the authority of the President, by virtue of the act of the 10th of April, 1812, have not been marched to the several stations assigned them.

Inasmuch as longer delay may be followed with distress to a certain portion of our fellow-citizens, and with injurious consequences to our country, I am commanded, by the President, to inform your Excellency, that this arrangement of the militia was preparatory to the march of the regular troops to the Northern frontier. The exigencies of the service have required, and orders have accordingly been given to Major General Dearborn, to move the regular troops to that frontier, leaving a sufficient number to man the guns in the garrisons on the seaboard. The execution of this order increases, as your Excellency cannot fail to observe, the necessity of hastening the detached militia to their several posts, as assigned by General Dearborn, in which case, they will, of course, be considered in the actual service and pay of the United States.

The danger of invasion, which existed at the time of issuing the order of the President, increases, and I am specially directed by the President, to urge the consideration to your Excellency, as requiring the necessary order to be given for the immediate march of the several detachments specified by General Dearborn, to their respective posts.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. EUSTIS.

His Excellency CALEB STRONG, *Governor of Massachusetts.*

BOSTON, August 5, 1812.

SIR:

I received your letter of the 21st July, when at Northampton, and the next day came to Boston. The people of this State appear to be under no apprehension of an invasion; several towns, indeed, on the sea coast, soon after the declaration of war, applied to the Governor and Council for arms and ammunition, similar to the articles of that kind which had been delivered to them by the State, in the course of the last war; and, in some instances, they were supplied accordingly. But they expressed no desire that any part of the militia should be called out for their defence, and, in some cases, we were assured such a measure would be disagreeable to them.

You observe, in your last letter, that the danger of invasion which existed at the time of issuing the order of the President, increases. It would be difficult to infer, from this expression, that, in your opinion, that danger is now very considerable, as the President's order must have been issued before war was declared, your former letter being dated the 12th of June, and General Dearborn's, who was then at Boston, on the 22d of that month; besides, it can hardly be supposed that, if this State had been in great danger of invasion, the troops would have been called from hence to carry on offensive operations in a distant Province. However, as it was understood that the Governor of Nova Scotia had, by proclamation, forbid any incursions or depredations upon our territories, and as an opinion generally prevailed that the Governor had no authority to call the militia into actual service, unless one of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution exists, I thought it expedient to call the Council together, and, having laid before them your letter, and those I had received from General Dearborn, I requested their advice on the subject of them.

The Council advised, "that they are unable, from a view of the constitution of the United States, and the letters aforesaid, to perceive that any exigency exists, which can render it advisable to comply with the said requisition. But as, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, the Governor and Council have authority to require the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, it is advisable to request the opinion of the Supreme Court, upon the following questions:

1st. Whether the commanders in chief of the militia of the several States have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution of the United States exist, so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the President, to be commanded by him, pursuant to acts of Congress?

2d. Whether, when either of the exigencies exist, authorizing the employing of the militia in the service of the United States, the militia thus employed can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the President of the United States?"

I enclose a copy of the answers given by the judges to these questions. Since the Council were called, a person deputed by the towns of Eastport and Robinston, on our Eastern boundary, at Passamaquoddy, applied to me, representing that they had no apprehensions of invasion by an authorized British force, but that there were many lawless people on the borders from whom they were in danger of predatory incursions, and requesting that they might be furnished with some arms and ammunition, and that three companies of militia might be called out for their protection. The Council advised that they should be supplied with such arms and ammunition as were necessary for their present defence, which has been ordered. They also advised me to call into the service of the United States three companies of the detached militia, for the purposes above mentioned. I have this day issued an order for calling out three companies of the detached militia, to be marched, forthwith, to Passamaquoddy, and to be commanded by a major. Two of the companies will be stationed at Eastport, and one company at Robinston, until the President shall otherwise direct.

I have no intention officiously to interfere in the measures of the General Government, but if the President was fully acquainted with the situation of this State, I think he would have no wish to call our militia into service in the manner proposed by General Dearborn.

It is well known that the enemy will find it difficult to spare troops sufficient for the defence of their own territory, and predatory incursions are not likely to take place in this State: for, at every point, except Passamaquoddy, which can present no object to those incursions, the people are too numerous to be attacked by such parties as generally engage in expeditions of that kind.

General Dearborn proposed that the detached militia should be stationed at only a few of the ports and places on the coast; from the rest, a part of their militia were to be called away. This circumstance would increase their danger; it would invite the aggressions of the enemy, and diminish their power of resistance.

The whole coast of Cape Cod is exposed, as much as any part of the State, to depredations; part of the militia must, according to this detaching order, be marched from their homes; and yet, no place in the old colony of Plymouth is assigned to be the rendezvous of any of the detached militia.

Every harbor or port within the State has a compact settlement, and, generally, the country around the harbors is populous. The places contemplated in General Dearborn's specification, as the rendezvous of the detached militia, excepting in one or two instances, contain more of the militia than the portion of the detached militia assigned to them. The militia are well organized, and would undoubtedly prefer to defend their firesides, in company with their friends, under their own officers, rather than to be marched to some distant place, while strangers might be introduced to take their places at home.

In Boston, the militia are well disciplined, and could be mustered in an hour upon any signal of an approaching enemy, and in six hours the neighboring towns would pour in a greater force than any invading enemy will bring against it.

The same remark applies to Salem, Marblehead, and Newburyport, places whose harbors render an invasion next to impossible. In all of them, there are, in addition to the common militia, independent corps of infantry and artillery, well disciplined and equipped, and ready, both in disposition and means, to repair to any place where invasion may be threatened, and able to repel it, except it should be made by a fleet of heavy ships, against which nothing perhaps but strong fortifications, garrisoned by regular troops, would prove any defence, until the enemy should land, when the entire militia would be prepared to meet them.

Kennebunk is unassailable by any thing but boats, which the numerous armed population is competent to resist. Portland has a militia, and independent corps, sufficiently numerous for its defence; and the same is the case with Wiscasset and Castine.

Against predatory incursions, the militia of each place would be able to defend their property, and, in a very short time, they would be aided, if necessary, by the militia of the surrounding country. In case of a more serious invasion, whole brigades or divisions could be collected, seasonably, for defence. Indeed, considering the state of the militia in this Commonwealth, I think there can be no doubt that, detaching a part of it, and distributing it into small portions, will tend to impair the defensive power.

I have thus freely expressed to you my own sentiments, and, so far as I have heard, they are the sentiments of the best informed men. I am fully disposed to afford all the aid to the measures of the National Government which the constitution requires of me; but I presume it will not be expected, or desired, that I shall fail in the duty which I owe to the people of this State, who have confided their interests to my care.

I am, sir, with respect, your most obedient and humble servant,

CALEB STRONG.

Hon. W. EUSTIS, Secretary of War.

*To his Excellency the Governor and the Honorable the Council of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.*

The undersigned, Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, have considered the questions proposed by your Excellency and Honors for their opinion:

By the constitution of this State, the authority of commanding the militia of the Commonwealth is vested exclusively in the Governor, who has all the powers incident to the office of Commander-in-chief, and is to exercise them personally, or by subordinate officers under his command, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution and the laws of the land.

While the Governor of the Commonwealth remained in the exercise of these powers, the Federal constitution was ratified, by which was vested in the Congress a power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and to provide for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers.

The Federal constitution further provides that the President shall be Commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

On the construction of the Federal and State constitutions must depend the answers to the several questions proposed. As the militia of the several States may be employed in the service of the United States, for the three specific purposes of executing the laws of the Union, of suppressing insurrections, and of repelling invasions, the opinion of the Judges is requested whether the Commanders-in-Chief of the militia of the several States have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies aforesaid exist, so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the President, to be commanded by him pursuant to acts of Congress.

It is the opinion of the undersigned that this right is vested in the Commanders-in-chief of the militia of the several States.

The Federal constitution provides that, whenever either of these exigencies exist, the militia may be employed, pursuant to some act of Congress, in the service of the United States; but no power is given either to the President, or to the Congress, to determine that either of the said exigencies do in fact exist. As this power is not delegated to the United States, by the Federal constitution, nor prohibited by it, to the States, it is reserved to the States, respectively; and, from the nature of the power, it must be exercised by those with whom the States have, respectively, entrusted the chief command of the militia.

It is the duty of these commanders to execute this important trust agreeably to the laws of their several States, respectively, without reference to the laws, or officers, of the United States, in all cases except those specially provided in the Federal constitution. They must, therefore, determine when either of the special cases exist, obliging them to relinquish the execution of this trust, and to render themselves, and the militia, subject to the command of the President. A different construction, giving to Congress the right to determine when these special cases exist, authorizing them to call forth the whole of the militia, and taking them from the Commanders-in-chief of the several States, and subjecting them to the command of the President, would place all the militia, in effect, at the will of Congress, and produce a military consolidation of the States, without any constitutional remedy, against the intentions of the people when ratifying the constitution. Indeed, since passing the act of Congress, of February 28th, 1795, c. 101, vesting in the President the power of calling forth the militia, when the exigencies mentioned in the constitution shall exist, if the President has the power of determining when those exigencies exist, the militia of the several States is in effect at his command and subject to his control.

No inconveniences can reasonably be presumed to result from the construction, which vests in the Commanders-in-chief of the militia of the several States, the right of determining when the exigencies exist, obliging them to place the militia in the service of the United States. These exigencies are of such a nature, that the existence of them can be easily ascertained by, or made known to, the Commander-in-chief of the militia, and when ascertained, the public interest will produce prompt obedience to the acts of Congress.

Another question proposed to the consideration of the Judges, is, Whether, when either of the exigencies exist authorizing the employing of the militia in the service of the United States, the militia thus employed can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the President of the United States?

The Federal constitution declares that the President shall be Commander-in-chief of the army of the United States. He may undoubtedly exercise this command by officers of the army of the United States, by him commissioned according to law. The President is also declared to be the Commander-in-chief of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. The officers of the militia are to be appointed by the States, and the President may exercise his command of the militia by officers of the militia duly appointed.

But we know of no constitutional provision authorizing any officer of the army of the United States to command the militia, or authorizing any officer of the militia to command the army of the United States. The Congress may provide laws for the government of the militia, when in actual service, but to extend this power to the placing them under the command of an officer not of the militia, except the President, would render nugatory the provision, that the militia are to have officers appointed by the States.

The union of the militia in the actual service of the United States with troops of the United States, so far as to form one army, seems to be a case not provided for, or contemplated, in the constitution. It is, therefore, not within our department to determine on whom the command would devolve, on such an emergency, in the absence of the President; whether one officer, either of the militia, or of the army of the United States, to be settled according to military rank, should command the whole; whether the corps must be commanded by their respective officers, acting in concert as allied forces; or what other expedient should be adopted, are questions to be answered by others.

The undersigned regret that the distance of the other Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court renders it impracticable to obtain their opinions, seasonably, upon the questions submitted.

THEOPHILUS PARSONS,  
SAMUEL SEWALL,  
ISAAC PARKER.

Boston, August 21, 1812.

SIR:

I mentioned in my letter to you of the 5th of August, that I had that day issued an order for calling out three companies of the detached militia, to be marched immediately to Passamaquoddy, for the defence of that frontier, and to be commanded by a major. In my instructions to Major General Sewall, to be communicated to the major to be designated by him, I directed that two of the companies should be stationed at Eastport, and one company at Robinston, until the President should direct otherwise, unless, in the mean time, the major, with the advice of Brigadier General Brewer, who lives at Robinston, and to whom I wrote on the subject, should think a different disposition of the companies would be more advantageous.

I have this day received a letter from General Sewall, dated the 17th instant, in which he says that he had designated the detached company in the neighborhood of Eastport, under the command of Captain Thomas Vose, Junior, of Robinston. The detached company in the interior neighborhood of Penobscot river, under the command of Captain Joshua Chamberlain, of Orrington, and the detached company in the same neighborhood, under the command of Captain Thomas George, of Brewer, to form a battalion, to be commanded by Major Nathan Low, of Deer Isle, and directed them to march immediately to Eastport, and that they would probably march the next day. I shall immediately write to Major Low, and direct him to conform to the above instructions, in disposing of the companies, until the President of the United States shall otherwise direct.

I am, sir, with respect, your most obedient servant,

CALEB STRONG.

Honorable WILLIAM EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*



NORTHAMPTON, *September 10, 1812.*

SIR:

I received this morning a letter from Major General Sewall, dated the first of this month, in which he mentioned that the detached troops, from the neighborhood of Penobscot, had marched to Eastport, five or six days before that time, with their adjutant and quartermaster, but that Major Low, who was appointed to command them, had been released from that service, on account of bodily infirmity, and that Major Jacob Ulmer, of Lincolnville, was appointed in his room, and had been notified to proceed immediately to Eastport.

General Sewall observes that application had been made to him for the appointment of a commissary and surgeon, for the post at Eastport, and if those appointments, or either of them, are thought necessary, he proposes Mr. Chevy, an officer of the artillery, for the former, and Doctor Bastow, a surgeon in the militia, for the latter, both inhabitants of Eastport.

I am, sir, with sentiments of respect, your most obedient servant,

CALEB STRONG.

Honorable WILLIAM EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*LYME, *20th April, 1812.*

SIR:

I had the honor this morning to receive your letter of the 15th instant, containing the directions of the President of the United States for detaching three thousand of the militia of this State, agreeably to the provisions of the act of Congress of the 10th instant. The act itself has not been received, and it will be very satisfactory to me to receive a copy of it, by the next mail, from your Department. In the mean time, every preparation will be made for detaching the officers and men, agreeably to the directions already received.

I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

ROGER GRISWOLD.

Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 12, 1812.*

SIR:

I am directed by the President to request your Excellency to order into the service of the United States, on the requisition of Major General Dearborn, such part of the quota of militia from the State of Connecticut, detached conformably to the act of April 10th, 1812, as he may deem necessary for the defence of the sea coast.

I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

W. EUSTIS.

His Excellency ROGER GRISWOLD, *Governor of Connecticut.*LYME, *17th June, 1812.*

SIR:

I have had the honor this afternoon to receive your letter of the 12th instant, communicating to me the request of the President that I would order into the service of the United States, on the requisition of Major General Dearborn, such part of the quota of militia from the State of Connecticut, detached conformably to the act of Congress of April 10th, 1812, as he may deem necessary for the defence of the sea coast.

In obedience to which request, I shall, on the requisition of General Dearborn, execute, without delay, the request of the President.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

ROGER GRISWOLD.

Honorable Wm. EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*SHARON, CONNECTICUT, *July 2, 1812.*

SIR:

His Excellency Governor Griswold has received from Major General Henry Dearborn a letter, under date of the 22d of last month, requesting that five companies of the militia of this State, detached conformably to the act of Congress of April 10, 1812, may be ordered into the service of the United States, to wit: "Two companies of artillery, and two companies of infantry, to be placed under the command of the commanding officer at Fort Trumbull, near New London, and one company of artillery, to be stationed at the battery at the entrance of the harbor of New Haven."

Impressed with the deep importance of the requisition, and the serious consideration it involves, his Excellency deemed it expedient to convene the Council at Hartford, on Monday the 29th ultimo. He has taken their advice upon this interesting subject, and has formed his own deliberate opinion; but, as he is under the necessity of leaving the State, on a journey for the recovery of his health, it becomes my duty, as Lieutenant Governor, to communicate to you the result.

The assurance contained in the Governor's letter of the 17th of June last, in answer to your's of the 12th of the same month, was necessarily given in full confidence that no demand would be made through General Dearborn, but in strict conformity to the constitution and laws of the United States. His Excellency regrets to perceive that the present requisition is supported by neither.

The constitution of the United States has ordained that Congress may provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

Accordingly, the acts of Congress of February, 1795, and of April, 1812, do provide for calling forth the militia in the exigencies above mentioned. The Governor is not informed of any declaration made by the President of the United States, or of notice by him given, that the militia are required "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions." As, therefore, none of the contingencies enumerated in the constitution, and recognised by the laws, are shown to have taken place, his Excellency considers that, under existing circumstances, no portion of the militia of this State can be withdrawn from his authority. Farther, if the call had been justified by either of the constitutional exigencies already recited, still, in the view of his Excellency, an insuperable objection presents itself against placing the men under the immediate command of an officer or officers of the army of the United States.

The appointment of the officers of the militia is by the constitution expressly reserved "to the States respectively." In the event of their being called into the actual service of the United States, in the cases above specified, the laws of the United States provide for their being called forth as militia, furnished with proper officers by the State. And, sir, it will not escape your notice, that the detachment from the militia of this State, under the act of Congress of the 10th of April last, is regularly organized into a division, consisting of brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, and supplied according to law with all the necessary officers. His Excellency conceives, then, that an order to detach a number of companies sufficient for the command of a battalion officer, and place them under the command of an officer of the United States, cannot, with propriety, be executed, unless he were also prepared to admit that the privates may be separated from their company officers, and transferred into the army of the United States; thus leaving the officers of the militia without any command, except in name; and in effect impairing, if not annihilating, the militia itself, so sacredly guaranteed by the constitution to the several States. Under these impressions, the Governor has thought proper, by and with the advice of the Council, to refuse a compliance with the requisition of Major General Dearborn.

His Excellency is sincerely disposed to comply promptly with all the constitutional requests of the National Executive—a disposition which has ever been manifested by the Government of this State; and he laments the occa-

sion which thus compels him to yield obedience to the paramount authority of the constitution and laws. He trusts the General Government will speedily provide an adequate force for the security and protection of the sea coast. In the mean time, his Excellency has issued the necessary orders to the general officers commanding the militia in that quarter to be in readiness to repel any invasion which may be attempted upon that portion of the State, and to co-operate with such part of the national forces as shall be employed for the same purpose.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN COTTON SMITH.

To the Honorable Wm. EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 14, 1812.*

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the third instant.

The absence of his Excellency Governor Griswold, on account of ill health, is seriously to be regretted, particularly at this important crisis, when his prompt assurances of obeying the requisition of the President, to call into the service of the United States such detachments of militia as might be required, conformably to the act of April 10, 1812, through General Dearborn, are intercepted and suspended by your Honor.

The reasons assigned for refusing to execute the engagements of his Excellency Governor Griswold appear not less extraordinary than the act itself.

After a declaration of war, against a nation possessed of a powerful and numerous fleet, a part of which were actually on our coast, had been promulgated, and officially communicated to the Executive of the State, the assertion made by your Honor, "that the Governor is not informed that the United States are in imminent danger of invasion," was not to have been expected. To remove all doubts from your mind on this subject, I am instructed by the President to state to you, that such danger actually exists; and to request that the requisition of General Dearborn, made by his special authority, for calling into the service of the United States certain detachments of militia from the State of Connecticut, be forthwith carried into effect.

The right of the State to officer the militia is clearly recognized in the requisition of General Dearborn. The detachments, when marched to the several posts assigned them, with their proper officers, appointed conformably to the laws of the State, will command, or be commanded, according to the rules and articles of war and the usages of service.

Very respectfully, &c.

W. EUSTIS.

His Honor Jno. C. SMITH, *Governor of Connecticut.*

LXME, *August 13, 1812.*

SIR:

His Honor Governor Smith has put into my hands your letter of the 14th of July, and it is with surprise I notice the construction you have put on my letter of the 17th of June. The unusual and exceptionable terms, also, in which your letter is expressed, have not escaped notice. But a regard to the propriety of my own conduct will not allow me to descend to any comments upon its particular expressions, but leave me to perform my duty to the General Government, by giving the explanation which appears proper.

When you communicated the request of the President, that any future requisition from General Dearborn, for a part of the draughted militia, might be complied with, it remained uncertain whether such a requirement would be made, or, if made, under what circumstances it might take place.

Confident, however, that the President would authorize no requisition which was not strictly constitutional, and particularly that the order would not exceed the conditions of the act of the 10th of April, to which you had referred, I had no hesitation in giving general assurance, that the requisitions which the President might make through General Dearborn would be complied with. I then thought, as I do still, that decency, and a due respect to the first Magistrate of the Union, required that my assurance should be general, and no expression should be used which might imply a suspicion that the President would violate the constitution in his orders. I also expected that this early and general declaration would be considered as evidence of a disposition, which has been uniformly felt in this State, to execute every constitutional requisition from the General Government.

In what light, however, my expressions have been viewed, I trust there will be no future misconception, when I assure you, that I neither intended, or expected, to be understood, by the general language of my letter, or any expression it contained, to give the smallest assurance that I would execute any order which I judged repugnant to the constitution, from whatever source it might emanate.

The light in which I have viewed the order from General Dearborn has been already communicated by Governor Smith, and it is only proper to add, that my opinion has not changed, but is confirmed by the unanimous opinions of the Council of the State.

The new light in which you have presented the subject, in your letter to Governor Smith, has received every attention, but still my opinion remains the same. The war, which has commenced, and the cruising of a hostile fleet on our coast, is not invasion; and the declaration of the President, that there is imminent danger of invasion, is evidently a consequence drawn from the facts now disclosed, and is not, in my opinion, warranted by those facts. If such consequences were admitted to result from a declaration of war with an European Power, it would follow, that every war of that character would throw the militia into the hands of the National Government, and strip the States of the important right reserved to them. In addition to the foregoing facts, it is proper for me further to observe, that I have found it difficult to fix in my mind the meaning of the words "*imminent danger of invasion*," used by Congress in the act of the 28th of February, 1795, and now repeated in your letter, as no such expression is contained in that part of the constitution which authorizes the President to call the militia into service. Presuming, however, that some definite meaning, thought consistent with the constitution, was at the time annexed to the expression, I have rather inferred that the Legislature must have intended only to include an extreme case, where an enemy had not passed the line of the United States, but were evidently advancing in force to invade our country. Such a case would undoubtedly come within the spirit of the constitution, although it might not be, included in its literal expression.

But whether the Congress, in 1795, were justified in the expression or not, is unimportant, there being no difficulty in the present case, as none of the facts disclosed furnish any thing more than a slight danger of invasion, which the constitution could not contemplate, and which might exist even in times of peace.

Whilst I regret this difference of opinion, on a question of such importance, I do not doubt that the President will do me the justice to believe, that a sense of duty leaves me no other course to pursue, and that every means for the defence of the State will be speedily provided for.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient and humble servant,

ROGER GRISWOLD.

Honorable WILLIAM EUSTIS, &c.

[12th CONGRESS.]

No. 116.

[2d SESSION.]

## ARMS PROVIDED FOR, AND ISSUED TO, THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 24, 1812.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 18, 1812.*

SIR:

In obedience to a resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives of the 7th instant, I have the honor to state, that, of the annual appropriation of two hundred thousand dollars for arming the whole body of militia, conformably to the act of April 23, 1808, four hundred and eighty-three thousand dollars have been drawn from the treasury on that account. The enclosed statement from the commissary general, marked A, exhibits the contracts which have been made by the late purveyor of public supplies with sundry manufacturers, for eighty-five thousand stands of arms. On those contracts, ninety-four thousand seven hundred and ninety-two dollars have been advanced, and thirty-one thousand six hundred and forty stands of arms have been delivered to the United States. In addition to those contracts, an agreement was entered into by this Department on the 18th of July last, with Eli Whitney, of New Haven, Connecticut, to manufacture and deliver fifteen thousand stands of arms, in a proportion of not less than fifteen hundred annually. On this contract, five thousand dollars have been advanced. It will also appear by the statement A, that twelve thousand two hundred and fifty stands of arms have been sold to the States of Georgia, Maryland, and Delaware.

Statement B exhibits the number of arms and equipments which have been issued under the act of April 23d, 1808, for arming the whole body of militia. These issues have been made within the last year, and to those States and territories whose exposed situation appeared to require immediate supplies.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

The Hon. the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the U. S.

A.

*Return of Muskets delivered under contracts made for the War Department by the late Purveyor, from the month of May, 1809, to the 7th October, 1812, viz:*

DATE OF CONTRACTS.	CONTRACTORS' NAMES.	FROM WHAT STATE.	Duration of Contracts.	Number of stands contracted for.	Advances made on contracts.	TO WHOM DELIVERED.	Muskets delivered to Sept. 30, 1809, inclusive.	Muskets delivered to Sept. 30, 1810, inclusive.	Muskets delivered to Sept. 30, 1811, inclusive.	Muskets delivered to October 7, 1812, inclusive.	Total amount delivered.	Number of stands due by each contractor on the 7th October, 1812.
June 30, 1808,	W. & I. I. Henry,	Pennsylvania,	5 years,	10,000	\$10,750	George Ingels,						
July 13, "	Goetz & Westphall,	Do.	do.	2,500	1,000	Do.	573	1,600	1,225	848	4,246	5,754
20, "	John Miles,	New Jersey,	do.	9,200	no advance	Do.	113	406	400	100	1,019	1,481
September 8, "	Winner, Nippes & Co.	Pennsylvania,	do.	9,000	7,000	Do.	213	438	967	789	2,407	6,793
" 14, "	Waters & Whitmore,	Massachusetts,	do.	5,000	9,375	Do.	1,000	1,700	800	400	3,900	5,100
October 13, "	Ethan Stillman,	Connecticut,	do.	2,500	3,200	Jacob Eustis,		1,200	1,000	800	3,000	2,000
" 20, "	Daniel Gilbert,	Massachusetts,	do.	5,000	8,000	William Lyon,			75	325	425	825
" 21, "	French, Blake, & Kinsley,	Do.	do.	4,000	6,000	Do.				550	325	875
" 25, "	I. & C. C. Barstow,	New Hampshire,	do.	2,500	5,375	Jacob Eustis,		500	1,050	625	2,175	1,825
" 29, "	Wheeler & Morrison,	Virginia,	do.	2,500	3,487	Capt. Walbeck,		275	650	700	1,625	875
" 31, "	Oliver Bidwell,	Connecticut,	do.	4,000	4,300	Do.			125	125	125	2,375
" 29, "	O. & E. Evans,	Pennsylvania,	do.	4,000	2,500	William Lyon,		125	350	275	750	3,250
" 31, "	Stephen Jenks & Sons,	Rhode Island,	do.	4,000	5,800	George Ingels,	274	601	634	451	1,960	2,040
" 1, "	R. & C. Leonard,	Massachusetts,	do.	5,000	9,875	James House,		325	1,000	975	2,300	1,700
" 9, "	A. & P. Bartlett,	Do.	do.	2,500	2,687	Jacob Eustis,		200	1,125	800	2,125	2,875
" 13, 1810,	Rufus Perkins,	Do.	do.	2,500	2,687	James Byers,		475	950	75	1,500	1,000
" 1, "	I. I. & N. Brooke,	Pennsylvania,	do.	4,000	4,000	Jacob Eustis,		100	100		200	2,300
" 9, "	W. & H. Shannon,	Do.	do.	4,000	2,200	George Ingels,		605	472	180	1,257	2,743
" 13, 1810,	Sweet, Jenks, & Sons,	Rhode Island,	do.	3,000	6,450	Do.	198	504	351	48	1,101	2,899
				85,200	\$94,792	James House,					250	2,750
							2,371	9,129	12,074	7,816	31,640	53,560

*Stands of Arms sold to the following States.*

May 3, 1808,	State of Georgia,											
May 16, 1809,	State of Maryland,										4,000	
August 4, 1810,	do.										4,000	
October 1, 1811,	do.										1,200	
June 10, 1812,	do.										1,200	
August 5, "	State of Delaware,										1,200	
September 1, "	do.										150	
											500	
											12,250	

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, December 12, 1812.

CALLENDER IRVINE, Commissary General.

## B.

Statement of Arms issued and loaned to the Militia of the several States and Territories.

Issued conformably to the law of April 23, 1803.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Stands of Arms.	Rifles.	Pistols.	Swords and Belts.	Equipments for Muskets.	REMARKS.
New Hampshire, - - -	1,000					
Vermont, - - - - -	2,500					
Rhode Island, - - -	1,000					
New Jersey, - - - -	1,000					
Delaware, - - - - -	500				500	
North Carolina, - -	2,130					
South Carolina, - -	2,000				2,000	
Georgia, - - - - -	1,000					
Ohio, - - - - -	1,500					
Kentucky, - - - - -	1,500					
Tennessee, - - - -	1,500					
Illinois Territory, -	216		45		216	
Indiana Territory, -		41	120	120		
Louisiana Territory, -	250		75	150		
Total, - - - - -	16,096	41	240	270	2,716	

## LOANED.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Stands of Arms.	Equipments for Muskets.	Camp Equipage,	REMARKS.
Rhode Island, - - -	250	150	-	Delivered to two volunteer companies. At Wilmington, New Castle, and Lewistown. Delivered to Major General Wadsworth. The militia and volunteers under General Hull.
Delaware, - - - - -	650	650	-	
Ohio, - - - - -	1,500	1,500	1,500	
Do. - - - - -	2,000	2,000	-	
District of Columbia, -	2,200			
Total, - - - - -	8,100	6,900	1,500	

12th CONGRESS.]

No. 117.

[2d Session.

## ADDITIONAL GENERAL OFFICERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 12, 1813.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON CITY, 23d December, 1812.

SIR:

Before I reply to your question, "how many major generals and brigadiers are necessary for an army of thirty five thousand men?" it may not be amiss to state what is believed to have been the proportion of officers of these grades in the Revolutionary army, and what is understood to be the proportion, at this time, in European armies.

In the first army of the Revolution, raised in 1775, we had a commander-in-chief, four major generals, and eight brigadiers. In 1776, five brigadiers were promoted to the rank of major generals, and twenty-three brigadiers appointed. In 1777, six brigadiers were promoted to the rank of major generals, and three major generals and eighteen brigadiers appointed.

The loss of papers in the War Office, by fire, in 1800, renders it impossible to say, with precision, at what particular periods many of these general officers left the service, but it is within my recollection that, on the 28th of June, 1778, fourteen major generals, and sixteen brigadiers, were actually in service of the United States. Yet, by referring to the official letters of General Washington, in 1778, and 1779, it will be seen that a further increase of general officers was often and warmly recommended.

The main army, under the immediate command of General Washington, it is believed, never amounted to thirty five thousand men, and it is by no means certain that this number was ever in service at one and the same time, in the whole of what was designated "the continental army." Yet, at no period, between the first of May, 1777, and the close of the war, had we less than thirty general officers in service.

It was deemed necessary, in the Revolution, and it is understood to be the general practice in Europe, at this time, to have at least one brigadier-general for every two thousand men, and one major general for every four thousand.

In this country we have never had a grade between the commander-in-chief and that of major general; hence it was found necessary, in the "continental army," to give to the senior major general the command of the right wing, and, to the next in rank, that of the left, which, from the limited number of general officers, often left a division to a brigadier, a brigade to a colonel, and a regiment to a subordinate field officer; but, in Europe, this difficulty is obviated by the appointment of general officers of higher grades.

From the best information I have been able to obtain on this subject, I have no hesitation in saying that eight major generals, and sixteen brigadiers, to command the divisions and brigades of an army of thirty-five thousand men, is the lowest estimate which the uniform practice of France, Russia, and England, will warrant, and that this is much below the proportion of officers of these grades actually employed in the army of the Revolution.

As you have not required my opinion whether it be necessary to have a higher grade than that of major general, I have not deemed it proper to touch this subject, and have confined myself to the number of major generals, and brigadiers, deemed necessary to command the divisions and brigades of an army of thirty-five thousand men. It may not, however, be improper to remark, that, if it is intended to have no higher grade than that of major general, their number should be increased to eleven; so as to give one for the chief command, one for each wing, and one for each division of four thousand men.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. H. CUSHING, *Adjutant General.*

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 10th, 1813.*

SIR:

In reply to the letter you did me the honor to write to me, on the 5th instant, by direction of the Committee on Military Affairs, I respectfully submit the following opinions:

1st. That an increased number of general officers is essential to the public service. The number of regiments provided for by law, is, two of light dragoons, three of heavy artillery, one of light artillery, one of riflemen, and forty-five of infantry, making, together, fifty-two regiments.

The simplest organization is ever the best. Hence it is, that, as a regiment consists of two battalions, so a brigade should consist of two regiments, and a division of two brigades.

This sphere of command will be found, in practice, sufficiently large. The management of two thousand men in the field, will be ample duty for a brigadier, and the direction of double that number will give full occupation to a major general. To enlarge the sphere of command in either grade would not be a mean of best promoting the public good.

Taking these ideas as the basis of the rule, and taking for granted, also, that our ranks are filled, the present establishment would require twenty-five brigadiers and twelve major generals. But the latter admission requires qualification, and, under existing circumstances, it may be sufficient that the higher staff should consist of eight major generals, and sixteen brigadiers.

The general argument, on this head, might be fortified by our own practice during the war of the Revolution, and by that of European nations at all times. Believing, however, that this view of the subject has been already taken by the adjutant general, in a late communication to you, I forbear to do more than suggest it.

2d. The recruiting service would be much promoted, were the bounty in land commutable into money, at the option of the soldier, and at the end of his service. This modification would be addressed to both descriptions of men—those who would prefer money, and such as would prefer land.

I need hardly remark, that bounties, at the close of service, have many advantages over those given before service begins. The former tie men down to their duty; the latter furnish, if not the motive, at least the means of debauch and desertion.

Another, and a public reason, for the preference, may be found in the greater convenience with which money may be paid at the end, than at the commencement of a war.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Honorable DAVID R. WILLIAMS,  
*Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs.*

[18th CONGRESS.]

No. 118.

[2d SESSION.]

### THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 13, 1813.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I lay before Congress a statement of the militia of the United States, according to the latest returns received by the Department of War.

JAMES MADISON.

*February 13, 1813.*

Return of the Militia of the United States.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Date of the Return.	GENERAL OFFICERS AND STAFF.							REGIMENTAL STAFF.								INFANTRY.							
		Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Gen'ls.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-camp.	Brigade Inspectors.	Brigade Quarterm'rs.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum & Fife Majors.	Chaplains.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants and Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.
New Hampshire, -	1812	3	6	1	1	6	6	6	37	37	-	37	34	37	35	71	-	34	74	297	586	1,107	716	18,301
Massachusetts, -	1812	13	25	1	1	26	26	24	137	135	-	99	91	85	157	82	94	186	836	1,787	3,503	1,984	55,158	
Vermont, -	1809	4	10	-	1	9	7	-	34	34	-	33	32	29	57	-	33	64	285	572	1,063	739	15,543	
Rhode Island, -	1811	1	4	1	1	6	4	4	10	11	6	9	2	11	8	18	14	16	70	140	413	137	3,204	
Connecticut, -	1812	4	8	-	1	-	-	-	42	43	-	42	43	31	41	37	69	39	43	80	363	745	1,453	1,024
New York, -	1812	14	45	3	3	33	45	32	172	168	154	146	107	146	-	276	6	149	309	1,341	2,542	6,135	3,178	
New Jersey, -	1811	4	13	1	1	8	12	12	44	45	77	30	24	25	-	50	-	48	99	388	723	1,386	492	
Pennsylvania, -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$94,723
Delaware, -	1810	1	3	1	1	5	2	-	9	8	8	9	8	6	-	20	-	10	19	75	148	288	86	6,475
Maryland, -	1811	3	12	1	1	6	12	-	42	33	-	40	33	-	-	-	40	82	47	571	1,633	448	28,123	
Virginia, -	1811	4	19	-	1	8	19	4	109	97	12	101	72	63	26	113	112	213	1,017	1,996	3,933	863	60,248	
North Carolina, -	1812	-	15	-	-	14	-	-	52	29	31	31	13	17	11	48	69	140	745	1,499	2,540	1,170	42,944	
South Carolina, -	1811	1	9	1	1	21	9	9	43	37	32	27	1	13	-	17	47	74	409	827	1,309	497	25,194	
Georgia, -	1810	4	9	1	1	17	9	9	35	27	22	29	32	19	8	9	34	82	365	626	1,339	53	21,070	
Kentucky, -	1811	9	20	-	1	13	17	13	77	59	71	47	21	44	6	100	8	163	628	1,179	2,498	487	35,483	
Tennessee, -	1812	2	8	-	1	6	-	-	40	1	-	3	1	-	3	28	44	86	446	763	915	495	25,910	
Ohio, -	1811	4	17	1	4	8	16	17	51	51	51	46	38	48	44	87	57	111	459	896	1,848	589	27,104	
Louisiana,* -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	23	29	16	10	2,088
District of Columbia, -	1812	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	7	1	-	-	-	-	12	16	69	139	292	40	4,372	
Mississippi Territory, -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	7	-	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indiana Territory, -	1811	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	3	-	-	-	3	3	4	-	8	16	63	126	193	23	3,630
Illinois Territory, †	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missouri Territory, ‡	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\* No return.  
† No return.

‡ No return.  
§ Including officers.

RETURN OF MILITIA—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Date of the Return.	ARTILLERY.						DRAGOONS.						RIFLEMEN.						Total non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, & Rank and File.	AGGREGATE.					
		Lieutenant Colonel Commandants.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Lieutenant Colonel Commandants.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.			Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.		
New Hampshire, -	1812	-	-	27	54	108	54	710	-	-	33	65	31	123	65	1,776	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,993	24,405
Massachusetts, -	1812	4	22	64	132	258	145	2,564	-	17	60	129	67	275	64	2,169	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66,459	70,530
Vermont, -	1809	-	-	10	23	35	27	303	5	-	28	56	27	105	31	1,035	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19,006	20,273
Rhode Island, -	1811	-	-	1	2	10	3	30	2	1	1	2	2	4	3	80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,911	4,211
Connecticut, -	1812	-	-	16	37	76	48	565	-	-	31	62	31	124	50	1,061	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,645	21,666
New York, -	1812	8	16	58	102	208	186	3,251	9	21	73	143	71	297	92	3,191	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92,836	98,606
New Jersey, -	1811	-	-	17	30	52	20	668	-	-	33	57	31	93	27	1,350	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32,191	33,891
Pennsylvania, -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$246	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,759	1	1	1	1	-	-	40	-	2,686	99,414
Delaware, -	1810	-	-	2	4	7	4	81	-	-	4	8	4	12	3	116	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	7,119	7,451
Maryland, -	1811	-	-	12	29	36	6	403	-	1	32	62	32	106	18	1,135	1	1	1	4	2	-	-	-	31,908	32,189
Virginia, -	1811	5	37	66	133	44	1,720	4	8	86	168	82	291	32	4,194	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71,640	75,730
North Carolina, -	1812	1	1	2	5	10	4	120	13	24	46	70	42	108	29	1,150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48,123	50,992
South Carolina, -	1811	-	-	20	37	70	24	914	-	-	45	92	42	99	17	1,587	12	12	12	44	20	3,104	-	-	32,909	33,729
Georgia, -	1810	-	-	4	8	12	8	117	4	7	22	22	22	71	7	625	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24,338	25,729
Kentucky, -	1811	-	-	1	-	-	-	53	1	14	28	13	35	12	539	44	42	43	169	33	2,358	-	-	-	41,810	44,422
Tennessee, -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	13	13	12	33	9	357	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,750	29,183
Ohio, -	1811	-	-	1	4	6	4	70	-	-	23	40	23	70	16	793	49	49	49	182	73	2,336	-	-	33,270	35,275
Louisiana,* -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	3	-	-	62	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,176	2,252
District of Columbia, -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	12	6	23	21	240	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,997	5,291
Mississippi Territory, -	1811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,856	4,160
Indiana Territory, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Illinois Territory, †	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missouri Territory, ‡	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
																						719,449				

\* No return.  
 † No return.  
 ‡ No return.

§ Including officers.  
 ¶ Including officers.  
 † Including officers.



Militia return of Ordnance, Arms, Ammunition, &c. belonging to the several States and Territories.

48  
of

STATES AND TERRITORIES.

	Date of Return.	ORDNANCE.											ARMS, AMMUNITION, &c.			
		Brass Twelve Pounders.	Brass Nine Pounders.	Brass Six Pounders.	Brass Four Pounders.	Brass Three Pounders.	Iron Eighteen Pounders.	Iron Twelve Pounders.	Iron Nine Pounders.	Iron Six Pounders.	Iron Four Pounders.	Iron Three Pounders.	Artillery Side Arms.	Sabres and Swords.	Pairs of Pistols.	Esopontoons.
New Hampshire, - - -	1812	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,720	1,720	-
Massachusetts, - - -	1812	1	-	50	-	96	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2,358	2,330	-
Vermont, - - - - -	1809	-	-	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	1,099	1,041	-
Rhode Island, - - -	1811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	87	88	-
Connecticut, - - -	1812	-	-	-	3	10	-	-	-	1	3	-	599	1,195	2,399	709
New York, - - - - -	1812	-	†	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,272	3,509	3,890	361
New Jersey, - - - -	1811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	1	1	-	125	1,864	528	100
Pennsylvania, ‡	1812	2	-	-	-	27	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Delaware, - - - - -	1810	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3	-	-	59	59	-
Virginia, - - - - -	1811	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	2	3	-	-	330	2,487	1,597	-
North Carolina, - -	1812	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	21	3	-	-	19	2,764	516	406
South Carolina, - -	1811	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,440	1,369	10
Georgia, - - - - -	1811	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	1	-	7	-	-	330	255	-
Kentucky, - - - - -	1811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1,531	345	417
Tennessee, - - - -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	120	-
Ohio, - - - - -	1811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,095	369	229
Louisiana, § - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
District of Columbia, -	1812	-	-	1 cannon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	120	60	-
Mississippi Territory, -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indiana Territory, - -	1811	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-
Illinois Territory, §	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missouri Territory, §	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\* Two iron pieces.

† Fifty-one iron and brass pieces,

‡ Small arms and equipments not stated in the return.

§ No returns.

1813.]

MILITIA.

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RETURN OF MILITIA ORDNNANCE, &c.—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Date of Returns.	ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUTREMENTS.															
		Muskets.	Rifles.	Fusils.	Bayonets.	Cartridge Boxes.	Ramrods; steel.	Pounds of Powder.	Cartridges with Ball.	Flints.	Loose Balls.	Wires and Brushes.	Scabbards and Belts.	Knapsacks.	Pouches and Horns.	Tumbrils and Wagons.	Stands of Colors.
New Hampshire, - - -	1812	15,378	-	-	10,600	9,900	4,820	2,656	-	40,100	27,850	3,670	7,670	5,370	-	15	-
Massachusetts, - - -	1812	48,094	1,376	-	4,676	47,686	47,428	1,055	738,816	103,846	56,275	48,079	47,287	37,275	-	91	-
Vermont, - - - - -	1809	11,523	-	-	5,273	6,302	5,657	2,137	-	12,906	115,632	6,647	4,902	2,470	-	3	-
Rhode Island, - - -	1811	3,505	-	-	3,100	2,691	3,505	-	3,202	6,559	-	3,227	3,555	136	-	1	-
Connecticut, - - -	1812	14,020	-	-	14,070	15,416	-	-	320,910	37,590	-	28,488	14,270	10,138	-	-	-
New York, - - - - -	1812	38,918	4,791	-	25,583	30,909	26,300	648	9,275	41,528	16,563	8,479	29,086	597	7,104	-	32
New Jersey, - - -	1811	14,909	197	349	4,443	1,204	3,952	20	-	2,440	-	300	-	-	4,628	-	-
Pennsylvania,* - - -	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Delaware, - - - - -	1810	340	-	154	83	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia, - - - - -	1811	14,990	-	116	13,431	14,429	11,350	532	1,586	1,913	1,942	385	2,268	56	-	6	-
North Carolina, - -	1812	4,793	7,401	19,086	396	2,508	-	588	4,006	-	37,248	1,788	-	284	17,873	-	-
South Carolina, - -	1811	2,043	5,496	9,000	2,083	500	-	1,300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia, - - - - -	1811	5,182	13,479	-	5,182	5,182	5,182	1,300	-	-	-	-	-	64	-	-	-
Kentucky, - - - - -	1811	5,540	18,175	-	190	510	250	21,190	1,370	68,935	-	-	800	373	19,697	-	-
Tennessee, - - - -	1812	4,626	9,419	-	69	162	-	3,731	1,238	13,570	54,746	3,823	-	-	-	-	-
Ohio, - - - - -	1811	4,927	9,746	226	-	560	-	576	1,896	13,622	12,765	379	-	-	5,763	-	-
Louisiana, † - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
District of Columbia, -	1812	628	50	-	572	456	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mississippi Territory, -	1812	797	805	-	-	-	-	204	-	1,211	1,518	-	-	-	1,819	-	-
Indiana Territory, - -	1811	130	1,109	30	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,396	-	-
Illinois Territory, † -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missouri Territory, † -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\* Small arms and equipments not stated in the return.

† No returns.

[12th CONGRESS.]

No. 119.

[2d SESSION.]

## CONTRACT PRICE OF ARMS FOR THE MILITIA,

*The payments made, the sum carried to the Sinking Fund, and the balance of appropriation remaining unexpended.*

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, MARCH 3, 1813.

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 1, 1813.

SIR:

Conformably to a resolution of the honorable the Senate of the United States, of the 27th of February last, requiring the Secretary of War to cause to be laid before the Senate information on the following points:

1st. What is the contract price of the arms contracted for, under the authority of the act making provision for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia of the United States?

2d. What amount of money has been drawn from the treasury under the appropriation of the said act, at what times, and in what sums, have such moneys been drawn from the treasury?

3d. To whom, and at what times, have the moneys drawn, as aforesaid, been paid?

4th. What is the balance of the appropriation, made by the said act, remaining unexpended, and has any part of such balance, and, if any, what, sum been carried to the Sinking Fund?

5th. Has any part of the money, appropriated by the said act, been applied to the manufacture of arms in the public factories, and, if so, how much?

I have the honor to state, that the average price of arms, manufactured by private contracts, for arming the whole body of the militia of the United States, under the act of April 23d 1808, is ten dollars and seventy-five cents for each stand; that the amount of money drawn from the treasury, and expended on that account, is detailed in the enclosed statement; that one hundred thousand dollars of the appropriation has been carried to the surplus fund; that the balance remaining to the credit of the appropriation is five hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of the annual sum of two hundred thousand dollars for the year 1813; and that no part of the money appropriated by the said act has been applied to the manufacture of arms in the public armories, except nine thousand seven hundred dollars at Springfield, Massachusetts.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

The Honorable the PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

*Statement of moneys drawn from the Treasury under the act "making provision for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia of the United States."*

1808, November 23, -	-	-	\$100,000	1811, June 25, -	-	-	10,000
1810, March 14, -	-	-	50,000	August 12, -	-	-	30,000
September 25, -	-	-	55,000	September 12, -	-	-	20,000
December 26, -	-	-	5,000	October 18, -	-	-	40,000
1811, May 9, -	-	-	40,000	1812, May 2, -	-	-	50,000
" 16, -	-	-	50,000	July 10, -	-	-	50,000
							<u>\$500,000</u>

NOTE.—The last ten sums, above stated, were advanced from the treasury, to Thomas T. Tucker, as agent for the Military Department.

*Statement of the expenditures under the same, viz:*

1808, July 8, in favor of Tench Coxe,	Warrant No. 541	-	-	-	\$25,000 00
August 5, ditto ditto,	ditto 649	-	-	-	20,000 00
October 18, ditto ditto,	ditto 840	-	-	-	10,000 00
November 17, ditto ditto,	ditto 907	-	-	-	25,000 00
December 5, ditto ditto,	ditto 957	-	-	-	2,687 50
1809, June 17, ditto Charles Williams, Inspector,	ditto 1,609	-	-	-	588 39
July 3, ditto Daniel Pettibone,	ditto 1,649	-	-	-	100 00
July 29, ditto ditto,	ditto 1,847	-	-	-	100 00
November 13, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,096	-	-	-	58 02
" 18, ditto Charles Williamson,	ditto 2,112	-	-	-	583 64
December 19, ditto Tench Coxe,	ditto 2,204	-	-	-	10,000 00
1810, February 26, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,395	-	-	-	20,000 00
April 24, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,580	-	-	-	20,000 00
May 21, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,635	-	-	-	10,000 00
" 26, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,644	-	-	-	25,000 00
July 17, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,779	-	-	-	10,000 00
September, 17, ditto ditto,	ditto 2,901	-	-	-	20,000 00
October 26, ditto Charles Williams,	ditto 2,976	-	-	-	1,132 36
1811, January 5, ditto Tench Coxe,	ditto 18	-	-	-	25,000 00
" 12, ditto ditto,	ditto 38	-	-	-	10,000 00
February 13, ditto ditto,	ditto 120	-	-	-	15,000 00
" " ditto ditto,	ditto 122	-	-	-	20,000 00
March 16, ditto ditto,	ditto 195	-	-	-	10,000 00
May 17, ditto ditto,	ditto 329	-	-	-	20,000 00
July 13, ditto Charles Williams,	ditto 445	-	-	-	1,122 54
September 9, ditto Tench Coxe,	ditto 545 & 546	-	-	-	25,000 00
October 18, ditto ditto,	ditto 635	-	-	-	10,000 00
1812, January 2, ditto ditto,	ditto 2 & 3	-	-	-	25,000 00
February 24, ditto ditto,	ditto 141 & 142	-	-	-	35,000 00
March 31, ditto ditto,	ditto 290	-	-	-	20,000 00
April 22, ditto John Chaffee,	ditto 386	-	-	-	9,700 00
June 22, ditto Benjamin Mifflin,	ditto 600 & 601	-	-	-	25,000 00
July 9, ditto ditto,	ditto 700	-	-	-	10,000 00
July 20, ditto Eli Whitney,	ditto 744	-	-	-	5,000 00
September 26, ditto Benjamin Mifflin,	ditto 905	-	-	-	10,000 00
September 7, ditto Caleb Irvine,	ditto 973	-	-	-	2,000 00
October 26, ditto Amasa Stetson,	ditto 1,255	-	-	-	5,000 00

\$483,072 45

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 1st, 1813.

[13th CONGRESS.]

No. 120.

[1st Session.]

## APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JUNE 16, 1813.

CAMP MEIGS, *May 2d*, 1813.

*To the Honorable the Senate of the United States. The officers undersigned (now in the service of the United States and attached to the army under the command of Major General William H. Harrison) respectfully represent:*

Having observed several appointments and promotions recently made in the army, and particularly in the corps to which we severally belong, and feeling that in some of them injustice has been done officers now in service; we owe it to ourselves, as well as the service in which we are engaged, to make known to your honorable body the wrongs complained of; you alone possessing the corrective power.

Our distance from the seat of Government prevents an immediate knowledge of new arrangements, made in the War Department, but we have seen no public document authorizing (as we conceive) some of the recent appointments and promotions from that Department. If, in the promotions and *new appointments* in the army, the age of an officer's commission, and the duration of service are to be wholly disregarded, few men would enter the army except from necessity—a crisis, we presume, wished for by none who has the good of his country at heart.

We are unwilling to believe that your honorable body would sanction a course so destructive to the necessary excitements of a soldier, and so chilling to his laudable ambition; nor would we have troubled you with this address, had not we feared that, in the crowd of momentous matter which might occupy your attention at the present session of Congress, it might escape your consideration, that, in some of the appointments recently made, private citizens have been made Captains over the heads of subaltern officers, who have been long in service; nor is it less worthy your attention, that, in many instances, subalterns have been promoted over the heads of superior officers—over officers, too, who, from experience, as well as services rendered their country in the field of battle, have at least some claim to the ordinary and just patronage of their Government.

We are well aware that, in armies, the usages of nations sanction extraordinary and honorable notice of even private soldiers, where extraordinary and honorable deeds authorize it; and we would be the last to complain at the elevation of a brother soldier, or even a private citizen, under similar circumstances.

It is unnecessary, we conceive, to call your attention to the individual promotions and appointments, by which we feel the usages of armies, and our individual rights, violated; they must necessarily be laid before you for approval.

In thus obtruding ourselves before the Senate of the United States, we trust it will be seen that we are actuated by no other motive than that which should pervade the breast of every soldier, and that the matter and manner of this address evince the greatest respect and deference, both to your honorable body and that of the War Department.

WILLIAM BRADFORD, *Capt. 17th Regt. United States' Infantry.*DAVID HOLT, *Capt. 17th United States' Infantry.*JAMES HACKLEY, *Lieut. 17th United States' Infantry.*THOMAS HAWKINS, *Ensign 17th United States' Infantry.*BENJ. W. SANDERS, *Lieut. 17th United States' Infantry.*E. SHIPP, *Ensign 17th United States' Infantry.*WILSON ELLIOTT, *Capt. 19th Regt. United States' Infantry.*HENRY FREDERICKS, *2d Lieut. United States' Infantry.*STEPHEN LEE, *Lieut. 19th Regt. United States' Infantry.*GEORGE W. JACKSON, *Lieut. 19th Regt. United States' Infantry.*JAMES CAMPBELL, *First Lieut. 19th Regt. United States' Infantry.*JOHN STOCKTON, *Ensign 19th Regt. United States' Infantry.*DAVID GUYNE, *First Lieut. 19th United States' Infantry.*CHARLES MITCHELL, *Ensign 19th Regt. United States' Infantry.*

[13th CONGRESS.]

No. 121.

[1st Session.]

## EXTENSION OF THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 19, 1813.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, *Washington, June 19*, 1813.

SIR:

The Ordnance Department, as originally organized, consisted of one commissary general, one assistant commissary general, four deputies, and not exceeding eight assistant deputies; at the last session of Congress, an augmentation of the assistant deputies to sixteen was authorized.

The duties of the Ordnance Department, as prescribed by law, are various and important. Such as, 1. Inspecting and proving cannon, cannon shot, shells, and gun powder; 2. Superintending the construction of gun carriages, ammunition wagons, equipments for cannon, and all machines used by the artillery in garrison or field; 3. Preparing ammunition both for the artillery and infantry, and all kinds of ordnance stores; 4. Furnishing to the Secretary of War semi-annual returns, exhibiting the actual state of the ordnance and ordnance stores, throughout the United States, together with the necessary estimates of wear, tear, and expenditure, on which to found contracts and purchases to ensure future adequate supplies; 5. Visiting and inspecting the several forts, posts, and camps, in the United States, to see that the ordnance and ordnance stores are kept in serviceable order, properly distributed, and economically expended.

The Ordnance Department, as at present filled, seems inadequate to the discharge of these duties.

General Harrison has judged it necessary to appoint, on his own authority, one deputy commissary and two assistant deputies, to act with the army under his command. General Wilkinson has selected one officer of artil-

lery to act as a deputy commissary, and appointed another *ad interim* to the station of assistant deputy. General Dearborn and General Bloomfield have each appointed an officer of the artillery to act in the Ordnance Department; and, lastly, General Pinckney is solicitous to have two assistant deputies appointed for the district under his command, in addition to one deputy already under his command.

It has been decided by the War Department, to establish three principal laboratories and arsenals: one at or near Albany; one at or near Pittsburgh; and one on the waters of the Chesapeake. At each of these establishments thirty or forty workmen will be employed, which will require at least one superior officer, and three or four inferior, at each station. The arsenals and laboratories will, therefore, alone, require fifteen or sixteen officers. To each military district, one deputy commissary ought at least to be allowed. My opinion, is, therefore, the deputy commissaries ought to be increased to eleven or twelve, leaving the number of assistant deputies at sixteen, as now established.

Nor should we be deterred by the idea of increased expense. In fact, a great deal of money would be saved by making systematic arrangements in relation to this branch of the service. We cannot possibly avoid these expenses; in some way or other they must be incurred. Cannon, their carriages and equipments, for our armies in the field, our posts on the frontiers, and the fixed and moveable batteries on the sea board, must be provided. Powder, shot, and shells, must at any rate be procured. The appropriations for the ordnance supplies, I am informed, amount to upwards of one million of dollars, and the future annual expenditure, during the war, will probably not be less. It is worth while to incur some expense, to ensure the faithful, judicious, and economical expenditure of such a sum of money. I know an instance where one hundred and twenty dollars per ton has, by the interference of militia officers, been paid for cannon shot on the very spot where the United States had contracted to have them delivered at seventy-two dollars per ton. Such extravagancies will be continually taking place, while chance and momentary exigencies regulate the supplies to be furnished to the military posts in our extensive country. Besides, while the Ordnance Department remains inadequate to the discharge of its duties, incessant complaints will arise of want of ammunition, want of artillery, arms, and accoutrements, and other articles essential to protection and defence.

I have the honor to be, with entire respect, sir, your obedient and very humble servant,

DECIUS WADSWORTH.

Honorable Mr. TROUP, of the House of Representatives.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 122.

[1st Session.

ARMING THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JULY 8, 1813.

Mr. TROUP, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred a resolution of the House, of the 15th of June, instructing them to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, alterations are necessary to be made in the act, entitled "An act making provision for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia of the United States;" and particularly whether any, and, if any, what, alterations are necessary as to the time when the arms procured by virtue of said act shall be distributed to each State and territory, reported:

That the funds appropriated by the act of 23d of April for arming the whole body of the militia, amounted, on the 23d day of April last, to one million of dollars; that of this sum ninety-four thousand seven hundred and ninety-two dollars have been actually expended; and that the whole number of arms procured, up to this day, amounts to 34,477 stands, all derived under contracts of supply; that of these the following disposition has been made, viz.

New Hampshire,	-	-	-	1,000						
Vermont,	-	-	-	2,500						
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	1,000						
New Jersey,	-	-	-	1,000						
Delaware,	-	-	-	500						
North Carolina,	-	-	-	2,130						
South Carolina,	-	-	-	2,000						
Georgia,	-	-	-	1,000						
Ohio,	-	-	-	1,500						
Kentucky,	-	-	-	1,500						
Tennessee,	-	-	-	1,500						
Illinois territory,	-	-	-	218						
Louisiana,	-	-	-	250						
					<i>Since the 24th December, 1812.</i>					
					Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	5,000
					New York,	-	-	-	-	2,000
					Maryland,	-	-	-	-	1,500
					Louisiana,	-	-	-	-	1,500
										<i>Before the 24th December, 1812.</i>
					Ohio,	-	-	-	-	1,500
					District of Columbia,	-	-	-	-	2,200

Making an aggregate of 26,000 stands delivered, and leaving a balance of 8,477 stands, subject to future distribution.

That the aforesaid disposition has been made in virtue of the authority conferred by the third section of the act of April, 1808, which is as follows: "That all the arms procured in virtue of this act shall be transmitted to the several States composing this Union, and territories thereof, to each State and territory, respectively, in proportion to the number of effective militia in each State and territory; and by each State and territory to be distributed to the militia in such State and territory, under such rules and regulations as shall be by law prescribed by the Legislature of each State and territory."

The language of this section is clear, and admits but of one construction; the proportion to which each State is entitled is secured by it; each State having contributed its just proportion of money to the purchase, each State is entitled to receive its just proportion of arms. "Shall be transmitted to each State and territory, respectively, in proportion to the number of effective militia in each State and territory. *Transmitted.* When? "At such time as the Executive may deem proper." This is the only construction, in the opinion of your committee, of which the language of the section is susceptible. If the intention of the Legislature had been to bind the Executive to a *simultaneous* or *periodical* transmission, the language of the section would have been different: "shall be transmitted *at the same time,*" or "shall be transmitted *annually,* or *biennially,* or *triennially,*" would have been the language of the Legislature. The time of transmission not being specified, therefore, but left, as your committee conclude, to a sound Executive discretion, the question is, whether any alteration in the act of April, 1808, be, in this respect, expedient.

In legislation it is extremely difficult, and frequently impossible, to foresee all the exigencies which may arise under a particular act, and, consequently, extremely difficult, and frequently impossible, to make adequate provision for them. In some cases, even the Legislature, foreseeing a possible exigency, it would be unwise to anticipate and provide for it by the *express letter* of the law. Would it become the Legislature of the Union, for instance, to anticipate the rebellion of a State against the authority of the United States, and to enact that "no State in actual rebellion against the United States should be entitled to receive its proportion of arms?" Your committee presume not. A legislation of this character would, to say nothing of the violence it would offer to the enlightened sensibility of the National Legislature, be the means, when frequently indulged, of bringing about that very state of things which cannot be thought of without horror, and which ought not to be spoken of at all. In every act of legislation, there

fore, something must be left to implication; something must be left to discretion. But there are other considerations which, in the opinion of your committee, justify the discretion as to the *time of transmission*.

A war unexpectedly breaks out; a particular section is exposed to the assaults of the enemy; that section destitute of arms; shall the enemy be suffered to advance, to lay waste with fire and sword, because the President is bound by the letter of the law so to distribute the arms as that each State shall, at *the same time*, receive a proportion exactly equal to the number of its effective militia? No, would be the exclamation from one end of the Union to the other; let the *safety* of a *part* be consulted, though the whole suffer inconvenience. Yet, were such the letter of the law, the Executive would, under any circumstances, be bound to respect it. The act of the 23d of April, 1808, was passed in a season of profound peace; contemplating future wars, it looked to no particular war; it had just gone into operation, had scarcely developed its first fruits, when the present war broke out. The war found the militia badly armed; it found particular portions of them worse armed and more exposed than others. Would it have been wise, under these circumstances, to distribute 30,000 stands of arms *equally* among 800,000 militia? Or would it have been wiser to consult the *wants* and *exposure* of particular portions?

But suppose it were expedient, in the opinion of your committee, to define with precision the time of transmission; what period ought to be selected? If a yearly or biennial or triennial distribution, were adopted, it might happen, by casualty or accident, that, within the period limited, no arms were received, or so few, that the expense and trouble of distribution would exceed the expense of manufacture; and what would the distribution of a dozen or an hundred stands of arms avail the militia of a great State; they would be lost in the transmission, or suffered by the States to lie neglected and forgotten. In the distribution by the States themselves, among their own militia, it is more than probable they would be governed by the same principle as that by which the recent disposition by the United States has seemed to be regulated. Would a State having one thousand companies of militia so scrupulously consult the principle of equality, in the distribution of one thousand stand of arms, as to give one musket and bayonet to each *company*? It may fairly be presumed not; the *wants*, the *frontier position*, and actual *exposure* of particular parts of the State, would be much more likely to regulate the distribution; those of the militia, to be sure, from whom, for the moment, they were withheld, might complain of a departure from the principle of exact equality, but with what concern would the legislative body of such State regard such complaints?

For these, and various other reasons, which might be adduced, but with which your committee forbear to trouble the House, they are of opinion that, for the present at least, the act of April, 1808, requires no alterations. They are the more confirmed in this opinion, because they have reason to believe, that there has been no misconstruction of the law; that the seeming irregularity which has taken place has grown out of the exigency of the times; that a disposition exists to correct such irregularity, as soon as circumstances will admit; that the correction is, in fact, at this moment proceeding; that, in due time, all the States must and will receive their respective proportions of arms; and, in fine, that the immediate representatives of the people in Congress, inspecting, as they do, with never ceasing vigilance, the execution of this, as well as every other law, stand ready to apply the remedy whensoever right, or justice, or expediency, shall seem to them to demand it.

SIR:

COMMITTEE ROOM, June 30, 1813.

I am directed, by the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom has been referred a resolution instructing them to inquire what alterations are necessary in the act of the 29th of April, 1813, providing for the arming the whole body of the militia of the United States, to ask information on the following points, viz.

1st. What number of arms have been received by the United States since the 24th day of December, 1812, under contracts or purchases, for carrying into effect the aforesaid act of the 23d April, 1808?

2d. Whether, since the 24th day of December, 1812, any further disposition has been made of the arms acquired under the act of the 23d April, 1808, and, if any further disposition, to what amount, to what States and territories, and the number to each, respectively?

3d. By what authority eight thousand one hundred stand of arms have been, as appears by a report from your Department, made to the House of Representatives, 24th December, 1812, loaned to several States and territories, and whether the arms so loaned were arms acquired under the authority of the aforesaid act of the 23d of April, 1808?

Or any other information in possession of your Department touching the distribution of arms acquired under the act of 1808, and which will enable the committee to comply with the instruction of the House.

SIR:

WAR DEPARTMENT, 6th July, 1813.

In reply to the note you did me the honor to write to me on the 30th ult. I beg leave to state, that two thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven stands of arms have been received into the public stores, since December, 1812, under contracts made pursuant to law; and that deliveries of arms, since that period, to the amount of seven thousand stands, have been made as follows, viz:

- 2,000 to the State of Connecticut.
- 2,000 to the State of New York.
- 1,500 to the State of Maryland.
- 1,500 to the State of Louisiana.

The arms stated in the report of December last to have been *loaned*, were in part acquired under the act of the 28th of April, 1808, viz:

1,500 delivered to Major General Wadsworth, of Ohio; and  
2,200 to the District of Columbia. And are considered as furnished under that law. In the former of these cases, the exigence growing out of the surrender of General Hull did not leave to this Department time for the employment of the customary form of getting the receipt of the Governor. The balance of loaned arms (2,900) was not acquired under the aforesaid act.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my very high respect,

JOHN ARMSTRONG,

Hon. Mr. TROUP.

## SPIRIT AND MANNER IN WHICH THE WAR IS WAGED BY THE ENEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JULY 31, 1813.

Mr. MACON, from the committee to whom was referred that part of the President's message "which relates to the spirit and manner in which the war had been waged by the enemy," made the following report:

That they have collected and arranged all the testimony on this subject which could, at this time, be procured. This testimony is submitted to the consideration of the House, arranged under the following heads:

First. Bad treatment of American prisoners.

Second. Detention of American prisoners as British subjects, on the plea of nativity in the dominions of Britain, or of naturalization.

Third. Detention of mariners, as prisoners of war, who were in England when the war was declared.

Fourth. Compulsory service of impressed American seamen on board British ships of war.

Fifth. Violation of flags of truce.

Sixth. Ransom of American prisoners from Indians in the British service.

Seventh. Pillage and destruction of private property on the Chesapeake bay, and in the neighboring country.

Eighth. Massacre and burning of American prisoners surrendered to officers of Great Britain, by Indians in the British service. Abandonment of the remains of Americans killed in battle, or murdered after the surrender to the British. The pillage and shooting of American citizens, and the burning of their houses, after surrender to the British under the guarantee of protection.

Ninth. Outrages at Hampton, in Virginia.

The evidence under the first head demonstrates that the British Government has adopted a rigor of regulation unfriendly to the comfort, and apparently unnecessary to the safe keeping, of American prisoners, generally. It shows, also, instances of a departure from the customary rules of war, by the selection and confinement in close prisons of particular persons, and the transportation of them, for undefined causes, from the ports of the British colonies to the island of Great Britain.

The evidence under the second head establishes the fact, that, however the practice of detaining American citizens as British subjects may be regarded as to the principle it involves, that such detentions continue to occur, through the agency of the naval and other commanders of that Government. It proves, too, that, however unwilling to allow other nations to naturalize her subjects, Great Britain is disposed to enforce the obligation entered into by their citizens, when naturalized under her own laws. This practice, even supposing the release of every person thus detained, obviously subjects our captured citizens, upon mere suspicion, to hardships and perils from which they ought to be exempt, according to the established rules in relation to prisoners of war.

The evidence under the third head shows that, while all other American citizens were permitted to depart within a reasonable time after the declaration of war, all mariners who were in the dominions of Great Britain, whether they resorted to her ports, in time of peace, for lawful purposes, or were forced into them under the pretence of illegal commerce, are considered prisoners of war. The injustice of this exception is not more apparent than the jealousy it discloses towards that useful class of our fellow-citizens. But the committee can but remark, that, if the practice of hiring American seamen to navigate British vessels is generally adopted and authorized, and that it is suffered appears from the advertisements of George Maude, the British agent at Port Royal, which is to be found with the testimony collected under the first head, that the naval strength of that empire will be increased in proportion to the number of our seamen in bondage. The present war having changed the relation of the two countries, the pretended right of impressment can no longer be exercised, but the same end may be accomplished by the substitution of this mode. Every seaman thus employed (the terms of whose engagement have not been ascertained) increases the naval strength of the enemy, not only by depriving the United States of his active services, but by enabling Great Britain to carry on, and even extend, her commerce, without diminishing the number of sailors employed in her vessels of war.

The testimony collected under the fourth head proves, that it is the ordinary practice of the officers of British armed vessels to force impressed Americans to serve against their country by threats, by corporal punishment, and even by the fear of immediate execution—an instructing commentary upon the professions of the Government of its readiness to release impressed American seamen, found on board ships of war.

On the evidence collected under the fifth head it is only necessary to observe, that, in one case, (the case of Dr. M'Keehan) the enormity is increased by the circumstance of the flag being divested of every thing of a hostile character, having solely for its object the relief of the wounded and suffering prisoners who were taken at the river Raisin on the 22d January, 1813. The treatment of Dr. M'Keehan, not by the allies of Britain, but by the officers of her army, can only be rationally accounted for by the supposition, that it was considered good policy to deter American surgeons from going to the relief of their countrymen, as the Indian surgeons had a more speedy and effectual mode of relieving their sufferings.

The evidence respecting the ransom of American prisoners from Indians, collected under the sixth head, deserves attention, principally from the policy it indicates, and as it is connected with Indian cruelties. Considering the savages as an auxiliary military force in the pay of Great Britain, the amount of ransom may be regarded as part of their stipulated compensation for military service; and, as ransoms would be increased, and their value enhanced, by the terror inspired by the most shocking barbarities, it may be fairly concluded, whatever may be the intention of the British Government, that the practice of redeeming captives by pecuniary means will be occasionally quickened, by the butchery of our fellow-citizens, and by indignities offered to their remains, as long as the Indians are employed by the enemy. The justice of this conclusion is confirmed by the testimony of those witnesses who were retained after ransom as prisoners of war.

The testimony collected under the seventh head shows, that the private property of unarmed citizens has been pillaged by the officers and crews of the British vessels of war on our coast, their houses burnt, and places of public worship mutilated and defiled. It appears that the officers, animated by the presence of Admiral Cockburn, particularly distinguished themselves in these exploits. This evidence proves, that they were governed by the combined motives of avarice and revenge; not satisfied with bearing off, for their own convenience, the valuable articles found, the others, which furnished no allurements to their cupidity, were wantonly defaced and destroyed. It has been alleged, in palliation of these acts of wanton cruelty, that a flag sent on shore by the Admiral was fired upon by the American militia. The evidence proves this not to have been the fact. This pretence has been resorted to only to excuse conduct which no circumstances can justify.

The committee forbear to make any observations upon the testimony collected under the eighth head, from a perfect conviction that no person of this or any other nation can read the simple narrative of the different witnesses of the grossest violations of honor, justice, and humanity, without the strongest emotions of indignation and horror. That these outrages were perpetrated by Indians is neither palliation nor excuse. Every civilized nation is answerable for the conduct of the allies under their command, and, while they partake of the advantages of their successes, they are equally partakers of the odium of their crimes. The British forces concerned in the affair of the 22d, at the river Raisin, are more deeply implicated in the infamy of these transactions than by this mode of reasoning, however correct. The massacre of the 23d January, after the capitulation, was perpetrated without any exertion on their part to prevent it; indeed, it is apparent, from all the circumstances, that, if the British officers did not connive at their destruction, they were criminally indifferent about the fate of the wounded prisoners. But what marks more strongly the degradation of the character of the British soldiers is, the refusal of the last officers

of humanity to the bodies of the dead. The bodies of our countrymen were exposed to every indignity, and became food for brutes, in the sight of men who affect a sacred regard to the dictates of honor and religion. Low, indeed, is the character of that army which is reduced to the confession that their savage auxiliaries will not permit them to perform the rites of sepulture to the slain. The committee have not been able to discover even the expression of that detestation which such conduct must inspire from the military or civil authority on the Canadian frontier, unless such detestation is to be presumed from the choice of an Indian trophy as an ornament for the legislative hall of Upper Canada.

The committee have considered it their duty to submit the evidence collected under the ninth head of the atrocities committed at Hampton, although these enormities have been committed since their appointment. These barbarities may be rationally considered as the consequence of the example set by the officers of the naval force on our coast. Human turpitude is always progressive, and soldiers are prepared for the perpetration of the most dreadful crimes by the commission of minor offences with impunity. That troops who had been instigated by the example of their officers to plunder the property and burn the houses of unarmed citizens, should proceed to rape and murder, need not excite surprise, however it may inspire horror. For every detestable violation of humanity an excuse is fabricated or found. The wounded prisoners on the Northern frontier were massacred by Indians; the sick murdered; and the women violated at Hampton, by the foreign troops in the pay of Great Britain. These pretexts, admitting them to be true, are as disgraceful as the conduct which made a resort to them necessary. Honor and magnanimity not only forbid the soldier to perpetrate crimes, but require every exertion on his part to prevent them. If, in defiance of discipline, acts of violence are committed upon any individual entitled to protection, the exemplary punishment of the offender can alone vindicate the reputation of the nation by whom he is employed. Whether such exertions were made by the British soldiers, or the character of the British nation thus vindicated, the evidence will show.

The shrieks of the innocent victims of infernal lust, at Hampton, were heard by the American prisoners, but were too weak to reach the ears or disturb the repose of the British officers, whose duty, as men, required them to protect every female whom the fortune of war had thrown into their power. The committee will not dwell on this hateful subject. Human language affords no terms strong enough to express the emotions which the examination of this evidence has awakened; they rejoice that these acts have appeared so incredible to the American people, and, for the honor of human nature, they deeply regret that the evidence so clearly establishes their truth. In the correspondence between the commander of the American and British forces will be found what is equivalent to an admission of the facts by the British commander. The committee have yet to learn that the punishment of the offenders has followed the conviction of their guilt. The power of retaliation being vested by law in the Executive Magistrate, no measure is considered necessary to be proposed but the resolution annexed to this report.

As such enormities, instead of inspiring terror, as was probably intended, are, in the opinion of the committee, calculated to produce a contrary effect, they submit, for the consideration of the House, the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to have collected and presented to this House, during the continuance of the present war, evidence of every departure by the enemy from the ordinary modes of conducting war among civilized nations.

## DOCUMENTS.

## No. 1.

*Bad treatment of American Prisoners by the British.*

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1813.

SIR:

I have received your favor of the 22d instant, and hasten to reply to the questions therein, respecting the case of Captain Jeduthan Upton, late commander of the privateer brig Hunter, of Salem. Captain Upton was taken in the month, I believe, of November last, off the Western islands, by the British frigate Phoebe, Captain Hilliard. In chase, Captain Upton, as is usual in such cases, threw his guns overboard to ease his vessel, in hopes by that means to facilitate his escape from the enemy; but this not availing, he was, as above stated, taken and carried into Plymouth, in England, where, on his arrival, he was immediately, with his first lieutenant, Mr. Wayne, put into Mill prison, and refused his parol, on the plea he had not on board, when captured, fourteen mounted carriage guns above the caliber of four pounders. After having been thus closely confined for three or four months in a filthy jail, they were in the month of March taken out and sent on board the prison ship at Chatham, where, when I left England in April last, they still were, in a worse situation, *if possible*, than in Mill prison. The allowance, sir, to American prisoners, in England, you are acquainted with; it is, therefore, not necessary for me to mention it here. It is but justice to state, that the captain of the Phoebe petitioned the Transport Board, and used every exertion in his power to obtain the parols of Captain Upton and Mr. Wayne, but all would not do; they were deaf to his petition, lost as they are to every sentiment of honor, and every principle of humanity.

Except Captain Upton and his first lieutenant, all the rest of his officers and crew were sent on board the prison ship on their first arrival at Plymouth; amongst them was the doctor of the Hunter, Mr. Carter, who came home in the cartel Robinson Potter. What I have stated respecting the treatment of Captain Upton and Mr. Wayne, I know to be facts, as I had the honor of spending twenty-four hours in Mill prison with them, and heard those facts related by themselves.

Very respectfully, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

ALEXANDER COFFIN, Jr.

J. MASON, Esq.

*Commissary General of Prisoners.*

NAVY YARD, CHARLESTOWN, June 3, 1813.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose to you a deposition respecting the inhuman treatment, which Mr. Nichols, late commander of the private armed ship Decatur, belonging to Newburyport, has received from the British Government at Barbadoes. I have been credibly informed that Captain Nichols is a very respectable and correct man, therefore a fair presumption, that he has not committed himself in such a manner as ought to deprive him of the established rights of a prisoner of war. Any measure which the Government of our country may see proper to adopt in consequence of this communication, I shall readily attend to.

I have the honor, sir, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. BAINBRIDGE.

HON. WILLIAM JONES,

*Secretary of the Navy, City of Washington.*

I, James Foot, of Newburyport, in the county of Essex, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, mariner, testify and depose, that I was a prize master on board the private armed brigantine Decatur, of Newburyport, in her late cruise, William Nichols, commander; that, on the 18th day of January, now last past, the said brigantine was captured by his Britannic majesty's frigate Surprise, commanded by Captain Cochran, and carried into Barbadoes. After our arrival in Barbadoes, Captain Nichols, with the other officers of the Decatur, were paroled. About two months after our arrival, his Britannic majesty's frigate Vesta arrived in Barbadoes, and through the influence of the commander of the Vesta, Captain Nichols, without any known or pretended cause, was arrested and held in close confinement, without liberty to speak to any of his officers or any other American. The place where Captain Nichols was confined, was about four feet in width, and about seven feet in length, on board a prison ship, where he remain-



ed for thirty-four days, as nearly as I can recollect, and was then taken on board his majesty's ship *Tribune*, and carried to England. What the cause of the unwarrantable and unjustifiable conduct of the enemy towards Captain Nichols was, I am unable to state; there were several reports in circulation; one was, that he was to be carried to England and held a prisoner until the release of certain men in France, from whom Captain Nichols recaptured his vessel, which had been taken by the British before the commencement of the present war between the two countries: another report was, that he was to be held until the close of the war, on account of his having been active against the enemy, since the commencement of hostilities, and having been fortunate in a former cruise.

JAMES FOOT.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, *Essex*, ss.

On this thirty-first day of May, in the year of our Lord 1813, personally appeared James Foot, the subscriber to the foregoing deposition, and made solemn oath that the same is true.

Before me

JACOB GERRISH, *Justice of the Peace.*

*Extract of a letter from the Commissary General of Prisoners, to Alexander Stewart, Esq. United States' Agent for prisoners at Jamaica, dated*

MAY 1, 1813.

"I enclose you a copy of an advertisement, said to have been taken from a Jamaica newspaper, apparently put forth by the British agent for prisoners, proposing to hire out American prisoners: you will inquire into this matter, and if it be as has been stated, you will remonstrate strongly against such a practice; and inform me of the practice, and the result."

[*Referred to in the preceding extract.*]

PORT ROYAL, *November 25, 1812.*

Masters of vessels about to proceed to England with convoy, are informed that they may be supplied with a limited number of American seamen (prisoners of war) to assist in navigating their vessels, on the usual terms, by applying to

GEORGE MAUDE, *Agent.*

*Extract from a memorial addressed to the Secretary of State, by James Orm, Joseph B. Cook, Thomas Humphries and others, masters of American vessels, who were prisoners of war in England, and returned to the United States in the cartel ship Robinson Potter.*

"We shall now proceed to give as correct a statement as we can of the treatment of our countrymen (prisoners of war) by the British in England. On the arrival at Plymouth of the masters, first mates, supercargoes, and passengers, they are sent to Mill prison, for one day and night; they have an iron bedstead to sleep on, with a small mattress which might easily be put into a countryman's wallet, and a small coarse blanket. The allowance for twenty-four hours, is three small salt herrings, or about the same weight of salted cod-fish, or half a pound of beef, one and a half pounds of black bread, a little salt, &c. &c. The second day they are paroled and sent to Ashburton, twenty-four miles from Plymouth; they must pay their own expenses to get there. While they are there they are allowed 1s. 3d. per diem, or 8s. 9d. sterling per week. Beef is 10d. per pound, bread in proportion, and every other necessary equally dear. The mates, who have nothing but their pay to live upon, join together, eight or ten in a mess, hire a room, and do their own cooking, washing, &c. &c. and in this way make out to keep from starving. Masters, supercargoes, and passengers, generally, have other resources, through their correspondents in England, and make out to live, by great economy, at from 30s. to 35s. sterling per week; the second mates and other officers are sent on board the different prison ships. On board some of them they are treated by the commanding officer as well as the nature of their situation will admit; on board of some others, they are very badly treated. This, it will naturally occur to you, sir, is owing to the different characters of the different commanders. Their allowance is 10½lb. brown bread, 2½lb. beef, 2lb. bad fish, 2lb. potatoes, and 10 ounces barley per week for each man, and 5 ounces salt per week for ten men. The prison ships are kept very filthy, and the prisoners are confined below at 4 P. M. and are kept in that situation until 7 or 8 A. M. At Portsmouth, particularly, they are very sickly, and we are informed die very fast, some days from eight to ten; in fact, they are very sickly on board all of them; several of this description came home with us in the Robinson Potter cartel, and had, when they came on board, the appearance of having made their escape from a church yard. It is not perhaps amiss, that we should state what we firmly believe; that is, it is the policy of the British Government to select the sickly to be first sent in cartels, and keep the hale and hardy seamen until they become sickly; thus rendering the whole of those gallant sons of Neptune, who escape death, when they return to their homes, at least for some time, perfectly useless to themselves, and quite so to their country, from their debilitated state; and, in fact, the probability is, that many of them will carry to their graves the indelible stamp upon their constitutions of the treatment which they received on board British prison ships: for that nation seems to have lost its boasted humanity, and if we did not find the word in their vocabulary, we should suppose it had never found a place there. Many of the seamen, prisoners on board those prison-ships, are impressed Americans, who have given themselves up, refusing to fight against their country. Four hundred on board the fleet in the Mediterranean, a short time before we left England, surrendered themselves and were sent to Gibraltar and England; several of them were most severely flogged for refusing to do their duty, were put in irons, and most of them, to their immortal credit, submitted to the severest punishment in preference to assist the enemies of their country. Some of us, whose signatures are annexed, were witnesses to the cruel fact. A tablet of gold is not rich enough to inscribe the names of such men upon; and when a country can boast of such seamen, she has nothing to fear from the enemy on the ocean on an equal footing. Captain Jeduthan Upton, late master of the private armed brig *Hunter*, of Salem, of fourteen guns, because he threw them overboard in chase, was not allowed his parole, but kept in close confinement for a long time in Mill prison, and lately has been sent on board a prison ship at Chatham. We mention these facts in hopes that government will retaliate exactly in the same way. Captain Samuel Turner, late master of the *Purse schooner*, of New York, was taken on his passage to France, in October, 1811, prior to the war, and in retaking his vessel, the prize master, a British midshipman, was killed; he arrived safely in France, and on his return to America, was again taken, in June, 1812, and sent to England, when being recognised, he was immediately arrested and sent on board the *St. Salvador*, Admiral Calder's flag ship, at Plymouth, where he remained a close prisoner until about January or February last, when he was sent on board the prison ship at Chatham, where we fear he will remain until death relieves him: he has been very ill treated, much abused, put in irons, and after, threatened to be hanged. These facts, some of us who sign this were witness to. We pray, in the name of justice, that Government will take, without delay, the case of Captain Turner into their serious consideration; it is a case which we think demands it; and the only way to prevent that nation from committing further outrages so degrading to human nature. We find in Roman history, that an injury or insult offered to a Roman citizen by a foreign Power, was considered as an insult offered to the whole Roman nation, and hope this will also be the American creed, because we believe it will be the surest way of putting a stop to those indignities which Americans have so often been obliged to suffer. We are, however, no advocates for cruelty, but, on the contrary, for lenity; yet we still believe, that in certain cases retaliation is not only necessary, but becomes a duty to prevent further cruelties on the part of an enemy."

NASSAU, *November 27, 1812.*

DEAR BROTHER:

I embrace this, the earliest, opportunity of communicating to you, that, on the 9th instant, fifteen days out, we fell in with and captured the fine copper bottomed ship *Venus*, vessel and cargo worth at least twenty-five thousand dollars. On the 12th, pursuing our course, and within five days' run of your place, we were captured by his Majesty's sloop *Moselle*, George Moubray, commander, and brought into this place. We remained on board the sloop two or three days, and on the 19th were transferred from thence to the prison ship, where we are now imprisoned, with an allowance of six ounces of bread, three gills of rice, eight ounces of the worst of beef, including bone, which is as much as meat, with as much brackish water as we can use; guarded day and night by ten or fifteen savage Africans, who are total strangers to humanity, and confined every evening at sun-down, not to be released until next morning sun-rise, abused to the lowest degree by the guard, and compelled to find salt for, and cook, our own victuals with green mangoes. None of us are ever permitted, under any conditions whatever, to visit the shores, with many other barbarous acts, which are too numerous to describe. This will be conveyed by the cartel sloop, captain Cooper, being the second cartel which has sailed since our arrival here. A schooner from Baltimore was only allowed eight men, and Cooper, who brought sixty-four prisoners, is only allowed eighteen in return, while we, eighteen in number, are detained in this miserable place; for which we cannot assign any reason, except to punish us as privateersmen, or as hostages for those twelve lately detained in Charleston; this last is the general belief, and as such, I deem a communication of the circumstance essential to Commodore Dent, commander of the southern station, that he may look to it and inquire the cause why Americans are to be detained here two or three months, while more prisoners have been received here, by a great many, than what have been sent to the United States. Men who have arrived here since we, have been sent off; they proceed with no degree of regularity in the exchange of prisoners, and act in open contradiction to every thing right, and really believe, that except you make known the circumstances, and use some favorable exertions, that some of us will be intentionally detained until the end of our present contest with Great Britain. As I wish your exertions for our exchange, I have subjoined a list of those who are thus miserably treated, that we may be demanded in a proper way. The *Rapid's* crew have been imprisoned here near three months, and have now no prospect of getting away, while the crews of two other privateers have been released.

## CREW OF THE LOVELY LASS.

Lieut. Antine Lambert,  
William L. Robeson.  
William Thomas,  
John Crandel,  
David Ashton,

John Gamache,  
John Hynes,  
Darius Swain,  
John M'Kenzie.

## RAPID'S CREW.

Captain Lameson,  
Peter Ia Vella,  
George Alexander,

James T. Miller,  
Francis Martin,  
Gaugion Bigulows.

## OTHER PRISONERS.

Simon West,

Matthew Bridge.

I wrote Mr. Peck and requested him to forward me a letter of introduction to some one here, and also a protection showing that I am an American. As it is possible that he may not get my letter, you will notice my request and pay that attention which it deserves. I mentioned in my letter to Mr. Peck, that any funds which I received here would be returned on application, as my expenditures will, through an economical principle, be as small as possible. I indulge the hope that you will conform to my wishes in this particular, and also inform Mr. Kelly of our imprisonment here, and request his influence in facilitating our exchange, with any other service.

We have no chance of gaining information here. Every person uses every exertion to keep us in ignorance; however, we are enabled to say, that the English prisoners have generally combined in speaking of the treatment they received in the United States.

I am, your affectionate brother,

WILLIAM L. ROBESON.

Capt. THOMAS J. ROBESON,

N. B. The *Moselle*, *Rhodian*, and *Variable*, three men of war, have just convoyed five or six vessels over the bar, bound to some part of England; it is supposed that they will return to cruise off Charleston. In case you address or send any thing for me to this place, you will direct to the care of Messrs. Bain, Dunshie, & Co. merchants here.

I am, yours, &c.

W. L. R.

HARTFORD, *May 9, 1813.*

SIR:

Annexed is Captain Samuel Chew's deposition, taken before Judge Edwards at New Haven. We expected it in season to have forwarded it by Mr. Dodd, but received it last evening by Mr. Huntington, the United States' Attorney for Connecticut district, and now forward it to you per mail.

Yours, respectfully,

HON. JAMES MONROE.

LUTHER SAVAGE & Co.

## CONNECTICUT DISTRICT, ss.

On this day, the 7th of May, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and thirteen, personally came before me, Pierpont Edwards, Judge of the district court of the United States, for the district aforesaid, Samuel Chew, of the city of New Haven, in the said district, and being duly sworn, deposed, That he was at Bridgetown, in the Island of Barbadoes, in the West Indies, in the month of February now last past; that on board a British prison ship, at Barbadoes, there were confined about five hundred and twenty-three American prisoners, of the crews of private armed vessels of the United States and merchantmen, captured since the war. At the time the deponent was at Barbadoes the American prisoners were supplied with bread and some meat; as to vegetables, the deponent was not informed. The regulations on board the said prison ship compelled the prisoners to go below decks, where they were confined at evening and until morning; as many as could were suspended in hammocks, and still there was not sufficient room below them for all to lie down. In this respect the situation of the prisoners was not only extremely uncomfortable, but hazardous, and more especially, should there be, as was apprehended, a scarcity of provisions during the approaching hot months. The deponent was not permitted to go on board said prison ship, but derived his information from masters of vessels, prisoners at said island, who were allowed occasionally to go on board said prison ship, with whom the deponent is personally acquainted, and in whose representations he has the most perfect confidence, and entertains no doubt of the facts by them stated; and this statement is given at the request of the friends of some of the prisoners at Barbadoes, particularly of the crew of the privateer *Blockade*, at Hartford.

PIERPONT EDWARDS, *District Judge of Connecticut District.*

I, Pierpont Edwards, Judge of the district court of the United States for the Connecticut district, do hereby certify and make known to all whom it may concern, that Captain Samuel Chew, the within named deponent, is a gentleman to me well known, having known him for many years: he is the son of Captain Samuel Chew, late of the

city of New Haven, deceased, and who fell by a cannon ball on board an American vessel during the revolutionary war: that the said deponent is a man of strict integrity, and attached to the constitution and Government of the United States, and the most perfect confidence is due to his said representations so as aforesaid sworn to.

PIERPONT EDWARDS, *District Judge of Connecticut District.*

MILVILLE PRISON, *August 30, 1812.*

SIR:

We, the subscribers, for ourselves and our countrymen, now confined as prisoners of war in Milville prison, Halifax, Nova Scotia, beg leave to represent to the American Government, that most of us have, for years past, made commerce our sole employment and hope, in which, for seven years or more, we have often been wantonly robbed by the English of what we had acquired by industry and danger, and while they striped us of our property, they often treated us with the greatest indignity, and even barbarity.

We have seen and known that they have often violated the sacred privilege of individual liberty and the law of nations; we are conscious of the long forbearance of our Government, and their repeated calls upon the honor and justice of the British nation, which, instead of redress, added other injuries; and when the hope of amicable remuneration had failed, and for retaliation our Government was forced to the last resort, an appeal to arms, we felt the justness of our cause, and hoped for the blessing of Heaven for success. To serve our country and to make up the losses which we had sustained, we, under commissions from the President of the United States, entered on board of privateers, and have unfortunately been captured by the British. We would state, that, in many instances after we had struck our colors, we were fired upon by cannon and muskets, by broadsides and volleys, and some of our men killed, and after our captors had come on board, some of us have been struck and severely wounded with cutlasses, without the least provocation for such inhumanity. Our American protections have been forced from us and destroyed, and some native American citizens have been taken out of our privateers and put on board British ships, and there obliged to serve. Most of us have been robbed of every thing, even of necessary clothing. When we were going from the ships to prison, the officers would not permit us to take our clothing and baggage with us, but pledged themselves that they should be sent to prison; but, disregarding their honor, we have lost all. Some of us have been marched thirty, and some sixty, and some one hundred and sixty miles over a miserable country, forced along beyond our strength, half starved, and some in irons. Our allowance, each man per day, one pound and a half of bread, a half pound of poor beef, well proportioned with bone, one gill of peas, one-third of an ounce of salt. We are without wearing apparel and without money, or any means of procuring them. A cold winter in this wretched country fast approaches, and in our destitute situation we must endure every thing, and many of us must perish. There are now of us in prison upwards of twelve hundred. Every art has been practised by the English officers to excite disaffection in our men to the American Government, and to induce them to enter into the English service. Necessity may oblige some to desert us and enter into British servitude, but we trust that speedy relief from our Government will save them from that wretched alternative of perishing with want or joining our enemies. For ourselves and the rest of the prisoners, we must say, we have now no fortunes to devote to the service of our country, but we have hearts which yet feel warmly the general impulse, and which we pledge, if opportunity ever again presents, to devote in the interest and service of our country.

We are now sufferers, but we will cheerfully suffer every hardship of war rather than sue for dishonorable peace. We respectfully request an exchange or some provision for relief. We feel the fullest confidence in our Government, and that we need only to apprise them of our situation to ensure their assistance and protection.

Yours, &c.

JOSEPH STARR, *Boston,*  
 FREDERICK JOHNSON, *New York,*  
 ROBERT McKEARNY, *New York,*  
 RICHARD RHEA, *New Jersey,*  
 GEORGE BATTERMAN, *Boston,*  
 JOHN HAZELTON, *Boston,*  
 WILLIAM DYER, *Boston,*  
 JAMES TRASK, *Boston,*  
 SOLOMON NORTON, *Boston,*  
 ALEXR. B. LATHAM, *New London.*  
 DARIUS DENISON, *New York,*  
 EASTWICK PRAY, *Portsmouth,*  
 WILLIAM TEMOLD, *Portsmouth,*  
 FOBES DALA, *Portland,*  
 CHARLES THOMPSON, Jr. *New York.*

HON. JAMES MONROE, *Secretary of State, &c.*

No. 2.

*Detention of American Prisoners as British subjects.*

OFFICE OF COMMISSARY GENERAL OF PRISONERS,

WASHINGTON, *June 10, 1813.*

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit the copy of a letter from Captain Stewart, commanding the United States' naval forces at Norfolk, dated the 20th of May, to Admiral Warren, and that of a letter from Rear Admiral Cockburn, dated the 21st of May, in reply, relative to a most unjustifiable act of Commodore Berresford, as to part of the officers and crew of the late United States' brig Vixen, at the mouth of the Delaware. Leaving the general question of the interference of Commodore Berresford with these prisoners of war returning on parole, and the exaction made by him in consequence of the irregular power thus assumed, on the ground on which Captain Stewart has very properly placed it, I will remark, that Captain Stewart was certainly misapprehended by Admiral Cockburn, in attributing to him the intention of conveying a threat, as to the final detention of two of the American prisoners. On the contrary, the expression used by Captain Stewart communicates, in very plain terms, the decision of this Government, then already made, that four of his Britannic Majesty's subjects should be immediately selected and held in durance, subject to the same treatment in all respects, &c.

And I have now to inform you, sir, that, in virtue of this decision, and by an order from this office, the marshal of Massachusetts has designated, and placed in close confinement, William Kitto, carpenter, and Thomas Beddingfield, boatswain of the late British packet Swallow, and John Squirrel and James Russel, seamen of the Dragon seventy-four, subjects of his Britannic Majesty, to be held responsible for the safety of John Stevens, carpenter, and Thomas King, seaman, part of the crew of the late United States' brig Vixen.

I flatter myself, sir, that this subject will command your early attention, and that you will cause the officer and seamen of the *Vixen* to be immediately released and returned to this country, according to their destination when taken from the cartel.

Very respectfully, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,  
J. MASON.

To Colonel THOMAS BARCLAY, &c.

H. M. S. POICTIERS, *May 8, 1813.*

SIR:

I am sorry I am under the necessity of detaining John Stevens and John King, late of the *Vixen*, in consequence of their being British subjects.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

J. P. BERRESFORD.

To Lieutenant DRAYTON.

UNITED STATES' FRIGATE CONSTELLATION,  
*Off Norfolk, May 20, 1813.*

SIR:

I have the honor to represent to your Excellency, that a part of the officers and crew of the late United States' brig *Vixen*, returning from Jamaica on parole as prisoners of war, were, on entering the Delaware, taken out of the flag of truce by Commodore Berresford, commanding that station, and detained until a part of the crew of the *Poictiers*, then prisoners at Philadelphia, were demanded by him and sent down in exchange; that ultimately he detained on board the *Poictiers* John Stevens, carpenter, and Thomas King, seaman, late of the United States' brig *Vixen*, on plea of their being subjects of his Britannic Majesty.

This violation of the rights of prisoners on parole is so contrary to the usage of all civilized nations, that I trust your Excellency will give such instructions upon that head as will prevent a similar violation in future.

I have it in command, from my Government, to state to your Excellency that, in retaliation for so violent and unjust a procedure, on the part of Commodore Berresford, in detaining the above Mr. John Stevens and Thos. King, that four subjects of his Britannic Majesty will be immediately selected and held in durance, subject to the same treatment, in all respects, which may be shown towards the aforesaid two persons during their detention. I hope your Excellency will give this subject your earliest attention, and direct the release of Mr. Stevens and Thomas King, who have been so improperly detained on board the *Poictiers*.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your Excellency's most obedient servant,

CHARLES STEWART,

*Commanding Officer of the United States' Naval forces at Norfolk.*

To his Excellency the Right Hon. Sir JOHN B. WARREN,

Admiral of the Blue, and Commander-in-chief of H. B. Majesty's Naval forces on the American station.

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP MARLBOROUGH,  
*In Lynhaven Bay, May 21, 1813.*

SIR:

In the absence of Sir John Warren, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter under date of the 20th current, complaining of the conduct of Commodore Berresford towards some American prisoners of war returning to Philadelphia on parole, and of his having detained on board the *Poictiers* Mr. John Stevens and Thomas King.

No report of these circumstances have yet reached Sir John Warren or myself from Commodore Berresford; but I have no hesitation in assuring you, sir, that every inquiry would have been made into them, and every satisfaction and explanation thereon, which the case might have required, would have been offered to your Government and yourself, with the least possible delay, had it not been for the threat with which your representation on this subject is accompanied, the tenor of which being likely to produce an entire change in the aspect of our communications, and particularly in what relates to the individuals which the fate of war has placed within the power of our respective nations, it totally precludes the possibility of my now entering further into the subject than to assure you your letter shall be transmitted to the right honorable the Commander-in-chief by the earliest opportunity, and whenever his answer arrives it shall be forwarded to you without delay.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high consideration, your most obedient humble servant,

G. COCKBURN, *Rear Admiral.*

Capt. STEWART, *commanding the Naval forces of the United States at Norfolk.*

SHARK, PORT ROYAL, (*Jamaica*) *March 29, 1813.*

SIR:

Captain Moubray, of his Majesty's sloop *Moselle*, has just sent to me the copy of a letter from you to him, and another to Mr. Cook, of his Majesty's late sloop *Rhodian*, dated the 25th ult., respecting six men\* mentioned in the margin, who were sent here from the Bahamas as having been taken in the American privateer *Sarah Ann*, and supposed to be subjects of his Majesty; but, as no proof to what country they belong has been adduced, it has never been my intention to bring them to trial, and they are at present on board the prison ships, waiting an exchange of prisoners.

I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES STIRLING, *Vice Admiral.*

CHARLES R. SIMPSON, Esq.

HARLEM, *June 1, 1813.*

SIR:

I beg leave to refer you to a communication which took place some time in the autumn or winter preceding, between Mr. Baker, his Majesty's late agent for prisoners of war, and Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, respecting six of the crew of the late American privateer *Sarah Ann*, Richard Moore, master, captured by his Majesty's sloop *Rhodian*, John George Ross, Esq. commander, whose names\* are inserted in the margin, and who, it appears, were sent to Jamaica, to which station the *Rhodian* belonged, on suspicion of their being subjects of his Majesty. And I further request your attention to a letter from Major General Pinckney to the Secretary of War, dated Head Quarters, Charleston, 4th of November, 1812, from which it appears that twelve of his Majesty's subjects, then prisoners of war at Charleston, were held in prison to answer in their persons for the fate of the six men, of the *Sarah Ann* privateer, sent to Jamaica.

I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a letter from Vice Admiral Stirling, commanding his Majesty's ships of war on the Jamaica station, to Mr. Simpson, late sub-agent for prisoners of war at Charleston, from which you will perceive, that the six men of the *Sarah Ann* are considered by the admiral as American prisoners generally, and are now on board a prison ship, in common with other American prisoners.

\* Edward Dick, Thomas Rodgers, Adam Taylor, Jonn Gaul, Mike Piuck, Geo. G. Roberts.

Having given you this information with respect to the six men of the Sarah Ann privateer, I have to request you will take the necessary measures to have the contingent responsibility which it was thought proper to attach to the persons of twelve British seamen, now in prison at Charleston, taken off, and that they may be informed thereof. I understand that John Gaul, one of the six men, was paroled, and arrived at Georgetown, South Carolina, in the brig Cyprus, and that he has reported himself to the marshal, who informed Mr. Simpson "that he had sent on to the Department of State his parole."

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most humble servant,

THOS. BARCLAY.

General MASON.

OFFICE OF COMMISSARY GENERAL OF PRISONERS,  
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1813.

SIR:

I learn, with pleasure, by the letter you did me the honor to address me on the 1st instant, and the letter from Admiral Stirling you have enclosed, that the six men belonging to the American privateer Sarah Ann, detained in October last, and sent to Jamaica to be tried as British subjects, have been restored to the ordinary state of prisoners of war, to wait an exchange, and that there is now no intention to bring them to trial.

I very cheerfully comply with your request, sir, and have this day directed the marshal of South Carolina to restore, in like manner, to the ordinary state of prisoners of war, the twelve British seamen, confined under the orders of this Government, by him, and to inform them that the responsibility attached to their persons for the safety of the men of the Sarah Ann has been taken off.

Very respectfully, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. MASON.

Colonel THOMAS BARCLAY.

CHILLICOTHE, June 8, 1813.

SIR:

I feel it my duty to lay before you the case of William M'Dowel Scott, late of Detroit, an unfortunate fellow citizen who has been seized and apprehended by the British commanding officer at Detroit and sent to Quebec, where he is now confined under pretence of being a British subject, and one found in arms in behalf of the United States against that Government.

William M'Dowel Scott is a native of Ireland, and emigrated to the United States about eighteen years since. He resided for some years in the State of New York, and in the summer of 1800, he came to Detroit, established himself as a physician, and has ever since resided there. He has been naturalized agreeably to the laws of the United States, and this fact is well known to the British Government: and both in the territory of Indiana, before that territory was divided, and subsequently in the territory of Michigan, he has held and filled with respect and fidelity some of the first offices in those two territories.

Such, for example, as a justice of the peace and a judge of the common pleas in the Indiana territory, and subsequently marshal of the territory of Michigan.

In all these offices, sir, and in every other situation, in which Doctor Scott's public and political character has been or can be viewed, he has uniformly manifested an undeviating attachment to the principles of our constitution and the administration of this Government.

His support, in the present cause, during the time that General Hull lay at Sandwich and Detroit, was not outdone by any person whatever. In fact it was his unwearied exertions that have provoked and spirited up the British to that line of conduct and persecution they are now pursuing towards him.

Proctor, who sent him from Detroit, and Sir George Prevost, who received him at Fort George and forwarded him to Quebec, threaten to treat him with all the severities authorized by the laws of nations and the usages of war, in cases of an actual bona fide British subject found in arms against that Government.

I do not, for myself, however, entertain a belief that they will dare to put their threats in execution to their full extent. But, sir, without the interference of the Government, they will detain him during the war, and they will make his life so wretched and miserable that death would be a welcome messenger.

I hope, sir, the occasion will be a sufficient apology for obtruding this communication upon you. I am amongst the number of those who have not the honor of a personal acquaintance with you. But General Taylor, who I look to as the bearer of it, is a gentleman to whom I am personally known, and who has likewise a pretty correct knowledge of the character of Doctor Scott.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. BRUSH.

The Honorable JAMES MONROE, Esq.

*Extract of a letter from John Mitchell, Esq. agent for American prisoners of war at Halifax, to the Secretary of State, dated*

*May 28th, 1813.*

"I have just been informed by the agent for prisoners, that Mr. John Light, of the Julian Smith, a privateer commanded by Captain Henry Cooper, will be detained here in consequence of his having, previous to the war, taken the oath of allegiance in this province, (Nova Scotia) and commanded a vessel out of this place (Halifax.) Mr. Light was lieutenant of the privateer when captured by the Nymph, the 12th May, 1813."

H. M. S. POICTIERS, May 8th, 1813.

SIR:

I am sorry I am under the necessity of detaining J. Stevens and T. King, late of the Vixen, in consequence of their being British subjects.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

J. P. BERRESFORD.

To Lieut. DRAYTON.

The original is in the possession of the commissary general of prisoners.

W. JONES.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 17, 1813.

SIR:

You are hereby authorized and instructed to address a letter to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, representing the following facts and determination, viz. That a part of the officers and crew of the late United States' brig Vixen were returning from Jamaica, on parole, as prisoners of war, and entering the Delaware, when Commodore Berresford caused them to be brought on board the Poictiers, and detained until a part of the crew of that ship, whom he demanded in exchange, were sent down from Philadelphia; that ultimately, he detained John Stevens, carpenter, and Thomas King, seaman, two of the aforesaid crew of the Vixen, on the plea of their being British subjects, as

appears by a letter from Commodore Berresford to Lieutenant Drayton, late first of the said brig Vixen; and that you are commanded explicitly to declare, that, in retaliation for the violent and unjust detention of the said John Stevens and Thomas King, the Government of the United States will immediately cause *four* British subjects to be selected and held in duress, subject to the same treatment, in all respects, that the said John Stevens and Thomas King may receive during their detention.

On the receipt of the admiral's answer, you will communicate the same to me without delay.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. JONES.

CHARLES STEWART, Esq. *Commanding Naval Officer, Norfolk, Va.*

*Col. W. Scott to the Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1813.

SIR:

I think it my duty to lay before the Department, that, on the arrival at Quebec of the American prisoners of war, surrendered at Queenstown, they were mustered and examined by British officers appointed to that duty, and every native born of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland sequestered and sent on board a ship of war then in that harbor. The vessel, in a few days thereafter, sailed for England, with those persons on board.

Between fifteen and twenty persons were thus taken from us, principally natives of Ireland, several of whom were known by their platoon officers to be naturalized citizens of the United States, and others to have been long residents within the same. One in particular, whose name has escaped me, besides having complied with all the conditions of our naturalization laws, was represented by his officers to have left a wife and five children, all of them born within the State of New York.

I distinctly understood, as well from the officers who came on board the prison ship for the above purpose, as from others, with whom I remonstrated on this subject, that it was the determination of the British Government, as expressed through Sir George Prevost, to punish every man, whom it might subject to its power, found in arms against the British King contrary to his native allegiance.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. SCOTT, *Lieutenant Colonel United States' 2d Artillery.*

*Mr. Beasley to the Secretary of State.*

LONDON, March 1st, 1813.

SIR:

Annexed you have a copy of a letter from Henry Kelly, in behalf of himself and twenty-two persons. He states that they are all citizens of the United States, and have wives and families there; that they were taken last October, in Upper Canada, and that they were sent to this country because they were born within the British dominions.

I am, respectfully, &c.

R. G. BEASLEY.

*On board H. M. S. Namur, lying at the Nore, February 6, 1813.*

SIR:

This is to inform you of the under named twenty-three American soldiers belonging to the 13th, 6th, and 1st regiments of the United States' armies. We were taken on the 13th of October, in Upper Canada. The reason of their sending us twenty-three here, is, we were born in the British dominions, though we are all citizens of the United States, and have our wives and children there. We are in a very miserable situation for clothing, having drawn no winter clothes before we were taken. We therefore hope you will send us some relief to shelter us from the inclemency of the weather.

Sir, I remain your obedient servant,

HENRY KELLY.

Sir, these are the names of my fellow sufferers:

Henry Blaney,  
George M'Cammon,  
John Dolton,  
Michael Condin,  
John Clark,  
Peter Burr,  
Andrew Doyle,  
John M'Gowen,  
James Gill,  
John Fulsum,  
Patrick M'Braharty,

Matthew Mooney,  
Patrick Karns,  
John Fitzgerald,  
John Wiley,  
John Donnelly,  
John Curry,  
Nathan Shaley,  
Edward M'Garigan,  
John Dimmie,  
John Williams,  
George Johnson.

Mr. R. G. BEASLEY.

*Extract of a letter from Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren to the Secretary of State, dated*

BERMUDA, March 8, 1813.

"I must refer you to my letter of the 30th of September, 1812, in which I stated the circumstance of twelve men belonging to the *Guerriere*, taken out of a cartel by Commodore Rodgers, and illegally detained, upon the pretext of six others, who were supposed to be British subjects, having been sent to the United Kingdom for examination; since that event, five of these people, named in the enclosed list, have been received at Halifax, with orders for their discharge. I therefore request you will communicate these particulars to the President, in order that further directions may be given respecting the *Guerriere's* men, so long confined at Boston, and to obviate the other inconveniences which must inevitably arise from such practices."

*The Secretary of State to Admiral Warren (extract) dated April 16, 1813.*

"It appears by your letter (of the 8th of March from Bermuda) that five only of the seamen that were taken on board the *Nautilus* and sent to England, in confinement have been returned. No account is given of the sixth. Orders have been issued for the release of ten of the twelve men, who, on the principle of retaliation, were confined by Commodore Rodgers at Boston. You will be sensible that it will be impossible, on that principle, to discharge the other two men until the sixth American seaman is returned, or such an explanation given of the cause of his

detention, as, according to the circumstances of the case, regarding the conduct of the British Government towards American seamen under similar circumstances, ought to be satisfactory."

*Extract of a letter from Lieutenant F. H. Babbitt to Master Commandant Wm. M. Crane, of the United States' Navy, (late of the United States' brig Nautilus,) dated*

Boston, Mass. 13th September, 1812.

Enclosed I send you a description of the proportion of our little crew, who have been so debased and traitorous as to enter the service of our enemy. Also, a list\* of those gallant fellows, whose glory it would have been to have lost their lives in the service of their country, and whose misfortune it has been to cross the Atlantic on suspicion of their being British subjects: four of them, native born Americans, and two naturalized citizens. On their parting with me, and removal from the Africa of 64 guns to the Thetis frigate, (the latter with a convoy from England, then in 43 30 N. and 46 30 W.) their last request and desire was, that I would particularly acquaint you with their situation, with their determination never to prove traitors to that country whose flag they were proud to serve under, and whose welfare and prosperity they equally hoped and anticipated to realise.

F. H. BABBITT.

*A list of men said to have entered on board his Britannic Majesty's frigate Shannon, Commodore Broke. Their description, as far as known.*

Jesse Bates, seaman; about five feet nine inches high, dark hair and complexion, dark snapping eyes, has an impediment in his speech, and at times affects lunacy; has a wife and family in Boston, Massachusetts.

Samuel Lang, marine, born in Kentucky, five feet eight inches high, or thereabouts, and is supposed to be with captain Hall, of the United States' marines, New York.

John Young, marine, five feet five inches high, large mouth, enlisted with captain Hall, Navy Yard, New York; when addressed, or is addressing an officer, casts down his eyes. For his particular description, as well as that of John Rose, marine, about five feet eight inches high, brown hair, full face, thick set, and a scowl in his countenance, refer to captain John Hall.

John O'Neal, seaman, about twenty-five years of age, five feet five inches high, dark hair, sharp face, dark eyes, thick set, and was shipped at Norfolk, Virginia, previous to your taking command of the Nautilus.

William Jones, ordinary seaman, about five feet eight inches high, light hair, twenty-four years of age, full face, thick set, downcast look, and is a very alert man; entered at New York, April last.

F. H. B.

*Sir John Borlase Warren to Mr. Monroe.*

HALIFAX, 30th September, 1812.

SIR:

Having received information that a most unauthorized act has been committed by Commodore Rodgers, in forcibly seizing twelve British seamen, prisoners of war, late belonging to the Guerriere, and taking them out of the English cartel brig Endeavor, on her passage down the harbor of Boston, after they had been regularly embarked on board of her for exchange, agreeable to the arrangements settled between the two countries, and that the said British seamen, so seized, are now detained on board the United States' frigate President, as hostages; I feel myself called upon to request, sir, your most serious attention to a measure so fraught with mischief and inconvenience, destructive of the good faith of a flag of truce, and the sacred protection of a cartel. I should be extremely sorry that the imprudent act of an officer should involve consequences so particularly severe as the present instance must naturally produce if repeated; and although it is very much my wish, during the continuance of the differences existing between the two countries, to adopt every measure that might render the effect of war less rigorous, yet in another point of view, the conviction of the duty I owe my country would, in the event of such grievances, as I have already stated, being continued, not admit of any hesitation in retaliatory decisions: but as I am strongly persuaded of the high liberality of your sentiments, and that the act complained of, has originated entirely with the officer who committed it, and that it will be as censurable in your consideration as it deserves, I rely upon your taking such steps as will prevent a recurrence of conduct so extremely reprehensible in every shape.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration,

Sir, your most obedient and most faithful humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN,  
*Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief, &c.*

His Excellency JAMES MONROE, Esq. *Secretary of State.*

*Mr. Monroe to Sir John Borlase Warren.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, October 28, 1812.

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th September, complaining that Commodore Rodgers, commanding a squadron of the United States' navy at the port of Boston, had taken twelve British seamen, lately belonging to His Britannic Majesty's ship the Guerriere, from a cartel in the harbor of Boston, and that he detained them on board the President, a frigate of the United States, as hostages.

I am instructed to inform you that inquiry shall be made into the circumstances attending, and the causes which produced, the act of which you complain, and that such measures will be taken, on a knowledge of them, as may comport with the rights of both nations, and may be proper in the case to which they relate.

I beg you, sir, to be assured, that it is the sincere desire of the President, to see (and to promote, so far as depends on the United States) that the war which exists between our countries be conducted with the utmost regard to humanity.

I have the honor, &c.

JAMES MONROE.

Sir JOHN BORLASE WARREN, *Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief, &c.*

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1812.

SIR:

I have the honor to annex a list of twelve of the crew of the late United States' sloop of war Wasp, detained by Captain John Berresford, of the British ship Poitiers, under the pretence of their being British subjects.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

GEORGE S. WISE, *Purser.*

The Honorable PAUL HAMILTON, *Secretary of the Navy.*

\*This list not received.

*List referred to in the preceding Note.*

John M'Loud,	-	boatswain,	-	} Has been in the service since 1804. Married in Norfolk in 1804 or 5, and has a wife and four children there. Has been in the service five or six years. Has a protection, and has sailed out of New York and Philadelphia for several years.  The greater number, if not all, had protections at the time of entering and being taken. Two others were detained, John Wade and Thomas Hutchins, but were given up—the former on Captain Jones assuring Captain Berresford he knew him to be a native citizen; the latter on a like assurance from D. Rodgers. William Mitchell was in the service during 1805—6 in the Mediterranean.
John Stephens,	-	boatswain's mate,	-	
Geo. M. D. Read,	-	quartermaster,	-	
William Mitchell,	-	seaman,	-	
James Gothright,	-	do.	-	
John Wright,	-	do.	-	
Thomas Philips,	-	do.	-	
Peter Barron,	-	do.	-	
John Connor,	-	ordinary seaman,	-	
John Rose,	-	do.	-	
George Brooks,	-	do.	-	
Dennis Daugherty,	-	marine,	-	

WASHINGTON CITY, December 17, 1812.

GEORGE S. WISE, Purser.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Pinckney to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, CHARLESTON, November 4, 1812.

"Information having been given upon oath to Lieutenant Grandison, who, at present, commands the naval department here, that six American seamen, who had been taken prisoners on board our privateers, had been sent to Jamaica to be tried as British subjects for treason, he called upon the marshal to retain double that number of British seamen as hostages. The marshal, in consequence of instructions from the Department of State, asked my advice on the subject, and I have given my opinion that they ought to be detained, until the pleasure of the President shall be known. The testimony of Captain Moon is herewith. I hope, sir, you will have the goodness to have this business put in the proper train to have the President's pleasure on this subject communicated to the marshal."

*Copy of a letter from Captain Moon, of the privateer Sarah Ann.*

NASSAU, NEW PROVIDENCE, October 14, 1812.

Six of my crew, claimed as British subjects, were this day taken out of jail and put on board His Majesty's brig the Sappho, and sailed for Jamaica, where, it is said, they are to be tried for their lives; consequently, I questioned each respectively as to the place of their nativity, and title to protection by the American Government, when they stated as follows, to wit:

David Dick, seaman, that he was born in the north of Ireland, but has resided in the United States ever since the year 1793; has served ten years in the United States' navy, viz: On board the frigates Chesapeake, President, Constitution, John Adams, and schooner Enterprise, and gun boat No. 2. David Dick, shoemaker, in Alexandria, is his uncle. Dick is about five feet six and a half inches high, dark hair, has a scar on his left elbow, and one on each wrist; he entered on board the Sarah Ann in Baltimore.

John Gaul, seaman, says he was born in Marblehead, State of Massachusetts; where his parents, brothers, and sisters, now reside; is married in New York, and his wife (Mary Gaul) lives in Roosevelt street, No. 37; has a regular discharge from the navy of the United States, by Captain Hugh G. Campbell, dated at St. Mary's, Georgia, 14th August, 1812; says he has served on board the United States' brig Vixen, gun boats No. 10 and 158, from the last of which he was discharged. Gaul is 27 years of age, about five feet seven inches high, brown hair, light complexion; he entered on board the Sarah Ann in Baltimore.

Michael Pluck, ordinary seaman, says he was born in Baltimore; his parents are dead, but is known by William Douland, Thomas Turner, and M'Donald of Baltimore; has a sister in some part of Pennsylvania, whose name is Ann Welsh; was never at sea before; never had a protection. Pluck is twenty-six years old, five feet six and a half inches high, and has a scar on his left cheek bone; entered on board the Sarah Ann at Baltimore.

Thomas Rodgers, seaman, says that he was born in Waterford, Ireland, but has resided many years in the United States, and has been duly naturalized, a copy of which naturalization is filed in the custom house at Baltimore; is known by Joseph Carey and Tom. Rodgers, cork cutter, both of Baltimore; has a wife and three children in Baltimore; has lost his protection, but requests Joseph Carey to do all he can to effect his discharge from the British. Rodgers entered on board the Sarah Ann in Baltimore.

George Roberts, a colored man and seaman. This man I had not an opportunity of questioning; but I know him to be a native born citizen of the United States, of which fact he had every sufficient document, together with free papers. Roberts entered on board the Sarah Ann in Baltimore, where he is married.

Sonty Taylor, boy, says he was born in Hackensack, New Jersey, but has neither friends, relations, nor acquaintance there; says Jane Snowden, of Savannah, Georgia, is his mother; never had a protection. Taylor is fifteen years old, has brown hair and light complexion; he entered on board the Sarah Ann in Savannah.

RICHARD MOON,

*Late Commander of the Privateer Sarah Ann.**Copy of a letter from Admiral Warren to Mr. Mitchell, agent for the exchange of American prisoners of war, dated*

HALIFAX, October 21, 1812.

SIR:

I had the honor to receive your letter and its enclosures, relating to Thomas Dunn,\* and beg leave to inform you, that it appears the said man is married in England, has been eight years in His Majesty's service, and received a pension from Government; under these circumstances, and the man never having made any application for his discharge from prison, he continues on board the Stafira.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

\* NOTE.—The application was made at the request of his father, John Dunn, of Boston, who transmitted a deposition of his birth.



*Extract of a letter from William H. Savage, late Agent for American Seamen and Commerce at Jamaica, to the Secretary of State, dated*

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1812.

"I take the liberty to enclose you copies of a correspondence which took place between Vice Admiral Stirling (commanding on the Jamaica station) and myself, since the declaration of war. I should have furnished it you at an earlier period, but an accident prevented, which I was not aware of until my arrival at this city."

*Copy of my letter to Vice Admiral Stirling, commanding on the Jamaica station, on the subject of American seamen, after the declaration of war.*

KINGSTON, JAMAICA, August 6, 1812.

SIR:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter received by me yesterday, from on board His Majesty's ship Sappho, purporting to have been written by four American seamen on board that ship, with a view to solicit my aid towards effecting their discharge, in consequence of the declaration of war by the Government of the United States, against Great Britain.

In making this application, I am fully aware that my duties ceased, as agent for the commerce and seamen of the United States, on the knowledge of such declaration being made known here; but, sir, I am led to believe that, at this period, it will not be deemed inadmissible on your part to receive, nor improper on mine to make, the request, that you will be pleased to grant an order for the discharge of these seamen, feeling conscious (should they even not be protected with the usual documents afforded to citizens of the United States) that an English seaman would not declare himself otherwise than such, under existing circumstances.

I seize the present opportunity also to forward to you twenty-one documents, as proof of the citizenship of that number of seamen, said to have been impressed by ships of war on this station, the greatest number of which have been heretofore unsuccessfully claimed by me, on behalf of the United States, and which may still comprise, at this time, some part of the crews of His Majesty's ships on this station.

I beg further to state to you, that I have received numerous applications from on board various of His Majesty's ships on this station, for the relief of seamen, who, I doubt not, are entitled to the protection of the American Government, many of them having with them proofs of their citizenship, as I am led to believe from the assertions contained in their communications. Applications have also been made for the relief of many, without success; the latter amount in number to forty-six, as per list of names enclosed, several of whom, I understand have been shifted (since their impressment) on board of other vessels than those they were at first taken on board of. All of which I beg to offer for your consideration, feeling, as I do, anxious to extend my last efforts in behalf of those seamen who are entitled to them, and at the same time being impressed with the idea, that it would be foreign to you, sir, to retain any Americans in the service of the navy of Great Britain, contrary to their disposition, during the present conflict. I, therefore, take the liberty of adding to my former request, that you will be pleased to grant orders that such seamen may be discharged from duty on board His Majesty's ships on this station.

With sentiments of the highest respect, &c.

WILLIAM H. SAVAGE.

*Copy of Vice Admiral Stirling's Secretary's letter, in answer to mine to the Vice Admiral of 6th August, 1812.*

ADMIRAL'S PENN, August 7, 1812.

SIR:

I am desired by Vice Admiral Stirling to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, and to acquaint you that directions were given, some days ago, that all seamen in the squadron under his command, who can prove themselves to be American born subjects, should be sent to the prison ship, until an exchange of prisoners is established between the two countries, in consequence of the late declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain.

I return herewith the papers which accompanied your letter

And am, sir, &c.

CHAS. STIRLING, Jr. Secretary.

*Extract of a letter from William H. Savage, Esq. late Agent for American Seamen and Commerce at Jamaica, to Charles Stirling, Jr. dated*

KINGSTON, September 16, 1812.

"In answer to my letter of the 6th ultimo, you were pleased to inform me that directions had been given by the Vice Admiral, some days prior to the date of my letter, for the removal of all native Americans (who could prove themselves such) from on board His Majesty's ships to that of the prison ship; but, as some time has now elapsed since you were pleased to give me this information, and learning that some instances of detention at present exist on board His Majesty's schooner Decouverte, I am led to embrace the subject again, as in one instance I shall hope to satisfy Vice Admiral Stirling of the man's being entitled to his removal from duty on board His Majesty's schooner of war. The person alluded to is Elijah Stirling, an American seaman, who was impressed from on board the British merchant ship Brilliant, at the Bay of Honduras, in the early part of the year 1810, by His Majesty's schooner Flordel Mar, and has since been detained on board of various of His Majesty's ships on this station, although provided with a regular protection, which instrument this man got conveyed to me about the 20th of September following, and which was by me forwarded to Admiral Rowley, accompanied (as usual in like cases) with a request that the man might be discharged. On the receipt of my letter, the Admiral answered, through his Secretary, that the nature of Stirling's impressment was such, that he could not comply with my request; but which answer was unaccompanied, in return, with the protection in question, and what has become of it, I am unable to say.

"About this period, I was led to understand from Admiral Rowley, that all American seamen who should be impressed from on board any British merchant vessel, would be retained in the service of His Majesty; but that all American seamen who should be impressed from on board of American vessels, would, on application, accompanied by proof, be discharged. As this information was received about the period of my application for the discharge of Stirling, I was led to conclude it stamped the nature of his impressment, and what confirmed it in my mind, was, that I received similar assurances to various applications made for American seamen, who had, under various circumstances, shipped on board of British ships, and were from thence impressed on board of His Majesty's ships of war, all of which I hope the Admiral will be pleased to take into consideration: for, to insist on the service of this man, I think will be a dereliction to the marked manner of his amiable endeavors to distinguish and relieve American seamen from duty on board the squadron under his command. I beg to enclose a note from Mr. Meek, (the late Secretary) relative to my application for this man's discharge, and to observe, that, if it is possible, the protection may yet be found among the papers of the late secretary, as it has not been usual to return me the protections of those men whose applications for discharge were not complied with.

"I beg furthermore to observe, that there appears also to be on board His Majesty's schooner Decouverte, two other American seamen, viz. John Englefield and Richard Lauderkin, the former of whom asserts, that he served his apprenticeship to the trade of a cooper, at Boston, but has lost his protection; the latter declares himself to be a native of Rhode Island, and that his protection has been destroyed by Mr. Oliver, commander of His Majesty's

schooner *Decouverte*. I shall not now animadvert on the impropriety of such a circumstance, but request, should the instances here cited be found correct, that they may meet the attention of the Vice Admiral.

*Extract of a letter from Vice Admiral Stirling's Secretary to W. H. Savage, Esq. in answer to his of the 16th September, 1812.*

ADMIRAL'S PENN, 19th September, 1812.

"I have just received your letter of the 16th instant, which I have laid before Vice Admiral Stirling, and I am directed to acquaint you, that Elijah Stirling, and other persons on board of His Majesty's schooner *Decouverte*, said to be American seamen, have not, when called upon, produced proof of being subjects of the United States. They do not fall under the description of persons which I informed you, in my letter of the 7th ult. were intended to be discharged from the King's service, and to be detained on board the prison ship until an exchange of prisoners takes place with America.

"The note from Mr. Meek, dated the 21st September, 1810, is returned herewith, and as it appears thereby that Admiral Rowley thought the circumstances under which Elijah Stirling was impressed did not permit him to be discharged, Vice Admiral Stirling does not feel himself justified in attending to the man's wishes on a bare assertion. The protection you allude to is not to be found among Admiral Rowley's papers left in this office."

No. 3.

*Detention of Mariners as prisoners of war, who were in England at the time the war was declared.*

*J. W. Croker to Mr. Beasley.*

ADMIRALTY OFFICE, 5th August, 1812.

SIR:

Having communicated to my lords commissioners of the admiralty your letter of the 31st ultimo, transmitting a list of men, said to be Americans, who have been impressed and detained on board His Majesty's ships, and requesting their discharge, I have their lordships' commands to acquaint you, that, under present circumstances, they will defer the consideration of this request.

I am, &c.

J. W. CROKER.

R. G. BEASLEY, Esq.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Beasley to the Secretary of State, dated*

LONDON, October 23, 1812.

"I have informed you that I had addressed Lord Castlereagh on the subject of our citizens who have been impressed, and are now held in the British naval service. I demanded their release, and complained of the treatment which some had received on offering to give themselves up as prisoners, or refusing to serve when they heard of the war. In reply, I have received a short note from Mr. Cooke, one of the under secretaries, stating that he was instructed to require of me the names of the men who had received the treatment complained of, and the vessels in which they were, which I immediately furnished, and urged a reply to the other part of my letter. In an interview I have since had with Mr. Cooke, I took occasion to remind him of it, when he intimated that the Government did not intend to answer me on that point; adding, that England was fighting the battles of the world; we had chosen to go to war, and so aid the great enemy, and that England had as much right to recruit her army and navy, in every possible manner, as France."

*Mr. Beasley to Lord Castlereagh.*

WIMPOLE STREET, October 12, 1812.

MY LORD:

In consequence of the war unhappily existing between the United States and Great Britain, it has become my duty to call your lordship's attention to the situation of the great number of American seamen who have been impressed, and are now held in the ships of war of His Britannic Majesty. In addition to the wrong which is done to the United States by this detention of their seamen, I regret to state that some of these unfortunate persons, having heard of the war, and offered to give themselves up as prisoners, have, for so doing, or for refusing to do service, been punished.

To put an end to a proceeding and a state of things so revolting to humanity, and so contrary to the law and usage of civilized nations, I persuade myself it is only necessary to present them to the view of the British Government; and I therefore trust that effectual measures will be immediately taken to restore these injured men to liberty and to their country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

R. G. BEASLEY.

*E. Cooke to R. G. Beasley.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, 19th October, 1812.

"In consequence of your letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 12th instant, I am directed by his lordship to desire you will furnish me with the names of the American sailors who have been so punished, and of the ship they are on board."

*Mr. Beasley to E. Cooke.*

WIMPOLE STREET, 21st October, 1812.

SIR:

Agreeably to the request contained in your letter of the 19th instant, I now transmit to you a list of impressed American seamen on board British ships of war, who, having heard of the war, offered to give themselves up as prisoners, and for so doing, or for refusing to do service, have been punished.

I beg you to remind Lord Castlereagh, that the other part of my letter of the 12th instant, requesting the release of the American seamen detained in the British service, is still unanswered.

I am, sir, &c.

R. G. BEASLEY.

The list referred to in the preceding letter, states the cases of the following persons:

John Ballard, on board the *Zenobia*, offered himself a prisoner, refused, and was put in irons for one night.

John Davis, on board the *Thistle*, gave himself up as a prisoner, and refused further service, for which he was flogged.

Ephraim Covell, on board *La Hogue*, gave himself up as a prisoner, and refused further service, in consequence of which he was kept seven days in irons.

John Hosman, on board *La Hogue*, gave himself up as a prisoner, and refused further service; was put in irons, still kept therein, and was threatened by the commander with further punishment.

Russell Brainard, on board *La Hogue*, gave himself up as a prisoner, was put in irons, and still kept therein.

Thomas W. Marshall, Peter Lazette, Edward Whittle Banks, and Levi Younger, on board the *Royal William*, gave themselves up as prisoners, and were in consequence thereof put into close confinement for eight days.

October 12, 1812.

Mr. Beasley requests Lord Castlereagh to cause the necessary passports to be furnished for the American ship *William and Eliza*, Captain Howland, to proceed to the United States with American citizens.

October 21, 1812.

Mr. Cooke acquaints Mr. Beasley that there will be no objection to granting a licence to a cartel for carrying to the United States such American citizens, non-combatants, as may wish to return to their country. He requests Mr. Beasley to inform him of the situation of the American ship *William and Eliza*.

*Mr. Beasley to E. Cooke.*

WIMPOLE STREET, October 23, 1812.

SIR:

I have now the honor to repeat to you what I stated in conversation this morning, that the persons for whose return to the United States I requested the necessary passports, are, for the most part, American masters and mariners; that some of them, in consequence of the loss of their vessels abroad, have come here on their way to America; that others of them, having been employed in British ships, are now desirous of returning home; that others, through the detention or condemnation of their vessels under British orders in council, and others, through all the casualties to which this class of men is always exposed, are left without the means of conveyance. None of these persons have been, in any way, engaged in hostilities against Great Britain. They are almost wholly destitute, and, for some time, have been chiefly supported at the expense of the United States. There are also, I believe, some American merchants and supercargoes, who are anxious of availing themselves of the same opportunity of returning to their country.

You are, I presume, aware, that the American Government has afforded every facility to the departure of those British subjects in the United States who were under similar circumstances with the persons included in my request.

With regard to the ship *William and Eliza*, in which these persons are to embark, I beg to observe, that I am well assured by those who have charge of her, that there is no impediment to her departure.

I am, &c.

R. G. BEASLEY.

*E. Cooke to R. G. Beasley.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 28, 1812.

SIR:

Having laid before Lord Castlereagh your letter requesting that you may be allowed to send a cartel to America, with citizens of the United States who wish to return to their country, I am directed by his lordship to express his consent to this proposition, and am to desire you will confer with the commissioners for prisoners of war with regard to the account you are to give for such parts of the crew as shall appear to be combatants, and on that principle must be exchanged.

I am, &c.

E. COOKE.

OCTOBER 29, 1812.

Mr. Beasley states to J. W. Croker, of the admiralty office, that Lord Castlereagh had referred him to the commissioners for prisoners of war; that he had accordingly applied to them, and learnt that the instructions which that board had received from the lords of the admiralty were not sufficiently explicit to enable them to proceed in the matter. Mr. Beasley requests that their lordships would be pleased to give such further directions to the transport board as might be found necessary.

OCTOBER 30, 1812.

John Barrow, of the admiralty office, informs Mr. Beasley, that his letter of the 29th October had been laid before the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and that the business had been referred to the transport board.

OCTOBER 29, 1812.

Mr. Beasley informs Alexander M<sup>r</sup>Leay, of the transport office, that he had requested the lords of the admiralty would be pleased to give the further instructions necessary, and presuming that these instructions would be immediately given, requests Mr. M<sup>r</sup>Leay to inform him at what time it will be convenient for the commissioners that he should confer with them on the subject.

OCTOBER 30, 1812.

Alexander M<sup>r</sup>Leay informs Mr. Beasley that he is directed to desire that Mr. B. would transmit to the transport office a list of all the persons whom Mr. Beasley proposed to send to America, stating their several qualities, and when, and how, they respectively came into Great Britain.

NOVEMBER 3, 1812.

Mr. Beasley transmits to Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay, of the transport office, a list of American citizens whom it is proposed to send to the United States in the ship William and Eliza, stating their several qualities, and when, and how, they respectively came into Great Britain. This list contains one hundred and ten names. To these are added a list of six persons, being other passengers in the same vessel. Mr. Beasley remarks to Mr. M<sup>o</sup>Leay, "I am well informed that many persons of the description, and under the circumstances, of those mentioned in the first of these lists, (being seamen) who were awaiting the result of my late application to Lord Castlereagh for a cartel for their conveyance to America, have, within a few days past, been seized by the impress officers, and taken on board the tender of the Tower; and I beg to know what are the intentions of the British Government respecting them."

NOVEMBER 6, 1812.

Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay informs Mr. Beasley that he had received and laid before the commissioners for the transport service, the list of persons proposed to be sent to the United States in the William and Eliza cartel, and adds, "In return I am directed to request that you will inform the board whether you will engage, that the above mentioned persons, on their arrival in the United States, shall be exchanged for an equivalent number of British subjects, who may have fallen into the hands of the Americans. I am at the same time to acquaint you, that the prisoners above alluded to must sign engagements not to serve against this country or its allies until regularly exchanged."

*Mr. Beasley writes to Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay.*

NOVEMBER 7, 1812.

"I have to inform the board that I am willing to engage that the American citizens whom I propose to send to the United States on board the William and Eliza cartel, shall, on their arrival there, be exchanged for an equivalent number of British subjects of the same description, who may have fallen into the hands of the United States under similar circumstances; and that the men themselves shall sign engagements for the performance of any conditions similar to those which may have been exacted of such British subjects in the United States; it being understood, that, if it be found that British subjects, under any such circumstances, have been suffered freely to depart from the United States, then these engagements, so far as regards the corresponding class of American citizens, shall be void. If, however, it be more satisfactory to the board, that the return or exchange of these men should be regulated by the principles recognised by the two Governments in the cartel which, I am informed, has been lately concluded at Washington, I am ready to enter into an engagement to that effect."

*Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay writes to Mr. Beasley.*

NOVEMBER 13, 1812.

"I am directed to acquaint you that the prisoners mentioned in the list transmitted by you will be released, upon your entering into an unconditional engagement that they shall be exchanged for British prisoners now in America, or who may be hereafter taken."

*Mr. Beasley writes to Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay.*

NOVEMBER 16, 1812.

"For those American citizens who composed the crews of ships taken in war, I am at all times ready to enter into any engagement which the law and usage of nations require. But for those whom your laws have invited, or whom misfortune has thrown into your country, whom accident, and not the fortune of war, has placed within your power, I must still urge my request, that they be allowed to depart the kingdom on the conditions proposed in my letter of the 7th instant." But "if the board will enter into an unconditional engagement, that all British subjects who have been permitted to leave the United States since the declaration of war, or who may be permitted to depart therefrom, shall be exchanged for American prisoners of war, I will, in like manner, engage for those American citizens agreeably to your letter." Mr. Beasley adds, "This arrangement, however, I would make with great reluctance; because it would not be in unison with that spirit of liberal warfare entertained by the Government of the United States, and because it would bring within the influence of the war those who might, without detriment to either party, be exempt from its operation."

*Mr. Beasley writes to Mr. Hamilton, of the Foreign Office.*

NOVEMBER 23, 1812.

"I must beg leave to state, that that part of my note of the 12th ultimo, addressed to Lord Castlereagh, relative to American citizens who have been impressed, and are now held in his majesty's naval service, remains unanswered. To the reasons already urged for the discharge of those men, may be added that of compelling them to fight against their country; and I need scarcely add, that, as they were forcibly detained before the commencement of hostilities, it would be very unjust to discharge them merely to make them prisoners. Of the number of those unfortunate persons, many must be in vessels on foreign stations at a great distance. It is a subject of much public interest in the United States, and one which involves the domestic comfort and happiness of many families."

*Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay writes to Mr. Beasley, and, after some preliminary reasoning, says:*

NOVEMBER 24, 1812.

"The commissioners (of the transport office) are instructed (by the lords commissioners of the admiralty) to continue to require from you an unconditional receipt, as prisoners of war, for all persons of this description previous to their being permitted to return to America."

*Alexander M<sup>o</sup>Leay writes to Mr. Beasley.*

DECEMBER 23, 1812.

"I have received and laid before the commissioners for the transport service, &c. your letter of the 15th instant, and in return am directed to acquaint you that, at present, they are only authorized to deliver up to you the Americans mentioned in the list transmitted by you on the 3d of November."

*Mr. Beasley writes to Alexander M'Leay.*

DECEMBER 24, 1812.

"After so long a time spent in discussing the principles and conditions of an exchange of prisoners between the United States and Great Britain, I perceive, with some surprise, by your letter of yesterday, that the only persons whom the board are authorized to deliver up to me, are those mentioned in the list transmitted to you on the 3d November, who, though so long known to the board as being at large in this city, have never been detained as prisoners, and who have, ever since their arrival, been maintained at the charge of the United States. During this interval those persons have been partially dispersed; some have been taken up as prisoners, some have been impressed, and some have otherwise disappeared. Others, however, under similar circumstances, have since been added, and there now remain about one hundred persons. Of these men, as I understand the tenor of our correspondence, those who belonged to vessels detained or taken in war, are to be suffered to proceed to the United States on my entering into the engagement which accompanied your letter of the 14th instant; but that, for the others, no engagement is required. In order to avoid any further misunderstanding, I beg to know whether this recapitulation is correct."

*Alexander M'Leay to R. G. Beasley.*

TRANSPORT OFFICE, 26th December, 1812.

SIR:

I have received and laid before the commissioners for the transport service, &c. your letter of the 24th instant, and, in return, I am directed to acquaint you that it is the intention of his Majesty's Government that such of the Americans, named in the list which accompanied your letter of the 3d of last month, as belonged to vessels detained or taken, and as are consequently prisoners of war, shall be suffered to proceed to the United States upon your entering into the engagement which accompanied my letter of the 14th instant; but that, for Americans who were resident or travelling in this country, or resorting hither for commercial purposes, not as mariners, no such engagement will be required.

I am, &c.

ALEXANDER M'LEAY.

*Mr. Beasley writes to Alexander M'Leay.*

DECEMBER 28, 1812.

"On referring to that list (which accompanied my letter of the 3d ultimo) you will perceive another class of persons, namely, mariners, who did not belong to vessels detained or taken; and as your omitting to notice these men in your letter might leave room for some doubt respecting them, I lose no time in requesting to be informed on what terms the board understand that they are to be suffered to return to the United States."

*Alexander M'Leay writes to Mr. Beasley.*

DECEMBER 29, 1812.

"By a reference to my letter of the 26th instant, you will observe that mariners are expressly excepted from the description of persons who are to be released unconditionally, and consequently it is necessary you should give a receipt for all the mariners named in the list transmitted by you."

*Mr. Beasley to Alexander M'Leay.*

FEBRUARY 17, 1813.

"In your reply of the 9th instant, communicating the result of inquiries made by order of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, relative to the alleged ill treatment of certain seamen claiming to be Americans, in the British service, in consequence of their having requested to be considered as prisoners of war, as represented in my letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 12th October, I have to observe, that, although the statement of those persons, and that contained in your letter, differ greatly as to the degree of this ill treatment, it does appear that some severity was exercised towards them on that occasion, and without any proper investigation of their claim of American citizenship, which, if established, should have exempted them not only from punishment, but from service. As it may be inferred, however, from your letter, that if proof be produced to support their claim, their request will yet be complied with, I have to inform you, that evidence to that effect was long since transmitted to the lords of the admiralty in behalf of several of these persons." [Here follows the names of persons, and a recitation of the proof of citizenship, &c.] Mr. Beasley proceeds, "I cannot avoid expressing my disappointment and regret that no notice has been taken of the request made to Lord Castlereagh in my letter of the 12th of October, for the general release of the American seamen detained in the British service."

*Alexander M'Leay to R. G. Beasley.*

TRANSPORT OFFICE, February 26, 1813.

SIR:

I have received, and laid before the Commissioners for the Transport Service, &c. your letter of the 17th of this month, with its enclosure, relative to the alleged ill treatment of certain seamen, claiming to be Americans, in the British service, in consequence of their having requested to be considered as prisoners of war; and the same having been referred to the right honorable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I am directed by the Board to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a letter which they have received from their Lordship's Secretary, in answer thereto.

I am, &c.

ALEXANDER M'LEAY

*John Barrow to the Transport Board.*

ADMIRALTY OFFICE, February 25, 1813.

GENTLEMEN:

Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, your letter of the 18th instant, enclosing a copy of a letter, together with the documents therein referred to, from Mr. Beasley, the American agent for prisoners

of war in this country, on the subject of certain alleged citizens of the United States detained in his Majesty's service, I have it in command to signify their Lordships' directions to you to acquaint Mr. Beasley, that neither now, in war, nor before, during peace, is, or was, the British Government desirous of having American seamen in its service; and that their Lordships will now discharge, as prisoners of war, as they formerly did as neutrals, those persons who can adduce any sufficient proof of their being Americans.

You will further inform Mr. Beasley, that all the cases stated by him have received, or are under accurate examination, and that such persons who may appear to be Americans, will be immediately sent to prison, as many have been already.

I am, &c.

JOHN BARROW.

*Alexander M'Leay to Mr. Beasley.*

TRANSPORT OFFICE, March 6, 1813.

SIR:

I am directed by the Commissioners for the Transport Service, &c. to inform you, that, upon the receipt of the printed letters which were transmitted by you to this office, for the purpose of being forwarded to certain seamen on board of his Majesty's ships of war, they considered it their duty to submit the same to the consideration of the right honorable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and to request their Lordships' directions on the subject; and the Board having, this day, received a letter from their Lordships' secretary, of which the enclosed is a copy, I have their directions to acquaint you accordingly, that the letters in question will not be forwarded, and that you cannot be permitted to maintain any correspondence with the seamen on board his Majesty's fleet.

I am, &c.

ALEXANDER M'LEAY.

*John Barrow to the Transport Board.*

ADMIRALTY OFFICE, March 5, 1813.

GENTLEMEN:

In reply to your letter of the 16th of last month, enclosing a letter addressed by Mr. Beasley to a seaman on board his Majesty's ship Porcupine, and requesting to be informed if letters of a similar description should be forwarded to the persons to whom they are addressed, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioner of the Admiralty, to signify their direction to you not to forward any such letters, and to acquaint Mr. Beasley that he cannot be permitted to maintain any correspondence with the seamen on board his Majesty's fleet; observing to him, at the same time, that the printed letter, in question, contains a statement unfounded in fact, for that, neither since the war with America, nor before, have their Lordships declined to release American seamen, admitted or proved to be such, though they have, and still do refuse, to release persons assuming, without any proof or document, that character.

I am, &c.

JOHN BARROW.

*Copy of a printed circular letter addressed to American seamen in British ships of war.*

LONDON, —, 1813.

In answer to your letter of the — —, I have to inform you, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having, in consequence of the war between the United States and Great Britain, declined to release those American citizens who have been impressed, and are held in the British service, there appears to be no other course for you to pursue, than to give yourself up as a prisoner of war, to the commander of the ship in which you are detained.

*Agent of the United States for prisoners of war in Great Britain.*

*Extracts of a letter from Mr. Beasley to Alexander M'Leay, dated 13th March, 1813.*

"In the letter of their Lordships' secretary of the 5th inst. the Board are directed to observe to me, that the printed letter which I addressed to certain American seamen detained in the British navy, "contains a *statement unfounded in fact*; for that, neither since the war with America, nor before, have their Lordships declined to release American seamen, admitted, or proved to be such." It is not necessary to my present purpose to enter upon an examination of their Lordships' conduct, on this matter, before the war; although my own official observation, in numerous cases, when I held the office of consul, would authorize me to dispute even that part of their secretary's assertion. But with reference to their Lordships' conduct since the war, I beg to remind them of their letter of the fifth August, soon after the commencement of the war, in answer to a request made on the 31st July, for the release of certain impressed American seamen, in which their Lordships, going beyond the mere declining to release the men, stated "that, under the present circumstances, they will defer the consideration of the request for their release;" or, in other words, that they will not, at present, war being commenced, even think on the subject of their release. If further proof be necessary of their Lordships' having, as I stated in my printed letter, declined the release of such seamen in consequence of the war, I will call to their recollection a letter written by their secretary, on the 25th of August, in answer to an application for the release of William Wilson, an impressed American, detained on board the Cordelia, in which they state that this man, being an alien enemy, *must continue to serve, or go to prison*. Should other corroboration be wanted, it may be found in the long and marked silence of the British Government to my numerous applications, again and again repeated, for the release of these men; seeing that it was not until the 25th of February, nearly seven months after their Lordships had informed me of their having deferred the consideration of the subject, and nearly five months after my formal demand made to Lord Castlereagh, that they directed the Board to inform me of their intention to treat them as prisoners of war. And even this was not done until eight days after my printed letter in question appears to have been on their table. Surely it was in utter forgetfulness of all these circumstances, that their Lordships declared my statement unfounded in fact; for it appears impossible that they can, in the mind of any person, bear a different interpretation from that which I have given them. But how do these facts bear on their Lordships' statement? How, I ask, does their determination, that Wilson, *proved and admitted to be an American, must continue to serve or go to prison*, support the assertion, that their Lordships have not declined to release American seamen when admitted or proved to be such? But, perhaps, in their Lordships' view, to send them from service and detention in ships of war, to confinement in prisons, is to release them. If so, it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further, and I will content myself with having vindicated the correctness of my own statement."

"I come now to the consideration of their Lordships' purpose, as expressed in their Secretary's letter of the 25th ultimo, to treat as prisoners of war the American seamen who have been impressed, and are held in the British service. Taking into view the manner in which these unfortunate persons came into the power of the British Govern-

ment; that their own rights and inclinations, the rights of their country, the law of nations, and every principle of justice were violated in the very act by which each of these men was brought within its power, and that this wrong accumulates so long as any of them remain in its power, I do maintain that they are, on every ground, entitled to, and the British Government is bound to grant, their immediate and complete release. It acquired them only as the spoils of unlawful violence; how then can it retain them as the fruits of lawful war? Its right of control over them can only arise from the lawfulness of their detention; but that which was unlawfully taken cannot be rightfully held; and to acknowledge the pretension to such control as their Lordships' purpose implies, would be to legitimatise the act by which they came into their power. The British Government disclaims all right and all intention to take them, and this disavowal is an acknowledgment of its obligation to restore them to the same condition, and to the same freedom, from which they were taken. Upon what ground is it, then, that they are to be treated as prisoners of war? Not many years have elapsed since all Europe resounded with the complaints of Great Britain against France, for retaining, as prisoners of war, certain British subjects, who, having entered the French territories, in time of peace, were found there at the breaking out of the war. But, if that were regarded in England as an outrage, what will be thought of this detention, as prisoners of war, of American seamen, who, having been wrongfully taken on the high seas, and forcibly carried into the British service, in time of peace, are found therein at the breaking out of a war, doing her service, and fighting her battles? The conduct of France was attempted to be justified by certain acts of England, which were alleged to be equally contrary to the law of nations. But what justification, what excuse, can be set up for this conduct of Great Britain towards the impressed American seamen? What infraction of the law of nations, what violence or injustice exercised towards British subjects, or what outrage is this cruel act to retaliate? It cannot be the free and spontaneous permission given by the United States, at the commencement of the war, for every British subject, of every class and description, found within their territories, or in their power, to return to his country; that this imprisonment of American seamen is to require. And, surely, this cannot be the indemnification which Great Britain offers these unfortunate men for the wrongs which she has inflicted on them, or the reward which she bestows for the service she has received at their hands.

"To the unqualified prohibition of all correspondence between myself and the impressed American seamen in his Britannic Majesty's fleet, so unreservedly stated in the letter of their Lordships' secretary of the 6th instant, I must conform, whatever may be my sentiments and feelings respecting it. The situation in which these unfortunate men and myself stood towards each other, appeared not only to invite, but to authorize a communication between us. On their part, the object of this correspondence was to obtain information and counsel as to the proper manner of conducting themselves under circumstances the most difficult, and on an occasion the most important and solemn, namely, how to act while forcibly held to service in ships of war belonging to a State engaged in actual hostilities against their country—a situation which their own good sense and proper feelings taught them was alike incompatible with their rights and their duties. My part has been, after having waited five months, in vain, for a communication of their Lordships' intentions, to recommend them, since there appeared no means of obtaining their release, to give themselves up as prisoners of war—an evil comparatively light to that which they suffer. In other instances, their letters have related the rejection of their offer, and the threats of punishment, and all contain complaints of the unexampled hardship of their situation."

*Extract of a letter from Robert Montgomery, Consul of the United States at Alicante, dated the 4th November, 1812, to the Secretary of State.*

"Herewith is a copy of a letter to Admiral Hallowell, with his reply. The man in question has declared, under oath, that he never signed any article or agreement whatever to serve on board the *Indefatigable*; nor any other British vessel, and he has now left her, losing what wages was due him."

ALICANTE, 23d October, 1812.

SIR:

Philips, a mariner and citizen of the United States, as appears by a regular protection, from the collector of New York, informs me that, some time since, he engaged himself on board the transport *Indefatigable*, for six months, at certain wages agreed for; that he has now been eight months in said vessel, and demands his discharge and wages, but the master having refused both, obliges me to request you will inform yourself of the fact, and if as the mariner states, order him to be paid off and discharged.

Permit me to assure you, &c.

ROBT. MONTGOMERY.

BENJAMIN HALLOWELL, Esq. *Admiral Royal Navy of Great Britain.*

*Admiral Hallowell to Mr. Montgomery.*

HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP MALTA, in *Alicante Bay*,

October 26, 1812.

SIR:

I find upon inquiry that there is on board the *Indefatigable* transport, the man mentioned in your letter of the 23d. As there is no objection to a foreigner going in the station of mariner, on board a vessel of that description, and as he has signed articles of agreement to serve on board the *Indefatigable*, I shall not molest him while he continues in her: but the moment he gets his discharge, I shall deem it my duty to take hold of him, and put him in confinement, as a prisoner of war.

I have the honor to be, &c.

BN. HALLOWELL.

No. 4.

*Compulsory service of impressed Americans on board British ships of war.*

I, Beekman Verplanck Hoffman, of the town of Poughkeepsie, do certify, that I am a lieutenant in the United States' Navy; that I was a lieutenant on board the *Constitution* frigate in the action and capture of the *Guerriere*; that, after her surrender, I was sent on board; and after taking out the crew, fired and blew up the ship; that eight impressed American seamen were among the crew of the *Guerriere*, who were liberated at Boston. I was also on board the *Constitution*, in the action and capture of the *Java*, and was sent on board that vessel, and after the crew were removed, set her on fire and blew her up. Amongst the crew of the *Java*, thirteen impressed American seamen were found, three of whom had entered the British service, and were left, the other ten were liberated as Americans.

B. V. HOFFMAN.

POUGHKEEPSIE, April 16, 1813.

## DUTCHESS COUNTY, ss.

Richard Thompson, being sworn, saith, that he is a native of New Paltz, opposite Poughkeepsie; that he sailed from Wilmington, about the 28th of April, 1810, on board the brig Warren, William Kelly, captain, for Cork. On the homeward passage, in September following, he was impressed and taken on board the Peacock, a British sloop of war, and compelled to do duty. That, while on board that vessel, he made many unsuccessful attempts to write to his friends, to inform them of his situation. He further saith, that, after he had heard of the war, himself and two other impressed American seamen, who were on board the Peacock, went aft to the captain, and claimed to be considered as American prisoners of war, and refused to do duty any longer. They were ordered off the quarter deck, and the captain called for the master-at-arms, and ordered us to be put in irons; we were then kept in irons about twenty-four hours, when we were taken out, brought to the gangway, stripped of our clothes, *tied and whipped, each one dozen and a half lashes, and put to duty.*

He further saith, that he was kept on board the Peacock, and did duty, till the action with the Hornet; after the Hornet hoisted American colors, he, and the other impressed Americans, again went to the Captain of the Peacock, asked to be sent below, said it was an American ship, and that they did not wish to fight against their country. The Captain ordered us to our quarters; called midshipman Stone to do his duty; and if we did not do our duty, to blow our brains out. "Ay, ay!" was answered by Stone, who then held a pistol at my head, and ordered us to our places. We then continued at our pieces, and were compelled to fight till the Peacock struck: and we were liberated after an imprisonment of about two years and eight months.

his  
RICHARD + THOMPSON.  
mark

POUGHKEEPSIE, April 17, 1813.

Read over and signed in presence of

JOSEPH HARRIS,  
JOHN S. FREAR.

## DUTCHESS COUNTY, ss.

James Tompkins, being sworn, saith, that he is a native of Ulster county, opposite Poughkeepsie; that he sailed out of New York, in the month of April, 1812, in the Ship Minerva, bound to Ireland; that, on her homeward bound passage, in July after, this deponent, with three other American seamen, Samuel Davis, William Young, and John Brown, were impressed and taken on board the British ship Acteon, David Smith, Captain. We were taken on Saturday evening; on Monday morning we were brought to the gangway, and informed that we must enter on board the ship and live as other seamen, or we should live on oatmeal and water and receive five dozen lashes. This deponent says, himself and the other three impressed with him, did refuse to enter, and each of them were then whipped five dozen lashes. On Wednesday following, we were again all brought up and had the same offer made to us, to enter, which we refused, and we were again whipped four dozen lashes, each. On Saturday after, the like offer was made to us, and on our refusal we were again whipped three dozen lashes. On Monday following, still refusing to enter, we were again whipped two dozen, each. On Wednesday following, we were again whipped one dozen each, and ordered to be taken below, and put in irons till we did enter; and the Captain said he would *punish the damned Yankee rascals till they did enter.* We were then put in irons, and laid in irons three months. During the time of our imprisonment the ship had an action, and captured a French ship. Before this action we were taken out of irons and asked to fight, but we refused; and after the action we were again ironed, where we remained till the ship arrived at London. After arriving there we first heard of the war with America, and that the Guerriere was taken. This deponent took his shirt, and Samuel Davis and William Young took their handkerchiefs, made stripes and stars for the American colors, and hung it over a gun, and gave three cheers for the victory. The next morning at six o'clock we were brought up and whipped, two dozen lashes each, for huzzaing for the Yankee flag. Shortly after this, we were all released by the assistance of the American Consul and Captain Hall, who knew us. This deponent further saith, that all had protections, and showed them, and claimed to be Americans, at the time they were impressed.

JAMES TOMPKINS.

Sworn before me this 17th day of April, 1813; at which time the said James Tompkins showed me his wrists, which, at his request, I examined, and there appeared to be marks on both of them, occasioned, as I suppose, from his having been in irons.

WM. W. BOGARDUS, *Justice of the Peace.*

## No. 5.

*Violation of Flags of Truce.*

MONTREAL PRISON, May 6, 1813.

SIR:

I am an unfortunate American, who was taken by the Indians, on my way to Malden, with a flag of truce, from General Harrison, on the night of the 31st of January, and after a variety of indignities, too tedious to mention, I was brought here; and put in the dungeon for thirty-three days, and have been up on the centre floor a week. I wish to see you, if possible, and have your advice, &c. &c.

In haste, yours, &c.

SAML. M'KEEHAN,  
*Surgeon's Mate, 2d Reg. 2d Brig. Ohio Militia.*

Lieutenant DUDLEY.

MONTREAL PRISON, May 9, 1813.

SIR:

Yesterday Sir George's aid came and informed me that the nature of my confinement had been contrary to his orders, and Colonel Lethbridge was required to restore me my liberty. I was also informed, that you and myself would probably, in a few days, be sent to the United States. Colonel Lethbridge told me he would send for me at 3 o'clock, and take my parole. In less than one hour, Major Shackleton called, and said the Governor, after a more mature consideration, had concluded he could not let me have my liberty until he would hear from General Proctor.

Two or three days after my imprisonment, Major Shackleton told me that General Proctor had promised, with the next despatches, to send on all the papers relating to my case, and that then I would have a hearing.

So you may see punishment by torture is not yet abolished. If they had drove a dagger through my heart, my punishment would have been much less, and their compassion much greater.

Yours, &c.

SAMUEL M'KEEHAN.

Major Shackleton also told me that Colonel Baynes was unauthorized to tell me what he did.

Lieutenant DUDLEY.

S. M'K.



MONTREAL GAOL, *May 12, 1813.*

SIR:

I am requested by Doctor M'Keehan to inform you of his present unpleasant situation. He is at this time so unwell as to be confined to his bed, and has no chance of getting any thing to make him comfortable. No person attends here to examine our situation; neither have we a chance to send out after any necessaries that we want.

I am confident the doctor's case requires some very speedy aid, particularly as it respects his confined situation, lodging, &c.

Yours, respectfully,

GEO. H. RODGERS, *United States' Army.*

Lieutenant DUDLEY.

## DOCTOR M'KEEHAN'S NARRATIVE.

On the 31st January last I was ordered, by General Harrison, to proceed to the river Raisin, with a flag of truce, and from thence to Malden, if not stopped by the Indians. We arrived at the foot of the rapids of the Miami, at dark, and not finding a company of rangers as expected, we encamped in a cave, the horse and carryall before the door, and the flag standing by them. About midnight the Indians fired in upon us, killed Mr. Lemont, wounded myself in the foot, and made us prisoners. After despatching Mr. Lemont with the tomahawk, scalping and stripping him, they seized my horse, harness, great coat, blankets, and other clothing, and one hundred dollars in gold, which the General had sent to procure necessaries for the wounded of General Winchester's army.

That night I was made to walk more than twenty miles, to where Captain Elliot was stationed with a party of Indians. The captain treated me politely, and sent me to Colonel Proctor. I was scarcely seated before the Colonel began to exclaim against Gen. Harrison; said he had been used to fight Indians and not British; found fault with my instructions, and said the flag was only a pretext to cover a bad design. I rebutted his insinuations with indignation, which I believe has been the cause of all my troubles since. I was not recognized, in my official character, until the 5th of February, when I was informed by Proctor's aid that I should attend on the wounded with Doctor Bower, and that I would be sent to the United States, but by a different route from that which I came. Doctor Bower in a few days was sent home and I detained.

On the 2d of March, I was arrested, by order of Colonel Proctor, and accused of carrying on a private correspondence. On the 8th, without having any trial, ordered to Montreal, and hurried on from Fort George, night and day, although thinly clothed, and the weather very cold. From Kingston to Prescott, I was made to eat with the officers' servants. This course of torture being finished, on the 28th, when I arrived in Montreal, and without being asked any questions, or suffered to ask any myself, I was put into the dungeon, eight or ten feet below the surface of the ground, where I had neither bed nor bedding, chair, bench, or stool; denied pen, ink, and paper, or even the use of a book, for two weeks. The only current of air that passed through my apartment came through the bowels of the privy! Here I was kept thirty-three days, when I was, to my great joy, put up with the American prisoners, and with them permitted to remain, till last Monday, when I was liberated by the intercession of Lieutenant Dudley, of the navy. Colonel Baynes, aid to the Governor, told me the outrage which had been committed on my person was contrary to his orders.

I left fourteen American prisoners in gaol, viz: George H. Rodgers, United States' army; Wm. Hollenback, Onis Hooker, Philaster Jones, Harry Jones, Lewis Minor, Zebina Conkey, Phiney Conkey, Canton; Seth Barnes, Camden; Jared Witheril, John Campbell, Schoharie; Major Watson, Ogdensburg; Alexander M'Gregor, Balston, who were kept in close confinement, notwithstanding Colonel Lethbridge and Major Shackleton had pledged their words to Captain Conkey, before he left Montreal for Quebec, that they should have the liberty of the town during the day. But the Captain was scarcely gone, when the pledge was either forgotten or disregarded. The prisoners now are not permitted to procure such things as their small stock of money would provide. Sometimes they are half a day without water, and two or three days without wood; and if they complain they are cursed and abused by the gaoler, and told they are only allowed a quart of water in the day. I am requested to represent their situation to General Dearborn, which I intend to do as soon as I arrive at Sackett's Harbor.

This is a sketch of the indignities I have had to put up with since the last of January.

I am, yours, &amp;c.

SAMUEL M'KEEHAN,  
*Surgeon's Mate 2d Reg't Ohio Militia.*ALBANY, *May 24th, 1813.**To his Excellency Major General Dearborn.*

SIR:

Without introduction or apology, I beg leave to state to your Excellency, that, on the 31st of January last, I was ordered by General Harrison to proceed to the river Raisin with a flag of truce. I was required, in my instructions, if I met no British officer at that place, to proceed to Malden (if too great danger did not appear from the savages.) The same evening, thirty-three miles from the river Raisin, the Indians fired upon us and killed Mr. Lemont, (one of my attendants) wounded myself in the foot, then conveyed me to Captain Elliot, who took me to the river Raisin, and from thence sent me to General Proctor, at head quarters, in Sandwich, who swore, by God, that the flag and papers which I gave him, was only a pretence to cover a dishonorable service. I rebutted his insinuations as moderately as my indignant feelings would permit. General Proctor made several observations on General Harrison's abilities as a commander; said he was used to fight Indians, but not British troops, &c. &c. He kept my instructions; did not even inform the senior officer, Ensign Baker, of the American prisoners, that he had a letter for him. I was ordered to a tavern, under the care of a French sergeant. I waited till the 4th of February before I wrote to General Proctor, demanding in what character I was considered; how long I would be detained, and the cause of my detention.

The next day the General's aid informed me I was recognised as surgeon's mate, and would attend with Doctor Bower on the American wounded prisoners. On the 12th, I received a letter from General Proctor, in answer to one I had written to him the day before, of which the following is a copy:

SANDWICH, *12th February, 1813.*

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the 11th instant, I am directed by Colonel Proctor, commanding, to observe, that you were sent in for the purpose of attending on the sick and wounded of General Winchester's army, for which purpose you are now detained; and beg leave further to observe, that, in the execution of your duty, you will render a most important service to your country.

I have the honor to be, sir, your humble and most obedient servant,

A. W. M'LEAN, A. D. C.

I continued to attend the wounded until the 2d of March, when A. D. C. M'Lean informed me that I was accused of carrying on a private correspondence, and that he was ordered to take me into custody and secure my papers; which was accordingly done in the most uncivil manner. On the 8th of March, I was taken by a guard to Fort George, without trial or hearing, although I had written to General Proctor repeatedly, requesting an investigation, to which I received no answer of any kind. From Fort George I was sent to Montreal, and hurried on night and day, although thinly clothed (having been robbed and stripped by the Indians) and the weather very cold. On

my arrival at Montreal, I was, without being asked any questions, or permitted to ask any myself, put into a dungeon eight or ten feet below the surface of the ground, in dark and solitary confinement, and there kept thirty-three days, after which time I was put up with the American prisoners. A few days after my elevation, Lieutenant Dudley became acquainted with my situation, and made such representations to Governor Prevost as induced his Excellency to send his aid, Colonel Baynes, who said he was directed by the Governor to inform me that the outrage which had been committed on my person was contrary to his orders, and told Colonel Lethbridge to take my parole and liberate me immediately. The Colonel, not having materials for writing at hand, said he would send for me at three o'clock. In less than one hour, the town major came, and informed me that the Governor, on more mature consideration, thought he could not liberate me until he got despatches from General Proctor. On the 17th May, eight or ten days after, I was taken from prison, and, in company with Lieutenant Dudley, sent to the United States. I may here observe, that the apartment in which I was confined did not contain either chair, bench, or stool, or any bedding whatever, for the space of two weeks. Fresh beef was furnished, but no salt. I was denied pen, ink, and paper, and treated uniformly with the utmost contempt by the sergeant, whom I had the honor of seeing once every day for a few minutes. By the request of fourteen American prisoners, now in Montreal gaol, whose names are hereunto annexed, I beg leave to state to your Excellency, that they are kept in close confinement, sometimes half a day without water, and frequently two or three days without wood to cook with; and when they complained, the gaoler's curses were freely lavished upon them. They have not the privilege of procuring some little necessaries, which the benevolence of some humane persons enabled them to do by giving them a little money. Sir George Prevost has told them that their confinement is owing to the bad faith of their own Government, &c.

I would have stated to your Excellency the knowledge I had, through the report of others, of the outrages and cruelties exercised on the American prisoners taken at General Winchester's defeat, but must refer your Excellency to Mr. Ruland, who had a command in the Michigan militia last summer, and who was, after having been dispossessed of all his property, sent to Fort George with me, who, no doubt, had many opportunities of hearing such things triumphantly spoken of among British officers and subjects.

I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most humble and obedient servant,

SAMUEL M'KEEHAN,  
Surgeon's Mate 2d Reg't Ohio Militia.

NIAGARA COFFEE HOUSE, June 4, 1813.

LIST OF PERSONS LEFT IN MONTREAL GAOL.

Geo. H. Rodgers, U. S. army,  
Gains Hooker,  
Jared Witherall,  
Lewis Minor,  
Pliny Conkey.

Wm. Hollenback,  
Philaster Jones,  
Major Watson,  
John Campbell,  
David Johnston.

Seth Barns,  
Danny Jones,  
Alex'r M'Gregor,  
Zebina Conkey,

No. 6.

RANSOM OF AMERICAN PRISONERS FROM INDIANS IN THE BRITISH SERVICE.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Woodward to the Secretary of State.*

ALBANY, March 22, 1813.

A few days previous to the thirty-first of January, 1813, I transmitted some letters addressed to the friends and families of a few of the prisoners whom we had been able to ransom out of the hands of the savages.

"On the thirty-first of January I addressed you a letter covering similar information for twelve other families."

No. 7.

*Pillage and destruction of private property on the Chesapeake Bay, and in the neighboring country.*

William Sears, of Talbot county, in Maryland, states, that, about the —— day of April last, whilst the British squadron, commanded, as he understood, by Admiral Warren, lay about Sharp's Island, in the Chesapeake Bay, he being on the island called Poplar Island, his place of residence, observed some tenders and barges coming off from the squadron in a direction towards the said island. The relator was then in the act of removing his furniture and other property from the island, and hastened therein from seeing the apparent approach of the enemy; but the said tenders and barges, whilst this relator was crossing to the main with his scows and batteaux laden with his property, and in tow of his two schooners, appeared suddenly to put back to their ships. The relator afterwards, in the afternoon and evening of the same day, made two other trips to the island, and succeeded in getting off all his bacon. On the succeeding day, as this relator thinks it was, he again went on the island and got off forty or fifty barrels of his corn and some other articles, without any interruption from the enemy. The relator having, in his first trip, got off his family and slaves, he now watched the movements of the enemy from his farm on the main. On Sunday morning the —— he saw two tenders come too at Poplar Island and go ashore in barges, and, after some length of time, he saw them depart from the island. The relator, in the afternoon of the last mentioned day, in company with several of his neighbors, went to see what the enemy had done on the island, and found that they had injured nothing, nor taken any thing away except some cider from the cellar. The relator then took off with him as many of his hogs and other articles as he could, and was hurried off by seeing the enemy put off from the squadron with several barges in tow of their tenders. The enemy, on that evening, took possession of the island, and remained that night and a part of the next day, as well as this relator recollects; and, on the last mentioned day, left the island and followed the squadron, which, in the mean time, had moved up the bay. The relator, seeing this, on the next or the second day after, again went on the island, and there found that the enemy had taken and killed about thirty head of black cattle, eighty-six head of old sheep and between twenty and thirty lambs; that they had killed three hundred breeding sows in their beds, whose pigs were found dead; and that they had taken off almost all of his poultry, *all* he supposes they could catch. From his house (where he had left some of his worst furniture) they took off an old looking glass, worth about four dollars, and some newspapers in a file. They broke several locks and one door, and threw many things about the house. In a house on the island, which had been occupied by James Sears, they broke his desk to pieces and threw about his furniture and other things; but the relator does not now recollect that any thing was taken away.

In testimony whereof, the said William Sears hath hereunto set his hand, this 22d day of June, 1813.

WILLIAM SEARS.

## MARYLAND, TALBOT COUNTY, SS.

Be it remembered, that, on this 22d day of June, 1813, William Sears, Esq. of Talbot county, personally appears before me, the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace of the State of Maryland, in and for Talbot county, duly commissioned and qualified, and made oath on the holy evangelists, that the statement of facts, herein contained, is substantially true, to the best of his knowledge, recollection, and belief.

Sworn before me,

PETER DENNY.

STATE OF MARYLAND, TALBOT COUNTY, *to wit:*

I hereby certify that Peter Denny, Esquire, before whom the above affidavit appears to have been made, and who has thereto subscribed his name, was, at the time of taking and signing the same, and still is, one of the State of Maryland's justices of the peace, in and for the county aforesaid, duly commissioned and qualified.

In testimony whereof, I have hereto set my hand, and affixed the seal of my office, this twenty-fourth day of June, Anno Domini 1813.

[L.S.]

JACOB LOOCKERMAN, *Clerk of Talbot County Court.*

## CECIL COUNTY, STATE OF MARYLAND.

Personally appeared before me, the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace for the county and State aforesaid, Frisby Henderson, and made oath on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that, on the 29th day of April, 1813, about seven o'clock A. M. a considerable British force, distributed into thirteen barges, commenced a hostile attack on a landing called Frenchtown, the property of this deponent, in the county aforesaid; that, some days previous thereto, a battery for five guns had been commenced on the wharf, but was in an unfinished state; that, on the approach of the British force, eight or ten men collected, and commenced firing from the battery, and stopped the advance of the barges for some time. The ammunition being expended, the barges then came on, and a firing from them commenced of cannon shot at the battery, and also at the dwelling houses in Frenchtown. The British then landed on the wharf, and immediately set fire to a new store house on the wharf, which at that time contained nothing but a large quantity of oats, the property of this deponent; and also a fishery adjoining the wharf was set on fire at the same time. After burning the said store house and fishery, a force of about two hundred and fifty marines was marched from the wharf, through Frenchtown, and up the river shore, to the dwelling house of this deponent, and demanded the way to the town of Elkton; that finding the river must be crossed on that direction to get to Elkton, the whole force returned to Frenchtown, broke open the upper store house, which was at that time full of goods, part of which was the property of the United States, and the remainder for different merchants of Baltimore, to the amount, probably, of fifty or sixty thousand dollars; and plundered and carried off part of the goods, and set fire to the house and burnt it with the remainder of the goods. This deponent saith, that, by the destruction of the two store houses and fishery, together with the oats and other property he had in the upper store house, burned by the British as aforesaid, he has sustained a loss of about three thousand dollars.

Sworn before me, the subscriber, on this 12th day of June, 1813.

ALEXANDER KINKEAD.

## CECIL COUNTY, STATE OF MARYLAND.

Personally appeared before me, the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace for the county aforesaid, Cordelia Penington, living in Frenchtown, and made oath on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that she saw the British on the 29th of April, 1813, land on the wharf at Frenchtown, and immediately set fire to and burnt the store house and fishery. That, on the British breaking open the upper store house, this deponent went down to the store house, and solicited the commanding officer not to burn the house; he replied, that he came for the purpose of burning the store houses; that they were public property; that this deponent replied, the store houses were private property, and belonged to her brother; the officer said there was public property in it, and should be burnt, and ordered the house set on fire, and burnt it with all the goods they did not carry away.

Sworn before me, the subscriber, the 12th day of June, 1813.

ALEXANDER KINKEAD.

## CECIL COUNTY, STATE OF MARYLAND.

Personally appeared before me, the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace for the county aforesaid, Delia Penington, and made oath on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that she saw the British, on the 29th of April, 1813, land on the wharf at Frenchtown, and immediately set fire to and burn down the store house and fishery. That, after the store house was on fire, the marines were marched up from the wharf; and, at the time of the plundering and burning the upper store house, the marines were formed in the road opposite her mother's house. The officer commanding the marines, who informed this deponent his name was Wybourne, said their orders were to burn the stage stable and destroy the stage coaches. That, on this deponent's soliciting of him not to burn the stables and stages, the officer replied, the question they generally asked when they went to any place was, how they voted at the elections, and inquired of this deponent if her uncle, meaning Mr. Henderson, voted for the war.

Sworn before me, the subscriber, this 12th day of June, 1813.

ALEXANDER KINKEAD.

I do hereby certify that, on the morning of the 6th of May last, I was impressed at my house at Turner's creek, by the British forces, as they passed up the river Sassafra to Frederick and George towns, and was forced to accompany them to the above places. On our way up we were met by two mulatto men in a batteau. Captain Byng, (the name, I believe, of the officer) in whose boat I was, took a white handkerchief, fastened it on his esponent, and was about to enter the batteau with the negroes, in order to proceed up the river, to inform the officer commanding there, that, if he would not fire upon their barges, they would not destroy the town, when he was ordered by the admiral not to do so, who observed, "that he would only send the negroes with the message; that, as they were known to the people in the fort above, he expected that they would believe what they told them." We were then opposite to Mr. Wicke's farm, which I think must be about a mile below the fort. The batteau with the negroes went to the fort as directed, and the British forces soon after followed. I was in the foremost boat, and continued in said boat until their return down the river, after burning the towns, when I was landed on Mr. Withered's shore; and most positively declare, that there was no white flag ever hoisted in her or any of the other boats, to my knowledge; nor did I ever hear any of the British officers or privates say they had ever hoisted a flag, or that one ever had been fired on.

The captain, on his return down the river, declared, that "if he could catch Colonel Veazey, who commanded at the fort above, he would quarter him, and give me part of his quarter for steaks, for that the fire he had received was one of Washington's rounds."

I can't say positively what number of men they lost, as they would only acknowledge five wounded, but think they have sustained greater injury.

Given under my hand, this 9th day of June, 1813.

JOHN STAVELY.

SAMUEL BOYER.

Subscribed and sworn to before

I certify that I was at the battery on Pearce's Point, on the 6th of May, when a squadron of British barges visited Georgetown; that I had a full view of all the barges until they got possession of the battery on the Cecil shore, and that I saw no white flag displayed from either of the barges.

W. SPENCER.

June 9, 1813.

We, the undersigned, certify that, on the 6th of May last, at the time Admiral Cockburn, with a considerable armed force, attacked and destroyed Frederick and George towns, on Sassafras river, in the State of Maryland, were in or near the breastwork below Fredericktown, under the command of Colonel Thomas W. Veazey. From our position, we had a full and perfect view of the enemy's hostile armament, and saw nothing with it, or preceded or followed it, that indicated or had the appearance of a *flag of truce*, according to the established usage of civilized nations.

We understand a flag of truce to be a mission for a pacific purpose, accompanied by men without arms, and unprotected by a naval or military force.

The barges moved up the river in close and compact order; the leading boat a few yards ahead of the rest, said to be Admiral Cockburn's, carried a colored flag, and was escorted by not less than fifteen armed barges, and full of armed men, immediately in its rear, and evidently approached in a menacing manner and with hostile intentions.

Given under our hands, this 10th day of June, 1813.

Joshua Ward,  
John W. Etherington,  
Dela F. Heath,  
John V. Price,  
Henry E. Coalman,  
Samuel Dixon,  
Joshua Greenwood,  
Robert H. Maxwell,  
William Etherington,

John Loftis,  
John Duffoy,  
John Etherington,  
Moses N. Carson,  
Hezekiah Dowlin, his + mark,  
James S. Price,  
Elias See,  
George Beaster.

We saw no flag of any description.

Joseph Davis,  
William Roberts,  
Dormer Oakes,  
Mesbuk Kendrick, his + mark,

John Conly, his + mark,  
Nicholas T. Franks, his + mark,  
Joshua Haffington,  
Nathan Farrow, his + mark.

STATE OF MARYLAND, CECIL COUNTY, ss.

On the 10th day of June, Anno Domini 1813, personally appeared each and every person whose names are subscribed to the foregoing certificate, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for the county and State aforesaid, and made oath on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that the facts detailed in the foregoing certificate are true to the best of their knowledge and belief.

Sworn before

H. B. PENINGTON.

I do hereby certify that I was at the breastwork near Fredericktown, on the 6th ultimo, when the British came up the river in their barges, and that I did not see a flag of truce, nor do I believe that the commanding officer at the breastwork knew or supposed there was any such thing in or among the barges. As witness my hand this 12th day of June, 1813.

JAMES SCANLAN.

Sworn to before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, and State of Maryland, the day and year abovementioned.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*The deposition of Richard Barnaby, of Fredericktown, in Cecil county, Maryland, aged about forty-eight years.*

Being duly sworn, deposes and saith, that, on the morning of the 6th of May, after the engagement took place at the fort below this town, that he went a short distance out of town to see some females to a place of safety, and, on his return, he met about twenty of the British troops armed, commanded by an officer, who observed, on meeting of him, here is one of the damned rascals from the fort; and then inquired where the damned rascals which were at the fort had run to, and ordered him to go with him and show them to him. The deponent observing he did not know where they were, the officer swore he was a liar, and drew his sword, and threatened to kill him; one of the men presented a bayonet, and another drew a dirk, and swore if he did not go he would run it through him. He afterwards went with them as far as Captain Francis B. Chandler's house, at which time Francis B. Chandler was going towards his house; and, on their hearing some person call him captain, the officer ordered his men to take him: the admiral coming up at the time, inquired the reason that house was set on fire. Afterwards this deponent returned to his own house with the admiral, and requested of him not to have it set on fire. The admiral promised it should not be burnt if he would furnish him with thirty fowls, which he promised he would do. He furnished them with about thirteen fowls. They then took away and destroyed nearly the whole of his furniture which was in the house, and his provisions, and left him.

Given under my hand this 12th June, 1813.

RICHARD BARNABY.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, the day and year above written.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*The deposition of Francis B. Chandler, of Fredericktown, Cecil county, Maryland, aged about thirty-nine years.*

Being duly sworn, deposes and saith, that, on the morning of the 6th of May last, just as he returned from the fort, he was standing near his house, and saw a British party, consisting of about fifty persons, armed and headed by an officer, said to be a post captain, running up to his house; that he, this deponent, stepped upon the steps of the house and requested the officer not to enter; that he caught him by the breast, and called him a damned rascal, and pulled him from off the steps, and then entered the house, with the whole of the party, and gave three cheers, and ordered the men to go to work, and called for fire; that they immediately commenced cutting the stair case, window sash, and breaking the glass, and set the house on fire in three places; that, at this time, Admiral Cockburn arrived, and he, this deponent, begged him to have the fire put out, until he would reason the case with him, and the Admiral asked him what he could do; if he could furnish thirty bullocks, in half an hour; that if he could not, the house should be burnt; and asked him if he would try to get them; and upon this deponent replying in the affirmative, ordered the fire to be put out for the present: that he, this deponent, got upon his horse, and rode about half a mile, when he fell in with Colonel Veazey, and informed him what he was after; and that the Colonel told him to go back and inform the Admiral that he should not have them: that he returned and informed the Admiral of it, who then asked him what else he could do; and if he had a good deal of poultry; and upon replying yes, told him

he must have it; and ordered his men to catch it; which was done and carried off: that then, by the great persuasion and entreaty of this deponent's wife and sister, the house was ordered not to be burnt; but the sister of this deponent was much abused by one of their inferior officers, for her exertions in endeavoring to save the property: that this deponent had his warehouse burnt by them, with a considerable quantity of goods in it, and that he himself was a prisoner with them for about three hours.

Given under my hand this 12th June, 1813.

FRANCIS B. CHANDLER.

Sworn to and subscribed, before me, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, the day and year above written.

H. B. PENINGTON.

On this 12th day of June, 1813, personally appeared Jonathan Greenwood, aged thirty years, and being first sworn on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, did declare, and say: that, on the morning of the 6th of May last, upon the landing of the British forces at Fredericktown, where this deponent resides, an officer and two sailors came to said deponent's house, and swore that, if they had not found him without arms, they would have thrust him through with their bayonets; they then retired, fell in with some other forces, which soon after came to deponent's house, broke it open, took whatever they conveniently could carry away, and destroyed the rest, with their cutlasses and dirks, and burned it, with his dwelling house, store house, and kitchen. The officers appeared to be most active in the destruction of his property. The houses in the town were, soon after, generally, set on fire and destroyed.

JONATHAN GREENWOOD.

Sworn to and subscribed, before me, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, on the day and year above written.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*The deposition of Captain John Allen, of Fredericktown, Cecil county, Maryland, aged about fifty-one years.*

Being duly sworn, deposes and saith, that, on the morning of the 6th May last, when the British forces landed, on the beach of Fredericktown, and marched up through the streets, they fell in with this deponent at his brother James Allen's house. The troops were headed by their commanding officer, (Admiral Cockburn, as this deponent was informed by one of the men) and observed, who the damnation are these that kept such a firing upon us—are they regulars? This deponent answered no, they were militia; he then asked where they were gone, and was told he did not know; he then asked, where are all the men of the town? and was informed they were moved out; he said he had sent word to the shore that, if he was not fired upon, he would not destroy any property, and turned round and observed, to a black boy standing by, you black son of a bitch was one of the persons I sent word by; which the boy denied. He then ordered the men to go on and burn and destroy, which they executed with fidelity. This deponent then begged the admiral to spare his house (meaning the house of James Allen) as his brother's wife was confined up stairs, in a very delicate situation, with an infant only two days old. He then ordered her to be cleared out; Mrs. M'Donnah, his wife's mother, run out, clasping her hands, and begged for God's sake to spare her child, for if she was removed her life would be lost. He then ordered, spare this house. He now marched off after the men that had been gone for some little time, and shortly after returned on horse back. This deponent then requested the Admiral to spare him one house, that he might collect his family together in, after it should please Providence to restore peace between the two nations. He then directed this deponent to get him some fowls, who informed him he had none; he damned him, and asked if he could not get them, and was told no; immediately afterwards a fire was made in the storehouse, and consumed. While George and Frederick towns were in flames, the Admiral, in the presence of this deponent, observed to his officers, well my lads, this looks well; to which no reply was made, and he ordered all hands on board of the boats. That this deponent saw the British, two and a half miles off, coming up, and saw no flag of truce, or any thing like it. That this deponent was of opinion the defence made by Colonel Veazey, and the men under his command, was such as to entitle them to much credit, and justified by every circumstance within his knowledge; though himself and brother are sufferers to nearly one-half of the property in Fredericktown.

JOHN ALLEN.

Sworn to and subscribed, before me, this 12th day of June, 1813, a justice of the peace for Cecil county.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*The deposition of Joshua Ward, living about one mile from Fredericktown, in Cecil county, aged forty-four.*

Being duly sworn, deposes and saith, that, from the best information he could obtain, from those persons that were left at his house, that a party of British, consisting of between thirty and forty men, commanded by an officer, said to be a post captain, on the 6th of May last, went to his house, and immediately placed a guard around it, inquired particularly for him, and searched every part of the house, swearing they would sacrifice him; being disappointed in finding me, they then began to destroy the tables, chairs, looking glasses, &c.; when they had completed the destruction of such furniture as they could not take off with them, the officer himself took down a pair of handsome looking glasses, and others of the party took as much of the best bedding, clothing, plate, window curtains, &c. as they could conveniently carry with them; my little boy's clothes they carried off on the point of their bayonets; before they left the house, they put powder in every room below stairs, an officer got fire himself from the kitchen, and had it kindled in the different rooms, and a bed put in the cellar with a part of the broken chairs, tables, &c. and a fire kindled; they then left the house, but continued in the yard until the fire was bursting from the windows, and swore, that, if there was an attempt to extinguish the fire, they would put the person to death; that they intended to return and burn every thing on the farm; they fired at one of my sons, not twelve years of age, as he was driving off a flock of sheep.

JOSHUA WARD.

Sworn to and subscribed, before me, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, Maryland, this 14th June, 1813.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*The deposition of Toilus Robertson, aged about thirty-four years, who did live within about one mile of Fredericktown, Cecil county, Maryland.*

This deponent states, that, on the morning of the 6th of May, he was at the breastwork near Fredericktown, at the time the British armament came up the Sassafra river; that he saw no flag of truce; that, after the militia were obliged to retreat, he returned home, and in a very short time saw a party of the British coming towards his house, and he and his family left their house, except two black women and a black man, who state that the British took the deponent's household furniture, and piled it up in the yard before the house door, and set them on fire, which communicated to the house, and consumed it also; the barn, which stood about one hundred yards from the house, was set on fire and consumed. This deponent lost all his household goods and provisions. He saw Fredericktown in flames, previous to his leaving his house, which alarmed himself and family to that degree, that he abandoned his house for their safety.

Witness my hand,

TOILUS ROBERTSON.

Sworn and subscribed to, before the subscriber, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, Maryland, this fourteenth day of June, 1813.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*The deposition of Moses N. Cannon, aged about thirty-two, who lives within about one-half mile of Fredericktown, in Cecil county, Maryland.*

This deponent states that he was at the breastwork, near Fredericktown, on the 6th May last, when the British armament came up the Sassafras river; that he saw no flag of truce; that, after the militia were obliged to retreat, he returned home, and was occupied in turning horses out of his wheat field, when a party of the British came to his house; he rode up to them, and they informed him that he was their prisoner; and on his observing that he was in their power, they inquired of him if he had any thing to drink, and he answering in the negative, they told him they had got something to eat, and asked him if he wanted his house burnt; and he answering in the negative, they told him to go then to the captain, that he was in the house, and would set fire to it; and on his going towards the house he met the person whom they called the captain, with another person with him, loaded with his, this deponent's, bed clothes, a pair of boots, and a number of other articles, carrying them towards his men, who were formed outside the yard; at the time, an officer on horseback rode up and inquired of the deponent where the damned militia were; he observed to him that they had retreated, pointing at the same time towards a wood; he observed he must burn the deponent's house, and on the deponent expostulating with him, and stating the disadvantage he would labor under, in case his house was burnt, he then inquired of him the road to the mouth of Elk river, and if he, the officer, could march his men there, and the deponent observed that his Government would not permit him to give him any instructions; and the officer observed that he knew that as well as the deponent, but that he might trust a British officer, and smiled, and turned his horse, and ordered his men to march, and they went off, without burning the house or asking any more questions. The deponent then went to a neighboring house to see about a part of his family, and on his return back towards his house, he was fired on by a party of the British, stationed in the public road, about one hundred and fifty yards from the deponent's house; he then retreated across the field, and abandoned his house; he saw, after riding from the party who fired on him, a party going towards his house, who, as he supposes, destroyed, or took away, the residue of his household goods, and broke the window glass, sash, doors, and did considerable damage to his house. Fredericktown was on fire about the time the first party of the British came to the deponent's house.

Witness my hand. MOSES N. CANNON.

Sworn to and subscribed, before me, a justice of the peace for Cecil county, Maryland, this fourteenth day of June, 1813.

H. B. PENINGTON.

SASSAFRAS NECK, Cecil County, June 28, 1813.

I do hereby certify, that, being in the fort at Fredericktown, on Sassafras river, on the morning of the 6th of May last, when a battle took place with the British and the militia, under the command of Colonel Thomas W. Veazey, I distinctly saw the enemy, from the time they first came in view, and discerned no flag of truce, or any thing resembling one. The enemy, after some resistance, landed, burned Frederick and George towns, and destroyed a great deal of other private property. My house, about eight miles on the river from the fort, was plundered by them on their way down the river.

Sworn before

JNO. T. VEASY.

H. B. PENINGTON.

*Valuation of Property destroyed in Fredericktown.*

OWNERS' NAMES.	SPECIES OF PROPERTY.	AMOUNT.
Captain John Allen,	Dwelling house, kitchen, and meat house,	\$1,200 00
	Small house,	200 00
	Small do.	300 00
	Stable and carriage house,	100 00
	Granary,	1,000 00
		\$2,800 00
Richard Barnaby,	Furniture and apparel,	411 00
John Barnaby,	House and kitchen,	350 00
	House and kitchen,	500 00
		850 00
John H. Brown,	Wearing apparel,	47 00
Captain Frs. B. Chandler,	Granary and shed, near bank,	1,000 00
	Granary on wharf,	250 00
		1,250 00
Jonathan Greenwood,	Dwelling house, kitchen, and store house,	1,226 00
	Merchandise,	792 37½
		2,018 37½
Mrs. Ann Moore,	Dwelling house,	1,200 00
	Furniture, &c.	447 00
		1,647 00
Joseph Jarvis,	House,	50 00
Elizabeth M <sup>c</sup> Clannan,	House,	100 00
James Mitchell,	Dwelling house, kitchen, and meat house,	300 00
Moses Cannon,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	250 00
Toilus Robertson,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	208 00
James Williamson,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	153 25
Joshua Ward,	Dwelling house and kitchen,	2,500 00
	Furniture, apparel, &c.	2,836 45
		5,336 45
John Ward, senr.	Tenant's house,	450 00
	Sum total,	\$15,871 07½

## Property destroyed in Georgetown.

OWNERS' NAMES.	SPECIES OF PROPERTY.	AMOUNT.
Ann Bagwell,	Furniture, &c.	\$156 00
Smith Bagwell's heirs,	Shoemaker's shop,	200 00
Margaret Downs,	Dwelling house and kitchen,	150 00
Denis Donlevy,	Household furniture, apparel, musical instruments, books, provision, &c. &c. &c.	3,744 15
Thomas Dollis,	Furniture, apparel, carpenter's tools, &c.	110 00
Margaret Jackson,	Houses, furniture, apparel, money, tools, &c. &c. &c.	1,865 75
Arthur Nicholson's heirs,	Dwelling house, &c.	350 00
Mary Nicholson,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	150 00
Joseph Jarvis,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	67 12½
Archibald M'Neill,	House,	200 00
Fanny M'Neill,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	109 87½
Philip F. Rasin,	Granary,	\$300 00
	Furniture, apparel, &c.	128 75
		428 75
Isabella Faggert,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	134 56
Robert Usilton,	Furniture, apparel, &c.	119 60
Mrs. Wilson,	Dwelling house, kitchen, and two out houses,	1,800 00
William Inland,	Dwelling house, kitchen, stable, and carriage houses,	850 00
Mrs. Pearer,	Dwelling house, brick, kitchen, stable and carriage house,	850 00
Mrs. Mary Everitt,	Carriage house,	80 00
Jacob Roads,	Old house,	40 00
Heirs of William Pope,	Tavern house, granary, two story stable and carriage house,	1,000 00
Miss Stengises,	Good brick dwelling house and kitchen,	2,500 00
Arthur Nicholson's heirs,		200 00
Isabella Freeman,	Dwelling house, kitchen, stable, and carriage house,	800 00
Mrs. Mary Henry,	Store house,	250 00
Robert Elliott,	Dwelling house, kitchen, and stable,	300 00
Stepney Congo,	Dwelling house,	150 00
Ann Peare,	Dwelling house and kitchen,	150 00
William Jackson,	Dwelling house, kitchen, store house, and granary,	500 00
Inois Spuran,	Dwelling house and kitchen,	1,000 00
Heirs of Alex. Williamson,	Dwelling house, kitchen, &c.	1,500 00
	Sum total, Georgetown,	\$19,755 81
	Ditto, Fredericktown,	15,871 07½
	Whole amount,	\$35,626 88½

The within is an inventory of property burned, otherwise destroyed, or taken away, on the sixth day of May last, by the British forces, commanded by Rear Admiral Cockburn, in Frederick and George towns, and the vicinity thereof, situated on Sassafras river, Eastern Shore, State of Maryland; taken by the subscribers, on oath, when they had a competent knowledge thereof; but when they had not a satisfactory knowledge of the property destroyed as aforesaid, schedules thereof were taken from the owners upon oath. The subscribers have sufficient reasons to believe, indeed, that property to a very considerable amount has been destroyed or taken away by the aforesaid British forces, from the above mentioned places, which they can obtain no correct or satisfactory account of.

JOHN J. COX,  
JOHN MAXWELL,  
JAMES BLACKISTON:

June 28, 1813.

EASTERN SHORE, Maryland,  
MARENGO, 18th July, 1813.

Sir:

Multiplied engagements and forgetfulness, succeeding each other, have prevented my forwarding to you this statement of the depredations committed on my property at Sharp's Island, by the enemy, while in the Chesapeake. On the 12th of April, while I was in the act of removing my stock, &c. they landed upwards of a hundred men and prevented my removing any thing. They detained me on the island until the seventeenth, in which time they were principally engaged in getting water. Declarations were made by Admiral Warren and the other officers, that every thing of the stock or grain kind, taken away, should be paid for at a fair price. Admiral Cockburn was, as I am informed, at this time sent up the bay with the advance detachment of the fleet. Admiral Warren's ship and a few tenders only, remained about the island. At that time they took twenty-eight hogs, four sheep, twelve cattle, thirteen bushels of Indian corn, and informed me that they should allow the following prices for them: Hogs \$2½, sheep \$2½, cattle \$13 a piece, corn \$1 per bushel. On my return to the island some weeks afterwards, the accounts were made out to the amount of \$247, bills on their Government for the amount, except about \$54 in specie. Before I returned to the island, the fleet had all gone down the bay. I understood from the inhabitants, living in sight of the island, that the enemy had paid the island another visit, and had made a general sweep of the stock. On my arrival at the island I found it too true. They had taken all my sheep, in number 91; sixty-five of which were one-half and three-fourths blood merinoes, and one full blood ram, which cost me \$95, eighteen head of cattle, and about twenty hogs. They left a bill on their Government for \$133 and cash to the amount of \$40. They took all the poultry, shot in a wanton manner one of the finest boars which this country could produce, and which was much admired by Admiral Warren for his uncommon beauty and breed, and who forbid, as a favor to me, that he should be disturbed. They bayoneted others, which they left wounded, and which would have been lost, had my overseer not saved a part by killing them. They left nothing for the sheep only a promise of \$2 per head. I have estimated my loss, arising principally from this last visit, at \$1,203, as will appear by the following statement:

18 cattle, at \$13,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$234 00
20 hogs, at \$4,	-	-	-	-	-	-	80 00
55 $\frac{3}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ blood lambs, at \$10,	-	-	-	-	-	-	550 00
36 common stock with fleece, at \$6,	-	-	-	-	-	-	216 00
4 taken at the first visit, merinoes, at \$10,	-	-	-	-	-	-	40 00
							<hr/>
Deduct \$2 $\frac{1}{2}$ paid for the first four,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$1,120 00
							10 00
							<hr/>
1 full blood merino ram,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$1,110 00
							95 00
							<hr/>
Bills and cash left,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,205 00
							173 00
							<hr/>
Trouble and expense of reinstating stock,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,032 00
							100 00
							<hr/>
							\$1,132 00

I will give those prices to any person who will reinstate the same number of stock and kine, at the close of the war, or deliver them at any of my farms, the ram excepted, as I have raised others of the same kind. The injury done me by breaking up the flock of sheep is far beyond the prices stated, as they cannot be reinstated for several years. The destruction of the ram was a wanton outrage, as he was not fit to be eaten. He was bayoneted, and I believe left on the island. This, I presume, was aimed at our manufactures.

There will be a loss of at least 20 per cent. upon the bills if sold here, and probably a total loss if I wait for the British Government to pay them. Add this to the amount above given, makes the total loss \$1,203.

Your friend and servant,

JACOB GIBSON.

JAMES NABB, *Esquire, near Easton.*

TALBOT COUNTY, *sct.*

On the 20th July, 1813, came Jacob Gibson, Esquire, before me, one of the justices of the peace for the State of Maryland, and for Talbot county aforesaid, and made oath, on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that what is contained in the within instrument of writing is just and true, as stated, as near as he can ascertain.

WILLIAM HARRISON, Jr.

UNITED STATES' FRIGATE ADAMS, *July 24, 1813.*

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter from Lieutenant Read, giving the particulars of the loss of the schooner Asp, and the inhuman conduct of the enemy to her commander, Mr. Segourney. Another letter from Lieutenant Reed, of the same date, mentions that no part of the enemy's force were then above Blackstone's Island. He further states, that, in their attempts to land on the Virginia shore, they have been invariably repulsed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. MORRIS.

HON. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

UNITED STATES' CUTTER SCORPION, POTOMAC, *July 23d, 1813.*

SIR:

It is with much pain I have to inform you of the death of poor Segourney, who was killed a few days ago, (I cannot say when) gallantly defending his vessel. He was attacked whilst lying in Kinsale creek, by three launches, and after a sharp contest beat them off. They, however, on gaining the mouth of the creek, were reinforced by two more, and again renewed the conflict. About this time Mr. Segourney got wounded through the body. The crew, on seeing him fall, having no officer capable of leading them, jumped overboard and gained the shore; when the enemy, who by this time succeeded in getting on board, finding the colors still flying and Segourney sitting up, barbarously knocked his brains out with the butt end of a musket.

At the commencement of the action, Mr. Segourney thinking them too strong for him, had ran the schooner on shore, in which situation the enemy found her, and not being able to get her off, set her on fire. The militia, however, (who must have been slow in collecting) by this time got down and beat them off, retook the schooner, and extinguished the flames.

They have since buried Mr. Segourney with the honors of war.

I have not heard any thing of the crew.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. C. REED.

Captain CHARLES MORRIS, *United States' frigate Adams.*

P. S. All this I have from authority which cannot be doubted.

*Extract of a letter from Midshipman H. M. McClintock, dated Kinsale, July 19th, 1813, to the Secretary of the Navy Department.*

"We were attacked by five boats; we continued doing the same as before, but having so few men we were unable to repel the enemy; when they boarded us they refused giving any quarter; there were upwards of fifty men on our decks, which compelled us to leave the vessel, as the enemy had possession; they set her on fire and retreated."

*Extract of a letter from John Tuberville, Major of the 2d Brigade 111th Regiment of the Virginia Militia, dated Kinsale, July 20th, 1813.*

"I arrived myself at the place of capture before the colors were lowered, and am confident that, even at that time, their numbers, amounting to between sixty and seventy, might have been reduced one half, before they could make their escape, could I have commanded twenty determined men. The gallant commandant fell before the enemy boarded him, by a ball which passed through his body, but continued to fight to the last extremity. When there were forty or fifty of the enemy on deck, one of the schooner's crew asked for quarter, which was denied him. At



this instant the few men remaining made their escape by swimming to the shore, and Mr. Segourney was instantly shot through the head. The vessel was shortly set on fire, and the barges moved off. The officers fought bravely, and Mr. McClintock defended the vessel with much credit to himself, after the commanding officer was wounded."

HON. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

NEWBERN, July 19th, 1813.

SIR:

On Sunday night, the 11th instant, an English fleet, consisting of one seventy-four, three frigates, one brig, and three schooners, anchored about one mile from Ocracock bar; about day-break we were informed of it at Portsmouth, by persons from Ocracock. I immediately got up and ordered the cutter to get under way and run up to Newbern and give the alarm, which she did, but made a very narrow escape from the barges, as she was obliged to beat over the swash against wind and tide, while they could row a straight course. I believe Admiral Cockburn had intended to have visited Newbern for the purpose of robbing the banks, but was prevented by the cutter making her escape to give the alarm. Indeed he said such was his intention, and was very much exasperated because the barges did not take her. I believe there were as many as twenty-five barges that crossed the bar, and I think there could not have been less than three thousand regulars, marines, and sailors in them: they captured the privateer brig Anaconda of New York, and the letter of marque schooner Atlas, of Philadelphia, both valuable fast sailing vessels; they then landed on Portsmouth and Ocracock, and such a cruel wanton destruction of property was scarcely ever witnessed; they broke in pieces almost every species of furniture, cut open beds, and scattered the feathers, and even carried their villany to such a length as to rob many women of their children's clothes without leaving them a second suit to their backs. The officers pretended there should be no depredations committed; and when complaints were made to them they would say, "point out the fellow and he shall be corrected," well knowing it was impossible to identify any one of them, among such a number of strangers. They took off of the two places two hundred cattle, four hundred sheep, and sixteen hundred fowls, for which they pretended to pay the inhabitants, some of whom I believe received more than compensation, and others received nothing: in short, they have ruined almost all on the places. I had time to send my trunk with what bonds and money there are belonging to the United States, on board the cutter, which escaped; I also had time to bring a few of the most valuable papers belonging to the office; it is well I did, for they destroyed my office entirely, every paper in it, both public and private; they destroyed my library and all other property of mine they could find, about eight hundred dollars' worth; and then sent me on board the seventy-four, where they detained me two days, until they had embarked and ready to sail. I was on shore two days before they discovered I was a public officer; I presume they sent me on board to prevent observation. After they had kept me until they were ready to start, they turned me adrift in the ocean in a small boat with four Spaniards, not one of whom was acquainted with the bar more than myself, in consequence of which we got into the breakers and very narrowly escaped being all lost; all these things were transacted under the direction of the humane Admiral Cockburn. I believe, from the conversation I overheard, that they intend to visit Beaufort, then Wilmington, and so on to the southward.

My returns will be made as soon as I can get what remain in some kind of order.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. S. SINGLETON, *Collector.*

HON. WILLIAM JONES, *Acting Secretary of the Treasury.*

On the morning of the 3d May, the day the British, under the command of Admiral Cockburn, made the attack on the town of Havre de Grace, on my return from the commons where I had deposited some ammunition, I observed an officer on the horse of Mr. James Wood of this place, a few paces in a southwest direction of the church. At first sight I was of the opinion it was one of our own officers, which I thought to be Adjutant M'Kenna, having heard but a few moments before, the voice of John O'Neill crying out in words to this effect: "damn it men, return; we can certainly beat the rascals off." I was, however, deceived, as this officer was the person who took O'Neill prisoner while in the act of entreating the militia to return. Not knowing at that time O'Neill was taken by him, I advanced in a direction towards the church on my way to the magazine, to assist in carrying off more ammunition, when I discovered in the front of the church a file of marines. To the best of my recollection, I was then at a distance of from 100 to 150 yards from the officer on horseback, and I think about the same from three militia men, when this officer (said to be Lieutenant Westfall) with a drawn sword in his hand, it being the only flag he carried, cried out two or three times, "will you surrender?" One of the militia men made answer, but what it was I could not distinctly hear, and immediately fired on him, and it is said wounded him in the hand. Finding it impossible to reach the magazine, the marines being then round the church, which was contiguous to it, I bent my course towards Mrs. Sears' tavern, in hopes of finding some of the British officers there, and by entreaty to save some of the private property, which I was fearful would be destroyed. On reaching Mrs. Sears' sign post, I found the first division of boats had just reached the wharf, and two large guns were fired, one of which threw a ball on the roof and knocked off some shingles; the firing then ceased, when two other gentlemen with myself advanced on the wharf and asked for the commander of that division of boats. A person, whom I supposed to be a midshipman from his appearance, answered "Captain Lawrance will be here directly;" he then asked a number of questions, such as, "have you any newspapers? how many militia have you? and where are they stationed? where is your post office?" &c. &c. to all of which we carefully avoided giving any direct answer. Some of the barges then warped up along side of the wharf, when I thought it most prudent to leave them, being fearful that I should be made a prisoner. I then walked up towards the ferry house, followed by the two gentlemen who went with me on the wharf; we were met by an officer, who immediately ordered us back. After reaching the lower end of the wharf, the midshipman before mentioned, said, "sir, this is Captain Lawrance," pointing to the officer; Lawrance then addressed us in words to this amount: "what have you got to say for yourselves; where is your mayor or chief magistrate?" He was told we had no mayor, and that there was no magistrate in the place. He then asked, "are you prepared to ransom the town?" I asked him what sum he demanded; he said about \$20,000. We told him no such sum could be raised. "Why, then," he replied, "did you fire on us; had you not done that, and hung out a flag, we would have treated you better." I then asked him what was their intention in coming, and in what manner they would have acted had a flag been hung out on their approach? To the first question he gave no answer, but after a short pause observed, "about one half the sum now demanded would have been taken." He was then told, small as that might appear to him, it could not have been raised. "Then," says he, turning hastily around, "in three quarters of an hour your town shall be in flames; you shall now feel the effects of war." The said Captain Lawrance then went into the tavern of Mrs. Sears, and with two or three men brought out a bale or box of goods, (which was said to have been lodged there the night before, belonging to a lady in Georgetown) and placed a few paces in front of the house; another officer (name unknown) entered afterwards, and brought out a second box, and placed it near the first. Captain Lawrance then turned to him and said, "sir, I have placed a guard here; we must now attend to other business; we will see to this," (pointing to the goods,) "to-night." The order to fire the houses was then given, and Captain Lawrance walked down street and entered the store of S. Hogg & Co., the door of which had been previously broken open, and a few men were in the act of taking off wearing apparel, &c.; others had got to the counting room desk in search of money, scattering the papers, &c. on the floor. The shameful act of pilfering the goods was however reserved for the redoubtable Captain Lawrance; he it was who first began the shameful scene, so disgraceful to an officer, by taking down knives, forks, &c. saying "ha! the very thing we want;" and, turning round, called in a fresh set of plunderers, and said "boys, here is fine plunder;" the men did not wait a second invitation, but set in with their worthy leader, and in a short time emptied the store, excepting some articles which were of little value.

WM. T. KILLPATRICK.

P. S. When I found that Captain Lawrance ordered his men in the store, and gave the order to plunder, I remonstrated with him on the impropriety of such proceeding, and observed that, with civilized nations at war, private property had always been respected. He replied, in a hasty manner, "you ought to be more particular in your choice of representatives; you wanted war, and you shall now feel the effects."

W. T. K.

Sworn to, this twenty-fifth day of June, 1813, before

ELIJAH DAVIS.

Personally came James Wood, of Havre de Grace, before me, the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace for Harford county, and made oath, according to law, that, on Monday morning, the 3d of May, 1813, between daylight and sunrise, as he was riding in the town of Havre de Grace, he discovered some men in the act of hauling up the shore a piece of artillery that had been mounted on the battery, and from their dress and the dulness of the morning, he took them to be Americans, nor did he discover his mistake until he was made prisoner and compelled to dismount; upon which the officer commanding the British immediately mounted his horse. A short period after, he was ordered on board of a barge in company with some other prisoners, which barge was moved up to Mrs. Sears' wharf, in company with other barges. Some short time after, he discovered a house at some distance from the water to be on fire, which excited some surprise, (the house belonged to Mr. John Tucker.) He observed to the cockswoin of the boat, there was a house on fire, and asked him if he did not suppose it to be set on fire by a rocket; he replied, "perhaps it might." Directly after, I saw the British kindling a fire in the yard of Mrs. Sears, and asked them for what that was intended. The cockswoin answered "to set *that* house on fire." I then asked them, "why, you are not going to burn the buildings?" The reply from an officer on board the same barge (and who, I believe, had not been on shore) was, "yes, sir, we shall lay your town in ashes;" and in a few minutes I saw a general conflagration of the greater part of the best buildings, during the time I remained on board, which was until a very short time before they left the place. I saw the officers as well as men in small squads bringing on board the barges, as they lay at the wharf, plundered property of almost every description, and depositing it. During the time, an officer brought on board a large trunk or box, and calling to one of the men said, "I will give you two dollars to take care of this for me; this is my own plunder; this was a stage passenger's property, and therefore is *mine*." He further declares that he has no knowledge of any flag of truce being held out by the British, nor does he believe there was any.

JAMES WOOD.

Sworn to, this twenty-fifth day of June, 1813, before

ELIJAH DAVIS.

Personally came Roxana Moore, before me, the subscriber, one of the justices of Harford county, State of Maryland, and made oath, according to law, that on Monday morning, the 3d of May, in consequence of the firing of the British into the town of Havre de Grace, I fled for safety (my husband being from home) into the cellar of the house in which I lived; that, upon the firing having stopped, I came up, and meeting an officer on horseback, and who was wounded in the hand, I applied to him for protection, fearing injury from some of the men. He replied, "I will not hurt you, nor shall my men, but I will burn your house." I answered him that I could not get out of it with my little children. He replied, "then I will burn your house with you and your children in it." They proceeded a little further, and, after having set fire to my neighbor Richard Mansfield's tavern house, a number of them returned and entered my house, and began to pillage and plunder. They took the *whole of my bed clothes, my own clothes, and all my children's, even to my youngest child's, a baby not two months old, together with my cradle furniture.* Upon my soliciting them to spare me some few things, one replied, "I will take every thing I can, it's what we came for," and immediately seized a shawl from around my neck, and which was at that time nearly all the covering my little baby, whom I held in my arms, had, and carried it away; they more than once put fire to the house, but from the exertions of some of my neighbors it was as often put out.

She further declares that she never saw any flag of truce held out by the British, nor doth she believe there was any.

ROXANA MOORE.

Sworn to, this twenty-fifth day of June, 1813, before

ELIJAH DAVIS.

Personally came Richard Mansfield, a citizen of Havre de Grace, before the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace for Harford county, Maryland, and made oath according to law, that on Monday morning, the 3d of May, 1813, being in his own house about sunrise, and viewing the British barges as they came up the river, they keeping up a continual firing into the town, until they reached Mrs. Sears' wharf, being about two hundred yards below this deponent's, when the firing ceased; they then landed, and, as well as he could discover at the distance from which he stood, immediately launched a 24 pounder on board a ferry boat, which bilged her, as she began to settle in the water as soon as they moved her out, and in a few minutes went down; during this time, two of the barges kept moving slowly up towards this deponent's, and as soon as they landed, a petty officer ran to this deponent's ferry boat and called out, "there is nothing in her;" "cast her off," was the reply, which was instantly done. This deponent and his son being at this time on the wharf, discovered a British officer on horseback with several of his men at his heels, making to his house, upon which he returned and met them a few yards in front of his house. This officer, (whose name this deponent since learned was Lieutenant Westfall, and who was wounded through the hand) immediately ordered the house to be set on fire. This deponent remonstrated against such procedure, urging its being unprecedented among civilized nations at war, to burn and destroy private property; that when nations were at war all public property became fair objects of destruction, but that private property had heretofore been respected, except such as might unfortunately be injured by the usual and customary mode of warfare, or that might be taken as provisions. His reply was, "by G—d it should be burnt." This deponent and a Mr. King, who came with the officer, solicited for the moveable property that was in the house, it being furniture, stating to him *that that* was this deponent's only dependence, and was all he had. He replied generally, by ordering his men to burn. During this conversation the men were in the house breaking and destroying every thing before them. Mr. King then begged the officer for one hour, saying that whatever could not be saved in that time might go. The officer's reply was, "one hour, no, by G—d, not five minutes; *burn that house.*" Immediately they commenced, and had the dwelling house on fire in four different places in a few minutes. This deponent, together with Mr. King, continued to solicit for permission to save some furniture: after some time, Lieutenant Westfall observed, "you may save what you can, and what you *can* save shall not be disturbed." Exertions were then made by this deponent, his son, and Mr. King, to save from the devouring flames, which proved successful for a short time; but a few minutes convinced us what little dependence was to be placed on the word of a *British* officer, as the men, aided by officers, carried off what had been, by great exertions and considerable risk, saved from the flames. The enemy had been busily employed breaking, destroying, and carrying away, until the flames got to such height as to render it unsafe to go within the walls. They then commenced upon such property as this deponent had saved, carrying off every portable article, until their barges were stowed; ripping up beds, throwing the feathers to the air, cutting up chairs, breaking open desks, &c. &c. The officer who made the attack on a walnut desk, refused to have it unlocked, but, after breaking open the lid, discovered the inner door, exultingly exclaimed, "ah! I am used to such things," or, "I am acquainted with opening desks," or some expression to that amount, and immediately broke it open, and continued his search as if for money. After having destroyed and carried off nearly the whole of this deponent's property, and seeing the buildings burnt down, they moved down to Mrs. Sears' wharf, and joined the other barges. This depo-

ment was then advised by some of his friends to apply to some of the officers and endeavor to get some of his property back, which he did, but found such obstacles in the way that, after getting a looking glass, and some two or three articles of small value, he gave it up; but upon meeting the admiral in person, he renewed his application, and after some time, was directed to go on board and get what he could; this deponent then stated the impossibility of succeeding without an officer to accompany him. An officer was sent, but after repeated attempts to get some of his property, he was, from the abuse and threats of being *run through with a sword* from an officer of marines, for claiming his property, compelled to decline any further exertions, after getting another looking glass, and a few more very trifling articles.

This deponent's observations being confined to his own house, and its immediate neighborhood, which was at the upper end of the village, he was not an eye-witness to their savagelike conduct generally. One dwelling house and grocery store, the property of Mr. George Bartoll, which stood a few rods below, and in front of this deponent's, he saw the enemy plundering, and breaking every thing to pieces, and ended by setting it on fire and burning it *down*; a number of houses were set on fire that were not consumed; a number they only robbed and broke the doors and windows; among the latter was the *church*, in which not one solitary window was left whole. During the time this deponent was on Mrs. Sears' wharf, and on board the barges, he solicited for the prisoners, citizens of the town, to be set at liberty, naming those that he immediately saw and knew, among whom was James Sears, a youth of about seventeen, and John O'Neal, a naturalized Irishman, both of whom were, in a most positive manner, refused; and, as soon as O'Neal's name was mentioned, the officer, to whom the application was made, replied, "no!" swearing he would have O'Neal *hung* if he could. O'Neal has since been discharged on *parole*. This deponent declares that he has no knowledge of any flag of truce being sent by the British, nor does he believe there was any.

R. MANSFIELD.

Sworn to, this twenty-fifth day of June, 1813, before

ELIJAH DAVIS.

No. 8.

*Massacre and burning of American prisoners surrendered to officers of Great Britain, by Indians in the British service. Abandonment of the remains of Americans killed in battle or murdered after the surrender to the British. The pillage and shooting of American citizens, and the burning of their houses after surrender to the British, under the guarantee of protection.*

*Extract of a letter from Augustus B. Woodward, Esquire, to General Proctor.*

DETROIT, February 2, 1813.

"They [the inhabitants of Michigan] have entertained a constant apprehension that, when the American forces approach the territory, and when an engagement has taken place, the fury of the savage mind at the sight of blood, and in reflecting on the dead they lose, and, perhaps, on the retaliatory treatment of prisoners, or of the dead, which their cruel mode of warfare is always likely to produce, might drive them to an ignoble revenge on the prisoners they find in the country, and the inhabitants of it, who are American citizens. They, therefore, pressed this subject on your attention, previous to the battle of the 22d of January, 1813; and felt satisfied with your assurance that you considered your own honor pledged for their effectual protection.

"Since the result of that battle, facts are before their faces which they cannot shut their eyes upon. Some of them are, perhaps, unknown to yourself. I will enumerate some which I believe there will be no difficulty in establishing beyond the reach of contradiction.

"First. Some of the prisoners, after the capitulation of the 22d of January, 1813, have been tomahawked by the savages.

"Second. Some of the prisoners, after that capitulation, have been shot by the savages.

"Third. Some of the prisoners, after that capitulation, have been burnt by the savages.

"Fourth. Some of the inhabitants of the territory of Michigan, citizens of the United States of America, after the capitulation, have been shot by the savages.

"Fifth. The houses of some of the inhabitants of the territory, American citizens, after the capitulation, have been burnt by the savages.

"Sixth. Some of the inhabitants, American citizens, after the capitulation, have been pillaged by the savages."

*A. W. McLean, Esq. to Mr. Woodward.*

SANDWICH, February 9, 1813.

Sir:

You will have the goodness to appoint a day for the purpose of adducing, before Colonel Proctor, such proofs as you may have, to substantiate the assertions in your letter to him, relative to the slaughter of the enemy's sick and wounded, on the 22d of January last.

I have the honor to be, &c.

A. W. McLEAN, *Aid-de-camp.*

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Woodward to General Proctor.*

SANDWICH, February 10, 1813.

"I had the honor to receive, on the third day of this month, a verbal message from you, communicated to me by Major Muir, requesting me to procure some evidence of the massacre of the American prisoners on the 23d day of January last.

"I met with only a few persons at Detroit who are inhabitants of the river Raisin, nor was it altogether a pleasant task to those to relate, in these times, the scenes they have beheld. Some of them, however, appeared before a magistrate, and I send you copies of what they have stated. It will occur to you, sir, immediately, that what any of them state on the information of others, though not direct evidence in itself, leads to the source where it may be obtained.

"In communicating your message, Major Muir added something having relation to American citizens who might be willing to take the oath to the King.

"It will be obvious to you, sir, that, in a state of open and declared war, a subject or citizen of one party cannot transfer his allegiance to the other party, without incurring the penalties of treason; and, while nothing can excuse his guilt, so neither are those innocent who lay temptation before him.

"The principles adopted by the United States on the subject of expatriation are liberal, but are perfectly inapplicable to a public enemy in time of war.

"Some of the French inhabitants of the territory of Michigan, citizens of the United States of America, have been much urged on this subject, and are apprehensive of being further troubled.

"I had the further honor of receiving, on the 8th instant, your verbal message, by your aid-de camp, Mr. McLean, acquainting me that there was no capitulation on the 22d of January, and that the prisoners surrendered at discretion.

"I, therefore, beg pardon for that mistake.

"The principles, however, of the law of nations impose an obligation almost equally strong."

No. XXV.—TRANSLATION.

TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, }  
District of Detroit, } ss.

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, one of the justices of the peace in the district of Detroit, Joseph Robert, an inhabitant on the river aux Raisins, who, being duly sworn on the Holy Evangelists, deposes and says, that, on the next day after the battle on the said river Raisin, a short time after sunrise, he saw the Indians kill the American prisoners with their tomahawks, and that they shot several, to wit, three; that the Indians set the house on fire, and that, in going out, the prisoners were massacred and killed as aforesaid, that is to say: three were shot, the others were killed in the houses, and burnt with the houses. The Indians burnt first the house of Jean Baptiste Jereau, and afterwards that of Gabriel Godfroy, Jr. The deponent has been informed that there were about forty-eight or forty-nine prisoners in the two houses. The deponent has seen dead bodies on the highway which the hogs were tearing and eating. Mr. Brunot told the deponent that the Indians had killed those of the prisoners who were least wounded, and that the others were burnt alive.

Antoine Cuellarie and Alexis Salliot, inhabitants of river Ecorces, told the deponent that two prisoners had been burnt in the house of Grandon, on the river aux Sables. The deponent has heard that the Indians had tore out the hearts of the prisoners, and had brought them still smoking into the houses, but did not recollect the names of the informants; he believes, however, they were men worthy of credit.

The deponent says further, that, after the first action on the river Raisin, the Indians fired on one named Solo, son-in-law to Stephen Labeau, an inhabitant on the river aux Sables, when returning from the house of Grandon to his father-in-law; on his arrival, he hallooed to his father-in-law to open the door, saying that he was mortally wounded; Stephen Labeau opened the door and told his son-in-law to throw himself on his bed, but that, in trying to move, he fell dead. An Indian knocked at the door, and Labeau having opened it, received a ball in his breast, and fell dead. The son of Labeau made his escape; the Indians shot several shots at him, which did not reach him.

The deponent says further, that Baptiste Couteur was killed near the house of the deponent, on the day of the second battle on the river Raisin, a little after sunrise.

The deponent says further, that the Indians have often threatened to burn his house and barn, if he did not march with them against the Americans. The deponent says he is an American citizen.

The deponent says that several of his neighbors have told him that they have received the same threat. Other settlements have been threatened with fire. The mills and houses on the river faux Roches were burnt in the month of September last, after the capitulation of Detroit. And further this deponent said not.

JOSEPH ROBERT.

Sworn and subscribed before me, the 4th February, 1813.

PETER AUDRAIN, J. P. D. D.

No. XXVI.

TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, }  
District of Detroit, } ss.

Be it remembered, that, on this day, February the fourth, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, personally came before the undersigned, a justice of the peace for the district aforesaid, viz: John M'Donnell, an inhabitant of the city of Detroit, who, after being duly sworn upon the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, deposes and saith, that a few days after the battle of the 22d January last, (at the river Raisin) he was personally present at the house of James May, Esquire, when he heard the said James May ask Mr. William Jones, the acting agent for the Indian Department, if there would be any impropriety in purchasing the prisoners from the Indians; and that he heard the said William Jones say, "that he thought there would be no impropriety in purchasing them, but would not undertake to authorize any person to do so;" that in consequence of which, this deponent purchased three or four of the prisoners; amongst the number was one by the name of ——— Hamilton, a private in the Kentucky volunteers, who declared to this deponent that on the first or second day after the battle at river Raisin, on 22d January last, as he and some of his fellow prisoners were marching with the Indians between this place and river Raisin, they came up to where one of the prisoners was burnt, the life just expiring, and an Indian kicking the ashes off his back, saying "damned son of a bitch."

This deponent also further deposes as aforesaid, that Doctor Bowers, a surgeon's mate of the Kentucky volunteers, who was purchased by him and some other gentlemen, stated to this deponent "that he was left to take care of the wounded after the battle, but felt rather timid on account of the savages, but that he received such assurances from Captain or Colonel Elliott of the safety of himself as well as the remaining prisoners, he concluded to stay, as sleighs were promised to be sent to fetch them away the next morning; that near about daylight of the morning following the day of the battle, the Indians came into the house where said Bowers was with the other prisoners, and proceeded to plunder and tomahawk such as could not walk, and stripping the said Bowers and the wounded prisoners of all their clothes; that while the said Bowers and two other prisoners, named Searles and Bradford, as near as this deponent can recollect, were sitting by the fire in the Indian camp, an Indian came up who appeared to be drunk, and called the said Searles, as near as this deponent can recollect, a Madison or Washington, then took up a tomahawk and struck the said Searles on the shoulder; that the said Searles caught hold of the tomahawk and held it for some time; that the said Bowers advised the said Searles to submit to his fate; with that the Indian gave him a second blow on the head, killed, scalped, and stript him; during this time the said Bowers and Bradford were personally present, and being apprehensive for their own safety, that he, Bowers, ran and came up to the old chief (who sold him to this deponent and others) who took him under his protection, and was very kind to him whilst he remained with him. This deponent further deposes, that he has reason to believe the aforesaid Bowers and Hamilton are now at Sandwich, and if applied to, they could give more ample information relative to the particulars of the aforesaid. And further this deponent saith not.

J. M'DONNELL.

Sworn and subscribed at my chambers, in the city of Detroit, the day and year before written.

JAMES MAY, J. P. D. D.

## APPURTENANCES TO No. XXVI.

No. 1.

*Note from Mr. John M'Donell to James May, Esquire.*

DETROIT, 4th February, 1813.

DEAR SIR:

I had a conversation with Mr. Smart, after leaving your house to-day, who had a conversation with Bowers and Bradford. He observes that I have made several material errors in my affidavit before you this day. He says the prisoner killed was of the name of Blythe, instead of Searles; and mentioned some other errors that differ widely from what I have sworn to, so that I think it is a pity that Bowers' and Bradford's own affidavits could not be had, instead of mine.

Your's,

J. M'DONELL.

JAMES MAY, Esq.

No. 2.

*Note from Mr. M'Donell to Mr. Lyons, his clerk.*

I wish you to mention to Judge Woodward that application is made for me by a friend on the other side to remain till the navigation opens. On that account, I hope that he will keep back the deposition that I have made regarding the murders committed by the savages on the river Raisin, as he has much better testimony to substantiate facts than what I have sworn to on hearsay; and, as I am sure, if the colonel was even disposed to hear my application, that affidavit will be enough to send me off; or, else, if I was allowed to remain, Elliot would set the Indians on me.

## No. XXVII.—TRANSLATION.

TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, }  
*District of Detroit,* } ss.

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, one of the justices of the peace in the district of Detroit, Antoine Boulard, of the river aux Raisins, who, being sworn on the Holy Evangelists, deposed and says, that, on the next day after the last battle on river aux Raisins, he saw the Indians kill the secretary of the American General, who was on the horse of the Indian who had taken him prisoner, with a rifle shot; that the prisoner fell on one side, and an Indian came forward with a sabre, finished him, scalped him, stript him, and carried away his clothes. The body remained two days on the highway, before the door of the deponent, and was part eat up by the hogs. Afterwards, the deponent, together with Francois Lasselle, Hubert Lacroix, Charles Chovin, and Louis Lajoie, took up the corpse, at dusk of the evening, and carried into a field near the woods, where the hogs did not go. They dared not bury it, for fear of being surprised by the Indians. And further this deponent saith not:

ANTOINE BOULARD, his + mark.

Sworn and subscribed in my presence, the 5th February, 1813.

PETER AUDRAIN, J. P. D. D.

No. XXVIII.

I hereby certify, that, the next day after the last battle on the river aux Raisins, the secretary of the American General was taken, near the door of the deponent, was wounded, and placed on a horse; that seven or eight Indians were near the house, one of whom shot him in the head with a rifle; that he did not fall off his horse until another Indian, drawing a sabre, struck him on the head several times, and then he fell to the ground, was scalped, and stript of his clothes, and left on the road, where he remained one day and a half. I, the deponent, with Francois Lasselle, Hubert Lacroix, and Louis Chovin, on the evening of the second day, took up the body, carried it to the skirts of the woods, and covered it with a few branches, but could not stay to bury it for fear of the Indians that were in the neighborhood; and, on the next day after the last battle, I was near the house of Gabriel Godfroy, Jr., and the house of Jean Batiste Jereau, where a great number of prisoners were collected; and that I heard the screaming of the prisoners whom the Indians were tomahawking; that the savages set the houses on fire, and went off.

LOUIS BERNARD dit *Lajoie*, his + mark.

DETROIT, 5th February, 1813.

No. XXIX.

I certify, that the bodies of the Americans killed at the battle of la Rivière aux Raisins, of the 22d of January last, remain unburied, and that I have seen the hogs and dogs eating them. The hogs appeared to be rendered mad by so profuse a diet of Christian flesh. I saw the houses of Mr. Jerome and Mr. Godfroy on fire, and have heard that there were prisoners in them. The inhabitants did not dare to bury the dead, on account of the Indians. The inhabitants have been threatened by the Indians, if they did not take up arms against the Americans.

ALEXIS LABADIE, his + mark.

MICHIGAN, February 6th, 1813.

No. XXX.

This is to certify, that, on or about the 28th day of January last past, an Indian woman came to my dwelling house, on the river Rouge, and informed me, that, on the morning of that day, an American prisoner had been killed in the Indian camp, and the reason she assigned for killing him was, because he had expressed a hatred for the Indians.

ROBERT ABBOTT.

DETROIT, 8th February, 1813.

No. XXXI.

TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, }  
*District of Detroit,* } ss.

Personally appeared before the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace in the said district, Aaron Thomas, and Agnes Thomas his wife, who both made oath, on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that the Indians have taken from the house of Mr. Attwater, on the 16th of August, 1812, one chintz gown, valued seven and a half dollars; one calico gown, valued three dollars and seventy-five cents; one calimanco petticoat, value four dollars; one pair of cotton stockings, one dollar and fifty cents; one pair of woollen stockings, seventy-five cents; one pair of silk gloves, one dollar and fifty cents; one new small trunk, two dollars; one pocket book, two dollars; thread, one dollar; needles, fifty cents; one shawl, one dollar; one cambric handkerchief, seventy-five cents; one cotton ditto, sixty-two and one-half cents; one shift, one dollar; three-fourths of a pound of pepper, fifty cents;

one cake of chocolate, twenty-five cents; one fan, fifty cents; one blanket, three dollars; one cloak, ten dollars; three yards of check cotton, ninety-three and three-fourth cents; one shawl, one dollar; one flannel loose gown, three dollars. On the 12th September, taken on river Rouge, one chesnut sorrel horse, fifty dollars; saddle and bridle, ten dollars. On Friday, the 11th September, taken on river Rouge, one other saddle, eight dollars; one pair leather leading lines, two dollars and fifty cents; leading lines, seventy-five cents; one axe, two dollars and fifty cents; chintz patches, two dollars.

Sworn before me, at my chambers, 17th September, 1813,

PETER AUDRAIN, J. P. D. D

No. XXXII.

*Letter from the Indians to the Inhabitants of the river Raisin, not dated.*

The Hurons and the other tribes of Indians, assembled at the Miami rapids, to the inhabitants of the river Raisin: FRIENDS, LISTEN! You have always told us you would give us any assistance in your power. We, therefore, as the enemy is approaching us, within twenty-five miles, call upon you all to rise up, and come here immediately, bringing your arms along with you. Should you fail at this time, we will not consider you in future as friends, and the consequences may be very unpleasant.

We are well convinced you have no writing forbidding you to assist us.

We are all your friends at present.

ROUND HEAD, (*by an emblem resembling a horse.*)

WALK-IN-THE-WATER, (*by an emblem resembling a turtle.*)

No. XXXIII.—TRANSLATION.

*Letter of the Inhabitants of the river Raisin, dated*

RIVIERE AUX RAISINS, 13th November, 1812.

SIR:

In the embarrassment in which we find ourselves, at present, on the subject of a letter addressed to Colonel Navar, on the part of the Hurons and other savage tribes, we depute him to you to represent to you the situation of the inhabitants of the river Raisin, praying you to assist him with your advice in so delicate a matter, having, at all times, had great confidence in your great knowledge.

We have the honor to be, with profound respect, your obedient servants,

JAQUES LASSELLE,  
JEAN BAPTISTE JEROME,  
JEAN BAPTISTE BEAUGRAND,  
FRANCOIS LASSELLE,  
DUNCAN REID,  
JEAN BAPTISTE LASSELLE.

To the Honorable JUDGE WOODWARD, *Detroit.*

*Extract from the report of Ensign Isaac L. Baker, Agent for the prisoners taken after the battle of Frenchtown, January 22d, 1813, to Brigadier General Winchester, dated*

“BRITISH NIAGARA, February 26, 1813.

“For the greatest number of our unfortunate fellow soldiers being sent from Detroit we are indebted to the exertions of our prisoner fellow-citizens there, who, with an unexampled generosity, when they saw their countrymen driven through the streets like sheep to a market, lavished their wealth for their ransom. Nor was the procurement of our liberty all. We had been almost entirely stripped by the Indians. Clothes, such as the exigency of the occasion permitted to be prepared, were furnished us.

“On the 8th instant, Colonel Proctor ordered me to make out a return of all the prisoners who were killed by the Indians subsequent to the battle, agreeable to the best information I could collect. The enclosed return, marked B, was produced by this order. I might have added the gallant Captain Nathaniel Gray; S. Hart, deputy inspector general; Captain Virgil M’Crackin, of Colonel Allen’s regiment; Captain John H. Woolfolk, your secretary; Ensign Levi Wells, of the 7th United States’ infantry; and a number of privates, whom I find, by subsequent information, have been massacred.

“The memory of past services rendered me by captain Hart’s family made me particularly anxious to ascertain his fate. I flattered myself he was alive, and every information I could get for some time flattered my hopes. But one of the last prisoners who was brought in, told me that the captain was certainly massacred. He was so badly wounded as to prevent him from walking. The Indians took him some distance on a horse, but at length took him off and tomahawked him.

“About the 10th instant, an Indian brought Captain M’Crackin’s commission to Sandwich; the paper was bloody. The fellow said he took the captain unhurt, but some time after, when stripping and examining him, he found an Indian scalp in his bosom, which induced him to kill him. This, you cannot but be assured, is a humbug of the fellow’s own making, to screen himself from the odium of barbarity. The captain’s character, and the danger that attended his carrying such furniture in a disastrous battle, give it the lie.

“Captain Woolfolk, after having been wounded in two places, by some means had got refuge in one of the French houses on the Raisin. He was discovered next day, and dragged from his asylum. He was taken to the house of a Mr. Lasselle, where he said he would give one thousand dollars to any one who would purchase him. Mr. Lasselle said it was out of his power, but he had no doubt his brother would do it, who lived at hand. He directed his owners to the house of his brother, but as they were on their way, an Indian from a waste house shot him through the head.

“Ensign Wells was taken by my side unhurt. I considered him as alive, until, on my arrival at this place, Captain Nags tells me he was killed by a Pottawatamy Indian, not long after he was taken.

“Many fresh scalps have been brought in since the battle, and dead bodies seen through the country, which prove that others have been killed, whose names I have not been able to find out, independent of those reported to Colonel Proctor.

This, sir, is all the information I have been able to collect, concerning those who were massacred. The fifteen or eighteen, mentioned in the remarks to the return made to Colonel Proctor, whose names do not appear, were not known by those who saw them killed.

“Major Graves, of the 5th regiment of Kentucky volunteers, I have been able to get no information of, further than that he was brought to the river Rouge, on the 25th or 26th of January, in a sleigh. I fear, from our having heard nothing of him since, that he is no more, and that valuable officer forever lost to his country.

“The dead of our army are still denied the rites of sepulture. At the time I left Sandwich, I was told the hogs were eating them. A gentleman told me he had seen them running about with skulls, arms, legs, and other parts of the human system in their mouths. The French people on the Raisin buried Captains Hart, Woolfolk, and some others, but it was more than their lives were worth to have been caught paying this last customed tribute to mortality.

“I several times agitated the subject of burying the dead, when in company with the British officers, but they always answered, that the Indians would not suffer it.”

## B.

*A return of the American Prisoners who were tomahawked by the Indians subsequent to the battle at Frenchtown, January 22, 1813.*

Names.	Rank.	Company.	Regiment.	Date.	Remarks.
1 Pascal Hickman,	Captain,	- -	1st Kentucky vol. rifle, -	Jan. 23,	In Frenchtown.
2 Jas. E. Blythe,	Private,	Hart's, -	5th Kentucky vol. infant. -	"	Ditto.
3 Charles Gerles,	do.	Do. -	Ditto, -	"	Sandy Creek.
4 Thos. S. Crow,	do.	Seabree's, -	1st Kentucky vol. infant. -	"	Three miles from Frenchtown.
5 Daniel Darnell,	do.	Williams', -	5th do. do. -	"	} Between Sandy Creek and Frenchtown.
6 Thomas Ward,	do.	Redding's, -	1st do. do. -	"	
7 William Butler,	do.	Sanghorne's, -	1st do. rifle, -	"	
8 Henry Downy,	do.	Edwards', -	17th U. States' infantry, -	24,	Near Brownstown.
9 John P. Sidney,	Serg'ant	Martin's, -	15th Kentucky vol. infant. -	26,	River Rouge.

REMARKS.—In addition to the above number, I saw two others tomahawked at Sandy creek myself, and find that the prisoners, now in the hospital in Sandwich, saw, say fifteen or eighteen others, treated in the same manner. Two men tell me they saw one who had the appearance of having been burned to death. Those men who saw Henry Downy and William Butler killed, tell me that the Indians left them without scalping.

ISAAC L. BAKER.  
*Ensign 2d United States' Infantry.*

Colonel H. PROCTOR.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated at the Miami Rapids, February 11, 1813.*

"I have the honor to enclose to you the deposition of Medard Labbardie, who was at the river Raisin on the 22d ultimo, and remained there till the 6th instant. His account of the loss of the enemy in the action is corroborated by several others, nor is there the least reason to doubt his statement, as it regards the horrible fate of our wounded men. There is another circumstance which plainly shows that the British have no intention to conduct the war (at least in this quarter) upon those principles which have been held sacred by all civilized nations. On the 30th ultimo, I despatched Doctor M'Keehan, a surgeon's mate in the militia, with a flag, to ascertain the situation of our wounded. He was attended by one of our militiamen and a Frenchman. On the night after their departure, they halted near this place for the purpose of taking a few hours' sleep, in a vacant cabin upon the bank of the river. The carryall in which they travelled was left at the door with the flag set up in it. They were discovered by a party of Indians (accompanied, it is said, by a British officer) and attacked in the manner described in the deposition. The militiaman was killed and scalped, the Doctor and the Frenchman taken. Doctor M'Keehan was furnished with a letter, addressed to any British officer whom he might meet, describing the character in which he went, and the object for which he was sent, an open letter to General Winchester, and written instructions to himself, all of which he was directed to show to the first officer he met with. He was also supplied with one hundred dollars in gold, to procure necessaries for the prisoners."

*The affidavit of Medard Labbardie, late resident near the river Raisin, in the Michigan territory.*

He being sworn, saith, he was in his house when he heard the guns at the commencement of the action at the river Raisin, on the 22d January, 1813, between the American forces under General Winchester, and the British, Canadian, and Indian forces, said to be commanded by Col. St. George. After some little time, he heard that the Indians were killing the inhabitants as well as the Americans, upon which he went towards the scene of action, in order to save his family. As he went on, he was, with one other inhabitant, taken prisoner by two Wyandot Indians, and carried prisoner to the Indian lines, from which he saw great part of the action. The right wing of the Americans had given way before he got a sight of the action. It terminated after the sun was some hours high, not far from 11 o'clock, A. M. by the surrender of the American forces that then remained on the ground. He saw the flag hoisted by the British sent to the American forces, and saw it pass three times to the Americans before the surrender. He could not understand English, but understood that General Winchester was taken prisoner before he got to the lines of his own men; that he was compelled to carry the flag to his own forces after he was taken; that he understood the reason of the flag passing so often, was, that the Americans refused to surrender upon any other terms than that the wounded should be taken care of, the dead buried, and the inhabitants protected in their property. That the British first refused to agree to these terms, but finally did agree to them. He also understood that the loss of the British and Indians in the action was about four hundred killed. He also understood that the loss of the Americans in the action was about one hundred and eighty killed.

He knows that, on the day of the action, all the prisoners who were able to march, were marched off towards Malden, the wounded, about sixty or eighty in number, left in two houses, without any of their friends, or a physician, to take care of them, and without any British officer or men. About ten Indians remained behind upon the ground; the balance of the Indians went off with the British, and he was told by some of the Canadian militia, that the British had promised the Indians a frolic that night, at Stony creek, about six miles from the river Raisin.

He was liberated after the line of march was formed for Malden. The next morning he was in the houses where the wounded were. That morning about fifty Indians returned; they brought whiskey with them; they drank some, and gave some to the Indians there, and between 9 and 10 o'clock A. M. commenced killing the wounded, then set fire to the houses the wounded were in, and consumed them. He was at his father's, on this side of Detroit river, about seven days after the action, and saw across the river the prisoners marched off for Niagara, from Malden.

He saith that he saw taken by his house, by Captain Elliott, and nine Wyandot Indians, two men that he understood had been sent by General Harrison with a flag to the British. One of the men, (Mr. Tessier) he knew, the other he did not know, but understood he was a doctor. He had not an opportunity of conversing with them, but understood from an inhabitant, to whom Mr. Tessier communicated it, that they stopped for the night and left the flag hoisted on the carryall; that the flag was taken away unknown to them, and that the Indians fired on them; that he, Tessier, told them they were Frenchmen, and surrendered, upon which the Indians ceased firing, and took them. They then mentioned they were sent with a flag. The Indians said they were liars, and took them off.

Mr. Tessier was set at liberty at the river Raisin, and remained two days expecting the doctor to return; at the end of which time, Tessier was sent for by the British, and taken to Malden. He understood that the doctor was sent off immediately to Niagara; the doctor was wounded in the ankle. He understood the British charged the doctor and Tessier with being spies. And further he saith not.

MEDARD LABBARDIE.

Witness, C. GRATIOT, Captain of Engineers, and Interpreter.

Sworn to, before me, this 11th day of February, 1813. Camp, foot of the Miami Rapids.

C. S. TODD, *Dis. Judge Ad.*  
R. GRAHAM, *Aid-de-camp.*

A true copy,

*His Majesty's ship San Domingo,*  
CHESAPEAKE, May 10th, 1813.

SIR:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, respecting a man named O'Neale, taken by the detachment from the squadron under the orders of Rear Admiral Cockburn. This man has been released upon the application of the magistrates of Havre de Grace, on parole.

I was not informed of this man being an Irishman, or he would certainly have been detained, to account to his sovereign and country for being in arms against the British colors.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

Brigadier General MILLER, commanding the United States' forces, &c. Baltimore.

NICHOLASVILLE, Kentucky, April 24th, 1813.

SIR:

Yours of the 5th instant, requesting me to give you a statement respecting the late disaster at Frenchtown, was duly received. Rest assured, sir, that it is with sensations the most unpleasant that I undertake to recount the infamous and barbarous conduct of the British and Indians after the battle of the 22d January. The blood runs cold in my veins when I think of it.

On the morning of the 23d, shortly after light, six or eight Indians came to the house of Jean Baptiste Jereame, where I was, in company with Major Graves, Captains Hart and Hickman, Doctor Todd, and fifteen or twenty private volunteers, belonging to different corps. They did not molest any person or thing on their first approach, but kept sauntering about until there were a large number collected, (say one or two hundred) at which time they commenced plundering the houses of the inhabitants, and the massacre of the wounded prisoners. I was one amongst the first that was taken prisoner, and was taken to a horse about twenty paces from the house, after being divested of part of my clothing, and commanded by signs there to remain for further orders. Shortly after being there, I saw them knock down Captain Hickman at the door, together with several others with whom I was not acquainted. Supposing a general massacre had commenced, I made an effort to get to a house about one hundred yards distant, which contained a number of wounded, but, on my reaching the house, to my great mortification, found it surrounded by Indians, which precluded the possibility of my giving notice to the unfortunate victims of savage barbarity. An Indian chief of the Tawa tribe, by the name of M'Carty, gave me possession of his horse and blanket, telling me, by signs, to lead the horse to the house which I had just before left. The Indian that first took me, by this time came up and manifested a hostile disposition towards me, by raising his tomahawk as if to give me the fatal blow, which was prevented by my very good friend M'Carty. On my reaching the house which I had first started from, I saw the Indians take off several prisoners, which I afterwards saw in the road, in a most mangled condition, and entirely stripped of their clothing.

Messrs. Bradford, Searls, Turner, and Blythe, were collected around a carryall, which contained articles taken by the Indians from the citizens. We had all been placed there, by our respective captors, except Blythe, who came where we were, entreating an Indian to convey him to Malden, promising to give him forty or fifty dollars, and whilst in the act of pleading for mercy, an Indian, more savage than the other, stepped up behind, tomahawked, stripped, and scalped him. The next that attracted my attention, was the houses on fire that contained several wounded, whom I knew were not able to get out. After the houses were nearly consumed, we received marching orders, and after arriving at Sandy creek, the Indians called a halt, and commenced cooking; after preparing and eating a little sweetened gruel, Messrs. Bradford, Searls, Turner, and myself, received some, and were eating, when an Indian came up and proposed exchanging his moccasins for Mr. Searls' shoes, which he readily complied with. They then exchanged hats, after which the Indian inquired how many men Harrison had with him, and, at the same time, calling Searls a Washington or Madison, then raised his tomahawk and struck him on the shoulder, which cut into the cavity of the body. Searls then caught hold of the tomahawk and appeared to resist, and upon my telling him that his fate was inevitable, he closed his eyes and received the savage blow which terminated his existence. I was near enough to him to receive the brains and blood, after the fatal blow, on my blanket. A short time after the death of Searls, I saw three others share a similar fate. We then set out for Brownstown, which place we reached about 12 or 1 o'clock at night. After being exposed to several hours incessant rain in reaching that place, we were put into the council house, the floor of which was partly covered with water, at which place we remained until next morning, when we again received marching orders for their village on the river Rouge, which place we made that day, where I was kept six days, then taken to Detroit and sold. For a more detailed account of the proceedings, I take the liberty of referring you to a publication which appeared in the public prints, signed by Ensign J. L. Baker, and to the publication of Judge Woodward, both of which I have particularly examined, and find them to be literally correct, so far as came under my notice.

I am, sir, with due regard, your fellow-citizen,

GUSTAVUS M. BOWER,

Surgeon's Mate 5th regiment Kentucky Volunteers.

JESSE BLEDSOE, Esq. Lexington.

JESSAMINE COUNTY, to wit:

This day Gustavus M. Bower personally came before me, John Metcalf, one of the Commonwealth's justices of the peace, in and for said county, and made oath to the truth of assertions before stated by the said Bower. Given under my hand this 24th day of April, 1813.

JOHN METCALF.

LEXINGTON, May 2d, 1813.

SIR:

I received your letter some time since, relative to the disastrous affair of Frenchtown, of 22d and 23d January last. For the particulars of the action, and the terms of capitulation, I refer you to the official report of General Winchester, which is correct as far as came within my knowledge. After the capitulation, I was introduced to Colonel Proctor, the commander of the British forces and Indians, as one of the surviving surgeons, and by him was requested to attend to our wounded who were left on the ground where the action was fought. I willingly acquiesced, and Doctor Bowers, my mate, remained with me; at the same time I informed Colonel Proctor of my apprehensions for the safety of the wounded and the surgeons; he replied, "be under no apprehensions, you will be perfectly safe, I will place you under the special care of the chiefs until morning, and very early I will send conveyances for the wounded and yourself to Amherstburg." Shortly after, I was requested to ascertain the number and rank of the wounded, and in so doing was assisted by a British officer, (whose name I did not know) to whom I likewise communicated my apprehensions of safety; he manifested some irritation at my doubts of British honor and magnanimity, and assured me protection would be afforded me. While engaged in this business, one of the rooms occupied by the wounded was crowded with Indians who were peaceable, but one of them, who could speak English, admonished the British officer of the propriety of stationing interpreters in the houses. Upon my return from this business to the room I occupied, and which was set apart for the wounded officers, I met, and was made acquainted with Captain Elliott, at present a British officer, who had visited Captain Hart, then wounded. Captain Hart was solicitous to be removed that evening, and Captain Elliott replied, if it was possible (and every exertion



should be made) he should, and if it could not be effected that evening, early in the morning he would call for him in his own train (sleigh) and convey him to his own house in Amherstburg, where he should remain until recovered, assuring him repeatedly, no danger was to be apprehended, and, if possible, he would remain with him that night. In the afternoon Captain Elliott and every British officer left the encampment, leaving behind three interpreters. From the repeated assurances, my apprehensions were quieted: for who could doubt? About one hour before daylight (for my duties required my attention nearly all the night) the interpreters suddenly disappeared. About an hour after day light, the Indians began to collect in the town, and commenced plundering the houses in which the wounded were placed, and then stripped them and myself of our clothing. At this time the room I had occupied was so crowded with Indians, and Captain Hart's wound, already painful, being injured by them, I conveyed him to an adjoining house which had been plundered and was empty, where I met the Indian, (who, on the preceding day, had requested that interpreters should be left) and he knew my rank. He inquired why the surgeons were left, and why the wounded were left? I replied, it was the wish of Colonel Proctor we should remain until he could send for us; and Captain Hart informed him Captain Elliott, was a friend of his, and was to call for him that morning. He shook his head significantly, and replied they were damned rascals, or we would have been taken off the preceding day. The Indian informed me every individual would be killed, and requested me to be quiet, for the chiefs were then in council, and "may be" only the wounded would be killed. Captain Hart offered him \$100 to take him to Malden. He replied, you are too badly wounded. While we were conversing, one of the wounded was tomahawked at our feet. Shortly after, the Indian returned and told me I was a prisoner, and must go. I was taken by the Indian to the house I had left, and there discovered that Captain Hickman and two others had, in my absence, been tomahawked, scalped, and stripped. I was tied and taken by this Indian towards Malden, about four miles, when I came to the encampment of the British wounded, and met with Captain Elliott and the surgeon of the 41st regiment. Captain Elliott immediately recognised me, and inquired the cause of my situation. I informed him what had taken place, and requested him to send back immediately; that some who were badly wounded might be still alive, and could be saved, and particularly named Captain Hart, for whom he manifested much friendship. Captain Elliott replied, it is now too late; you may rest assured that those who are once taken by the Indians are safe, and will be taken to Malden, and those who are badly wounded are killed ere this. I replied, many are unable to walk, and some will be killed after making an effort, and walking several miles, who might be saved; to which he replied, charity begins at home; my own wounded are to be conveyed first, and if any sleighs remain, they shall be sent back for your wounded. My anxiety to get some person to return, in hopes of saving some of the prisoners, induced me at length to make an appeal to their avarice. The surgical instruments of the detachment were left in the room I occupied, and I informed the surgeon of their value and importance at that time; he immediately despatched an interpreter for them, who returned with the information they were destroyed in the burning of the house, and gave additional confirmation of the massacre of the wounded. I was released from the Indians by Captain Elliott and the surgeon. At this time my brother, who was wounded, and several others, were in possession of the Indians, who were taking them towards Malden. I requested their release, and permission for them to accompany me on foot, under British protection. Captain Elliott told me it was impossible, and to be under no fears, they were safe: for he knew the fidelity of the Indians with whom they were. When the intelligence of the massacre was by me communicated to Captain Elliott and the surgeon, they appeared much exasperated, and declared it was impossible to restrain the savages. The cause he then assigned to me was, that when the Indians discovered their loss in killed and wounded, and that of the British, they started off towards our wounded, declaring they would have satisfaction, and, he continued, I was fearful of the event. During the plunder and the massacre, our wounded conducted themselves with the utmost composure and resignation, and made no resistance, which they knew would be fruitless, and destruction to all.

It was asserted by Colonel Proctor, in a conversation at Amherstburg, that the Indians had got some whiskey in the house where we were stationed, and had become intoxicated. That the Indians may have had some whiskey, I shall not deny; but I think I can safely say, that they did not procure it there, and *that* was not the cause of the massacre: for, on the preceding days, and subsequent to the action of the 18th, I wanted some spirits, and made application to the housekeeper, who assured me there was none about the house, for it was all consumed by the British and Indians, who had quartered in the house prior to the action of the 18th; besides, the Indians showed no manifestation of drunkenness; their deliberate pilfering, and their orderly conduct throughout, was not such as would be expected from drunken Indians.

Upon my arrival at Malden, I was again solicited to take charge of the wounded; the surgery was opened to me, and I had the use of the medicines and dressings necessary, and they had as comfortable rooms as could be procured. During our stay in Malden, some eight or ten of the wounded were brought in by the Indians; several made their escape who were doomed to massacre, and found protection with the inhabitants of the territory, who brought them into Malden; and several made their escape, wandered in and delivered themselves up at the fort. Prior to our leaving Malden, one poor fellow was brought in scalped alive by the Indians, and delivered up to the British; but before I reached him, death put an end to his sufferings. I frequently, and on every occasion, urged the British officers to exert themselves and procure the release of the wounded from the Indians, urging the necessity of having their wounds dressed. In a conversation on this subject with Captain Elliott, and while urging it, he replied, the Indians are excellent surgeons. The prisoners were all marched off to Sandwich, after remaining a few days at Malden, and I was called upon to know how many from their wounds were unable to march, who had sleighs furnished them, which was the case during the march to Fort George. Before I conclude, I must say, that the terms of capitulation were violated in every particular by the enemy. The wounded were not protected; private property was not held sacred; and our side arms were not restored. With a few exceptions, I was treated respectfully by the British officers, save the abuse which was lavished on my Government, and *that* was by no means sparingly bestowed.

I am, respectfully, yours, &c.

JOHN TODD, M. D.

*Late Surgeon to the 5th Regiment of Kentucky Volunteer Militia.*

The Hon. JESSE BLEDSOE.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, }  
Fayette County, } ss.

This day, Doctor John Todd came before me, John H. Morton, a justice of the peace for said county, and made oath that the facts stated in the foregoing letter are substantially true to the best of his knowledge.

Given under my hand, this 3d day of May, 1813.

JOHN H. MORTON.

STATE OF KENTUCKY, }  
Pendleton County, in the Town of Falmouth. }

On the 21st day of April, 1813, I, John Dawson, an orderly sergeant in Captain Glave's company of the first regiment Kentucky volunteer militia, being detailed off, and attached to Captain Wriel Seabrees' company, and was in the battle of the 18th of January, and did not receive a wound, but on the 22d, about 9 o'clock, received a shot under the right arm, which lodged between the ribs. After the capitulation of our troops, there came a paymaster of the British army in the house where I was, to take the number of wounded that was in the house. I asked what was to be done with us; he replied, "don't make yourself uneasy about that, you shall be protected this night by a strong guard which shall be left with you." But to my sad misfortune, I found there were but three interpreters left, and in the night an officer took two of them away, and in the morning the other one said he could not talk Indian. So when the Indians came in the morning, they broke open the doors of the houses, began to tomahawk, scalp

and plunder, then set fire to the houses which contained the prisoners; with this I got up, put on my great coat, put up my knapsack, and went out of doors. I had not been out more than one minute before an Indian came up to me and took the coat off my back; also another Indian told me to put my knapsack in his sled. I did so. At this time Major Graves and Captain Hart were out in the yard. I heard Captain Hart make a bargain with an Indian to take him to Malden, which the Indian agreed so to do, for the sum of one hundred dollars. I saw the Indian put a pair of socks on Hart, and put him on a horse; this was the last I saw of Hart. I then saw a man riding, whom I thought was a British officer. I made to him, but found that he was an Indian who was aid-de-camp to General Roundhead; he had with him, when I came up, twelve men. It was at the mouth of a lane where I overtook him, where there were two Indians scalping two men; he hallooed to them to give way; they did so. After this, we went on; and on Sandy creek, about three miles from the battle ground, I saw Major Graves in an Indian sleigh; this is the last account of him that I could ascertain. We went on that night to Brownstown, and in the morning of the 24th a man gave out walking, with the rheumatic pains, who was by the name of Downey. The Indians tomahawked him, and then stripped him. We then marched on above Detroit, on the river Rouge. I staid with them seven days. They then took me into Detroit; (leaving a young man in the camp by the name of John Davenport) and sold me to Major Muir, who commands Fort Detroit. I then was sent over to Sandwich, where I staid until the 8th of February; they marched me to Fort George, and — me on the 19th of February, 1813. The above is a true statement as far as I saw, though I saw numbers massacred that I did not know.

During my confinement with the Indians, whilst at their camps, they showed more humanity than the British.

Given under my hand, this 21st day of April, 1813.

JOHN DAWSON.

PENDLETON COUNTY, ss.

I, William Mountjoy, one of the Commonwealths' justices of the peace for the State of Kentucky, in and for said county, do certify, that the foregoing certificate of John Dawson was written, subscribed, and sworn to before me. Given under my hand this 21st day of April, 1813.

WM. MOUNTJOY.

STATE OF KENTUCKY,  
Pendleton County, in the Town of Falmouth. }

On the 21st day of April, 1813, I, Thomas Pollard, a private of Captain Glave's company, of the first regiment of Kentucky volunteer militia, was in battles, fought with the British and Indian army on the 18th and 22d of January last, at the river Raisin, and after the surrender of our army as prisoners of war on the 22d, upon the assurances of the British officers promising protection to my wounded fellow soldiers, and that they would send carryalls for them the next day. Although I had received no injury in either of the actions fought on the 18th and 22d, I voluntarily staid to assist and comfort my messmates, John Dawson, Albert Ammerman, and Jesse Green, all of whom had received wounds by balls.

I have first examined the statement made and sworn to by John Dawson, hereto annexed, and witnessed every circumstance therein stated to be truly stated, within my own knowledge. The Indian who bargained with Captain Hart to take him to Fort Malden for one hundred dollars, and took charge of him, put him on a horse and started on his way; spoke good enough the English tongue for us to understand the contract.

THOMAS POLLARD.

PENDLETON COUNTY, ss.

I, William Mountjoy, one of the Commonwealths' justices of the peace for the State of Kentucky, in and for said county, do certify that the foregoing certificate of Thomas Pollard was subscribed and sworn to before me.

Given under my hand, this 21st April, 1813.

WM. MOUNTJOY.

STATE OF KENTUCKY,  
Pendleton County, in the Town of Falmouth. }

On the 21st day of April, 1813, I, Albert Ammerman, a private of Captain Glave's company of the first regiment of Kentucky volunteer militia, being wounded in the battle of the 18th January last, at the river Raisin, by a ball in the flesh of the thigh; and from the window of the house which was appropriated for an hospital, was a witness to the battle of the 22d of the same month; and after the surrender, I being but slightly wounded, proposed marching with the rest of the prisoners, and was prevented by the order of a British officer, who said that a guard would be left to take care of the wounded, and carryalls would be sent for them to ride into Malden on the next morning. But to my astonishment no guard was left, and about sunrise on the morning of the 23d, a party of Indians returned to the hospital, and the first Indian that came to the room I was lodged in, could speak the English language. He was asked by one of the wounded what was to be done with the wounded. He replied they were all to be killed that could not walk; and shortly after a general massacre commenced. I instantly put on my knapsack and went out of the house; my knapsack was demanded by an Indian at the door, to whom I gave it. He conducted me to a log some little distance from the house, on which I sat down, where I witnessed the butchery of many of my fellow-citizens, sufferers by the tomahawk and scalping knife, and to finish the scene, set fire to the houses occupied by the wounded prisoners; many of them, struggling in the arms of death, put their heads out of the windows whilst enveloped in smoke and flames. After this bloody work was finished, I was marched off on the direction towards Brownstown, by an Indian, and when about half a mile from Frenchtown on our way, was overtaken by two Indians who had Captain Hart in custody, mounted on a horse. As they approached nearly to us, I noticed they were speaking loud and animated as if in a quarrel, but not understanding their language, did not understand what passed between them, but think it is probable that the quarrel was occasioned respecting one hundred dollars which I understood Captain Hart had given to one of the Indians aforesaid, to convey him to Fort Malden. The quarrel appeared to grow very warm, so much so that the Indians took aim at each other with their guns; and, as if to settle the dispute, it appeared to me as if they had mutually agreed to kill Captain Hart, and plunder him of the rest of his money and effects, which they did, by taking him off his horse, then knocked him down with a war club, scalped and tomahawked him, and stripped him naked, leaving his body on the ground. I was gratified in observing that during this scene of trial, Captain Hart refrained from supplication or entreaty, but appeared perfectly calm and collected. He met his fate with that firmness which was his particular characteristic. No other prisoner of our army of the United States was present to witness this melancholy scene, the death of Captain Hart. During my captivity with the Indians, five days only, I was treated with more hospitality than I had any reason to expect; much more so than I experienced from the British, after I was ransomed at Detroit, by Mr. Benjamin Chittenden, who will ever be entitled to my utmost gratitude; by him I was humanely treated, and also by some of the French Canadians.

ALBERT AMMERMAN, (his + mark.)

PENDLETON COUNTY, ss.

I, William Mounjoy, one of the Commonwealths' justices of the peace for the State of Kentucky, in and for said county, do certify, that the foregoing certificate of Albert Ammerman was subscribed and sworn to before me. Given under my hand, this 21st day of April, 1813.

WM. MOUNTJOY.

LEXINGTON, *April 13th*, 1813.

SIR:

You request of me a statement of facts within my own knowledge, concerning the murder of our men after the battle and surrender at Frenchtown.

I was one of those who was taken by the Indians on the retreat, about one and a half miles from where the action first commenced. Just before we were taken, with the assistance of Lieutenant Chinn, belonging to the militia, I formed between fifteen and twenty men, I then discovered the Indians running upon us on each side and in front, about sixty in number, with their arms at a trail. I discovered there was no chance to repel them. I ordered the men to ground their arms, which was done: the Indians then came up and secured the arms of our men, and shot them, including the Lieutenant before mentioned. I was the only one saved. I was taken and delivered up to Captain Elliott, a British officer.

As to the murder of the wounded, I know nothing of my own knowledge.

Your obedient servant,

A. GARRETT.

HON. JESSE BLEDSOE.

FAYETTE COUNTY, *ss.*

This day, Lieutenant Ashton Garrett, of the 17th regiment U. S. infantry, came before me, and made oath, that the foregoing statement is just and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Given under my hand, this 13th day of April, 1813.

JOHN H. MORTON, *J. P.*STATE OF KENTUCKY, FAYETTE COUNTY, *ss.*

Personally appeared before me, a justice of the peace for the county aforesaid, Charles Bradford, an inhabitant of the town of Lexington, State of Kentucky, who, being duly sworn on the Holy Evangelists, deposeth and saith, that he was in the actions at the river Raisin, on the 18th and 22d January last; that he was wounded in the right hip, and remained at Frenchtown after the capitulation; that, on the 22d, before the prisoners (who were able to walk) were marched for Malden, he saw Captain William Elliott, with whom he had been formerly acquainted, and of whom he inquired, personally, what would be done with the wounded prisoners? whether they would be taken to Malden that evening with the other prisoners, or not? He said they would not be taken to Malden that evening, but a strong guard would be left to protect them against any outrage the Indians might be disposed to commit. Elliott had a similar conversation with Major Graves, Captains Hart and Hickman, and Doctors Todd and Bowers, in the presence of this deponent. He, Elliott, further stated that sleighs would be sent to convey the wounded to Malden the next morning. This deponent further says, that the British marched away; no guard was left to protect the wounded; and that Captain Elliott, when asked the reason, observed that some interpreters were left, whose influence among the Indians was greater, and that they were better able to protect us than a guard. About two or three o'clock in the morning of the 23d January, this deponent discovered that the interpreters had left the house in which he was, and he never saw them afterwards; that between day-light and sun rise, on the 23d, he saw a large number of Indians come to the house; they burst open the door, and in a few minutes commenced plundering the prisoners, and tomahawking those who were unable to walk. This deponent left the house as soon as possible, and went into the yard, where a number of his fellow-prisoners had assembled. He was there claimed as a prisoner by an Indian, who gave him some articles to hold whilst he plundered more. At this time he was standing with Doctor Bowers and James E. Blythe, when an Indian, without any provocation, tomahawked Blythe, and scalped him. Shortly after, they (the Indians) set fire to the houses in which the wounded had been quartered, and burnt them down, with the bodies of those whom they had murdered. This deponent was then taken by the Indians, in company with Doctor Bowers, Charles Searls, Julius Turner, and several others, to Sandy creek; that on the way he saw a number of the prisoners who had been tomahawked; that, whilst at Sandy creek, they murdered Charles Searls, Thomas S. Crow, and three or four others. That this deponent was then packed with forty or fifty pounds weight, and taken to the river Rouge, where the Indians had encamped: that, whilst he was there, he inquired of an Indian whether he would take him to Malden, as he wished to be given to Captain Elliott. The Indian said, if Captain Elliott told him to do so he would, as they always did as he requested them. This deponent was six days with the Indians before they took him to Detroit, where he was purchased by Stephen Mack and Oliver W. Miller, for eighty dollars. That the British officer commanding at Detroit (Major Muir) again claimed him as a British prisoner, notwithstanding his having just been ransomed from their allies, (by his own countrymen) and sent him to Sandwich, where he remained until the 9th or 10th February, when he was sent to Fort George, and there paroled. This deponent states, that, whilst a prisoner at Sandwich, he was several times treated insultingly by the British officers, and by one John M'Gregor; that the citizens, generally, treated the prisoners with kindness and attention, as far as was in their power.

This being the first opportunity the deponent has had of expressing his gratitude to the American citizens who treated the prisoners with so much friendship and humanity at Detroit, cannot refrain from so doing. And, as long as he lives, the names of Messrs. Mack, Miller, Smart, Woodward, Williams, M'Donald, Hunt, Mays, &c. shall never be forgotten.

Sworn and subscribed to before me, this 29th day of April, 1813.

CHARLES BRADFORD.

OLIVER KIEN, *J. P.*UNITED STATES' SHIP MADISON, *Sackett's Harbor, June 4*, 1813.

SIR:

I have the honor to present you, by the hands of Lieutenant Dudley, the British standard taken at York on the 27th of April last, accompanied by the mace over which was hung a *human scalp*.

These articles were taken from the parliament house by one of my officers, and presented to me. The scalp I caused to be presented to General Dearborn, who, I believe, still has it in his possession. I also send, by the same gentleman, one of the British flags taken at Fort George on the 27th of May.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

HON. W. JONES, *Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

A true copy from the original filed in the Navy Department, July 22, 1813.

W. JONES.

No. 9.

OUTRAGES AT HAMPTON, IN VIRGINIA.

*Extract of a letter from General Taylor to Admiral Warren, dated*HEAD QUARTERS, NORFOLK, *June 29*, 1813.

"I have heard with grief and astonishment of the excesses, both to property and persons, committed by the land troops who took possession of Hampton. The respect I entertain for your personal character leads me to make

known these excesses. It would not become me to suggest what course of inquiry and punishment is due to the honor of your arms. But the world will suppose those acts to have been approved, if not excited, which are passed over with impunity. I do not, however, deprecate any measures you may think necessary or proper, but am prepared for any species of warfare which you may be disposed to prosecute. It is for the sake of humanity I enter this protest.

"We are, in this part of the country, merely in the noviciate of our warfare. The character it will hereafter assume, whether of mildness or ferocity, will materially depend on the first operations of our arms, and on the personal character and dispositions of the respective commanders.

"For myself, I assure you most solemnly, that I neither have authorized, nor will sanction, any outrage on humanity or the laws of civilized warfare. On the contrary, I think it due, no less to my personal honor than to that of my country, to repress and punish every excess. I hope that these sentiments will be reciprocated. It will depend on you whether the evils inseparable from a state of war shall, in our operations, be tempered by the mildness of civilized life, or, under your authority, be aggravated by all the fiend-like passions which can be instilled into them."

H. B. M. SHIP SAN DOMINGO, *Hampton Roads, Chesapeake, June 29, 1813.*

SIR:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day, stating that you had communicated to your Government the proposal of an exchange of prisoners, and, also, that some excesses had been committed by the troops in the late affair at Hampton. I have communicated to my friend, Sir Sidney Beckwith, the commander of his Majesty's forces on shore, this part of your letter, and he will have the honor of writing to you upon the points to which it alludes.

I beg leave to assure you that it is my wish to alleviate the misfortunes of the war commenced against my country, by every means in my power; at the same time, I am prepared to meet any result that may ensue between the two nations:

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient faithful humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN,  
*Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief.*

Brig. Gen. TAYLOR, *Commanding the United States' forces at Hampton.*

A true copy.

JAMES MAURICE, *Major, Acting A. A. G.*

H. M. SHIP SAN DOMINGO, *June 29, 1813.*

SIR:

Admiral Sir John B. Warren having communicated to me the contents of your letter, I lose no time in assuring you that your wish cannot exceed mine to carry on war with every attention to the unfortunate individuals in whose immediate vicinity military operations may take place. In this spirit I shall vie with you to the utmost. At the same time, I ought to state to you that the excesses of which you complain at Hampton were occasioned by a proceeding of so extraordinary a nature, that, if I had not been an eye-witness, I could not have credited it. At the recent attempt on Craney Island, the troops in a barge sunk by the fire of your guns, clung to the wreck of the boat. Several Americans, I assure you most solemnly, waded off from the island, and, in presence of all engaged, fired upon and shot these poor fellows. With a feeling natural to such a proceeding, the men of that corps landed at Hampton.

That occurrences of that kind may never occur again, and that the troops of each nation may be guided by sentiments of honor and humanity, is the earnest wish of, sir, your very obedient servant,

SIDNEY BECKWITH, *Q. M. Gen.*

To Brig. Gen. TAYLOR, *Commanding the United States' Troops, Norfolk.*

A true copy.

JAMES MAURICE, *Major, Acting A. A. G.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NORFOLK, *July 1, 1813.*

SIR:

It affords me the highest satisfaction to receive your assurance that you wish "to carry on war with every attention to the unfortunate individuals in whose immediate vicinity military operations may take place." Such sentiments can alone give splendor to courage, and confer honor on military skill. Worthless is the laurel steeped in female tears, and joyless the conquests which have inflicted needless woe on the peaceful and unresisting. The frankness with which you admit the excesses at Hampton is a guarantee against the repetition.

I cannot doubt, sir, your conviction that the scene described by you at Craney Island was really acted. But the very reason it appeared to you incredible and inhuman, it should have been unauthorized. Your own perception of propriety shall decide, if facts should not have been ascertained, and redress demanded, before retaliation was resorted to—a retaliation, too, extravagant in its measure, applying not to the perpetrators of the alleged offence, or their comrades, but to the innocent and helpless. I have reason to think that you are mistaken in your impressions of the conduct of our troops at Craney Island. That they waded into the water on the sinking of your boat is true; but I learn that it was for the purpose of securing their conquest, and assisting the perishing. One person, perhaps more, was shot, but it was only for a continued effort to escape, after repeated offers of safety on surrender, (such at least is the representation made to me.) If, however, your yielding troops have been butchered, it is due to the honor of our arms to disclaim and punish the enormity. The fame of my country shall never be tarnished by such conduct in the troops under my command. I have to-day ordered an inquiry into the facts, by a board of field officers. Proper measures shall be taken to punish whatsoever of impropriety may have been committed. I flatter myself you will perceive in these measures a disposition to afford no cause of reproach in any future conflict. When we meet, let us combat as soldiers, jealous of the honor of our respective countries, anxious to surpass each other as well in magnanimity as in courage.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my consideration and respect.

ROBERT B. TAYLOR, *Brig. Gen. Commanding.*

To Sir SIDNEY BECKWITH, *Quartermaster General,*

*Commanding the Land Forces of H. B. M. Hampton Roads.*

A copy.

JOHN MYERS, *Aid-de-Camp.*

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Taylor to the Secretary of War, dated*

*NORFOLK, 2d July, 1813.*

I enclose, as was promised yesterday, copies of the letters written to Admiral Warren and General Beckwith. My aid, who carried them down, yesterday, brought back a letter from Admiral Warren, of which a copy is enclosed, and has made a statement of what occurred in his conference with the General.

The letter of the Admiral, though polite, is certainly not responsive to any thing which has occurred, and the conversation with the General, though equally civil, is obviously designed to prevent any further discussion of the subject. From the report of prisoners and deserters, there is too much reason to believe that, before the attack on

Craney Island, the cupidity of the troops had been excited by a promise of the pillage of Norfolk. To inflame their resentment, after their failure, and to keep alive the hope of plunder at Norfolk, there is much reason to fear that our troops have unmeritedly been charged with misconduct at Craney Island, and that made a pretext for their excesses and their conduct at Hampton. I entertain no doubt of the justification of the honor and magnanimity of our men, by the reports of the board of officers. I do not mean that the subject shall drop, but when I communicate the report, I shall leave the British commander the alternative, either of adopting similar measures in his own army, or remaining under the imputation of having excited their troops to commit these excesses. Our troops are highly inflamed.

*Notes for Captain Myers in his interview with Admiral Warren.*

A defenceless and unresisting town has been given up to indiscriminate pillage, though civilized war tolerates this only as to fortified places, carried by assault, and after summons.

Individuals have been stripped naked; a sick man stabbed twice in the hospital; a sick man shot, at Pembroke, in his bed, and in the arms of his wife, long after the defeat of the troops; his wife also shot at, and wounded—a Mr. and Mrs. Kirby.

Females have been not only assaulted, and personally abused and struck, but even violated.

If occasion offers, notice may be immediately made of the information, given by prisoners and deserters, of the promise to plunder Norfolk.

As to the imputation of our troops at Craney Island, if Admiral Warren should mention it, deny the fact, and state the actual conduct of our troops, in going into the water to assist their men, and then giving them refreshments as soon as they entered the fort. Refer to the conduct of all our prisoners, particularly those taken from the boats of the Victorious.

JOHN MYERS, *Captain and Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NORFOLK, *July 2d, 1813.*

SIR:

In obedience to your orders I proceeded, yesterday, with a flag of truce, to Admiral Warren, in Hampton Roads, to whom I handed both the despatch for himself and that for Sir Sidney Beckwith. The Admiral received me with civility, and with many acknowledgments for the terms of your letter. Sir Sidney was on shore at Old Point Comfort. Feeling some difficulty about the propriety of delaying on board for his arrival, I was about to depart, but Admiral Warren expressed a wish that I would remain, saying that he would desire, no doubt, to give a reply.

Sir Sidney did not arrive till 8 o'clock. He expressed great respect for the motives that had actuated you, sir, in the measures which you were pursuing. They were more than he desired. It was sufficient, he said, if your own mind was satisfied. He expressed regret at the trouble you had taken, and much deference for your character, with a resolution to vie with you in efforts to confine future operations within the bounds of humanity, and the usages of war. He said, in allusion to the pretended conduct of our men at Craney Island, that it proceeded no doubt from a few of the more disorderly. I denied the charge altogether, as I had done in my previous interview, when it was made the justification of their outrages at Hampton, on the ground of retaliation.

I found that it was not his intention to give to your despatch a written reply. By the light manner in which he glanced at the subject of your investigation, I could perceive that it was pressed further than was desirable to him. It was my wish, however, to be able to report to you the probability of a like course of inquiry on his part, and I enumerated the catalogue of abuses and violence at Hampton. I mentioned the pillage of the town, and the wanton destruction of medicine; that individuals had been stripped naked; a sick man stabbed twice, who was in the hospital; a sick man shot in his bed, at Pembroke, and in the arms of his wife, who was also shot at, and wounded, long after the defeat of the troops—a Mr. and Mrs. Kirby; and finally, the assault on females, their being struck, and personally abused, and even violated.

At the mention of the murder of Kirby, and the wound given to his wife, Sir Sidney distinctly *admitted* it; the others he appeared not to be acquainted with the particulars of, and expressed some concern at it. He said that he had, however, on coming to a knowledge of their conduct, immediately ordered the embarkation of the troops that were concerned, with a determination that they should not again land; and that, while he was unable to control a past event, the responsibility of a recurrence should rest on himself; that the troops under his command were strangers to him, on his arrival here, and appealing to my knowledge of the nature of the war in Spain, in which these men (meaning the French corps) he said had been trained, told me they could not be restrained.

Thus far he thought he could not give a more convincing proof of the sincerity of his professions, than in the withdrawal of these troops, and that he had, moreover, just been employed in finding a new watering place on Back river, in order to remove from Hampton, and to quiet the minds of the inhabitants.

He assured me that in making such a pledge, as he was doing, it should not be lightly regarded. That he would either send away these troops, or wait the arrival of others, for new operations. He concluded by expressing a hope that you, sir, would in future use no reserve in communicating any subject of impropriety; and, on his part, that he should certainly do so, with due regard to the liberality of your conduct. He hoped the subject was at rest. I took my leave.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN MYERS, *Captain and Aid-de-Camp.*

Brigadier General ROBERT B. TAYLOR, *Norfolk.*

*Extracts of a letter from General Taylor to Sir Sidney Beckwith, Quartermaster General, commanding the land forces of his Britannic Majesty, at Hampton Roads, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, *July 5, 1813.*

"I have now the honor to transmit to you the proceedings of the board of officers convened to inquire into the transactions at Craney Island. They doubtless will convince you that, in that affair, the American troops merited no censure; that their conduct was distinguished by humanity and magnanimity; and that the distance to which you were removed from the scene, by rendering it impossible that you could be informed of the motives of their conduct, unhappily led you to draw conclusions equally mistaken and unmerited.

"You have done me the justice to declare that the measures pursued by me evince a disposition to permit, in my troops, no abuses on humanity, or the laws of authorized war. As I cannot doubt the existence of similar sentiments with you, I have a right to expect, on your part, measures equally decisive and unambiguous. If I have deemed it needful to forbid openly, to my whole army, all acts of impropriety, and to direct a public investigation of charges believed to be unmerited, but having the sanction of your imputation, I put it to your candor to determine, if excesses in your troops, admitted by yourself, and some of them of the most atrocious character, should pass unnoticed. My conduct, and your declarations, give me a claim to ask that these excesses be punished. Your army will then learn the abhorrence you feel for such acts, and be restrained, by the fear of your indignation, from similar outrages. But if these admitted excesses are passed by, the impunity of the past will be construed, by your troops, into an encouragement of future outrages, and your own humane intentions be completely defeated. Neither can

you be unmindful of the propriety of taking, from my army, the pretexts for impropriety, by a knowledge of effectual restraints on yours.

"I am fully impressed with the liberality of your conduct in promising to remove the troops who committed the outrages of Hampton from the opportunity of repeating these enormities. But, besides that my confidence in the gallantry of the American troops forbids me to desire any diminution of your force, and such a measure being liable to misconception, by our own troops, might not attain your object. The rank and file of an army seldom reason very profoundly, and however erroneously, might ascribe their withdrawal to the desertions which have, on every opportunity, taken place in that corps, and in their unwillingness, if any should have been displayed, to fire on the American troops. If this should unfortunately be the case, your force will be diminished, without securing the great ends of discipline and humanity for which you had, with so much liberality, made the sacrifice. I am the more pressing on this subject, because I have reason to believe that, even since your assurance, though unquestionably against your wishes, very improper acts have been committed by the troops on James river. The domestic property of peaceable private citizens, respected by all civilized nations, has been pillaged, and what furnished no allurements to cupidity has been wantonly defaced and destroyed.

"If such acts are either directed, or sanctioned, it is important to us, and to the world, to know what species of warfare the arms of Great Britain mean to wage. If authorized, it will be of little practical avail to know, that the director of these arms entertains the most liberal personal dispositions, while these dispositions remain dormant and inoperative.

"If I am troublesome on this subject, charge it to my anxious desire that nothing may occur to embitter our own feelings, and those of our respective nations. In the progress of the war, charges of inhumanity have unhappily been frequent and reciprocal. I am not indifferent to the infamy which such a charge fixes on the officer, who either encourages or permits it. I derive the highest satisfaction from the assurances you have given of similar sentiments. We have, sir, become enemies, by the sacred obligations we owe our respective countries. But, on the great and expanded subject of human happiness, we should be friends by the sympathy of our feelings. Let us then cordially unite, and exercising effectually the powers with which our Governments have invested us, give to our warfare a character of magnanimity, conferring equal honor on ourselves, and on our countries."

*Extract from General Orders.*

NORFOLK, *Assistant Adjutant General's Office,*

*July 1st, 1813.*

The General commanding has deemed it proper to remonstrate against the excesses committed by the British troops who took possession of Hampton. It has been attempted to justify, or palliate, these excesses, on the ground of inhumanity in some of the troops at Craney Island, who are charged with having waded into the river, and shot at the unresisting and yielding foe, who clung to the wreck of a boat which had been sunk by the fire of our guns.

Humanity and mercy are inseparable from true courage, and the General knows too well the character of the troops under his command to doubt their magnanimity towards an unresisting foe. It is equally due to the honor of the troops engaged, and to the hitherto unquestioned fame of the American arms, for honor and clemency, that the imputation should be investigated. If the charge be well founded, the army must be purified by punishment for this abomination. If, as the commander hopes and believes, the conduct of our troops has been misconceived, the world should have an authentic record to repel the imputation.

He, therefore, directs that a board of officers, to consist of Colonel Freeman, President, Lieutenant Colonels Boykin, Mason, and Read, do convene the day after to-morrow, at a place to be appointed by the President, for the purpose of investigating these charges, and report accordingly.

JAMES MAURICE, *Major, Act. Ast. Ad. Gen.*

The evidence having been gone through, the Board, after deliberate and mature consideration, do pronounce the following opinion:

That it appears from the testimony adduced, that, on the 22d of last month, in the action at Craney Island, two of the enemy's boats, in front of their line, were sunk by the fire of our batteries; the soldiers and sailors who were in those boats were consequently afloat, and in danger of drowning; and being in front of the boats which were uninjured, to disable these, our guns were necessarily fired in a direction of the men in the water, but with no intention whatever to do them further harm, but, on the contrary, orders were given to prevent this by ceasing to fire grape, and only to fire round shot. It also is substantiated, that one of the enemy, who had apparently surrendered, advanced towards the shore, about one hundred yards, when he suddenly turned to his right, and endeavored to make his escape to a body of the enemy who had landed above the island, and who were then in view; then, and not till then, was he fired upon, to bring him back, which had the desired effect, and he was taken unhurt to the island.

It further appears, that the troops on the island exerted themselves in acts of hospitality and kindness to the unresisting and yielding foe.

"Therefore, the Board do, with great satisfaction, declare, as their unbiassed opinion, that the charge alleged against the troops is unsupported, and that the character of the American soldiery, for humanity and magnanimity, has not been committed, but, on the contrary, confirmed."

CONSTANT FREEMAN,  
*Colonel Artillery, President.*

ARMISTEAD T. MASON,  
*Lieut. Colonel, commanding 5th Reg. Inf.*

FRANCIS M. BOYKIN,  
*Lieut. Colonel, commanding 3d Reg. Inf.*

THOMAS READ, JUN.  
*Lieut. Colonel, commanding Artillery.*

JOHN BARBER, *Recorder.*

A true and correct copy.

JAMES MAURICE, *Maj. Act. As. Ad. Gen.*

*Copy of a note from Sir Sidney Beckwith to Gen. Taylor, dated H. M. ship San Domingo, July 6, 1813.*

Quarter Master General Sir Sidney Beckwith begs leave to return his best acknowledgments to Gen. Taylor for his polite communication, and to repeat his earnest wish that military operations should be carried on with all the liberality and humanity which becomes the respective nations. Any infringement of the established usages of war will instantly be noticed and punished.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Taylor to the Secretary of War, dated*

NORFOLK, 7th July, 1813.

"The Board of officers convened to examine the charge brought against our troops in the affair at Craney Island have made such a report as an American could desire. I enclosed a copy yesterday to the British commander, with a letter, of which a copy is enclosed. The bearer of my despatch was met by a flag, the officer of which received the despatch, and a few hours after returned with an answer, of which a copy is also enclosed. I fear, from the generality of its terms, that little amelioration of the system, hitherto practised, is to be expected; but something is gained by placing the enemy so decidedly in the wrong, that the world cannot doubt to whom is to be ascribed any excesses which hereafter may be committed on either side."

*Extract of an official letter, addressed by Major Crutchfield to Governor Barbour, dated*

YORK COUNTY, HALF-WAY HOUSE, June 20, 1813.

"To give you, sir, an idea of the savage-like disposition of the enemy, on their getting possession of the neighborhood, would be but a vain attempt. Although Sir Sidney Beckwith assured me that no uneasiness might be felt in relation to the unfortunate Americans, the fact is, that, on yesterday, there were several dead bodies lying unburied, and the wounded not even assisted into town, although observed to be crawling towards a cold and inhospitable protection. The unfortunate females of Hampton, who could not leave the town, were suffered to be abused in the most shameful manner, not only by the venal savage foe, but by the unfortunate and infatuated blacks, who were encouraged by them in their excesses. They pillaged, and encouraged every act of murder and rapine—killing a poor man by the name of Kirby, who had been lying on his bed at the point of death for more than six weeks; shooting his wife in the hip at the same time, and killing his faithful dog while lying under his feet. The murdered Kirby was lying, last night, weltering in his bed."

*Extract of a letter from Captain Cooper of the Cavalry, to Charles K. Mallory, Esq. Lieutenant Governor of Virginia.*

"I was yesterday in Hampton with my troop; that place having been evacuated in the morning by the British. *My blood ran cold at what I saw and heard.* The few distressed inhabitants running up in every direction to congratulate us; tears were shedding in every corner. The infamous scoundrels, monsters, *destroyed every thing* but the houses, and (my pen is almost unwilling to describe it) *the women were ravished by the abandoned ruffians!* Great God! my dear friend, can you figure to yourself our Hampton females seized and treated with violence by those monsters, and not a solitary American arm present to avenge their wrongs? But enough; I can no more of this.

"They have received a reinforcement of 2,000, in all 6,000 men; and Norfolk or Richmond is their immediate aim. Protect yourselves from such scenes as we have witnessed. They retired in great confusion, leaving behind 3,000 weight of beef, muskets, ammunition, canteens, &c. &c. and some of their men, which we took. It is supposed that they apprehended an immediate attack from 6,000 of our men, which caused them to retreat so precipitately. My friend, rest assured of one thing, that they cannot conquer Americans; they cannot stand them: if we had had 1200 men, we should have killed or taken the greater part of them."

*From the same to the same, dated*

ARMISTEAD'S MILL, NEAR HAMPTON, July 10, 1813.

DEAR FRIEND:

"Your favor of the 7th has just been received through the politeness of Major Crutchfield, who had it forwarded to me at this place. I am surprised to hear that you have among you a *man* who would endeavor to apologize for the unprecedented villany and brutal conduct of the enemy in Hampton. *Be assured of one fact, that that which I informed you of in my last was strictly true.*

"You request me to make known to you a few of the distressing particulars in a way which will force conviction upon the minds of the incredulous. I will attend to it, my friend, that you may be enabled to confound such with positive proofs. At present you must content yourself with the following, and *believe it as religiously as any fact beyond denial.*

"Mrs. Turnbull was pursued up to her waist in the water, and dragged on shore by ten or twelve of these ruffians, who satiated their brutal desires upon her, after pulling off her clothes, stockings, shoes, &c. This was seen by your nephew Keith, and many others. Another case—a married woman, her name unknown to me, with her infant child in her arms, (the child forcibly dragged from her) shared the same fate. Two young women, well known to many, whose names will not be revealed *at this time*, suffered in like manner. \* Doctor Colton, Parson Holson, and Mrs. Hopkins, have informed me of these particulars. Another, in the presence of old Mr. Hope, had her gown, &c. &c. cut off with a sword, and violence offered in his presence, which he endeavored to prevent, but had to quit the room, leaving the unfortunate victim in their possession, who, no doubt, was abused in the same way. Old Mr. Hope himself was stripped naked, pricked with a bayonet in the arm, and slapped in the face; and were I to mention a hundred cases in addition to the above, I do not know that I should exaggerate."

*Extract from a report made to Major Crutchfield by Thomas Griffin and Robert Lively, Esqrs. dated*

YORK, 4th July, 1813.

"Upon reaching Hampton, a scene of desolation and destruction presented itself. The few inhabitants we found in town seemed not yet to have recovered from their alarm: dismay and consternation sat on every countenance: reports had reached us of the violence and uncontrolled fury of the enemy after they obtained possession of the place; their conduct, in some cases, being represented such as would have disgraced the days of Vandalism. Our feelings were much excited, and we deemed it our duty to pursue the inquiry as far as practicable, and are sorry to say, that, from all the information we could procure, from sources too respectable to permit us to doubt, we are compelled to believe that acts of violence have been perpetrated, which have disgraced the age in which we live. The sex, hitherto guarded by the soldier's honor, escaped not the rude assaults of superior force; nor could disease disarm the foe of his ferocity. The apology, that these atrocities were committed by the French soldiers attached to the British forces now in our waters, appears to us no justification of those who employed them, believing, as we do, that an officer is, or should be, ever responsible for the conduct of the troops under his command."

\* The former of these gentlemen acted as surgeon to the detachment lately stationed at Hampton, and is a young gentleman of the first respectability. The latter is president of the academy at that place, and stands deservedly high in public estimation. Mrs. Hopkins, also, is a lady of very high respectability, and of the most unquestionable veracity.

† This worthy old gentleman is bowing beneath the pressure of age, being near 70, or older: has a numerous family, most of them sons, now in the service of their country.

To the Editor of the Enquirer.

SIR:

Having just returned from Hampton, where I made myself acquainted with all the particulars of British outrage, whilst that place was in their possession, I am requested, by many persons, to communicate, through you, to the public, the information I have given them. I do this with no hope or expectation of satisfying those who required other testimony than Major Crutchfield's or Captain Cooper's. I too well know there are those among us, who will still doubt, or pretend to doubt. But as I believe this class to be few in number, and insignificant in the public estimation; as I firmly believe that a large majority of all political persuasions are open to conviction, and feelingly alive to their country's wrongs; I cannot withhold from them the facts, whose simple recital will, according to their different temperaments, inflame them with rage, or fill them with horror.

My name you are at liberty to give to the public, or only to those who may inquire for it, as you think proper. I have reason to believe that those who know me, whether federal or republican, will know and acknowledge that I am incapable of publishing a falsehood; and I aver, that every statement inconsistent with the following, no matter on whose authority it is made, is untrue; in proof of which I solemnly undertake, before the world, to establish every fact contained in it, provided any gentleman will sign his name to a denial of either of them.

I went to Hampton with a determination of inquiring minutely into the truth of reports, which I *hoped*, for the honor of a soldier's profession, and of human nature, to have found exaggerated. In the investigation, I resolved to depend on the second hand relation of no one, where I could mount to the original source of evidence; but since, in some cases, this was impracticable, I feel it a duty carefully to distinguish the one class from the other.

That the town and country adjacent was given up to the indiscriminate plunder of a licentious soldiery, except, perhaps, the house where the head quarters were fixed, is an undeniable truth. Every article of valuable property was taken from it. In many houses not even a knife, a fork, or plate was left. *British officers* were seen by Dr. Colton in the act of plundering a Mr. Jones's store. His house, although he remained in town, was rifled, and his medicine thrown into the public street, just opposite where many officers took up their quarters, who must have been eye-witnesses of the scene. The church was pillaged, and the plate belonging to it taken away, although inscribed with the donor's name. The wind-mills in the neighborhood were stripped of their sails. The closets, private drawers, and trunks of the inhabitants, were broken open, and scarcely any thing seemed to be too trifling an object to excite the cupidity of these robbers. Several gentlemen informed me that much of their plunder was brought into the back yard of Mrs. Westwood's house, where Sir Sidney Beckwith and Admiral Cockburn resided. But I had no opportunity of seeing this lady, who, *it was said*, would testify to the fact. In short, Hampton exhibits a dreary and desolate appearance, which no *American* can witness unmoved. Doctor Wardlaw and Mr. John G. Smith, of this city, visited it in company with me; and their indignation was equal. They, and every one who saw and heard what I have stated, united in execrating the monsters who perpetrated these enormities; and political distinctions, if any existed, were lost in the nobler feelings of pity for the sufferers, and a generous ardor to avenge their wrongs.

Here it may be necessary to notice a publication I have this moment read in the Alexandria Gazette of the 12th, where, among other things, it is said, on the authority of a "gentleman who was in Hampton the day after the evacuation by the enemy," that it was believed there "that nearly all the plundering was committed by the negroes;" and that he saw many "articles brought to the magistrates which had been secreted in negro houses." That *some* plundering may have been committed by the negroes, who, (as I was told) were embodied and paraded though the streets, is probable enough; that the expression of *such* an opinion may have been heard in Hampton is likewise probable; but I do utterly deny, that it is believed there, by any person worthy of credit, that "nearly all the plundering was committed by them." Let the gentleman, then, who gives this account, state from whom he derived his information. Let him give the names of the magistrates who received the plunder thus found, and his *own*; and let him declare what were the main articles he saw brought in. I will not directly hazard the assertion, but I am very much inclined to believe, there were no magistrates in the town at the time spoken of, unless Parson Holson, Dr. Colton, or Captain Wills, are magistrates; and with all these gentlemen I conversed, and heard not a whisper countenancing the statement in the Alexandria paper. How it is known that the negroes "had the address," first to impose on the British commanders, and then on the American troops, which "induced them to retreat to York," and leave Hampton to be plundered by these artful rogues, that *gentleman* is left to say; but that the American troops did not retire to York, in consequence of such information, is undoubtedly true. Nor is it less true that Captain Cooper's troop arrived in time to prevent any plundering of the least consequence, after the evacuation; and in time to prevent, what many gentlemen there believed to have been a plan concerted between the black and white allies—the firing of the town.

That "Admiral Warren expressed his regret that the inhabitants of Hampton had not all remained, as in that case no plundering would have happened," is possible enough; since it admits the fact of the plundering, and is conformable with the answer given to Captain Wills, who complained to Cockburn and Beckwith of the destruction of his private property. "Why did you quit your house?" said these *honorable* men. "I remained in my house," answered Doctor Colton, "and have found no *better* treatment."

That Kirby, who, for seven weeks or more, had been confined to his bed, and whose death the savages only a little hastened, was shot in the arms of his wife, is not denied. Those who wish for further confirmation may go and take him from his grave, and weep, if they can feel for an American citizen, over his mangled body. They may go to his wounded wife, and hear her heart-rending tale, and then they may turn to the account of the *gentleman*, and derive consolation from the excuse (*which I never heard*) "that it was done in revenge for the refusal of the militia to give quarter to some Frenchmen, who were on board a barge that was sunk by our troops, who continued to fire on the almost drowning men, when making for the shore." This vile slander on our troops will, I have no doubt, be met, in the proper manner, by the gallant officer who commands them at Norfolk. But the worst is to come.

I conversed with a lady whose name is mentioned in Captain Cooper's letter, in company with Parson Holson, Doctor Colton, and Captain Wills. Her story was too shocking in its details to meet the public eye. When I had convinced her of the object I had in view in visiting her—that it was dictated by no impertinent curiosity, but a desire to know the whole truth, to enable me, on the one hand, to do justice even to an enemy, or, on the other, to electrify my countrymen with the recital of her sufferings, she discovered every thing which her convulsive struggles between shame and a desire to expose her brutal assailants would permit. This woman was seized by five or six ruffians, some of them *dressed in red and speaking correctly the English language, and stripped naked*. Her cries and her prayers were disregarded, and her body became the subject of the most abominable indecencies. She at one time made her escape, and ran into a creek hard by, followed by a young daughter; whence she was dragged by the monsters in human shape, to experience new and aggravated suffering. In this situation she was kept the whole night, whilst her screams were heard at intervals by some of the Americans in town, who could only clasp their hands in hopeless agony.

Virginian! American! Friend or enemy of the administration, or of the war! go, as I have done, to this woman's house, and hear and see her. See too her young daughter on the bed of sickness, in consequence of the abuses of that night! and your heart, if it be made of "penetrable stuff," will throb with indignation, and a thirst for revenge, and your hand instinctively grasp the weapon for inflicting it.

A Mrs. Briggs related to us, that a woman who had come to Hampton, to visit her husband, who was in the militia, was taken forcibly from her side by four soldiers in green, and with her young child, which one of them snatched from her arms, borne to the hospital, in spite of her screams. They had previously robbed them of their rings, and attempted to tear open their bosoms. A Mrs. Hopkins, who was not in town when I was there, obtained the assistance of an officer, and rescued the woman from her ravishers, but not until one of them had gratified his abominable desires. I was told by the gentleman who accompanied me, that Mrs. Hopkins confirmed this statement, and would swear to at least two other cases of a similar kind, without, however, giving up the names of the *young and respectable* women who suffered.

Doctor Colton and Captain Mills, assisted by an officer, rescued another lady from the greatest of all calamities.



Old Mr. Hope, aged, as he told Major Crutchfield, (in my presence) sixty-four or five years, was seized by these wretches and stripped of all his clothing, even of his shoes and his shirt. A bayonet was run a little way into his arm behind, as if in cruel sport; while several were held to his breast. In this situation he was kept for a considerable time, and would probably have been another victim of their rage, if their attention had not been diverted to a woman, who had sought refuge in his house. They followed her into the kitchen, whither she had run for safety. Mr. Hope made off amidst her agonizing screams, and when he returned to his house, he was told by his domestics that their horrid purposes were accomplished. This I had from him.

How far this violation extended will never be known. Women will not publish what they consider their own shame, and the men in town were carefully watched and guarded. But enough is known to induce the belief of the existence of many other cases, and enough to fire every manly bosom with the irrepressible desire of revenge.

I am not disposed to fire the public patience, or I could tell of enormities little inferior to the above. But the enemy are convicted of robbery, rape, and murder, and it is unnecessary to add to the catalogue of their crimes.

Men of Virginia! will you permit all this? Fathers, and brothers, and husbands, will you fold your arms in apathy, and only curse your despoilers? No, you will fly with generous emulation to the unfurled standard of your country. You will imitate the example of those generous spirits who are, even now, in crowds, tendering their services to the commander-in-chief; who are pouring from their native mountains, and soliciting to be led against the enemy wherever he dares to show his face. You will prove yourselves worthy of the immortal honor that the enemy has conferred upon you in selecting you as the object of his vengeance. You will neglect, for a time, all civil pursuits and occupations, and devote yourselves to the art, a knowledge of which the enemy has made necessary. You will learn to *command; to obey;* and, with "Hampton" as your watch word—to *conquer.*

P.\*

SIR:

YORK, July 4, 1813.

Anxious to effect, as early as possible, the objects of the flag entrusted to us by you on the 1st instant, we proceeded, immediately after receiving your despatches for Admiral Warren and General Taylor, to Hampton. On our arrival at the latter place, some difficulty arose in procuring a vessel to convey us to the British fleet; and after some delay, we were compelled to embark in a small, open, four oared boat, the only one, it seemed, which the fury of the enemy had left capable of floating. We proceeded to the fleet of the enemy with the utmost despatch which our little skiff, and the excessive heat of the day, would permit; and when distant from the Admiral's ship about a half mile, we were met and hailed by a barge of the enemy, the officer of which was informed we had despatches for Admiral Warren. We were invited into the barge, which invitation we accepted, as well to relieve ourselves from the confinement on board our little vessel, to lighten as much as possible the burthen of our oarsmen, and to proceed with as much expedition as was practicable to obtain the objects of our mission. On our arrival at the Admiral's ship (the *San Domingo*) we were directed to proceed to the "*Sceptre*," a line of battle ship, on which we were informed Admiral Cockburn had recently hoisted his flag. Arriving along side of this ship we were desired by the officer of the barge to ascend the ship. Upon our reaching the deck, we found a large assemblage of officers—certainly a greater number than could be necessarily attached to a single ship. In the space of ten minutes the two Admirals, Warren and Cockburn, approached; to the former, we delivered your despatches, who, upon perusal, evinced embarrassment, and after a short pause, said, that the principal object of the flag appeared to be to procure supplies for your hospital. He was answered in the affirmative. Could not these supplies have been as easily and early procured from Richmond as from Norfolk? We thought not. The Admiral then said he would reflect upon the subject, and return us an answer soon, and retired with Admiral Cockburn to the cabin of the ship. A period of about fifteen minutes then elapsed, when Admiral Cockburn advanced, and addressing Major Griffin, informed him, that the Admiral would see him in the cabin. Upon Major Griffin's reaching the cabin, the two Admirals only with him, Admiral Warren again repeated the opinion, that the hospital supplies could be as expeditiously procured from Richmond, as from Norfolk, saying, it was contrary to their regulations to permit even a flag to go to Norfolk; that it was their intention to land Mr. King, who went with the flag, at Seawell's point, and jointly with Admiral Cockburn, expressed an unwillingness to permit the flag to proceed. They were answered, that if the flag was permitted to proceed, the supplies could be procured sooner than if the flag was compelled to return, certainly in the course of the following day; that if compelled to resort to Richmond, three days, probably more, would pass before the stores could reach Hampton; that our wounded and sick were suffering for medicine and necessaries; that all the medicine, private as well as public property, had been wantonly destroyed by the troops who lately captured Hampton; and that the supplies absolutely required for the use of the hospital could not be procured in Hampton. The Admiral said he had heard that the hospitals had received some supplies. He was asked from whence, and assured it was not the case. Finding the Admiral still hesitating, Major Griffin said, "that the reputed humanity of Admiral Warren forbid Major Crutchfield to doubt that the application for the passage of a flag to Norfolk would be refused." After a short pause Major Griffin was informed that the flag might proceed, upon condition of returning along-side the ship, in the same vessel, with the same persons, and with no increase of persons. The restriction to the *same vessel* was combated, on the ground that, in the event of much wind, the boat was too small to navigate the roads, and thus the object of the flag would be defeated. But finding no relaxation in the condition probable, it was determined, upon consultation with Lieutenant Lively, to proceed. Upon the subject of prisoners, Admiral Warren acknowledged one only to be in the fleet, taken at Hampton. He declined all arrangement, and avoided all discussion on this topic, saying he had opened a correspondence with General Taylor, but nothing was decided. Relative to the officers' baggage captured in Hampton, the Admiral said that such articles as had been found had been restored, and mentioned the papers of Captain Pryor, which had been placed in the care of Captain Myers of Norfolk, and assured Major Griffin that he would direct Sir Sidney Beckwith to inquire farther, and if any should be discovered it would be made known to us on our return. We were then informed we might proceed, which we immediately did, and reaching Norfolk after 3 P. M. repaired to General Taylor's quarters, who directed the supplies written for by the surgeons. Returning on the 2d, we were, as customary, again met by a barge of the enemy, and desired to call on board the Admiral's ship; we entered the ship with the officer of the barge, and were received by the Captain, who inquired if we had despatches for the Admiral. Being informed we were the returning flag that had proceeded to Norfolk the day before, the Captain retired to the cabin, and shortly returned with information that we might proceed when we pleased; this we did, and deposited with Doctor Colton the medical and hospital supplies sent from Norfolk.

Upon our reaching Hampton a scene of desolation and destruction presented itself. The few inhabitants we found in town seemed not yet to have recovered from their alarm; dismay and consternation sat on every countenance. Reports had reached us of the violence and uncontrolled fury of the enemy after they obtained possession of the place; their conduct, in some cases, being represented such as would have disgraced the days of Vandalism. Our feelings were much excited, and we deemed it our duty to pursue the inquiry as far as practicable, and are sorry to say, that, from all the information we could procure, from sources too respectable to permit us to doubt, we are compelled to believe that acts of violence have been perpetrated, which have disgraced the age in which we live. The sex, hitherto guarded by the soldier's honor, escaped not the rude assaults of superior force; nor could disease disarm the foe of his ferocity. The apology that these atrocities were committed by the French soldiers attached to the British forces now in our waters appeared to us no justification of those who employed them, believing, as we do, that an officer is, or should be, ever responsible for the conduct of the troops under his command.

We have the honor to be, your humble servants,

THOMAS GRIFFIN,  
ROBERT LIVELY.

To Major CRUTCHFIELD, *Commandant, York.*

\*Believed, upon good authority, to be Colonel Richard E. Parker, of Westmoreland county, Virginia.

## ADDENDA.

WASHINGTON CITY, July 30, 1813.

*From William Berry, Midshipman in the Frigate Chesapeake.*

SIR:

I consider myself bound to lay before you what came under my knowledge while on board the Chesapeake, as well as on board the Shannon.

After the enemy had complete possession of the ship, Midshipmen Randolph and Flushman were ordered from the fore and main top. In coming down the shrouds Lieutenant Faulkner (the British officer) said to his men, kill those damned rascals. Then, and immediately, several muskets were discharged at them, but without effect. My station was in the mizen top, where I had an opportunity of seeing their actions. I was looking on deck when I saw one of the Chesapeake's men crawling along, attempting to get below, with one of his legs off. One of the enemy stepped up to him with his cutlass, and immediately put an end to his existence. Lieutenant Faulkner looked up in the mizen top; pointing at me, said he to his men, go up three of you and throw that damned Yankee overboard. They immediately rushed up, seizing me by the collar; now, said they, you damned Yankee, you shall swim for it, attempting to throw me overboard; but I got within the rigging, when one of them kicked me in the breast, which was the cause of my falling; being stunned by the fall, I lay some time senseless, and, when I came too, I was cut over the head with a cutlass, which nearly terminated my existence. Eleven of our midshipmen were confined in a small place, nine feet by six, with an old sail to lay on, and a guard at the door, until a day or two before our arrival at Halifax; and, likewise, eleven of us upon five rations, and some days only one meal. Our clothes were taken on board of the Shannon; Lieutenant Wallis, the commanding officer on board, would not let us take our clothes below with us, but pledged his word and honor as an officer, we should receive our clothes. But we discovered, next morning, that their midshipmen had on our clothes and side arms. We were conversing together respecting our clothes—one of their midshipmen overheard our conversation, and made a report to the Lieutenant commanding. He then sent word to us that if we said any thing more about the clothes, he would put us in the fore-hold with the men. We expected to receive our clothes when we arrived in port, but, I assure you, sir, nothing was ever restored. Other rascally things occurred, which our officers will, when they return, make known to the public, disgraceful to a civilized nation. If your request could have been made sooner, I should have felt gratified in making a fuller statement.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect,

Honorable L. CONDUCT, *Washington.*

WILLIAM BERRY.

Another circumstance took place on board, which entirely escaped my memory until this moment. Several of the officers had money taken from them which they received from the Chesapeake as prize money. Mr. Higginbotham, as nearly as I can recollect, had upwards of one hundred and thirty dollars.

GEORGETOWN, July 30th, 1813.

SIR:

Having perused a letter of yours to Mr. Berry, requesting information respecting the treatment of the American officers and seamen of the late Chesapeake, I consider myself bound, sir, to lay before you what came under my knowledge. My having been wounded, and remaining on board the Chesapeake, might not give me that scope for observation which others possessed; but, I am sorry to say, many things transpired disgraceful to the character of a brave enemy. Whilst undressing myself in the steerage, after the Americans were driven below or had surrendered, and after resistance had ceased, I believe entirely, several muskets and pistols were at once pointed down the hatchway, and discharged in the direction of the cockpit; and as the steerage and cockpit were filled with the wounded, in all probability some of them were killed outright. It was Midshipman Hopewell, and not Livingston, who was so inhumanly treated, as described in the public prints. It has been the custom in our navy to take the side-arms of officers, (prisoners) but to restore them on their leaving the ship. Ours were taken, worn, and never restored, together with what nautical instruments they could lay their hands on. When spoken to by the American officers on the subject, the answer was, such things were free plunder. A day or two after the action, I was conversing with Lieutenant Budd and Mr. Nicholls, near the taffarel, respecting the engagement, when it was observed some of the Shannon's men were listening to our conversation. Immediately after, Lieutenant Faulkner, the commanding officer, ordered sentinels to be placed at the mizen mast; and, said he to them, if you see any of the Chesapeake's officers abaft the mizen mast, cut them down; if you see them conversing together, cut them down without hesitation. It will be remembered the three officers who caused this order were all severely wounded. We received no caution and overheard it by accident. So great was the rage for plunder, that Captain Lawrence, before his death, could not obtain a bottle of wine from his private sea stores, without a note from the doctor to the Lieutenant commanding. I pass over the robbing of the midshipmen on board the Shannon, as it did not come under my immediate notice. If your request could have been made earlier, I should have felt gratified in making a fuller statement.

Yours, respectfully,

WM. A. WEAVER.

Honorable LEWIS CONDUCT, *Washington.*

[13th CONGRESS.]

No. 124.

[1st SESSION.]

## ADDITIONAL FORTIFICATIONS, AND AN INCREASE OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, AUGUST 1, 1813.

COMMITTEE CHAMBER, Monday, 30th May, 1813.

SIR:

I am directed by the committee of the Senate to whom was referred so much of the message of the President as relates to the military establishment, to inquire of you what provision has been made, by your Department, for the protection and defence of the seaboard of the United States; whether the protection authorized by law is deemed sufficient; if not, what further or other provision is considered necessary; whether any, and, if any, what, modification of the military establishment, or extension thereof, is deemed expedient. I am also directed to ask you to give the committee such information, in relation to any other specific objects in your Department, as you may deem proper to be communicated, or which may require legislative provision.

Accept assurances of my high respect.

JOSEPH ANDERSON, *Chairman.*

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 10th, 1813.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, written by direction of the Committee of the Senate "to whom was referred so much of the message of the President as relates to the military establishment;" and inquiring

What provision had been made by the War Department for the protection of the seaboard?

Whether the protection authorized by law be deemed sufficient? And, if not, What further or other provision be considered necessary?

Whether any, and, if any, what, modification or extension of the military establishment be deemed expedient? and What other specific objects within my Department may require legislative provision?

To these questions I beg leave to reply:

1st. That, so far as the defence of the seaboard depends on troops, the statement I had the honor to make to you yesterday will be found to contain an appropriate answer to the first question. It but remains, therefore, to present a table of the posts, the number and caliber of the cannon, and of the quantity of ammunition, at each of these. This will be found in the documents enclosed, numbered 1, 2, 3.\*

2d. That, in my opinion, the present protection of the seaboard is not sufficient, and that the measures to be taken for its better defence are of two kinds: additional fortifications, and an increased number of regular troops.

Under the former of these heads, it is proposed to erect a work, of earth, (or of more durable materials, if found advisable) on a small island of the Delaware, called the Pea Patch. The plan and extent of the work will be adapted to the relation which the island bears to the shores and channel of the Delaware; and, from the survey made, it is believed that the work will completely cover both. The situation of the island is eight miles below New Castle.

A work of the same description at Hawkins's Point, near Baltimore.

A work on Maryland Point, or on that called Cedar Shoal Point, on the Potomac. It cannot be doubted but that the seat of the National Government should be placed, not merely beyond injury, but beyond disturbance, from an enemy.

A work on Craney Island, for the better protection of Norfolk, has been commenced, and is mentioned here but from a belief that the importance of the position will be found to justify an extension of the present plan.

At Charleston, or its dependencies, some covering works have been projected, but want of funds has hitherto prevented their execution.

Savannah is believed to be a position which, from various causes, is more exposed than any other, and upon the defence of which, few expenditures of public money have been made. It is, therefore, proposed to protect it by a chain of redans on three of its sides, and, on the fourth, which is understood to be the most vulnerable, by a few redoubts, connected by a ditch and parapet, &c. &c.

No additional work at New Orleans is thought necessary. One, of regular form, and of considerable extent, has been recently erected on the Eastern bank of the Mississippi, at the Detour l'Anglais, and a second has been projected for commanding the entrance from the sea into lake Pontchartrain. When these are finished, the defence of New Orleans from exterior attacks, and by means of fixed batteries, may be considered as complete.

Under the second general provision, (an increased number of regular troops) I offer the following arrangement of permanent garrisons, viz:

To districts No. 1 and 2,	-	-	-	-	2,000 men.
To do. do. 3 and 4,	-	-	-	-	3,000
To do. do. 5,	-	-	-	-	3,000
To do. do. 6,	-	-	-	-	2,000
To do. do. 7,	-	-	-	-	3,000

3d. In fulfilling the arrangement stated in the preceding article, it will be necessary to organize the whole number of the twenty regiments authorized to be raised during the last session of Congress. Of these regiments fifteen have been already set on foot, including ten companies of rangers, intended for the defence of the territories of Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. It is respectfully proposed that the remaining five be also raised expressly for the defence of other and particular points, and that their service be made commensurate with the war. Corps of this description may be promptly obtained, and made to take a very efficient character. This is the only modification of the present military establishment which is believed to be necessary. An extension of it, called for as well by justice as by policy, is the establishment of an invalid corps. Instances of partial decrepitude have been much multiplied by the events of the last and present campaigns, and can best be relieved by an establishment which but demands from the sufferer a service proportioned to his physical ability, and which, while it gives occupation, guaranties against want.

4th. Some minor and insulated subjects require legislative notice and provision.

1. The law creating the ordnance department provides for four deputy commissaries. It is proposed to authorize the President to add five other deputies. This will enable the head of that department to assign to each military district, one deputy, who shall establish and superintend a laboratory within the same, and thus do away the expense and risk of transmitting fixed ammunition from one district to another.

2. Aids-de-camp are now taken from the line of the army, in all cases; as are assistant adjutants and inspectors general, and (in many cases) their principals; and, also, the paymasters of districts. These multiplied draughts upon the line are found to have a bad effect, and the more so, as officers of the greatest intelligence are generally selected to fill these appointments. It is therefore proposed that general officers be permitted to select their aids from the mass of citizens, and that the rank, pay, and emoluments, of a captain of cavalry be given to each aid-de-camp, so long as he be continued as such.

3. No provision is made by law for paying money to officers of light dragoons and light artillery, in lieu of forage, when not drawn in kind.

4. The provisions of the act of the 6th of July, 1812, in relation to the price to be allowed in lieu of forage not drawn in kind, by officers of certain grades, appear to be contradictory.

5. The United States possess, in fee simple, sundry lots of ground in Pittsburg. It is understood that, if these were divided into smaller lots, and sold at public sale, they would bring not less than forty thousand dollars—a sum which would be competent to establish a laboratory near that place, on a scale proportioned to all the demands of the West, Southwest, and Northwest. A law will be necessary to make such sale.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Hon. JOSEPH ANDERSON, Esq. *Chairman, &c. &c.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 18th, 1813.

SIR:

The following report, additional to that made on the 10th instant, on the subject of an increased seaboard defence, is respectfully submitted to the committee to whom was referred so much of the President's message as relates to the military establishment.

Our Atlantic towns and cities furnish, respectively, a large number of seafaring men, who, from their hardihood, and habits of life, might be very usefully employed in the defence of the seaboard, particularly in the management of great guns, whether in fixed or in floating batteries, or in those of position. A corps of great efficiency might be formed out of these men, and on terms much more economical than those necessary to obtain soldiers of the line.

\* Not on file.

Their term of service need not exceed eight months in each year, viz: from the month of March to that of December. They may be had at the rate of twelve dollars per month (if subsisted) and without expense on account of clothing.

1,000 sea fencibles; at \$12 per month, each, is, per month.	\$12,000
8 months, at \$12,000, per month, is	96,000
Subsistence for term aforesaid, is	36,600
Pay and subsistence of officers, viz: 10 captains, 10 first lieutenants, 10 second lieutenants, and 10 third lieutenants, is	12,952
Total,	\$145,552

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Honorable JOSEPH ANDERSON, Esq.  
*Chairman, &c. &c. Senate United States.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 12th, 1813.*

SIR:

In reply to the inquiry of the honorable the Senate, viz: "What preparations have been made, and are now in readiness, for the defence of the navy yard and other public property in the city of Washington, in case it should be assailed by the enemy?" I have the honor to report that, on the water line, the means of defence are of two kinds, naval and military; that there are of the former, one frigate, two schooners, and three gunboats, so stationed as to co-operate with Fort Washington; that this fort and its covering work have been recently put into a state of thorough repair, are well equipped with heavy cannon, furnaces, &c. &c., and are now occupied by a competent garrison of United States' artillery; that, to any attempts on the land side, we can oppose the 10th, 36th, 35th, and a detachment from the 5th, regiments of infantry, and one battalion of militia; the whole amounting to 1,600 effectives. That the navy yard and marine establishment can furnish an additional defence of nearly one battalion; that two companies of light artillery have been organized, under an officer of much experience, and are supplied with cannon, caissons, &c.; that several uniformed corps are in weekly drill, and ready for service the moment that a call upon them shall become necessary; that, within the District alone, we may count on an additional force of nearly twelve hundred effective militia, and that a competent supply of arms, and of fixed and loose ammunition, has been placed within their reach.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

*The Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate of the United States.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 26th, 1813.*

SIR:

I beg leave to submit to the consideration of the Military Committee of the Senate, a copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, having relation to the subject submitted in my letter of the 19th instant. Mr. Stacey has been discharged, on the ground that a citizen cannot be considered as a spy.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Hon. Mr. ANDERSON, *Chairman of the Military Committee Senate United States.*

U. S. SHIP MADISON, *Sackett's Harbor, July 4, 1813.*

SIR:

On the 1st instant I caused Mr. Samuel Stacey to be apprehended as a spy. Mr. Stacey lives upon the St. Lawrence, a few miles below Ogdensburg, and I have the most positive information that he has been in the habit of conveying information to the enemy for many months. He visited this place a few days before the British made the attack on the 29th of May, and I have no doubt but that he is the person that gave the information that most of the troops had been sent to Niagara. I had information from the person that I employ on the other side that this man would visit the Harbor about the last of June. He was accordingly watched. When he left Ogdensburg, he said he was going to Utica upon important business. He told others that he was going into the Western country to collect money, instead of which, he came to the Harbor, without any ostensible business, and made a great many inquiries respecting the fleet: when they would sail? and the force of the new ship? &c. &c. I therefore thought it my duty to detain this man for trial. I can prove his frequent intercourse with the enemy. At any rate I shall deprive the enemy of the information which he could have conveyed to him, which is all important at this time.

It would be very desirable to hang this traitor to his country, as he is considered respectable in the country in which he lives; and I think that it is full time to make an example of some of our countrymen, who are so base and degenerate as to betray their country by becoming the spies and informers of our enemy. I hope the steps which I have taken, with respect to Mr. Stacey, will meet with your approbation.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

The Honorable WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 125.

[2d Session.]

REGISTER, AND RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ARMY FOR 1813.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, DECEMBER 29, 1813.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 27, 1813.*

SIR:

Conformably to a resolution of the honorable the Senate of the United States, dated July 31, 1813, I have the honor to transmit, herewith, a corrected list of all the officers in the army of the United States.

I have the honor, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

The PRESIDENT of the Senate of the United States.

## GENERAL STAFF.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington.*

Staff Appointments.	Names, and Rank in Line.	Dates of Commission, in Staff.	Stations.
Adjutant and Inspector General.			
Inspector General,	Abimael Y. Nicoll, major 1st artillery,	March 18, 1813.	Washington.
Assistant Adjutant General,	Charles K. Gardner, major 25th infantry,	March 18, "	
Commissary General Ordnance,	Decius Wadsworth,	July 2, 1812.	Do.
Deputy Commissary Ordnance,	John Morton,	Sept. 11, "	Do.
Ditto,	Edwin Tyler,	Aug. 5, 1813.	Do.
Assistant Ditto,	Nehemiah Baden,	Aug. 6, "	Do.
Paymaster of the Army,	Robert Brent,	July 1, 1808.	Do.
Assistant Topographical Engineer,	James Kearney, lieutenant 5th infantry,	April 12, 1813.	Do.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 1.

*Massachusetts and New Hampshire.*

Brigadier General,	T. H. Cushing, commanding.		
Adjutant General,	Peter P. Schuyler, colonel 13th infantry,	April 28, 1813.	
Assistant Inspector General,	Enos Cutler, captain 7th infantry,	March 18, "	
Assistant Dep. Quartermast. Gen.	Jonathan Allen,	April 20, "	
Hospital Surgeon,	Benjamin Waterhouse,	June 29, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	Joseph Goodhue,	Feb. 8, 1803.	
Ditto,	James H. Sargent,	March 8, 1806.	
District Paymaster,	Nehemiah Freeman,		Boston.
Ditto,	Jos. C. Boyd, for militia, &c.		Maine.
Deputy Commissary of Purchases,	Amasa Stetson,		Boston.
Ditto,	John Langdon, jun.		Portsmouth.
Military Storekeeper,	Samuel Devans,		Charlestown.
Ditto,	John Rice,		Portsmouth.
Ditto,	John Chaffee,		Springfield.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2.

*Rhode Island and Connecticut.*

Brigadier General,	H. Burbeck, brevet, commanding.		
Inspector General,	Jacob Kingsbury, colonel 1st infantry,	April 28, 1813.	
Assistant Dep. Quartermast. Gen.	Richard H. Ashley, lieutenant 1st artillery,	April 11, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	William Turner,	Sept. 28, "	
District Paymaster,	George L. Perkins,		New London.
Deputy Commissary of Purchases,	Elisha Tracy,		Norwich.
Military Storekeeper,	Giles L. Hommedieu,		Norwich.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 3.

*New York, from the Sea to the Highlands, and East Jersey.*

Major General,	Henry Dearborn, commanding,		New York.
Adjutant General,	John R. Fenwick, lieutenant-colonel L. A.	March 18, 1813.	Do.
Assistant Adjutant General,	Thomas Chrystie, lieutenant 3d artillery,	March 18, "	Do.
Inspector General,	Nicholas Gray,	March 18, "	Do.
Assistant Inspector General,	J. C. Tillotson, lieut. 2d light dragoons,	March 18, "	Do.
Deputy Quartermaster General,	Theophilus W. Smith,	April 2, "	Do.
Assistant Dep. Quartermast. Gen.	William A. Barron,	April 2, "	
Engineer,	William Cutbush, first lieutenant,		Fort Columbus.
Deputy Commissary of Ordnance,	George Talcott, jun. lieut. 25th infantry,	Aug. 5, "	New York.
Assist. Deputy Com. of Ordnance,	Aeneas M'Kay,	March 12, "	Do.
Judge Advocate,	Evert A. Bancker,	March 18, "	Do.
Hospital Surgeon,	Samuel Akerly,	July 6, 1812.	Fort Columbus.
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	Alexander Wolcott,	March 25, "	Do.
Chaplain,	Peter I. Vanpelt,	April 2, 1813.	
District Paymaster,	Samuel H. Eakin,		New York.
Deputy Commissary of Purchases,	Samuel Russell,		Do.
Military Storekeeper,	John Fellows,		Do.
Ditto,	Jonathan Snowden,		West Point.
Ditto,	H. P. Deering,		Sagg Harbor.

## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 4.

*West Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.*

Staff Appointments.	Names, and Rank in Line.	Dates of Commission, in Staff.	Stations.
Brigadier General,	Joseph Bloomfield,		Philadelphia.
Adjutant General,	William Duane,	March 22, 1813.	Do.
Assistant Inspector General,	Robert Sterry, captain 6th infantry,	May 10, "	Do.
Quartermaster General,	William Linnard,	April 12, "	Do.
Deputy Quartermaster General,	J. S. Swearingen, captain 1st artillery,	March 17, "	Pittsburg.
Assistant Dep. Quartermast. Gen.	Robert Patterson, lieutenant 32d infantry,	June 24, "	Province Island.
Ditto,	Samuel Duncan,	Aug. 6, "	Carlisle.
Deputy Commissary of Ordnance,	Abraham R. Woolley,	Dec. 4, 1812.	Pittsburg.
Assist. Deputy Com. of Ordnance,	William Wade,	March 12, 1813.	Do.
Ditto,	William C. Lyman,	April 19, "	Do.
Assistant Topographical Engineer,	Thomas Clark, lieutenant 2d artillery,	April 1, "	Philadelphia.
Apothecary General,	Francis Le Barron,	June 11, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	John F. Heileman,	July 2, 1802.	Province Island.
District Paymaster,	Henry Phillips, captain 6th infantry,		Philadelphia.
Ditto,	Jacob W. Albright, lieutenant 1st infantry,		Pittsburg.
Commissary General of Purchases,	Callender Irvine,		Philadelphia.
Military Storekeeper,	Richard Parker,		Carlisle.
Ditto,	William C. Bennett,		Wilmington.
Ditto,	D. Kirkpatrick,		Newcastle.
Ditto,	John M. Taylor,		Philadelphia.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 5.

*Maryland and Virginia.*

Brigadier General.	James Bankhead, major 7th infantry,	Sept. 9, 1813.	
Adjutant General,	William Swan, major 2d infantry,	Aug. 7, "	
Quartermaster General,	Paul Bentalon,	June 29, "	
Deputy Quartermaster General,	Ferdinand Marsteller,	July 17, "	
Assistant Dep. Quartermast. Gen.	Walker K. Armistead, lieutenant-colonel.		
Engineer,	Samuel Babcock, captain.		
Assistant Engineer,	Paul H. Perrault,	April 12, "	
Topographical Engineer,	William Jones,	July 2, "	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate,	George W. Maupin,	Nov. 5, 1802.	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	Lemuel B. Clark,	Jan. 4, 1803.	
Ditto,	Saterlee Clark, lieutenant 1st artillery,		Annapolis.
District Paymaster,	Samuel Turner,		Petersburg.
Ditto,	John M'Kinney,		Washington.
Deputy Commissary of Purchases,	James Calhoun, Jr.,		Baltimore.
Ditto,	Robert C. Jennings,		Norfolk.
Ditto,	Edwin Starke,		Do.
Military Storekeeper,	Samuel Annin,		Harper's Ferry.
Ditto,	Thomas B. Rutter,		Baltimore.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 6.

*North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.*

Major General,	Thomas Pinckney, commanding.		
Adjutant General,	Francis K. Huger, lieutenant col. 2d art.	April 6, 1813,	
Assistant General,	John Erving, lieutenant 1st artillery,	April 6, "	
Inspector General,	William R. Boote, major 2d infantry,	April 6, "	
Deputy Quartermaster General,	Samuel Chaplain, lieutenant 1st artillery,	March 18, "	
Ditto,	Thomas Bourke,	April 19, "	
Assist. Dep. Quartermaster Gen.	Peter Lequex, lieutenant 8th infantry,	Aug. 31, "	
Ditto,	William Cox,	" " "	
Ditto,	Joseph B. Paine,	" " "	
Ditto,	James Ward,	" " "	
Engineer,	Prentis Willard, captain.		
Deputy Commissary of Ordnance,	John H. Margart,	Dec. 31, 1812,	
Assist. do. do.	Daniel Bruckner,	Aug. 6, 1813,	
Ditto,	Christopher Keyser,		
Judge Advocate,	Thomas T. Dent,	July 19, "	
Hospital Surgeon,	William M'Caw,	May 20, "	
Ditto,	George V. Proctor,	June 11, "	
Ditto,	Thomas Akin,	June 29, "	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate,	John H. Sackett,	March 22, "	
Ditto,	Joseph L. Stevens,	June 29, "	
Ditto,	William Meriwether,	July 19, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	William Ballard,	March 24, 1812,	
District Paymaster,	Samuel Dusenbury,	March 25, "	
Military Storekeeper,	Hamlin Cook, lieutenant 8th infantry.		Charleston.
	Henry Simmons,		

## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, NO. 7.

*Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee.*

Staff Appointments.	Names, and Rank in Line.	Dates of Commission, in Staff.	Stations.
Brigadier General, - - -	Thomas Flournoy, commanding.		
Ditto, - - -	David R. Williams.		
Assistant Adjutant General, - - -	Carey Nicholas, captain 7th infantry, -	April 25, 1813.	
Assistant Inspector General, - - -	Daniel Hughes, captain 1st infantry, -	Aug. 7, "	
Quartermaster General, - - -	William Piatt, captain 2d infantry, -	June 23, "	
Assistant Deputy General, - - -	John T. Wirt, lieutenant 2d infantry, -	April 25, 1813.	
Hospital Surgeon, - - -	David C. Kerr, - - -	April 30, 1812.	
Garrison Surgeon, - - -	Oliver H. Spencer, - - -	Oct. 9, 1804.	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate, - - -	James Stephenson, - - -	May 27, 1812.	
Ditto, - - -	Stephen Sutton, - - -	" " "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate, - - -	Robert Huston, - - -	Feb. 27, 1807.	
Ditto, - - -	Charles Slocum, - - -	March 25, "	
Ditto, - - -	William T. Davidson, - - -	June 13, 1808.	
District Paymaster, - - -	S. Knight, captain 1st infantry, for volunt.		
Ditto, - - -	John T. Pemberton, captain 2d infantry, -		New Orleans.
Ditto, - - -	Alpha Kingsley, captain 1st infantry, -		Tennessee.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 8.

*Kentucky, Ohio, and the Territories of Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri.*

Major General, - - -	William H. Harrison, - - -	- - -	Upper Canada.
Brigadier General, - - -	Duncan M'Arthur, - - -	- - -	Detroit.
Ditto, - - -	Lewis Cass.		
Adjutant General, - - -	Edmund P. Gaines, colonel 25th infantry, -	Sept. 1, 1813,	Upper Canada.
Assistant General, - - -	Robert Dunn, lieutenant 22d infantry, -	March 22, "	Ditto.
Assistant Inspector General, - - -	Levi Hakill, captain 1st light dragoons, -	April 6, "	Ditto.
Quartermaster General, - - -	John C. Bartlett, - - -	April 12, "	
Deputy Quartermaster General, - - -	Taylor Berry, lieutenant 17th infantry, -	March 31, "	
Assist. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. - - -	James W. Bryson, lieutenant 1st infantry, -	April 25, "	Newport.
Ditto, - - -	Joseph Wheaton, - - -	April 28, "	
Engineer, - - -	Charles Gratot, captain.		
Ditto, - - -	El. D. Wood, captain and major brevet,		
Topographical Engineer, - - -	Simon Z. Watson, - - -	Aug. 20, "	
Deputy Commissary of Ordnance, - - -	Robert D. Richardson, - - -	Aug. 5, "	
Assistant Comm. of Ordnance, - - -	Thomas L. Hawkins, - - -	Aug. 6, "	
Judge Advocate, - - -	John S. Wills, - - -	May 7, "	
Hospital Surgeon, - - -	John R. Martin, - - -	July 2, "	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate, - - -	Hugh Stanard, - - -	May 20, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate, - - -	William Turner, - - -	July 9, 1810,	
Ditto, - - -	Cornelius Cunningham, - - -	Oct. 15, "	
Ditto, - - -	Anthony Benezet, - - -	March 25, 1812,	
Ditto, - - -	Samuel Meriwether, - - -	Aug. 1, 1813,	
Regimental Surgeon, - - -	S. M'Keehan, - - -	July 29, "	
Regimental Surgeon's Mate, - - -	John M'Culloch, ditto, - - -	" "	
Chaplain, - - -	Stephen Lindsley, - - -	" "	
Ditto, - - -	Thomas Hersey, - - -	Aug. 20, "	
District Paymaster, - - -	A. Whitlock, captain 1st infantry, -	- - -	Vincennes.
Ditto, - - -	James Taylor, - - -	- - -	Kentucky.
Ditto, - - -	Samuel Huntington, - - -	- - -	Head Quarters.
Ditto, - - -	Jesse Hunt, - - -	- - -	Ohio.
Deputy Commissary of Purchases, - - -	John H. Piatt, - - -	- - -	Do.
Assistant Commissary, - - -	Robert Irvine, - - -	- - -	Detroit.
Military Storekeeper, - - -	Thomas Martin, - - -	- - -	Newport.
Brigadier General, - - -	Benjamin Howard, - - -	- - -	St. Louis.
Assist. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. - - -	William Christy, - - -	- - -	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate, - - -	Abraham Stewart, - - -	April 19, 1813.	
Ditto, - - -	Jonathan S. Cool, - - -	March 6, 1806.	
District Paymaster, - - -	Thompson Douglass, - - -	Feb. 8, 1811.	

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 9.

*New York, North of the Highlands, and Vermont.*

Major General, - - -	James Wilkinson, commandant.		
Ditto, - - -	Morgan Lewis.		
Brigadier General, - - -	John P. Boyd.		
Ditto, - - -	Jacob Brown.		
Ditto, - - -	Leonard Covington.		
Quartermaster General, - - -	Robert Swartwout, head of department, -	March 21, 1813,	Dead.
Adjutant General, - - -	John B. Walbach, captain 1st artillery, -	Aug. 6, "	
Assistant General, - - -	John Johnson, major 21st infantry, -	April 2, "	
Ditto, - - -	Ebenezer Beebe, captain 6th infantry, -	" "	
Ditto, - - -	Talbot Chambers, captain 5th infantry, -	" "	

## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 9—Continued.

Staff Appointments.	Names, and Rank in Line.	Dates of Commission, in Staff.	Stations.
Inspector General,	James Gibson, captain light artillery,	July 13, 1813.	
Assistant General,	John R. Bell, lieutenant light dragoons,	Sept. 29, "	
Quartermaster General,	Elisha Jenkins, of the district,	April 22, "	
Deputy Quartermaster General,	Christopher Van de Venter, lieut. 1st. art.	March 26, "	Prisoner in Can.
Ditto,	Samuel Brown,	" "	
Assist. Dep. Quartermaster Gen.	Gustavus Loomis, lieutenant 1st artillery,	April 19, "	
Ditto,	Ezra Smith, lieutenant 1st artillery,	" "	
Ditto,	John Bliss, lieutenant 2d infantry,	April 28, "	
Ditto,	Thomas B. Baldwin,	May 3, "	
Ditto,	John G. Camp, lieutenant 12th infantry,	May 20, "	
Ditto,	Marshall Jenkins,	" "	
Ditto,	Abraham Ten Eyck,	" "	
Ditto,	Thomas Campbell,	July 29, "	
Ditto,	Timothy Burr,	July 31, "	
Ditto,	James Rees,	Aug. 1, "	
Chief Engineer,	Joseph G. Swift, colonel.		
Engineer,	George Bomford, major.		
Assistant Engineer,	J. G. Totten, captain and major brevet.		
Topographical Engineer,	John Anderson, captain 19th infantry,	April 12, "	Pris. on parole.
Ditto,	Isaac Roberdeau,	April 29, "	
Assist. Topographical Engineer,	Benjamin Connor, lieutenant 1st artillery,	Aug. 3, "	
Assist. Commissary Gen. of Ord.			
Deputy Commissary Gen. of Ord.	James Daliba, lieutenant 1st artillery,	Aug. 5, "	
Ditto,	Thomas L. Campbell,	" "	
Assist. Commissary Gen. of Ord.	Rufus L. Baker,	March 12, "	
Ditto,	George Larned,	April 19, "	
Ditto,	James Baker,	Aug. 6, "	
Judge Advocate,	Philip S. Parker,	April 2, "	
Ditto,	Stephen Lush, Jr.	Oct. 5, "	
Physician and Surgeon General,	James Tilton,	June 11, "	
Hospital Surgeon,	James Mann,	April 9, 1812.	
Ditto,	Garret E. Prendergast,	April 25, "	
Ditto,	William M. Ross,	March 18, 1813.	
Ditto,	Hosea Blood,	May 5, "	
Ditto,	Ezekiel W. Bull,	Aug. 8, "	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate,	William Thomas,	July 7, 1809.	
Ditto,	Rogers Smith,	May 14, 1812.	
Ditto,	Samuel Scofield,	Sept. 15, "	
Ditto,	Joshua B. Whitridge,	March 30, 1813.	
Ditto,	Henry Van Hoesenburg,	March 31, "	
Ditto,	Edward Purcell,	May 2, "	
Ditto,	William W. Hazard,	May 14, "	
Ditto,	Henry Brundige,	May 16, "	
Ditto,	William E. Horner,	July 2, "	
Ditto,	John Rodgers,	July 13, "	
Ditto,	Jos. Wallace,	" "	
Ditto,	Abraham Vanhoy,	" "	
Ditto,	Eleazer Aspinwall,	July 15, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	Joseph West,	June 10, 1802.	
Ditto,	John H. Turner,	May 1, 1810.	
Ditto,	David Neilson,	Dec. 3, 1812.	
Ditto,	Charles Taylor,	April 3, 1813.	
Chaplain,	David Jones,	April 2, "	
Ditto,	Robert Elliott,	May 20, "	
Ditto,	Aaron J. Booge,	June 16, "	
Deputy Paymaster General,	Washington Lee, major 16th infantry,		Utica.
Assistant Paymaster General,	Joseph H. Rees, lieutenant 3d artillery.		
Ditto,	Donald Fraser, lieutenant 15th infantry.		
District Paymaster,	George Merchant,		Albany.
Deputy Commissary of Purchases,	John H. Plummer,		Ditto.
Assistant Commissary,	Mathew Irwin,		Champlain.
Ditto,	George Wadsworth,		Burlington.
Ditto,	James E. Herron,		Niagara.
Military Storekeeper,	John Shaw,		Albany.
<b>RIGHT WING.—Lake Champlain.</b>			
Major General,	Wade Hampton.		
Brigadier General,	Thomas Parker.		
Ditto,	George Izard.		
Adjutant General,	William King, major 15th infantry,	July 18, 1813,	
Inspector General,	Henry Atkinson, captain 3d infantry,	April 25, "	
Quartermaster General,	James Thomas,	April 28, "	
Assist. Dep. Quartermaster Gen.	Henry Stanton, lieutenant light artillery,	July 12, "	
Engineer,	William M'Ree, major.		
Assistant Engineer,	Sylvanus Thayer, 1st lieutenant.		
Assist. Topographical Engineer,	Daniel Rose, lieutenant 21st infantry,	July 20, "	
Hospital Surgeon,	Samuel Shaw,	April 6, "	
Ditto,	Walter V. Wheaton,	March 28, "	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate,	Thomas C. Walker,	July 2, "	
Garrison Surgeon's Mate,	Israel Stoddard,	Feb. 18, "	
District Paymaster,	Walter Sheldon, lieutenant 11th infantry.		



## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## RANK, DISTRICTS, STATIONS, &amp;c.

Names.	Rank.	Dates of appointment.	No. of district.	Stations and Remarks.
<i>General Officers.</i>				
Henry Dearborn, - - -	Major General, - - -	January 27, 1812, - -	3	
Thomas Pinckney, - - -	Ditto, - - -	March 27, 1812, - -	6	
James Wilkinson, - - -	Ditto, - - -	March 2, 1813, - -	9	
Wade Hampton, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	9	
Morgan Lewis, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	9	
William H. Harrison, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	
Joseph Bloomfield, - - -	Brigadier General, - - -	March 27, 1812, - -	4	
James Winchester, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	-	Prisoner of war.
William Hull, - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 8, 1812, - -	-	Do. parole.
Thomas Flournoy, - - -	Ditto, - - -	June 18, 1812, - -	7	
Thomas H. Cushing, - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 2, 1812, - -	1	
John Chandler, - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 8, 1812, - -	-	Prisoner of war.
John P. Boyd, - - -	Ditto, - - -	August 26, 1812, - -	9	
Thomas Parker, - - -	Ditto, - - -	March 12, 1813, - -	9	
George Izard, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	9	
William H. Winder, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	-	Prisoner of war.
Duncan McArthur, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	
Lewis Cass, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	
Benjamin Howard, - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	
David R. Williams, - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 9, 1813, - -	7	
Jacob Brown, - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 19, 1813, - -	9	
Leonard Covington, - - -	Ditto, - - -	August 1, 1813, - -	9	
Henry Burbeck, - - -	Brigadier General by brevet, - - -	July 10, 1812, - -	2	
Moses Porter, - - -	Ditto, ditto, - - -	September 10, 1813, - -	9	

## QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Names.	Rank.	Description of Quartermasters.	Dates of appointment.	No. of district.	Stations and Remarks.
Robert Swartwout, - - -	Brig. Gen. - - -	Chief of Department, - - -	March 21, 1813, - -	-	
William Linnard, - - -	Colonel, - - -	Quartermaster Gen'l, - - -	April 12, 1813, - -	4	Philadelphia.
John C. Bartlett, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	
Elisha Jenkins, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 22, 1813, - -	9	Albany.
James Thomas, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 28, 1813, - -	9	
William Piatt, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	June 23, 1813, - -	7	New Orleans.
William Swan, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	August 7, 1813, - -	5	Norfolk.
James S. Swearingen, - - -	Major, - - -	Dep. Q'rmaster Gen. - - -	March 17, 1813, - -	4	Pittsburg.
Samuel Champlain, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	March 18, 1813, - -	6	Charleston.
C. Van De Venter, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	March 26, 1813, - -	-	
Samuel Brown, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	9	
Taylor Berry, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	March 31, 1813, - -	8	St. Louis.
Theos. W. Smith, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 2, 1813, - -	3	New York.
Thomas Bourke, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 19, 1813, - -	6	Savannah.
Paul Bentalou, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	June 29, 1813, - -	5	Baltimore.
William A. Barron, - - -	Captain, - - -	As. Dep. Q'r mast. Gen. - - -	April 2, 1813, - -	3	New York.
Richard H. Ashley, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 11, 1813, - -	2	Newport.
Gustavus Loomis, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 19, 1813, - -	9	
Ezra Smith, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	9	
William Chrystie, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	St. Louis.
Jonathan Allen, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 20, 1813, - -	1	Pittsfield.
John T. Wirt, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 25, 1813, - -	7	Mobile.
James W. Bryson, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	Newport.
John Bliss, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	April 28, 1813, - -	9	
Joseph Wheaton, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	8	
John G. Camp, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	May 20, 1813, - -	9	
Abraham Ten Eyck, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	9	
Robert Patterson, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	June 24, 1813, - -	4	
Henry Stanton, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 12, 1813, - -	9	
Ferdinand Marsteller, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 17, 1813, - -	5	Washington.
Thomas Campbell, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 29, 1813, - -	9	
Timothy Burr, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	July 31, 1813, - -	9	
James Rees, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	August 1, 1813, - -	9	
Samuel Duncan, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	August 6, 1813, - -	4	Carlisle.
Peter Lequex, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	August 31, 1813, - -	6	
William Cox, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	6	
Joseph B. Paine, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	6	
James Ward, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	Ditto, - - -	6	
Joseph Miller, - - -	Do. - - -	Ditto, - - -	September 1, 1813, - -	9	

## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## TOPOGRAPHICAL DEPARTMENT.

Names.	Rank.	Description.	Dates of appointment.	No. of district.	Stations and Remarks.
John Anderson,	Major,	Topographical Engin.	April 12, 1813,	4	Prisoner of war.
Paul H. Perrault,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	5	
Isaac Roberdeau,	Do.	Ditto,	April 29, 1813,	4	
Simon Z. Watson,	Do.	Ditto,	August 20, 1813,	8	
Thomas Clark,	Captain,	Assist. Top. Engineer,	April 1, 1813,	4	War Office.
James Kearney,	Do.	Ditto,	April 12, 1813,	9	
Daniel Rose,	Do.	Ditto,	July 20, 1813,	9	
Benjamin Connor,	Do.	Ditto,	August 3, 1813,	9	

## ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

John R. Fenwick,	Colonel,	Adjutant General,	March 18, 1813,	3	New York. Philadelphia. Charleston. Boston.
William Duane,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	4	
Francis K. Huger,	Do.	Ditto,	April 6, 1813,	6	
Peter P. Schuyler,	Do.	Ditto,	April 28, 1813,	1	
William King,	Do.	Ditto,	July 18, 1813,	9	Norfolk.
John B. Wabach,	Do.	Ditto,	August 6, 1813,	9	
Edmund P. Gaines,	Do.	Ditto,	September 1, 1813,	8	
James Bankhead,	Do.	Ditto,	September 9, 1813,	5	
Charles K. Gardner,	Major,	Assist. Adjutant Gen.	March 18, 1813,	3	
Thomas Chrystie,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	8	
Robert Dunn,	Do.	Ditto,	March 28, 1813,	9	
John Johnson,	Do.	Ditto,	April 2, 1813,	9	
Ebenezer Beebee,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	9	
Talbot Chambers,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	9	
John Erving,	Do.	Ditto,	April 6, 1813,	6	
Cary Nicholas,	Do.	Ditto,	April 25, 1813,	9	

## INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

A. Y. Nicoll,	Colonel,	Inspector General,	March 18, 1813,	3	
Nicholas Gray,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	6	
William Boote,	Do.	Ditto,	April 6, 1813,	9	
Henry Atkinson,	Do.	Ditto,	April 25, 1813,	2	
Jacob Kingsbury,	Do.	Ditto,	April 28, 1813,	9	
James Gibson,	Do.	Ditto,	July 13, 1813,	1	
Enos Cutler,	Major,	Assist. Inspect. Gen.	March 18, 1813,	3	
John C. Tillotson,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	8	
Levi Hukill,	Do.	Ditto,	April 6, 1813,	9	
J. Snelling,	Do.	Ditto,	April 25, 1813,	4	
Robert Sterry,	Do.	Ditto,	May 10, 1813,	7	
Daniel Hughes,	Do.	Ditto,	August 7, 1813,	7	

## ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Decius Wadsworth,	Colonel,	Commissary General,	July 2, 1812,	9	Washington.
George Bomford,	Major,	Assist. Commis. Gen.	June 13, 1812,	-	Albany.
John Morton,	Captain,	Deputy Commissary,	September 11, 1812,	-	Washington.
Abraham R. Woolley,	Do.	Ditto,	December 4, 1812,	4	Pittsburg.
John H. Margart,	Do.	Ditto,	December 31, 1812,	6	Charleston.
James Dalibre,	Do.	Ditto,	August 5, 1813,	9	Albany.
Thomas L. Campbell,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	9	
Edwin Tyler,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	5	
R. D. Richardson,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	8	N. W. Army.
George Talcott, Jun.	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	3	New York.
Aeneas McKay,	Lieutenant,	Assistant Dep. Com.	March 12, 1813,	3	New York.
William Wade,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	4	Pittsburg.
Rufus L. Baker,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	9	Albany.
William C. Lyman,	Do.	Ditto,	April 19, 1813,	4	Pittsburg.
George Larned,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	9	Albany.
Nehemiah Baden,	Do.	Ditto,	August 6, 1813,	5	Washington.
Daniel Brucknor,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	6	
Christopher Keiser,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	6	Charleston.
Thomas L. Hawkins,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	-	N. W. Army.
James Baker,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	9	Albany.

## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## JUDGE ADVOCATES.

Names.	Rank.	Dates of appointment.	No. of district.	Stations and Remarks.
E. A. Bancker, Esq. -	Judge Advocate, -	March 18, 1813, -	3	
Philip S. Parker, Esq. -	Ditto, -	April 2, 1813, -	9	
John S. Wills, Esq. -	Ditto, -	May 7, 1813, -	8	
T. T. Dent, Esq. -	Ditto, -	July 19, 1813, -	6	
Stephen Lush, Jun. Esq. -	Ditto, -	October 5, 1813, -	9	

## HOSPITAL DEPARTMENT.

James Tilton, -	Physician & Surgeon General, -	June 11, 1813, -	9	
Francis Le Baron, -	Apothecary General, -	Ditto, -	9	
James Mann, -	Hospital Surgeon, -	April 9, 1812, -	9	
G. E. Prendergast, -	Ditto, -	April 25, 1812, -	9	
David C. Kerr, -	Ditto, -	April 30, 1812, -	7	
Samuel Akerly, -	Ditto, -	July 6, 1812, -	3	
William M. Ross, -	Ditto, -	March 18, 1813, -	9	
W. V. Wheaton, -	Ditto, -	March 28, 1813, -	9	
Samuel Shaw, -	Ditto, -	April 6, 1813, -	9	
Hosea Blood, -	Ditto, -	May 5, 1813, -	9	
William McCaw, -	Ditto, -	May 20, 1813, -	6	
George D. Proctor, -	Ditto, -	June 11, 1813, -	6	
B. Waterhouse, -	Ditto, -	June 29, 1813, -	1	
Thomas Akin, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	6	
John R. Martin, -	Ditto, -	July 2, 1813, -	8	
E. W. Bull, -	Ditto, -	August 8, 1813, -	9	
William Thomas, -	Hospital Surgeon's Mate, -	July 7, 1809, -	9	
Roger Smith, -	Ditto, -	May 14, 1812, -	9	
James Stephenson, -	Ditto, -	May 27, 1812, -	7	
Stephen Sutton, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	7	
Samuel Schofield, -	Ditto, -	September 15, 1812, -	9	
John H. Sackett, -	Ditto, -	March 22, 1813, -	5	
J. B. Whitredge, -	Ditto, -	March 30, 1813, -	9	
H. Van Hovenberg, -	Ditto, -	March 31, 1813, -	9	
Edward Purcell, -	Ditto, -	May 2, 1813, -	9	
William W. Hazard, -	Ditto, -	May 14, 1813, -	9	
Henry Brundidge, -	Ditto, -	May 16, 1813, -	9	
Joseph L. Stevens, -	Ditto, -	June 29, 1813, -	6	
Thomas C. Walker, -	Ditto, -	July 2, 1813, -	9	
William Jones, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	5	
William E. Horner, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	9	
John Rogers, -	Ditto, -	July 15, 1813, -	9	
Joseph Wallace, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	9	
E. Aspinwall, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	9	
Abraham Vanhoy, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	9	
William Meriwether, -	Ditto, -	July 19, 1813, -	6	
A. Torbling, -	Ditto, -	October 4, 1813, -	9	
Oliver H. Spencer, -	Garrison Surgeon, -	July 9, 1804, -	7	New Orleans.
Joseph West, -	Garrison Surgeon's Mate, -	June 10, 1802, -	9	Niagara.
John F. Heileman, -	Ditto, -	June 2, 1802, -	4	Fort Mifflin.
George W. Maupin, -	Ditto, -	November 5, 1802, -	5	Fort Nelson.
Joseph Goodhue, -	Ditto, -	February 8, 1803, -	1	Fort Constitution.
Abraham Stewart, -	Ditto, -	March 6, 1806, -	8	St. Louis.
James H. Sargent, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	1	Fort Independence.
Robert Huston, -	Ditto, -	February 27, 1807, -	7	Fort Stoddart.
Charles Slocum, -	Ditto, -	March 25, 1807, -	7	Natchitoches.
Lemuel B. Clark, -	Ditto, -	January 4, 1808, -	5	Norfolk.
William T. Davidson, -	Ditto, -	June 13, 1808, -	7	Fort Stoddart.
John H. Turner, -	Ditto, -	May 1, 1810, -	7	
C. Cunningham, -	Ditto, -	October 15, 1810, -	8	Detroit.
Jonathan S. Cool, -	Ditto, -	February 8, 1811, -	8	Fort Osage.
William Ballard, -	Ditto, -	March 24, 1812, -	6	Fort Hawkins.
Samuel Dusenbury, -	Ditto, -	March 25, 1812, -	6	St. Mary's.
Alexander Wollcott, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	3	New York.
Anthony Benezet, -	Ditto, -	March 25, 1813, -	8	Fort Wayne.
William Turner, -	Ditto, -	September 29, 1812, -	2	Newport, R. Island.
David Neilson, -	Ditto, -	December 3, 1812, -	9	
Israel Stoddard, -	Ditto, -	February 18, 1813, -	9	Burlington.
Charles Taylor, -	Ditto, -	April 3, 1813, -	9	
Samuel Meriwether, -	Ditto, -	August 1, 1813, -	8	St. Louis.

## CHAPLAINS.

David Jones, -	Chaplain, -	April 2, 1813, -	9	
Peter J. Van Pelt, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	3	
James I. Wilmer, -	Ditto, -	May 20, 1813, -	8	
Robert Elliot, -	Ditto, -	Ditto, -	9	
Aaron J. Booge, -	Ditto, -	June 16, 1813, -	9	
Stephen Lindsley, -	Ditto, -	July 29, 1813, -	8	
Thomas Hersey, -	Ditto, -	August 20, 1813, -	8	

## GENERAL STAFF—Continued.

## MILITARY ACADEMY.

Names.	Rank.	Dates of appointment.	No. of district.	Stations and Remarks.
Senior Officer of Engineers,	Superintendent.			
Jared Mansfield,	Prof. natural & exper. philos.			
Andrew Ellicott,	Professor of mathematics.			
Alden Partridge,	Professor of art of engineering.			
F. De Masson,	Teacher of French language.			
C. E. Zoeller,	Teacher of Drawing.			
Samuel Walsh,	Surgeon.			
Adam Empie,	Chaplain.			

## PURCHASING DEPARTMENT.

C. Irvine, Esq.	Commissary General,		-	Philadelphia.
Jonn McKinney,	Deputy Commissary,		5	Washington.
John H. Plummer,	Ditto,		9	Albany.
John Langdon,	Ditto,		1	Portsmouth.
Amasa Stetson,	Ditto,		1	Boston.
Elisha Tracy,	Ditto,		2	Norwich.
Samuel Russell,	Ditto,		3	New York.
John H. Piatt,	Ditto,		8	Cincinnati.
James Calhoun, Jun.	Ditto,		5	Baltimore.
Robert C. Jennings,	Ditto,		5	Norfolk.
Matthew Irwin,	Assistant Commissary,		9	Champlain, N. York.
George Wadsworth,	Ditto,		9	Burlington, Ver.
Robert Irvine,	Ditto,		8	Detroit.
James E. Herron,	Ditto,		9	Niagara.
John M. Taylor,	Military Storekeeper,		4	Philadelphia.
Samuel Devens,	Ditto,		1	Charlestown.
John Shaw,	Ditto,		9	Albany.
John Fellows,	Ditto,		3	New York.
Jonathan Snowden,	Ditto,		3	West Point.
H. P. Deering,	Ditto,		3	Sagg Harbor.
Richard Parker,	Ditto,		4	Carlisle.
D. Kirkpatrick,	Ditto,		4	Newcastle.
William C. Bennett,	Ditto,		4	Wilmington.
Henry Simons,	Ditto,		6	Charleston.
Thomas Martin,	Ditto,		8	Newport.
G. L. Hommedieu,	Ditto,		2	Norwich.
Edwin Starke,	Ditto,		5	Norfolk.
John Rice,	Ditto,		1	Portsmouth.
John Chaffee,	Ditto,		1	Springfield.
Samuel Annin,	Ditto,		5	Harper's Ferry.
Thomas B. Rutter,	Ditto,		5	Baltimore.

## PAY DEPARTMENT.

Names.	Rank.	Description of Paymasters.	Dates of Appointment.	No. of district.	Stations and Remarks.
Robert Brent, Esq.		Paymaster of Army.			
Washington Lee,	Major,	Deputy Paymast. Gen.	April 13, 1813,	-	Northern army.
D. Fraser,	2d Lieut.	Asst. Dep. Paym. Gen.	August 4, 1813,	-	Frontiers N. Y.
J. H. Rees,	1st Lieut.	Ditto,	September 24, 1813,	-	Ditto.
Nehemiah Freeman,	Major,	District Paymaster,	March 16, 1802,	1	Boston.
Ambrose Whitlock,	Captain,	Ditto,	June 13, 1805,	8	Vincennes.
Simeon Knight,	Do.	Ditto,	March 24, 1808,	7	Natchez.
Alpha Kingsley,	Do.	Ditto,	February 9, 1810,	7	Nashville.
John T. Pemberton,	Do.	Ditto,	June 4, 1812,	7	New Orleans.
Henry Phillips,	Do.	Ditto,	June 12, 1812,	4	Philadelphia.
Jonathan Eastman,	1st Lieut.	Ditto,	March 4, 1806,	-	Pr. war, parole.
Satterlee Clark,	Do.	Ditto,	August 15, 1810,	5	Washington.
Hamlin Cook,	Do.	Ditto,	July 26, 1813,	6	Charleston.
Walter Sheldon,	Do.	Ditto,	August 4, 1813,	9	Burlington, Vt.
Jacob W. Albright,	Do.	Ditto,	September 4, 1813,	4	W. Pennsylv'a.
Samuel H. Eakin,	Citizen,	Ditto,	June 3, 1812,	3	New York city.
James Taylor,	Do.	Ditto,	June 4, 1812,	8	Newport, pr. wr.
Joseph Watson,	Do.	Ditto,			
Thompson Douglass,	Do.	Ditto,	June 12, 1812,	8	St. Louis.
Samuel Turner,	Do.	Ditto,	Ditto,	5	Petersburg.
Jesse Hunt,	Do.	Ditto,	September 22, 1812,	8	Cincinnati.
George Merchant,	Do.	Ditto,	September 29, 1812,	9	Albany.
Samuel Huntington,	Do.	Ditto,	October 3, 1812,	8	N. W. army.
Joseph C. Boyd,	Do.	Ditto,	January 14, 1813,	1	Portland.
Robert Gardner,	Do.	Ditto,	August 3, 1813,	-	Quebec, pay pr.
George L. Perkins,	Do.	Ditto,	September 7, 1813,	2	New London.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REGIMENT OF LIGHT ARTILLERY.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Joseph G. Swift, July 31, 1812.		<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Sylvester Thayer, July 1, 1812. Wm. Cutbush, ditto, " Ed. De Russy, July 6, " Thos. P. Finley, July 31, " Fred. Lewis, Sept. 20, "	Paymaster. Aid of Maj. General Dearborn.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Walker K. Armistead, July 31, 1812.		Jas. Gadsden, March 17, 1813.	
<i>Majors.</i> G. Bomford, July 6, 1812. William McRee, July 31, "		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> T. W. Maurice, Aug. 1, 1813. Hipolite Dumas, Aug. 3, " D. B. Douglass, Oct. 1, " George Prescott, Oct. 16, " J. L. Smith, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Charles Gratiot, Feb. 23, 1808. A. Partridge, July 23, 1810. Eleazar D. Wood, July 1, 1812, J. G. Totten, July 31, " Sam. Babcock, Sept. 20, "	Maj. bvt. May 6, 1813. Maj. bvt. June 6, do.		

REGIMENT OF LIGHT ARTILLERY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Moses Porter, March 12, 1812,	Brig. General brevet, Sept. 10, 1813.	W. Sumpter, May 27, 1813. G. W. Hight, August 10, " Wm. W. Smith, Oct. 1, " Wm. K. Beall, Oct. 23, 1811. G. N. Morris, ditto, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> J. R. Fenwick, Dec. 2, 1811,	Adjutant General.	<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> J. H. Wilkins, March 30, 1813. John Gates, jr. April 1, " Nelson Freeland, April 4, " J. T. McKinney, April 5, " S. M. Mackay, May 27, " B. F. Robb, June 30, " Wm. Bazeau, August 10, " G. E. Wells, October 1, " Elijah Lyon, October 23, " S. Washburn, ditto, "	Adjutant.
<i>Majors.</i> Abraham Eustus, March 15, 1810, Thomas Pitts, January 20, 1813.	Lieut. Colonel brevet, Sept. 10, 1813.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Henry Stanton, June 29, 1813,	Assist. Deputy Quartermaster General.
<i>Captains.</i> James Gibson, May 2, 1810, Wm. Campbell, May 30, " R. H. McPherson, July 15, " J. N. McIntosh, May 1, 1811. Samuel Price, August 15, " Aw. McDowell, April 1, 1812. Luther Leonard, July 6, " Benj. Branch, August 24, " G. W. Melvin, ditto, " A. W. Thornton, Jan. 20, 1813.	Inspector General.	Joseph Scott, July 2, " Lloyd Hilleary, Aug. 1, " Edm. M. Giles, ditto, " Rich. W. Field, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Fras. Stribling, March 1, 1811. Tho. Ketchum, Sept. 1, " John R. Bell, August 24, 1812, F. B. Murdoch, ditto, " W. F. Hobart, April 5, 1813.	Assist. Inspector Gen.	<i>Surgeon.</i> A. Tombling, October 4, 1813.	

FIRST LIGHT DRAGOONS.

<i>Colonel.</i> Jacint Laval, August 1, 1813.		James Barton, August 1, 1813, Loring Austin, Sept. 3, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Nelson Luckett, August 1, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> V. P. Luckett, October 9, 1812. Edward Carrington, do. 12, " Owen Ransom, Dec. 1, " Thomas Heriot, Jan. 20, 1813. W. Hampton, jr. Mar. 17, " T. B. Barton, July 27, " F. H. Lissenhoff, Aug. 1, " John A. Binns, Sept. 3, "	
<i>Majors.</i> T. A. Helms, June 7, 1813. A. P. Hayne, August 1, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Thomas F. Hunt, July 2, 1813. Benjamin Desha, Aug. 1, " T. J. Harrison, do. 15, " L. P. Gustine, July 29, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Asa Morgan, January 18, 1810. Sk. Osborne, February 20, 1811. Silas Halsey, May 31, " A. Cummings, Nov. 1, " W. M. Littlejohn, Dec. 1, 1812. George Haig, January 20, 1813. Levi Hukill, June 7, " E. Boardman, August 1, "	As. Inspec. Gen.	<i>Cornets.</i> Thomas Hogan, Sept. 9, 1813. Philip Anspach do. 25, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Joseph Kean, May 31, 1811, H. Whiting, August 20, " George Birch, Nov. 1, " F. S. Belton, January 20, 1813, William Neilson, June 7, " Louis Laval, July 28, "	Adjutant. Aid to Brigadier Gen. Boyd. Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon.</i> Lewis Dunham, Dec. 12, 1808.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> S. H. Littlejohn, April 3, 1813.	

SECOND LIGHT DRAGOONS AND FIRST ARTILLERY.

SECOND LIGHT DRAGOONS.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> James Burn, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Walter Coles, July 6, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> A. T. Macneil, July 6, 1812.		Ira Williams, do. 6, "	
<i>Majors.</i> J. T. Woodford, July 6, 1812,		Benjamin Smith, do. 6, "	
James V. Ball, Sept. 16, "		J. C. Tillotson, August 10, "	- As. Inspec. Gen.
<i>Captains.</i> S. R. Proctor, July 6, 1812.		Robert H. Craig, Mar. 18, 1813,	- Adjutant.
S. G. Hopkins, do. 6, "		P. Callan, March 18, "	
Henry Hall, do. 6, "		Isaac Griffith, do. 18, "	
Saml. D. Harris, do. 6, "		Daniel Barthing, April 22, "	
John A. Burd, do. 6, "		James Martin, do. 30, "	
Joseph Selden, do. 6, "		Benjamin Burd, May 16, "	
Jonas Holland, do. 6, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> George Watts, March 18, 1813.	
John Butler, do. 6, "		James Trippe, April 29, "	
Charles J. Nourse, Aug. 15, 1813.		H. A. Hays, do. 29, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Abel Wheelock, July 6, 1812.		A. M <sup>r</sup> Farland, do. 29, "	
Beverly Turpin, do. 6, "		C. Wright, do. 29, "	
Walter German, do. 6, "		Hugh Sterling, do. 29, "	
J. Nicholas, jr. do. 6, "		John Hoopes, May 20, "	- Aid to Maj. Gen.
James Hedges, do. 6, "		John L. Elbert, June 20, "	Hampton.
A. H. Sneed, do. 6, "		<i>Cornets.</i> T. S. Bracken, May 16, 1813.	
Gabriel Barbour, do. 6, "		Sylvr. Booth, July 19, "	
Fayette Roane, April 16, 1813.		Charles Clarkson, July 29, "	
T. S. Johnson, May 16, "		R. Northington, do. 29, "	
Edward Conway, Oct. 31, "		Claiborne Cain, October 1, "	
	Lieut. Col. by brevet, Dec. 18, 1812.	Wm. Johnson, do. 11, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> W. H. Buckner, July 6, 1812.	
	Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> L. M. Bailey, May 7, 1812.	

FIRST ARTILLERY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Henry Burbeck, April 1, 1802,		Milo Mason, February 29, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Const. Freeman, April 1, 1802,		C. Van de Venter, Mar. 12, "	- Ditto.
<i>Majors.</i> Wm. Mac Rea, July 31, 1800,		J. Fitzgerald, March 14, "	
A. Y. Nicoll, Dec. 1, 1804,		J. Erving, jr. August 16, "	- As. Adj. Gen.
Jas. B. Many, May 5, 1813.		A. L. Sands, February 10, 1813.	
<i>Captains.</i> Lloyd Beall, February 16, 1801,		Thomas J. Beall, Mar. 3, "	
S. T. Dyson, Sept. 15, 1804.		James Daliba, do. 3, "	- Dep. Com. Ord.
Nathaniel Leonard, Dec. 1, "		Gus. Loomis, May 5, "	- A. D. Q. M. G.
C. Wollstonecraft, Mar. 13, 1805.		Ezra Smith, do. 11, "	- Ditto.
J. B. Walbach, Jan. 31, 1806,		R. H. Ashley, do. 20, "	
Moses Swett, June 30, 1807.		J. S. Brush, June 20, "	
Wm. Wilson, May 3, 1808.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> F. Whiting, February 10, 1812.	
E. Humphreys, January 9, 1809.		Samuel Spotts, do. 10, "	
Frs. Newman, October 1, "		William Parker, do. 10, "	
J. S. Swearingen, Jan. 13, 1811,		Levi Whiting, do. 10, "	
James Hanham, July 10, "		J. W. Rouse, March 27, "	
Michael Walsh, Oct. 31, "		B. B. White, April 14, "	
James Reed, March 12, 1812.		P. St. Medard, do. 30, "	
Thomas Murray, Feb. 10, 1813.		Abel B. Chase, do. 30, "	
Wm. Gates, March 3, "		James Baker, May 1, "	
J. F. Heileman, May 5, "		W. H. Nicoll, July 6, "	
J. Gansevoort, do. 11, "		J. W. Lent, jr. March 12, 1813,	- Aid to Brig. Gen.
Hopley Yeaton, do. 20, "		Charles Clark, do. 12, "	Burbeck.
Samuel Maclay, June 20, "		Thomas Elfe, jr. do. 17, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Jona. Eastman, June 30, 1807,		S. Rockwell, do. 20, "	
Josh. Proveaux, January 9, 1809.		Josh. Bosque, April 12, "	
Thos. Bennett, August 1, "		A. W. Forbush, May 5, "	
Ethan A. Allen, Oct. 1, "		Peter Melendy, June 29, "	
Archd. Darrah, Jan. 29, 1811.		B. C. Bartlett, do. 29, "	
M. P. Lomax, June 30, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> M. M. Russell, July 10, 1813.	
Justus Post, July 1, "		Hugh Orr, July 19, "	
S. Clarke, July 10, "		J. Bennett, August 1, "	
S. Champlain, October 31, "		W. J. Sever, do. 1, "	
Heman A. Fay, Dec. 23, "		Edmd. Hopkins, do. 1, "	
	Dist. Paymaster.	Benj. Conner, do. 3, "	- As. Top. Eng.
		John Ellison, Sept. 29, "	
	Agt. Fortificat'n.	<i>Surgeon.</i>	
	Dist. Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
	Deputy Quartermaster General.		

## SECOND AND THIRD ARTILLERY.

## SECOND ARTILLERY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Winfield Scott, March 12, 1813.		J. H. Dearing, July 6, 1812. Isaac Davis, March 13, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonels.</i> F. K. Huger, March 3, 1813, Wm. Lindsay, do. 12, "	Adjutant Gen.	R. A. Zantzinger, do. 13, " Robert Stewart, do. 13, " J. L. Edwards, do. 28, " Edwin Sharpe, June 26, " William Tyler, Aug. 14, "	
<i>Majors.</i> D. M. Forney, July 6, 1812. J. Hindman, June 26, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Jacob Warley, July 6, 1812. Wm. Smith, do. 6, " Lewis Morgan, do. 6, " John Ruffin, do. 6, " J. H. Gamble, do. 6, " Jno. W. Kincaid, do. 6, " Robert Goode, do. 6, " Francis O. Byrd, do. 6, " Thomas Winn, do. 6, " Thomas Clark, April 16, 1813, Cld. D. Cooper, do. 16, " Jos. P. Prince, do. 16, " G. Doneghey, do. 16, " P. J. Nevill, do. 20, " M. S. Massey, May 13, " J. P. Bunting, June 26, " J. Henderson, do. 26, " T. Shubrick, do. 26, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Nathan Towson, July 6, 1812. S. B. Archer, do. 6, " Wm. Nicholas, do. 6, " J. N. Barker, do. 6, " J. B. Pon, do. 6, " Sanders Donoho, do. 6, " Thos. Biddle, jr. do. 6, " Jos. Phillips, do. 6, " John Ritchie, do. 6, " John Goodall, do. 6, " Jesse Robinson, do. 6, " Robert M. Gill, do. 6, " P. Hawkins, jr. do. 6, " Danl. Cushing, do. 6, " Stanton Sholes, do. 6, " G. W. Russell, do. 6, " Spots. Henry, do. 6, " Frederick Evans, do. 6, " A. J. Williams, March 12, 1813. T.M. Randolph, jr. June 26, "	Brigade Major.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> W. E. Broadwater, July 2, 1813. Benj. Lawson, do. 9, " H. M. Campbell, do. 19, " John Mitchell, do. 19, " Hy. L. Duffell, Aug. 1, " W. Berryman, do. 1, " Jas. C. Pickett, do. 4, " Britton Evans, do. 15, " J. Watmough, Sept. 22, " Wm. Kenny, do. 23, " N. Henderson, Oct. 12, "	As. Top. Eng. Aid to Brig. Gen. Izard.
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> John S. Peyton, July 6, 1812. Hy. K. Craig, do. 6, " Adrian Neil, do. 6, " P. M'Donough, do. 6, " Wm. M. Read, do. 6, " Jonan. Kearsley, do. 6, " Wm. J. Cowan, do. 6, " John Fontaine, do. 6, " J. H. Larwill, do. 6, " Lowndes Brown, do. 6, " Luther Scott, do. 6, " Robt. R. Ruffin, do. 6, " Hy. Slaughter, do. 6, "	Adjutant.	<i>Surgeon.</i> J. De La Motta, May 1, 1812.	
	Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> James Trimble, July 6, 1812. Louis L. Near, do. 6, "	

## THIRD ARTILLERY.

<i>Colonel.</i> A. Macomb, July 6, 1812.		J. M. O'Conner, Mar. 13, 1813, G. H. Richards, do. 13, " S. M. Dewey, May 20, " S. Churchill, August 15, " B. K. Pierce, October 1, "	Late Quarter- master.
<i>Lieutenant Colonels.</i> G. E. Mitchell, March 3, 1813. James House, do. 3, "		<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Jas. Green, jr. July 6, 1812. J. L. Tracy, do. 6, " Moses J. Chase, do. 6, " W. de Peyster, do. 6, " John Farley, do. 6, " Harold Smith, do. 6, " Peter Pifer, do. 6, " Benj. Brearley, do. 6, " John W. Green, do. 6, " Samuel Weston, do. 6, " C. M. Macomb, March 13, " Jos. H. Rees, do. 13, " W. R. Duncan, do. 13, " Chester Root, do. 13, " Mw. Jenkins, do. 13, " P. D. Spencer, May 13, " Jno. Mountfort, do. 20, " G. Dearborn, October 1, " Felix Ansart, do. 1, " William King, do. 1, "	
<i>Majors.</i> Samuel Nye, July 6, 1812. G. Armistead, March 3, 1813.			
<i>Captains.</i> Ichb. B. Crane, July 6, 1812. Roger Jones, do. 6, " J. H. Boyle, do. 6, " A. S. Brooks, do. 6, " J. W. Gookin, do. 6, " W. Van Deursen, jr. do. 6, " J. S. B. Romayne, do. 6, " Hor. H. Watson, do. 6, " Eben. B. Morse, do. 6, " James M'Keon, do. 6, " Rufus M'Intire, do. 6, " Benj. S. Ogden, do. 6, " Jona. Brooks, Sept. 24, " Stephen Collins, Jan. 13, 1813. A. C. W. Fanning, Mar. 13, "	Brigade Major.	Adjutant. As. Dep. Pay- master Gen. Paymaster.	

## FIRST AND SECOND REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRD ARTILLERY—Continued.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and brevets.		
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>					
T. C. Legate, July 6, 1812.	As. Adj. Gen.	D. Blaney, jr. October 1, 1813.			
John P. Bartlett, do. 6, "		Libbeus Custis, do. 1, "			
Adam A. Gray, do. 6, "		Wm. Lyon, do. 1, "			
<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>					
J. I. Cromwell, Nov. 23, "		C. Newkirk, October 1, 1813.		Oliver Bangs, do. 11, "	
Thos. Chrystie, Mar. 18, 1813,					
F. P. Woolsey, May 20, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>			
W. M'Clintock, June 20, "		J. H. Bradford, Oct. 3, 1813.			
L. H. Osgood, do. 20, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>			
R. M. Kirby, July 9, "		Joseph Eaton, April 14, 1812.			
G. B. Sheldon, do. 9, "		Ger. Senter, do. 14, "			
Wm. B. Read, do. 29, "					
Th. B. Chickering, Aug. 1, "					
Ed. Baynton, October 1, "					

## FIRST INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i>								
J. Kingsbury, August 18, 1808,	Inspec. Gen.	S. Perkins, December 31, 1812.	As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen.					
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>								
R. C. Nicholas, August 15, 1812.		J. T. Helm, January 20, 1813.						
<i>Majors.</i>								
Z. Pike, March 20, 1800,		L. C. brevet, July 10, 1812.		J. W. Bryson, do. 20, "	Ditto. Aid to Major Gen. Harrison.			
E. B. Clemson, Jan. 20, 1813.				J. Campbell, do. 20, "				
<i>Captains.</i>								
John Whistler, July 1, 1797,		Major brevet, July 10, 1812. As. Ins. Gen. Aid to Major Gen. Lewis. Dist. Paymaster.		D. Stansbury, do. 20, "				
Simon Owens, August 18, 1808.				B. Vasquez, July 30, "				
D. Hughes, December 15, 1808,				<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>				
Daniel Baker, March 12, 1812,				Lewis Bissell, March 12, 1812.		Ditto. Aid to Major Gen. Harrison.		
<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>								
A. Whitlock, August 26, "				J. A. Shaw, August 26, "				
W. Whistler, Dec. 31, "	Ormond Marsh, Oct. 30, "							
J. C. Symmes, Jan. 20, 1813.	Danl. Curtis, Dec. 31, "							
Simeon Knight, do. 20, "	R. A. M'Case, do. 31, "							
A. Kingsley, do. 20, "	N. E. Westfall, Jan. 20, 1813.							
H. Johnson, do. 20, "	W. Anderson, do. 20, "							
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>								
Benj. Marshall, Oct. 14, 1808.	Ditto. Ditto.		John O. Fallan, do. 20, "					
J. Brownson, December 8, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>						
T. Hamilton, do. 15, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>						
J. W. Albright, Aug. 26, 1812,		J. C. Wooding, August 1, 1813.						
<i>Surgeon.</i>								
H. Catlett, February 18, 1813.								
<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>								
S. C. Muir, April 7, 1813.								

## SECOND INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i>						
Richard Sparks, July 6, 1812.	As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Quartermaster. As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Aid to Major Gen. Wilkinson.	John T. Wirt, July 6, 1812.	As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Quartermaster. As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Aid to Major Gen. Wilkinson.			
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>						
John Bowyer, July 6, 1812.		E. Bogardus, do. 6, "				
<i>Majors.</i>						
Wm. R. Boote, July 6, 1812,		Inspec. Gen. Quartermaster General.		H. Bradley, August 15, "	As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Aid to Major Gen. Wilkinson.	
Wm. Swan, January 20, 1813,				P. Willis, November 1, "		
<i>Captains.</i>						
Hugh M'Call, August 19, 1800,		Major brevet, July 10, 1812. Quartermaster General. Dist. Paymaster. Late Paymaster. Adjutant.		H. H. Villard, January 10, 1813.		
Wm. Piatt, February 17, 1809,				John Bliss, do. 20, "		
W. Lawrence, Jan. 1, 1810.				H. A. Burchsted, May 5, "		
H. B. Brevoort, May 1, 1811.				J. Bell, do. 30, "		
John Miller, March 12, 1812.				<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		
R. Chamberlain, July 6, "				T. Doggett, September 28, 1812.		As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Quartermaster. As. Dep. Quartermaster Gen. Aid to Major Gen. Wilkinson.
J. T. Pemberton, Jan. 20, 1813,	R. Sturges, Nov. 1, "					
Wm. F. Ware, May 5, "	Jas. Stuart, December 27, "					
John M. Davis, do. 30, "	H. Conway, jr. Jan. 10, 1813.					
<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>						
<i>Ensigns.</i>						
<i>Surgeon.</i>						
<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>						
S. C. Muir, April 7, 1813.						



## THIRD AND FOURTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRD INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> H. V. Milton, August 15, 1813.		J. F. Everitt, August 4, 1813. Wm. Triplett, do. 15, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> G. C. Russell, June 6, 1811.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> J. W. Hansell, January 3, 1812. T. Hunter, do. 3, " Wm. Christian, do. 3, " W. Bourke, March 12, " John Tarrant, do. 12, " A. Donoho, November 1, " James Smith, do. 19, " T. Turner, August 4, 1813. R. Goodwin, do. 15, "	
<i>Majors.</i> M. Arbuckle, August 15, 1812. Wm. Carson, January 20, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> John Martin, March 12, 1813. W. L. Robeson, do. 12, " J. A. Watson, do. 12, " Jas. A. Hart, do. 12, " Jack. F. Ross, May 20, " T. W. Barton, August 1, "	
<i>Captains.</i> John Nicks, July 1, 1808. H. Atkinson, do. 1, " J. McClelland, do. 1, " Jas. Woodruff, Dec. 12, " Wm. Butler, do. 31, 1809. R. B. Moore, Sept. 1, 1810. J. Denking, February 6, 1811. H. G. White, May 11, " W. R. Davis, August 4, 1813. S. W. Butler, do. 15, "	Isp. General.	<i>Ensigns.</i> C. Stephens, June 29, 1813. Thos. Rogers, do. 29, " W. V. Cobbs, August 4, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> H. Chotard, December 31, 1809. B. D. Herriot, do. 1, 1810. S. C. Mabson, do. 31, " John Burnett, March 1, 1811. Wm. Laval, May 11, " J. M. Wilcox, January 3, 1812. Geo. Morley, April 24, " J. L. Carey, Nov. 1, "	Adjutant.  Quartermaster.	<i>Surgeon.</i> R. Shubrick, Aug. 8, 1809.  <i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	

## FOURTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> R. Purdy, August 26, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> P. Wheelock, January 3, 1812. S. Butterfield, do. 3, " Rufus Preble, February 15, " S. Armstrong, Sept. 15, " S. Legate, January 20, 1813. Paul Peckham, May 19, " J. Ranney, do. 30, " E. Kerby, July 31, " C. Munroe, September 2, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> J. Darrington, July 6, 1812.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> J. P. Norton, March 12, 1813. A. Wilson, jr. do. 12, " N. Wadhams, do. 27, " G. W. Boyd, April 16, " Thos. Hunt, May 6, " J. L. Gardner, do. 20, " T. Green, jr. May 20, "	
<i>Majors.</i> N. Heald, August 26, 1812. S. Ranney, January 20, 1813.		<i>Ensigns.</i> John Drake, May 20, 1813. James Dean, July 19, "	
<i>Captains.</i> J. Binney, December 12, 1808. R. B. Brown, March 18, 1809. J. Snelling, June 12, " O. G. Burton, August 25, 1811. C. Fuller, November 9, " C. Larrabee, Sept. 15, 1812. E. Way, January 20, 1813. J. L. Eastman, August 15, " F. Conkling, Sept. 2, "	Major brevet, Aug. 9, 1812.	<i>Surgeon.</i> Sylvester Day, March 13, 1813.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> A. Hawkins, August 25, 1811. G. P. Peters, October 29, " John Smith, do. 31, " L. Peckham, Nov. 9, " G. Gooding, February 15, 1812. Josiah Bacon, Sept. 15, " P. Greenough, Jan. 20, 1813. M. Bulley, July 31, " J. Plymton, August 15, " G. W. Hovey, Sept. 2, "	Paymaster.  Quartermaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> A. Farnsworth, April 14, 1812. J. M. Harper, January 19, 1813.	

FIFTH AND SIXTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

FIFTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Danl. Bissell, August 15, 1812.		J. Cummings, July 6, 1812, S. W. Prestman, do. 6, " G. D. Snyder, Sept. 1, " John Fendall, April 30, 1813. J. B. Taylor, June 26, " J. Darnall, August 14, " Geo. Murray, do. 15, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> George Gibson, August 15, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Matthew Galt, jr. Mar. 12, 1813. Jas. Kearney, April 11, " Jas. Smith, jr. do. 16, " J. A. B. Harding, do. 25, " George Rea, August 14, " Jacob Swoyer, do. 14, " Wm. C. Yates, do. 14, " T. Murphey, do. 14, " M. Fishback, do. 15, " George Brent, October 1, "	As. Top. Eng.
<i>Majors.</i> N. Pinkney, January 20, 1813. Benj. Wallace, April 30, "	Aid to Major Gen. Wilkinson.		
<i>Captains.</i> Colin Buckner, July 1, 1808. G. M. Brooke, May 1, 1810. R. Whartenby, do. 3, " Townsend Stith, Sept. 30, " A. M'Ilhenny, do. 1, 1811. T. Chambers, October 31, " James Dorman, Nov. 9, " W. S. Henshaw, April 30, 1813. Leroy Opie, June 26, " Richd. H. Bell, Aug. 15, "	As. Adj. Gen.		
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> John Jamieson, Oct. 31, 1811, J. Saunders, Nov. 9, "	Adjutant. Aid to Brigadier Gen. Parker. Paymaster.	<i>Ensigns.</i> Bailey Buckner, July 2, 1813. Albert Vincent, do. 19, " G. Liftwitch, do. 19, " T. W. Morgan, do. 19, " John Maul, do. 29, " Robert Means, July 29, " John Wells, do. 29, " W.R. Richardson, do. 31, " A. Whitehead, Sept. 15, " Azal Gates, do. 15, "	
Josh. Owens, January 3, 1812, R. W. Chick, March 12, " J. S. Allison, July 6, " J. R. Corbaly, do. 6, " Wm. C. Bird, Sept. 1, " P. B. Greenwell, April 30, " J. G. Clark, June 26, " John Gassaway, Aug. 15, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> Adam Hays, February 10, 1812.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Henry O. Hill, January 3, 1812. John W. Smoot, do. 3, " J. M'Gunegle, March 12, "	Quartermaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> Alexander Blair, July 6, 1812. Clajon Reily, March 22, 1813.	

SIXTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Jonas Simonds, July 8, 1808.		G. W. Ten Broeck, Mar. 20, 1813. R. B. Cuyler, April 1, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> James Miller, November 30, 1810,	Colonel brevet, Aug. 9, 1812.	<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> D. Vander Heyden, Jan. 3, 1813. G. W. Runk, ditto, " H. R. Windle, ditto, " Henry Cooke, March 12, " N. Sherman, October 4, " R. McClellan, ditto, " I. L. Dubois, October 13, " George Keese, Feb'y 1, 1813. W. B. Staats, March 20, " A. Quackinbush, April 1, "	Paymaster.
<i>Majors.</i> J. Campbell, July 6, 1812. Horatio Stark, January 20, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> James Young, March 12, 1813. John Sisk, ditto, " Henry Meyer, ditto, " Patrick Ford, May 20, " John Harris, July 19, " Charles Rowan, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Ebenez. Beebe, January 19, 1809, J. Machesney, June 10, " J. T. Arrowsmith, Oct. 20, " G. Humphreys, Dec. 31, " J. Walworth, January 1, 1810. P. Muhlenburg, October 1, " Clem. Sadlier, Novem. 15, 1811. Robert Sterry, January 3, 1812, J. E. A. Masters, June 4, " Henry Phillips, October 13, "	Assist. Adj. Gen.  Assist. Insp. Gen. District Paymaster.	<i>Ensigns.</i> W. Bicker, jr. July 29, 1813. John Wood, ditto, "  <i>Surgeon.</i> T. Lawson, May 21, 1813.  <i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> W. Beaumont, Dec. 2, 1812.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Edward Webb, October 1, 1810. Henry Shell, March 9, 1811. James Bailey, January 3, 1812. Londus L. Buck, ditto, " A. R. Thompson, ditto, " J. Chapman, July 6, " Wm. Hazard, October 13, " G. D. Smith, October 31, "	Quartermaster. Adjutant.		

## SEVENTH AND EIGHTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## SEVENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> William Russell, May 3, 1808.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> E. Taylor, February 10, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Thorn. Posey, April 30, 1813.		W. Snodgrass, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> J. Bankhead, August 15, 1813, Ross Bird, ditto, "	Adjutant General.	H. P. Helm, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Uriah Blue, May 9, 1809. Richard Oldham, Dec. 1, " James Doherty, Jan. 1, 1810. Enos Cutler, September 3, " Zach. Taylor, November 30, 1810.		William Prosser, ditto, " J. Forsythe, ditto, " John Hays, ditto, " John Meek, January 20, 1813. J. N. Carrick, March 20, " T. F. Thomas, July 9, "	
W. H. Overton, Dec. 3, " Carey Nicholas, March 1, 1811, W. McClellan, ditto, " Alex. A. White, June 6, " Narcis. Broutin, April 6, 1813.	Assis. Inspec. Gen. Major brevet, Sept. 5, 1812. Assist. Adj. Gen.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> E. T. Hall, March 12, 1813. T. Blackstone, ditto, " John Weaver, ditto, " I. M. Rieley, ditto, " A. Ross, May 2, " John Noble, ditto, " T. B. Rice, August 9, " D. Burford, ditto, " Noble Johnson, ditto, "	Paymaster.
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> J. Robertson, November 30, 1810, J. S. Wade, December 3, " Samuel Vail, March 1, 1811. George C. Allen, ditto, " Elijah Montgomery, June 24, " D. McClellan, February 10, 1812, T. R. Richardson, ditto, " Jacob Miller, ditto, " M. McClelland, Jan. 20, 1813. S. Kercheval, April 6, "	Adjutant. Quartermaster.	<i>Ensigns.</i> William Query, July 2, 1813. A. Neilson, July 19, " Wilson Creed, ditto, " F. S. Gray, August 6, " R. B. De Witt, ditto, " W. S. Doherty, August 9, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> A. G. Goodlet, Feb. 10, 1812.	

## EIGHTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Patrick Jack, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> J. A. Black, July 6, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> L. Manning, August 15, 1813.		B. Martin, ditto, " R. Lamer, ditto, " Henry Bill, March 25, 1813. R. V. Marye, ditto, " P. Lequex, May 5, "	Assistant Deputy Q'rmas. Gen. Aid to Major Gen. Pinckney.
<i>Majors.</i> W. Cumming, March 25, 1813. Philip Cook, August 15, "		J. Ferguson, ditto, " T. F. Wells, ditto, " L. Gresham, August 14, " W. W. Davis, August 15, "	
<i>Captains.</i> D. E. Twiggs, July 6, 1812. R. Cunningham, ditto, " W. Chisolm, ditto, " F. B. Warley, ditto, " W. Jones, ditto, " T. W. Farrar, ditto, " W. McQueen, ditto, " M. I. Keith, ditto, " C. Crawford, ditto, " H. Walton, August 15, 1813.	Aid to Brig. Gen. Flournoy. Brigade Major.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> S. Coleman, May 5, 1813. James Colson, ditto, " J. G. Bostwick, ditto, " William Wayne, ditto, " A. Dousset, ditto, " R. J. Easter, ditto, " J. A. Beaulard, August 15, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Hamlin Cook, July 6, 1812, R. P. Johnson, ditto, " T. S. Bailey, ditto, " T. C. Hunter, ditto, " Otis Dyer, ditto, " J. H. Mallory, May 5, 1813. M. A. Roberts, ditto, " James Wilde, ditto, " William Bee, jr. August 14, " E. Halloway, August 15, "	District Paymaster. Paymaster.	<i>Ensigns.</i> H. L. Oneal, May 20, 1813, J. Gignilliat, ditto, " J. G. Stallings, July 2, " <i>Surgeon.</i> W. R. Waring, April 11, 1813, <i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> J. W. Caldwell, July 6, 1812. Charles Lewis, July 19, 1813.	

NINTH AND TENTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

NINTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Simon Learned, July 6, 1812.		Aaron Lewis, August 15, 1813. J. H. Cranson, ditto, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> T. Aspinwall, March 12, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> W. Browning, March 13, 1813. D. Chandler, ditto, " H. Wellington, May 13, " Charles Foster, ditto, " W. Lyman, June 26, " Otis Fisher, June 30, " E. Norton, July 15, " J. Gleason, August 14, "	Adjutant.
<i>Majors.</i> C. Lyman, June 26, 1813. H. Leavenworth, Aug. 15, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> J. Howard, March 17, 1813. J. Christie, August 15, " David Foot, ditto, " A. Burghardt, ditto, " T. Childs, jr., ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> T. Crooker, July 6, 1812. A. F. Hull, ditto, " E. Foster, March 13, 1813. J. Ingersoll, jr., April 16, " D. S. Townsend, May 13, " G. Bender, jr., ditto, " J. F. Norris, June 26, " T. Harrison, August 15, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> E. Badger, August 30, 1813. J. W. Colburn, Sept. 29, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> S. L. Allen, March 23, 1813. W. L. Foster, ditto, " B. F. Greene, March 30, " J. Fowle, jr., April 16, " S. Turner, May 13, " E. Childs, ditto, " Loring Palmer, June 26, 1813. David Perry, June 30, "	Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon.</i> J. Lovell, May 15, 1812.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> T. G. Mower, Dec. 2, 1812.	

TENTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> James Welborn, July 6, 1812.		R. Plummer, July 6, 1812. S. A. Miller, March 23, 1813. Lewis Yancey, ditto, " Jehu Bird, April 15, " A. G. Glynn, August 14, " James Roane, August 15, " B. T. Goodwyn, ditto, "	Paymaster.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> A. Pickens, jr., July 6, 1812.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> John Garrett, March 24, 1813. W. J. Gordon, ditto, " James Norris, ditto, " Isaac Craton, ditto, " F. McRae, ditto, " G. R. Bridges, ditto, " W. Lancaster, jr., Aug. 14, " James K. Hill, ditto, " S. Thomas, ditto, " W. Alexander, August 15, "	
<i>Majors.</i> W. S. Hamilton, March 3, 1813. A. L. Langham, August 15, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> R. Wood, March 24, 1813. N. S. Wade, ditto, " R. H. Goodwyn, ditto, " M. Parkes, July 2, " W. Pannill, ditto, " John Carney, July 19, " T. H. Ferguson, July 31, " S. H. Bryant, August 1, " John Rice, September 9, "	
<i>Captains.</i> G. Cloud, July 6, 1812. T. M. Nelson, ditto, " Philip Brittain, ditto, " Robert Mitchell, ditto, " Eman. I. Leigh, ditto, " Mark Harden, ditto, " Joseph Bryant, ditto, " Josiah Woods, ditto, " Joseph Clay, ditto, " Jesse Copeland, ditto, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> I. Foster, July 10, 1813.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> George Vashon, July 6, 1812, Adjutant. George Strother, ditto, " William Bailey, ditto, " H. H. Carson, ditto, " Abner S. Lewis, ditto, " Charles Lutterloh, ditto, " W. L. Duffphey, April 15, 1813. William Irvine, August 14, " Jos. J. Clinch, August 15, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> E. H. Bell, March 12, 1812. R. Everitt, March 24, 1813.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Thomas D. Kelly, July 6, 1812. Jos. G. Wall, ditto, " Arthur Fox, ditto, "			

## ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## ELEVENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Isaac Clark, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> W. F. Hail, March 13, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Moody Bedel, July 6, 1812.		Ezek. Jewett, May 13, "	
<i>Majors.</i> O. C. Merrill, March 3, 1813.		F. A. Sawyer, June 26, "	
J. McNeal, jr. August 15, "		T. Aldrich, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> J. W. Weeks, July 6, 1812.		J. V. Barron, ditto, "	
B. S. Egerton, ditto, "		T. Staniford, ditto, "	
Samuel Gordon, ditto, "		Isaac Clark, jr. August 14, "	
W. S. Foster, March 13, 1813.		Wm. Risley, August 15, "	
John Bliss, May 13, "		J. E. Merritt, ditto, "	
Richard Baen, June 26, "		Enoch Cooper, ditto, "	
V. R. Goodrich, ditto, "	Late Quartermaster.	<i>Ensigns.</i> S. C. Cotton, July 19, 1813.	
Horace Hale, August 15, "		J. C. Walker, ditto, "	
Benjamin Smead, ditto, "		John Levake, July 29, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> M. Corning, July 6, 1812.		Joseph Hopkins, Aug. 4, "	
W. Sheldon, March 13, 1813,	District Paymaster.	Thos. Tupper, August 23, "	
W. S. Heaton, ditto, "		P. S. Sandford, ditto, "	
James Wells, ditto, "		Hazen Bedel, Septem. 21, "	
James Greene, May 13, "		B. Stevenson, ditto, "	
H. J. Blake, June 26, "		H. Webster, Septem. 22, "	
D. Crawford, ditto, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> G. P. Spencer, April 7, 1813.	
R. Bucklin, jr. August 15, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> T. Woodward, August 9, 1813.	
N. S. Clarke, ditto, "	Adjutant.	John Sackett, ditto, "	
Thomas Levake, ditto, "			

## TWELFTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Isaac A. Coles, March 12, 1813.		John Towles, July 6, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Thos. Taylor, August 15, 1813.		W. C. Parker, March 29, 1813.	
<i>Majors.</i> R. C. Nicholas, March 3, 1813.		Bailey Bruce, ditto, "	
W. Morgan, June 26, "		A. Eggleston, March 30, "	
<i>Captains.</i> T. P. Moore, July 6, 1812.		R. Booker, ditto, "	
James Gibson, ditto, "		Isaac Keyes, June 26, "	
James Paxton, ditto, "		Jos. McGavock, ditto, "	
Thomas Sangster, ditto, "		David P. Polk, Septem. 30, "	
A. C. Randolph, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> C. Randolph, March 29, 1813.	
James Charlton, ditto, "		P. C. Johnston, ditto, "	
Charles Page, ditto, "		John Strother, ditto, "	
A. L. Madison, ditto, "		David Hunter, ditto, "	
Thomas Post, March 29, 1813.		John Macky, ditto, "	
Robert G. Hite, June 26, "	Late Adjutant.	F. L. Dade, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Z. Morgan, July 6, 1812.		Philip Wager, ditto, "	
J. G. Camp, ditto, "	As. Dp. Q'mast. Gen. Paymaster.	Jos. Shommo, ditto, "	
L. B. Willis, ditto, "		Jos. Thomas, ditto, "	
A. McDonald, ditto, "		Mw. M. Claiborne, jun. August 14, "	
John Key, jr. March 29, 1813.		<i>Ensigns.</i> Geo. Eskridge, March 29, 1813.	
Robert Houston, ditto, "		Michael Crupper, ditto, "	
John Kenney, ditto, "	Quartermaster.	Thomas Blair, April 19, "	
Oth. W. Callis, June 26, "		John Robinson, May 18, "	
William Stone, jr. ditto, "		S. Grantland, jr. May 20, "	
R. Harrison, September 30, "		N. C. Kindey, July 2, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> P. Magruder, July 6, 1812.		De Lafayette Johnston, July 9, "	
M. Hughes, ditto, "		Robert Call, August 1, "	
		R. Randolph, ditto, "	
		S. Bartlett, ditto, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> J. C. Bronaugh, April 28, 1812.	

## THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRTEENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.		
<i>Colonel.</i> P. P. Schuyler, July 6, 1812,	Adjutant General.	Wm. W. Carr, May 13, 1813. D. B. Wilcox, August 15, "	Quartermaster.		
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> S. S. Conner, March 12, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Jacob Sammons, July 6, 1812. Jos. H. Dwight, April 1, 1813, John Williams, ditto, " John Kirby, ditto, " George Reab, jr. April 20, " T. W. Denton, May 13, " John Graham, June 20, " Mason Ronalds, ditto, " John Haight, August 15, " Wm. Anderson, jr. ditto, "			
<i>Majors.</i> J. V. H. Huyck, July 6, 1812. R. M. Malcom, March 3, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> F. J. Wheeler, May 2, 1813. C. Harrison, May 16, " M. C. Cantine, August 1, " G. Helmbold, August 15, " R. Humphreys, Sept. 30, " R. M. Harrison ditto, " A. Schuyler, October 17, "			
<i>Captains.</i> John Sproull, July 6, 1812. Hugh R. Martin, ditto, " Mordecai Myers, ditto, " Myndert M. Dox, ditto, " W. D. Lawrence, ditto, " S. W. Kearney, April 1, 1813. Samuel Haring, ditto, " John K. Paige, May 13, " W. B. Adams, ditto, " John Campbell, August 15, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> J. Y. Lancing, October 15, 1812.			
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> R. S. Gardiner, July 6, 1812, W. Gansevoort, ditto, " John L. Fink, ditto, " Israel Turner, ditto, " Daniel Hugunin, April 1, 1813. Alfred Phelps, May 13, " Hugh Robinson, ditto, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> John McCall, April 15, 1812. David Marsh, April 1, 1813.			
		Paymaster.			

## FOURTEENTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> C. G. Boerstler, June 20, 1813.	Adjutant.	Wm. G. Mills, March 13, 1813,	Aid to Brig. Gen. Winder.				
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Timothy Dix, June 20, 1813.		James H. Gale, ditto, " Kiml. Godwin, ditto, " S. F. Donalson, ditto, " R. Bennett, May 12, " N. N. Robinson, ditto, " W. G. Sanders, May 13, " John Lynch, August 15, "		Paymaster.			
<i>Majors.</i> Samuel Lane, March 3, 1813. I. D. Barnard, June 26, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Abraham Clark, March 13, 1813. Thomas Barton, ditto, " Robert Beall, April 30, " J. H. Falconar, May 4, " C. Comegys, jr. May 10, " B. Ricketts, May 12, " Massom Mudd, ditto, " W. Thompson, ditto, " D. McCrimmin, May 13, "			Adjutant.		
<i>Captains.</i> H. Grindage, July 6, 1812. T. Montgomery, ditto, " Henry Fleming, ditto, " Wm. McIlvain, ditto, " K. McKenzie, ditto, " D. Cummings, March 13, 1813. Thomas Karney, May 13, " Reuben Gilder, June 26, " Jos. Marshall, August 15, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> W. G. Shade, March 13, 1813. John A. Dix, May 10, " Henry Parker, May 12, " T. Davidge ditto, " Jesse Keen, July 19, " Asa Partridge, Sept. 24, "				Quartermaster.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> J. McDonald, July 6, 1812. Richard Arell, ditto, " Peter Rich ditto, " John Waring March 13, 1813. Thomas Randall, ditto, " John Beckett, ditto, " Edw. Wilson, May 12, " A. Woodward, May 13, " J. W. Thompson, June 26, " J. B. Sparkes, August 15, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> John Young, June 4, 1812.					
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> James Christie, July 6, 1812. George Murdock, ditto, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> S. W. Magruder, March 28, 1813. R. C. Downes, May 12, "					

## FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## FIFTEENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> D. Brearley, March 12, 1813.		David Curtis, May 13, 1813. C. Stewart, August 15, " John Scott, ditto, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Robert Carr, August 15, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> D. Fraser, March 13, 1813,	Assist. Deputy Paymaster General.
<i>Majors.</i> E. L. Whitlock, July 6, 1812. William King, March 3, 1813,	Adjutant General.	J. Dickerson, ditto, " William Coffie, ditto, " C. Noyes, May 13, " H. K. Mullin, ditto, " J. T. David, ditto, " C. H. Roberts, ditto, " D. E. Burch, August 15, " John Rose, ditto, "	Quartermaster.
<i>Captains.</i> Z. Rossell, July 6, 1812. C. W. Hunter, ditto, " White Youngs, ditto, " H. H. Van Dalsem, ditto, " J. L. Barton, July 30, " J. D. Hayden, March 13, 1813. Aaron Sutphen, May 13, " Abm. Per Lee, ditto, " Jb. D. Howell, August 15, " G. McGlassin, ditto, "	Brigade Major.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Levi Heath, August 1, 1813. Wm. B. Howell, ditto, " Floreath Meline, Oct. 1, "	Adjutant. Paymaster.
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> William Barnett, July 6, 1812. James Piatt, ditto, " J. Schofield, ditto, " R. L. Howell, Sept. 15, " S. McDougall, Sept. 30, " David Riddle, March 13, 1813. A. Godwin, jr. May 13, "	Brigade Major.	<i>Ensigns.</i> J. C. Dehart, September 9, 1813. Ch. W. Lee, September 30, " <i>Surgeon.</i> Fenn Deming, April 14, 1812. <i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> R. T. Baker, March 12, 1812.	

## SIXTEENTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> C. Pearce, July 6, 1812.		Thomas Mahon, August 15, 1813. Samuel Weigly, ditto, " Thomas Evans, ditto, " E. Olmstead, Sept. 30, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> R. Dennis, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Charles Fidler, May 16, 1813. T. P. McMahon, May 19, " Wm. Downey, August 15, " S. Nicholson, ditto, " S. Roberts, ditto, " Thomas Lyon, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> W. Lee, March 3, 1813, Robert Gray, August 15, "	Deputy Paymaster General.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Ths. Findley, August 15, 1813. John Williams, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> G. G. Steele, July 6, 1812. A. McEwen, ditto, " J. F. McElroy, ditto, " W. Davenport, Sept. 28, " J. Machesney, March 13, 1813. M. Greenwood, April 16, " John Baldy, ditto, " J. W. Aitken, August 15, " F. D. Cummins, ditto, " J. D. Coon, ditto, "	Late Paymaster. Late Adjutant.	<i>Ensigns.</i> George Bryan, August 1, 1813. Samuel Ladd, ditto, " Hector Burns, ditto, " Thos. Martin, ditto, " L. Diffenbuch, August 14, " Nathaniel Young, ditto, 19, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> N. McLaughlin, April 16, 1813. Thomas Horrell, ditto, " T. M. Powers, ditto, " Isaac Finch, August 15, " John Rahm, ditto, " Jacob Whisler, August 5, "	Quartermaster.	<i>Surgeon.</i> S. Gilliland, May 15, 1812. <i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> G. Baylies, December 2, 1812.	

## SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Samuel Wells, July 6, 1812.		Jos. Duncan, March 13, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> William M'Millan, July 6, 1812.		Chesteen Scott, do. 30, "	Dep. Qr. Mast. Gen.
<i>Majors.</i> Geo. Croghan, March 30, 1813, Richard Graham, " 30, "	Lieut. Col. brevet, August 2, 1813.	Taylor Berry, do. 30, " Thos. Hawkins, April 16, " James Gray, do. 16, " William Baylor, Aug. 15, " T. Buckley, do. 15, " Samuel S. Berry, do. 15, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Wm. Bradford, July 6, 1812, Charles Quiray, do. 6, " R. Hightower, do. 6, " David Holt, do. 6, " James Hunter, do. 6, " William J. Adair, do. 6, " James Duncan, jr. do. 6, " C. H. Holder, March 29, 1813. B. W. Sanders, April 16, " M. L. Hawkins, April 16, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> John Hamilton, April 6, 1813. G. J. Floyd, do. 6, " S. H. Craig, do. 12, " Reuben Taylor, do. 12, " T. S. Morgan, do. 12, " William Hughes, May 13, " William Eubank, Aug. 15, " John Taylor, do. 15, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Benj. Johnson, July 6, 1812. Alex. Robertson, do. 6, " H. Crittenden, do. 6, " M. W. Fisher, do. 6, " J. Hackley, jr. March 13, 1813. A. Garrett, do. 13, " T. Mountjoy, do. 13, " C. A. Baylar, April 16, " Parry Hawkins, do. 16, " Philip King, Aug. 15, "	Paymaster.	<i>Ensigns.</i> G. M. Beall, April 6, 1813. James Maxwell, June 11, " R. W. Ewing, do. 16, " J. Mershon, do. 18, " Richard Doyle, July 2, " Ander. Evans, Aug. 1, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Ed. Ship, jr. March 13, 1813, James Munday, do. 13, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> William Turner, April 7, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> W. S. Madison, Dec. 2, 1812. J. M. Talbot, March 13, 1813.	

## EIGHTEENTH REGIMENT.

<i>Colonel.</i> William Drayton, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> W. N. Miller, July 6, 1812. R. Mebane, jun. do. 6, " John Watkins, do. 6, " H. Brown, do. 6, " R. Thruston, do. 6, " John Street, do. 6, " Alex. Pagan, March 13, 1813. John Peebles, do. 13, " W. D. Freeman, June 30, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Benajah White, July 6, 1812.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Horatio Dade, March 13, 1813. Fred'k Kinloch, do. 13, " S. W. Smith, June 16, " John S. Todd, July 22, "	
<i>Majors.</i> William Strother, July 6, 1812. M. J. Kenan, June 26, 1813.		<i>Ensigns.</i> W. Whately, June 29, 1813. George Bruton, do. 29, " J. W. Allston, do. 29, " George Taylor, Aug. 6, " A. B. Addison, Oct. 11, "	
<i>Captains.</i> J. G. Blount, jr. July 6, 1812. George Butler, do. 6, " William Taylor, do. 6, " Edward King, do. 6, " H. P. Taylor, do. 6, " Owen Clinton, do. 6, " T. I. Robison, do. 6, " Jas. Hamilton, March 13, 1813. M. G. Waage, June 26, "	Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon.</i>	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> W. A. Blount, July 6, 1812. B. T. Elmore, do. 6, " Elias D. Dick, do. 6, " J. W. Farrow, do. 6, " Alexander King, do. 6, " William Tisdale, do. 6, " Thos. Reynolds, March 13, 1813. T. C. Wilhight, June 26, " E. S. Hawkins, do. 30, "	Quartermaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> William M'Caw, May 1, 1812. James B. Hill, July 6, "	



## NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## NINETEENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> John Miller, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants:</i> C. Mitchell, March 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> J. B. Campbell, July 6, 1812.	Col. brevet, Dec. 18, 1812.	J. Whistler, jun. do. 30, "	
<i>Majors.</i> George Todd, July 6, 1812. Thomas S. Jesup, April 6, 1813.		E. T. Langham, April 6, "	
<i>Captains.</i> A. Edwards, July 6, 1812. H. H. Hickman, do. 6, " Wilson Elliott, do. 6, " James Herron, do. 6, " John T. Chunn, do. 6, " Hugh Moore, do. 6, " Asahel Nearing, do. 6, " John Anderson, March 16, 1813. David Gwynne, do. 30, " G. W. Jackson, Aug. 15, "		Geo. Atchison, do. 6, " A. E. Hoffman, do. 6, " W. Blanchard, do. 6, " George W. Stall, do. 6, " Asher Phillips, May 20, " John Miligan, Aug. 15, " John Stockton, do. 15, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Samuel Booker, July 6, 1812. Stephen Lee, do. 6, " John Hazelton, do. 6, " James Campbell, do. 6, " James Morrow, do. 6, " J. D. Fleming, do. 6, " Philip P. Price, March 30, 1813. Jonathan Rees, do. 30, " H. Frederick, Aug. 15, " Battle Harrison, do. 15, "	Topographical Eng.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Jacob Anderson, April 6, 1813. Mason Seward, do. 6, " Robert Carr, do. 6, " D. L. Carney, do. 6, " William Leavitt, do. 6, " A. C. Looker, Aug. 15, "	
		<i>Ensigns.</i> John Cochran, July 6, 1812. E. B. Baskerville, do. 6, " Hugh May, do. 6, " John Simmons, do. 19, 1813. C. Niswanger, do. 19, " T. R. M'Knight, do. 19, " John Jolly, do. 19, " D. E. Jackson, do. 29, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> Levi Rogers, Jan 28, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> Charles Marvin, Mar. 12, 1812. Daniel Turney, Dec. 31, "	

## TWENTIETH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> T. M. Randolph, March 3, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Thos. Blackwell, July 6, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> D. Campbell, March 12, 1813.		John Archer, do. 6, "	Paymaster.
<i>Majors.</i> John Stanard, March 3, 1813. Lewis L. Taylor, do. 3, "		J. H. Howard, do. 6, " George Evans, jun. do. 6, " William Ligon, do. 6, " John B. Hogan, April 16, 1813. W. F. Pendleton, do. 16, " J. M. Glassell, do. 16, " E. B. Randolph, Aug. 14, " Daniel Booker, do. 15, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Richard Pollard, July 6, 1812. Wm. S. Jett, jun. do. 6, " J. A. Thornton, do. 6, " J. Macrea, jun. do. 6, " Byrd C. Willis, do. 6, " W. A. Shelton, April 5, 1813. T. B. Randolph, do. 5, " Charles Gee, do. 16, " Bernard Peyton, do. 16, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> John Wiley, jun. Mar. 30, 1813. John Hill, do. 30, " H. Saunders, jun. April 4, " Jacob Koontz, do. 12, " Thomas Rawlins, do. 16, " Frs. Callaway, do. 16, " Jos. Barnett, do. 16, " Samuel Harris, Aug. 14, " W. H. Godwin, do. 14, " G. M'Laughlin, do. 15, "	Quartermaster.
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Micajah Lynch, July 6, 1812. John P. Duval, do. 6, " M. M. Payne, do. 6, " W. G. Hayes, do. 6, " R. Crawford, do. 6, " Clement White, do. 6, " Thomas Harris, do. 6, " Benjamin Smith, April 5, 1813. Thomas Howson, do. 16, " Thomas Monroe, do. 16, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> J. Pettipool, July 6, 1812. Dabney Morris, May 3, 1813. H. Lewis, July 2, " James Fuller, do. 2, " John Baker, do. 29, " Robert Carter, Aug. 1, " Jos. B. Scott, do. 1, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> M. C. Buck, July 2, 1813.	

TWENTY-FIRST AND TWENTY-SECOND REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> El. W. Ripley, March 12, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Wm. Bowman, July 6, 1812. John Downer, do. 6, " James Pratt, March 13, 1813. Nathl N. Hall, do. 13, " A. Bigelow, April 16, " Jos. Cilley, May 13, " N. Blasdell, Aug. 15, " Edward Hall, do. 15, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Timothy Upham, March 12, 1813.			Quartermaster.
<i>Majors.</i> John Johnson, June 26, 1813. Jos. Grafton, do. 26, "	Assist. Adjutant Gen.		
<i>Captains.</i> Josiah H. Vose, July 6, 1812. Charles E. Tobey, do. 6, " Joseph Treat, do. 6, " Charles Procter, do. 6, " Jer. Chapman, do. 6, " Benjamin Ropes, do. 6, " Lemuel Bradford, do. 6, " S. Burbank, March 13, 1813. M. Marston, June 26, " J. Eastman, jun. July 30, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Brackett Paine, Aug. 15, 1813. Daniel Rose, do. 15, "	Assist. Topog. Eng.
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Daniel Henderson, July 6, 1812. Perez Loring, March 13, 1813. Azor Orne, do. 13, " Peter Pelham, April 16, " Henry Bender, May 13, " J. Bartlett, June 26, " Ira Drew, Aug. 14, "	Adjutant.	<i>Ensigns.</i> H. C. Babcock, Aug. 1, 1813. J. W. Holding, do. 5, " Benjamin Jackson, do. 5, " Francis Larned, Oct. 1, " Nicholas Tilman, do. 1, " Brad. Farnum, do. 17, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> A. Trowbridge, Aug. 1, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> Josiah Everett, July 21, 1813. Elisha Allen, do. 21, "	

TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Hugh Brady, July 6, 1812.		John D. Kehr, March 13, 1813. Robert Dunn, April 16, " Gideon Low, do. 16, " Thomas Wright, do. 16, " Robert R. Hall, June 20, " John R. Guy, do. 20, " John Armstrong, do. 20, " John Fee, do. 26, "	Quartermaster. Assist. Adj. Gen.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> George M <sup>r</sup> Feely, July 6, 1812.			Paymaster.
<i>Majors.</i> Robert Lucas, March 3, 1813. Ralph Marlin, do. 3, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Jas. M <sup>r</sup> Kenney, March 13, 1813. Wm. Gillaspie, do. 13, " Peleg Slocum, June 16, " O. Martine, do. 26, " R. M. Davidson, do. 26, " Samuel Brady, do. 26, " John Arrison, do. 26, " J. H. Vanderslice, July 19, " G. S. Wilkins, do. 29, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Sampson S. King, July 6, 1812. Jacob Carmack, do. 6, " John Pentland, do. 6, " John Foster, do. 6, " Silas Amberson, do. 6, " David Espy, April 16, " Jos. Henderson, do. 16, " Th. Lawrence, June 20, " Willis Foulk, do. 20, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> James Stewart, July 19, 1813. Joseph Stahl, do. 29, " John Clark, do. 29, " Geo. F. Semple, Aug. 1, " John Semple, do. 4, " Robert Beans, do. 14, " Fred. Hennings, Oct. 1, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> John Larken, July 6, 1812. Thos. Y. Sprogel, do. 6, " James Huston, do. 6, " William Morrow, do. 6, " John Greene, March 13, 1813. S. A. Rippey, April 16, " G. W. Ferguson, do. 16, " William Sturgis, June 20, " D. Cornyn, do. 20, " James M <sup>r</sup> Ghee, do. 20, "	Adjutant.	<i>Surgeon.</i> Wm. N. Mercer, Aug. 7, 1813.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Jacob Fetter, July 6, 1812. J. Culbertson, March 13, 1813.		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> P. H. Craig, July 6, 1812. Jesse Magaw, do. 6, "	

TWENTY-THIRD AND TWENTY-FOURTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

TWENTY-THIRD INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> James P. Preston, Aug. 15, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Rod. Simons, July 6, 1812. J. P. Livingston, Sep. 25, " Levi S. Burr, March 18, 1813. J. M'Aulay, jun. April 16, " Jus. Ingersoll, June 20, " Samuel Tappan, do. 20, " Alph. Wetmore, do. 26, "	Quartermaster.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Jas. R. Mullany, March 3, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> W. G. Belknap, April 5, 1813. S. B. Griswold, do. 5, " Zadoc P. Morse, do. 16, " John Jones, do. 16, " Rd. C. Smyth, May 3, " James S. Abeel, do. 3, " Abm. Cantine, do. 10, " J. P. Dieterich, do. 10, " Rd. Phillips, do. 13, " Samuel R. Hill, June 21, "	
<i>Majors.</i> H. B. Armstrong, April 12, 1813. D. M'Farland, Aug. 15, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> Ezra King, July 6, 1812. J. Cauldwell, jun. Apr. 7, 1813. John B. Truax, May 4, " Francis Blaize, do. 12, " Dudley Lamb, Oct. 4, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Peter Mills, July 6, 1812. Derick Van Veghten, do. 6, " David Scott, do. 6, " Thomas Delano, do. 6, " Hor. G. Armstrong, Sep. 25, " L. B. Canfield, do. 25, " Isaac Roach, jun. April 13, 1813. S. D. Wattles, June 20, " A. W. Odell, do. 20, " E. F. Gilbert, do. 26, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> Silas Fuller, July 6, 1812.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> John M'Cartey, July 6, 1812. R. Goodell, do. 6, " William Clarke, do. 6, " B. H. Mooers, do. 6, " John M. Lowe, March 17, 1813. W. J. Worth, do. 19, " H. Whiting, June 20, " P. L. Hogeboom, do. 20, " Fred. Brown, do. 20, " Abijah Bennet, do. 20, "	Aid to Major General Lewis. Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> John Gale, July 9, 1812. Henry White, do. 28, 1813.	

TWENTY-FOURTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> W. P. Anderson, July 6, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Abner Hynes, April 20, 1813. T. P. Favrot, June 26, " Adam Peck, jun. do. 26, " Litt. Johnston, do. 26, " Sam'l T. Balch, Aug. 14, " John Butler, do. 14, " Jos. A. Martin, do. 14, " W. M. Crawford, do. 15, " Daniel Green, do. 15, " J. S. Williamson, do. 15, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Joseph L. Smith, March 12, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Francis Valle, May 13, 1813. John Gillbreath, do. 13, " Rd. M. Woods, do. 13, " F. Baldrige, do. 13, " William Martin, Aug. 9, " W. G. Childress, do. 15, " Lewis M. Ayer, do. 15, " Hezk. Jackson, do. 15, "	
<i>Majors.</i> F. Armstrong, June 26, 1813. Robert Butler, Aug. 15, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> Robert Renfro, Aug. 9, 1813. Alex. Hamilton, do. 9, " R. M'Combs, do. 9, " W. K. Pauling, do. 9, " William Johnson, do. 9, " Abm. Fine, Oct. 1, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Aw. H. Holmes, July 6, 1812. Alexander Gray, do. 6, " John A. Rodgers, do. 6, " William O. Allen, do. 6, " Robert Desha, do. 6, " J. H. Campbell, do. 6, " Minor Sturges, May 13, 1813. Frank Hampton, June 26, " W. O. Winston, Aug. 15, " W. Wilkinson, do. 15, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> Henry Skinner, April 5, 1813.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Silas Stevens, July 6, 1812. James Stuart, do. 6, " Samuel Scott, March 13, 1813. Joseph Anthony, June 26, " Rt. Buntin, jun. do. 26, " Tal. Richards, Aug. 15, " Uriah Allison, do. 15, " Caleb G. Fobes, do. 15, " John O. Fallon, do. 15, " Joseph Perkins, do. 15, "	Paymaster.  Aid to Major Gen. Harrison.	<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> C. Humphries, April 25, 1812. Harry Bradford, Aug. 9, 1813.	

TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY AND RIFLE REGIMENT.

TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	
<i>Colonel.</i> E. P. Gaines, March 12, 1813:	Adjutant General.	Arch'd C. Cray, April 16, 1813.	Quartermaster.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Jonas Cutting, July 6, 1812.		T. S. Seymour, June 20, " Jesse Beach, do. 26, " E. Shaylor, Aug. 15, " Alex. T. F. Bill, do. 15, " John G. Munn, do. 15, " George M'Chain, Sept. 30, "		
<i>Majors.</i> C. K. Gardner, June 26, 1813. William Batteny, Aug. 15, "	Assist. Adj. Gen.	<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> J. Hutchinson, May 13, 1813. G. Talcott, jun. July 10, " Russell Eddy, do. 13, " Clark Robbins, do. 13, " John Gifford, do. 13, " J. D. Brown, Aug. 15, " S. H. Devotion, Sept. 28, "		Dep. Com. Ord. Paymaster.
<i>Captains.</i> George Howard, July 6, 1812, Peter Bradley, do. 6, " Joseph Kinney, March 13, 1813. T. M. Read, April 16, " J. B. Murdoch, do. 16, " Henry Dyer, June 20, " Minor Robbins, do. 26, " J. A. Thomas, Aug. 15, " Benjamin Watson, do. 15, " D. Ketchum, Sept. 30, "	Late Quartermaster.	<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Henry De Witt, Oct. 17, 1813.		
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> J. Burbidge, March 13, 1813. Edward White, April 16, " Daniel Forward, do. 16, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> Giles Gridley, April 9, 1812.		
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> P. Woodbury, July 6, 1812. J. L. Comstock, Dec. 2, "		

RIFLE REGIMENT.

<i>Colonel.</i> T. A. Smith, July 6, 1812.	Aid to Maj. Gen. Pinckney.	<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Harvey Murray, Oct. 17, 1812. J. S. M'Intosh, Nov. 13, " Jos. Calhoun, jun. Dec. 2, " Hyem Cohen, do. 2, " William Arnold, do. 3, " John M'Intire, do. 3, " J. Shortridge, do. 3, " John Hanson, Dec. 4, " John Harlee, Jan. 20, 1813. Josiah Hill, do. 20, "	Quartermaster.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> G. W. Sevier, July 6, 1812.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> S. V. Hamilton, March 12, 1813. R. M'Farland, do. 12, " Jacob Tipton, do. 12, " W. Armstrong, do. 12, " Bennet Riley, do. 12, " L. Norton, do. 12, " J. S. Gray, May 20, " Andrew Lindsay, June 29, "	
<i>Majors.</i> J. M'Donald, Aug. 1, 1812. Benj. Forsyth, Jan. 20, 1813.		<i>Ensigns.</i> T. F. Smith, July 2, 1813. Samuel Cobbs, do. 2, " G. Davidson, do. 2, " F. Howard, do. 19, " J. H. Stannon, do. 29, " Peter Albright, Aug. 1, " Edward Drake, do. 7, "	
<i>Captains.</i> H. R. Graham, March 8, 1809. A. A. Massias, July 1, " F. Ridgeway, do. 31, 1810. Michael C. Hays, June 1, 1811. L. Morgan, July 1, " Daniel Appling, April 1, 1812. Joshua Hamilton, July 6, " T. A. Patterson, Aug. 1, " T. Ramsay, Nov. 30, " William Smith, Jan. 20, 1813.		<i>Surgeon.</i> W. W. Hall, March 24, 1812.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Elias Stallings, March 16, 1811. L. G. A. Armistead, Feb. 10, 1812. W. E. Morris, April 30, " John Findley, do. 30, " H. V. Swearingen, July 6, " E. Wadsworth, Aug. 1, 1812. William Townly, do. 1, " W. C. Beard, Sept. 27, " James Ryan, Nov. 30, " George Gray, Jan. 20, 1813.		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> S. Gantt, July 2, 1813.	

## LINEAL RANK.

## MAJOR GENERALS.

Henry Dearborn, January 27, 1812,  
Thomas Pinckney, March 27, 1812,  
James Wilkinson, March 2, 1813,  
Wade Hampton, March 2, 1813,  
Morgan Lewis, March 2, 1813,  
W. H. Harrison, March 2, 1813.

## BRIGADIER GENERALS.

Jos. Bloomfield, March 27, 1812,  
James Winchester, March 27, 1812,  
William Hull, April 8, 1812,  
Thomas Flournoy, June 18, 1812,  
T. H. Cushing, July 2, 1812,  
John Chandler, July 8, 1812,  
John P. Boyd, August 26, 1812,  
Thomas Parker, March 12, 1813,  
George Izard, March 12, 1813,  
W. H. Winder, March 12, 1813,  
D. M'Arthur, March 12, 1813,  
Lewis Cass, March 12, 1813,  
Benjamin Howard, March 12, 1813,  
D. R. Williams, July 9, 1813,  
Jacob Brown, July 19, 1813,  
L. Covington, August 1, 1813,

## COLONELS.

*April 1, 1802.*

H. Burbeck, 1st art. brig. gen. brev.

*May 3, 1808.*

William Russell, 7th infantry.

*July 8.*

Jonas Simonds, 6th infantry.

*August 18.*

J. Kingsbury, 1st infantry, in staff.

*March 12, 1812.*

M. Porter, L. A. brig. gen. brevet.

*July 6.*

Richards Sparks, 2d infantry,  
Alexander Macomb, 3d artillery,  
Thomas A. Smith, rifle,  
P. P. Schuyler, 13th infantry, staff,  
Simon Larned, 9th infantry,  
James Burn, 2d light dragoons,  
Isaac Clark, 11th infantry,  
Hugh Brady, 22d infantry,  
Wm. P. Anderson, 24th infantry,  
Cromwell Pearce, 16th infantry,  
Patrick Jack, 8th infantry,  
Samuel Wells, 17th infantry,  
John Miller, 19th infantry,  
William Drayton, 18th infantry,  
James Wellborn, 10th infantry,

*July 31.*

Joseph G. Swift, engineer,

*August 15.*

Daniel Bissell, 5th infantry.

*August 26.*

Robert Purdy, 4th infantry.

*March 3, 1813.*

T. M. Randolph, 20th infantry.

*March 12.*

Ed. P. Gaines, 25th inf. adj. gen.

Winfield Scott, 2d artillery,

David Brearly, 15th infantry,

Isaac A. Coles, 12th infantry,

Elea. W. Ripley, 21st infantry,

L. Laval, 1st light dragoons.

*June 20.*

Charles G. Boerstler, 14th infantry.

*August 15.*

Homer V. Milton, 3d infantry,

James P. Preston, 23d infantry.

## LIEUTENANT COLONELS.

*April 1, 1802.*

C. Freeman, 1st art. col. brevet.

*November 30, 1810.*

J. Miller, 6th infantry, col. brevet.

*June 6, 1811.*

Gilbert C. Russell, 3d infantry.

*December 2.*

J. R. Fenwick, light art. col. staff.

*July 6, 1812.*

John Bowyer, 2d infantry,  
John Darrington, 4th infantry,  
George W. Sevier, rifle,  
A. T. Macneill, 2d light dragoons,  
William M'Millan, 17th infantry,  
J. B. Campbell, 19th inf. col. brevet,  
Benaja White, 18th infantry,  
Jonas Cutting, 25th infantry,  
George M'Feely, 22d infantry,  
Richard Dennis, 16th infantry,  
Moody Bedel, 11th infantry,  
Andrew Pickens, 10th infantry.

*July 31.*

W. K. Armistead, engineer.

*August 15.*

Robert C. Nicholas, 1st infantry.

*March 3, 1813.*

George E. Mitchell, 3d artillery,

James R. Mullany, 23d infantry,

James House, 3d artillery,

F. K. Huger, 2d artillery, col. staff.

*March 12.*

Samuel S. Conner, 13th infantry,

Timothy Upham, 21st infantry,

Thomas Aspinwall, 9th infantry,

Joseph L. Smith, 24th infantry,

David Campbell, 20th infantry,

William Lindsay, 2d artillery.

*April 30.*

Thornton Posey, 7th infantry.

*June 20.*

Timothy Dix, 14th infantry,

N. Luckett, 1st light dragoons.

*August 15.*

George Gibson, 5th infantry.

Robert Carr, 15th infantry,

Thomas Taylor, 12th infantry,

Lawrence Manning, 8th infantry.

*March 21, 1800.*

Z. Pike, 1st inf. lieu. col. brevet.

*July 31.*

W. M'Rea, 1st art. lieu. col. brevet.

*December 1, 1804.*

A. Y. Nicoll, 1st artillery, col. staff.

*March 15, 1810.*

A. Eustis, lt. art. lieu. col. brevet.

*July 6, 1812.*

W. R. Boote, 2d infantry, col. staff,

John Campbell, 6th infantry,

George Bomford, engineer,

Eph. L. Whitlock, 15th infantry,

John T. Woodford, 2d lt. dragoons,

Samuel Nye, 3d artillery,

William Strother, 18th infantry,

Daniel M. Forney, 2d artillery,

John V. H. Huych, 13th infantry,

George Todd, 19th infantry.

*July 31.*

William M'Ree, engineer.

*August 1.*

James M'Donald, rifle.

*August 15.*

Matthew Arbuckle, 3d infantry.

*August 26.*

Nathan Heald, 4th infantry.

*September 16.*

J. V. Ball, 2d lt. drag. lt. col. brev.

*January 20, 1813.*

Eli B. Clemson, 1st infantry,

N. Swan, 2d infantry, col. in staff,

Ninian Pinkney, 5th infantry,

William Carson, 3d infantry,

Horatio Stark, 6th infantry,

Arthur Morgan, 7th infantry,

Stephen Ranney, 4th infantry,

Benjamin Forsyth, rifle,

Thomas Pitts, light artillery.

*March 3.*

George Armistead, 3d artillery,

Washington Lee, 16th infantry,

W. King, 15th infantry, col. staff,

Samuel Lane, 14th infantry,

John Stanard, 20th infantry,

Richard M. Malcolm, 13th infantry,  
Lewis L. Taylor, 20th infantry,  
Robert C. Nicholas, 12th infantry,  
Robert Lucas, 22d infantry,  
William S. Hamilton, 10th infantry,  
Ralph Marlin, 22d infantry,  
Orsa. C. Merrill, 11th infantry.

*March 25.*

William Cumming, 8th infantry.

*March 30.*

G. Croghan, 17th inf. lt. col. brevet,

Richard Graham, 17th infantry.

*April 6.*

Thomas S. Jesup, 19th infantry.

*April 12.*

H. B. Armstrong, 23d infantry.

*April 30.*

Benjamin Wallace, 5th infantry.

*May 5.*

James B. Many, 1st artillery.

*June 7.*

Thomas A. Helms, 1st lt. dragoons.

*June 26.*

J. Johnson, 21st infantry, in staff,

Jacob Hindman, 2d artillery,

Charles K. Gardner, 25th infantry,

Willo. Morgan, 12th infantry,

Francis Armstrong, 24th infantry,

Joseph Grafton, 21st infantry,

Isaac D. Bernard, 14th infantry,

Michael J. Kenan, 18th infantry,

Chester Lyman, 9th infantry,

A. P. Hayne, 1st light dragoons.

*August 15.*

J. Bankhead, 7th inf., col. staff,

Ross Bird, 7th infantry,

Ang. L. Langham, 10th infantry,

Henry Leavenworth, 9th infantry,

Daniel M'Farland, 23d infantry,

Robert Butler, 24th infantry,

John M'Neal, 11th infantry,

William Batten, 25th infantry,

Robert Gray, 16th infantry,

Philip Cook, 8th infantry.

## CAPTAINS.

1797.

J. Whistler, 1st inf., major brevet.

1800.

H. M'Call, 1st inf., major brevet.

1801.

L. Beall, 1st artillery, maj. brevet.

1804.

Samuel T. Dyson, 1st artillery,

Nathaniel Leonard, 1st artillery.

1805.

Charles Wollstonecraft, 1st artillery.

1806.

J. B. Walbach, 1st art., col. staff.

1807.

Moses Swett, 1st artillery.

1808.

Charles Gratiot, engineer,

William Wilson, 1st artillery,

John Nicks, 3d infantry,

H. Atkinson, 3d inf., col. in staff,

John M'Clelland, 3d infantry,

Colin Buckner, 5th infantry,

Simon Owens, 1st infantry,

John Binney, 4th infantry,

James Woodruff, 3d infantry,

D. Hughes, 1st inf., major staff.

1809.

Enoch Humphreys, 1st artillery,

E. Beebe, 6th inf., major staff,

W. Piatt, 2d infantry, col. staff.

Henry R. Graham, rifle,

Return B. Brown, 4th infantry,

Uriah Blue, 7th infantry,

John Machesney, 6th infantry,

J. Snelling, 4th inf., major brevet.

Abraham A. Massias, rifle,

Francis Newman, 1st artillery,

J. T. Arrowsmith, 6th infantry,

Richard Oldham, 7th infantry,

William Butler, 3d infantry,

Gad Humphreys, 6th infantry,

## LINEAL RANK—Continued.

## CAPTAINS—Continued.

1810.

William Lawrence, 2d infantry,  
James Doherty, 7th infantry,  
John Walworth, 6th infantry,  
Asa Morgan, 1st light dragoons,  
George M. Brooke, 5th infantry,  
J. Gibson, light artillery, col. in staff,  
Richard Whartenby, 5th infantry,  
William Campbell, light artillery,  
Robert H. M'Pherson, light artillery,  
Alden Patridge, engineer,  
Fielder Ridgeway, rifleman,  
Robert B. Moore, 3d infantry,  
E. Cutler, 7th infantry, maj. staff,  
Townsend Stith, 5th infantry,  
Peter Muhlenberg, 6th infantry,  
Z. Taylor, 7th infantry, major brev.  
Walter H. Overton, 7th infantry,  
1811.

J. S. Swearingen, 1st art. maj. staff,  
James Denking, 3d infantry,  
Seleck Osborne, 1st light dragoons,  
C. Nicholas, 1st inf., major staff,  
William M'Clelland, 7th infantry,  
Henry B. Brevoort, 2d infantry,  
John N. M'Intosh, light artillery,  
Hays G. White, 3d infantry,  
Silas Halsey, 1st light dragoons,  
Michael C. Hays, rifleman,  
Alexander A. White, 7th infantry,  
Lodowick Morgan, rifleman,  
James Hanhan, 1st artillery,  
Samuel Price, light artillery,  
Oliver G. Burton, 4th infantry,  
Alexander M'Ilhenny, 5th infantry,  
Michael Walsh, 1st artillery,  
T. Chambers, 5th inf., maj. staff,  
Alex. Cummings, 1st light dragoons,  
Charles Fuller, 4th infantry,  
James Dorman, 5th infantry,  
Clement Sadlier, 6th infantry,  
January 3, 1812.

R. Sterry, 6th inf. major in staff.

March 12.

John Miller, 2d infantry,  
Daniel Baker, 1st infantry,  
James Reed, 1st artillery.

April 1.

Andrew M'Dowell, light artillery,  
Daniel Appling, rifle.

June 4.

J. E. A. Masters, 6th infantry.

July 1.

E. D. Wood, engineer, maj. brevet.

July 6.

Reuben Chamberlain, 2d infantry,  
Luther Leonard, light artillery,  
Joshua Hamilton, rifle,  
Ichabod B. Crane, 3d artillery,  
Roger Jones, 3d artillery,  
James H. Boyle, 3d artillery,  
Alexander S. Brooks, 3d artillery,  
Nathan Towson, 2d artillery,  
Samuel B. Archer, 2d artillery,  
William Nicholas, 2d artillery,  
James N. Barker, 2d artillery,  
Stephen R. Proctor, 2d light drag.  
Jacob B. Pon, 2d artillery,  
Sanders Donoho, 2d artillery,  
Samuel G. Hopkins, 2d light drag.  
Henry Hall, 2d light dragoons,  
Thomas Biddle, jr., 2d artillery,  
Thomas P. Moore, 12th infantry,  
Henry Grindage, 14th infantry,  
John W. Gookin, 3d artillery,  
Richard Pollard, 20th infantry,  
Zachariah Russell, 15th infantry,  
George Cloud, 10th infantry,  
Joseph Philips, 2d artillery,  
Thomas M. Nelson, 10th infantry,  
Andrew H. Holmes, 24th infantry,  
John Sproull, 13th infantry,  
Josiah H. Vose, 21st infantry,  
William Bradford, 17th infantry,  
Peter Mills, 23d infantry.

James Gibson, 12th infantry,  
William Van Deursen, 3d artillery,  
Samuel D. Harris, 2d light dragoons,  
John A. Burd, 2d light dragoons,  
Abraham Edwards, 19th infantry,  
Joseph Selden, 2d light dragoons,  
Turner Crooker, 9th infantry,  
John G. Blount, 18th infantry,  
Charles Quiray, 17th infantry,  
Jas. I. B. Romayne, 3d artillery,  
George G. Steele, 16th infantry,  
Hugh R. Martin, 13th infantry,  
David E. Twiggs, 8th infantry,  
Richard Hightower, 17th infantry,  
Charles W. Hunter, 15th infantry,  
Sampson S. King, 23d infantry,  
George Howard, 25th infantry,  
John W. Weeks, 11th infantry,  
George Butler, 18th infantry,  
Dk. Van Veghten, 23d infantry,  
Charles E. Tobey, 21st infantry,  
Thomas Montgomery, 14th infantry,  
James Paxton, 12th infantry,  
Har. H. Hickman, 19th infantry,  
Hor. H. Watson, 3d artillery,  
Joseph Treat, 21st infantry,  
Alexander Gray, 24th infantry,  
Robert Cunningham, 8th infantry,  
Philip Brittain, 10th infantry,  
Mordecai Myers, 13th infantry,  
John Ritchie, 2d artillery,  
Hodijah Meade, 20th infantry,  
Ebenezer B. Morse, 3d artillery,  
Jonas Holland, 2d light dragoons,  
Thomas Sangster, 12th infantry,  
Ar. C. Randolph, 12th infantry,  
John Goodall, 2d artillery,  
Jacob Carmack, 22d infantry,  
Myndert M. Dox, 13th infantry,  
William Chisholm, 8th infantry,  
Charles Proctor, 21st infantry,  
William S. Jett, jr., 20th infantry,  
Wilson Elliott, 19th infantry,  
James M'Keon, 3d artillery,  
White Youngs, 15th infantry,  
William M'Ivain, 14th infantry,  
John A. Thornton, 20th infantry,  
Rufus M'Intire, 3d artillery,  
David Holt, 17th infantry,  
John A. Rodgers, 24th infantry,  
John Butler, 2d light dragoons,  
John Pentland, 22d infantry,  
Felix W. Warley, 8th infantry,  
Robert Mitchell, 10th infantry,  
Jesse Robinson, 2d artillery,  
William Taylor, 18th infantry,  
Alexander M'Ewen, 16th infantry,  
James Herron, 19th infantry,  
Robert M. Gill, 2d artillery,  
William Jones, 8th infantry,  
William O. Allen, 24th infantry,  
John Macrae, jr., 20th infantry,  
Philemon Hawkins, 2d artillery,  
Edward King, 18th infantry,  
H. H. Van Dalsem, 15th infantry,  
W. D. Lawrence, 13th infantry,  
Emanuel I. Leigh, 10th infantry,  
Jeremiah Chapman, 21st infantry,  
Daniel Cushing, 2d artillery,  
James Hunter, 17th infantry,  
James Charlton, 12th infantry,  
John Foster, 22d infantry,  
Benjamin S. Ogden, 3d artillery,  
James F. M'Elroy, 16th infantry,  
Robert Desha, 24th infantry,  
John T. Chunn, 19th infantry,  
Byrd C. Willis, 20th infantry,  
Stanton Sholes, 2d artillery,  
Henry P. Taylor, 18th infantry,  
William J. Adair, 17th infantry,  
Mark Harden, 10th infantry,  
George W. Russell, 2d artillery,  
Charles Page, 12th infantry,  
Andrew L. Madison, 12th infantry,  
Joseph Bryant, 10th infantry,  
Benjamin S. Egerton, 11th infantry,  
Thomas W. Farrar, 8th infantry,

Spotswood Henry, 2d artillery,  
Samuel Gordon, 11th infantry,  
Hugh Moore, 19th infantry,  
Frederick Evans, 2d artillery,  
Benjamin Ropes, 21st infantry,  
Peter Bradley, 25th infantry,  
James H. Campbell, 24th infantry,  
William M'Queen, 8th infantry,  
Josiah Woods, 10th infantry,  
Samuel Bradford, 21st infantry,  
Joseph Clay, 10th infantry,  
Asahel Nearing, 19th infantry,  
Owen Clinton, 18th infantry,  
James Duncan, 17th infantry,  
Silas Amberson, 22d infantry,  
Matthew I. Keith, 8th infantry,  
Thomas I. Robeson, 18th infantry,  
Jesse Copeland, 10th infantry,  
Charles Crawford, 8th infantry,  
David Scott, 23d infantry,  
Henry Fleming, 14th infantry,  
Ken. M'Kenzie, 14th infantry,  
Thomas Delano, 23d infantry,  
Abraham F. Hull, 9th infantry,  
July 31.

J. G. Totten, eng. major brevet.

August.

Thomas A. Patterson, rifle,  
Benjamin Branch, light artillery,  
George W. Melvin, light artillery,  
Ambrose Whitlock, 1st infantry.

September.

Charles Larrabee, 4th infantry,  
Samuel Babcock, engineer,  
Jonathan Brooks, 3d artillery,  
H. G. Armstrong, 23d infantry,  
Lizur B. Canfield, 23d infantry,  
William Davenport, 16th infantry,  
Joseph L. Barton, 15th infantry.

October.

Henry Philips, 6th infantry.

November.

Thomas Ramsey, rifleman.

December.

W. M. Littlejohn, 1st light dragoons,  
William Whistler, 1st infantry.

January, 1813.

Stephen Collins, 3d artillery,  
John C. Symmes, 1st infantry,  
Simeon Knight, 1st infantry,  
Alpha Kingsley, 1st infantry,  
Hezekiah Johnson, 1st infantry,  
John T. Pemberton, 2d infantry,  
Ebenezer Way, 4th infantry,  
George Haig, 1st light dragoons,  
William Smith, rifleman,  
Archibald W. Thornton, light art.

February.

Thomas Murray, 1st artillery.

March.

William Gates, 1st artillery,  
Alexander J. Williams, 2d artillery,  
John Machesney, 16th infantry,  
James Hamilton, 18th infantry,  
David Cummings, 14th infantry,  
A. C. W. Fanning, 3d artillery,  
John M. O'Conner, 3d artillery,  
George H. Richards, 3d artillery,  
Edmund Foster, 9th infantry,  
Jeremiah D. Hayden, 15th infantry,  
William S. Foster, 11th infantry,  
Joseph Kinney, 25th infantry,  
Sullivan Burbank, 21st infantry,  
J. Anderson, 19th inf., major staff,  
Caleb H. Holder, 17th infantry,  
Thomas Post, 12th infantry,  
David Gwynne, 19th infantry.

April.

Stephen W. Kearney, 13th infantry,  
Samuel Haring, 13th infantry,  
Wm. A. Shelton, 20th infantry,  
Thomas B. Randolph, 20th infantry,  
Narcissus Broutin, 7th infantry,  
Isaac Roach, jr., 23d infantry,  
David Espy, 22d infantry,  
Jared Ingersoll, jr., 9th infantry,  
Thomas M. Read, 25th infantry,



**TWENTY-SEVENTH AND TWENTY-EIGHTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.**

**TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY.**

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> George Paull, June 29, 1813.		John Eagen, May 20, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Robert Morrison, June 29, 1813.		Samuel Coleman, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> J. R. Munson, March 18, 1813.		John Carroll, ditto, "	
Thomas Rowland, June 29, "		Avory Buttles, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Henry Northup, May 20, 1813.		John Mifford, ditto, "	
Alexander Hill, ditto, "		T. C. Shields, ditto, "	
Joseph Cairns, ditto, "		Q. F. Atkins, Aug. 7, "	
G. Saunderson, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
William Gill, ditto, "		Michael Halm, May 20, 1813,	
John Spencer, ditto, "		A. Bushnel, ditto, "	
Absalom Martin, ditto, "		James Nixon, ditto, "	
James Applegate, ditto, "		O. Granger, ditto, "	
James A. Harper, ditto, "		A. Strethers, ditto, "	
I. Van Horne, jr., ditto, "		A. Patterson, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Philip Houtz, ditto, "	
A. P. Pinney, May 20, 1813.		John Booten, ditto, "	
Samuel Shannon, ditto, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
W. Warner, ditto, "		J. G. Pigman, May 20, 1813.	
Elias Gilman, ditto, "		James Shannon, ditto, "	
Abraham Shane, ditto, "		John H. Simons, ditto, "	
N. Gregory, ditto, "		William Hall, ditto, "	
E. Benedict, ditto, "		N. L. Reeves, ditto, "	
Charles L. Cass, ditto, "		John Williby, ditto, "	
Samuel Drennan, ditto, "		John Patterson, ditto, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		N. M'Fadden, ditto, "	
Jamas Blair, May 20, 1813.		Thomas Riddle, ditto, "	
J. Collins, ditto, "		J. J. Tullass, Aug. 7, "	
	Paymaster.	<i>Surgeon.</i>	
		John Hamm, April 16, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
		Ed. B. Jackson, April 28, 1813.	

**TWENTY-EIGHTH INFANTRY.**

<i>Colonel.</i> T. Deye Owings, March 11, 1813.		David G. Cowan, May 20, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Anthony Butler, March 11, 1813.		James F. Moore, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> William Trig, March 11, 1813.		W. D. Hayden, ditto, "	
James Smiley, ditto, "		John C. Kouns, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Benjamin Moseby, May 20, 1813.		William Henry, ditto, "	
George Stockton, ditto, "		W. Greenup, ditto, "	
Henry C. Gist, ditto, "		William Stewart, ditto, "	
John Lowrey, ditto, "		Richard Price, June 30, "	
J. Megowan, ditto, "		John Trumbs, ditto, "	
N. H. Moore, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
Henry Daniel, ditto, "		J. G. Reynolds, May 20, 1813.	
Jep. Dudley, ditto, "		J. Heddleston, ditto, "	
T. L. Butler, June 30, "		Thomas Griffith, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Joseph Taylor, ditto, "	
Joseph Clark, May 20, 1813.		John Wyatt, ditto, "	
Joseph C. Bell, ditto, "		Robert Clark, ditto, "	
David M'Nair, ditto, "		Daniel Conner, ditto, "	
Hugh Innis, ditto, "		Jonas Jordan, ditto, "	
Matthew H. Jouitt, ditto, "		James Howerton, ditto, "	
James Hickman, ditto, "		C. Harrison, June 30, "	
Robert Stockton, ditto, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
John Mason, ditto, "		Ch. L. Harrison, May 20, 1813.	
Thomas Edmonson, ditto, "		John B. Clark, ditto, "	
Reasin H. Gist, June 30, "		John M'Nair, ditto, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		Peter Davis, ditto, "	
Charles Larned, May 20, 1813.		W. P. S. Blair, ditto, "	
	Paymaster.	Joseph Dawson, ditto, "	
		W. N. Bryan, ditto, "	
		O. W. Crockett, June 30, "	
		Jonas Roads, ditto, "	
		Daniel Brown, ditto, "	



## TWENTY-NINTH AND THIRTIETH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## TWENTY-NINTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> M. Smith, April 12, 1813.		T. Brownson, April 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> G. D. Young, April 12, 1813.		Daniel Adams, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> John E. Wool, April 13, 1813.		Thomas Dunham, ditto, "	
Asa B. Sizer, ditto, "		H. Van Antwerp, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Chas. G. Jones, March 24, 1813.		Thomas Sutton, ditto, "	
F. Y. Waterman, do. 25, "		J. Rosecrantz, ditto, "	
P. B. Van Beuren, April 30, 1813.		Sylvanus Mott, ditto, "	
B. Schuyler, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> S. B. Hickcock, April 30, 1813.	
M. D. Danvers, ditto, "		Alex. M'Knight, ditto, "	
Elam Lynds, ditto, "		S. D. Kellogg, ditto, "	
J. C. Rochester, ditto, "		James Palmer, ditto, "	
James B. Spencer, ditto, "		J. I. Wynkoop, ditto, "	
T. Machin, jr., ditto, "		John Frasher, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> A. B. Conant, April 30, 1813.		Daniel Smith, jr., ditto, "	
A. Spencer, jr., ditto, "		J. W. Edwards, ditto, "	
A. C. Spencer, ditto, "		Alton Nelson, ditto, "	
Aaron Ward, ditto, "		P. R. Halstead, ditto, "	
H. B. Stebbins, ditto, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> Thomas Vail, April 30, 1813.	
G. Dumbleton, ditto, "		S. Newcomb, ditto, "	
Aaron Walters, ditto, "		Thos. Turner, jr., ditto, "	
Joel Peebles, ditto, "		J. R. Townsend, ditto, "	
J. B. Stewart, ditto, "	Paymaster.	L. H. Mitchell, ditto, "	
Teunis Hanson, ditto, "		Walter Smith, ditto, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants:</i> B. A. Boynton, April 30, 1813.	Adjutant.	John Sing, ditto, "	
B. A. Barrett, ditto, "		John Wynkoop, ditto, "	
		J. W. Lansing, Aug. 7, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> Martin Jennison, July 1, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> R. G. Walmsey, July 1, 1813.	

## THIRTIETH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Elias Fasset, February 23, 1813.		A. Bostwick, April 30, 1813,	Quartermaster.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Martin Norton, Feb. 23, 1813.		Gideon Hawley, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> Hains French, Feb. 23, 1813.		Thomas Stephens, ditto, "	
John Bayley, ditto, "		Andrew Rublee, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> S. Wright, April 30, 1813.		Abel Gibbs, ditto, "	
Salmon Clark, ditto, "		Elisha Smith, ditto, "	
David Sanford, ditto, "		James Johnson, ditto, "	
Peabody Utley, ditto, "		M. L. Selden, Aug. 15, "	
John Wires, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Benjamin Darby, April 30, 1813.	
A. J. Brown, ditto, "		Benjamin Fasset, ditto, "	
D. Farrington, ditto, "		Nath. Spalding, ditto, "	
G. Spencer, jr., ditto, "		R. B. Hyde, ditto, "	
S. Danforth, ditto, "		Phelps Smith, ditto, "	
James Taylor, ditto, "		Almerin Smith, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> William Miller, April 30, 1813.		Return Strong, ditto, "	
S. Robinson, ditto, "		H. Wadams, ditto, "	
William Barney, ditto, "		James Smith, ditto, "	
William Myrick, ditto, "		Th. Chittenden, Aug. 15, "	
J. M. Young, ditto, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> Henry Hendrix, April 30, 1813.	
G. W. Kendall, ditto, "		S. Hatheway, ditto, "	
Shev. Weeks, ditto, "		A. B. Dake, ditto, "	
Israel Smith, ditto, "	Paymaster.	J. R. Pettibone, ditto, "	
R. Salisbury, ditto, "		R. R. Childs, ditto, "	
G. Brownson, Aug. 15, "		Daniel Griswold, ditto, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> J. H. Burton, April 30, 1813.	Adjutant.	W. B. Ferris, ditto, "	
Stephen Rumsey, ditto, "		Stephen Webb, ditto, "	
		T. Matthews, ditto, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> P. S. Mason, June 29, "	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> Wm. Paddock, June 29, 1813.	
		W. A. Needham, July 19, "	

## THIRTY-FIRST AND THIRTY-SECOND REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRTY-FIRST INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff Appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff Appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Daniel Dana, February 23, 1813.		Simon Brown, April 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Huckens Storrs, Feb. 23, 1813.		Asa Baker, ditto, "	
<i>Major.</i> M. Ormsbee, Feb. 23, 1813.		Fifield Lifford, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i> D. A. A. Buck, April 30, 1813.		John Putnam, ditto, "	
Asa Aikins, ditto, "		John Farwell, ditto, "	
L. Egerton, ditto, "		John Hatch, ditto, "	
Rufus Stewart, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
N. Noble, ditto, "		Luther Bugbee, April 30, 1813,	Adjutant.
Ethan Burnap, ditto, "		E. Emmons, ditto, "	
Cyrus Johnson, ditto, "		Eleazer Davis, ditto, "	Quartermaster.
Joseph Morrill, ditto, "		John Pratt, jr. ditto, "	
Silas Dickinson, ditto, "		Jonathan Eddy, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		S. Wetherbee, jr. ditto, "	
C. L. Rockwood, April 30, 1813.		John Atwood, ditto, "	
Andrew Arnold, ditto, "		Jonas Gates, ditto, "	
J. S. Bicknell, ditto, "		F. Nickinson, ditto, "	
Presbury West, ditto, "		James Adams, ditto, "	
William Bingham, ditto, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Levi Powers, ditto, "		Harvy Gilman, April 30, 1813.	
Enos Walker, ditto, "		Jeremiah York, ditto, "	
D. C. Bryant, ditto, "		S. M. Perkins, ditto, "	
John Merrill, ditto, "		Asa Peabody, ditto, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		J. Y. Sawyer, ditto, "	
Levi Cox, April 30, 1813.		S. Stephens, jr. ditto, "	Paymaster.
A. W. Brown, ditto, "		Isaac Briggs, ditto, "	
Chas. Livermore, ditto, "		J. Greenleaf, ditto, "	
		Aaron Matson, ditto, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
		Truman Powell, July 19, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i>	
		E. Littlefield, July 19, 1813.	

## THIRTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> S. E. Fotherall, May 6, 1813.		James M'Karاهر, May 17, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> S. B. Davis, May 6, 1813.		C. B. Hopkins, ditto, "	
<i>Major.</i> George H. Hunter, May 6, 1813.		Joseph Baldwin, ditto, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		William Crosier, ditto, "	Paymaster.
G. F. Goodman, March 18, 1813.		A. Bonnaffon, ditto, "	
William Smith, ditto, "		Thomas F. Hargis, ditto, "	
Samuel Borden, May 17, "		Charles Kean, ditto, "	
Thomas Town, ditto, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
John Steele, jr. ditto, "		De. E. Sweeney, May 17, 1813.	
J. J. Robinson, ditto, "		A. L. Gamble, ditto, "	
Jonathan B. Smith, ditto, "		H. M'Clelland, ditto, "	
Horatio Davis, ditto, "		George Dannaker, ditto, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Thomas M'Elwe, ditto, "	
Robert Patterson, April 5, 1813,	Act. dep. qr. m. gen.	George K. Hall, ditto, "	
Pr. P. Walter, April 17, "	Adjutant.	<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Claud. F. Le Grand, ditto, "		John Stewart, May 17, 1813.	
Richard Bache, ditto, "		Henry Wilson, ditto, "	
Maskline Clark, ditto, "		G. W. Hunter, ditto, "	
R. G. Rawlins, ditto, "		Michael E. Israel, ditto, "	
John Suter, ditto, "		Henry Gulick, ditto, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		James Irvine, ditto, "	
John Wilson, May 17, 1813.	Aid to brigadier gen. [Bloomfield.]	James M'Ilvaine, ditto, "	
		G. F. H. Crocket, ditto, "	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
		Frank. Bache, May 17, 1813.	
		Henry Hall, ditto, "	

## THIRTY-THIRD AND THIRTY-FOURTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRTY-THIRD INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Isaac Lane, February 23, 1813.		Solomon Strout, April 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> John A. Harper, July 19, 1813.		Alex. Worster, do. 30, "	
<i>Major.</i> Daniel Lane, February 23, 1813.		T. Buckminster, do. 30, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Benjamin Adams, April 30, 1813.		James Willey, do. 30, "	
Benjamin Dunn, do. 30, "		Mija. M. Lane, do. 30, "	
Elias Foss, do. 30, "		Wm. Morris, jr. do. 30, "	
Noah Haley, jr. do. 30, "		S. Woodman, jr. do. 30, "	
Francis Drew, do. 30, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Nich. Edgecomb, April 30, 1813.	
R. K. Goodenow, do. 30, "		S. Hopkinson, do. 30, "	
Isaac Hodsdon, do. 30, "		Wm. Cutts, do. 30, "	
Charles Lothrop, do. 30, "		Joseph Bryant, do. 30, "	
Th. Dinsmore, do. 30, "		B. Palmer, jr. do. 30, "	
James Currey, do. 30, "		Hanson Hayes, do. 30, "	
<i>First Lieutenants</i> Joel Milliken, April 30, 1813.		John Dunn, do. 30, "	
G. Newbegin, do. 30, "		Rufus K. Lane, do. 30, "	
Josiah Moulton, do. 30, "		Jona. Goodwin, do. 30, "	
Steph. Bean, do. 30, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> James Warren, April 30, 1813.	
Jere. Goodwin, do. 30, "	Paymaster.	James Walker, do. 30, "	
Geo. Scammon, do. 30, "	Adjutant.	Nathl. Webster, do. 30, "	
Ebenezer Seavey, do. 30, "		James Banks, do. 30, "	
Alex. M <sup>c</sup> Colley, do. 30, "		Geo. Dunham, do. 30, "	
James Weeks, do. 30, "		J. B. Hartford, do. 30, "	
Jos. Morrison, do. 30, "		Joseph Snow, do. 30, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> D. M <sup>c</sup> Glaughlin, April 30, 1813.	Quartermaster.	Samuel Powell, do. 30, "	
Isaac F. Snow, do. 30, "		B. D. Gardner, do. 30, "	
Henry Cole, do. 30, "		William Marr, do. 30, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> Perl. F. Groves, April 10, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> Ward Bassett, April 10, 1813.	
		John P. Briggs, do. 10, "	

## THIRTY-FOURTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> J. D. Learned, February 23, 1813.		Wm. Nash, April 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Ebene. Smith, February 23, 1813.		Nathl. Wilson, do. 30, "	
<i>Major.</i> T. M. Vinson, February 23, 1813.		David Sherman, do. 30, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Robert Douglass, April 30, 1813.		Wm. Nevers, do. 30, "	
Sherm. Leland, do. 30, "		S. Dearborn, do. 30, "	
Robert R. Kendall, do. 30, "		Timothy Bacon, do. 30, "	
Peter Chadwick, do. 30, "		Calvin Crocker, do. 30, "	
Benjamin Poland, do. 30, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Otis Robbins, April 30, 1813.	
Benjamin Bailey, do. 30, "		Royal D. Simons, do. 30, "	
William Sweet, do. 30, "		Thos. Johnson, do. 30, "	
Isaac Carter, do. 30, "		Robert Gibson, do. 30, "	
Danl. Crossman, do. 30, "		Moses Clough, do. 30, "	
Jos. C. Adams, do. 30, "		Jos. M <sup>c</sup> Clure, do. 30, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> John Merrill, April 30, 1813.	Paymaster.	Edward Springer, do. 30, "	
Thomas Bailey, do. 30, "	Quartermaster.	Isaac Townsend, do. 30, "	
Wm. Stevens, do. 30, "		Supply B. Gookin, July 1, "	
John Lee, do. 30, "		Flavil Sabin, August 15, "	
Jeremiah Edes, do. 30, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> Henry Taylor, April 30, 1813.	
Ewd. Barneville, do. 30, "		Elias Morse, do. 30, "	
Elihu Norton, do. 30, "		Oliver Blake, do. 30, "	
Thos. Clark, do. 30, "		Steph. Morrell, do. 30, "	
Ben. Woodman, do. 30, "		John Nash, do. 30, "	
Nathl. Gookin, May 16, "	Adjutant.	D. Farnsworth, do. 30, "	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> N. S. Benton, April 30, 1813.		Josiah Parlin, do. 30, "	
W. A. Springer, do. 30, "		G. W. Thomas, do. 30, "	
Joseph Sumner, do. 30, "		Cotton Ward, July 1, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> Jotham Forbes, April 30, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i> Charles Loring, May 20, 1813.	
		Thad. Hubbard, do. 20, "	

## THIRTY-FIFTH AND THIRTY-SIXTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRTY-FIFTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i>		<i>Wm. Rivers, March 31, 1813.</i>	
Jos. Goodwyn, March 3, 1813.		Henry Cook, do. 31, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		Wm. Loyall, do. 31, "	
Robert Pegram, March 3, 1813.		S. C. Williams, do. 31, "	
<i>Majors.</i>		James Minor, do. 31, "	
Aug. C. Smith, March 3, 1813.		David B. Stith, do. 31, "	
A. I. M'Connico, do. 22, "		John B. Hall, do. 31, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		Robert Eskridge, do. 31, "	
Danl. C. Butts, March 31, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
Saml. M'Guire, do. 31, "		Charles R. Rose, March 31, 1813.	
M. Taliaferro, do. 31, "		David Shelton, do. 31, "	
John Thorp, do. 31, "		Chas. Hutchings, do. 31, "	
B. Hardaway, do. 31, "		Edwin Jones, do. 31, "	
Benj. B. Jones, do. 31, "		Thomas K. Ball, do. 31, "	
F. E. Walker, do. 31, "		William Dunn, do. 31, "	Paymaster.
W. T. Cocke, do. 31, "		F. D. Charlton, do. 31, "	
Isaac T. Preston, do. 31, "		R. Crockwell, do. 31, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Winfield Jones, do. 31, "	
John W. Stith, March 31, 1813.		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Christn. Miller, do. 31, "		Samuel Kirby, March 31, 1813.	
James Belches, do. 31, "		John Thompson, do. 31, "	
Th. J. Parker, do. 31, "		R. W. Scott, do. 31, "	
Francis H. Hoee, do. 31, "		P. R. Burwell, do. 31, "	
John G. Crump, do. 31, "		John Huson, do. 31, "	
Blair Bolling, do. 31, "		Robert R. Conrad, do. 31, "	
Edw. L. Pegram, do. 31, "		Lawr. M. Gale, do. 31, "	
John Garland, do. 31, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		Wright Tucker, July 19, 1813.	
L. Dangerfield, March 31, "		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i>	
		W. W. Southall, July 20, 1813.	

## THIRTY-SIXTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i>		<i>Wm. L. Rogers, April 30, 1813.</i>	
Henry Carbery, March 22, 1813.		Richd. K. Watts, do. 30, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		Clement Sewell, do. 30, "	
William Scott, March 25, 1813.		Charles Queen, do. 30, "	
<i>Majors.</i>		W. Hindman, jr. Aug. 15, "	
Alex. Stuart, March 25, 1813.		Wm. Merrick, do. 15, "	
Henry Lee, jr. April 8, "		Wm. A. Rind, do. 15, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
Joseph Hook, April 30, 1813.		George Slye, April 30, 1813.	
Henry C. Neale, do. 30, "		Wright Hall, do. 30, "	
Jos. S. Nelson, do. 30, "		Henry Redman, do. 30, "	
C. C. Randolph, do. 30, "		F. J. Wheeler, do. 30, "	
Thos. Carbery, do. 30, "		J. M. Burgess, do. 30, "	
Samuel Rasin, do. 30, "		Philip Fisher, August 15, "	
J. J. Merrick, do. 30, "		John Clark, do. 15, "	
Mort. D. Hall, do. 30, "		Edward Scott, do. 15, "	
H. W. Deneale, do. 30, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Thos. Corcoran, do. 30, "		Julius Germane, April 30, 1813.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Edwd. Hopkins, do. 30, "	
Wm. C. Hobbs, April 30, 1813.		Richd. H. Lee, do. 30, "	
James Neale, do. 30, "		W. T. S. Beall, do. 30, "	
John Ricaud, do. 30, "	Paymaster.	Wm. Gallop, do. 30, "	
James Ord, do. 30, "		Geo. Johnson, do. 30, "	
Francis J. Neale, do. 30, "	Quartermaster.	John Mansfield, do. 30, "	
John Chauncey, do. 30, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
Wm. N. Earle, August 15, "		Thos. P. Hall, July 10, 1813.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i>	
Jas. H. Ballard, April 30, 1813.	Adjutant.	John H. Beall, July 31, 1813.	

## THIRTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i>		Daniel Bicknell, April 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		Eldad Ruggles, do. 30, "	
A. Benjamin, March 11, 1813.		Jas. L. Reynolds, do. 30, "	
<i>Majors.</i>		Eli Bradley, do. 30, "	
Roswell Lee, March 3, 1813.		David Tracey, do. 30, "	
Saml. Hoadley, do. 11, "		W. Wakeman, do. 30, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		Nathan Clark, May 19, "	
Elizur Warner, April 30, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
Christ. Ripley, do. 30, "		Samuel Keeler, April 30, 1813.	
Chauncey Ives, do. 30, "		Ralph Steel, do. 30, "	
S. B. Northrop, do. 30, "		Thomas Weller, do. 30, "	
Riley Sweet, do. 30, "		J. R. Warren, do. 30, "	
Noah T. Ferry, do. 30, "		G. H. Parmele, do. 30, "	
D. Waterbury, do. 30, "		Saml. Robinson, do. 30, "	
Stephen D. Tilden, do. 30, "		Andw. Andrews, do. 30, "	
S. B. Dickinson, do. 30, "		Irad Storrs, do. 30, "	
Guy Gaylord, May 31, "		John Phelps, jr. June 3, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
John Brown, April 30, 1813.		Saml. Keeler, jr. April 30, 1813.	
H. W. Huntington, do. 30, "	Adjutant.	Oren Hatch, do. 30, "	
David C. Welsh, do. 30, "	Paymaster.	Lyman Mallory, do. 30, "	
William Morgan, do. 30, "		Henry Lord, do. 30, "	
Stephen Drummer, do. 30, "		Thomas Hewitt, do. 30, "	
Elipha. Ripley, do. 30, "		John Fellows, do. 30, "	
Demas Deming, do. 30, "		Wm. Kellogg, do. 30, "	
Chaun. Hosford, do. 30, "		Ebenezer Fisk, June 3, "	
David Gibbs, do. 30, "		Jas. Smith, jr. do. 22, "	
Solomon Dewy, May 31, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		Elijah Butts, May 20, 1813.	
Henry Starr, April 30, 1813.		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i>	
		Asahel Hall, September 19, 1813.	

## THIRTY-EIGHTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i>		B. B. Sweeting, May 20, 1813.	
Peter Little, May 19, 1813.		Jerem. Green, do. 20, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		J. M. Barrett, do. 20, "	
William Stewart, May 19, 1813.		William Jones, do. 20, "	
<i>Majors.</i>		Jas. S. Griffin, do. 20, "	
Leonard Frailey, May 19, 1813.		Geo. Fletcher, do. 20, "	
George Keyser, do. 19, "		John Sticher, do. 20, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		Wm. H. Bates, Aug. 15, "	
James H. Hook, May 20, 1813.		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
James Haslett, do. 20, "		D. W. Duncan, May 20, 1813.	
Isaac Aldridge, do. 20, "		Peter Keyser, do. 20, "	
John Rothrock, do. 20, "		Saml. Barkley, do. 20, "	
John Brookes, do. 20, "		Wm. Harwood, do. 20, "	
John Buck, do. 20, "		Hynson Crabbin, do. 20, "	
A. Miltenberger, do. 20, "		F. W. Hoffman, do. 20, "	
Henry O'Neal, do. 20, "		Henry Huber, do. 20, "	
Ch. Stansbury, do. 20, "		Benj. P. Head, August 15, "	
S. C. Leakin, do. 20, "		Geo. W. Lee, do. 15, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
John Mowton, May 20, 1813.	Adjutant.	Cassa. Watkins, May 20, 1813.	
James Smith, do. 20, "		John Savery, do. 20, "	
William Ford, do. 20, "		Rich. M. Sands, do. 20, "	
Henry S. Geyer, do. 20, "		Wm. Camp, jr. do. 20, "	
G. S. Eichelberger, do. 20, "	Quartermaster.	John B. Martin, do. 20, "	
Wm. R. Gwinn, do. 20, "	Paymaster.	John Spicknall, do. 20, "	
William Hall, do. 20, "		W. H. Addison, do. 20, "	
Joshua Medtart, August 15, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>		Tobias Watkins, May 20, 1813.	
James Holmes, May 20, 1813.		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	

## THIRTY-NINTH AND FORTIETH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## THIRTY-NINTH INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i>		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>	
John Williams, June 18, 1813.		B. M. Patterson, July 29, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		M. C. Molton, do. 29, "	
Th. H. Benton, June 18, 1813.		James Leith, do. 29, "	
<i>Majors.</i>		Ashlay Stanfield, do. 29, "	
L. P. Montgomery, July 29, 1813.		Jesse C. Tate, do. 29, "	
Wm. Peacock, do. 29, "		Jos. R. Henderson, do. 29, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		Guy Smith, do. 29, "	
John Phagan, July 29, 1813.		David M'Millen, do. 29, "	
Wm. Walker, do. 29, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
Benj. Reynolds, do. 29, "		Jos. S. Jackson, July 29, 1813.	
George Hallam, do. 29, "		Ellis Thomas, do. 29, "	
John B. Long, do. 29, "		Benj. Duncan, do. 29, "	
A. H. Douglass, do. 29, "		M. W. M'Clellan, do. 29, "	
Hen. Henniger, do. 29, "		Isaac Pangle, do. 29, "	
John Jones, do. 29, "		Simpson Payne, do. 29, "	
James Davis, do. 29, "		J. M. Armstrong, do. 29, "	
Thos. Stuart, do. 29, "		Rand. Quarles, do. 29, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Willie Martin, July 29, 1813.		Saml. Houston, July 29, 1813.	
James Gray, do. 29, "		T. C. Hindman, do. 29, "	
Rbt. M. Somerville, do. 29, "		Joel Parrish, do. 29, "	
Benj. Wright, do. 29, "		Andrew Greer, do. 29, "	
D. Lauderdale, do. 29, "		Jacob K. Snap, do. 29, "	
James Sharp, do. 29, "		John M'Henry, do. 29, "	
Samuel Wilson, do. 29, "		Thomas Easten, do. 29, "	
Jas. M'Donald, do. 29, "		J. H. Anderson, do. 29, "	
Nath. Smith, do. 29, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
Joel Denton, do. 29, "		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i>	
		John H. Read, July 2, 1813.	

The following five regiments are authorized by the act of the 5th July, 1813, to serve during the war.

## FORTIETH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i>		J. Orne Bowden, Sept. 1, 1813.	
Joseph Loring, jr. July 31, 1813.		Joseph M'Comb, do. 1, "	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		Sam. Hodges, jr. do. 1, "	
John Breck, July 19, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>	
<i>Majors.</i>		James Harris, Sept. 1, 1813.	
Perley Putnam, July 19, 1813.		Samuel C. Pope, do. 1, "	
Hen. C. Brown, do. 19, "		John Spalter, do. 1, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		Elias Goodspeed, do. 1, "	
J. B. Varnum, July 19, 1813.		R. H. Blanchard, do. 1, "	
Seth W. Nye, do. 19, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
James Perry, do. 29, "		John Parrott, July 29, 1813.	
Leonard Ross, August 1, "		Saml. H. Russell, Sept. 1, "	
M. N. Sandborn, do. 1, "		Enoch Manning, do. 1, "	
Robert Neale, jr. do. 1, "		Andrew Lewis, do. 1, "	
John Leonard, do. 6, "		Moses Aldrich, do. 1, "	
John Bailey, September 1, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Elisha Field, do. 1, "		Jas. Perry, jr. July 29, 1813.	
John Fillebrown, do. 1, "		Nich. B. Proctor, Sept. 1, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Perez Alexander, do. 1, "	
Robert Carter, July 29, 1813.		Isaac Carpenter, do. 1, "	
Dani. P. Brown, August 1, "		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
Charles Durant, Sept. 1, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	

## FORTY-FIRST AND FORTY-SECOND REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

## FORTY-FIRST INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Robert Bogardus, July 29, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Jud. Hammond, Sept. 30, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> J. W. Livingston, July 29, 1813.		T. E. Beekman, do. 30, "	
<i>Majors.</i> Darby Noon, August 1, 1813.		Alex. Clinton, do. 30, "	
James D. Wallace, do. 1, "		Daniel Wishart, do. 30, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Gilbert Seaman, August 1, 1813.		William Seaman, do. 30, "	
Alex. Hamilton, do. 1, "		John Tabalee, do. 30, "	
Alpheus Sherman, do. 1, "		Geo. Hamilton, do. 30, "	
Saml. B. Romaine, do. 1, "		John H. Sims, do. 30, "	
Samuel Berrian, do. 1, "		Henry Brown, do. 30, "	
James Campbell, do. 1, "		Luther Hand, do. 30, "	
Wm. S. Radcliff, do. 3, "		<i>Third Lieutenant.</i> Sol. Sutherland, August 1, 1813.	
Chs. Humphrey, do. 7, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> George West, August 6, 1813.	
John B. Scott, Sept. 30, "		Jeremiah Smith, Sept. 30, "	
Francis Allyn, do. 30, "		John Webb, jr. do. 30, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Thomas Barker, August 1, 1813.		Lawrence Rigail, do. 30, "	
M. M. Quackenbos, do. 1, "		Wm. Hammet, do. 30, "	
John Ingersoll, do. 7, "		Isaac Miller, do. 30, "	
James McCullen, do. 7, "		Asher Corles, do. 30, "	
William Loudon, do. 9, "		George Maxwell, do. 30, "	
John L. Clark, Sept. 30, "		John C. Hart, do. 30, "	
J. L. Bogardus, do. 30, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> John Neilson, Sept. 30, 1813.	
J. M. Schermerhorn, do. 30, "		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> Fayette Cooper, Sept. 30, 1813.	
		Henry White, do. 30, "	

## FORTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Wm. N. Irvine, August 4, 1813.		James Laken, August 3, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> James G. Forbes, August 1, 1813.		Thos. Traquir, do. 4, "	
<i>Major.</i> Tunis Riker, August 1, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants,</i> Robert Shaw, jr. Aug. 1, 1813.	
<i>Captains.</i> Thos. Stockton, Sept. 20, 1813.		Joseph Hall, do. 1, "	
Geo. W. Barker, Jan. 10, "		P. Mendenhall, do. 4, "	
E. S. Mendenhall, Aug. 1, "		Howerton Cross, do. 7, "	
Wm. G. Oliver, do. 1, "		Alex. Trotter, Sept. 9, "	
Thos. Hanson, do. 4, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> J. B. Welhenson, Aug. 1, 1813.	
Edm. B. Duvall, do. 4, "		Daniel Saint, do. 3, "	
John Junkin, do. 7, "		Fredk. Lazarus, Sept. 25, "	
Armstrong Irvine, Oct. 1, "		Martin Grant, do. 25, "	
John Biddle, do. 1, "		J. Armstrong, do. 30, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Josiah S. Carty, August 3, 1813.		<i>Surgeon.</i> <i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> Jas. M. Kelly, August 1, 1813.	

## FORTY-THIRD AND FORTY-FOURTH INFANTRY.

## FORTY-THIRD INFANTRY.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Nicholas Long, August 4, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Robert Stark, August 1, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Dunc. L. Clinch, August 4, 1813.		Joshua Irby, do. 1, "	
<i>Majors.</i> James Campbell, August 1, 1813.		Robert H. Briggs, do. 1, "	
Thomas D. King, do. 4, "		W. Timberlake, do. 4, "	
<i>Captains.</i> John J. Goodwyn, Aug. 1, 1813.		Edward Hare, do. 4, "	
Theo. L. Gurdin, do. 1, "		John M. Neel, do. 4, "	
G. H. Manigault, do. 1, "	Aid to Brigadier	Robert L. Coombs, do. 4, "	
Joel E. Grace, do. 1, "	Gen. Izard.	Archd. Bigby, do. 4, "	
Edw. F. Tattall, do. 4, "		James Moss, do. 4, "	
Thomas Hyde, do. 4, "		R. Campbell, jr. Oct. 16, "	Aid to Brigadier Gen. Williams.
Henry Garrett, do. 4, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> William Miles, August 1, 1813.	
Robert Love, jr. do. 4, "		Marshall Ayres, do. 1, "	
George Dabney, do. 4, "		Holomon Battle, do. 4, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Abner H. Hicks, August 1, 1813.		Wm. H. Norman, do. 4, "	
Samuel A. Taylor, do. 1, "		Wm. Welsh, do. 4, "	
W. Edmondson, do. 1, "		Elisha Gates, do. 4, "	
Saml. Farrow, jr. do. 1, "		Levin V. Greer, do. 4, "	
Charles Cantey, do. 3, "		<i>Ensigns.</i> Jas. B. Moore, August 1, 1813.	
John Smallwood, do. 4, "		John Vereen, do. 3, "	
James Smith, do. 4, "		Daniel Wall, do. 3, "	
George R. Gilman, do. 4, "		John H. Lawson, do. 4, "	
Wm. W. Holt, do. 4, "		Joseph Oliver, do. 4, "	
		Lar. L. Baldwin, do. 4, "	
		W. H. Fairchild, do. 4, "	
		<i>Surgeon.</i>	
		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	

## FORTY-FOURTH INFANTRY.

<i>Colonel.</i> Geo. T. Ross, August 1, 1813.		<i>Captains.</i> Isaac L. Baker, April 5, 1813.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> René Trudeau, August 1, 1813.		Wm. O. Butler, ditto, "	
<i>Majors.</i> Henry D. Piere, August 1, 1813.		<i>First Lieutenant.</i> Nathl. Pryor, August 30, 1813.	
Waters Clark, ditto, "		<i>Second Lieutenant.</i> Elzr. B. Billings, Aug. 9, 1813.	
		<i>Surgeon.</i> Squire Lea, August 1, 1813.	



## RANGERS AND UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

## RANGERS.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Captains.</i>		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>	
William Dunn, April 12, 1813.		Sylvester Pattie, July 19, 1813.	
Piere André, ditto, "		James Calloway, ditto, "	
James Bigger, April 30, "		Peter Craig, ditto, "	
Fred. Shoults, May 20, "		Sam. Gilham, August 1, "	
Andrew Ramsey, July 19, "		Arthur Morgan, ditto, "	
David Musick, ditto, "		Andrew Bankston, ditto, "	
Daniel M. Boone, ditto, "		Brattn. Crawford, Aug. 5, "	
James B. Moore, August 1, "		John Knox, October 1, "	
W. B. Whiteside, ditto, "			
Jacob Short, ditto, "			
Jas. Manary, sen. Aug. 5, "			
Sam. McCormick, Aug. 7, "			
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Henry Brinton, April 12, 1813.		Green B. Fields, April 12, 1813.	
Hyacin. Lassell, ditto, "		David L. Gregg, ditto, "	
John Carr, April 30, "		Jno. Owens, jun. April 30, "	
James Morrison, July 19, "		David Bailey, July 19, "	
P. K. Robbins, ditto, "		John McNair, ditto, "	
William Massey, ditto, "		Drakeford Gray, ditto, "	
Jos. Borough, August 1, "		John Journey, August 1, "	
David Robinson, ditto, "		Aaron Armstrong, ditto, "	
Nathl. Journey, ditto, "		Eben. F. Seaman, Aug. 5, "	
John Hopkins, August 5, "		William Patterson, Oct. 1, "	
James Flinn, October 1, "			
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>			
Henry Ristine, April 12, 1813.			
Homer Johnson, ditto, "			
James Curray, April 30, "			

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

*From Maine and New Hampshire.*

<i>Colonel.</i>		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>	
Denny McCobb, Dec. 23, 1812.		Benj. White, jr. Oct. 1, 1812.	
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>		Joseph Low, Nov. 18, "	
Aquila Davis, January 13, 1813.		Marshall Baker, Dec. 2, "	
<i>Captains.</i>		David Denison, ditto, "	
Elijah Hall, October 1, 1812.		Daniel Patch, Dec. 15, "	Quartermaster.
Benj. Bradford, Nov. 18, "		Daniel Page, ditto, "	
Josh. Danforth, Nov. 20, "		Saml. Sylvester, Jan. 1, 1813.	
Daniel Holden, Dec. 15, "		James Bean, Jan. 12, "	
Nathan Stanley, ditto, "		<i>Ensigns.</i>	
Smith Elkins, January 1, 1813.		John Neal, jr. October 1, 1812.	
Joseph Flanders, Jan. 24, "		Wm. Kendall, Nov. 16, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>		Wm. Reed, ditto, "	
Th. B. Sylvester, Nov. 1, 1812,	Adjutant.	Jonas G. Brooks, Dec. 1, "	
John Butterfield, Nov. 18, "		Joseph Berry, Jan. 1, "	
Daniel M. Gregg, Nov. 18, "		Enoch Page, Jan. 24, "	
David Doane, Nov. 20, "		Parker Chase, March 26, "	
A. P. Cochran, Dec. 2, "		<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
Henry Snow, Dec. 15, "		John Trivett, March 1, 1813.	
Daniel George, January 12, 1813.		James Bates, March 12, "	

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS—Continued.

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

## From New York. Second Regiment.

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Colonel.</i> Samuel Hawkins, Feb. 15, 1813.		Joseph De La Montanya, January 1, 1813,	Quartermaster.
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Gilbert Ketcham, Feb. 15, 1813.		R. W. Nelson, January 16, "	
<i>Major.</i> W. S. Tallmadge, Feb. 15, 1813.		James Darrow, February 1, "	
		E. B. Baldwin, February 9, "	
		J. L. Bleecker, Feb. 10, "	
		Aw. D. Willson, April 16, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Edmund G. Perlee, Nov. 5, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> John Bailey, November 5, 1812.	Adjutant.
J. D. Wadsworth, ditto, "		Platt Ketcham, Nov. 17, "	
Thomas Bruyn, ditto, "		Jacob Montross, Dec. 25, "	
John S. Suffern, ditto, "		G. S. Caldwell, Jan. 4, 1813.	
David Crawford, ditto, "		John Peters, January 10, "	
John McCamley, ditto, "		Morris Janson, January 11, "	
John Miller, December 1, "		Epens. Wheelar, Feb. 1, "	
Joseph Delafield, Dec. 29, "		Geo. S. Allison, Feb. 10, "	
Gabriel Y. Denton, Jan. 21, 1813.		Jesse Barlow, Feb. 16, "	
Robert Gourlay, jr. Feb. 1, "		John Wilson, April 16, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Sanford Allyn, November 5, 1812.		<i>Third Lieutenant.</i> James Archer, July 1, 1813.	
Moses Burnet, ditto, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> Steph. Rapalje, Nov. 14, 1812.	
Richard Eldred, ditto, "		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> Josiah Torrey, Dec. 30, 1812.	
Z. Schoonmaker, Dec. 9, "	Paymaster.		
J. A. Rapalje, Dec. 21, "			
Job Wright, ditto, "			

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

## From New York. Third Regiment.

<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i> Alex. Denniston, February 1, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Ebenezer Cole, Dec. 28, 1812.	Adjutant.
<i>Captains.</i> Gouv. S. Bibby, Dec. 8, 1812.		Peter Holmes, January 1, 1813.	
Christian Hartell, Dec. 28, "		Allen Reynolds, Jan. 20, "	
Geo. K. McKay, Jan. 9, 1813.		Isaac Percy, Jan. 25, "	
Charles Hughes, Jan. 16, "		Eras. H. Weed, Jan. 28, "	
Jonan. Gidney, Jan. 18, "		Caleb Crane, Jan. 30, "	
John Hatfield, Jan. 23, "		Matthew D. Coe, Jan. 31, "	
John Hatfield, Jan. 23, "		Chas. T. Butler, March 1, "	
Benjamin Wood, Jan. 30, "		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> William Buttre, Feb. 1, 1813.	
Ths. Shearwood, Jan. 31, "		Daniel L. Scott, Feb. 28, "	
Isaac Little, February 1, "		N. G. Carmer, August 15, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Thomas Earle, August 20, 1812.		<i>Surgeon.</i> Robert C. Hunter, Jan. 31, 1813.	
Thomas Darling, Dec. 31, "		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> Elias C. Badeau, Feb. 9, 1813.	
William Perron, Jan. 1, 1813.	Paymaster.		
Edwin Baldwin, Jan. 2, "			
Stephen Baxter, Jan. 9, "			
James Kerr, Jan. 25, "			
William Walsh, Jan. 28, "			
Robert P. Ross, Jan. 31, "			
Ephraim Clark, March 1, "			

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

## From Richmond, Virginia.

<i>Captain.</i> Richard Booker, Dec. 1, 1812.		<i>Second Lieutenant.</i> B. Hazlegrove, Dec. 1, 1812.	
<i>First Lieutenant.</i> John W. Ellis, Dec. 1, 1812.		<i>Ensign.</i> Robert Kennedy, Dec. 1, 1812.	

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS AND SEA FENCIBLES.

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

*From the Mississippi Territory.*

Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.	Names and Rank.	Staff appointments and Brevets.
<i>Brigadier General.</i> F. L. Claiborne, March 1, 1813. Com'ding the two following Regiments.		Alexander Calvit, Feb. 24, 1813. John Allen, do. 25, " Robert Layson, March 4, " Benj. F. Salvage, do. 12, "	Aid to the General.  Quartermaster.
<i>Colonel.</i> Joseph Carson, April 30, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Kean Caldwell, Oct. 12, 1812. Charles Moore, Dec. 1, " Charles Baron, Jan. 15, 1813. S. M. Osborn, Feb. 8, " N. Lockridge, March 5, " R. C. Anderson, do. 6, " George Dougherty, do. 15, " Robert Swan, do. 15, " James Lockett, do. 15, " George H. Gibbs, do. 15, " Robert Burton, do. 15, " D. M. Calliham, do. 15, "	
<i>Major.</i> Daniel Beasley, Feb. 15, 1813.		<i>Ensigns.</i> Stephen Mays, Feb. 28, 1813. Y. R. M'Donald, Mar. 6, " Benj. Blanton, do. 6, " Benj. Stowell, do. 6, " William S. Britt, do. 12, " Isaac W. Davis, do. 15, " Robert Davis, May 23, " Charles West, Aug. 12, " Samuel Guest, do. 15, " Richard Smith, do. 15, "	
<i>Captains.</i> Philip A. Engle, Jan. 9, 1813. Archilaus Wells, do. 15, " Randall Jones, do. 27, " William Jack, do. 28, " Wm. C. Mead, do. 29, " Benjamin Dent, do. 31, " Hatn. Middleton, do. 31, " Abrm. M. Scott, do. 31, " James Foster, do. 31, " L. V. Foelckil, Feb. 1, " C. G. Johnson, March 1, " Hans Morrison, do. 8, "		<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i> William R. Cox, Feb. 17, 1813.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> James Baily, Oct. 12, 1812. Richn. Bowman, Dec. 18, " A. L. Osborn, Jan. 15, 1813. William Morgan, do. 15, " J. D. Rodgers, do. 20, " W. R. Deloach, Feb. 1, " Theron Kellogg, do. 6, " A. Montgomery, do. 9, " John Camp, do. 10, "	Adjutant.		

## UNITED STATES' VOLUNTEERS.

*From Louisiana.*

<i>Major.</i> William Henry, April 30, 1813.		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> D. Hutchings, Dec. 5, 1812. Adrian F. Duval, Jan. 9, 1813. John Koen, Aug. 15, " James M <sup>r</sup> Arthur, do. 15, " John Files, do. 15, " W. R. Chambles, do. 15, " T. C. Vaughn, do. 15, "	
<i>Captains.</i> P. A. Rivery, Nov. 20, 1812. John Mowry, do. 24, " A. Peychaud, Dec. 16, " E. de Mirepoix, do. 19, " Ferd. Amelung, do. 28, " L. de Marans, Jan. 13, 1813. Abram. Miller.		<i>Ensigns.</i> Curtis Lewis, Dec. 5, 1812. Pat <sup>k</sup> M <sup>r</sup> Clasky, Feb. 6, 1813. Robert Steele, Aug. 15, " Lewis W. Brant, do. 15, " John Booth, do. 15, "	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Hugh Davis, Oct. 22, 1812. George Russel, Nov. 25, " Noel G. Dupuy, do. 27, " Joseph Bigé, Dec. 28, " J. P. Thebault, do. 28, " Francis Hewit, Jan. 25, 1813. Benj. Bridges, Aug. 15, "		<i>Surgeon.</i> Peter Lambert, Dec. 26, 1812.	

## SEA FENCIBLES.

<i>Captains.</i> Thos. M. Newell, Aug. 1, 1813. John Nicholson, do. 1, " Lemuel Morris, do. 4, " John Du Bose, do. 4, " Frederick Brooks, do. 7, "		Richard Baynor, Aug. 7, 1813.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i> Abraham Nicols, Aug. 1, 1813. James J. Cumming, do. 1, " John J. Couturier, do. 4, "		<i>Second Lieutenants.</i> Ferd. A. O'Neal, Aug. 1, 1813. William Lytle, do. 1, " Byrd B. Mitchel, do. 7, "	
		<i>Third Lieutenants.</i> Henry B. Jones, Aug. 1, 1813. John Hardwick, do. 4, " John Boner, do. 7, "	



## ORGANIZATION OF A COMPANY.

## COMPONENT PARTS OF A COMPANY.

REGIMENTS.	No. of companies to a reg't.	COMPONENT PARTS OF A COMPANY.														Total.		
		Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Third Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Artificers.	Master of the sword.	Saddlers.	Farrriers.	Blacksmiths.		Drivers.	Privates.
Light Artillery, - -	10	1	1	1	1	-	-	5	4	2	8	-	1	1	-	12	58	95
Dragoons, first and second,	8	1	1	1	1	-	1	5	6	2	-	1	1	1	-	-	64	86
First Artillery, - -	20	1	1	1	1	-	-	5	4	4	8	-	-	-	-	-	56	81
Second and Third Artillery,	20	1	1	1	1	-	-	5	4	2	8	-	-	-	-	-	72	95
Infantry, - - -	10	1	1	1	1	1	-	5	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	108
Riflemen, - - -	10	1	1	1	1	1	-	5	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	68	84

Two regiments form a brigade, to be under a brigadier general, who has one aid-de-camp and one brigade major. Two brigades form a division, to be commanded by a major general, who has two aids-de-camp, (and when he commands an army, one adjutant general, one inspector general, one quartermaster general, two assistant adjutant generals, two assistant inspector generals, one deputy quartermaster general, and four assistants, one topographical engineer, and one assistant) that is, beside a chief of each department, as many assistants *may* be allowed as there are brigades in each separate army.

NOTE.—By the act of 29th January, twenty additional regiments for twelve months' service are authorized. (One of them to be rangers, by a subsequent act, and five regiments to be for five years, for local service.)

	21,880
	36,374
Total authorized force,	<u>58,254</u>

## RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

## RANK OF REGIMENTS.

WAR OFFICE, *May 1, 1813.*

- 1st. The light artillery.  
 2d. The light dragoons,  
 3d. The foot artillery, } According to the numbers of the regiments respectively.  
 4th. The infantry,  
 5th. The riflemen.  
 6th. The volunteers in the service of the United States, and } According to the numbers given to them respec-  
 7th. The militia draughts, } tively by the General commanding the district.  
 This regulation is confined to parades. On all other occasions, regiments will be drawn up in the way which shall be directed by the General, or other commanding officer.

## RANK OF OFFICERS.

In all cases in which command shall not have been specially given, the eldest officer, whether of cavalry, of artillery, or of infantry, will command.

Where a controversy concerning rank shall arise from the sameness of date in commissions, it shall be determined by reference to former commissions in the regular service; and if none such should have been held, by former commissions in the militia.

Brevet rank gives no precedence nor command, except on detachments; nor shall persons having such rank only, be included in the roster of officers for any duty other than that performed by detachments, and to which they shall be specially assigned.

Officers of the regular army of the same grade with those of the volunteers and militia, have precedence of these, whatever may be the dates of their respective commissions.

There is no precedence between staff departments. The officers assigned to these will take rank, 1st, from the brevets they hold; and 2d, from the rank they respectively have in the line.

## RULES WITH REGARD TO PROMOTION.

- Original vacancies will be supplied by selection; accidental vacancies by seniority, excepting in extraordinary cases.
- Promotions to the rank of Captain will be made regimentally; to that of field appointments, by line, the light artillery, dragoons, artillery, infantry, and riflemen, being kept always distinct.
- No officer shall be entitled to the pay, rations, or emoluments, annexed to any office, until he shall have notice of his appointment thereto from the War Department; or from a general officer, with respect to appointments in the gift of Generals.

## COMPLIMENTS TO BE PAID BY THE TROOPS.

The highest military honors are payable to the President and Vice President of the United States, whether in uniform or not.

To the Secretary of War, to Major Generals commanding districts or corps of the army, and to Governors of States, when in uniform, the same honors will be paid; with this exception, that to them the standards of the cavalry will not be dropped in saluting.

All other Major Generals are entitled to three ruffles of the drum, with presented arms, and to the dropping of all colors other than the standards.

Brigadier Generals commanding districts or corps of the army, are entitled to the honors payable to Major Generals not commanding in chief.

All other Brigadiers are entitled to two ruffles of the drum, and presented arms.

To Colonels, the guards of their own regiments turn out and present their arms, once a day; after which, they only turn out with ordered arms.

To Lieutenant Colonels and Majors, their own guards turn out with ordered arms, once a day.

When a Lieutenant Colonel or Major shall command a regiment, their own quarter guards pay them the compliments due to a Colonel.

When a General or other officer, entitled to a salute, shall pass in the rear of a guard, it will not face about, but stand with shouldered arms.

When a General or other officer, entitled to a salute, shall pass guards while in the act of relieving, both guards will salute, taking the word of command from the senior officer of the two.

Military compliments are to be paid to officers of the navy, when in uniform, agreeably to their rank, as follows, viz: Commodores, with broad pennants, have the same compliments as Brigadier Generals; and all other Post Captains, those due to Colonels.

All guards are to be under arms when an armed party approaches their posts; and to parties commanded by a commissioned officer, they will present arms and beat a march, and the officers will salute.

The colors of a regiment passing any guard will be saluted, the drums of the regiment saluting in turn.

When two regiments meet on a march, the regiment of inferior rank will halt, form, and salute the other, which proceeds on its march with swords drawn, bayonets fixed, trumpets sounding, drums beating, and colors flying, until it shall have cleared the front of the latter regiment.

All regiments marching with standards or colors, have claim to the compliments of any regiment they may meet on their march not having standards or colors, without regard to the rank of the particular corps.

#### SALUTES.

The national salute shall be conformable to the number of States composing the Union.

A national salute shall be fired on a visit to the post from the President of the United States.

Fifteen guns shall be fired on a visit from the Vice President, the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, a Major General of the army; and thirteen guns on that of a Brigadier General when commanding a district. No other person shall be entitled to salutes, and no salutes will be fired to any person but on his arrival. No salutes shall be fired to foreign ships or vessels of war, but in return, and in every case their salute shall be returned gun for gun, notice being given. No salutes shall be fired to public armed vessels of the United States under the rate of a frigate, and to those only in return, gun for gun, notice being given.

At one o'clock, on the fourth day of July of each year, a national salute will be fired from all the military posts and forts in the United States.

Salutes shall not be fired from guns of higher caliber than twelve pounders.

#### DUTIES OF ADJUTANTS GENERAL.

These will be divided under the following heads, viz:

Distribution of orders:

Details of service:

Instruction of the troops in the manual exercise, and the evolutions and arrangement of them when brought into action; and

Direction of the military correspondence.

##### 1. *Distribution of Orders.*

The general orders of the day having been received from the commanding General, the Adjutant General, or his assistant, will carry them to the office of distribution, where they will be recorded in a book kept for that purpose, whence, at an hour which shall have been previously assigned, they will be transcribed by the Aids-de-camp of general officers, by Majors of brigade, by the Adjutants of all separate corps less than brigades, by a Deputy or Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, by an Hospital Surgeon, or an Hospital Surgeon's Mate, detailed for that duty by the senior surgeon, and some commissioned officer from each corps of engineers; and when so transcribed, they will be carried without delay to the corps to which these officers respectively belong, and be there promulgated, under the orders of the officers commanding the corps, and become to them a rule of conduct.

##### 2. *Details of Service.*

These shall be made agreeably to prescribed rules, and the usage of war.

All corps will furnish according to their strength—the longest off duty, the first on duty. When it may be found practicable, the troops are to act by companies, battalions, or regiments.

Return detachments will not be excused from duty more than two days.

Seniority of corps with respect to troops, and priority of rank with respect to officers, will entitle to precedence for command; subject to deviations under the orders of the commanding general.

In details, the following gradation will govern:

1. Reconnoitering parties and corps of observation.
2. Foraging before the enemy.
3. Detachments and outposts.
4. Guards of trenches.
5. Van guards in approaching an enemy.
6. Rear guards in retiring from an enemy.
7. General courts martial.
8. Guard of the General commanding in chief.
9. Camp of garrison guards.
10. Other guards mounted from the grand parade.
11. Guards of general officers and the staff according to rank.
12. Pickets.
13. General fatigues.
14. Police.

In the routine of duty the law of detail will always give it to the officer longest off duty, and when two have been credited with the same grade of service, on the same day, reference to the former tour on the roster will determine the detail.

Should a tour of service of higher grade occur to an officer while on any subordinate duty, he shall be relieved, and the tour on which he is, be passed to his credit.

If an officer's tour for general court martial, picket, or fatigue, occur while he is on any other duty from the grand parade, he shall not be relieved, but stand for the next tour.

### 3. *Instruction of the Troops.*

This shall be governed by circumstances, as to time, place, and frequency; of which the commanding general will judge. The mode of infantry discipline, adopted by regulation of the War Department, will be observed.

### 4. *Military Correspondence.*

Reports of services performed, and demands for courts of inquiry, or courts martial, shall be made to the Adjutant General. All returns intended to exhibit the strength of the corps, made agreeable to the 19th article of war, and accounting for the absent non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates; reports of the Hospital and of the Quartermaster's Departments; and of ordnance and of ordnance stores attached to the army; shall also be addressed to the Adjutant General; out of which he shall form a general return, to be transmitted monthly, for the information of the War Department; and those transmitted for the months of June and December, shall be accompanied with lists of the officers serving in any garrison or corps of the district or army so returned, specifying their names, rank, and places of station. Returns of ordnance and ordnance stores shall be made agreeably to forms prescribed by the Commissary General of ordnance. Departures from these forms, and inattention to the injunctions above, will be regarded and punished as acts of positive disobedience.

July 9, 1813.

The returns required of Adjutants General, for the information of the War Department, will exhibit regiments and detachments of regiments, separately and by name.

WAR OFFICE, *May 1st*, 1813.

## DUTIES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL.

These will be divided under the following heads, viz:

- Mustering and inspecting troops of the line, and militia detachments serving with them:
- Selecting places of encampment, and posting guards:
- Superintending the police of the camp and of the march:
- Inspecting parades; and
- Making half yearly confidential reports to the War Department, of the state of the army, division, or detachment, to which they belong.

### 1. *Mustering and inspecting the Troops of the Line and Militia Detachments.*

Troops of all descriptions shall be mustered once in two months, for payment, nor shall any payment be made but upon muster rolls signed by an Inspector General, or his assistant, or, in the absence of these, by some officer of the army of the United States, specially assigned to this duty, by the general commanding the district in which the said troops, so mustered, shall be found. Three copies of these rolls shall, in all cases, be made; one of them to be deposited with the Paymaster of the district, and two of them to be sent to the War Department; the one for the use of the Accountant of the said Department, and the other for the Paymaster of the army.

Semi-annual musters of the whole army, whether regular or militia, shall be made on or before the 1st day of January, and 1st day of July, in each year; and rolls thereof, in alphabetical order, forwarded to the War Department as promptly thereafter as possible.

Inspections of the troops are of two kinds: stated and occasional. The former shall take place monthly, (as often as may be practicable) on the last day of each month; the latter, as often as the General commanding the district, the Chief of the Staff, or the Inspector General, may think proper. The general object of both shall be to ascertain the exact state of the arms, equipments, and clothing, and of every other circumstance tending to show the actual condition of the troops so inspected.

Dragoon, artillery, and all other horses belonging to the public, will also be subjects of inspection, quarterly; those unfit for service will be branded in the presence of the inspecting officer, with the letter C, and immediately transferred to the Quartermaster General's Department, for public sale; nor shall any horse, so branded, be thereafter accepted by any inspecting officer. Returns of *cast* horses will be made quarterly.

A return of every inspection shall be made and deposited in the office of the Inspector General, for the information of the general commanding the district; and half yearly returns of inspection shall be made to the War Department.

### 2. *Superintending the Police of the Camp and of the March.*

It will be the duty of this department to designate all guards for the security and good order of the camp; to take charge of all prisoners made by these or otherwise; to examine and report the several cases to the commanding general, and to take his orders in relation to their future disposal; to inspect the state of tents, barracks, and hospitals; to punish any want of care or cleanliness therein; to regulate all sutlers and markets, within any camp, cantonment, or garrison; and to inspect and enforce the order of march, and to punish all infractions of it.

### 3. *Inspecting Parades.*

The troops detailed from each regiment for the service of the day will be brought to the parade ground of the brigade, under the command of the senior officer present, and on duty; these detachments will there be embodied, and marched to the ground of division parade, accompanied by the adjutant of the day, under command of the senior officer; the whole will then be marched as aforesaid, to the ground of general parade, accompanied by a major of brigade, detailed for that service by division orders; where they will be received by an Inspector or an Assistant Inspector General, reviewed, and detached for the service of the day.

### 4. *Selecting Places for Encampment and Posting Guards.*

This duty shall be performed under the directions of the commanding general; and the Inspector, in performing it, shall call to his aid an officer from each corps of engineers.

### 5. *Making half yearly Confidential Reports to the War Department.*

These reports will relate to the conduct of corps, and to that of individuals composing them. They shall be submitted to the general commanding the army, and shall receive from him his remarks in writing, before they are transmitted to the War Department. They shall specify—

- 1st. The progress made by each corps or regiment, in military discipline in general, and particularly in a knowledge of the evolutions prescribed for the practice of the troops; in habits of obedience, and of attention to personal appearance, and to the rules of interior economy.
- 2d. Whether the field and company officers, respectively, know their duty, and are able and willing to perform it? Whether the subalterns are severally sober, active, and industrious, careful to acquire knowledge, and to communicate it to the non-commissioned officers and privates? Whether the Adjutant, Quartermaster, and Paymaster, are competent to the duties assigned to them? Whether the regimental books are kept with accuracy and regularity? and whether the non-commissioned officers perform their duty with promptitude and effect?
- 3d. Whether the meat and bread furnished by contract are of good quality, and whether these, and other articles, composing the rations, are regularly issued?
- 4th. Whether the forage be good, and of sufficient quantity?
- 5th. Whether the hospital supplies and regulations be sufficient, and regularly dispensed in the one case, and observed in the other?

- 6th. Whether there has been any irregularity in the proceedings of courts martial, or in the execution of sentences pronounced by them? And
- 7th. Whether the quantity of ammunition in store is sufficient, and well secured, and whether the arms and equipments are in proper order?

On each of these heads there will be a special report; and in what may be said on the 2d, all possible frankness is expected. One motive more to this, will be found in the solemn declaration of the Government, that, while it shall be its invariable practice to distinguish, and to reward merit of every description, and in every grade, all pretensions not having that foundation, however propped and patronized by names, will be utterly disregarded.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

It shall be the duty of this department to provide—

- 1st. For the quartering and transporting of troops.
- 2d. For transporting all military stores, camp equipage, and artillery.
- 3d. For opening and repairing roads, and constructing and repairing bridges, which may be necessary to the movement of the army, or of any detachment thereof.
- 4th. It shall be the further duty of this department to receive from the departments of purchase, and of ordnance, all clothing, camp equipage, arms, ammunition, and ordnance; to transport the same to the place of destination, and there to make distribution thereof, agreeably to the direction given to the articles by the Commissary General of Purchases, and to the orders of the general commanding the district to which they are destined.

Quartermasters in the intermediate districts, between the places of receipt and delivery, will be held responsible for the safe transportation of all articles through their respective districts.

Articles for conveyance by this department shall be transported in bulk as much as possible, and with each quantity of stores conveyed, the Quartermaster at the post from which it is sent shall furnish a conductor, who shall have charge of it, and for whose conduct, in the safe keeping and delivery thereof, the Quartermaster shall be responsible.

5th. It shall be the duty of the department to provide all forage and fuel for the use of the troops, and have the same transported and issued agreeably to the regulations which follow.

6th. To provide good and sufficient store houses for provisions deposited under contract between individuals and the Government, and to appoint store keepers (for the custody of the said provisions, or other articles, the property of the public, which may be placed there) who shall give security for their safe keeping and delivery, under the orders of the commanding General of the district, or of the Quartermaster General; and to find means of transporting the same, when so required by the engagements of the Government.

7th. To make returns, half yearly, to the Secretary of War, of all horses and draught oxen, or horses and oxen on hire in public service; showing their number, employment, and condition; and a similar return of all other articles, the property of the public, of which the department may be possessed.

8th. To make and transmit to the Secretary of War, monthly summary statements of the accounts of the Department; and quarterly accounts thereof, agreeably to the forms which shall be prescribed by the Treasury Department.

9th. All money drawn for the use of the Department, within any military district, shall be drawn and accounted for by the senior officer of the Department within such district.

No purchases, on public account, will be made by the Quartermaster's Department, but of the following articles:

1st. Of forage.

2d. Of fuel.

3d. Straw for soldiers' bedding.

4th. Articles of stationery for regimental and garrison service.

5th. Dragoon and artillery horses, oxen, wagons, and carts, for the transportation of baggage; boats for the same; and

6th. Boards, planks, nails, and other materials, for constructing and repairing barracks, hospitals, and bridges.

In all cases in which gun carriages and artillery wagons may want repair in the field, the senior officer of artillery is to see the necessary repairs done, and for the expense of these, will make his draft on the Quartermaster General's department.

When any building occupied by troops as a barrack shall have been left by them in a filthy state, or shall have suffered injury by them, the Quartermaster of the post, or of the party succeeding to them, shall, in the one case, have the quarters cleansed, and in the other repaired; and the expense of so doing shall be deducted from the pay of the officers commanding the party which immediately preceded in the occupation of the buildings so cleansed and repaired.

*Regulations which shall govern the allowance of Quarters, of Forage, of Fuel, of Straw for Bedding, of Stationery, and of the transportation of the Baggage of Officers, when ordered on distant commands.*

1. *Of Quarters.*

To a Major General, three rooms and a kitchen.

To a Brigadier General, the Adjutant and Inspector General, principal Quartermaster General and Commissary General of Ordnance, each, two rooms and a kitchen.

To each Adjutant General, Inspector General, Quartermaster General, and Field Officer of a regiment, to the Assistant Commissary General of Ordnance, and to each Deputy Quartermaster General, one room and a kitchen.

To each Assistant Adjutant General, Assistant Inspector General, Topographical Engineer, Major of Brigade, or Brigade Inspector, Deputy Paymaster General, Captain of the Line, Judge Advocate, Hospital Surgeon, Regimental Surgeon, and Chaplain, one room.

For all other commissioned officers, one room to every two officers; and to each mess of six or more officers, one kitchen.

To twelve non-commissioned officers, musicians, or privates, one room or (in the summer) a kitchen.

The eldest officer to have the choice of quarters.

2. *Of Fuel.*

The allowance of fuel, from the last day of April to the first day of November of each year, shall be at the rate of one cord of wood per month for each *kitchen* (or room occupied for cooking). At all posts, garrisons, or cantonments, within the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Ohio, one cord and a half of a cord of wood per month, from the last day of October to the first day of May of each year, for *each room and kitchen* occupied agreeably to the preceding regulations; and at all other posts, garrisons, or cantonments, during the same period, one cord of wood per month for each kitchen or other room occupied as aforesaid.

Each commanding or senior officer at any separate post, whatever may be his rank, will be entitled to fuel for one kitchen.

The allowance of wood for the quarters of the sick will be regulated by the commanding officer and surgeon.

No compensation in money to be made in lieu of allowances of fuel or of quarters; and no fuel to be drawn but within the month for which it is due. No fuel furnished for the use of a garrison, post, camp, or cantonment, shall be removed therefrom, but by the Quartermaster attached thereto; and any overplus of fuel beyond what has been used, or may be necessary for use, at such post, shall revert to the United States. Coal may be issued, in proportion to the cost of wood, in lieu thereof.



### 3. Of Forage.

To all horses in actual service there shall be allowed fourteen pounds of hay, and twelve quarts of oats, or, in lieu of oats, eight quarts of corn per diem.

Officers will be allowed to draw forage in kind, when on actual service in the field, where their duties require them to be mounted, for the number of horses they actually keep in service, not exceeding the following rates: Major Generals, seven; Brigadier Generals, five; Colonels of artillery and infantry, four; Lieutenant Colonels and Majors, three; and all other officers entitled by law to receive money in lieu of forage, when the same shall not be drawn in kind, two each.

### 4. Of Straw.

One truss of straw, weighing thirty-six pounds, is allowed for every two men.

At the expiration of sixteen days, each truss is to be refreshed with eight pounds. At the expiration of thirty-two days, the whole straw is to be removed, and a fresh bedding of one truss to be furnished; and so on, every succeeding period of sixteen and thirty-two days. The same quantity of straw is allowed for servants, or batmen not soldiers, or for washerwomen, in the proportion of one woman to every seventeen men.

The straw is to be changed for the sick in hospital as often as may be deemed necessary by the surgeon or (in his absence) by the mate.

Requisitions for fuel or straw must state the number and rank of the officers, the number of non-commissioned officers and privates, servants, batmen, and washerwomen, for whom it may be demanded, and certified by the commandant of the regiment, garrison, or recruiting rendezvous. No fuel or straw shall be drawn for officers or for soldiers whilst on furlough, nor any allowance made to them for the same.

### 5. Of Transportation.

To each company, or detachment of one hundred men, shall be allowed one four-horse wagon and team, or two two-horse wagons and teams, for the conveyance of baggage and camp equipage, consisting of one common tent, one iron kettle, and two tin pans, for every six men.

When officers are ordered on distant commands, the following rates are to govern in the allowance made to them for the transportation of their baggage: at two dollars per hundred pounds per hundred miles.

To a Major General, - - -	1,250 lbs.	To a Captain, - - -	400 lbs.
Brigadier General, - - -	1,000	Surgeon, - - -	400
Colonel, - - -	750	Subaltern, - - -	300
Lieutenant Colonel, - - -	600	Surgeon's mate, - - -	300
Major, - - -	500	Cadet, - - -	200
Hospital surgeon, - - -	750		

The most direct post route will determine the distance for the amount of transportation, whether performed by land or water.

To every officer ordered on general courts martial, temporary commands, or on other duties, on the seaboard, or in the Atlantic States, there will be allowed, if he so elect, in lieu of the transportation of his baggage, his stage hire; no delay being admitted on the road. Receipts from the stage offices, or certificates on honor, of the performance of the duty, will be required.

No allowance for transportation of baggage to officers fulfilling the first order after appointment.

### 6. Of Stationary.

To a Major General, or other officer, commanding a district, so much stationary as may be necessary for the discharge of his public duties.

To every other general officer twenty-four quires of paper per annum.

To every officer commanding a separate post or garrison of not less than two, nor more than five companies, twelve quires per annum, and one blank book of three quires.

To every officer commanding a separate post or garrison of not more than ten companies, eighteen quires per annum, and one blank book of three quires.

To a Colonel, or other officer, commanding a regiment, for the use of himself and regimental staff, eighteen quires per annum, and a blank book of three quires.

To a Major, six quires of paper, and one blank book, per annum.

For the use of every company, whether in garrison or otherwise, twelve quires per annum, and a blank book of two quires.

For the use of every other commissioned officer in the army of the United States, two quires per annum.

For the use of every officer and garrison, a proportion of other stationary, at the rate of fifty quills, as many wafers, and a paper of ink powder, to each six quires.

### Annual Estimates.

It shall be the duty of this department to make out and transmit to the War Department, on or before the first day of December in each year, annual estimates of the forage, fuel, straw for bedding, articles of stationary, dragoon and artillery horses, oxen, wagons, and carts for transportation of baggage, &c., and of all other articles the furnishing of which appertains to the said department.

November 9, 1812.

Officers, prisoners of war, are allowed for transportation of baggage, from the places where they are paroled to their respective homes, unless transportation is provided by the enemy, or the Government.

July 9, 1813.

In addition to the provision made for repairs of buildings occupied as barracks and quarters, it is ordered, that where private lands and buildings are occupied by the troops of the United States, a reasonable compensation shall be made to the proprietor by the Quartermaster of the district or post; and when the rate of compensation cannot be satisfactorily agreed on, discreet and disinterested persons shall be appointed by the Quartermaster and proprietor, to appraise the rent, which will be settled by the Quartermaster, and the damage repaired as before provided.

"Every officer of the army, whose duty requires him to be on horseback in time of action, and whose horse shall be killed in battle, shall be allowed a sum not exceeding two hundred dollars, on making satisfactory proof of the loss and value of the horse so killed; the proof required shall be by the affidavit of the Quartermaster of the corps to which the owner may belong, or of two other credible witnesses."\*

The Quartermaster's department will adjust and settle all claims conformably to the above provisions.

*Double rations are allowed to the Commanding Officers of the following Military Posts and Stations, viz:*

*Maine.*—Passamaquoddy, Wiscasset, Georgetown, and Harbor of Portland.

*New Hampshire.*—Harbor of Portsmouth.

*Massachusetts.*—Harbor of Boston, New Bedford, Springfield, †Harbors of Salem, Marblehead, Gloucester, and Newburyport.

*Rhode Island.*—Harbor of Newport.

*Connecticut.*—Fort Trumbull.

\* Act of May 12, 1796.

† These are considered as one military station.

*New York.*—Harbor of New York, West Point, and Niagara.  
*Pennsylvania.*—Fort Mifflin and Pittsburg.  
*Maryland.*—Fort M'Henry, Harbor of Annapolis, and Fort Washington.  
*District of Columbia.*—Greenleaf's Point.  
*Virginia.*—Harbor of Norfolk and Fort Powhattan.  
*North Carolina.*—Fort Johnson and Beaufort.  
*South Carolina.*—Georgetown, Harbor of Charleston, Beaufort, and Rocky Mount, or Mount Dearborn.  
*Georgia.*—Savannah, Fort Hawkins, Colerain, and Point Petre.  
*Mississippi Territory.*—Fort Stoddert, Fort Adams, and Washington.  
*Orleans Territory.*—Plaquemine, Nachitoches, Fort St. John, Baton Rouge, and Pass Christian.  
*Louisiana Territory.*—Belle Fontaine, Fort Osage, and Fort Madison, or Belle Vue.  
*Illinois Territory.*—Fort Massac.  
*Indiana Territory.*—Vincennes, Chicago, or Fort Dearborn, Fort Wayne, and Fort Harrison.  
*Tennessee.*—Highwassee and Fort Hampton.  
*Kentucky.*—Newport.  
*Michigan Territory.*—Detroit and Michillimackinack.

And to Generals commanding separate armies and to the commanding officer at New Orleans, treble rations. The commanding officer at each of the posts within named will certify, on honor, that he was the actual commanding officer at the post, and for the time stated in his return, or account for additional rations; which certificate will accompany his return, and be considered a necessary voucher. One officer only can be considered entitled to additional rations.

*Specific monthly allowance of Wood, from 30th April to 1st November.*

		SUMMER MONTHS.	Cords.
1st.	To a Major General,	- - - - -	1
2d.	To each Brigadier General, &c.	- - - - -	1
3d.	To each Adjutant General, &c.	- - - - -	1
4th.	To each Assistant Adjutant General, &c.	- - - - -	$\frac{1}{2}$
5th.	To every officer not included above,	- - - - -	$\frac{1}{3}$
6th.	To each non-commissioned officer, musician, or private,	- - - - -	1-12
	To the senior officer (of staff or the line) at a post,	- - - - -	1

*From the 31st October to 1st May.*

		WINTER MONTHS.	
1st.	To a Major General,	- - - - -	6
2d.	To each Brigadier General, &c.	- - - - -	$4\frac{1}{2}$
3d.	To each Adjutant General, &c.	- - - - -	3
4th.	To each Assistant Adjutant General, &c. and for a kitchen, when he messes in garrison, in addition,	- - - - -	$1\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ — $1\frac{3}{4}$
5th.	To each other officer, and, when he messes in garrison, for a kitchen in addition,	- - - - -	$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ —1
6th.	To each non-commissioned officer, musician, or private, To the senior officer at a post, if of a rank named under the 4th rate of allowance, To the senior officer at a post, if of a rank named under the 5th rate of allowance,	- - - - -	$\frac{1}{3}$ $\frac{1}{3}$ $2\frac{1}{2}$

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

MAY 1, 1813.

1. *Of Laboratories.*

There shall be three principal laboratories in the United States; one in the neighborhood of ———, one in the neighborhood of ———, and one near ———.

At each of these laboratories the head of the department will cause to be bought ten acres of land, and have thereon erected workshops competent to the accommodation of forty workmen, and barracks for the further accommodation of the same, with the necessary magazines and store houses. The workmen at each of the said laboratories shall be engaged for a term of service not less than five years, and at the rates prescribed by law; and at each there shall be one master wheelwright and carriage maker, and one master blacksmith, the whole to be under the direction of the Commissary General, or of some one of his officers. It is, however, understood, that, if workmen cannot be engaged for a term as long as five years, the Commissary General may engage them for a shorter period. And he is also authorized to employ women and children, at low wages, in all work which can be as well performed by them as by men; and accounts regularly presented and certified by him, of the amount of all wages for work done under this regulation, shall be paid by the paymaster of the army.

At these workshops shall be made all gun carriages, ammunition wagons, travelling forges, and every other apparatus for the artillery, and shall be prepared all kinds of ammunition for garrison and field service.

2. *Inspection of Powder, &c.*

It will be the duty of the Commissary General of Ordnance to call upon the Commissary General of Purchases for the names and places of residence of all persons engaged in making powder, cannon, cannon shot, or other ordnance stores, under contract with the United States, and, on notice of the time of delivery of such articles, he will cause the same to be duly proved and inspected. Until thus previously inspected and proved, no ordnance, cannon balls, shells, shot, or powder, shall be received or paid for by any public agent of the United States.

3. *Distribution of Ordnance.*

The orders of general officers for the supply of ordnance, ammunition, carriages, &c. shall go no farther than to direct the number and caliber of the guns, the quantity and kinds of ammunition necessary for the service, and to command the preparation and delivery of these, and other enumerated articles, to some officer charged with its conveyance to the camp or garrison of the general requiring them.

The artillery will be distributed, for field service, into divisions or half divisions. A division of artillery will consist of six pieces of ordnance, viz: Four cannon of the same caliber, and two howitzers, or six cannon of not more than two calibers.

A half division of artillery will consist of two pieces of cannon of the same caliber, and of one howitzer, or of three pieces of cannon of the same caliber.

To each pair of three pounders will be allotted one ammunition wagon or caisson.  
 To each six pounder, one ammunition wagon or caisson.  
 To each howitzer, two ammunition wagons or caissons.  
 To each gun of larger caliber than a six pounder, destined to act with the army in the field, two, or at most three, ammunition wagons or caissons.

To each division of artillery will be allotted three wagons, [provided with assorted and spare articles of equipment, ammunition, harness, entrenching and artificers' tools, &c.

To each half division will be allotted one wagon, with assorted and spare articles and tools, as above.

To each division of flying artillery, and every two divisions of foot artillery, will be allotted one travelling forge.

The proportion of overplus small arms for the infantry may be one-fourth of the number of effective troops in the field; these shall be placed in *reserve*, at some safe and convenient situation near the army.

The proportion of musket cartridges for the infantry shall consist of thirty rounds per man, accompanying the troops in ammunition wagons; and such additional quantities, as may be judged requisite, shall be placed in *reserve*, as provided for small arms in the preceding paragraph.

Wagons will be provided with mining and laboratory tools and utensils, together with additional quantities of entrenching and artificer's tools, whenever the nature of the service may render it necessary.

#### 4. *Preservation and safe-keeping of Ordnance Stores, &c.*

It will be the duty of the Commissary General of Ordnance to take measures for the completion, reparation, and preservation of all ordnance, ammunition, artillery carriages, and machines, in the respective fortresses, magazines, and arsenals.

#### 5. *Return of Ordnance Stores, &c.*

The senior officer of artillery of every division or detachment of the army, and of every garrison and post, and all keepers of magazines and arsenals, or other persons having charge of military stores, shall make returns quarterly to the Commissary General of Ordnance, agreeably to such forms as may be furnished by him.

The military stores, above referred to, are:

Fire arms of every description, with their equipments and accoutrements;

Ammunition, whether fixed or loose;

Laboratory stores and utensils;

Artificers' tools; and

All artillery carriages and machines, not to include camp equipage or barrack furniture.

Such returns shall be made by the Commissary General, as are required by law: and

#### 6. *Annual Estimates.*

It shall be the duty of the Commissary General of Ordnance to make out and render to the War Department, yearly estimates of the powder, ordnance, cannon balls, shells, and shot, timber and other materials for gun carriages and ammunition wagons, laboratory utensils, artificers' tools, &c. which shall be requisite for the service of the public.

### PURCHASING DEPARTMENT.

1st. The Commissary General of this Department and his deputies will purchase, upon the orders and estimates of the War Department, all ordnance, ordnance stores, laboratory utensils, artificer's tools, artillery carriages, ammunition wagons, timber, and other materials for making and repairing these; artillery harness, ammunition, small arms, accoutrements, and equipments; clothing, dragoon saddles and bridles; tents, tent-poles, camp kettles, mess pans, bed sacks, medicines, surgical instruments, hospital stores, and all other articles required for the public service of the army of the United States, excepting only such as are directed to be purchased by the Quartermaster General's Department.

2d. The articles, so purchased as aforesaid, shall (such as may require it) be carefully packed, and all be delivered over, by the Commissary General, or by his deputies, to an officer of the Quartermaster General's Department, for transportation to the places of their destination and use; and all parcels so packed shall be legibly marked with the name of the place or places whither they are to be sent, and that of the detachment or corps for which they are intended, accompanied by an invoice of the articles contained in the said parcels.

3d. The Commissary General of Purchases, and his deputies, shall severally make and transmit monthly summary statements to the Secretary of War, and quarterly accounts of the purchases and deliveries made by them, respectively, to the Accountant of the War Department, with the necessary vouchers, and agreeably to the forms which shall be prescribed by the Treasury Department.

#### *Returns of Clothing, &c.*

To enable the War Department to furnish the orders and estimates as provided by the foregoing regulation, each regimental Quartermaster shall make and transmit, on or before the first day of December in each year, an estimate, countersigned by the commanding officer of the regiment, of all such clothing, arms, accoutrements, equipments, and camp equipage, as may be necessary for the supply of the regiment, for the ensuing year; with a return of the articles on hand, and a report of the condition in which they are.

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In the returns for clothing, one column shall represent what is due to the detachment or regiment, one what is actually wanted, and a third, the articles, if any, on hand, and in the custody of some officer of the detachment or regiment.

These returns shall be signed by the regimental Quartermaster, or officer doing that duty, and countersigned by the officer commanding regiments or corps.

Upon returns thus made, the Commissary of Issues will furnish such articles; and in such proportions, as the state of the public stores will permit.

No return will be made but for the clothing of men actually present.

### DUTIES OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.

To make such surveys, and exhibit such delineation of these, as the commanding General shall direct; to make plans of all military positions (which the army may occupy) and of their respective vicinities, indicating the various roads, rivers, creeks, ravines, hills, woods, and villages to be found therein; to accompany all reconnoitering parties sent out to obtain intelligence of the movements of the enemy, or of his positions, &c.; to make sketches of their route, accompanied by written notices of every thing worthy of observation thereon; to keep a journal of every day's movement, when the army is in march, noticing the varieties of ground, of buildings, of culture, and the distances and state of the roads, between given points, throughout the march of the day; and, lastly, to exhibit the relative positions of the contending armies on fields of battle, and the dispositions made, whether for attack or defence.

### HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

It shall be the duty of the Physician and Surgeon General to prescribe rules for the government of the hospitals of the army; to see these enforced; to appoint stewards and nurses; to call for and receive returns of medicines, surgical instruments, and hospital stores; to authorize and regulate the supply of regimental medicine chests; to make out general half-yearly returns of these, and of the sick, (in hospitals) to the War Department, and yearly estimates of what may be wanted for the supply of the army.

The Apothecary General shall assist the Physician and Surgeon General, in the discharge of the above mentioned duties, and shall receive and obey his orders in relation thereto.

## MISCELLANEOUS RULES.

Each Major General will appoint his Aids-de-camp. Each Brigadier General will appoint his Brigade Major and Aid-de-camp. No Aid-de-camp shall be taken from a rank higher than that of a subaltern.

No officer shall be permitted to hold two staff appointments at the same time.

No surgeon of the army shall be engaged in private practice.

No officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, shall be the agent of a contractor.

Quartermasters of regiments, or of corps, will cause the company provision returns to be consolidated and carried to the commanding officers of regiments, and of detachments, or brigades, for their signatures. Abstracts of these, furnished and presented by the contractors, will be signed by officers commanding brigades, (or separate posts) and will thus become vouchers for the contractors.

No furlough shall be given during a campaign; nor any but by the General commanding the district or army, and for the cause of disability, which disability shall be certified by a regimental or hospital surgeon.

Furloughs shall, beside expressing the term of time granted to absentees, express, also, an order to join the regiment, post, or garrison, to which they may belong.

No order shall be given to officers seeking a furlough for their own convenience, which shall have the effect of entitling them to an allowance for transportation of baggage.

All discharges given to soldiers by generals commanding separate detachments, shall specify the causes of discharge.

All officers, whatever may be their rank, passing through a garrison town, or established military post, shall report their arrival at such town, or post, to the commanding officer, by written notice, if the officer arriving be elder in rank, and personally, if he be younger in rank than the officer commanding.

All officers arriving at the seat of Government, will, in like manner, report to the Adjutant and Inspector General.

## REGULATION OF NOVEMBER 1, 1808.

Officers of the cavalry will be allowed money in lieu of forage, under the rule which governs in the allowance to officers of other corps, to wit, twelve dollars to a Colonel, eleven dollars to a Lieutenant Colonel, &c.

Captains and subalterns of that corps are not to be allowed forage, or money in lieu thereof, until ordered to be mounted.

## MILITARY DISTRICTS.

May 1, 1813.

The United States have been divided into nine, as follows, viz:

Massachusetts and New Hampshire,	-	-	-	-	No. 1.
Rhode Island and Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	No. 2.
New York, from the sea to the Highlands, and New Jersey, excepting that part of the State which furnishes the first division of militia,	-	-	-	-	No. 3.
That part of New Jersey excepted above, Pennsylvania, and Delaware,	-	-	-	-	No. 4.
Maryland and Virginia,	-	-	-	-	No. 5.
The two Carolinas and Georgia,	-	-	-	-	No. 6.
Louisiana, the Mississippi territory, and Tennessee,	-	-	-	-	No. 7.
Kentucky and Ohio, and the territories of Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri,	-	-	-	-	No. 8.
New York, North of the Highlands, and Vermont,	-	-	-	-	No. 9.

## RULES WITH REGARD TO RECRUITING.

Each military district of the United States shall form a recruiting district, within which shall be established one principal rendezvous, and such minor depots for recruits as may be prescribed by the general or other officer commanding, who shall superintend and direct the recruiting service, within such district, either by himself, or by some officer whom he shall designate for that purpose, and whom the Secretary of War shall approve.

The Commissary General of Purchases will cause to be deposited at the principal rendezvous in each district, a sufficient quantity of clothing, arms, accoutrements, ammunition, camp equipage, and medicine, for the several corps to be recruited therein; and that there shall at no time be a deficiency of any of these articles, the superintending officer shall give notice to the Commissary General of the articles received, delivered, and on hand, and at what time a further supply will be necessary.

The superintendent will be held strictly responsible for the good conduct, order, and discipline, of the parties within his district, and will transmit weekly returns, showing the name, rank, regiment, and station, of every officer employed therein, on the recruiting service, the strength of their parties, and the alterations since the last return; and he will use every possible exertion to promote the said service, by visiting the different rendezvous within his district, and by directing his recruiting officers to places where they are known, or to such as promise most success. It shall be his further duty to report to the War Department all commissioned and non-commissioned officers who may be incapable, or negligent, or unsuccessful, in the discharge of their functions.

Recruiting officers will receive money, &c. for their recruits, from the superintending officer of the district, for which they will give the proper duplicate receipts, and be held accountable. They will transmit to him a statement of their accounts weekly, showing the amount of money, clothing, &c. received and distributed, and the balance remaining on hand.

All the recruiting officers within the district shall report weekly to the superintendent, the strength of their parties, the names of their recruits, and the description of their persons, respectively, and shall detach these to the general rendezvous, where they shall be embodied and organized into squads or companies, for the purposes of discipline.

Soldiers enlisted by the officers of any particular regiment shall be given over to that regiment, nor shall any transfer of soldiers from one corps to another be made, without the assent of the officers commanding both corps, or by the orders of the War Department. When a recruiting officer shall send a party of recruits to the principal rendezvous, he will transmit to the commanding officer an exact statement of each man's account, as respects clothing, subsistence, bounty, and pay; and a like statement must accompany every man sent to the regiment, to be entered in the books of the company for which he enlisted. No person shall be received as a recruit, who has sore legs, scurvy, scald head, ruptures, or other infirmities. Healthy, active boys, between fourteen and eighteen years of age, may be enlisted for musicians; and whenever the recruit, who is under age, shall have a parent, guardian, or master, his consent shall be obtained, and accompany the enlistment. The recruiting officer shall be accountable for any loss which the United States would otherwise sustain by enlisting recruits of either of the above descriptions.

When a recruit is rejected, his clothing, if delivered, and the bounty or pay advanced to him, shall be returned; for which the recruiting officer will be held accountable.

No party shall be detached on the recruiting service, unaccompanied by a commissioned officer, unless by special permission of the superintendent. As soon as convenient, and within six days at furthest, from the time of his enlistment, every recruit is to be brought before a magistrate, and take and subscribe the necessary oath, agreeably to the 10th article of the rules and articles of war. No objection is to be made to a recruit for want of size, provided he be strong, active, well made, and healthy. If any recruit, after having received the bounty, or a part of it, shall abscond, he is to be pursued, and punished as a deserter.

Every officer engaged in the recruiting service, at posts where there shall be no Quartermaster, will procure the necessary transportation, forage, fuel, straw, and stationary, taking the requisite vouchers.

Recruiting officers shall, as far as practicable, be furnished with drums and fifes, from their regiments; where this may be impossible, and musicians have not been enlisted, they are authorized to engage a drummer and fifer, at a rate not exceeding fifteen dollars per month, and one ration per day each.

When medical or surgical aid is required by a recruiting party, if no surgeon or mate of the army be at or near the post, the senior officer shall have authority to obtain such by special agreement in writing, under the following rules, viz:

For any number of sick, not more than thirty, the rate of compensation shall not exceed the pay and emolument of a surgeon's mate of the army, exclusive of medicine. In any other case it shall not exceed those of a regimental surgeon.

All communications relating to the recruiting service shall be addressed to "*The Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, War Department.*"

#### MILITARY DISTRICTS.

Each regiment shall furnish a recruiting party or parties, to be expedited to the military districts, according to the following arrangement, viz:

<i>District, No. 1.</i>	{ Two companies of the light artillery, Three troops of the 2d light dragoons, One battalion of the 1st artillery,	The 4th infantry, The 9th infantry, and The 21st infantry.
<i>District, No. 2.</i>	{ One troop of the 2d light dragoons, One battalion of the 1st artillery, and	The 25th infantry.
<i>District, No. 3.</i>	{ Two companies of light artillery, Two troops of the 2d light dragoons, Two battalions of the 3d artillery,	The 6th infantry, and The 15th infantry.
<i>District, No. 4.</i>	{ Two companies of light artillery, Two troops of the 2d light dragoons, One battalion of the 2d artillery, The 3d infantry,	The 5th infantry, The 16th infantry, and The 22d infantry.
<i>District, No. 5.</i>	{ Two companies of light artillery, One troop of the 1st light dragoons, One and a half battalion of the 2d artillery,	The 12th infantry, The 14th infantry, and The 20th infantry.
<i>District, No. 6.</i>	{ Two troops of the 1st light dragoons, One battalion of the 1st artillery, The 8th infantry,	The 10th infantry, and The 18th infantry.
<i>District, No. 7.</i>	{ Two troops of the 1st light dragoons, One battalion of the 1st artillery, The 2d infantry,	The 7th infantry, The 24th infantry, and Three companies of riflemen.
<i>District, No. 8.</i>	{ Two companies of light artillery, Three troops of the 1st light dragoons, One and a half battalions of the 2d artillery, The 1st infantry,	The 17th infantry, The 19th infantry, and Four companies of riflemen.
<i>District, No. 9.</i>	{ Two troops of the 2d light dragoons, Two battalions of the 3d artillery, The 11th infantry,	The 13th infantry, The 23d infantry, and Three companies of riflemen.

#### RULES WITH REGARD TO MILITIA DRAUGHTS.

1st. All militia detachments for the service of the United States must be made under the requisition of some officer of the United States, (to be hereafter authorized to make such requisition) on the Executive authority of the State, or of the territory from which the detachments shall be drawn.

2d. In these requisitions shall be expressed the number of privates, non-commissioned and commissioned officers required; which shall be in the same proportions to each other as obtain in the regular army. The looser method of requiring regiments or brigades will be discontinued.

3d. So soon as one hundred privates, eleven non-commissioned, and five commissioned officers, shall have been organized as a company, under any requisition as aforesaid, they will be mustered and inspected by an Inspector General, or his assistant, or some other officer of the army of the United States, thereto specially appointed; upon whose rolls and reports they will be entitled to pay, &c.

4th. It shall be the duty of the officer so mustering and inspecting militia detachments, to make immediate report thereof to the War Department; and

5th. Payment will be made through the regimental paymaster, in all cases in which the corps shall be organized as a regiment; and in all cases in which it shall fall short of the number necessary to that organization, by the Paymaster accompanying the army or division to which it may belong.

#### CHANGES IN THE UNIFORM OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

The coat of the infantry and artillery shall be uniformly blue. No red collars or cuffs, and no lace, shall be worn by any grade, excepting in epaulettes and sword knots.

All officers will wear coats of the length of those worn by field officers. All the rank and file will wear coatees. The button holes of these will be trimmed with tape on the collar only. Leather caps will be substituted for felt, and worsted or cotton pompons for feathers.

General officers, and all others of the general staff, not otherwise directed, shall wear cocked hats, without feathers; gilt bullet buttons; and button holes in the *herring-bone* form.

The epaulettes of Major Generals will have, on the gold ground of each strap, two silvered stars.

The epaulettes of Brigadiers will have, on each strap, one star.

The uniform of the physician and surgeon, and apothecary generals, and hospital surgeons and mates, shall be black; the coats with standing collars, and, on each side of the collar, a star of embroidery, within half an inch of the front edge.

The rules, with respect to undress, are dispensed with; excepting that cockades must always be worn.

#### *Of the General Staff.*

*The Coat*—Single breasted, with ten buttons, and button holes worked with blue twist, in front, five inches long at the top and three at the bottom. The standing collar to rise to the tip of the ear, which will determine its width. The cuffs, not less than three and a half nor more than four inches wide. The skirts faced with blue, the bottom of each not more than seven, nor less than three and a half, inches wide; the length to reach to the bend of the knee. The bottom of the breast and two hip buttons to range.

1. On the collar one blind hole, five inches long, with a button on each side.
2. The blind holes on each side of the front, in the *herring-bone* form, to be in the same direction with the collar, from the top to the bottom.
3. Blind holes (in the like form) to proceed from four buttons, placed lengthwise, on each skirt. A gilt star, on the centre of the bottom, two inches from the edge.
4. The cuffs, to be indented within one and a half inch of the edge, with four buttons lengthwise on each sleeve, and holes to the three upper buttons, corresponding with the indentation of the cuff, on the centre of which is to be inserted the lower button.
5. All general officers will be permitted to embroider the button holes. The Commissary General of Ordnance, the Adjutants, Inspectors, and Quartermasters General, and the Commissary General of Purchases, will be permitted to embroider the button holes of the collar only.

*Vest, breeches, and pantaloons*—White (or buff for general officers)—blue pantaloons may be worn in the winter, and nankeen in the summer. Vests single breasted, without pocket flaps.

1. Breeches, or pantaloons, with four buttons on the knee, and gilt knee buckles.
2. High military boots and gilt spurs.

*Black stock*—of leather or silk.

*Chapeaux*—of the following form: the fan not less than six and a half, nor more than nine inches high in the rear, nor less than fifteen, nor more than seventeen and a half inches from point to point, bound round the edge with black binding half an inch wide.

1. Button and loop, black.
2. Cockade, the same, four and a half inches diameter, with a gold eagle in the centre.

*Swords*—Yellow mounted, with a black, or yellow, gripe. For the officers of the Adjutant, Inspector, and Quartermaster General's departments, sabres; for all others, straight swords.

*Waist Belts*—of black leather. No sashes.

*Epaulettes*—of gold; according to rank.

*Note*.—Officers of the corps of engineers will wear the uniform already established for that corps.

The dress of the hospital staff will conform, as to fashion, to the uniform of the staff, except that they will wear pocket flaps, and buttons placed across the cuffs, four to each, and covered buttons in all instances, of the color of the coat, (black.)

Officers of the line appointed to a staff station, which confers no additional rank, will wear the uniform of their rank in the line, with high boots and spurs.

#### *Of the Artillery.*

*Coat*—of the same general description with that of the staff; and

1. Pocket flaps, cross indented below, not less than two and a half nor more than three inches wide, with four buttons and blind holes; two buttons at the opening of the pocket of each skirt; and a diamond of blue cloth, ornamented one and a quarter inch on each side, the centre two inches from the bottom of the coat.
2. The blind holes on either side of the front, with the coat buttoned close to the collar, accurately to form lines with the corresponding ones opposite, from the top to the bottom, i. e. not to represent *herring-bone*.
3. The cuffs, with four blind holes, extending from four buttons placed across on each.
4. Two blind holes on the collar, five inches long, with two buttons on each side.
5. Gilt buttons of the size and insignia furnished the Commissary General of Purchases, from the War Department.

*Vests, breeches, and pantaloons*—for the field and staff, the same as those described for the general staff: and *vests and pantaloons*, for the officers of the line, the same, except the first and second particular articles.

*Stocks and Chapeaux*—of the same general description with those of the general staff:

1. Button and loop of the chapeau, yellow.
2. Black cockade of leather, four and a half inches diameter, with a gold eagle in the centre. A white feather to rise eight inches; that of the adjutant, white and red.

*Swords*—cut and thrust, yellow mounted; with a black or yellow gripe.

*Waist Belts*—of white leather.

*Sashes*—to be worn only on a tour of duty, and round the waist.

*Epaulettes*—of gold (bullion and strap) according to rank. The Adjutant, Quartermaster, and Paymaster, to wear a counter strap on the opposite shoulder.

The surgeons and mates, to include garrison surgeons and mates, will wear the same uniform except the cape, which is of black velvet; the plume black.

#### *Of the Infantry.*

The same as that pointed out for the officers of artillery, with the following exceptions:

The sword of the sabre form, and with mounting of silver, or plated. For the medical staff, small swords. Epaulettes, buttons, spurs, buckles, and trimmings, silver or plated; and caps may be worn on duty.

Schedule of the monthly compensation of the Troops of the United States, agreeably to the several acts of Congress in force on the 1st of April, 1813.

BANK OR GRADE.	Pay.	Forage by No. of horses.	Subsistence or Rations per day.	REMARKS.
Major General, - - -	\$200 00	7	15	
Secretary to the general command- ing the army of the United States,	24 00	2	-	In addition to comp. in the line.
Aid-de-camp to a major general, -	24 00	2	4	
Brigadier General, - - -	104 00	5	12	
Aid-de-camp to a brigadier general,	20 00	2	-	Do. do. do.
Brigade Major, - - -	24 00	2	-	Do. do. do.
Brigade Chaplain, - - -	50 00	2	4	
Judge Advocate, - - -	50 00	2	4	
Adjutant and Inspector General, -	104 00	5	12	
Adjutant General, - - -	90 00	5	6	
Assistant do. do. - - -	60 00	4	4	
Inspector General, - - -	75 00	4	6	
Assistant Inspector General, - - -	60 00	4	4	
Quartermaster General, - - -	75 00	4	6	
Deputy Quartermaster General, - - -	60 00	4	4	
Assistant Dep. do. do. - - -	40 00	-	3	
Topographical Engineer, - - -	60 00	4	4	
Assistant Topographical Engineer,	40 00	-	3	
Paymaster of the Army, - - -	120 00	-	-	
Deputy Paymaster General, - - -	50 00	-	-	In addition to comp. in the line.
Assistant Deputy Paymaster Gen.	30 00	-	-	Do. do. do.
District Paymaster,* - - -	50 00	3	4	When not from the line.
Assistant Paymaster, - - -	10 00	-	-	In addition to comp. in the line.
Regimental Paymaster, † - - -	10 00	2	-	Do. do. do.
Regimental Quartermaster, - - -	10 00	2	-	Do. do. do.
Regimental Adjutant, - - -	10 00	2	-	Do. do. do.
Principal Wagon Master, - - -	40 00	1	3	
Wagonmaster, - - -	30 00	1	2	
Principal Foragemaster, - - -	40 00	2	3	
Assistant Foragemaster, - - -	30 00	1	2	
Conductor of Artillery, - - -	30 00	-	2	
Principal Barrackmaster, - - -	40 00	2	3	
Deputy Barrackmaster, - - -	30 00	1	2	
Superintendent of Artificers, - - -	45 00	1	3	
Assistant Superintend't of Artificers,	30 00	-	2	
Master Artificers, - - -	30 00	-	-	
Artificers of the corps of that name,	16 00	-	1½ each	Rations in kind only.
Special Commissary of Purchases, -	60 00	4	4	
Commissary General of Ordnance, -	75 00	4	6	
Assistant Commissary do. do. - - -	50 00	3	7	
Deputy Commissary of Ordnance, -	40 00	1	5	
Assistant do. do. do. - - -	30 00	-	2	
Wheelwrights, carriage makers and blacksmiths, - - -	16 00	-	-	Rations receivable in kind only.
Laborers, - - -	9 00	-	-	Of the ordnance department.
Commissary General, - - -	-	-	-	\$3,000 per annum.
Superintendent, - - -	-	-	-	3,000 do.
Physician and Surgeon General, - -	-	-	-	2,500 do.
Apothecary General, - - -	-	-	-	1,800 do.
Hospital Surgeon, - - -	75 00	2	6	
Hospital Surgeon's Mate, - - -	40 00	2	2	
Hospital Stewards, - - -	20 00	-	2	
Wardmasters, - - -	16 00	-	2	
Surgeons, - - -	45 00	2	3	
Surgeons' Mates, - - -	30 00	2	2	
Professor of natural and experimen- tal philosophy, - - -	60 00	3	5	
Assistant do. do. do. - - -	40 00	-	3	Of the corps of engineers only.
Professor of mathematics, - - -	50 00	3	4	
Assistant do. do. do. - - -	40 00	-	3	
Professor of the art of engineer- ing, - - -	50 00	3	4	
Assistant do. do. do. - - -	40 00	-	3	
Teacher of the French language, - -	40 00	-	3	Of the corps of engineers only.
Teacher of drawing, - - -	40 00	-	3	
Cadet, - - -	16 00	-	2	
Colonel (except of cavalry) - - -	75 00	4	6	
Lieutenant Colonel, do. do. - - -	60 00	3	5	
Major, (except cavalry) - - -	50 00	3	4	
Captain, (except cavalry) - - -	40 00	-	3	
First Lieut., do. do. - - -	30 00	-	2	
Second Lieut., do. do. - - -	25 00	-	2	
Third Lieut., do. do. - - -	23 00	-	2	
Ensign, - - -	20 00	-	2	And forage for the light artillery, when mounted, the same as for light dragoons.

\* When taken from the line, thirty dollars, (in addition) provided it does not exceed the pay, &c. of a Major.

† Of the first artillery, and first and second infantry, forty dollars per day and three rations.

SCHEDULE—Continued.

RANK OR GRADE.	Pay.	Forage by No. of horses.	Subsistence or rations per day.	REMARKS.
*Sergeant Major, - - -	\$ 12 00	-	-	Pay during the continuance of the present war.
*Quartermaster Sergeant, - - -	12 00	-	-	
*Sergeant, - - -	11 00	-	-	
*Principal Musician, - - -	11 00	-	-	
*Corporal, - - -	10 00	-	-	
*Musician, - - -	9 00	-	-	
*Private, driver, bombardier, matross, sapper and miner, - - -	8 00	-	-	
*Artificer, saddler, farrier, & blacksmith, not attached to the Quartermaster General's and Ordnance department, - - -	13 00	-	-	
Colonel of cavalry, - - -	90 00	5	6	
Lieutenant Colonel cavalry, - - -	75 00	4	5	
Major, do. - - -	60 00	4	4	
Captain, do. - - -	50 00	3	3	
First Lieutenant, do. - - -	33 33	2	2	
Second Lieutenant, do. - - -	33 33	2	2	
Third Lieutenant, do. - - -	30 00	2	2	
Cornet, do. - - -	26 66	2	2	
Riding Master, do. - - -	26 66	2	2	
Master of the sword, do. - - -	26 66	2	2	

\* Annual suits of clothing and rations receivable in kind only.

RANK OR GRADE.	PAY.	REMARKS.
Non-commissioned officers and privates of the companies of rangers.	\$1 per day each; 75 cents per day without horses.	To furnish their own rations, arms, equipments, and horses.

Women (in the proportion of one to every seventeen men) a ration in kind, also to matrons and nurses allowed in hospitals.

NOTE.—Though forage may be allowed for the number of horses noted, yet money, in lieu thereof, cannot. A distinction should therefore be drawn; say forage money for one horse only, to all those of the staff, who have not been entitled, heretofore, to more than ten dollars per month. The Brigade Major, aid to a Brigadier, and Adjutant, are expressly limited to that. The allowance of forage in kind, hay, oats, and corn, may be made to as many horses in actual service as the War Department directs.

Commanding officers of separate posts additional rations, at the discretion of the President.

Officers who actually keep waiters not of the army, are allowed to draw money in lieu of subsistence; and agreeably to the act of the 12th of April, 1808, it will be estimated at twenty cents per ration.

Major Generals are entitled to six waiters; Brigadier Generals, four; Colonels, three; Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Hospital Surgeons, two; and all other commissioned officers, one each.

The vouchers required for charges under this allowance, and the provisions of the act of the 6th July, 1813, will be the certificate of the officer that he actually employed and kept in service the number of waiters charged, not of the army; and that he did not, during the term so charged, keep or employ as waiters or servants, soldiers from the line of the army.

CLOTHING.

Cost of an annual suit of each description, calculated at the present prices of clothes, &c.

	Dolls. Cts.	Dolls. Cts.
<i>Infantry Clothing.</i>		
Coat, - - - - -	6 24½	
Cap, - - - - -	87½	
Vest, - - - - -	2 08	
Overalls, linen, two pair, at 92½ cts. each, - - - - -	1 85	
Ditto woollen, two pair at \$2 77½ cents, - - - - -	5 55½	
Frock, - - - - -	1 57½	
Trowsers, - - - - -	1 15	
Gaiters, - - - - -	28½	
Shirts, four, at \$1 42 cents each, - - - - -	5 68	
Stockings, two pair, at 54 cents each, - - - - -	\$1 08	
Socks, two pair, at 10 cents, - - - - -	20	
Shoes, four pair, at 98 do. - - - - -	3 92	
Blanket, - - - - -	3 00	
Stock and clasps, - - - - -	14½	
Cockade and eagle, - - - - -	08½	
	8 43	
Feather, - - - - -	35	
Privates, - - - - -	-	34 07½
Musicians, - - - - -	-	35 95½
Sergeants, - - - - -	-	37 47½



## CLOTHING—Continued.

	Dolls. Cts.	Dolls. Cts.
<i>Old Artillery Clothing.</i>		
Hat, - - - - -	1 00	
Coat, - - - - -	6 64 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Vest, - - - - -	2 08	
Overalls, linen, two pair, at 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents,	1 85	
Ditto, woollen, two pair, at \$2 77 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents,	5 55 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Frock \$1 57 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents, trowsers, \$1 15 cents, gaiters, 28 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents,	3 01 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Shirts, four, at \$1 42 cents,	5 68	
Stockings, socks, shoes, blanket, stock and clasp, and cockade and eagle,	8 43	
Plume, - - - - -	15	
Privates, - - - - -	-	34 41
Musicians, - - - - -	-	36 44
Sergeants, - - - - -	-	37 85
<i>Dragoon Clothing.</i>		
Cap, - - - - -	2 50	
Coatee, - - - - -	5 96 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Vest, - - - - -	2 08	
Overalls, linen, two pair, at 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents,	1 85	
Ditto, woollen, two pair, at \$2 77 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents,	5 55 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Frock, \$1 57 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents, trowsers, \$1 15 cents, gaiters, 28 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents,	3 01 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Shirts, four, at \$1 42 cents,	5 68	
Stockings, socks, shoes, blanket, stock and clasp, and cockade and eagle,	6 47	
Plume (say feather) - - - - -	35	
One pair boots, - - - - -	6 00	
Cloak, - - - - -	13 75	
Privates, - - - - -	-	53 22
Musicians, - - - - -	-	55 09 $\frac{1}{2}$
Sergeants, - - - - -	-	57 16
<i>Light Artillery Clothing.</i>		
Cap, - - - - -	1 00	
Coat, - - - - -	6 21 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Vest, - - - - -	2 08	
Overalls, linen, two pair, at 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents,	1 85	
Ditto, woollen, 2 pair at \$2 77 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents,	5 55 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Frock, \$1 57 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents; trowsers, \$1 15 cents; gaiters, 28 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents,	3 01 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Shirts, four, at \$1 42 cents,	5 68	
Stockings, socks, shoes, blanket, stock and clasp, and cockade and eagle,	8 43	
Feather, - - - - -	35	
Privates, - - - - -	-	34 18
Musicians, - - - - -	-	36 05
Sergeants, - - - - -	-	37 59
<i>Rifle Clothing.</i>		
Cap, - - - - -	1 50	
Coat, - - - - -	6 21 $\frac{3}{4}$	
Vest, - - - - -	2 08	
Green overalls, fringed, two pair, at \$2 77 $\frac{3}{4}$	5 54 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Woollen, do. two pair, at \$2 77 $\frac{3}{4}$	5 55	
Rifle frock, - - - - -	2 63	
Shirts, four, at \$1 42 cents,	5 68	
Stockings, socks, shoes, blanket, stock and clasp, and cockade and eagle,	8 43	
Feather, - - - - -	35	
Privates, - - - - -	-	37 98 $\frac{3}{4}$
Musicians, - - - - -	-	39 85
Sergeants, - - - - -	-	41 77

NOTE.—The price of the corporal's clothing is the same as that of the privates of the respective corps to which they may belong.

*Pay and Subsistence allowed in the Navy of the United States to Officers, and Petty Officers.*

RANK OR STATION.	Pay per month.	Rations per day.
	Dollars.	Number.
Captain of a vessel of thirty-two guns and upwards,	100	8
Captain of a vessel of twenty and under thirty-two guns,	75	6
Master commandant,	60	5
Lieutenant,	40	3
Lieutenant commanding,	50	4
Chaplain,	40	2
Surgeon,	50	2
Surgeon's mate,	30	2
Master,	40	2
Purser,	40	2
Boatswain,	20	2
Gunner,	20	2
Sailmaker,	20	2
Carpenter,	20	2
Midshipman,	19	1
Master's mate,	20	1
Captain's clerk,	25	1
Boatswain's mate,	19	1
Cockswain,	18	1
Yeoman of the gun room,	18	1
Quarter Gunner,	18	1
Quartermaster,	18	1
Carpenter's mate,	19	1
Armorer,	18	1
Steward,	18	1
Cooper,	18	1
Master-at-arms,	18	1
Cook,	18	1

NOTE.—Whenever any officer shall be employed in the command of a squadron on separate service, the allowance of rations shall be double during the continuance of such command and no longer; except in the case of the commanding officer of the navy, whose allowance, while in service, shall always be at the rate of sixteen rations per day, agreeably to an act of Congress passed the 25th February, 1799.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 126.

[2d Session.]

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 14, 1814.

Mr. TAYLOR, from the Committee for Revising Militia Laws, to whom was referred a resolution instructing an inquiry into the expediency of so amending the laws of the United States that the militia called out under their authority may not be compelled to serve more than three months for a tour of duty, reported:

That, by the 4th section of the act to provide for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections and repel invasions, &c. passed February 28, 1795, the service of the militia is limited to a term not exceeding three months in any one year, after their arrival at the place of rendezvous. By the 3d section of the act to authorize a detachment from the militia of the United States, passed April 10, 1812, the militia may be compelled to serve not exceeding six months. The last mentioned act will have expired at the end of two years from its passage. These are the only acts in force to authorize calling out the militia into actual service. When such call is made under the act of 1795, to repel either actual or threatened invasion, the service is limited to the term contemplated by the resolution. But, in case a detachment is required for more distant service, the term of three months would often be inadequate to effect any valuable purpose. The committee, therefore, submit the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That it is inexpedient to limit the service of the militia called out under the authority of the United States to a term not exceeding three months.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 127.

[2d SESSION.

## CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE ARMY ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 2, 1814.

*To the House of Representatives of the United States:*

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report of the Secretary of War, complying with their resolution of the 31st of December last.

JAMES MADISON.

January 31st, 1814.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 25, 1814.

SIR:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 31st of December last, requesting such information (not improper to be communicated) as may tend to explain the causes of the failure of the arms of the United States on the Northern frontier, I have the honor to submit the following documents, and to offer to you, sir, the assurance of the very high respect with which I am,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

The PRESIDENT.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND MAJOR GENERAL DEARBORN, &amp;c.

*Note presented to the Cabinet, on the 8th February, 1813, by the Secretary of War.*

The enemy's force at Montreal and its dependencies has been stated at 16,000 effectives. It more probably does not exceed 10 or 12,000. The militia part of it may amount to one sixth of the whole. Is it probable that we shall be able to open the campaign on Lake Champlain, with a force competent to meet and dislodge this army before the 15th of May? I put the question on this date, because it is not to be doubted but that the enemy will then be reinforced, and, of course, that new relations, in point of strength, will be established between us. Our present regular force, on both sides of Lake Champlain, does not exceed 2,400 men. The addition made to it must, necessarily, consist of recruits, who, for a time, will not be better than militia; and when we consider that the recruiting service is but beginning, and that we now approach the middle of February, the conclusion is, I think, safe, that we cannot move in this direction, and thus early, (say 1st of May,) with effect.

It then remains to choose between a course of entire inaction, because incompetent to the main attack, or one having a secondary, but still an important object; such would be the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott, on the St. Lawrence and Lake Erie, including the towns of Kingston and York, and the Forts George and Erie.

On this line of frontier the enemy have,

At Prescott,	-	-	-	-	300
At Kingston,	-	-	-	-	600
At George and Erie, &c.	-	-	-	-	1,200
Making a total (of regular troops) of	-	-	-	-	2,100

Kingston and Prescott, and the destruction of the British ships at the former, would present the first object; York, and the frigates said to be building there, the second; George and Erie, the third.

The force to be employed on this service should not be less than 6,000 effective regular troops, because, in this first enterprise of a second campaign, nothing must, if possible, be left to chance.

The time for giving execution to this plan is clearly indicated by the following facts:

1st. The river St. Lawrence is not open to the purposes of navigation before the 15th of May; and

2d. Lake Ontario is free from all obstruction, arising from ice, by the 1st day of April.

Under these circumstances we shall have six weeks for the expedition before it be possible for Sir George Prevost to give it any disturbance.

Should this outline be approved, the details for the service can be made and expedited in forty-eight hours.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 10, 1813.

"I have the President's orders to communicate to you, as expeditiously as possible, the outline of a campaign, which you will immediately institute and pursue, against Upper Canada:

"1st. 4,000 troops will be assembled at Sackett's Harbor.

"2d. 3,000 will be brought together at Buffalo and its vicinity.

"3d. The former of these corps will be embarked and transported, under convoy of the fleet, to Kingston, where they will be landed. Kingston, its garrison, and the British ships wintering in the harbor of that place, will be its first object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of Upper Canada) the stores collected, and the two frigates building there. Its third object, Forts George and Erie, and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last, there will be a co-operation between the two corps. The composition of these will be as follows:

1st. Bloomfield's brigade,	-	-	-	-	1,436
2d. Chandler's do.	-	-	-	-	1,044
3d. Philadelphia detachment,	-	-	-	-	400
4th. Baltimore do.	-	-	-	-	300
5th. Carlisle do.	-	-	-	-	200
6th. Greenbush do.	-	-	-	-	400
7th. Sackett's Harbor do.	-	-	-	-	250

8th. Several corps at Buffalo, under the command of Colonel Porter, and the recruits belonging thereto,

Total, 7,030

"The *time* for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of Lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the first of April.

"The Adjutant General has orders to put the more Southern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on Lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by some new raised regiments from the East.

"You will put into your movements as much privacy as may be compatible with their execution. They may be masked by reports that Sackett's Harbor is in danger, and that the principal effort will be made on the Niagara, in co-operation with General Harrison. As the route to Sackett's Harbor, and to Niagara, is, for a considerable distance, the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at Lake Champlain."

ALBANY, February 18, 1813.

SIR:

Your despatches of the 10th. were received last evening. Nothing shall be omitted, on my part, in endeavoring to carry into effect the expedition proposed.

I fear the very large magazines of provisions on Lake Champlain will be unsafe, unless a considerable part is removed at some distance from the store, or a considerable force is assembled at Burlington, and vicinity, by the time the two brigades shall move. Another motive for having a large force on that lake will be, that of preventing the enemy from sending almost his whole force from Lower Canada to Kingston, as soon as our intentions shall be so far known as to afford satisfactory evidence of our intentions in relation to the conquest of Upper Canada; and unless an imposing force shall menace Lower Canada, the enemy's whole force may be concentrated in Upper Canada, and require as large a force to operate against them as would be necessary to operate towards Montreal. It may be advisable to draw out a body of New Hampshire militia to serve for a short time, in Vermont. You will judge of the expediency of such a measure; but I do not believe that there will be a sufficient body of new raised troops in season for taking the place of the two brigades.

I this day received a letter from Colonel Porter, in which he informs me that General Winchester had arrived at Niagara, with such of his troops as had escaped the tomahawk, and that they were crossing over on parole. He states that, at the close of the action, all those who, by wounds or other causes, were unable to march, were indiscriminately put to death. Such outrageous conduct will require serious attention, especially when British troops are concerned in the action.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

HON. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 24, 1813.

SIR:

Before I left New York, and till very recently since my arrival here, I was informed, through various channels, that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was not practicable, on account of the snow which generally lays to the depth of two, and sometimes three feet, over all that Northern region during those seasons. Hence it is, that, in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest and best to make the attack by a combination of naval and military means, and to approach our object, not by directly crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy of, the fleet. Later information differs from that on which this plan was founded; and the fortunate issue of Major Forsyth's last expedition shows that small enterprises, at least, may be successfully executed at the present season. The advice given in your letter of the — instant, has a bearing also on the same point and to the same effect. If the enemy be really weak at Kingston, and approachable by land and ice, Pike (who will be a brigadier in a day or two) may be put into motion from Lake Champlain, by the Chateaugue route, (in sleighs) and, with the *two* brigades, cross the St. Lawrence where it may be thought best, destroy the armed ships, and seize and hold Kingston, until you can join him with the other corps destined for the future objects of the expedition; and, if pressed by Prevost, before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw himself to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security on our side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence is now every where well bridged, and offers no obstruction to either attack or retreat. Such a movement will, no doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet him. The dilemma it presents will be serious. Either he must give up his western posts, or, to save them, he must carry himself in force, and promptly, to Upper Canada. In the latter case, he will be embarrassed for subsistence. His convoys of provision will be open to our attacks, on a line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage will be, to let us into the secret of his real strength. If he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to recover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and, after all, maintain himself at Montreal and on Lake Champlain, he is stronger than I imagined, or than any well authenticated reports make him to be.

With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we have nothing to fear; because, as stated above, Prevost's attention must be given to the western posts and to our movements against them. He will not dare to advance southwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank and menacing his line of communication. But, on the other supposition, they (the magazines) may be easily secured—first, by taking them to Willsborough; or, second, to Burlington; or, third, by a militia call, to protect them where they are. Orders are given for the march of the eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two companies of axe-men, sent to open the route to the Chamdiere.

The southern detachments will be much stronger than I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will mount up nearly to 1,000 effectives.

With great respect, dear General, I am yours, faithfully,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Gen. DEARBORN.

HEAD QUARTERS, ALBANY, February 25, 1813.

SIR:

I this day received, by express, from Colonel Macomb, the enclosed account from Major Forsyth. His known zeal for a small partisan warfare has induced me to give him repeated caution against such measures, on his part, as would probably produce such retaliating strokes as he would be unable to resist; but I fear my advice has not been as fully attended to as could have been wished. He is an excellent officer, and, under suitable circumstances, would be of important service.

I have requested the Governor to order General Brown out with three or four hundred of such militia as he can soonest assemble to join Forsyth; and I have ordered Colonel Pike, with four hundred of his command, to proceed, in sleighs, by what is considered the shortest and best route, to the neighborhood of Ogdensburg, or to Sackett's Harbor. On his arrival at Pottsdam, or Canton, or Russel, he will be able to communicate with Brown or Forsyth, or both, and act with them as circumstances may require.

The affair at Ogdensburg will be a fair excuse for moving troops in that direction; and, by this movement, it will be ascertained whether the same route will be the best in future; the distance by that route from Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbor is but little more than one-half of what it would be by the route proposed, and I am assured by a gentleman whom I can confide in, that there will be no difficulty by that route.

Chauncey has not yet returned from New York. I am satisfied that, *if he had arrived as soon as I had expected him, we might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice;* but his presence was necessary for having the aid of the seamen and marines.

From a letter received this day from Colonel Porter, at Niagara, it appears that the enemy were preparing to strike at Black Rock. I can give him no assistance.

I am, sir, with respect and esteem, your obedient humble servant,

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

H. DEARBORN.

*February 22, 1813.*

SIR:

I have only time to inform that the enemy, with a very superior force, succeeded in taking Ogdensburg this morning about nine o'clock. They had about two men to our one, exclusive of Indians. Numbers of the enemy are dead on the field. Not more than twenty of our men killed and wounded; Lieutenant Beard is among the latter.

I have made a saving retreat of about eight or nine miles. I could not get all the wounded off.

We have killed two of the enemy to one of ours killed by them. We want ammunition and some provisions sent to us, also sleighs for the wounded.

If you can send me *three hundred men all shall be retaken,* and Prescott too, or I will lose my life in the attempt. I shall write you more particularly to-day.

Yours, with due respect,

BENJAMIN FORSYTH, *Capt. Rifle Reg. Commanding.*

Col. MACOMB, *Sackett's Harbor.*

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

*ALBANY, February 26, 1813.*

"Having received information that Sir George Prevost was moving towards Upper Canada, with considerable force, but not such as can be fully relied on, I have, however, ordered four hundred more of Pike's command to follow the first detachment without delay."

HEAD QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR, *March 3, 1813.*

SIR:

Having been informed that Sir George Prevost had adjourned the Legislature at Quebec, assigning as the motive that his Majesty's service required his presence in Upper Canada, and having received certain information of his passing Montreal and having arrived at Kingston, I set out immediately for this place, having ordered the force at Greenbush, and part of Colonel Pike's command, in sleighs, for this place. I arrived here in fifty-two hours. I am now satisfied, from such information as is entitled to full credit, that a force has been collected from Quebec, Montreal, and Upper Canada, of from six to eight thousand men, at Kingston, and that we may expect an attack within forty-eight hours, and perhaps sooner.

The militia have been called in, and every effort will, I trust, be made to defend the post; but I fear neither the troops from Greenbush nor Plattsburg will arrive in season to afford their aid. I have sent expresses to have them hurried on.

Commodore Chauncey has not arrived; he will be here to-morrow. The armed vessels have not been placed in the positions intended by the Commodore.

Our total force may be estimated at nearly three thousand of all descriptions.

Sir George Prevost is represented to be determined to effect his object at all events, and will undoubtedly make every effort in his power for the purpose.

We shall, I trust, give him a warm reception; but, if his force is such as is expected, and should make an attack before our troops arrive from Greenbush and Plattsburg at Sackett's Harbor, the result may at least be doubtful.

I have the honor, sir, to be, with the highest respect and consideration, your obedient humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, *March 9, 1813.*

SIR:

I have not yet had the honor of a visit from Sir G. Prevost. His whole force is concentrated at Kingston, probably amounting to six or seven thousand; about three thousand of them regular troops. The ice is good, and we expect him every day; and every measure for preventing a surprise is in constant activity. The troops from Greenbush (upwards of 400) have arrived. I have heard nothing from Pike: he should have been here yesterday. I have sent three expresses to meet him; neither has returned. I have suspicions of the express employed by the Quartermaster-General to convey the orders to Pike; the earliest measures were taken for conveying a duplicate of his orders. I hope to hear from him to day. His arrival, with eight hundred good troops, would be very important at this time. The enemy are apprised of his movement.

I begin to entertain some doubts whether Sir George will venture to attack us, but shall not relax in being prepared to give him a decent reception.

I should feel easier if Pike should arrive in season. I am in want of officers of experience. My whole force, exclusive of seamen and marines, who will be confined to the vessels, and have no share in the action, until my force shall be worsted, amounts to nearly 3,000, exclusive of 450 militia at Brownville, and on the road leading from Kingston, by land. Within two or three days I may have 300 more militia from Rome and Utica.

The ice will not probably be passable more than from six to ten days longer; it is not usually passable after the 15th of March. This unexpected movement of the enemy will effectually oppose the movements contemplated on our part, and I shall not think it advisable to order General Chandler to move at present. As soon as the fall of this place shall be decided, we shall be able to determine on other measures. If we hold this place, we will command the lake, and be able to act in concert with the troops at Niagara, while Chandler's brigade, with such other troops as may assemble in Vermont, may induce a return of a considerable part of those troops that have left Lower Canada.

When I ordered Pike to move, I directed General Chandler to have the provision at Plattsburg moved to Burlington. There was but a small proportion of our magazines at Plattsburg; they are principally at Burlington and White Hall.

Yours, with respect and esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

MARCH 14, 1813.

"From the most recent and probable information I have obtained, I am induced to believe that Sir George Prevost has concluded that it is too late to attack this place. He undoubtedly meditated a coup-de-main against the shipping here. All the apprehension is now at Kingston. Sir George has visited York and Niagara, and returned to Montreal. Several bodies of troops have lately passed up from Montreal; but such precautions have been taken to prevent their number being ascertained, as to render it impossible to form any accurate opinion of their forces, or even to imagine very nearly what they amount to. From various sources, I am perfectly satisfied that they are not in sufficient force to venture an attack on this place, knowing, as they do, that we have collected a fine body of troops from Greenbush and Plattsburg, and that the militia have been called in. We are probably just strong enough on each side to defend; but not in sufficient force to hazard an offensive movement. The difference of attacking and being attacked, as it regards the contiguous posts of Kingston and Sackett's Harbor, cannot be estimated at less than three or four thousand men, arising from the circumstance of militia acting merely on the defensive. I have ordered General Chandler with the 9th, 21st, and 25th regiments, to march for this place; Clark's regiment, and a company of artillery, to be left at Burlington, for the present, where the regiment will be filled in a few weeks. I have ordered the recruits for the three regiments that will march for this place to be sent to Greenbush, and Col. Earned is ordered there to receive them with Backus's dismounted dragoons, and other detachments from Pittsfield."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, March 16, 1813.

"It was yesterday unanimously determined, in a council of the principal officers, including Commodore Chauncey, that we ought not, under existing circumstances, to make an attempt on Kingston, before the naval force can act. The harbors in this lake will not probably be open so as to admit of the vessels being moved until about the 15th of April."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, without date, proposing to pass by Kingston, and attack York, &c.*

"To take or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the complete command of the Lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him ten or twelve hundred troops, to be commanded by Pike; take York, from thence proceed to Niagara, and attack Fort George by land and water, while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry Forts Erie and Chippewa, and join those at Fort George, and then collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature deliberation, the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself as the most certain of ultimate success."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 29, 1813.

"Your despatches of the 11th and 14th instant, from Sackett's Harbor, and one of the 22d, from Albany, have been received. The correspondence between you and Major Murray, in relation to an exchange of prisoners, has been referred to the Department of State. The alteration in the plan of campaign, so as to make Kingston the last object, instead of making it the first, would appear to be necessary, or at least proper; but the force assigned to the attack of the upper posts, is believed to be too small.

"Accident may prevent a co-operation of the corps at Buffalo. That sent from Sackett's Harbor should have in itself the power of reducing Forts George and Erie, and holding in check the militia who may be sent to support them. The ships can give little aid in the business, except merely in covering the landing. Double the number you purpose sending would not be too many. Various considerations recommend the employment of a large and decisive force, and none, that I can think of, dissuade from it. If our first step in the campaign, and in the quarter from which most is expected, should fail, the disgrace of our arms will be complete. The public will lose all confidence in us, and we shall even cease to have any in ourselves. The party who first opens a campaign has many advantages over his antagonist, all of which, however, are the result of his being able to carry his whole force against a part of his enemies. Washington carried his whole force against the Hessians, in New Jersey, and beating them, recovered that moral strength, that self-confidence, which he had lost by many preceding disasters. We are now in that state of prostration that he was in, after he crossed the Delaware; but, like him, we may soon get on our legs again, if we are able to give some hard blows at the opening of the campaign. In this we cannot fail, provided the force we employ against his western posts be sufficiently heavy. They must stand or fall by their own strength. They are perfectly isolated, and out of the reach of reinforcements; send, therefore, a force that shall overwhelm them—that shall leave nothing to chance. If I had not another motive, I would carry my whole strength, merely that their first service should be a successful one. The good effects of this will be felt throughout the campaign.

"I have hastened to give you these thoughts, under a full conviction of their usefulness; and shall only add, that there is no drawback upon this policy. When the fleet and army are gone, we have nothing at Sackett's Harbor to guard, nor will the place present an object to the enemy.

"How then would it read that we had lost our object on the Niagara, while we had another brigade at Sackett's Harbor doing nothing?"

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

ALBANY, April 5, 1813.

"I have this day been honored with your letter of the 29th ultimo. As troops cannot with safety be transported from Sackett's Harbor to York, or Niagara, in *bateau* or flat bottomed boats, I must depend on Commodore Chauncey's armed vessels, with one or two other sloops, for the transportation of our troops; and it was considered doubtful, whether more than twelve hundred men could be so conveyed, which number I considered amply sufficient for the two first objects contemplated, but as many as can be transported with safety shall be sent. The co-operation of the troops under General Lewis may be relied on. Boyd and Winder are with him, and nothing but outrageous gales of wind can prevent success.

"The troops from Maryland and Pennsylvania arrived last evening. They, with the other detachments at Greenbush, will proceed towards Lake Ontario within two or three days. As soon as practicable, after sending off the troops, I shall move westward."

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 19, 1813.

SIR:

Taking for granted that General Prevost has not been able or willing to reinforce Malden, Erie, and George, and that he has assembled at Kingston a force of six or eight thousand men, (as stated by you) we must conclude that

he means to hazard his more western posts, shorten his line of defence, and place his right flank on Lake Ontario.

This arrangement is, no doubt, in consequence of our preparations at Sackett's Harbor. These gave him reason to fear that we meant to cut his line of communication at that point, which, so long as he has a hope of keeping the command of the lake, is one of infinite importance to his views.

The danger, however, now is, that, in the event of the success of our present expedition, he may lose this hope, abandon Kingston, and concentrate his forces at Montreal.

This event is, in my opinion, so probable, as to render necessary a communication of the views of the President, in relation to the movements on your part, (which shall be subsequent to those now making) on two suppositions:

- 1st. That the enemy will keep his ground at Kingston; and,
- 2d. That he will abandon that ground and withdraw from Montreal.

On the first supposition, there is no difficulty in either selecting our object, or the means of pursuing it. We ought to destroy the communication between Kingston and Montreal, by interposing a competent force between the two, and assailing the former by a joint operation of military and naval means.

Local circumstances favor this project. A few armed boats on Lake St. Francis stops all intercourse by water; in which case, cannon, military stores, and articles of subsistence in *bulk*, cannot be conveyed between Montreal and Kingston.

From Lake Ontario to Ogdensburg we command the navigation of the St. Lawrence by our armed vessels, and, under their protection, our army can be passed over and established on the Canada side, at the point deemed most proper for attack.

On the other supposition, that the British garrison is withdrawn from Kingston to Montreal, the old question of approaching him by Lake Champlain, or by the St. Lawrence, recurs, and ought now to be settled, so that there should be no unnecessary pause in our operations at a later and more momentous period of the campaign.

The circumstances in favor of the St. Lawrence route are these—

1st. Our force is now upon it.

2d. It furnishes a conveyance by water the whole distance.

3d. The enemy is not fortified on the St. Lawrence side, and has on it no strong out-posts, which must be forced, in order to secure our flanks and rear, while engaged in the main attack; and,

4th. By approaching his *flank* (as this route enables you to do) instead of his *front*, we compel him to change his position, in which case he must do one of four things: either he must occupy the north side of the river, and give up the south, or he must occupy the south side and give up the north, or he must confine himself to the island, and give up both sides, or lastly, he must occupy both sides, and in this case expose himself to be beaten in detail.

None of these advantages are to be found in approaching him by the other route. Our troops are not upon it; we cannot move by water; his out posts are fortified, and must be carried by assault; his front is the only assailable point, and that is covered by the St. Lawrence; our attack must be made exactly where he wishes it to be made; all his arrangements and defences are, of course, in full operation, nor is he compelled to disturb them in the smallest degree. In a word, we must fight him on *his* previous dispositions and plans, and not on any of *our own*.

These reasons are deemed conclusive for preferring the route of the St. Lawrence, and your measures (subsequent to your present expedition) will, therefore, be conformed to this view of the subject.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General DEARBORN.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, April 23, 1813.

"The troops embarked yesterday. Every vessel is crowded with as many men as possible; the total number 1600, of the best men. I trust we shall sail within one or two hours. If the sails for a new vessel arrive within a day or two, and a small sloop from Oswego, which ought to have been here five days since, 150 more men will go in them. The ice did not move out until the 19th; I arrived on the 20th."

HEAD QUARTERS, YORK, UPPER CANADA, April 23, 1813.

SIR:

After a detention of some days, by adverse winds, we arrived here yesterday morning, and at eight o'clock commenced landing our troops about three miles westward of the town, and one and a half from the enemy's works. The wind was high and in an unfavorable direction for our boats, which prevented the troops landing at a clear field (the ancient site of the French fort Tarento.) The unfavorable wind prevented as many of the armed vessels from taking such positions as would as effectually cover our landing as they otherwise would have done; but every thing that could be done was effected. Our riflemen under Major Forsyth first landed under a heavy fire from Indians and other troops. General Sheaffe commanded in person. He had collected his whole force in the woods near where the wind obliged our troops to land, consisting of about 700 regulars and militia, and 100 Indians. Major Forsyth was supported, as promptly as possible, with other troops; but the contest was sharp and severe for near half an hour. The enemy was repulsed by a far less number than their own, and as soon as General Pike landed with 7 or 800 men, and the remainder of the troops were pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works; and as soon as the whole of the troops had landed and formed on the clear ground intended for the first landing, they advanced through a thick wood to the open ground near the enemy's works, and after carrying one battery by assault, were moving on in columns towards the main works: when the head of the columns was within about sixty rods of the enemy, a tremendous explosion occurred from a large magazine prepared for the purpose, which discharged such immense quantities of stone as to produce a most unfortunate effect on our troops. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of our killed and wounded, but our loss by the explosion must, I fear, exceed one hundred; and among them I have to lament the loss of the brave and excellent officer Brigadier General Pike, who received such a contusion from a large stone as terminated his valuable life within a few hours. His loss will be severely felt. Previous to the explosion, the enemy had retired into the town, excepting a party of regular troops, which did not retire early enough to avoid the shock; it is said, that upwards of forty of them were destroyed. General Sheaffe moved off with the regular troops and left directions with the commanding officer of the militia to make the best terms he could. In the mean time, all further resistance on the part of the enemy ceased, and the outlines of a capitulation were agreed on. As soon as I was informed of General Pike's being wounded, I went on shore. I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the troops in action to General Pike from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated. Every movement was under my view. Our troops behaved with great firmness and deserve much applause, especially those who were first engaged, under circumstances that would have tried the firmness of veterans. Our loss in the action in the morning, and in carrying the first battery, was not great, probably about 50 killed and wounded; among them were a full proportion of officers; and although the enemy had a decided advantage in point of numbers and position at the commencement, their loss was greater than ours, particularly in officers.

It was with the greatest exertion that the small vessels of the fleet could work into the harbor against a gale of wind directly ahead; but as soon as they got in contact with the batteries a tremendous cannonade commenced from 24 and 32 pounders, and was kept up without intermission under a heavy fire from two batteries, until the enemy's batteries were carried or blown up by the explosion, which undoubtedly had a powerful effect on the enemy. I am

under the greatest obligations to Commodore Chauncey for his able and indefatigable exertions in every possible manner that could give facility and effect to the expedition. He is equally estimable for deliberate, sound judgment, bravery, and industry. The Government could not have made a more fortunate selection for the important trust he holds. Unfortunately, the enemy's armed ship the "Prince Regent," left this place for Kingston four days before we arrived. A large ship on the stocks, and nearly planked up, with a large store of naval stores, were set on fire by the enemy soon after the explosion of the magazine. There are no vessels fit for use in the harbor. A considerable quantity of military stores and provisions remained. We shall not possess the means of transporting the prisoners from this place and must of course leave them on parole. I hope we shall so far complete the necessary measures at this place in the course of this day as to be able to sail to-morrow for Niagara, by which route I send this by a small vessel, with notice to General Lewis of our approach.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA, *May 3, 1813.*

SIR:

I arrived at this place last evening with Commodore Chauncey in his fast sailing schooner the *Lady of the Lake*: we left the fleet with the troops on board in York road. The wind has been so unfavorable as to render it impracticable to come to this place with any prospect of effecting a landing.

I have had a conference with Generals Lewis, Boyd, and Winder, at which Commodore Chauncey was present. I did not find the preparations at this place as complete as could have been expected; but as soon as the wind will permit, we shall make a descent. Commodore Chauncey has returned to the fleet, and will sail for this place as soon as he shall judge the wind favorable for crossing and landing the troops. In the mean time we shall be preparing to act in concert. General Boyd will take command of the brigade lately commanded by General Pike. We find the weather on this lake at this season of the year such as to render naval operations extremely tedious and uncertain, especially when we have to debark troops on the shore of the lake, where there are no harbors. Westerly winds are necessary: we have none but easterly. I have no doubt of ultimate success, unless harassed and dispersed by the elements.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded. You will observe the loss was very small excepting that produced by the explosion. As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, the loss of the enemy amounted from ninety to one hundred killed, two hundred wounded, and upwards of three hundred prisoners. I have not been able to ascertain precisely the number of the militia put on their parole; I presume it could not be less than five hundred. There was an immense depot of naval and military stores. York was the principal depot for Niagara and Detroit; and, notwithstanding the immense amount which was destroyed by them, we found more than we could bring off. General Sheaffe's baggage and papers fell into my hands. These papers are a valuable acquisition: I have not had time for a full examination of them. A scalp was found in the executive and legislative chamber, suspended near the speaker's chair, in company with the mace and other emblems of royalty. I intend sending it to you with a correct account of the facts relative to the place and situation in which it was found.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA, *May 13, 1813.*

SIR:

Commodore Chauncey, with the fleet and troops, arrived here on the evening of the 8th, and in the course of the night the troops were debarked in a very sickly and depressed state. A large proportion of the officers and men were sickly and debilitated. It was deemed expedient to give them time to recruit their health and spirits, and in the mean time for the fleet to return to Sackett's Harbor, and take on board one thousand additional troops; and orders were despatched to Utica, Rome, and Oswego, to have the troops at those places forwarded here in boats from Oswego. Backus's corps of light dragoons, about four hundred, principally dismounted, and five hundred of the 11th regiment from Burlington, have been ordered to Sackett's Harbor. These, with three hundred volunteers, and a full company of artillery, are to form a garrison at that place. Additional cannon will be mounted. General Brown of the militia has been requested to hold three or four hundred men of the immediate vicinity in readiness to aid the garrison, in the event of any attack. My intention is to collect the main body of the troops at this place, and as soon as Commodore Chauncey returns, and the forces from Oswego arrive, to commence operations in as spirited and effectual a manner as practicable. This change in the proposed system of operations has been rendered necessary by a long series of the most unfortunate winds and weather that could have occurred at this season, and such as could not have been contemplated.

Colonel Scott reached this yesterday in boats from Oswego, with three hundred men. He was seven days wind bound in different places, and narrowly escaped the loss of his boats and men. I had expected him on the 3d. I had almost given him up for lost.

General Harrison is invested; and presuming on the uncertainty of events, I shall make calculation of a reinforcement to the enemy of British and Indians from Detroit. We shall be prepared for them; and I shall consider a concentration of their force rather as a fortunate circumstance than otherwise.

I observed in a former letter, that, on my arrival here on the evening of the 2d, the preparations for an immediate co-operation were not as complete as could have been expected. General Lewis was at 14 miles distance. Winder, with his command, was at Black Rock. The boats had not been transported from Schlosser; not one of the scows completed; the heavy guns and mortars not placed in the batteries; two 18 and two 12 pounders not mounted; but, with all these defects, we should have made an attack on the 4th or 5th, if the fleet had arrived with the troops in health, on the 3d, as was expected.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient and humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, UPPER CANADA, *May 27, 1813.*

SIR:

The light troops under the command of Colonel Scott and Major Forsyth landed this morning at 9 o'clock. Major General Lewis's division, with Colonel Porter's command of light artillery, supported them. General Boyd's brigade landed immediately after the light troops, and Generals Winder and Chandler followed in quick succession. The landing was warmly and obstinately disputed by the British forces; but the coolness and intrepidity of our troops soon compelled them to give ground in every direction. General Chandler, with the reserve, (composed of his brigade and Colonel Macomb's artillery) covered the whole. Commodore Chauncey had made the most judicious arrangements for silencing the enemy's batteries near the point of landing. The army is under the greatest obligation to that able naval commander for his indefatigable exertions, in co-operation in all its important movements, and especially in its operations this day. Our batteries succeeded in rendering Fort George untenable; and when the enemy had been beaten from his position, and found it necessary to re-enter it, after firing a few guns, and setting fire to the magazines, which soon exploded, moved off rapidly by different routes. Our light troops pursued them several miles. The troops having been under arms from one o'clock in the morning were too much exhausted for



any further pursuit. We are now in possession of Fort George and its immediate dependencies; to-morrow we shall proceed further on. The behavior of our troops, both officers and men, entitles them to the highest praise; and the difference in our loss with that of the enemy, when we consider the advantages his positions afforded him, is astonishing. We had seventeen killed and forty-five wounded. The enemy had ninety killed and one hundred and sixty wounded, of the regular troops. We have taken one hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded. Colonel Meyers, of the 49th, was wounded and taken prisoner. Of ours only one commissioned officer was killed, Lieutenant Hobart, of the light artillery. Enclosed is the report of Major General Lewis.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great consideration and respect, your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

The Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

ON THE FIELD, *one o'clock, May 27, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

Fort George and its dependencies are ours. The enemy, beaten at all points, has blown up his magazines and retired. It is impossible at this moment to say any thing of individual gallantry. There was no man who did not perform his duty in a manner which did honor to himself and his country. Scott and Forsyth's commands, supported by Boyd's and Winder's brigades, sustained the brunt of the action. Our loss is trifling; perhaps not more than twenty killed, and twice that number wounded. The enemy left in the hospital one hundred and twenty-four, and I sent several on board the fleet. We have also made about one hundred prisoners of the regular forces.

I am, dear sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

MORGAN LEWIS.

Major General DEARBORN, *Commander in Chief of the Northern Army.*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, *May 29, 1813.*

SIR:

General Lewis was ordered to march yesterday morning with Chandler's and Winder's brigades, the light artillery, dragoons, light infantry, and riflemen, in pursuit of the enemy, by the way of Queenstown. I had received satisfactory information that the enemy had made a stand on the mountain, at a place called the Beaver Dams, where he had a deposite of provisions and stores, and that he had been joined by three hundred regulars from Kingston, landed from small vessels near the head of the Lake. I had ascertained that he was calling in the militia, and had presumed that he would confide in the strength of his position, and venture an action, by which an opportunity would be afforded to cut off his retreat.

I have been disappointed. Although the troops from Fort Erie and Chippewa had joined the main body at the Beaver Dams, he broke up yesterday precipitately, continued his route along the mountain, and will reach the head of the lake by that route. Lieutenant Colonel Preston took possession of Fort Erie and its dependencies last evening. The fort had been abandoned and the magazines blown up. I have ordered General Lewis to return without delay to this place, and, if the winds favor us, we may yet cut off the enemy's retreat at York; but, unfortunately, we have plenty of rain but no wind; it may, however, change for the better in a few hours. I shall afford Commodore Chauncey every facility in my power in his preparations for commanding Lake Erie. He is very anxious to return to Sackett's Harbor: for, until his other ship is fitted, *it is not certain* that he can continue in the command of Lake Ontario. I was the last evening honored with your despatches of the 15th instant. I have taken measures in relation to the twenty-three prisoners who are to be put in close confinement.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high consideration and respect, your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. General JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEWARK, UPPER CANADA, *June 4, 1813.*

"Chandler and Winder are in pursuit of the enemy, who has halted about fifty-five miles from here. I am still very feeble, and gain strength but slowly."

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, *June 6, 1813.*

SIR:

I have received an express from the head of the lake this evening, with the intelligence that our troops were attacked, at two o'clock this morning, by the whole British force and Indians, and, by some strange fatality, though our loss in numbers was small, and the enemy was completely routed and driven from the field, both Brigadier Generals Chandler and Winder were taken prisoners. They had advanced to ascertain the situation of a company of artillery when the attack commenced. General Chandler had his horse shot under him and was bruised by the fall. General Vincent, their commander, is supposed to have been killed. Colonel Clark was mortally wounded, and fell into our hands with sixty prisoners of the 49th. The command devolved on Colonel Burn, who has retired to the Forty Mile creek. If either of the general officers had remained in command, the enemy would have been pursued and cut up, or if Colonel Burn had been an officer of infantry. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must exceed two hundred and fifty. The enemy sent in a flag next morning, with a request to bury their dead. Generals Lewis and Boyd set off immediately to join the advanced army. I never so severely felt the want of health as at present, at a time when my services might, perhaps, be most useful. I hope General Hampton will repair here as soon as possible.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. General JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

JUNE 8, 1813.

There was a mistake in the arrival of the express mail—since writing the above, the enemy's fleet has passed, consisting of two large ships and four heavy schooners. I have consequently deemed it prudent to *concentrate the forces at this point.*

H. D.

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, *June 8, 1813.*

SIR:

I have been honored with your letters of the 26th and 27th ult. and a duplicate of one of the 19th of April. My ill state of health renders it extremely painful to attend to the current duties; and, unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some place where my mind may be more at ease, for a short time. Colonel Macomb proceeded with two hundred men, with the Commodore, to Sackett's Harbor. Lieutenant Colonel Ripley has also gone, by the way of Oswego, to the harbor with his regiment, where he will be joined by several hundred recruits; he took charge of the provisions to Oswego. The Commodore will not probably venture out until his

new ship is fit for sea. The enemy has now the command of the lake, and, as long as that is the case, any offensive operations below this must be suspended. I had intended placing a small garrison at Fort Erie, and a stronger one at Fort George, but as you have directed otherwise, I shall select Fort George, as guarding the only harbor on the southern shore of the lake. Detroit will be the safest harbor on Lake Erie. I have, by the request of Commodore Chauncey, detached 200 men to aid Captain Perry in removing his armed vessels from Black Rock to Presque Isle. Commodore Chauncey is unwilling to approach Malden, unless he can have a reinforcement to General Harrison of our regulars. As my command does not extend to Malden, I ask your directions on this subject. The Commodore is anxious that his fleet on Lake Erie should proceed with troops to Michillimackinack and St. Joseph, as soon as the business shall be decided at Detroit. On taking possession of this place, the inhabitants came in in numbers, and gave their paroles. I have promised them protection. A large majority are friendly to the United States, and fixed in their hatred against the Government of Great Britain. If they should generally be made prisoners of war, and taken from their families, it would have a most unfavorable effect on our military operations in the provinces. The whole country would be driven to a state of desperation, and satisfy them, beyond a doubt, that we had no intention of holding the provinces. The same effect would be produced on the Indians, who are now principally quiet for fear of losing their valuable tract of land on Grand river. I had authorized the civil magistrates to combine in the *due* exercise of their functions, and cannot, with propriety, revoke this authority, unless specially directed.

The whole of our troops, officers and men, in the action of the 27th, discovered a degree of ardor and readiness for action, which evinced a determination to do honor to themselves and country. The animating example set by Colonel Scott and General Boyd in landing, and repulsing the enemy, deserves particular mention. I am greatly indebted to Colonel Porter, Major Armistead, and Captain Totten, for their judicious arrangements and skilful execution in demolishing the enemy's forts and batteries, and to the officers of the artillery generally, who had the direction of the guns.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. General JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from Major General Morgan Lewis to the Secretary of War, dated*

NIAGARA, June 14, 1813.

"You will perceive, by the enclosed copy of orders, marked 1, that General Dearborn, from indisposition, has resigned the command, not only of the Niagara army, but of the district. I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit for service. He has been repeatedly in a state of convalescence, but relapses on the least agitation of mind.

"In my last, I mentioned the unfortunate circumstance of the capture of our two brigadiers, Chandler and Winder. The particulars are detailed in the report of Colonel Burn, marked 2, which he gives from the best information he could collect. His corps lay a considerable distance from the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed diagram. The light corps spoken of, were Captains Hindman's, Nicholas's, and Biddle's companies of the 2d artillery, serving as infantry. These three gentlemen, and Captains Archer and Towson, of the same regiment, and Leonard of the light artillery, are soldiers who would honor any service. Their gallantry, and that of their companies, was equally conspicuous on this occasion as in the affair of the 27th ult. A view of General Chandler's encampment will be sufficient to show that his disaster was owing to its arrangement; its centre being its weakest point, and, that being discovered by the enemy in the evening, received the combined attack of his whole force, and his line was completely cut. It is said, though I cannot vouch for its truth, that General Winder saw this, and remonstrated against it. The gallantry of the 5th, 25th, and part of the 23d, and light troops, saved the army; of the 5th, it is said, that, when the day broke, not a man was missing; and that a part of the 23d, under Major Armstrong, was found sustaining its left flank. Their fire was irresistible, and the enemy was compelled to give way. *Could he have been pressed the next morning, his destruction was inevitable.* He was dispersed in every direction, and even his commanding general was missing, without his hat or horse. I understand he was found the next evening, almost famished, at a distance of four miles from the scene of action.

"Lieutenant M'Chesney's gallantry recovered a piece of artillery, and prevented the capture of others. He merits promotion for it.

"On the evening of the sixth of June, I received the order No. 4, and joined the army at five in the afternoon of the 7th. I found it at the Forty Mile creek, ten miles in the rear of the ground on which it had been attacked, encamped on a plain of about a mile in width, with its right flank on the lake, and its left on the creek, which skirts the base of a perpendicular mountain of considerable height. On my route, I received Nos. 5 and 6, enclosed.

"At 6 in the evening, the hostile fleet hove in sight, though its character could not be ascertained with precision. We lay on our arms all night. At dawn of day struck our tents, and descried the hostile squadron abreast of us, about a mile from the shore. Our boats which transported the principal part of our baggage and camp equipage, lay on the beach; it was a dead calm; and, about six, the enemy towed in a large schooner, which opened her fire on our boats. As soon as she stood for shore, her object being evident, I ordered down Archer's and Towson's companies, with four pieces of artillery, to resist her attempts. I, at the same time, sent Captain Totten, of the engineers, (a most valuable officer) to construct a temporary furnace for heating shot, which was prepared and in operation in less than thirty minutes. Her fire was returned with a vivacity and effect (excelled by no artillery in the universe) which soon compelled her to retire. A party of savages now made their appearance on the brow of the mountain, (which, being perfectly bald, exhibited them to view) and commenced a fire on our camp. I ordered Colonel Chrystie to dislodge them, who entered on the service with alacrity, but found himself anticipated by Lieutenant Eldridge, the Adjutant of the regiment, who, with a promptness and gallantry highly honorable to that young officer, had already gained the summit of the mountain with a party of volunteers, and routed the barbarian allies of the Defender of the Christian Faith. This young man merits the notice of Government.

"These little affairs cost us not a man. Sir James L. Yeo, being disappointed of a tragedy, next determined, in true dramatic style, to amuse us with a farce. An officer with a flag was sent to me from his ship, advising me that, as I was invested with savages in my rear, a fleet in my front, and a powerful army on my flank, he, and the officers commanding His Britannic Majesty's land forces, thought it a duty to demand a surrender of my army. I answered that the message was too ridiculous to merit a reply. No. 7 was delivered to me at about six this morning. Between seven and eight o'clock, the few wagons we had being loaded, first with sick, and next with ammunition, &c. the residue of camp equipage and baggage was put in the boats, and a detachment of two hundred men of the 6th regiment detailed to proceed in them. Orders were prepared to be given them to defend the boats, and, if assailed by any of the enemy's small vessels, to carry them by boarding. By some irregularity which I have not been able to discover, the boats put off without the detachments, induced probably by the stillness of the morning. When they had progressed about three miles, a breeze sprung up, and an armed schooner overhauled them. Those who were enterprising kept on and escaped; others ran to the shore, and deserted their boats. We have lost twelve of the number, principally containing the baggage of the officers and men.

"At ten, I put the army in motion on our return to this place. The savages and incorporated militia hung on our flanks and rear throughout the march, and picked up a few stragglers. On our retiring, the British army advanced, and now occupies the ground we left."

*Papers referred to by General Lewis.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA, June 6, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL:

You will please to proceed, with as little delay as may be, and take command of the advanced army. Brigadier Generals Boyd and Swartwout, and Colonel Scott, will accompany you. I have ordered an additional escort

of light artillery, to be equipped as cavalry, to attend you. You will attack the enemy as soon as practicable; your force will ensure success. Every possible effort should be made for preventing the enemy's escape.

May success and glory attend you!

Yours, with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

Major General LEWIS.

NIAGARA, June 6, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL:

A ship having appeared this morning steering towards the head of the lake, which is undoubtedly one of the enemy's ships, (others are appearing) you will please to return with the troops to this place as soon as possible.

Yours, with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

P. S. The object of the enemy's fleet must be intended to cover the retreat of their troops, or to bring on a reinforcement.

H. D.

Major General LEWIS.

June 6, 1813.

It is possible the fleet in sight may be our own; a few hours will probably enable you to determine and act accordingly.

H. DEARBORN.

General LEWIS.

DEAR GENERAL:

I am induced to suspect that the enemy's fleet have an intention on this place. Two small schooners have been examining the shore very minutely for three or four hours this afternoon. They have gone on towards the head of the lake, and their ships appear to have taken the same course. They may take on board additional troops near the head of the lake, and be here before you reach this place. You will please to send Milton's detachment, and 500 of Chandler's brigade, and Colonel Burn's light dragoons, with all possible despatch; they ought, if possible, to be here some time to-morrow forenoon. You will follow with the remainder of the troops as soon as practicable. It will be necessary to take care that your boats are not taken or lost. General Swartwout and Colonel Scott should return as soon as they can.

Yours, with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

General LEWIS.

#### ORDERS.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, June 10, 1813.

By reason of the temporary indisposition of Major General Dearborn, the command of the troops on this frontier, and of the ninth military department of the United States, devolves on Major General Lewis. All persons concerned are notified accordingly.

By command.

W. SCOTT, *Adjutant General.*

*Extract of a letter from Colonel James Burn, 2d light dragoons, to Major General Dearborn.*

"In the afternoon of the 5th, our advance guard, consisting of the light infantry, under the command of Captains Hindman, Biddle, and Nicholas, a part of the rifle corps, under Captain Lytle, and a detachment of the 2d dragoons, under Captain Selden, commenced a sharp skirmish with the advance of the enemy, said to be a detachment of the 49th regiment, which soon retreated, covered by a thick woods, having, however, several wounded on both sides, and one dragoon horse killed. In the evening, our advance returned behind Stony creek, where the army took a position for the night. The light infantry, and part of the rifle corps on the right of the 25th regiment, formed the right wing. The artillery, under Captains Towson and L. Leonard, the centre. The 5th, 16th, 23d, and some riflemen, the left wing, and the cavalry in the rear. A strong picket guard was posted some distance in front, also strong flank and rear guards, in such manner as to surround the whole encampment with sentinels; the troops lay under arms, without any covering. Our numbers in the field did not exceed one thousand—three hundred effectives of the 13th and 14th regiments having encamped on the borders of the lake, about three miles distant, for the protection of the boats. The enemy forced our picket, and attacked us, about two o'clock in the morning, (which was very dark) with their army and Indians, expecting, no doubt, to throw us into confusion. Their views were, in this instance, however, completely frustrated; and, when the day dawned, none were to be seen, except their killed and wounded, who covered the field of battle. The attack began on our right, and was gallantly repelled by the fire of the light troops and 25th regiment, commanded by Major Smith. In a few minutes, it became general along the whole line, and was nobly returned by the artillery of the centre, commanded by Captains Towson and L. Leonard, and again by the troops of the left wing, viz. the 5th, under Lieutenant Colonel Milton, the 23d, commanded by Major Armstrong, and the 16th. The fire continued, with little intermission, for one hour, during which time, the enemy attempted, by frequent charges, to break our line, but without effect, being obliged to give way by the well directed fire of our brave troops.

"The 13th and 14th regiments (which had been detached the preceding evening) were active in making prisoners, and advanced with much ardor to the field, in hopes of sharing, with the gallant 5th, and 25th, 23d, and light troops, the glory of another combat. But the unfortunate capture of Brigadier Generals Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action, unknown to any part of the army, and hurried into the enemy's lines, prevented the future operations from being carried into effect with the promptitude which would assuredly have taken place had either of those officers been present to command.

"You will be surprised to find our loss so small; that of the enemy exceeds ours much; they lost in killed about sixty, many wounded, and upwards of seventy prisoners, all regulars, and principally of the 49th regiment. Several of their officers were killed, wounded, and missing. A flag was sent by Colonel Hervey, asking permission to make inquiries for them; also, to be allowed to send a surgeon to attend their own wounded, which I readily granted. On the return of day-light, I found the command of the army had devolved on me, and, being at a loss what steps to pursue in the unpleasant dilemma, occasioned by the capture of our Generals, finding the ammunition of many of the troops nearly expended, I had recourse to a council of the field officers present, of whom a majority coincided in opinion with me, that we ought to retire to our former position at the Forty Mile creek, where we could be supplied with ammunition and provisions, and either advance or remain, until further orders.

"Every aid was afforded by the staff. The assistant Adjutant General, Major Johnston, and Brigade Majors Jones and Wartenby exerted themselves in rendering all the assistance in their power.

"The army, on this occasion, has proved its firmness and bravery; by keeping its position in a night attack, in which the yells of the Indians, mingled with the roaring of cannon and musketry, were calculated to intimidate. The enemy charged repeatedly, and so dark was the night that our army could not distinguish friend from foe; in one of those, they succeeded in carrying off a six-pounder, a howitzer, and a caisson, to the great mortification of our brave artillery. I presume it was on that occasion, also, that we lost our generals, who were distinctly heard encouraging our men to fight. The squadron of dragoons remained formed, and steady at their post, but could not act, on account of the darkness of the night, and the thickness of the adjacent woods. Much credit is due to the troops, generally, but too much praise cannot be said of the conduct of the 5th and 25th regiments."

MONTREAL, June 18, 1813.

SIR:

I deem it my duty to improve the earliest opportunity possible to give you a more detailed account of the affair of the 6th instant, near Stony creek, than I have before had it in my power to do.

On the morning of the 5th, I arrived at Forty Mile creek. The detachment under General Winder was then under marching orders for Stony creek. After a short halt, the whole marched for that place, and arrived there between five and six o'clock P. M., at which place a small picket of the enemy was posted, but retired on our approach. The advanced guard pursued, and soon fell in with a picket of about one hundred strong, under Colonel Williams. A skirmish ensued. I hastened the main body. Williams retreated, and our advance pursued. The pursuit was continued rather longer than I could have wished, but returned to their proper position in the line of march, not far from sunset. I had ordered the 13th and 14th, who were in the rear, to take a position for the night near the mouth of the creek, to cover the boats, (should they arrive) which would be on the route which I intended to pursue the next morning; and, a favorable position presenting itself, I encamped with the residue of the troops (except Captain Archer's company of artillery) which accompanied the 13th and 14th on the spot where we had halted, with an advanced picket from half to three quarters of a mile in front, with express orders for them to keep out constantly a patrol. A right and left flank guard and a rear guard were also posted. I gave positive orders for the troops to lay on their arms. Contrary to my orders, fires were kindled; but there are doubts whether this operated for or against us, as the fires of the 25th, which were in front, and by my orders had been abandoned, enabled us to see a small part of the enemy, while the fires on our left enabled the enemy to see our line. On the whole, I think it operated against us. I did expect the enemy would attack us that night, if he intended to fight; but, perhaps, this was not expected by all. I had my horse confined near me, and directed that the harness should not be taken from the artillery horses. I directed where and how the line should be formed, in case of attack. About an hour before day light, on the morning of the 6th, the alarm was given. I was instantly up, and the 25th, which lay near me, was almost as instantly formed, as well as the 5th and 23d, which were on the left, under the immediate eye of General Winder. Owing to the neglect of the front picket, or some other cause, the British officers say that they were not hailed, nor an alarm given, until they were within three hundred yards of our line. The extreme darkness prevented us from seeing or knowing at what point they intended to attack us, until an attack was made on our right. A well directed fire was opened upon them from the 25th, and from nearly the whole line. After a few minutes, I heard several muskets in our rear, in the direction of the rear guard, and then expected that the enemy had gained our rear by some path unknown to me, and were about to attack us in rear. I instantly ordered Colonel Milton, with the 5th, to form in our rear near the woods, to meet such circumstances as might take place, knowing that I could call him to any other point, if necessary, at any moment. I had observed that the artillery was not covered, and directed General Winder to cause the 23d to be formed so far to the right that their right should cover the artillery. At this moment, I heard a new burst of fire from the enemy's left on our right, and, not able to see any thing which took place, I set out full speed towards the right to take measures to prevent my right flank from being turned, which I expected was the object of the enemy. I had proceeded but a few yards, before my horse fell under me, by which fall I received a serious injury. Here was a time when I have no recollection of what passed, but I presume it was not long. As soon as I recovered, I recollected what my object was, and made my way to the right, and gave Major Smith such directions as I thought proper to prevent his right from being turned by surprise. I was then returning toward the centre, and, when near the artillery, heard men, who, by the noise, appeared to be in confusion, it being the point at which I expected the 23d to be formed. I expected it was that regiment. I approached them, and, as soon as I was near enough, I saw a body of men, who I thought to be the 23d, in rear of the artillery, broken. I hobbled in amongst them, and began to rally them, and directed them to form; but I soon found my mistake; it was the British 49th, who had pushed forward to the head of their column, and gained the rear of the artillery. I was immediately disarmed, and conveyed down the column to its rear. It was not yet day, and the extreme darkness of the night, to which was added the smoke of the fire, put it totally out of our power to see the situation of the enemy. This was all that saved their columns from sure and total destruction, of which some of their officers are aware. After seeing the situation of the column as I passed, I did hope and expect that General Winder, on the first dawn of light, would see their situation, and bring Colonel Milton with the 5th (who I had still kept in reserve, until I could have day light to discern their situation) to attack this column, which, I am sure, he would have done to advantage; but, to my mortification, I soon learned that he had fallen into the same mistake with myself; and, by endeavoring to learn what was taking place in the centre, he was also taken, as well as Major Van De Venter. To the extreme darkness of the night, the enemy's knowledge of his intended point of attack, and our not knowing at what point to expect him, must be attributed his partial success, and not to a want of strength or bravery in our troops, who generally behaved remarkably well under all the circumstances; and, however unfortunate the event, as it relates to myself, I only ask that all the circumstances may be taken into consideration in making up your opinion upon the conduct of General Winder and myself in this affair, which I am sure you will do, and I flatter myself you will see no cause of censure. I regret that my decrepit situation, and the rapidity with which we have been brought to this place, has put it out of my power to give you a detailed account of the affair earlier. I am now able to walk some with the aid of a cane, and hope I shall continue to recover.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

JOHN CHANDLER, *Brigadier General.*

Major General DEARBORN:

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, June 12, 1813.

SIR:

As the General is unable to write, I am directed by him to inform you, that, in addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with, he has, within the last twenty-four hours, experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his breast, which has obliged him to relinquish business altogether, and the command is given over to Major General Lewis, who will, in future, make the necessary communications to the Department of War. The British fleet still rides triumphant in this section of the lake.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect and consideration, your obedient and humble servant,

SAMUEL S. CONNER,

*A. D. C. to Gen. Dearborn.*

Hon. Gen. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 19, 1813.

"Your letters of the 6th and 8th instant have been received. There is, indeed, some strange fatality attending our efforts. I cannot disguise from you the *surprise* occasioned by the *two escapes of a beaten enemy*: first, on the 27th ultimo, and again on the 1st instant. Battles are not gained when an inferior and broken enemy is not destroyed. Nothing is done, while any thing that might have been done is omitted. This maxim is as old as the profession of arms, and in no walk of life applies with as much force as in that of a soldier.

"Should Proctor have retired from Malden, and been able to effect a junction with Vincent's corps at the head of the lake, it has been done for one of two purposes: either to dispute with you the possession of the peninsula, or more securely to effect their general retreat to Kingston. The latter is the more probable conjecture of the two, and is strengthened by the appearance of Yeo on the upper part of the lake, and by the position which Vincent has taken there."

*Extract.*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, June 20, 1813.

SIR:

"I have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. Brigadier General Boyd is the only general officer present; and, from resignations, sickness, and other contingencies, the number of regimental officers present, fit for duty, are far below what the service requires. A considerable proportion of our army being composed of new recruits, and the weather having been extremely unfavorable to health, the sick have become so numerous, in addition to the wounded, as to reduce the effective force far below what could have been contemplated; but if the weather should become favorable, which ought to be expected, a great part of the sick will probably be fit for duty in a short time. The enemy have been reinforced at the head of the lake with about 500 men of the 104th regiment. A vessel carrying ammunition and other munitions of war, bound to the head of the lake, was captured, four days since, by one of Commodore Chauncey's schooners, from which I conclude, that the enemy will endeavor to keep up such a force at or near the head of the lake, as to prevent any part of our force in this quarter from joining, or proceeding to Sackett's Harbor, for the purpose of attacking Kingston; and such is the state of the roads in this flat country, in consequence of continual rains, as to render any operations against the enemy extremely difficult, without the aid of a fleet for the transportation of provisions, ammunition, and other necessary supplies. The enemy would probably retreat on our approach, and keep out of our reach, being covered by one or more armed vessels, which remain on this part of the lake. The whole of these embarrassments have resulted from a temporary loss of the command of the lake. The enemy has availed himself of the advantage, and forwarded reinforcements and supplies."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Dearborn, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 1, 1813.

"The leisure you now have offers a fine opportunity for the adjutants and inspectors general to attend to their particular duties. Some of the parties of which you speak, from the enemy, may practise a trick on those who follow them. *These last ought to be very circumspect.* Chauncey will, I hope, soon re-appear on the lake. A battle will then decide which of us shall be victor for the campaign. I am afraid that we have all along acted on a belief, very pleasing, but ill founded, viz: that we were a-head of the enemy as to naval means and naval preparation on the lakes. Are we sure that our calculations with regard to Lake Erie have been better than those with regard to Lake Ontario? A week or two will decide this question."

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, June 25, 1813.

SIR:

I have the mortification of informing you of an unfortunate and unaccountable event, which occurred yesterday. On the 23d, at evening, Lieut. Colonel Boerstler, with 570 men, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen, in due proportion, was ordered to march, by the way of Queenstown, to a place called the Beaver Dams, on the high ground, about eight or nine miles from Queenstown, to attack and disperse a body of the enemy collected there for the purpose of procuring provisions, and harassing those inhabitants who are considered friendly to the United States. Their force was, from the most direct information, composed of one company of the 104th regiment, above 80 strong; from 150 to 200 militia; and from 50 to 60 Indians. At eight o'clock yesterday morning, when within about two miles of the Beaver Dams, our detachment was attacked from an ambuscade, but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods, and then retired to a clear field, and sent an express for a reinforcement, saying he would maintain his position until reinforced. A reinforcement of 300 men marched immediately, under the command of Colonel Chrystie; but on arriving at Queenstown, Colonel Chrystie received authentic information that Lieutenant Colonel Boerstler, with his command, had surrendered to the enemy, and the reinforcement returned to camp. A man who belonged to a small corps of mounted volunteer riflemen came in this morning, who states, that the enemy surrounded our detachment in the woods, and towards twelve o'clock commenced a general attack; that our troops fought more than two hours, until the artillery had expended the whole of its ammunition, and then surrendered; and at the time of the surrender, the informant made his escape. Why it should have been deemed proper to remain several hours in a position surrounded with woods, without either risking a decisive action, or effecting a retreat, remains to be accounted for, as well as the project of waiting for a reinforcement from a distance of fifteen or sixteen miles.

No information has been received of the killed or wounded. The enemy's fleet has again arrived in our neighborhood.

With respect and esteem, I am, sir, your humble servant,

H. DEARBORN,

HON. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 6, 1813.

SIR:

I have the President's orders to express to you his decision that you retire from the command of district No. 9, and of the troops within the same, until your health be re-established, and until farther orders.

I have the honor to be, sir, with very great respect, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General HENRY DEARBORN.

## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND BRIGADIER GENERAL BOYD.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Brigadier General Boyd, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 30, 1813.

"The restriction put upon you with regard to the enemy was but commensurate with their command of the lake. So long as they had wings, and you had only feet, so long as they could be transported, supplied, and reinforced, by water, and at will, common sense, as well as military principles, put you on the *defensive*. These circumstances changed, the reason of the rule changes with them; and it now becomes your business, in concert with the fleet, to harass and destroy the enemy, wherever you can find him. Of the competency of your force there can be no doubt, provided your estimate of his be but tolerably correct."

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 30, 1813.

SIR:

I have this moment received information that Fort Meigs is again attacked, and by a *considerable regular force*. This must have been drawn from De Rottenberg's corps. His late insolence in pushing his small attacks to the very outline of your works has been intended to mask the weakness produced by this detachment. If, as you say, you can beat him, do it without delay; and remember, that, if you beat, you must destroy him. There is no excuse for a general who permits a beaten enemy to escape and to rally. These remarks grow out of some recent events in your quarter, and require no explanation. It is the President's wish that you should communicate fully and freely with Brigadier General Williams. It is only by this kind of intercourse that the efforts of all can be united in promoting the public good.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General Boyd, Fort George.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General John P. Boyd to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, July 27, 1813.

"I had the honor to address you last on the 24th instant. On the 22d instant, General Lewis and Commodore Chauncey were advised by me that, from intelligence received from Major Chapin and deserters, most of the enemy's captured ordnance, and their principal depot of ammunition, stores, &c. are at the head of the lake. It was suggested that a small force might surprise, take, destroy, or bring them off, if part of the fleet might be allowed to assist in moving our troops.

"Yesterday the Lady of the Lake brought me a letter from Commodore Chauncey, stating that he approved of the enterprise, and *would go himself with his fleet to the head of the lake*, and requested guides, information, &c. I have deemed it proper to detail a number of troops, under the command of Colonel Scott, which will embark on board the Lady of the Lake, with directions to join the squadron, which is believed to be now somewhere near Little York."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Boyd to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT GEORGE, July 31, 1813.

"I had the honor to address you on the 27th instant. Agreeably to the plan therein suggested, Commodore Chauncey arrived here on the 28th instant, and received on board the fleet a body of men under the command of Colonel Scott. Light and contrary winds retard their progress up the lake, but ere this the attack has probably been made on the head of the lake. No information has as yet been received.

"The enemy has lately kept his Indians so constantly scouring the woods of our vicinity, that we gain no deserters nor intelligence of his movements."

*Colonel Scott's Report.*

FORT GEORGE, August 3, 1813.

SIR:

I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders, I proceeded on board the fleet with the detachment of troops under my command, destined to act against the enemy's post at the head of Little Lake, or Burlington bay; in sight of which place I arrived late in the evening of the 30th ultimo, the fleet having been greatly delayed by the almost constant calm which has prevailed since we sailed.

This delay of forty-eight hours, after our destination became obvious to the enemy, enabled him to anticipate our arrival by a reinforcement of 200 men from the nearest posts on this side of the lake, of which we were early apprized. Nevertheless, Commodore Chauncey, with my concurrence, thought it advisable to land the detachment from the army, together with about 250 marines and seamen from the fleet, (making a total force of about 500 men.) The better to enable us to ascertain the exact force and position of the enemy's camp, the landing was made on the neck of land which nearly cuts off the Little Lake from Lake Ontario. From this point we could plainly discover the enemy's position on Burlington heights, surrounded on three sides by a creek, and in front by an entrenchment and a battery of seven pieces of cannon. The Little Lake or bay is, between those two points, six or seven miles across.

Perceiving the strength of the enemy's position, and learning from the inhabitants that the force on the heights, independent of the reinforcement above mentioned, was nearly equal to our own, the Commodore determined not to risk an attack, especially as our boats would have been greatly annoyed in the ascent towards the head of the bay by a small schooner of the enemy's, having on board one 18 pound carronade. The channel connecting the two lakes did not afford water for the passage of either of our schooners. In the above opinion I fully concurred with the Commodore. It may be added, that the enemy received a further reinforcement of 400 men the same evening, by land, from Kingston.

On our return to this harbor, the fleet put into York, at which place we burnt the barracks and public stores, and brought off one piece of ordnance, (24 pounder) eleven batteaux, and about 400 barrels of flour and hard bread. The barracks and stores had been repaired since the 27th May. Thirty or forty sick and wounded in hospital were paroled, and four prisoners (regulars) brought off. There had been no garrison at the place for the few days previous.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. SCOTT, Colonel commanding detachment.

Brigadier General Boyd, Commanding, &amp;c. &amp;c.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General John P. Boyd to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, U. C. August 8, 1813.

"By Tuesday's mail I had the honor to receive your commands of the 30th instant, and yesterday a number of letters enclosed, which were delivered as directed.

"Conceiving myself at liberty to act offensively on the arrival of the fleet, an expedition was immediately concerted against the enemy, and acceded to by Commodore Chauncey. One thousand was to embark on board the fleet, under the command of Brigadier General Williams, to land at the head of the lake. The army at this place was to move in two columns against the enemy's front, while General Williams assailed his rear and cut off his retreat. Yesterday morning, the time when the troops were to have embarked, the enemy's fleet was discovered off this place.

"Commodore Chauncey weighed anchor, approached him, and by every indication that a leeward position would admit, offered to engage."

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, August 12, 1813.

SIR:

I had the honor to address you the 8th instant. Unfavorable winds continued to thwart the wishes of Commodore Chauncey to bring the enemy to action; and about the 9th instant he was so unfortunate as to lose, in a squall, two small schooners, which upset. On the night of the 10th a severe cannonade was heard on the lake, which we ascertained, in the morning, resulted in the loss of two of our smallest schooners. Undiscouraged by these slight disasters, Commodore Chauncey is still in pursuit of the enemy, resolved to bring him to a general engagement. These circumstances have necessarily delayed the attack upon the enemy, which was contemplated in my last letter. General Porter is assembling a body of volunteers and Indians at Buffalo, with a view to co-operate in this enterprise. He will probably join us soon. Any thing which can be done without the co-operation of the fleet, shall be attempted. To attack the enemy, without being able to cut off his retreat, would be only beating without capturing him.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD, *Brigadier General Commanding.*

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD QUARTERS, FORT GEORGE, August 15, 1813.

SIR:

I had the honor to address you on the 12th instant; since which time nothing of importance has occurred. Commodore Chauncey has left this part of the lake, and the enemy have now so far the ascendancy as to render the proposed enterprise against his land force impracticable. Yesterday General Porter arrived at this place with a body of volunteers and Indians, which had been previously assembled at Buffalo. In the event of such an attack as was contemplated, this force would be of infinite service. At present they can only be employed to harass the enemy.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD, *Brigadier General Commanding.*

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

LETTERS FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS, COMMANDING AT SACKETT'S HARBOR.

*Extracts of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Lewis, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 9, 1813.

"An order was expedited to General Dearborn, yesterday, permitting him to retire from the command of the army and district. Another was sent to Boyd, forbidding him to engage in any affair with the enemy that could be avoided, and subjecting him to the orders of Major General Hampton and of yourself. This last (for Hampton is now the oldest officer in the district) was intended to meet the contingency suggested in my last letter, viz: that if we regained the command of the lake, and Yeo retired under the guns of Kingston, that this moment of superiority must not be lost, and that, bringing down Boyd's division, a blow might be struck at that place. To favor this enterprise, orders will be sent to General Hampton to push his head quarters to the position held by our army the last campaign on Lake Champlain; and a requisition for ten thousand militia from the States of New York and Vermont, in reinforcement of this part of the plan, will be superadded.

"The moment Chauncey goes out, our stores along the south shore of the lake should be brought down to the harbor, and, in that case, your small posts (consisting of regular troops) drawn into your main body."

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1813.

SIR:

It is not merely possible, but probable, that the British fleet in Lake Ontario may, upon the fitting out of the General Pike, refuse a battle, and take shelter under the guns of Kingston until their new brig shall restore to them the superiority. A question of much importance arises on this supposed state of things. What will be the best possible employment of our force during the period we may be able to command the lake? Shall we reinforce the troops at Fort George from Sackett's Harbor, and cut off Vincent, or shall we bring from Fort George the mass of the division there, and uniting them to your present command, attack the enemy at Kingston? If the latter part of the alternative be adopted, two things must be done. A heavy body of militia should be assembled at Ogdensburgh to draw to that point the enemy's attention, and General Hampton should move rapidly and in force against Montreal. Our assembled force at Sackett's Harbor would amount to seven thousand men, independently of the naval means. The enemy's land force at Kingston is about four thousand. Could a successful attack be made here, the fate of the campaign is decided—perhaps that of the war. The object is great; but in proportion as it is so, the means of effecting it ought to be well considered. From the sketches I have been able to procure of Kingston and its vicinity, I have no doubt but that the attack should be made on the works which cover the battery on Navy Point. These gained, town, battery, and harbor, are all at your discretion. Beware of dividing your attack. Confine it to a single point, but let that point be a commanding one.

Believe me, General, very respectfully and faithfully, yours,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major Gen. LEWIS, *Sackett's Harbor.*

## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to General William H. Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 5, 1813.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 11th and 20th ultimo.

"The suspension of your movement in advance appears to have been necessary; but though this may be the case, your demonstrations against Malden should not cease. These you will make in such a way as shall be best calculated to keep up the enemy's alarm for the safety of that post, and of the ships of war wintering there. You will be more able to appreciate the value of this policy when I state, that we shall very soon be in motion on the Niagara and St. Lawrence.

"You did well in stopping the march of the two regiments from Ohio. To have added to your force so long as your object is restricted to the maintenance of your present position, would have been a very useless expenditure of both public spirit and public money.

"As your campaign is now at an end, and yet nearly approached to that which is coming, it may be proper to communicate to you the President's views in relation to your subsequent movements.

"It would appear that Malden can only be successfully approached by the route you are now upon, at two seasons of the year—mid-winter and mid-summer. The former is gone, and to wait for the latter would be hardly less disastrous than defeat itself. What remains for us to do is, to keep our present ground till the lake opens, and then to approach our object by water, and under convoy of the vessels of war building at Presque Isle. These will be afloat and ready to operate by the middle of May. By the same time boats for the transportation of the troops, a train of artillery, baggage, &c. may be constructed. Cleveland is believed to be the place best fitted for this purpose. It will also be made the depot for the troops to be employed on the expedition, which will be the 24th regiment now at Massac; and three of the twenty new regiments provided by an act of the session of Congress which closed yesterday. Two of these will be raised in the State of Ohio, and the third in that of Kentucky.

"Whatever these troops may fall short of the number and strength contemplated by the laws under which they shall be raised, must necessarily be made up from *militia and volunteers*; whence will arise the necessity of strictly attending to the progress of enlistments, so that, in the event of their failure, which may be readily foreseen, time may be left for resorting to the other expedient."

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 7, 1813.

Sir:

Your letter of the 18th of February, was, from some cause, delayed much beyond the usual course of the mail, and even some days after the receipt of your despatch of the 20th.

You will find by my letter of the 5th instant, the plan prescribed for your part of the ensuing campaign; and to prevent any ill effect arising from its miscarriage, a second copy is herewith enclosed. It is probable that Colonels M<sup>r</sup>Arthur and Cass will both be promoted to the rank of Brigadier, and will be assigned to the command of the two brigades intended to form your division of the army. In the enumeration of corps making parts of this division, I did not mention the two regiments of the line, the 17th and 19th, parts of which are already with you. The filling up of these would be an important service, and you are requested to promote it. If you are at ease with regard to the safety of your present post, against the attacks of the enemy, and have secured to yourself the means of subsisting it, there can be no motive for either reinforcing it by new draughts from the militia, or retiring from it. If, on the other hand, your force should be so reduced as to make your stay perilous, without a further reinforcement, you may employ the two regiments raised in Ohio, or so many of them as may be necessary to your object. If, again, the policy of adding to your force be forbidden, by the difficulty of subsisting it, and there arises a combination of both facts, viz: a want of force to maintain your present position, and a want of means to subsist a larger one, in that case, and in that alone, you will retire to the frontier settlements, and interpose the wilderness between you and the enemy.

These directions have not grown out of any suggestions to be found in your letters, but have been produced by a circumspection which it is always proper to extend beyond the mere limits of existing circumstances.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILLIAM H. HARRISON, *Franklinton, Ohio.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 9, 1813.

Sir:

The Government have the intention of building a number of boats on Lake Erie, for the purpose of transporting troops on that lake. Cleveland is the point farthest west, where any portion of these can be made with sufficient expedition. If the whole could be made there the better. These boats will be of the kind known by the name of Schenectady boats, narrow, and sharp a-head, and flat-bottomed. They will carry from forty to fifty men each, with their baggage, arms, and accoutrements, and provision for the voyage. It is proposed to commit the superintendence of this service to you, and to bestow upon you, pro hac vice, the staff appointment of Deputy Quartermaster General. If workmen cannot be found at Cleveland and other places on the lake, you will take them from Pittsburg, and have sent on without delay. Funds for this purpose will be put under your control, and you will be careful to make reports, weekly, of your progress.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Captain JESUP, *Washington.**Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, CHILLICOTHE, March 17, 1813.

"The known candor of your character is a sufficient security for my receiving your pardon for the liberty I take in making objections to the plan of operations communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there is a positive certainty of our getting the command of Lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand five hundred, or even three thousand, well disciplined men, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland, and landing on the northern shore, below Malden, would perhaps be the one by which that place and its dependencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted with the extent of the preparations that are making to obtain the naval superiority upon Lake Erie; but should they fail, and the troops be assembled at Cleveland, it would be difficult to get again upon the proper track for making the attack round the head of the lake. The attempt to cross the lake from Cleveland should not be made with any other than well disciplined troops. A comparatively smaller number of men of this description could effect the object, and for those, the means of conveyance might be obtained; but the means of transporting such an army as would be required, of militia, or undisciplined regulars, could not be procured. I can



see no reason why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of embarkation for the troops, or the deposite of provisions and stores. These are already accumulated at the rapids of Miami, or in situations to be easily sent thither, to an amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted campaign. Although the expense and difficulty of transporting the provisions, artillery, and stores, for an army, round the head of the lake, would be very considerable, the lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy baggage taken in boats along its margin, the troops would find no difficulty in the land route. The force contemplated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success. Admitting that the whole should be raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little superior to militia; the officers having, with scarcely an exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct their men; we have, therefore, no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency in discipline.

"I am well aware of the intolerable expense which attends the employment of a large militia force. We are now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors which made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are procured, and so deposited that the period for the march of the army from the advanced posts can be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need not be called out until the moment they are to act. Experience has convinced me that militia are more efficient in the early than in the latter part of their service. Upon the whole, it is my decided opinion that the rapids of Miami should be the point of rendezvous for the troops, as well as the principal depot. Indeed it must necessarily be the first deposite—the provisions for the army being so placed that they can be taken to the lake in no other way. The artillery and a considerable supply of ammunition are already there. Boats and pirogues have been built in considerable numbers on the Auglaize and St. Mary's rivers, and every exertion is now making to increase them, intended for the double purpose of taking down the provisions to the rapids, and for coasting the lake with the baggage of the army in its advance. I had calculated upon being able partially to use this mode of transportation, even if the enemy should continue their naval superiority on the lake; but, with this advantage on our side, the whole baggage of the army could be safely and expeditiously carried along the coast in the boats and pirogues, which could be taken into the strait to transport the army to the Canada shore.

"As I have before observed, the army, unencumbered with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty in marching round the lake at any season, but what the enemy would create, and we have the means of subsisting a force that would be irresistible.

"The objections to proceeding this way, stated in my letter to Colonel Monroe, arose from the time that would be necessary to construct boats after we should have arrived at the strait; but this objection is entirely obviated by our obtaining the command of the lake, as the boats and pirogues built upon the Miami will answer the purpose. With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion is, that not only the regular troops, designated in your letter, but a large auxiliary corps of militia should be employed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness of troops of that description. This, however, could not be an object, considering the very short time that it would be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the commencement of the march from the rapids be fixed, and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and accomplish the object, and return home in two months.

"Amongst the reasons which makes it necessary to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail in the Western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree, than amongst the greater part of the militia which were with me through the winter. The new draughts from this State are entirely of another character, and are not to be depended upon. I have no doubt, however, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured, and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Kentucky would furnish some regiments that would be not inferior to those that fought at the river Raisin, and they were, in my opinion, superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times. Eight troops of cavalry have been formed in Kentucky to offer me their service; and several of them were intended for twelve months' volunteers. Governor Shelby has some thoughts of taking the field in person—a number of good men will follow him. He thinks that an address from me to the people of the State would produce a good effect; I have strong objections to those addresses, but will, nevertheless, have recourse to one, should other means fail of bringing forward a sufficient force.

"Every exertion shall, in the mean time, be used, to forward the recruiting service: for a few weeks I think that my services would be more useful in that than any other employment."

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 4, 1813.

Sir:

Your despatch of the 17th ultimo, from Chillicothe, has been received, and I hasten to repeat to you the views of the President, in relation to the next campaign, and the injunctions growing out of these, with regard to the employment of militia, &c.

Our first object is to get a command of the lakes. Means to accomplish this object have been taken, and we have the fullest assurance that, by the 1st day of June, it will be accomplished.

This fact assumed, there can be no longer a doubt by what means, or by what route, the division of the army assigned to you, ought to approach Malden. A passage by *water* will carry you directly to the fortress you would attack, without impairing your strength by fatigue, or diminishing it by battle. A passage by *land* will, on the other hand, call for great efforts, and expose you to great losses, which, if they do not destroy, will at least cripple you. The former will be easy, safe, and economical; the latter difficult, dangerous, and enormously expensive.

On the other supposition, that we fail to obtain the command of the lake, a new question will arise: whether the campaign shall take an offensive or defensive character? Be this question determined as it may, the utmost extent which can be given to the force employed, will be seven thousand effectives.

Various reasons determine this point. The enemy have never had in the field, for the defence of Malden, more than two thousand men. Their number has, no doubt, been hitherto limited by their means of subsistence, and this cause is not likely to suffer any very material change in their favor during the ensuing campaign. More than seven thousand men, therefore, would be unnecessary on our part. Again: to maintain a greater number, would be impracticable, in the present state of the treasury.

It now remains only to signify to you, clearly and distinctly, the kind of force the Government mean hereafter to employ, in offensive operations, if it can be obtained.

When the Legislature, at their last session, adopted the measure of augmenting the army to fifty-two regiments of the line, it was expressly in the view of superseding, hereafter, the necessity of employing militia, excepting in moments of actual invasion. In obedience to this policy, the President assigned to the 5th military district of the United States four of these new regiments, which, if filled, and superadded to the two regiments of the line now in that district, and the 24th, in march for it, will give a total of seven regiments, or seven thousand men. This number forbids the belief that any employment of militia draughts will be necessary, when it shall have been collected. Till, however, this be done, or, at least, till time be given for the experiment, so many militia only are to be called out, as shall be necessary for the *defence* of your posts on the Miami, and of your depots of provision on the lake. And, should the recruiting service go on less fortunately in the patriotic States of Kentucky and Ohio, than in other parts of the Union, you are, in that case, and in that case only, authorized to call out *so many militia draughts as will make good the deficiency*, and, organizing these, under the rules already prescribed, await the farther orders of the President, in your camp at the Rapids.

To these orders I have to add, that you will regard it as your duty to keep this Department regularly and frequently informed of the actual condition of the troops under your command; as well in regard to equipment and supplies of provision and ammunition, as to number, discipline, and health; and that your weekly and monthly reports shall include, also, the state of the ordnance and quartermaster's departments, noting particularly the number of horses and oxen employed by both. You will readily perceive the necessity for giving this order, when I state, that no return, of any description, from your division of the army, has ever been received at the Adjutant

General's office. Your proposition of the new staff has been given to you. Captain Adams has been appointed Assistant Adjutant General, and Mr. Bartlett, Deputy Quartermaster General of your division. The Brigadier Generals M<sup>r</sup> Arthur and Cass are employed in superintending the recruiting service. A letter from the latter gives reason to believe that this will go on well in the State of Ohio.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major-General HARRISON,  
*Commanding the 8th Military District United States.*

*Extracts of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP MEIGS, April 21, 1813.

"The plan for future operations, as laid down in your letter of the 4th, is, no doubt, the best that could have been devised, in the event of the promised naval success, and a prosperous issue to the recruiting business. My measures will, therefore, be entirely directed to the prosecution of the campaign in that way.

"There is nothing to be feared as to the ulterior operations of the campaign.

"I shall cause the movements of the enemy to be narrowly watched; but, in the event of their landing at Lower Sandusky, that post cannot be saved. I will direct it, in such an event, to be evacuated. The stores there are not of much consequence, excepting about 500 stands of arms, which I will cause to be removed as soon as the roads are practicable; at present it is impossible."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General William H. Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 8, 1813.

"Your letters of the 21st and 25th ultimo have been received. I never meant that you, or your artillery, or stores for the campaign, now collected at Fort Meigs, should be brought back to Cleveland for embarkation. My intention was, that the boats built there should move along the coast, in the wake of the fleet, to Sandusky, or to the very foot of the rapids, if that were practicable and expedient, taking in, on the route, what was wanted. The boats building and built by Major Jesup are not decked, but strong and high sided, and very competent to the navigation of the lake, particularly between the chain of islands and the west shore."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General William H. Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 21, 1813.

"Your future requisitions for ordnance stores will be governed by the quantity on hand at Fort Meigs and Franklinton, and by the number and calibers of the pieces you propose to take with you against Malden. Your whole train, if I am well informed, amounts to thirty-five pieces, of which nine are eighteen pounders.

"The 24th regiment was, on the 10th instant, at Lexington, (Kentucky) on their way to Cleveland. You will give it any other point of rendezvous you may think proper, and adopt such means to assemble the other parts of your division as will be most advisable. On this head, I would but suggest, that the arrangement which shall best mask your real design, and most impress the enemy with a belief that your march to Malden will be by land, will be the best.

"Clothing for the 26th, 27th, and 28th regiments, has been forwarded from Philadelphia.

"The last accounts of the boats preparing by Major Jesup, were favorable. That officer will, necessarily, report to you, and take your orders."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Harrison, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 14, 1813.

"Orders have been sent to Captain Perry to communicate to you the naval movements, and to concert with you the necessary co-operations.

"Of the militia, you are authorized to take what, in your judgment, will be necessary. Such of the Kentucky militia as are in service would be better than a new draught. There is (of the Pennsylvania militia) one regiment at Erie, armed, equipped, &c. These are subjected to your command."

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 5, 1813.

SIR:

The best interpretation of the late movements of the enemy in your quarter, is, that De Rottenberg has detached to the aid of Proctor between four and five hundred men, and that, with these, he is attempting to save Malden, by attacking Fort Meigs. If this conjecture be well founded, it suggests the true policy on our part, provided the flotilla was over the bar. Go directly to Malden, and leave Mr. Proctor to amuse himself with Fort Meigs. There is no objection to your appointing the sergeants to other offices, pro tempore. Captain Butler has been appointed Major of the 32d regiment, and Lieutenant M<sup>r</sup> Gee, captain in the 42d.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major-General HARRISON.

*Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison, to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, SENECA TOWN, August 22, 1813.

"I am exerting every nerve to complete my preparations for crossing the lake, as soon as I am reinforced by two thousand of the Kentucky militia. That number is indispensable, from the sickly state of the regular troops, of whom I shall think myself fortunate to take with me two-fifths of the aggregate amount."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, SENECA TOWN, August 29, 1813.

"I shall be able to embark, some day between the 10th and 15th proximo, with upwards of 2,000 regular troops, and 3,000 militia. Every exertion has been, and is continued to be made, to prepare for the contemplated offensive operations; but, as we could not navigate the lake until our flotilla came up, nor accumulate at any point on its margin, the stores that were at Upper Sandusky and Fort Winchester, during Proctor's late invasion, it will take the time I have mentioned before the embarkation can be effected. It might be facilitated by moving the troops that are here, immediately to the lake, and then waiting for the Kentucky militia. But so extremely unhealthy is the whole of the Southern shore, from Huron to the river Raisin, that the most fatal effects would follow the keeping the troops upon it, even for a few days. You can form a correct estimate of the dreadful effects of the immense body of stagnant water, with which the vicinity of the lake abounds, from the state of the troops at Lower Sandusky. Upwards of ninety are this morning reported on the sick list, out of about two hundred and twenty. Those at Fort Meigs are not much better."

*Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, BASS ISLAND, September 22d, 1813.

"The greater part of the troops are here with me, and the whole will, I believe, be up by twelve o'clock. I shall proceed as far as the Middle Sister, in the course of to-night and to-morrow, and, in the following night get so near the enemy's coast as to land two or three miles below Malden, by eight o'clock in the morning. These prospects may, however, be retarded by adverse winds. Commodore Perry gives me every assistance in his power, but his crews were so much cut up in the late action, that he cannot navigate his vessels without the aid of my men."

WAR DEPARTMENT, SACKETT'S HARBOR, September 22, 1813.

SIR:

Information has reached me, through various but unofficial channels, that Commodore Perry had captured the whole of the British fleet on Lake Erie. If this be true, it is matter of much personal and public congratulation. It enables you to make sure of Malden, and, as a subsequent measure, to carry your main body down the lake, and by throwing yourself into De Rottenberg's rear, to compel him to quit his new positions before Fort George. After General Wilkinson shall have left that place, there will be found on the two sides of the Niagara a force amounting to three thousand men, who will be subjected to your orders. By giving this new direction to your operations, you will readily perceive of how much more importance it is, in the opinion of the Executive, to be able to expel the enemy from the country lying between the two lakes, Erie and Ontario, than to pursue the Indians into their woody and distant recesses. A few days will put us in motion from this point.

Accept my best wishes, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General HARRISON.

HEAD QUARTERS, AMHERSTBURGH, September 27, 1813.

SIR:

I have the honor to inform you, that I landed the army under my command about three miles below this place, at three o'clock this evening, without opposition, and took possession of the town in an hour after. General Proctor has retreated to Sandwich, with his regular troops and Indians, having previously burned the fort, navy yard, barracks, and public store houses. The two latter were very extensive, covering several acres of ground. I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of overtaking him, as he has upwards of 1,000 horses, and we have not one in the army. I shall think myself fortunate to be able to collect a sufficiency to mount the general officers. It is supposed here that General Proctor intends to establish himself upon the river French, forty miles from Malden.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient humble servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

JOHN ARMSTRONG, Esq. *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from Major General William H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, near Moravian town, on the river Thames, eighty miles from Detroit,

October 5, 1813.

"I have the honor to inform you that, by the blessing of Providence, the army under my command has, this evening, obtained a complete victory over the combined Indian and British forces, under the command of General Proctor. I believe that nearly the whole of the enemy's regulars are taken or killed; amongst the former are all the superior officers, except General Proctor. My mounted men are now in pursuit of him. Our loss is very trifling."

*Extracts of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, DETROIT, October 16, 1813.

"A detachment of the army, under the command of Brigadier General M<sup>r</sup> Arthur, has been for some days waiting at this place for the necessary provisions to proceed to Lake Michigan. I am sorry to inform you, however, that, from the effects of a violent storm, there is now no prospect of accomplishing that desirable object, the reduction of Michilimackinack, this season. It is with the greatest regret I inform you, that it is almost reduced to a certainty, that two of our schooners have been lost on Lake Erie, the Chippewa and Ohio; the former loaded with the baggage of the troops from Bass Island, the latter with flour and salt provisions from Cleveland."

"Upon a consultation with the two Brigadiers, and Commodore Perry and Captain Elliot, it was unanimously determined that the season is too far advanced to attempt an expedition to Mackinack, if it were not commenced in two or three days, and there was no hopes of supplies being obtained in that time.

"It is generally believed here, that General Proctor despatched an order to the commanding officer at Mackinack, to destroy the post, and retreat by the way of Grand River. At any rate, it is not a matter of much importance to have that place in our possession during the winter, cut off as it is from a communication with the rest of the world."

SACKETT'S HARBOR, October 20, 1813.

SIR:

The enemy's corps before Fort George broke up their cantonments on the 9th, and marched rapidly for Burlington Bay, which he reached on the 11th. By taking this route he may intend to reinforce Proctor on the river French, or Kingston, at the head of the St. Lawrence. He was apprised of the abandonment of Malden on the fifth.

We are, perhaps, too remote to profit by each others suggestions; but it does not appear to me that Sandwich is the point at which Proctor will stop, if you pursue him. From Point aux Pins, on Lake Erie, there is a good road, to Chatham, on the Thames; the distance is not more than twenty-four miles. Were this gained, and travelled back to Sandwich, the enemy's means of subsistence might be destroyed, and himself compelled to surrender. But, of the practicability of this, you are the best judge. My opinion is suggested by the map.

The first division of this army sailed two days ago. The second and the reserve follow to-day.

Yours, with great respect,

J. ARMSTRONG.

Major General HARRISON.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA,

October 21, 1813.

"Soon after my letter to you of the 16th instant was written, I was informed that a special messenger, with despatches from you, had left Bass Island in the schooner Chippewa, which had been driven from the mouth of the Detroit river in a violent storm; and from the circumstance of a quantity of baggage, belonging to the officers, which was known to be on board, being found on the lake shore, she was believed to have been lost. As I had nearly completed the arrangement for a suspension of hostilities with the Indians, although I had no information as to the movement of the army on Lake Ontario, I determined to embark General M<sup>r</sup>Arthur's brigade, and the battalion of the United States' riflemen, and proceed with them down the lake, until I could receive some certain information of the movements of the army under General Wilkinson, and what was expected from me. I arrived here this morning, with Commodore Perry, in the Ariel, having left the remainder of the fleet at Bass Island. It is probable they will be here this evening, when we shall immediately proceed to Buffalo."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, BUFFALO, New York, October 24, 1813.

"I have this moment landed at this place, from on board the schooner Ariel, which is one of the seven vessels with which I left Detroit, having on board the greater part of M<sup>r</sup>Arthur's brigade, and the detachment of United States' rifle regiment, under Colonel Smith. The other vessels are all, I believe, in sight, and will be up in a short time. The aggregate number of troops with me is about thirteen hundred; but not more than one thousand fit for duty. Before this reaches you, you will no doubt be informed of the loss of your messenger, Captain Brown, with the despatches that were entrusted with him. Not having received your directions, and being entirely ignorant of the state of our military operations in this quarter, I was much at a loss to know how to proceed; but believing that General Cass with his brigade would be able to secure Detroit, and our adjacent conquests, after having concluded an armistice with a greater part of the hostile tribes, I concluded that I could not do better than to move down the lake with the remaining part of the troops. A part of M<sup>r</sup>Arthur's brigade is still at Bass Island, where they were left for the want of means of conveyance; and a considerable portion of their baggage was also left from the same cause. Means, however, have been taken to collect, and bring them on.

"I shall move down the troops immediately to Fort George, where I shall await your orders, unless an opportunity should previously occur of striking at the enemy. The information I have received here of the situation and movements of the enemy, on the head of Lake Ontario, is vague and contradictory."

WAR DEPARTMENT, WILNA, October 30, 1813.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the fifth and of the twenty-fourth instant.

The despatch by Captain Brown, and which with him was lost in Lake Erie, suggested, as an ulterior movement, the coming down to the Niagara river, and putting yourself on the right and rear of De Rottenberg's position before Fort George; while General M<sup>r</sup>Clure, with his brigade of militia, volunteers, and Indians, should approach them in front. The enemy seems to have been aware of this, or of some similar movement, as he began his retreat on the ninth, and did not stop until he had gained the head of Burlington Bay, where I understand, by report, he yet is. This is his last strong hold in the peninsula. Routed from this, he must surrender, or make his way down Lake Ontario to Kingston. His force is estimated at twelve or fifteen hundred effectives. The capture or destruction of this corps would be a glorious finale to your campaign. Our operations in this quarter are but beginning, at a time when they ought to have ended.

I shall go on slowly towards Utica, where I may have the pleasure of seeing Adjutant General Gaines.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General HARRISON.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to General Harrison, dated*

BOONSVILLE, November 3, 1813.

"I have fortunately met Colonel Gaines on the way to his regiment. The deputy paymaster shall have orders to attend to the brigade you have brought with you. Captain Butler will act as your assistant adjutant general, and shall receive an appointment as such. The officers of the several corps composing your division, (as well those at Fort George as of General Cass's brigade) not indispensable to the command of the troops now in the field, should be immediately despatched on the recruiting service. I need not invoke your attention to a subject so important to the early and successful opening of the next campaign, and to the extent and character of your particular command. Will the whole of Cass's brigade be wanted to the westward? In the event of a peace with the savages, a less force will be sufficient; and to hasten and secure this event, the present moment and present impressions must be seized. Of the warriors, suing for peace, one or more should be sent by the nearest route, and by the most expeditious mode, to the Creek Nation. The story of their defeat by you, and subsequent abandonment by the British, communicated by themselves, would probably have a decided effect on their red brethren of the South, and save us the trouble and expense of beating them into a sense of their own interest. When I wrote to you from Wilna, it was doubt-

ful whether our attack would be made directly upon Kingston or upon Montreal. Reasons exist for our preferring the latter course, and have probably determined General Wilkinson to go down the St. Lawrence. In this case, the enemy will have, at Kingston, besides his fleet, a garrison of twelve or fourteen hundred men. Had we not a corps in the neighborhood, these might do mischief, and even render insecure the winter station of our fleet. To prevent this it is deemed advisable to draw together, at Sackett's Harbor, a considerable military force. There are now at that post between four and five hundred men of all descriptions—sick, convalescent, and effective. Colonel Scott's detachment (about seven hundred) are on their march thither; and it is barely possible that Col. Randolph's (not arriving in time to move with the army) may be there also. This does not exceed three hundred and fifty. M<sup>r</sup> Arthur's brigade added to these, will make a force entirely competent to our object. To bring this brigade down the lake you must have the aid of the fleet, which will be readily given by Commodore Chauncey. On this point I shall write to him, and suggest a communication with you in relation to it.

"This new disposition will render necessary the employment of so many of the militia and volunteers, now in service under General M<sup>r</sup>Clure, as you may deem competent to the safe-keeping of Forts George and Niagara, and their dependencies."

HEAD QUARTERS, NEWARK, November 16, 1813.

SIR:

Commodore Chauncey, with the fleet, arrived here yesterday morning, and informed me that he was ready to receive the troops to convey them down the lake; and that the season was so far advanced, rendering the navigation dangerous to the smaller vessels, that it was desirable they should be embarked as expeditiously as possible. As a very small part of the militia and volunteers had arrived, and the situation of Sackett's Harbor appearing to me to require immediate reinforcement, I did not think proper to take upon myself the responsibility of postponing the departure of the troops for the lower part of the lake, conformably to the directions contained in your letter of the third instant.

The information I received yesterday, from two respectable citizens, that were taken near Fort Meigs, in June last, and who made their escape in an open boat from Burlington, confirms me in the propriety of sending them off. These men state, the troops were hurrying to Kingston from York as fast as possible. The regulars going down in boats, and the militia bringing the latter back.

The troops are now all embarked, and under the command of Colonel Smith, who is an officer in whose capacity and bravery the greatest reliance may be placed.

I shall set out this evening for the seat of Government.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration,

Sir, your humble servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

HON. JOHN ARMSTRONG, Esqr. Secretary of War.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GOVERNOR SHELBY, IN RELATION TO THE NORTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN.

FRANKFORT, August 1, 1813.

SIR:

A few days ago I was honored with a letter from General Harrison, under date of the 20th ultimo, by his Aid-de-camp, Major Trimble. In it he says, that "he had just received a letter from the Secretary of War, authorizing him to call from the neighboring States such numbers of militia as he might deem requisite for the ensuing operations against Upper Canada." In pursuance of that power, he has made a requisition on the Government of Kentucky for reinforcements, and has referred me to Major Trimble for information, &c. &c. and has, in warm terms, solicited my taking the field in person. Much delay would have been the inevitable consequence of ordering out the militia as *infantry*, in the ordinary mode, by draught. As *mounted volunteers*, a competent force can, I feel confident, be easily raised. I have therefore appointed the 31st of this month, at Newport, in this State, for a general rendezvous of mounted volunteers.

I have the honor of enclosing, for the information of the President, a copy of my address to the militia of this State on the occasion.

The prospect of acting efficiently against Upper Canada will, I have no doubt, call forth a large force to our standard, and they will be immediately marched to the head quarters of the Northwestern army, in such bodies as will best facilitate their movements; when there they can act as foot or mounted, as circumstances may require.

I shall take great pleasure to hear from the President on this subject, previous to my departure from this place, and I request the favor of you to lay this letter immediately before him for his consideration, and that you will be pleased to apprise me of the result by the earliest conveyance.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

ISAAC SHELBY.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

RED HOOK, NORTH RIVER, August 21, 1813.

SIR:

I had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 1st of August, by the Southern mail of yesterday, and of learning from the War Office that a copy of it had been forwarded to the President for his consideration and orders. These will be communicated to your Excellency as promptly as possible.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY.

NOTE.—It is understood that it was not till the receipt of the above at the War Office, for transmission to Kentucky, that Governor Shelby's letter was sent to the President.

WAR OFFICE, September 27, 1813.

SIR:

In the absence of the Secretary of War, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the President has been pleased to approve your arrangements, in substituting volunteers for the detached militia required by General Harrison.

The term of service for the detachment under your Excellency must depend on the arrangements of the commanding general, to whom you are referred for the necessary information relative to their duty, and the points where your troops will be expected to operate.

It will be proper for your Excellency to keep up a correspondence with General Harrison. This is rendered the more necessary, as the several requisitions which have been made by him for volunteers and militia have not been accurately reported to the War Office; and it is possible he may find it advisable to discharge a part of your force before they reach the frontier.

In the present critical period of the campaign, it seems advisable to submit all further arrangements to General Harrison, under the instructions he has received from the President through the Secretary of War.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

DANL. PARKER, *C. C. War Department.*

His Excellency ISAAC SHELBY, *Governor of Kentucky.*

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND MAJOR GENERAL HAMPTON.

September 1, 1813.

DEAR SIR:

Prevost has gone up to the head of the lake; Yeo has followed him. The object is either to attack Boyd, or to draw Wilkinson to the west, and spin out the campaign, without either giving or receiving blows of decided character. In either case, his [Prevost's] rear is manifestly neglected, and we must not lose the advantage he presents for attacking it. Wilkinson has gone on to Fort George to baffle Prevost, (if the former be his object) and to bring off the army, should the other be manifestly his intention. If Chauncey beat Yeo, Sir George's case will be desperate. This is the pivot on which the issue of the campaign turns.

I am, dear sir, yours, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

CAMP, NEAR BURLINGTON, September 7, 1813.

SIR:

Your letter of the 1st instant came to hand by express the last evening. My dispositions for a movement had been shaped to meet the arrangement communicated in my letter of the 31st ultimo; but I called together the heads of departments this morning to know how far it would be practicable to anticipate that which you had indicated in your despatch of the 29th, and it was found impracticable.

Learned's regiment has not arrived. The ordnance and fixed ammunition belonging to the artillery were only to leave Albany on the 5th, and the latter for the infantry is not yet on its way, notwithstanding my order to Major Bomford, as early as the 12th or 15th of August; and without it I shall be fifty rounds a man short, having now less than fifty, including those in the cartridge boxes. But what is worse than all, the Quartermaster General's arrangements for the land transportation is shaped to the 20th, and cannot be met at an earlier day.

A descent by water, and direct attack on the Isle aux Noix, is out of the question. It is a place of immense strength, and cannot be approached but by a decided superiority of naval strength. This Commodore M'Donough does not pretend to assume *in the narrow waters*. He has this morning been explicitly consulted upon that point. Our approach must be by the Plains of Acadia. I have directed a monthly return to be enclosed. Our strength will be less than 4,000 effectives. Lane and Leonard's regiments have come on, with mumps and measles upon them, and totally destitute of the least instruction. Too much must not be expected from us. All accounts concur in representing the force of the enemy at more than 5,000, exclusive of three battalions of *incorporated militia* (twelve months men) stationed at the *Cedars* and *Cascades*, some distance up the St. Lawrence. If any have gone to Kingston, they have been detached from these points. These battalions consist of 400 men each.

I shall expect information from you respecting the state of things above, but shall not wait a moment for it after I am ready.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, September 13, 1813.

SIR:

Your letter of the 7th instant has been received. Chauncey probably fought a battle on the 11th instant. A heavy cannonade was distinctly heard at this place for several hours, and a boat from Great Sodus states, that an engagement between the fleets took place off Presque Isle, on the northern shore of the lake. (Presque Isle is nearly opposite to Great Sodus.) We are anxiously looking for the result. Had Chauncey been beaten, or so crippled as to make it necessary for him to go into port, we should have seen him here before to-day. His absence and his silence give us, therefore, an assurance that whatever may have been the issue of the battle, it has not disabled him from covering the intended movement of the troops.

Our information differs widely from yours as to the strength of the enemy at Montreal and its dependencies. A deserter from a British detachment of 300 men, moving from Montreal to Kingston, and who left them near the head of the rapids, came to this post the day before yesterday. He states that the whole regular force near Montreal does not exceed one thousand effectives, and that but three hundred invalids have been left at Quebec. This agrees with information received through other channels less direct, and perhaps less correct than yours.

From General Wilkinson I have not heard a syllable since his arrival at Fort George, which was on the 4th instant. He must now be on the point of moving.

The 10th and 32d regiments are in march for Plattsburg. The latter was destined for this place, but learning that it could not leave Philadelphia before the 12th, I have given to it the shorter march and nearer scene of action.

It is much to be regretted that our naval means on Lake Champlain should have fallen so far short of their object. To our operations an ascendancy in the narrow parts of the lake is of infinite moment. A well chosen position on the plains is the alternative of most promise. It may keep the different corps of the enemy in a state of separation.

With great respect, I am, sir, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General HAMPTON.

HEAD QUARTERS, CUMBERLAND HEAD, September 15, 1813.

SIR:

I have got my forces nearly concentrated at this point; and, with M'Donough's aid, have put a stopper on the lake, which ensures tranquillity while my preparations are going on. All now depends on the Quartermaster General, and I believe he will surmount every obstacle. I shall soon be ready.

I am, &c.

WADE HAMPTON.

SECRETARY OF WAR.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, September 19, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL:

Chauncey has chased Yeo round the lake and obliged him to take shelter in Kingston. The Commodore has now gone up to Fort George to bring down the troops. We are ready at this point to embark. It may, perhaps, be

the 30th before *our* forces will be assembled and in *motion*. Your movements may of course be somewhat delayed; say to the 25th or 26th.

It is believed in Kingston that Sir George Prevost is about going to Quebec. Will he not stop at Montreal?

Yours, faithfully,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General HAMPTON.

HEAD QUARTERS, AT LITTLE CHAZEY, *September 22, 1813.*

SIR:

At 6 o'clock, P. M. on the 19th, I dropped down with the army from Cumberland Head for the shore near this place, and landed at 12 o'clock at night, and an hour after had the light corps of the army in motion against the advanced posts of the enemy—Snelling's command against a post a little over the line, on the lake shore, and Hamilton's against Odletown. The blow was to have been struck at the dawn, and the corps were to unite at the latter place, twelve miles distant. Both corps were misled by their guides. Snelling finding himself out of his way for the first point, pushed for the second, and as Hamilton had taken a circuit to get below it, Snelling arrived first and fell upon the picket in a house, which he killed or took, except two or three, and the main body escaped.

Hamilton arrived soon after; the army joined them a little after nine. A few despicable Indians continued to lurk about the distant bushes, and frequently crawled up and fired upon our sentries during the day and the succeeding night.

One was killed on his post in the dark, and two or three others wounded. They were frequently drove off and the thickets scoured, but they continued to hover around as long as we staid. The army had on their backs five days provisions, and my intention was to push through the wood, remove all obstructions, and repair the roads for our supplies, artillery, baggage, &c. which was to follow; but an insurmountable difficulty occurred, which at once defied all human exertion. The drought had been uncommon, and I had some doubts of the practicability of procuring water for the troops, horses, and teams; but the points of Odletown, La Cole, and the river La Cadia were represented to me as a sure resource.

The troops, however, soon dried up the wells and springs of Odletown, and the beds of La Cole and La Cadia are represented, from an authority not to be questioned, to be dry. The troops began to suffer extremely, and the few cavalry and artillery horses that arrived, were obliged to be sent back to Champlain, a distance of four miles, for water. The difficulty began to produce effects the most to be dreaded.

It was not a time to hesitate: the general staff and commanding officers of the corps were called together, and there was but one voice.

The *Chataugay route* was adopted. It was circuitous, but afforded water, and was practicable in less time, all obstructions in the other considered.

The army fell back in the afternoon of the 21st, and encamped at Champlain. The Chataugay road takes off near this place, and the army will advance on it seven miles this afternoon. The baggage is now advancing on it. I hope to arrive at Chataugay on the evening of the twenty-fourth. I can from thence join you at any point you may advise on the St. Lawrence. My object is *Cognawaga*, opposite to La Chine, about forty miles from Chataugay, and ten from Montreal. I have my guides, and information I can rely upon. This position will present three points. If I do not hear from you I can take either, or hold fast, as circumstances shall indicate.

My first movement was unexpected to the enemy; must draw him into some confusion; and will pass as a feint so soon as he hears of my route to Chataugay. My force is less numerous than I expected. It is raw, and of a description that will be forever falling off. All *I can say is*, it shall have all the capacity I can give it.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

P. S. Since writing I find that all the corps cannot leave this ground before morning, and that it will be the 25th before we reach Chataugay.

W. H.

The Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, *September 25, 1813.*

SIR:

Your letter of the 22d instant was delivered to me last night. Commodore Chauncey left this place on the 18th, in the intention of running up to Fort George, and covering the transportation of the troops from that point to this. On the twenty-first he had not arrived there; the effect, I suppose, of adverse winds. This circumstance will necessarily bring after it a delay in the execution of our joint operations, and will indicate the propriety of your not advancing beyond Malone, or the *Four Corners*, until you have advice of our movement. The distance from this place to Malone is about one hundred and thirty miles. An express can reach you in thirty hours, and will, of course, enable you to gain the village of Cognawaga as early as may be proper. You will give such direction to the militia corps assembling or assembled at Plattsburg as you may think most advisable.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major Gen. HAMPTON.

HEAD QUARTERS, POMEROY'S,

*Thirteen miles from Chataugay, Sept. 25, 1813.*

SIR:

I had this morning, at three o'clock, the honor to receive your letter of the 19th, and finding so much time on my hands, the idea has occurred, that a great advantage may arise from a closer view of our means, and the clearest possible concert and understanding in their application. Of every matter and thing, relating to mine, Col. Atkinson will give you as full an idea as if you had been with me for the last five days. When you shall have reflected fully upon them, my arrangements and ideas, your indications can be made with more precision and confidence.

The perfect *rawness* of the troops, with the exception of not a single platoon, has been a source of much solicitude to the best informed among us. This solicitude has not been removed by the first experiment. Every thing was done, to be sure, that ought to have been done; but not in that *style* which the example of a Snelling, a Hamilton, &c. ought to have inspired in the movements of even the light corps. We want a little more mercury, in the ranks, at least. Can you not let me have the first dragoons, and one more veteran battalion? At all events let me have Hane and Haig, that I may have their local as well as their constitutional ardor.

But the great object of this letter is, a full and distinct view and understanding on both sides. All I need say is, that whatever part shall be assigned to me, in the general plan, shall be executed to the utmost extent of my ability and power.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient and very humble servant,

W. HAMPTON.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Hampton, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, September 28, 1813.

"The position you have taken is better calculated to keep up the enemy's doubts, with regard to your real point of attack, than any other. *Hold it fast till we approach you.* In the present state of the campaign we ought to run no risks by *separate* attacks, when *combined ones* are practicable and sure. Had you been able to have broken down the head of their defences, and seized the bank of the St. Johns, at the Rapids, you would have hothered his knightship considerably; but, on the whole, the western movement is to be preferred; because in it there is *safety and concert*, and, in the mean time, enough to render his attention to different points necessary, and of course to keep his forces in a state of division.

"The moment the enemy left the upper parts of the Chesapeake, I ordered Pickens, with his battalion of the tenth, to join you. A battalion of the thirty-second has similar orders."

HEAD QUARTERS, CHATAUGAY, October 4, 1813.

DEAR SIR:

No change of importance in my affairs has occurred since my last, by Colonel Atkinson; but, as there are several of minor consideration, I have judged that a detailed view of them might be of some use, at the moment of your arranging, with our commanding general, the main case of the proposed operations.

The road to Plattsburg will be completed to-day, and is a perfect *turnpike*. The artillery, consisting of eight six-pounders, one twelve, and one howitzer, tolerably appointed and found, is arrived. I have but a small stock of provisions on hand, but have the most pointed assurance from Colonel Thomas, the Quartermaster General, that a supply of sixty days of bread and flour will arrive, at once, in the course of three or four days. I have only from forty to fifty rounds of musket cartridges with me, but this convoy will make the supply an *hundred*, and give to the artillery all it requires in reserve. The supply of salted provisions will not exceed one-fourth of the proportion of flour; but we have, and can have, an unlimited supply of good beef cattle. Brigadier General Parker is at Plattsburg, hastening my supplies, and presiding over some arrangements that were thought necessary. I have directed the commencement of a *petty war*, or invasion of the lines, at and near Lake Champlain, by Colonel Clark, who has some volunteers, and Brigadier General Fasset, (our colonel) who has, at my instance, called out his brigade of militia. The latter, I understand, turn out but badly; but they will make, together, I suppose, from six hundred to a thousand men. There has been inculcated by the artifices of the British, a shameful and corrupt neutrality on the lines, for the purpose of gain. I have directed these officers to break the truce. And, should other means fail, to act the part of the mischievous urchin, who, to get two peaceable *tabbies* at "*making the fur fly*," held them up together by the tail. To be serious, it is really time each individual shall take his side, and that traitors to either should meet their due reward. What I am aiming at, however, is tranquillity on the road, by kicking up a dust on the lines. It will also create a division at a proper point. Of Hopkins's militia, but about two hundred and fifty have arrived, and not more than fifty or sixty of them have consented to pass the line. Such as refused, General Parker was authorized to keep on the lines below, and to excite all the *alarm* he could, with them and the Vermonters. The change of habit has produced more sickness among my raw soldiers than I expected. I believe the number has accumulated at this place to three hundred, and I am afraid will increase. The enemy is in considerable force, about twelve or fourteen miles distant. He made an attack on one of my out-posts, with three or four hundred regulars, and as many Indians, on the afternoon of the first instant, but he fell into bad hands. He found Snelling well posted with his own and Wool's corps. The attack was made with the Indians, and the regulars lay in ambush. But Snelling dashed upon them with such rapidity upon their flanks, that they all scampered away together. Lieutenant Nash, of the thirty-third regiment, and one man, were killed, and one wounded. If the Indians lost any, they carried them off.

The Indians still hover about us, and shoot at our sentries. The St. Regis people are poor d—ls.

I have written in much haste, and have neither time for correction nor copying. You must take it for better or for worse. I will only entreat you to regard it in any other light rather than of an official communication. You may, however, no less rely upon all the information it conveys.

I am, sir, very respectfully and truly, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

The Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG.

HEAD QUARTERS, CHATAUGAY, October 12, 1813.

DEAR SIR:

My solicitude to know your progress, and the real state of the *grand army*, is extreme. It is, perhaps, not less necessary for both, that I should be constantly informed. Implicit faith, cordiality, and concert, ought to unite our efforts. These have formed the basis of our exertions so far, and promises, more than our numbers, the result so much desired. I have no reference to individuals; but to the *heart* of every man. The point and movement of our junction is all important: and that, and not the moment of my departure from hence, ought to be indicated; because I ought to be the best judge of the *time* necessary to surmount the obstacles in the way. Between this and Cognawaga, much work on the road is necessary, and I ought to advance upon it two or three days earlier than might be judged necessary on a smooth and solid road. By seizing and holding strong positions in my front, the work could progress in my rear, without incurring risk, until I arrived within a striking distance. You have said "*hold fast*," and it might be considered precipitate to advance before I hear, at least, that the Rubicon is passed above. These are points for your consideration, and those with you who guide the general movement. You have not sent me the two hundred mounted dragoons. Their presence, on ground the possession of which I do not despair of gaining, added to a force of four thousand effective infantry, and a well appointed *train*, ought to inspire you with some reliance upon our army, new as it is. High pretensions have been avoided; but the moment has arrived when it is, perhaps, necessary for us to be estimated at as much as we are worth.

The tenth is at hand, and is included in the estimate. It is believed the militia may serve for escorts to what must follow us.

Colonel Clark is carrying on his small war, on the lines, with all the effect contemplated. The enemy's motley force have every where nearly disappeared. He is concentrating, no doubt, on points in my way, or on the river.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully and truly, your obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

The Hon. General ARMSTRONG, Secretary of War.

We had an intelligent deserter of the regiment of Canadian fencibles. He states the enemy's force near us, at three thousand men; but, when put to the detail, gave it as follows:

Thirteenth regiment—two flank companies and part of a battalion,	300 men.
Muron's French regiment, two flank companies,	200
Canadian fencibles, Colonel Robinson,	150
Colonel Shaburry's command, voltigeurs, and Indians, and some fencibles,	700
Two battalions of incorporated militia,	750
The whole commanded by Colonel Williams,	2,100

Sir George had gone along to Montreal. He brought down thirty-six boats and about six hundred troops, included in the above.



SACKETT'S HARBOR, *October 16, 1813.*

DEAR GENERAL:

Your favor of the twelfth ultimo has been handed to me by Major Parker. The Niagara division has been slow in its movements. It has at length reached Henderson's harbor, and moves this day to Grenadier Island, whether the division here is moving also. From this point (Grenadier Island) we take our departure either for Kingston, or for Montreal. The enemy broke up his positions before Fort George on the ninth, burned his surplus stores, arms, &c. and moved rapidly for Burlington Bay, which he reached on the eleventh instant. Advices from the Bay of Canti state that he is coming down to Kingston, and that his sick and convalescent, to the number of one thousand two hundred, had already arrived there. He will bring with him about one thousand five hundred effectives, and, thanks to the storm and our snail-like movements down the lake, they will be there before we can reach it. The *manœuvre* intended is lost, so far as regards Kingston. What we now do against that place must be done by hard blows, and at some risk. The importance of the object may, however, justify the means. In the other case, (an immediate descent of the St. Lawrence) the army will make its way to the Isle Perrot, whence we shall immediately open a communication with you. Under these circumstances you will approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or other point which shall better favor our junction, and hold the enemy in check. Your known vigilance and skill make it unnecessary to suggest any measures of precaution against the enterprises of the enemy, while you remain within stroke of him. The dragoons will pass the St. Lawrence near the Coteau de lac.

Yours, &amp;c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General HAMPTON.

HEAD QUARTERS, FOUR CORNERS, *November 1, 1813.*

SIR:

On the morning of the 21st ultimo the army commenced its movement down the Chateaugay, for the purpose of placing itself in a situation which would enable it to fulfil its part of the proposed combined operations on the St. Lawrence.

An extensive wood of eleven or twelve miles in front, blocked up with felled timber, and covered by the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a serious impediment to the arduous task of opening a road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier General Izard, with the light troops and one regiment of the line, was detached early in the morning to turn these impediments in flank, and to seize on the more open country below, while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measure, as will be seen by the report of Brigadier General Izard, which I have the honor to enclose, completely succeeded, and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22d. The 23d and 24th were employed in completing the road and getting up the artillery and stores.

I had arranged, at my departure, under the direction of Major Parker, a line of communication as far up the St. Lawrence as Ogdensburg, for the purpose of hastening to me the earliest notice of the progress of our army down. I had surmounted twenty-four miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had in advance of me seven miles of open country, but, at the end of that distance, commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an entire abatis, and filled by a succession of wooden breastworks, the rear most of which were supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force and light corps of the enemy, and in the rear all his disposable force. As the extent of this force depended upon his sense of danger on the St. Lawrence, it was a cause of regret that all communication from yourself or Major Parker seemed to be at an end. As it was, however, believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength in this position, if free from apprehension of danger from above, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge him, and, if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned us.

Our guides assured us of a shoal and practicable fording place, opposite the lower flank of the enemy's defences, and that the wood on the opposite side of the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops. Colonel Purdy, with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th, to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in rear, and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front, and it was believed the pass might be carried, before the enemy's distant troops could be brought forward to its support.

I had returned to my quarters from Purdy's column, about 9 o'clock at night, when I found a Mr. Baldwin, of the Quartermaster General's department, who put into my hands an open paper, containing instructions to him from the Quartermaster General, respecting the building of huts for the army in the Chateaugay, below the line. This paper sunk my hopes, and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support which had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable. I could only go forward. The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th, leaving its baggage, &c. on the ground of encampment.

On advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column on the opposite side was not so far advanced as had been anticipated. The guides had misled it, and finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communicate with it, but only waited the attack below. About two o'clock the firing commenced, and our troops advanced rapidly to the attack. The enemy's light troops commenced a sharp fire, but Brigadier General Izard advanced with his brigade, drove him every where behind his defences, and silenced the fire in his front. This brigade would have pushed forward as far as courage, skill, and perseverance, could have carried it; but, on advancing, it was found that the firing had commenced on the opposite side, and the ford had not been gained.

The enemy retired behind his defences, but a renewal of his attack was expected, and the troops remained some time in their position to meet it. The troops on the opposite side were excessively fatigued. The enterprise had failed in its main point, and Colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his column to a shoal four or five miles above, and cross over. The day was spent, and General Izard was ordered to withdraw his brigade to a position three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward.

The slowness and order with which General Izard retired with his brigade, could but have inspired the enemy with respect. They presumed not to venture a shot at him during his movement; but the unguardedness of some part of Purdy's command exposed him to a rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after dark, and exposed him to some loss. These attacks were always repelled, and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we lost. Our entire loss of killed, wounded, and missing, does not exceed fifty. In its new position, within three miles of the enemy's post, the army encamped on the night of the 26th, and remained until 12 o'clock of the 28th. All the deserters, of whom there were four, having concurred in the information that Sir George Prevost, with three other general officers, had arrived with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences, and a letter from Major Parker (by express received on the evening of the 26th) having informed me that no movements of our army down the St. Lawrence had been heard of at Ogdensburg, and for some distance above, the following questions were submitted to the commanding officers of brigades, regiments, and corps, and the heads of the general staff, in a council convened for the purpose: "Is it advisable, under existing circumstances, to renew the attack on the enemy's position, and, if not, what position is it advisable for the army to take, until it can receive advices of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence?" The opinion of the council was expressed in the following words:

"It is the unanimous opinion of this council, that it is necessary, for the preservation of this army and the fulfilment of the ostensible views of the Government, that we immediately return by orderly marches to such a position (Chateaugay) as will secure our communications with the United States, either to retire into winter quarters, or be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion, the army has returned by slow marches to this place, and

now awaits the orders of the Government. Its condition will be stated by the bearer, Colonel King, who can give you, upon every point, more full and perfect information than could be contained in a written detail.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant.

W. HAMPTON.

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, DISTRICT No. 9,  
*Seven miles above Ogdensburg, November 6, 1813, in the evening.*

SIR:

I address you at the special instance of the Secretary of War, who, by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp, on the 29th ultimo.

I am destined to, and determined on, the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and, to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is the circumstance of greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes on which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgment should determine that point. To assist you in forming the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott to-night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; I shall cross the cavalry at Hambleton, which will not require a day, and shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river with Grand river, there to cross to the isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal island, at about twenty miles from the city; after which, our artillery, bayonets, and swords, must secure our triumph, or provide us honorable graves. Enclosed you have a memorandum of my field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own, but we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found. On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give as favorable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about fifteen days, and our meat at twenty. In speaking on this subject to the Secretary of War, he informed me that ample magazines were laid up on Lake Champlain, and, therefore, I must request you to order forward two or three months' supply, by the safest route, in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion that, if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from, if not to see you, at that place, on the 9th or 10th instant,

And have the honor to be, respectfully, &c.

JAMES WILKINSON.

To Major General W. HAMPTON, &c.

P. S. I was preparing an express, which I should have despatched to-morrow, but for the fortunate call of Colonel King.

A copy.

JOHN HOOMES, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD QUARTERS, FOUR CORNERS, *November 8, 1813.*

SIR:

I had the honor to receive, at a late hour last evening, by Colonel King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed, of deciding upon the means of our co-operation.

The idea, suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being the most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision. Colonel Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried upon his back; and, when I reflected that, in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that, by throwing myself back on my main depot, where all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Cognawaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success than by the junction at St. Regis.

The way is, in many places, blockaded and abatised, and the road impracticable for wheels during winter; but, by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving.

I have ascertained, and witnessed, the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance.

My troops and other means will be described to you by Colonel Atkinson. Besides their rawness and sickness, they have endured fatigues, equal to a winter campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited, and fallen off; but, upon this subject, I must refer you to Colonel Atkinson.

With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertion I will attempt, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

W. HAMPTON.

To Major General WILKINSON.

A copy.

JOHN HOOMES, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD QUARTERS, PLATTSBURG, *November 12, 1813.*

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter I have received from General Wilkinson, and of my reply. The forage at Chateaugay had been nearly consumed before the expedition down the river; and, in the return of the army, enough only could be found to subsist the horses and teams two or three days. All accounts concurred in the report, that General Wilkinson had not commenced his operations against Kingston, and that no descent down the river was intended. Hence, the necessity for sending off the cavalry, artillery, and provision teams, to Plattsburg, for subsistence; and hence also, the impossibility of a junction at St. Regis with no more provisions than must have been consumed on the march to that place. General Wilkinson had no spare transportation for us; and the junction would have reduced the stock of provisions to eight or ten days for the whole. The alternative was adopted under the impression of *absolute necessity*.

The army has approached on this route to the road leading to Chazy, a few miles from the lines, where I shall join it to-night. I can only repeat what I said in my letter to General Wilkinson, "that what can be accomplished by human exertion shall be attempted, to meet the objects of the campaign." But I should be uncandid not to own that many circumstances are unpropitious. The force is dropping off by fatigue and sickness to a most alarming extent. My returns yesterday report the effectives at little more than half their original state at Chateaugay; and, what is more discouraging, the officers, with a few honorable exceptions, are sunk as low as the soldiers, and endure hardship and privation as badly. In a word, since the show, produced by clothing, movements, &c. has worn off, all have assumed their *native rawness*. Fatigue and suffering from the weather have deprived them of that spirit which con-

stituted my best hopes. What confidence can the best officer (and I have a few surpassed by none) feel, under such circumstances? It is painful to hold up to you this picture, but it is but too faithfully drawn.

The Quartermaster General has been ordered to procure, on hire, 400 wagons, and I shall attempt to open a communication on the direct route from the town of Champlain. Success, under the circumstances I have mentioned, must depend upon the efforts and force opposed to me. The *demonstration*, however, can but produce a partial good.

On the route I took, the enemy burnt and consumed every thing before him, and this I understand to be his general plan. If the same course precede the advance of General Wilkinson, and my feeble force should be foiled, the consequences are much to be dreaded. But the Rubicon is now passed, and all that remains is to push for the Capitol.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMPTON.

General JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War*.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Hampton to the Secretary of War, dated*

CHAZY, November 15, 1813.

"I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a letter I received the last evening from General Wilkinson, by Colonel Atkinson, whom I had sent to him for the purpose of settling the plan of our proposed joint operations. Of the consistency of this letter with that of the 6th instant, and my answer, or of the insinuation it contains, I shall say nothing. Upon so plain a case, and an attempt so unworthy the occasion, common sense will afford every explanation I could wish. I shall make the necessary arrangements for placing the troops in winter quarters, and commence my journey to the southward."

HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR CORNWALL, U. C. November 12, 1813.

SIR:

I this day had the honor to receive your letter of the 8th instant, by Colonel Atkinson, and want language to express my sorrow for your determination not to join the division under your command with the troops under my immediate orders.

As such resolution defeats the grand objects of the campaign in this quarter, which, before the receipt of your letter, were thought to be completely within our power, no suspicion being entertained that you would decline the junction directed, it will oblige us to take post at the French Mills, on Salmon river, or in their vicinity, for the winter.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. WILKINSON.

Major General HAMPTON.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND MAJOR GENERAL WILKINSON.

[Submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, on the 23d July, and communicated to General Wilkinson on the 5th of August, 1813.]

The time at which we have reason to expect an ascendancy on Lake Ontario has arrived. If our hopes on that head be fulfilled, though but for a short period, we must avail ourselves of the circumstance, to give to the campaign a new and increased activity.

For this purpose our forces on the Ontario should be *concentrated*, because neither section of them, as they are now divided, is competent to any great object.

The point of concentration is more doubtful:

1st. If at Fort George, our utmost success can but give us the command of the peninsula, which, if General Harrison succeeds against Malden, will be of diminished interest, both to us and to the enemy: to us, because Malden will more completely cover our western frontier, and control the savages, than Forts George and Erie: to the enemy, because, Malden lost, our inroad upon the peninsula will but have the effect of *shortening*, not of *dividing*, the enemy's line of operations; in a word, success at this point will not give to the campaign a character of *decisive advantage*.

2d. If, on the other hand, we make Sackett's Harbor the point of concentration, Kingston may become the object of our attack, which, by the way, will but be returning to the original plan of campaign prescribed to General Dearborn. This place is of much importance to the enemy, and will no doubt be defended by him with great obstinacy, and with all the resources which can be safely drawn from other points. That it may be taken by a joint application of our naval and military means is not, however, to be questioned. The enclosed diagram will show the number and character of the enemy's defences. His batteries on No. 1 cannot be sustained but by his fleet. These carried, he is open to a descent at No. 2 and 3. If he divides his force between both, we oppose one half of his strength with the whole of ours. If he concentrates at No. 2, we seize No. 3, and command both the town and the shipping. If he concentrates at No. 3, we occupy No. 2, and with nearly the same results.

Cotemporary with this movement, another may be made on the side of Lake Champlain, indicating an intention of attacking Montreal and its dependencies, and really attacking them, if, to save Kingston, these posts have been materially weakened.

3d. Another and different operation, to which our means are competent, would be a movement from Sackett's Harbor to Madrid, on the St. Lawrence. At this place the river may be most easily crossed. The ground opposite to it is a narrow bluff, skirted by the river on one side, and a swamp of great extent and of difficult passage on the other. This gained and fortified, our fleet continuing to command the water line from the head of the river to Ogdensburgh, and Lake St. Francis occupied with a few gun boats and barges, the army may march against Montreal, in concert with General Hampton. The only natural difficulty to the execution of this plan would be presented by a branch of the Grand river, which must be crossed; but at this season, though deep, it is believed to be fordable.

Under the preceding supposition, it is respectfully submitted, whether it will not be most advisable to make Sackett's Harbor the point of concentration; and leave to the commanding general an election (to be determined by circumstances) between the two plans suggested under the second and third heads.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Approved and adopted, 23d July, 1813.

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1813.

I have examined the projects of the campaign, intended for the past and ensuing stages of it, on the side of Canada, which you put into my hands yesterday. The novelty of the subject to me, and the pressure of time, will prevent the deliberate consideration of it which its importance merits; and therefore I shall confine myself to a few brief observations touching the project of the 23d ult.

1st. If we command Lake Ontario (without which the project is impracticable) and our force be competent to carry Kingston, the incorporation of our troops should take place at Sackett's Harbor, and the attack be made as promptly as possible.

2d. On the contrary, should our combined disposable force be deemed incompetent to the certain and speedy reduction of Kingston, then it may be preferable to strengthen our force at Fort George, cut up the British force in that quarter, destroy the Indian establishments, and (should General Harrison fail in his objects) march a detachment to capture Malden.

While these operations are pending, a bold feint or provisional attack on Montreal, by Major General Hampton, will certainly call Sir George Prevost to that place; and it is presumable that, seeing our movements directed towards Erie, he may carry his best troops with him from Kingston.

These suggestions spring from my desire to hazard as little as possible in the outset, and to secure infallibly whatever may be attempted, with the intention to increase our own confidence, to diminish that of the enemy, and to popularise the war.

After our operations on the peninsula have been closed, we may raze the works there under your provision, leave our settlements on the strait in tranquillity, and like lightning must direct our whole force against Kingston; and having reduced that place, and captured the shipping, we may descend the stream, and form a junction with the column of General Hampton in the neighborhood of Montreal, should the lateness of the season permit, by which all our movements, after the conquest of Upper Canada, must be governed.

To give General Hampton's movements a menacing aspect, and to enable him to profit by events, he should take with him a heavy train of battering cannon and mortar pieces, which will be found indispensable in the attack of Montreal; and to weaken that place, and to favor a protracted season, I would advise that a heavy column of militia or volunteers, if engaged for three months only, should be put in motion from the vicinity of Lake Memphragog, to descend the river St. Francis, and take post on the right bank of Lake St. Petre, with a battering train of travelling carriages, organized and equipped either to keep post or retire when the season or other circumstances should render expedient.

Before I close this letter, I will beg leave to call your attention to several specific points, on which I require information and authority, which I deem essential to the salutary discharge of the high and solemn trust about to devolve upon me.

1st. A copy of the instructions to Major General Hampton, for my government in the correspondence to ensue between us.

2d. Shall I be allowed a private secretary, which is necessary, and of right belongs to the command on which I am about to enter?

3d. I require permission to take for my aids-de-camp such officers as are best fitted to discharge the important duties of the station.

4th. I ask authority (or is it understood that I possess it) to supply every defect of the munitions of war and transport, by land or water, by means of the authorized agents.

5th. I entreat that ample funds may be deposited in proper hands, to give effect to the department of intelligence, without which the chief will find himself hoodwinked.

6th. I trust no order, of whatever nature, will be passed to any officer under my command, but through my hands. This is not only necessary to the regular conduct of the public service, but it is vitally essential to the preservation of sound subordination, and is conformable to the rules of the service in all armies, inasmuch as he who is responsible for all should have the control of all.

7th. I hope I may be expressly authorized to detach from my command all persons who may manifest a temper or disposition to excite discontents, to generate factions, or embitter the service. This is indispensable to put down seditious spirits, and to harmonize the corps.

8th. Should we move against Kingston in the first instance, the withdrawal of our force from Fort George will enable the enemy to re-occupy that point, and for a brief period to harass our frontier on that strait. May not the militia or a body of volunteers be called forth to relieve the regular troops at that place, and prevent discontents and complaints?

9th. For the maintenance of the necessary authority of the chief, it is hoped the Secretary of War will decline and forbid all correspondence with his subordinate officers, except in cases of personal grievance.

10th. I beg to be advised of the means of communication between our military positions, and particularly from Sackett's Harbor to Burlington, which should be rapid and infallible.

11th. I ask authority to equip the whole of our horse artillery, and to mount the whole of our dragoons, because these arms will be found all important in every combat which may ensue.

A serious impression of the dread responsibility which awaits me, and a correct sense of the public expectation which accompanies me, must be my apology for giving you so much trouble.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

HON. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 8th, 1813.*

SIR:

I have given to your observations of the 6th instant all the consideration they so justly merit.

The main objection to any plan which shall carry our operations wide of Kingston and westward of it, is, that, in the event of its success, it leaves the strength of the enemy unbroken; it but wounds the *tail* of the lion, and of course is not calculated to hasten the termination of the war, either by increasing our own vigor, or by diminishing that of the enemy. Kingston is the great depot of his resources; and so long as he retains this, and keeps open his communication with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other defences, and of reinforcing or renewing the war in the west. Kingston, therefore, as well on grounds of policy as of military principle, presents the *first* and *great* object of the campaign.

There are two ways of approaching this; by *direct* or by *indirect* attack: by breaking down the enemy's battalions and forcing his works, or by seizing and obstructing the line of his communication, and thus drying up the sources by which he is nourished and maintained. Circumstances must govern in choosing between these different modes. Were our assembled land and naval forces competent to the object, a *direct* attack would, no doubt, be the shorter and better way; but if, on the contrary, our strength be inferior, or hardly equal to that of the enemy, the *indirect* attack must be preferred. These considerations have suggested the third plan, to be found in my note of the 23d ultimo. To give execution to this, I would collect my force at the head of the St. Lawrence, make every demonstration of attacking Kingston, proceed rapidly down the river, seize the northern bank at the village of Hamilton, leave a corps to fortify and to hold it, march upon Montreal with the main body, effect there a junction with Hampton, and take a position which shall enable you to secure what you gain. On this plan, the navy would perform its part by occupying the mouth of the river, and preventing a pursuit by water; by clearing the river of the armed boats of the enemy; by holding with its own the passage of Hamilton, and by giving support to that position. If the enemy pursues, it must be by land, without subsistence, (excepting what he carries on his back) and without artillery. If he remains stationary, his situation must soon become even more serious, as the country in which he is cannot long subsist him. It will then but remain for him to fight his way to Quebec, to perish in the attempt, or to lay down his arms. After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that, in conducting the present campaign, you will make Kingston your *primary object*, and that you will *choose* (as circumstances may warrant) between a *direct* and *indirect* attack upon that post.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON, *Commanding District No. 9.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 9, 1813.*

SIR:

In answer to that part of your letter of the 6th instant which calls for information, &c. on certain enumerated points, I have the honor to state:

- 1st. That General Hampton's instructions go only to assemble and organize his division at Burlington. It is intended that he shall operate cotermporarily with you, and under your orders, in the prosecution of the plan of campaign which has been given to you.
- 2d. The senior Major General, commanding the principal army, is entitled to the services of a private secretary.
- 3d. The ordnance and other departments of supply, within the district (No. 9) are subject of course to your orders.
- 4th. The Quartermaster General of the army will supply the funds for secret service.
- 5th. All orders to subordinate officers pass from the War Department to the Adjutant General, to be communicated by him to the General commanding the district in which such subordinate officer may serve.
- 6th. No specific permission is necessary for removing factious or disorderly men. All such will probably become subjects of the confidential reports to be made by Inspectors. To detach such men from one district to another is only shifting the evil; the better way is to report them for dismissal.
- 7th. If the corps at Fort George be recalled, the works should be razed, or occupied by a force competent to hold it against an assault. There is a corps of militia and volunteers (to whom the Six Nation Indians have associated themselves) at Black Rock, which may be kept in service. They are commanded by General Porter and Mr. Parrish. [See the confidential letter of General Porter, enclosed.]
- 8th. The Secretary of War will decline and forbid all improper communications, and particularly such as may bear any color of insubordination.
- 9th. Besides the ordinary mode of communication, by mail, expresses may be employed in extraordinary cases.
- 10th. The dragoon and light artillery corps shall be made efficient. Horses may be bought for both. An officer from each corps should be directed to superintend the purchases. Price (average) not to exceed one hundred and twenty dollars.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON, *Commanding the Northern Army.*SACKETT'S HARBOR, *August 21, 1813.*

SIR:

I arrived here yesterday: my machinery is in motion, and I have strong hopes of giving the change to Sir George, which will lead directly to the object of first importance.

Commodore Chauncey is in port here, and his antagonist, Sir James Yeo, at Kingston. In the late interviews between these naval commanders, the first has zealously sought a combat, which the latter has cautiously avoided; the superiority on the lake, therefore, remains still to be settled; but I have Chauncey's assurance for it, and place much confidence in his word. It is obviously Sir James's plan to decline a conflict, but on what ground I cannot determine.

Our schooner here will be equipped and manned by Wednesday, and I shall sail with the squadron for Fort George probably the day after; I am endeavoring to draw Sir George after me; but whether I succeed in this attempt or not, should our men and means answer report, and Heaven favor me, I will be in possession of Kingston, or below that place, on the 26th proximo.

Major General Hampton must not budge until every thing is matured in this quarter, and we have either got possession of Kingston, or have cut its communication with Montreal, of which I shall give him seasonable advice, via Plattsburg, where I shall calculate on his arrival, the 20th of the ensuing month, completely equipped for a forward movement. If he changes his position, and shows his column west of the lake sooner, it may carry Sir George to Montreal, and produce precautions which might otherwise be neglected until too late for any salutary effect.

The militia called forth by Governor Tompkins, of which, by the by, you gave me no information, should not be arrayed before he hears from me, at Fort George, because the assembly of such a body would increase the alarm, and put all Canada in counter motion, while incidents, beyond the control of man, may intervene to procrastinate my movements, and thus baffle the effects of the proposed co-operation, on the side of Vermont: should a corps of militia be drawn from thence, no movement should be made by them until General Hampton has crossed Champlain.

It would be highly interesting to the public service, and extremely acceptable to me, to see you at Niagara, from whence, should I find it practicable, it is my intention to commence my movement down the lake, about the 15th of the next month; the best possible disposition for the safety of that frontier, and for the security of the vast mass of ordnance and stores, which I must leave there, may render your advice and authority indispensably necessary, to avert clamors, and prevent any obstruction to my prompt movement.

With high consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*SACKETT'S HARBOR, *August 26, 1813.*

SIR:

Chauncey will go out, he says, to-morrow or next day, to seek Sir James. I see the necessity of settling the point of *naval superiority* before we commit ourselves, and, therefore, the decision cannot be had too soon. In the mean time the essential arrangements progress, and if the means can be mustered, they will ensure the end.

I fear Yeo will avoid a contest, to spin out the campaign, and gain time for reinforcements, and the organization of militia; but if he will not come out, we must blockade him. I go for Niagara the moment our arrangements are matured here. Sir George has actually gone for the head of the lake with a reinforcement. To prevent his playing tricks with Boyd, I have sent him (Boyd) the note of which you have a copy.

On Saturday, the 21st, one hundred and sixty regular troops ascended by Ogdensburgh to Kingston, and on the 23d and 24th, they were followed by five hundred Highlanders in their keltis; who conducted up one hundred boats: thus we see that this quarter attracts chief attention. All my efforts will be made to induce Sir George to draw after him a chief part of the garrison of Kingston, which must now be near five thousand strong. The situation of Proctor and the irruption of our Indians have gone far to excite these dispositions. Meet me at Niagara, if possible, and for God's sake press on the recruits from Albany and the southward, and send me Wadsworth, Swift, Fenwick, and Izard. All things go well here, and, thank God, the men are recovering rapidly. I hear not a word from Hampton. I hope he does not mean to take the stud; but if so, we can do without him, and he should be sent home.

Truly yours,

JA. WILKINSON.

General ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War.*

SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 30, 1813.

SIR: With every exertion he could make, it was not until the last evening Chauncey got under way, and the weather being calm, he must be now off this harbor.

Agreeably to my information, Sir James Yeo sailed for the head of the lake, the 22d instant, with the two captured schooners in addition to his squadron, no doubt to co-operate with Sir George, but did not get clear of the Ducks before the 25th.

Brigadier General Boyd is warned of this movement, and being placed on his guard, he ought to baffle every enterprise of the enemy; what an awful crisis have I reached! If Sir George beats Boyd, and Sir James, Chauncey, my prospects are blasted; and the campaign will, I fear, be lost. If Sir George beats Boyd, and Chauncey beats Sir James, Kingston yet may be ours; but should both the knights be beaten, and our Quartermaster can find transports in season, (of which I have fears, as I found next to none here) then we shall certainly winter in Montreal, if not discomfited by some act of God. If I could have mustered three thousand combatants on this ground, with transport to bear them, I would now have been before Kingston, where Sir George has left only one thousand five hundred regular troops, and about five hundred militia; but our utmost force is short of two thousand five hundred, as you will perceive from the enclosed return; and we could not have found boats to transport one thousand.

The enemy having determined to change his system of operations, from defence to offence, is assembling his whole disposable force at the head of the lake, to attack Fort George; thus placing himself at too great a distance from Montreal to give seasonable succor to that city: he certainly presumes on our imbecility, and we as certainly should take advantage of his presumption.

The militia called for should, therefore, be immediately arrayed, and marched to this frontier, and Major General Hampton should, without delay, cross the Champlain, and commence his movement towards St. Johns, taking the Isle aux Noix in his route, or not, as circumstances may justify.

Four thousand of the best appointed yeomanry should be ordered to rendezvous at Hamilton, on the St. Lawrence, for eventual operations with this division; and the residue may accompany or follow Hampton, to draw the militia of Montreal, and the disposable force of the lower country, to the east of the St. Lawrence, and thereby make the island an easy conquest from this quarter.

Sir George Prevost, it would seem, has taken his part, and, deluded by the hope of re-conquest, has abandoned his rear to our enterprise, and we might now, without the co-operation of our squadron, safely occupy Madrid, and cut the communication of the two provinces with this division only, if we had transport; but of this we are totally destitute, every boat we command here being at this time absent, with a detachment of eight hundred men, ordered to make a feint to the westward, under pretence of reinforcing Niagara, before I was apprised of Sir George's movements.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 30, 1813, 5 o'clock, P. M.

SIR: I have commenced, barely, the arrangement of the department of intelligence; an intelligencer left Kingston, or its vicinity, last evening, to tell me that Sir George Prevost had commenced his operations against Boyd, and had driven in his pickets, and taken sixty or seventy prisoners, but had been repulsed from his line of encampment. The militia of Montreal are at Kingston, and reinforcements, by single hundreds, are arriving frequently; four hundred men are expected in the course of the week.

The force at Kingston is two thousand men (regulars fifteen hundred, militia five hundred.) Major General Darrach commands, and they are assiduously strengthening their works. Sir James Yeo sailed with six weeks' provisions, expressly to co-operate with Sir George at the head of the lake; a double battle and a double victory offer a strong temptation; but I will not be diverted from my course.

I have written Governor Tompkins on the subject of a draught of militia, for the strait of Niagara, to supply the absence of our troops of the line, and prevent clamor, but have not been so happy as to receive an acknowledgment of my letter.

With perfect respect, your obedient servant,

J. A. WILKINSON.

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, SACKETT'S HARBOR, Sept. 6, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL:

I arrived here yesterday. Nothing new, except that Prevost has returned to Kingston. General Hampton will go through the campaign cordially and vigorously, but will resign at the end of it. He will be ready to move by the 20th, with an effective regular force of four thousand, and a militia detachment of one thousand five hundred. On the supposition that Sir George had decidedly taken his part, and had chosen the peninsula as his champ de bataille, I had ordered Hampton to move immediately against the Isle aux Noix. Two thousand militia will be promptly assembled at Champion, twenty-four miles from this place, and on the route to the St. Lawrence. The place was selected as offering two objects, and of course leaving his knightship to guess. To have pushed them directly to Ogdensburgh would not have had that advantage. A larger draught would have been difficult. Another view of the subject is, that this part of the plan cannot be confided to militia exclusively; they must be propped by a regular corps, otherwise the back door may not be sufficiently closed and barred.

The battle on the lake! Shall we have one? If Yeo fights and is beaten, all will be well. If he does not fight, the result may also be favorable.

Yours, cordially,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General WILKINSON.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT GEORGE, September 11, 1813.

"I have indulged the hope, for several days past, that I should have been enabled to address you in propria persona, but in this I have been baffled by a severe and unremitting malady, which obliges me to resort to the pen of a common friend.

"I reached this place the evening of the fourth. Commodore Chauncey at that time occupied the harbor; and Sir James Yeo, with the British squadron, was vaporing in front of it. This state of things continued, without any material change, until the evening of the 7th, when a light land breeze gave to the Commodore an opportunity of standing out to meet the enemy. The two squadrons were about two leagues asunder, of consequence an action appeared inevitable: yet so it has happened, that, since that period, until about five o'clock, yesterday, P. M. these two naval armaments have kept from four to eight miles distant, without having exchanged a single shot, or done to each other the smallest visible damage—the British uniformly on the retreat, and the American in pursuit.

"General Peter B. Porter left me to day, properly authorized and instructed to bring into operation a corps of the Six Nation Indians, which he proposes to increase to one thousand men, by volunteers from the militia, and is disposed to be busy and active wherever he may be directed.

"I hear nothing of Brigadier General M'Clure, and the New York militia. I shall mature my plans for embarkation as rapidly as the difficulties which may oppose me can be matured; but we are greatly deficient in transport, and have not received a single boat from Oswego or any other place. Strong shallops and slip-keels are necessary to the transport of the heavy cannon, ordnance stores, ammunition, clothing, &c. &c.

"I am writing to Bomford for many things, which I was assured I should find here, and I pray you to put him on the alert, or I may be caught in the snow. I dictate this under much depression of head and stomach; and am,

"With great respect and esteem, your most obedient servant,  
"JAMES WILKINSON."

*Extract of a letter from General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT GEORGE, September 16, 1813.

"I have escaped from my pallet, and with a giddy head and trembling hand, will endeavor to scrawl you a few lines, the first I have written since my arrival here.

"With respect to the advance squadrons, we are still without one word of authentic information, but we are entertained by daily rumors, as wild and extravagant as they are inconsistent and contradictory. I hope we may soon have an end of this state of uncertainty, which damps our exertions, and retards our measures.

"The removal of the main body of the troops from this position is an operation of great delicacy and interest; and it was therefore your presence here would have been more important than elsewhere.

"I am not authorized to abandon this useless occupancy, and therefore it must be maintained against the united British force in its vicinity. To secure the end, and nothing must be hazarded, will require a serious drain from our best troops, which enfeebles our too feeble force for the main attack. The head of the militia under M'Clure has not yet shown itself: when it does (if in any reasonable time) and we have conferred, I shall be better enabled to develop the intricate path before me. But, in the mean time, alas! sir, the season will, I fear, be lost.

"The Indians enter into our views with great zeal, and I look for a corps of at least five hundred men in eight days; whether to relieve De Rottenberg of five or six hundred of his effective men, before I turn my back on him, will be determined by considerations of policy in relation to our red allies and the militia, and the fate of our squadron. The enemy profess to day a total ignorance of the occurrence of an action between the squadrons.

"In the course of sixteen days, the enemy have lost sixty-five men by desertion, we barely six. We count 4,600 on paper, and could show about 3,400 combatants. The enemy, from the best information we have, have about 3,000 men on paper, of whom 1,400 are sick. Shall I make a sweep of them or not, at the hazard of our main object? Not unless that main object is jeopardized by the fate of our squadrons—it would require an operation of three weeks; but my views are forward, and I shall not abandon the prospect while a ray of hope remains.

"I have received your letters to the 6th, from Sackett's Harbor, and thank you for them. For your comfort, the men here are gaining health, and, with their officers, breathe an ardent spirit for combat."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL:

Accident detained the express last evening, and gives me an opportunity to drop you another line.

Not a word more of Chauncey; what has become of him? I pray you to decide whether I am to move with or without any further knowledge of the squadron.

From the enclosed, No. 2, it would appear that the enemy expect tranquil winter quarters in this neighborhood: for the number of barracks proposed to be built will not receive more than 1,400 or 1,600 men, including guards, ordinary and extraordinary, stow them as you can; but, shall I have the enemy within four miles of this place, making a wide investiture of it from Queestown to Four Mile creek; or shall I break him up? With our prospects the decision is embarrassing; change them, to the abandonment of the chief design, and our course is direct, viz: to take possession at Burlington Bay, and cut up or capture the whole division in this quarter, which may be estimated at 3,000 regular troops. I pray you to deliberate on these points, and give me your advice without delay.

I have despatched an express to ———, for General M'Clure, of whom I have heard nothing since my last; but to supply the defect of his silence, the enclosed copy of a communication from a committee, of which P. B. Porter is chief, will fully suffice. I have responded in the most courteous terms, making reference to you for your determination on the momentous occasion, as you will perceive from my answer. Now let me entreat you to weigh these propositions, to take into consideration the possible failure of the militia, and the substitution in such case of these volunteers: for, in the present crisis, we should, if possible, render "assurance doubly sure." The letter of David Rodman (a stranger) is also transmitted for consideration. Let me have your answer, and tell me how to act as speedily as possible, I beseech. The boats from Oswego have not yet arrived.

I am feeble to childhood, but shall look at the troops in battalion on Tuesday.

Truly yours,

JAMES WILKINSON.

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1813.

SIR:

I am ordered by General Wilkinson to forward the enclosed papers. One, a letter from a committee of three, of which P. B. Porter is the first; and the other a letter from Daniel Rodman, the organ of an association of residents in and near Canandaigua.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

H. LEE, jr.

*Major of infantry, and Aid-de-camp to Major General Wilkinson.*

The Honorable J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

BLACK ROCK, September 17, 1813.

SIR:

In consequence of encouragements from General Boyd, that a general and decisive movement was about to be made by the army, and that an additional force was desirable, we repaired to Fort George, about five weeks ago, with five hundred men, consisting of volunteers, militia, and Indians. Most of us remained there for twelve or fourteen days, but our hopes not being realized, the men continually dispersed and went home, not, however, without expectations, again encouraged by Generals Boyd and Williams, that we should be shortly called on again to aid in operations which the people in this part of the country, so long harassed by the calamities of war, feel so strong an interest in forwarding. Under similar expectations, many of our friends in the interior have intimated to us their readiness to join with respectable reinforcements on the shortest notice: and we are informed that one company, about seventy strong, is actually on its march, and will arrive here to day or to-morrow.

We are at this moment much at a loss how to act, and our difficulty is increased by the various rumors and conjectures circulated by the different officers daily arriving from head quarters, some of whom represent that no offensive operations are to be undertaken on this frontier, but, that the regular army is immediately to be marched, either to the East to attack Kingston, or to the West to join General Harrison. Others state, that an attack is to be made on the British forces in the vicinity of this place.

Under these circumstances, we are induced to inquire of you, whether such a force as we have it in our power to raise is desired by you to effectuate your plans, and if so, in what numbers, and at what time? If your object be to sally out upon the enemy at Fort George, we could bring you a respectable force. But, on the contrary, if you meditate an attack at some other point, and the withdrawal of the regular troops from Fort George, and placing this frontier on the defensive only, by means of militia, we would observe that our prepared force is of such a character as could not be engaged in this service.

Upon the supposition that you intend to withdraw the regular troops from this frontier, we beg leave to submit a proposition for your consideration.

We believe we are not incorrect in saying that it would require nearly quite as great a force to defend this line of frontier against a given force of the enemy, as it would to attack and subdue that enemy. Sir George Prevost has ordered the militia of the upper province to be called out en masse. They are to assemble on Saturday next. And if, after your departure, the enemy opposite here should take it in his head to retain all his regular force, and play off his skill against the inexperience of our militia, we might have occasion to fear a repetition of former scenes in the present war.

Our proposition (in case of your leaving this place) is, that we be permitted to raise, between this and the first of October, a volunteer force of from 1,000 to 1,200 men, exclusive of Indians. That we add to it as many of the militia stationed on the lines as may be willing to join us. That we be furnished with a small train (say four pieces) of field artillery, with experienced officers, and men to fight them; and that with this force we be authorized to invade the enemy's country.

Should you think proper to confer such an authority on us, and direct that the volunteers shall be furnished with arms, ammunition, provisions, &c. and receive pay while in actual service, we pledge our lives, that, before the close of the season, we will occupy the whole of the valuable and populous peninsula, opposite this river, and either capture, destroy, or disperse, all the enemy's force in this quarter.

You may perhaps make it convenient to send an answer by the bearer, Captain Hall.

We are, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servants,

PETER B. PORTER,  
CYRENIUS CHAPIN,  
JOSEPH M'CLURE.

Major General WILKINSON.

CANANDAIGUA, September 14, 1813.

SIR:

A large number of patriotic citizens of this and the adjacent towns, anxious to do their duty in a crisis so interesting to the nation in general, and to this part of the country in particular, have associated themselves to volunteer their services to the United States for the *residue* of the campaign at least.

In order to effectuate their intentions, however, it will be necessary that their movements should receive your approbation and sanction, and that they should be assured that the corps, whether a company, battalion, or (as is possible) a regiment, should be received, organized, and countenanced, by your order and authority. The lateness of the season, and the anxiety of the members, induce us to request an early and authoritative reply, that the association may be equipped according to law, and be useful to their country this season. It may not be hardly decorous for us to say it, but we must observe that the subscribers will prove to be obedient and brave soldiers.

In their behalf, I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL RODMAN.

Major General WILKINSON,  
or officer commanding Fort George.

GENTLEMEN:

FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1813.

Your letter of yesterday, which reached me last evening, gives you a claim to my acknowledgments and to those of your country. But, as I am altogether unauthorized, by law or instruction, to sanction your plan for the levy of a body of volunteers, and as your anticipations, propositions, and suggestions, embrace a range and a character upon which I have neither right nor authority to deliberate, I have considered it my duty to transmit a copy of your letter to the Secretary of War, now at Sackett's Harbor, by express, for his deliberation and decision.

I hope he may find it convenient and proper to meet your views, and have only to add, that you shall be advised of his answer, without a moment's delay, after it may reach my hands.

With high consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

To PETER B. PORTER, Major CYRENIUS CHAPIN,  
and JOSEPH M'CLURE.

DEAR GENERAL:

SACKETT'S HARBOR, September 18, 1813.

Our information from the other side of the lake amounts to this: Prevost goes to Montreal; the whole regular force in Kingston consists of ten companies of De Waterville's regiment; that at Prescott, of two companies of the same corps, and about forty artillerymen.

De Waterville's regiment was made up in Spain, is composed of Poles, Germans, Spaniards, and Portuguese, and completely disaffected. What a precious moment, my friend, is this!

The Commodore was brought back to us yesterday by adverse winds. He goes this morning; let not the great objects of the campaign be hazarded by running after Yeo: these accomplished, his race is run. Kingston, or the point below, seized, all above perishes, because the tree is then girdled.

In speaking of your artillery, you do not include the guns taken at Fort George, and which will be necessary for its defence. A small garrison will be sufficient against *assault*: siege we need not dread. It is already too late to live in trenches. Porter (of the artillery) would do well to command the place. Tell him from me he is a Brigadier by brevet.

The means of transportation are now with you; hasten your march, and may God bless you in all your enterprises.

Yours, truly and always,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General WILKINSON.

*Extracts of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

*"September 20, 1813.*

"I am well again, and that's a good thing: for I have been, during my sickness, somewhat of a *Smelfungus*. Now, indeed, would be a fine time to slip into the St. Lawrence, if Chauncey could keep Sir James blockaded above Kingston, and command the river below at the same time, and our preparations were completely matured;



but it is an herculean task to extract order from chaos. No time has, or shall be, lost on my part; but we cannot, when prepared at all points, control the winds. It was last night, only, the transports from Oswego arrived; and, if I am not hardly opposed by weather, I hope I shall have 1000 men afloat by the 26th, and complete my embarkation on the 30th, after which, until we reach Grenadier Island, I must look to our squadron and the heavens for safety.

“Chauncey tells me he is liable to be blown off from his station, and, in such case, Sir James may slip out by him, but promises to follow him. It is material, to prevent the enemy from following and cutting our rear, that some competent force should take post on the St. Lawrence, below Kingston; and I pray of you to make this arrangement with Chauncey. Before I left Sackett’s Harbor, I ordered a dozen slip-keeled boats, to carry 50 men each, and to row 30 oars, to be armed with a light cannon in their bow. This armament is to sweep the St. Lawrence of the enemy’s gun boats, and to take post in advance, when and wherever it may be advisable. I beg you, if necessary on your part, to give effect to this order.

“We have just received advice confirmatory of a naval combat on Lake Erie, in which it is said Perry has taken the whole British squadron, on the 10th instant, and brought the vessels into ‘Putney harbor, at the islands,’ his own vessel, the Lawrence, barely capable of being floated. The action lasted six hours. This will cancel your news from our Commodore. The enclosed letter from General M’Clure breathes a good spirit, but he will not be up for several days. In the mean time, I shall prepare his orders, to be ready to give him the command.

“A body of horse, a small one, at that point where the fate of the island is to be decided by combat (for believe not that we shall get possession of Montreal without a battle) will be invaluable. Burn has been ordered hence, some time before my arrival, to recruit his cavalry, and prepare them for action, and I shall order him by express to-morrow to incline by indirect dilatory marches towards Hamilton, there to look for further orders, somewhere about Antwerp, or that quarter. From Denmark or Champion he is to advise the commanding officer at Sackett’s Harbor of his movements.

“De Rottenberg is under the full belief that I mean to attack him, and I shall keep up the delusion as long as possible.

“The snail’s pace of the reinforcements approaching this division, and, pardon me, their direction and route, occasion me surprise. Of what avail will be the detachments under Colonels Randolph and Coles,\* which are, I learn, from Washington, on their march to this place, where they cannot, or will not, arrive before the 15th proximo? If these detachments had been ordered on by all the available water communications from Annapolis to Albany, they could have reached Sackett’s Harbor in season, and a column of eight hundred men would have been found an important desideratum in our impending operations. Where, also, are the one thousand men reported to me by Colonel Duane as being ready for march, before I reached Philadelphia? I must hope, near Sackett’s Harbor. I put these questions to you that I may apprise you of facts, that you, with whom it rests, may apply the remedy, for I find we possess little military subordination or respect, and that a chief of an army is obeyed more from courtesy than principle or professional obligations.

“I send this by the privateer Fox to Commodore Chauncey, with a request that he accelerate its progress to you. This place neither stops a gap, extends our possessions, nor covers or protects a country; it is good for naught, but to command the ground it occupies, and, therefore, I shall dismantle and abandon it.”

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Wilkinson, dated*

“SACKETT’S HARBOR, September 22, 1813.

“DEAR GENERAL:

“Your letters of the 16th, 17th, and 18th instants, have been this moment received; I hasten to answer them. The main object must be prosecuted. Chauncey is not broken down; he can and will command the lake, and, while he does so, our position at Fort George may be maintained. If the enemy’s sick list amounts to one thousand four hundred out of three thousand, the enemy can undertake nothing with effect. In this view of the subject, *close with P. B. Porter’s proposition*, made in the following words, viz. ‘Our proposition (in case of your leaving this place) is, that we be permitted to raise, between this and the 1st of October, a volunteer force of from one thousand to one thousand two hundred men, exclusive of Indians; that we add to it as many of the militia stationed on the lines as may be willing to join us; that we be furnished with a small train, (say four pieces of field artillery, with experienced officers and men to fight them) and that with this force we be authorized to invade the enemy’s country.’

“Rodman’s corps may join Porter. Any volunteers you may have with the army, whose times are near expiring, and who are desirous of continuing in service, may do so, also. We will cover the whole by a requisition upon Governor Tompkins for additional militia.

“The enemy’s fleet have left the Chesapeake, I believe, for Halifax, whence the land troops are to be sent into Canada—another motive for quick movements.

“My last letters by Chauncey, of the 18th or 19th, gave you all we yet know. Prevost has left Kingston, it is said for Quebec, more probably for Montreal.

“Yours, faithfully and ever,

“JOHN ARMSTRONG.”

NIAGARA, September 27, 1813, 6 o’clock, A. M.

DEAR SIR:

I received, at eight o’clock last evening, your interesting letter of the 22d, and shall employ its authorizations to the best possible effect.

Fifteen hundred men were embarked, with orders to sail the day before yesterday, but a strong easterly wind has made it impossible to move.

The whole force (say three thousand combatants, after deducting the garrisons of Forts George and Niagara) were ready for embarkation yesterday, and, as the weather is serene at this moment, I hope the whole may be able to move at dusk this day: I say at dusk, because I am desirous to keep my neighbors under a delusion as long as possible; they are perplexed as to my intentions, and will not be able to penetrate them before they have discovered the course of my flotilla.

I have authentic information from York the evening of the 24th instant. The brigade of militia in the vicinity were required to assemble the 25th, and six hundred men of the 41st and 49th regiments, second battalion, were daily expected there on their route to this neighborhood. This is good; and still better, three spacious block houses are ordered by Sir George to be erected at York.

But, sir, here is one drawback: the tantalizing Sir James Yeo was in shore with his fleet, on the evening of the 24th, (Friday) about twenty eight miles east of York. Where he is now we know not, for he has not since been heard of, and Chauncey is just sending out the Lady of the Lake and the Neptune to reconnoitre York, and the coast in that quarter. What may be the views of the Knight? To gasconade, to retard my movement, or to enable De Rottenberg to follow me, I am unable to divine; but will not be longer delayed, and, therefore, shall be twenty miles to the eastward before to-morrow morning, should the weather permit. If Sir James can be discovered, Chauncey will seek him; otherwise, he will sail with me to cover my left flank.

As we have not a moment to lose, I shall proceed directly to Grenadier† Island, writing you, and sending orders to the commanding officer, by a despatch boat, *en passant*.

\* These corps arrived in time.

† I had determined on this point of rendezvous before I heard from General Brown.

After all, we are so straitened for transport that we shall not find room for more than fifteen days' provisions; indeed, we have little more to spare from this position, and, therefore, our sole dependence must be on the magazines at Sackett's Harbor, of which the contractor should be personally advised. Heaven protect you!

Truly yours,

J. A. WILKINSON.

Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

FORT GEORGE, October 2, 1813.

DEAR SIR:

Since my last, of the 17th instant, I have had difficulties, perplexities, and anxieties, sufficient to discompose a saint.

Commodore Chauncey having ascertained that the British squadron was on the opposite coast, agreeably to the information I had given him, left port on the evening of the 27th to look for it; on the morning of the 28th we discovered our squadron off this place about mid-channel, and standing for the York shore; about 12 o'clock, though very distant, we discovered it was warmly engaged—the enemy to leeward, and scarcely discernible; we could, with our glasses, distinguish the Pike firing both her batteries, and frequently enveloped in smoke. The enemy were forced towards the head of the lake, and about 3 o'clock we lost sight of our sternmost vessel, the action still continuing. From that period, until yesterday morning, I was kept in suspense as to the issue of the action; the wind blowing a gale from the southeast, and producing such a swell as made it impossible for our privateers to keep the lake; and of course my flotilla was confined to port with the troops, either on board, or encamped on the beach. The evening before the last, our whole fleet (alone) were discovered beating down the lake. In the course of the night they came to, off Four Mile creek, and yesterday morning the Commodore presented himself. Our observations on the action were in the main correct, except that the battle was fought by the Pike alone, (or next to it) who, having carried away Sir James's mizzen and main top masts, his squadron bore up to protect him, and Chauncey was engaged with the whole. Unlucky fellow! he could have taken a schooner and a brig, but his eyes being fixed on the Commodore, he would not look at smaller game. Finally, Sir James, as usual, ran away; was chased to the head of the lake; came to anchor close in shore; and the gale and tremendous sea threatening, in case of a continued action, to put both squadrons on shore—Sir James, with the British force, assembled there, and Chauncey into the hands of the enemy—he clawed off and came down to confer with me. He has my opinions in writing, and I expect his answer this morning.

Early yesterday, before I had heard from the Commodore, the wind, for the first time, becoming favorable, I despatched all my batteaux; and, as soon as I had ascertained Sir James Yeo's situation, our sail boats followed; but, alas! before 1 o'clock the wind again came round to the southeast, and several of our schooners returned, though a majority of them, and the whole of the batteaux, proceeded, and I hope reached Eighteen Mile creek.

I have been detained by the arrival of about three hundred and fifty Indians, to whom I was obliged to give an audience and a talk, and I lodged in this place to see whether the enemy might look at it, and what would be the conduct of the garrison of six hundred and ninety militia, and eight hundred regular troops; under the command of Colonel Scott. We have just had an alarm, and being myself among the first on parade, I have witnessed a scene by which I shall profit Scott, before I leave him, which will be in a couple of hours, as, thank Almighty God, the wind again breezes, though it has rained all right, and still continues to rain. Oh! if it may please God to favor us with this breeze, we shall soon be near you; but it is in his power, by adverse winds, to delay, and, by tempests, to destroy us. I move with about three thousand five hundred men. Farewell, and God preserve you!

JAMES WILKINSON.

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG.

*Extract from the Journal of the Secretary of War.*

"4th of October, 1813.—General Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's Harbor on this day from Fort George. He immediately visited the Secretary of War, in company with Generals Lewis and Brown, and in the presence of these officers remonstrated freely and warmly against making an attack on Kingston, urging the propriety of passing that post and of going directly to Montreal.

"The Secretary of War differed from General Wilkinson in opinion, but thought his objections worthy of consideration, and proposed a meeting on the day following for that purpose.

"The meeting took place accordingly, when General Wilkinson presented the paper marked No. 1. That marked No. 2 was presented by the Secretary, and the opinion with which it closes was adopted as that which should regulate the movements of the army."

No. 1.

Reasons for attacking Kingston *anterior* to a descent upon Montreal.

- 1st. We shall capture a garrison of eight hundred or one thousand, and demolish a strong hold of the enemy.
- 2d. We shall destroy his naval depot and magazines of every species.
- 3d. We shall, by this operation, diminish his force, destroy his resources, and place the division at the head of the lake, under De Rottenberg, in great difficulty and distress; and
- 4th. We shall destroy every naval resource, and of consequence prevent the building, equipping, and even repairing, a single vessel.

*Against* this attack it may be urged—

- 1st. That the reduction of the place may cost more time than we calculate on.
- 2d. It may encumber us with wounded and sick; and
- 3d. It is possible the British squadron may, as heretofore, elude Commodore Chauncey, and find us before Kingston, or overtake us on the St. Lawrence.

In the first place, from the lateness of the season, the loss of a few days may expose us to the autumnal rains, and jeopard the chief object of the campaign. In the second place, our own force will be diminished and our movements retarded; and in the third place, the chief object of the campaign, *the capture of Montreal*, will be utterly defeated, and our own army subjected to great difficulties, losses, and perils.

Submitted to the Honorable the Secretary of War.

JAMES WILKINSON.

No. 2.

- 1st. The Niagara division will probably arrive here in a day or two.
- 2d. The weather is yet good, and the lake navigable by scows and boats.
- 3d. The enemy's main force is in the neighborhood of Fort George, and his fleet at the head of the lake.
- 4th. The garrison of Kingston does not exceed eight hundred or one thousand men.
- 5th. If we effect a landing at M'Pherson's farm, on the eastern side of Kingston, a point may be seized which will command the town, the forts, and the harbor; and, within seven hours after the landing is effected, a sufficient battery may be erected and in operation.

6th. Nine and twelve pounders will be sufficient for burning block houses, &c. and may be dragged by the men.  
7th. The time necessary to reduce the place will not exceed a single day, and of course will not materially interfere, on that account, with our object below.

8th. The loss we may sustain can only be conjectured. Judging from that at Fort George, where the enemy were more numerous, it will be inconsiderable.

9th. The advantages of taking Kingston are two: you sever the enemy's line of communication, and you expel him from his only secure harbor.

The premises assumed under the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th heads, may change, and our conclusions with them. The only safe decision therefore is, that, if the British fleet shall not escape Commodore Chauncey, and get into Kingston harbor; if the garrison of that place be not largely reinforced; and if the weather be such as will allow us to navigate the lake securely, Kingston shall be our first object, otherwise we shall go directly to Montreal.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

SACKETT'S HARBOR, *October 5, 1813.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 9, 1813.*

DEAR GENERAL:

Does there exist between you and the Commodore a clear and distinct understanding on the subject of our plan of operations, and the kind and degree of assistance he will be able to give to its execution? Can he take a position which shall have the effect of shutting in Yeo, and of covering our descent upon Kingston, and our subsequent movement down the St. Lawrence? Is it not probable that a part of the enemy's fleet will, immediately on our appearance at Grenadier Island, occupy the passage of the river? If we can be covered in going to our first object, and should attain that, we may be able to dispense with further naval assistance; but, should we fail, (a contingency which, being possible, ought to be regarded) naval aid will be necessary to the prosecution of the second part of the plan. As the fleet is wind-bound, and the Commodore here, explanations on these points may be readily and conveniently given. Let me know the result, and believe me

Truly yours,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON.

HEAD QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR, *October 9, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

The Commodore and myself have hitherto understood each other perfectly, and I think we shall harmonize to the end. He is ready to sail the moment the wind serves; and you may rest assured that nothing essential to give effect to the operations of the army under my command, and to accomplish the views of the Government, has been or shall be omitted.

Respectfully and truly yours,

JAMES WILKINSON.

Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR, *October 18, 1813.*

"The diminution of our force, by disease and various casualties, and more especially the uncertainty of the period of our movement against Montreal, render it necessary, in my judgment, that you should revoke the order of march you have given to Major General Hampton, and that he should be directed to march for Morrisville, as rapidly as may be consistent with the health of his troops. This proposition is founded on the presumption that we make the reduction of Kingston and the conquests of the upper provinces the first objects of our operations."

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 19, 1813.*

SIR:

I received your letter of yesterday, and should have answered it more promptly, but that business of the south and west required my immediate attention.

When, on the 4th instant, you returned from Fort George, we had the prospect of a speedy concentration of our forces at this point. The Niagara division had sailed on the 30th ultimo; the enemy's principal force occupied a cantonment between lakes Erie and Ontario; his fleet was at the head of the lake, and his garrison at Kingston, reduced to seven or eight hundred men. Under these circumstances it was no doubt wise to decide as we did, that our first attack should be carried against that place; but do these circumstances any longer exist? The expected concentration is but now effected, (18th of October.) A reinforcement of one thousand five hundred men has been thrown into Kingston; the British fleet has got into port there, and our force, from disease and other casualties, is, according to your statement, diminished and diminishing. To reinstate and augment this, it is now proposed to order General Hampton from his present position at Chatauge, to Morrisville, on the St. Lawrence. These places are distant upwards of one hundred miles. A march of such length, at this season of the year, and in the present condition of the roads, loaded as he is with a train of artillery, with means of subsistence, and with tents and baggage, cannot be performed under fifteen days, to which must be added the time necessary for giving the order for making the arrangements preliminary to such a movement, and for making also the subsequent one from Morrisville to the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river; all of which would probably protract the moment of junction till the 15th of November.

Admonished, as we are, by the storms which have assailed us for ten days past, and which have not yet ceased, I cannot but think that a period so late would of itself be fatal to the project.

Other circumstances lead to the same conclusion. Beginning our operations from the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river, we shall have a march of twenty-four miles to Kingston, and through a country covered with woods, destitute of inhabitants, and pervious only by two roads, which, without any interruption from the enemy, are represented as nearly impassable at present. This movement (unlike that originally projected\*) cannot be made without the aid of horses; and a less number of these than six hundred,† including the 2d regiment of dragoons, is, I understand, deemed insufficient. Now these must be fed, and their provender drawn from this place, as the country between Gravelly Point and Putneyville affords none, and interposes a swampy desert, which shuts us out from the supplies of Rossie and Rayville, &c. An important question arises here—can the necessary forage be obtained from this neighborhood? The Quartermaster General says "it cannot, that it must be carted from Lowville, (forty miles distant) and transported hence by water." These facts, on your plan, menace our operations against Kingston, with a delay which would probably surround us with all the embarrassments of a Canadian winter, and extinguish every hope of grasping the other, the safer and the greater object below. I call it the safer and greater object, because,

\* A descent at McPherson's farm, two miles and a half below Kingston.

† Forage for this number was required by the General.

At Montreal, you find the weaker place, and the smaller force to encounter: at Montreal, you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of four thousand men: at Montreal, you approach your own resources, and establish between you and them an easy and an expeditious intercourse: at Montreal, you occupy a point which must be gained in carrying your attacks home to the purposes of the war, and which, if seized *now*, will save one campaign: at Montreal, you hold a position which completely severs the enemy's line of operations; which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him; and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself.

These, General, are the thoughts which present themselves on your proposition, and which I understand as abandoning, for this campaign, the proposed attack on Montreal. I am entirely disposed to listen to all that can be said on the other side of the question, but, at present, the reasons assigned leave me no doubt of the policy of pursuing, promptly and firmly,\* the plan already indicated, and which, besides the approbation of the President, has received the sanction of a council of war.†

I am, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON.

HEAD QUARTERS, SACKETT'S HARBOR, October 19, 1813.

DEAR SIR:

I was about to embark for Grenadier Island, when I received your letter of this morning, which I will endeavor to answer; my very feeble condition, and the want of time for reflection, disqualify me from doing full justice to my opinions.

You will recollect that, in my letter of the 6th of August, I proposed to take Kingston, as preliminary to an attack on Montreal; you offered a different opinion in your letter of the 8th, and on my arrival here, I submitted the alternative to a council of war, which decided in favor of your plan to leave Kingston untouched, and proceed directly against Montreal; but ulterior considerations and information‡ have induced me to adhere to my original plan.

Permit me, previous to the discussion of the grounds of my opinion, to submit a few incidental remarks.

It is extremely doubtful what may be the present force of the enemy at Kingston, and very uncertain how much our own force may have been diminished by disease, and the casualties attending our movements.

From the retreat of Proctor before General Harrison, and the information received from Colonel Scott, I think it probable that De Rottenberg, with the effectives of his division, has gone to reinforce Proctor, and that the troops which have descended to Kingston consisted only of the sick of that division.

My idea of recalling General Hampton to reinforce us, was produced by an alarm with respect to the insufficiency of our force, which I found spreading; and the direction which I suggested was founded on your own proposition§ of the 13th instant, at which time I understood you to offer the opinion, that the march from Hampton's encampment to Morrisville might be accomplished in six days, and my own opinion is, that, by disembarassing himself of his artillery and its attirail, perhaps he might be able to make the march in that time, or a few days more.

My reasons for preferring the attack of Kingston to that of Montreal, are these:

By the reduction of that place, we conquer a province, not only of great importance to the enemy, but a valuable acquisition to ourselves; we capture or destroy four thousand of his best troops; we put an end to the Indian war; and, by the destruction of his naval force, establish our command of the lake, and permit a respectable part of our naval force to be employed elsewhere.

On the contrary, leave Kingston, its garrison, and the British squadron in our rear, and proceed to Montreal, none of those important objects will be gained. The enemy will remain in undisturbed possession of the province, at liberty to exercise his enterprise against this frontier at discretion: for it is a fact, however opinions may vary, the resources of the province are adequate to the subsistence of his army. His naval superiority on the lake will be re-established by the opening of the spring; the Indian depredations may be encouraged and continued; or, should he prefer it, he may, on the opening of the campaign, leaving Sir James Yeo triumphant on the lake, with a suitable garrison for the protection of Kingston, descend the St. Lawrence with his main force, and fall upon our rear, while we shall be engaged in front, admitting we succeed in establishing ourselves at Montreal.

Having passed Kingston, the fortifications at Prescott may present such an obstacle to our further progress, as to compel us to land and reduce it by force—an operation which may consume more time than can be spared at this advanced season. I speak conjecturally; but, should we surmount every obstacle in descending the river, we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion.

I will barely add, that, as the winter commences at Montreal by the 20th of November, should we be delayed on the route by any untoward incidents, our embarrassments and perils will be greatly multiplied.

I offer these results of my frail judgment with a conscientious regard to the public good. I am bigoted to no project, and therefore am willing to yield my own judgment to that of others.

Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is *necessary to my justification* that you should, by the *authority of the President*, direct the operations of the army under my command *particularly against Montreal*. With my earnest wishes for the successful issue of whatever may be undertaken, I am, dear sir, with much respect and esteem, truly yours,

J. A. WILKINSON.

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War*.

N. B. All the objections which apply to the landing below Kingston may be obviated by landing above it. My sole motive for suggesting the idea of landing below, was to prevent the *garrison's escape*. If there be a deficiency of forage on our part, it is the fault of the Quartermaster General, who was instructed as early as August to lay in a supply of twelve thousand bushels for the subsistence of the cavalry.

J. A. WILKINSON.

Honorable J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War*.

\* This refers to the preceding plan, approved by the President on the 23d July, and communicated to General Wilkinson on the 5th of August.

† This council consisted of Generals Wilkinson, Lewis, Brown, and Swartwout, and Commodore Chauncey. The opinion was unanimous.

NOTE.—Before the Secretary of War left Sackett's Harbor, and while it was deemed practicable, and was intended to carry our attacks against both Kingston and Montreal, he had one or more conversations with Commodore Chauncey, on the general subject of naval co-operation. These had particular reference to two points, the place of landing [in case Kingston was the object of attack] and the *degree of protection* which the fleet could be able to render to the debarkation of the army. The places of descent indicated by the Secretary were three:

- 1st. M'Pherson's farm, two miles and a half below Kingston.
- 2d. The mouth of the Little Cataraqui, four or five miles above Kingston; and
- 3d. The mouth of the Gaunanoqui river, twenty-four miles below Kingston.

The Commodore's answer was substantially as follows: that he would not take upon himself the responsibility of covering the landing of the army at the *first* of these points, but that he would cover its landing at either of the other two.

‡ This ulterior information was not communicated to the Secretary of War.

§ What is here called a *proposition* was but a question, *whether the march could be performed in six days?* General W. answered in the negative, and advised that General Hampton should be ordered to go on to Cognawaga.

*Endorsement on the preceding letter by the Secretary of War.*

NOTE.—If we look at the plan of campaign of the 23d of July, we find that it proposed an attack on Kingston, and even indicated the mode of that attack. If we examine General Wilkinson's letter of the 6th of August, we find that he provisionally adopted that opinion: and if we refer to the letter of the Secretary of War of the 8th, so far from expressing a *different opinion*, we discover that it instructed the General to *choose* between a *direct* and an *indirect* attack on that post. It was not, therefore, any *difference* of opinion between the Secretary and the General that was submitted to the council of war, as stated in the preceding letter, but the mere *alternative* presented by the instructions of the letter—the simple *choice* between the two modes of attack.

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 20, 1813.

SIR:

I received your letter of yesterday by Major Lee. You appear to have written it under an impression that your instructions of August last made a direct attack upon Kingston unavoidable. A copy of these instructions is before me, and in the last paragraph of them we find a summary of their substance. It is as follows: "After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that, in conducting the present campaign, you will make *Kingston* your principal object, and that you will *choose*, as circumstances may indicate, between a *direct* and an *indirect* attack on that post." Both modes of attack are slightly detailed in these orders, and a preference given to the latter, but without at all infringing your right of choice, or in any degree lessening your responsibility. *Nor am I now at liberty to change the ground of these instructions*, since the only effect of this would be to *substitute my opinion for yours*. The former has not, however, been withheld; it has been given freely and fully, and is yet unshaken by any consideration presented to my mind.

As we are now about to part, it may be proper that I should subjoin to what I have said in favor of a movement on Montreal, a short statement of my objections to a direct attack on Kingston.

1st. If its garrison consists of *four thousand* of the best troops of the enemy, (as you suggest) your attack will fail.

2d. If your attack fails, your retreat is impracticable.

3d. Your descent must necessarily be made above or below the town, on the water's edge, and within a short distance of your object. If made *below* the town, your fleet cannot cover it;\* if made *above* the town, it must be done in presence of the enemy, and within stroke of his fleet, and that he will think the object sufficient to justify the risk cannot be doubted. Besides, an approach on this side, however successful, leaves to the enemy the means of escaping.

4th. The experiment already made of the lake navigation is not encouraging. Though pressed by no enemy other than the weather, the army has not been able to reach Grenadier Island but in broken order, and with considerable loss. On your plan, they have eighteen other miles to go on the open lake, and much of this distance under the eye of the British fleet. Is it probable that our *scows* will be able to navigate this remaining distance (at a season and under circumstances so unfavorable) in better order, or with less loss?

These are the best thoughts I can offer, and it only remains to add to them my best wishes for your army and for yourself.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON.

LADY OF THE LAKE, OFF SACKETT'S HARBOR, October 24, 1813.

SIR:

I was at Grenadier Island the day before yesterday, and found the troops dropping in so slowly that I determined to return, hunt them up, and quicken their movement. My presence at the harbor was also necessary to have clothing selected to cover numbers of our naked men.

I will say nothing of the horrid condition in which that place was left. Colonel Coles has arrived with upwards of two hundred good men, and expects about eighty more to-day. Randolph and Scott are expected at Oswego, nine hundred strong. I have contrived to rig and send off vessels to bring up six hundred of them in season for my movement from Grenadier Island, which will not be delayed one instant unnecessarily. The people at Kingston appear to be much affrighted, firing their alarm guns on the slightest appearance. J. N. has returned, and if he may be credited, De Rottenberg has not arrived, and all the force they can spare is sent down the river to take possession of, and fortify, some critical passes. My health continues, unfortunately, bad.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

GRENADIER ISLAND, October 28, 1813.

"I send you this by an extra Aid-de-camp, Captain Nourse, to relieve the anxiety to which you must be subject, in the impending eventful moment.

"The extent of the injuries to our craft, the clothing and arms of the men, and to our provisions, on the passage from Sackett's Harbor to this place, greatly exceeded our apprehensions, and has subjected us to the necessity of furnishing a supply of clothing, and of making repairs and equipments to our flotilla generally. In fact, all our hopes have been very nearly blasted; but thanks to the same Providence which placed us in jeopardy, we are surmounting our difficulties, and, God willing, I shall pass Prescott on the night of the 1st or 2d proximo, if some unforeseen obstacle does not present to forbid me. I shall expect to hear from you at Morrisville, where Colonel Swift is to meet me, and to guard against chance shots, I wish wagons would be held in readiness to receive our powder and field ammunition, at a suitable distance above Prescott.

"I keep up the delusion here; and the enemy, about sixteen hundred strong, exclusive of five hundred militia, are in daily expectation of a visit at Kingston, yet they have taken post, I understand, at Cornwall and the Coteau de Lac. No matter: once past Prescott, and our bayonets and sabres shall remove all impediments.

"The inexorable winds and rains continue to oppose and embarrass our movements; but I am seizing on every moment's interval, to slip into the St. Lawrence, corps and detachments, as they can be got ready. Our rendezvous will be in Bush creek, about twenty miles below, and nearly opposite to Gaunanoqui, which position menaces a descent on the opposite shore. I shall sail from that position at four o'clock of the morning, and will pass Prescott about the same time the ensuing morning.

"We have had such a fluctuation of sick and well between this place and Sackett's Harbor, that it is impossible to say in what force we shall move; but I calculate on 6,000 combatants, exclusive of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season, notwithstanding all my arrangements and exertions to accelerate their march: they are both under provisional orders for Ogdensburgh."

\* Commodore Chauncey declared he would not take the responsibility of covering the descent of the army if made at M'Pherson's farm, *below* the town.

WAR DEPARTMENT, DENMARK, October 30, 9 o'clock, P. M.

DEAR GENERAL:

I this moment received your despatch by Captain Nourse. I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted as to enable you to say with assurance when you will pass Prescott. I should have met you there; but bad roads, worse weather, and a considerable degree of illness, admonish me against receding further from a point where my engagements call me about the 1st proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at Antwerp, and communicated in a letter from that place by Major Lush. I wrote a single line to you to-day, giving the fortunate issue of Harrison's business, and his arrival at Fort George with M<sup>r</sup> Arthur's brigade. If Vincent be within the peninsula, Harrison will root him out. It remains with you to sweep the rest of the line before you. Montreal taken, what are Prescott and Kingston? Give Hampton timely notice of your approach, and of the place and hour of junction.

Yours, sincerely,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON.

*Extracts of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

GRENADIER ISLAND, November 1, 1813.

"You will perceive from the duplicate under cover (letter of the 28th of October) what were my calculations four days since; but the winds and waves and rains and snow still prevail, and we have made several fruitless attempts to turn Stony Point, one of them at great peril to three thousand men, whom I seasonably remanded to the harbor without the loss of a life. Our sick, one hundred and ninety-six in number, have not fared as well: they were embarked in stout comfortable vessels, and sailed the day before yesterday morning for Sackett's Harbor, but they were driven on shore by a storm, which continued with unremitting violence all night; and as no exertion could relieve them, I anticipated the loss of the whole; but the tempest having abated, and the wind shifted from S. W. to N. E. boats were sent out yesterday morning, and Dr. Bull reports the loss of three men only. Other means of transport will be provided to-morrow, and these unfortunate men will be sent to the hospital at Sackett's Harbor.

"Brigadier Brown with his brigade, the light artillery, the riflemen, the volunteers, the gunboats, Bissell's regiment, and a part of Macomb's, are, I expect, safe at French creek, with the artillery and ordnance stores. These corps have made the traverse of the arm of the lake under circumstances of great danger, though fortunately without the loss of a life, but at the expense of some boats.

"I shall wait one day longer, and if the passage should still continue impracticable to the troops, I will land them on the opposite shore, march them across the country to the St. Lawrence, and send the empty boats round to a given rendezvous.

"As Major General Hampton is under your orders, permit me to suggest to you what is worthy of reflection—whether he should take a position and wait the arrival of my command near the confluence of the St. Lawrence and Grand river, or whether he should move down the St. Lawrence and menace Chambly? If he is strong enough to meet Sir George, the latter will be the preferable plan, because it will have the effect to divide the enemy's force; otherwise he should adopt the first idea, hazard nothing, and strengthen my hands.

"The enclosed copy of a memorandum from Colonel Swift will show you what he is about, I flatter myself, to your satisfaction. The sole unpleasant circumstance before me, is our total ignorance of the *preparations* of Sir George, and what we may expect to meet on the island. I fear no consequences; but it must be painful to lead more than six thousand men to battle hoodwinked; and yet all my efforts to procure intelligence from Montreal have proved fruitless."

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to General Wilkinson, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, 1st November, 1813.

"Prevost will perhaps be found between the Coteau de Lac and the Isle Perrot. If wise, he will attempt to fight you before your junction with Hampton. Avoid this, and leave nothing to chance that you can settle on your own terms. A junction with Hampton enables you to give the law."

*Extract of a letter from General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

GRENADIER ISLAND, November 3, 1813, 7 o'clock, A. M.

"The troops and squadron are at last in the river, excepting Macomb's regiment, with which I shall join them by 10 o'clock, as the weather is propitious. Extreme illness, and the arrival of Colonel Randolph with two hundred and thirty men, kept me here last evening. We shall be encamped at French creek to-night; will take to-morrow for final organization and arrangement, and the next day pass or prepare to take Prescott; by preference I shall not disturb the place, because I have not time to spare."

ALBANY, 12th November, 1813.

DEAR GENERAL:

My accounts from and of you are of the same date. Neither come down lower than the 3d instant. These left you with the reserve at Grenadier Island.

General Hampton has made a movement towards the St. Lawrence. After feeling and skirmishing with the enemy, he retired again to the Four Corners, until he had notice of your approach. I hastened to inform him by express (who would reach him in forty-eight hours) that you were in motion; that on the 5th you would pass or take Prescott, and that on the 8th you would be at Hamilton, whence he might expect to hear from you; that he must put himself again in motion, and take a position which would enable him to join you, or which should detain the enemy on the south side of the river. If Prevost, on learning your approach, quits his present position, and re-occupies the north bank of the St. Lawrence, Hampton goes on and joins you. If he remains on the south bank, he abandons Montreal and even the road to his capital. In the fulness of my faith that you are in Montreal, and that you have both seen and seized on all the advantages that the errors of an enemy may have given you,

I am, dear General, cordially yours,

J. ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

FRENCH MILLS, November 15, 1813.

"It is a fact, for which I am authorized to pledge myself on the most confidential authority, that, on the 4th of the present month, the British garrison of Montreal consisted solely of four hundred marines and two hundred sailors, which had been sent up from Quebec. What a golden, glorious opportunity has been lost by the caprice of Major General Hampton."

HEAD QUARTERS, FRENCH MILLS,

*Adjoining the Province of Lower Canada, November 16, 1813.*

SIR:

I beg leave to refer you to the journal which accompanies this letter, for the particulars of the movement of the corps under my command down the St. Lawrence, and will endeavor to exert my enfeebled mind to detail to you the more striking and important incidents which have ensued my departure from Grenadier Island, at the foot of Lake Ontario, on the 3d instant.

The corps of the enemy from Kingston, which followed me, hung on my rear; and, in concert with a heavy galley and a few gun-boats, seemed determined to retard my progress. I was strongly tempted to halt, turn about, and put an end to his teasings; but alas! I was confined to my bed. Major General Lewis was too ill for any active exertion; and, above all, I did not dare suffer myself to be diverted a single day from the prosecution of the views of the Government. I had written Major General Hampton on the 6th instant, by his Adjutant General, Colonel King, and had ordered him to form a junction with me on the St. Lawrence, which I expected would take place on the 9th or 10th. It would have been unpardonable had I lost sight of this object a moment, as I deemed it of vital importance to the issue of the campaign.

The enemy deserve credit for their zeal and intelligence, which the active universal hostility of the male inhabitants of the country enable them to employ to the greatest advantage. Thus, while menaced by a respectable force in rear, the coast was lined by musquetry in front at every critical pass of the river, which obliged me to march a detachment, and this impeded my progress.

On the evening of the 9th instant, the army halted a few miles from the head of the Longue Saut. In the morning of the 10th, the enclosed order was issued. General Brown marched agreeably to order, and about noon we were apprised, by the report of his artillery, that he was engaged some distance below us. At the same time the enemy were observed in our rear, and their galley and gunboats approached our flotilla and opened a fire on us, which obliged me to order a battery of eighteen pounders to be planted, and a shot from it compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the advanced parties. But, by this time, in consequence of disembarking and re-embarking the heavy guns, the day was so far spent, that our pilots did not dare enter the Saut, (eight miles a continued rapid) and, therefore, we fell down about two miles, and came to for the night. Early the next morning every thing was in readiness for motion; but having received no intelligence from General Brown, I was still delayed, as sound caution prescribed I should learn the result of his affair before I committed the flotilla to the Saut. At half past ten o'clock, A. M. an officer of dragoons arrived with a letter, in which the General informed me he had forced the enemy, and would reach the foot of the Saut early in the day. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to sail, at which instant the enemy's gun-boats appeared, and began to throw shot among us. Information was brought me at the same time, from Brigadier General Boyd, that the enemy's troops were advancing in column. I immediately sent orders to him to attack them. This report was soon contradicted. Their gunboats, however, continued to watch us, and a variety of reports of their movements and counter-movements were brought to me in succession, which convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack when it could be done to the greatest advantage, and, therefore, I determined to anticipate them. Directions were accordingly sent by that distinguished officer, Colonel Swift, of the engineers, to Brigadier General Boyd, to throw the detachment of his command, assigned to him in the order of the preceding day, and composed of men from his own, Covington's and Swartwout's brigades, into three columns, to march upon the enemy, out flank them if possible, and take their artillery. The action soon after commenced with the advanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp and galling; and, with occasional pauses, was sustained with great vivacity, in open space and fair combat, for upwards of two and a half hours, the adverse lines alternately yielding and advancing. It is impossible to say with accuracy what was our number on the field, because it consisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats to render safer the passage of the Saut. Brigadier Generals Covington and Swartwout voluntarily took part in the action at the head of the detachments from their respective brigades, and exhibited the same courage that was displayed by Brigadier General Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. Our force engaged might have reached sixteen or seventeen hundred men, but certainly did not exceed eighteen hundred. That of the enemy was estimated at from twelve hundred to two thousand, but probably did not amount to more than fifteen or sixteen hundred, consisting, as I am informed, of detachments from the 49th, 84th, and 104th regiments of the line, with three companies of the voltigeur and Glengary corps, and the militia of the country, who are not included in the estimate.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to give you a detailed account of this affair, which certainly reflects high honor on the valor of the American soldier, as no example can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field, or yielding to their antagonists. But, sir, the information I now give you is derived from officers of my confidence, who took active parts in this conflict: for, though I was enabled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to be able to lead the troops I commanded—the disease with which I was assailed, on the 2d of September, on my journey to Fort George, having, with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on me ever since; and, at the moment of this action, I was confined to my bed, and emaciated almost to a skeleton, unable to set my horse, or to move ten paces without assistance.

I must, however, be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks in relation to the affair. The objects of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed; the last being bound by the instructions of his Government, and the most solemn obligations of duty, to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means; because, this being effected, one of the greatest difficulties opposed to the American army would be surmounted: and the first, by duties equally imperious, to retard, and, if possible, prevent such descent—he is to be accounted victorious who effected his purpose. The British commander, having failed to gain either of his objects, can lay no claim to the honors of the day. The battle fluctuated, and triumph seemed, at different times, inclined to the contending corps. The front of the enemy was at first forced back more than a mile, and, though they never regained the ground thus lost, their stand was permanent, and their charges resolute. Amidst these charges, and near the close of the contest, we lost a field piece by the fall of the officer, who was serving it, with the same coolness as if he had been at a parade or review; this was Lieutenant Smith of the light artillery, who, in point of merit, stood at the head of his grade.

The enemy having halted, and our troops being again formed in battalia, front to front, and the firing ceased on both sides, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, and the infantry being much fatigued, the whole were re-embarked, and proceeded down the river, without further annoyance from the enemy or their gunboats, while the dragoons, with five pieces of light artillery, marched down the Canada shore without molestation.

It is due to his rank, to his worth, and to his services, that I should make particular mention of Brigadier General Covington, who received a mortal wound directly through the body, while animating his men, and leading them to the charge. He fell where he fought, at the head of his men, and survived but two days.

The next morning the flotilla passed through the Saut, and joined that excellent officer, Brigadier General Brown, at Barnharts, near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait my arrival; and where I confidently expected to hear of Major General Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore. But, immediately after I halted, Colonel Atkinson, the Inspector General of the division under Major General Hampton, waited on me with a letter

from that officer, in which, to my unspeakable mortification and surprise, he declined the junction ordered, and informed me he was marching towards Lake Champlain, by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal. This letter, together with a copy of that to which it is an answer, were immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of my general officers, and the Colonel commanding the elite, the Chief Engineer, and the Adjutant General, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season, and the army, then near Cornwall, should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters."

I acquiesced in these opinions, not from the shortness of the stock of provisions, (which had been reduced by the acts of God) because that of our meat had been increased five days, and our bread had been reduced only two days, and because we could, in case of extremity, have lived on the enemy; but because the loss of the division under Major General Hampton weakened my force too sensibly to justify the attempt. In all my measures and movements of moment, I have taken the opinions of my general officers, which have been in accord with my own.

I remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing or hearing from the "powerful force" of the enemy in our neighborhood, and the same day reached this position with the artillery and infantry. The dragoons have been ordered to Utica, and its vicinity, and I expect are fifty or sixty miles on the march.

You have, under cover, a summary abstract of the killed and wounded in the affair of the 11th instant, which shall soon be followed by a particular return, in which a just regard will be paid to individual merits. The dead rest in honor, and the wounded bled for their country and deserve its gratitude.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

*Return of the Killed and Wounded of a Detachment of the Army of the United States, descending the St. Lawrence, under the command of Major General James Wilkinson, in an action fought at Williamsburgh, in Upper Canada, on the 11th of November, 1813.*

KILLED.										WOUNDED.											
Subalterns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musician.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.	Brigadier General.	Assistant Adjutant General.	Aid-de-camp.	Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musician.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.	Grand total.	Grand aggregate.
3	7	3	1	88	99	102	1	1	1	1	1	5	6	9	13	1	198	221	237	320	339

*Names of the Commissioned Officers killed and wounded.*

KILLED.

Lieutenant William W. Smith, of the light artillery; Lieutenant David Hunter, of the 12th regiment infantry; Lieutenant Edward Olmstead, of the 16th regiment infantry.

WOUNDED.

Brigadier General Leonard Covington, mortally, (since dead); Major Talbot Chambers, Assistant Adjutant General, slightly; Major Darby Noon, Aid-de-camp to Brigadier General Swartwout, slightly; Colonel James P. Preston, of the 23d regiment infantry, severely, his right thigh fractured; Major William Cummings, of the 8th regiment infantry, severely; Captain Edmund Foster, of the 9th regiment infantry, slightly; Captain David S. Townsend, of the 9th regiment infantry, severely—taken prisoner; Captain Mordecai Myers, of the 13th regiment infantry, severely; Captain John Campbell, of the 13th regiment infantry, slightly; Captain John B. Murdoch, of the 25th regiment infantry; Lieutenant William S. Heaton, of the 11th regiment infantry, severely; Lieutenant John Williams, of the 13th regiment infantry, slightly; Lieutenant John Lynch, of the 14th regiment infantry, severely—taken prisoner; Lieutenant Peter Pelham, of the 21st regiment infantry, severely—taken prisoner; Lieutenant James D. Brown, of the 25th regiment infantry, slightly; Lieutenant Archibald C. Crary, of the 25th regiment infantry, severely, in the skirmish the day before the action.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

HEAD QUARTERS, MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 9, FRENCH MILLS, November, 1813.

J. B. WALBACH, *Adjutant General.*

N. B.—Colonel Preston commanded the 13th regiment of infantry during the action; and Major Cummings did duty with the 16th regiment of infantry in the action.

*Journal referred to in the foregoing letter of Major General Wilkinson.*

October 21st. Boisterous weather; left Sackett's Harbor; at night arrived off Grenadier Island.

October 22d. Called for a return of the troops on the island; found a large body to be still in the rear, wrecked or stranded; returned in quest of them, and to order from the harbor a supply of winter clothing and shoes for the troops on the island, who were nearly destitute; observed at night, on our way up, many fires on different points of the coast; wind so high could not call at them; reached the harbor at midnight.

October 23d. Orders given for the shipment of the clothing; many stragglers picked up and embarked for Grenadier Island; Colonel Coles arrived with two hundred men of the 12th regiment, and sailed for the same place; the Growler equipped, manned, furnished with a skipper, and sent to Oswego for Colonels Randolph and Scott (who were expected at that place) and as many men as she could carry. We sailed for Grenadier Island; arrived about 8 o'clock at night off the island; weather blustering, with frequent rain. All this time the General's illness continued without abatement.

October 24th. Hard rains with heavy gales. Still at anchor off the island.



*October 25th.* The General landed, and measures were immediately taken to seize every pause of the prevailing storms to slip the flotilla into the St. Lawrence by small detachments. In these deceitful momentary calms we found it impossible to traverse in safety the arm of the lake to Gravelly point, though distant only nine miles. In the several attempts made, many boats driven ashore, and much provision and clothing lost. French creek, nearly opposite the point where the enemy expected we should land to attack Kingston, was made the general rendezvous of the troops, and Brigadier General Brown ordered on to take the chief command. The expedition of the Growler was so far successful, that, on the 31st, Colonel Randolph, after a perilous voyage, reached Grenadier Island with two hundred and thirty men of the 20th regiment. On the 2d November, Commodore Chauncey, by concert, entered the St. Lawrence, fell down nearly to French creek, and took a position to command the north and south channels. In the evening of the 1st November our vigilant enemy having observed, even amid the storms, our movement and position at French creek, attacked the detachment at that place, under General Brown, about sunset, with a squadron of two brigs and two schooners, with many boats loaded with infantry for landing, should their cannonade make a sufficient impression. Very soon Captain M'Pherson of the light artillery erected a battery of three 18 pounders, and returned their fire with such spirit and effect that they fell down to a harbor below, beyond its range. Next morning the attack was renewed and repelled, and one of the brigs was, with great difficulty, towed off by the squadron, which put into Kingston channel, behind Grand Island. We lost two killed and four wounded. The enemy were supposed to have suffered severely from the evident disabled state of their brig, and the deliberate and well directed fire of the gallant Captain M'Pherson.

*November 3d.* The rear of the army, with the General more and more sick, sailed for the general rendezvous, where the chief part arrived in the evening. The General was carried on shore, and lodged in a tent, his malady increasing in violence.

*November 4th.* This day was devoted to final arrangements for the sailing of the flotilla. Weather moderating.

*November 5th.* Charming day. The flotilla got under way, and, without accident, fell down and landed early in the night below Morrisville. The General suspecting he would be followed by the enemy, as in the morning his course had been discovered by three of their look-out gun boats and a gig, and knowing that two of their armed schooners could jeopard his movement, gave orders for the flotilla to pass Prescott, then seven miles below him, in the course of the night. But some confusion occurred, arising from the novelty of the movement, and the order was countermanded.

*November 6th.* This morning the health of the General appeared better; he ordered the flotilla to descend to a point within three miles of Prescott; and the day being fine, got into his gig, and proceeded to reconnoitre the place. In the mean time, the powder and fixed ammunition were debarked and placed in carts, to be transported by land, under cover of the night, beyond the enemy's batteries. As soon as the General returned, orders were issued for the debarkation of every man (except so many as were necessary to navigate the boats) who were directed to march, under cover of the night, to save useless exposure to the enemy's cannon, to a bay two miles below Prescott; and arrangements were made, at the same time, for the passage of the flotilla by that place, the superintendency of which devolved on Brigadier General Brown, the general officer of the day. About eight o'clock, P. M., we had so heavy a fog, that it was believed we could pass the British fortress unobserved, and orders were accordingly given for the army to march and the flotilla to get under way. The General, in his gig, proceeded ahead, followed by his passage-boat and family; but a sudden change of the atmosphere exposed his passage-boat to the garrison of the enemy, and near fifty twenty-four pound shot were fired at her without effect, while the column on land, discovered by the gleam of their arms, were assailed with shot and shells, without injury. General Brown, on hearing the firing, judiciously halted the flotilla until the moon had set, when it got in motion, but was perceived by the enemy, who opened upon it, and continued their fire, from front to rear, for the space of three hours; and yet, out of more than three hundred boats, not one was touched, and only one man was killed, and two were wounded; and before ten next morning the whole of the flotilla (except two vessels) reached the place of rendezvous. About noon, this day, Colonel King, Adjutant General of the army of General Hampton, arrived, and waited on the Commander-in-chief, whom he informed that he had been to Sackett's Harbor with a despatch from General Hampton to the Secretary of War; that he had no communication, written or verbal, from Major General Hampton to him (the Commander-in-chief) but that, not finding the Secretary of War at Sackett's Harbor, he had thought proper, on his return, to call for any communication he (General Wilkinson) might have to make to General Hampton. The General had intended, in the course of this day, to send an express to General Hampton, with an order to him to form a junction of his division with the corps descending the St. Lawrence, and availed himself of the opportunity, presented by Colonel King, to send the order.

*November 7th.* The General having been exposed to the open air all last night, in consequence found himself ill. In passing Prescott, two of our largest vessels, loaded with provisions, artillery, and ordnance stores, either through cowardice or treachery, had been run into the river near Ogdensburgh, and opposite Prescott. The enemy kept up so constant a cannonade on them, that we found it difficult, and lost half a day, to get them out. We perceived the militia in arms at Johnson, directly opposite us, and several pieces of field artillery in motion. Understanding that the coast below was lined with posts of musketry and artillery at every narrow pass of the river, Colonel Macomb was detached, about one o'clock, with the elite corps, of about 1200 men, to remove these obstructions, and the General got under way about half past three o'clock. Four or five miles below we entered the first rapids of the river, and, soon after passing them, two pieces of light artillery, which had not been observed by Col. Macomb, opened a sharp fire upon the General's passage-boat, but without any further effect than cutting away some of the rigging. Lieutenant Colonel Eustis, with a part of our light gun barges, came within shot of the pieces of the enemy, and a cannonade ensued, without injury on either side. In the mean time Major Forsythe, who was in the rear of the elite of Colonel Macomb, landed his riflemen, advanced upon the enemy's guns, and had his fire drawn by a couple of videttes, posted in his route, on which their pieces were precipitately carried off. The General came too at dusk, about six miles below the town of Hamilton, where he received a report from Colonel Macomb, who had routed a party at a block-house, about two miles below, and captured an officer.

*November 8th.* This morning the flotilla fell down to a contraction of the river, at a point called the "White House," where the dragoons were assembled to be crossed. Brigadier General Brown was ordered this morning to reinforce Colonel Macomb with his brigade, and to take the command; and the whole day and following night were devoted to transporting the dragoons. About noon this day we received advice that two armed schooners, and a body of the enemy in bateaux, estimated at one thousand or fifteen hundred men, had descended the river from Kingston, and landed at Prescott; that they had immediately sent a flag across the river to Ogdensburgh, and demanded the delivery of all public property there, under the penalty of burning the town. Not long after, information was received that the enemy had re-embarked at Prescott in their bateaux, and were following us with seven gun boats.

*November 9th.* This morning, very early, the enemy menaced our rear, and a slight skirmish took place between our riflemen and a party of their militia and Indians, in which we had one man killed, and the enemy were driven back. The cavalry, with four pieces of light artillery, under the command of Captain M'Pherson, were attached to the command of Brigadier General Brown, and he was ordered to march to clear the coast below us as far as a point near the head of the Longue Saut. The rapidity of the current obliged us to halt the flotilla several hours, to enable General Brown to make good his march in time to cover our movement. During this period the enemy frequently threatened our rear, but never indicated an intention to make a serious attack. About three o'clock, P. M. the flotilla got under way, and came to, about five o'clock, at the Yellow house, having floated nearly eleven miles in two hours, where we encamped for the night.

*November 10th.* This morning the following order was issued:

## "MORNING GENERAL ORDERS.

"HEAD QUARTERS, TUTTLE'S BAY, November 10, 1813.

"General Brown will prosecute his march with the troops yesterday under his command, excepting two pieces of artillery and the second dragoons, who, with all the well men of the other brigades, except a sufficient number to navigate the boats, are to march under the orders of Brigadier General Boyd. This precaution is enjoined by regard to the safety of the men in passing the Longue Saut; and as this rapid is long and dangerous, the General earnestly requests the commanding officers of regiments and corps to examine the boats, and see them properly fitted, in order to avoid accidents as much as possible. Brigadier General Boyd will take the necessary precaution to prevent the enemy, who hangs on our rear, from making an advantageous attack, and if attacked, is to turn about and beat them. The boats are to resume the station assigned them in the original order respecting the flotilla, and for this the commanding officers of regiments and brigades will be held responsible. The movement of yesterday was a reproach to the service. The flotilla will come to to-day at Barnhart's, near Crab Island, and two guns from the front will be the signal for landing. In case of an attack in force beyond all expectation, the corps under Brigadier General Boyd and Brown are to co-operate with each other, promptly and with decision. The general officer of the day will strictly attend and see that the flotilla puts off and moves in the prescribed order, and will arrest any officer who presumes to deviate therefrom."

Brigadier General Brown marched, and about noon was engaged by a party of the enemy near a block house on the Saut, erected to harass our flotilla in its descent. About the same time the enemy were observed to be advancing on our rear, and their galley and gunboats hove in sight, approached our flotilla, then at shore, and began to cannonade it. The slender structure of our gun barges made it impossible for them to resist the long twenty-four pounder of the enemy's galley; this obliged the General to order two eighteen pounders to be run on shore and formed in battery, a single shot from which gave such an alarm to the enemy's vessels, that they retired up the river, accompanied by their troops. But these slight operations so far wasted the day, that our pilots were afraid to enter the Saut (a continued rapid of eight miles) with the flotilla; we therefore fell down within two or three miles of the head of it, and came to for the night. By this time the General had become so extremely ill as to be unable to sit up, and was confined to his bed in a small berth under the quarter deck of his passage boat.

November 11th. Having heard the firing of the cannon yesterday between General Brown and the enemy, being still unapprised of the result, it became necessary that we should hear from him before we committed ourselves to the Saut, which allows no retreat, no landing, no turning to the right or left, but where the impetuosity of the current impels. About ten or eleven o'clock, A. M. the Commander-in-chief received advice from General Brown that he had forced the enemy to retire before him, and had arrived near the foot of the Saut. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to prepare to sail, and for General Boyd and his command to commence their march, when some firing took place from the gun boats, and a report was brought to the Commander-in-chief that the enemy was advancing in column; on this he ordered General Boyd to attack them, and the flotilla was directed not to leave the shore. But the report was soon after contradicted. A variety of reports respecting their movements and counter movements were, after this, successively brought to the General, which impressed him with the conviction that the enemy had determined to attack his rear, as soon as the flotilla should put off and the troops commence their march. He resolved to anticipate them; he therefore sent Colonel Swift, of the engineers, with instructions to Brigadier General Boyd, who had been directed by the order of the preceding day to take command of the detachment on shore, to form that detachment into three columns, to advance upon the enemy, to endeavor to outflank them, and to take their artillery. Soon after this the action commenced, and for the numbers engaged was extremely warm and bloody for upwards of two hours, during which time, in open space and fair combat, the raw undisciplined troops of the United States braved, and frequently drove, the best troops of the British army. Descriptions of battles have become too subservient to the gratification of personal vanity, and the acquisition of popular applause; yet every man who has taken part in a great action must know that there is nothing more difficult than to do justice to the merits of a battle in all its parts, where it is hard to find two officers, unless fighting side by side, who agree in opinion as to the propriety of measures and the conduct of men. The fortunes of this day were various; sometimes one line, sometimes the other, giving way. Unfortunately, during the shiftings of the action, by the death of Lieutenant Smith, a young officer of the highest promise, the enemy got possession of a field-piece, the only trophy they obtained. It is difficult to speak of the precise numbers engaged on either side, because the detachment under General Boyd consisted of an indefinite number of his own, Covington's, and Swartwout's brigades, ordered from on board the boats to lighten them, and save the hazard of the men's lives in descending the Saut. Neither Covington nor Swartwout were obliged to take part in the action with this detachment; yet they both entered the field, taking command of that part of it which belonged to their respective brigades, where they exhibited the same courageous conduct which distinguished General Boyd on the field; and, to the great loss of the service, Brigadier General Covington received a mortal wound when encouraging and leading on his detachment. The numbers engaged on our side could not have exceeded sixteen or seventeen hundred men, while those of the enemy are reckoned, by spectators, at from one to two thousand; but 'tis probable did not exceed fifteen hundred, consisting, as we are informed, of detachments of the 49th, 84th, and 104th, the voltigeurs, and Glengarian regiment.

With respect to the courage displayed by our officers, it would be useless to enter into details, since they all manifested in their respective stations equal intrepidity. The names of the meritorious dead and wounded will be recorded in another place. The firing ceased, by common consent, about four o'clock, P. M.; our troops were formed in battalions in front of the enemy, who were also in line, and they separated, the enemy to their camp, and we to our boats. The troops being much exhausted, it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that the dragoons, with the artillery, should proceed by land. The embarkation took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the flotilla made a harbor near the head of the Saut, on the opposite shore. The views of the American and British commanders were, on this occasion, precisely opposed. The first being bound by the instructions of his Government, and the most solemn obligations of duty, to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means, and the last by duties equally imperious to retard, and, if possible, to prevent such descent. If, then, he found himself victorious on this day, it was certainly in his power to have effected the one or the other object; and as he made no attempt to effect either, it follows, incontestably, that he had no fair ground on which to claim a victory.

November 12th. The flotilla sailed early this morning, and passed down the Saut without discovering either the boats or troops of the enemy, and arrived, in the course of the forenoon, at Barnhart's, where the commanding General received a letter from Major General Hampton, by the hands of Colonel Atkinson, his Inspector General, which blasted all his hopes, and destroyed every prospect of the campaign. A council of war was called upon the receipt of this communication, which was submitted to their consideration, whereupon the council determined that the conduct of Major General Hampton, in refusing to join his division to the troops descending the St. Lawrence to carry an attack against Montreal, rendered it expedient to leave the left bank of the St. Lawrence, and to remove the troops to French Mills, on Salmon river; and on the thirteenth of November this recommendation was accordingly carried into effect, ample time having been given to the enemy to have tried a second action, if they had dared to run the hazard.

Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated

FRENCH MILLS, November 17, 1813.

"After what has passed between us, you can perhaps conceive my amazement and chagrin at the conduct of Major General Hampton. The game was in view, and, had he performed the junction directed, would have been ours in eight or ten days. But he chose to recede, in order to co-operate, and my dawning hopes, and the hopes and honor of the army, were blasted."

*Extract from the General Order of General Wilkinson, of November 13.*

"The troops are to embark without loss of time, yet are not to be hurried in leaving the Canadian shore, from whence the Commander-in-chief is compelled to retire by the extraordinary, unexampled, and it appears unwarrantable conduct of Major General Hampton, in refusing to join this army with a division of four thousand men, under his command, agreeably to positive orders from the Commander-in-chief, and, as he has been assured by the Secretary of War, of explicit instructions from the War Department.

"Thus deprived of a large portion of his promised force, the Commander-in-chief feels himself bound, by a sense of regard to this meritorious corps, and of sacred duty to the United States, to spare the lives of brave men, and not to hazard the character or interest of the nation by an unequal conflict. He, with lively regret, and the deepest mortification, suspends the attack on Montreal; but he assures the army that it is not abandoned."

*Colonel Purdy's report to Major General Wilkinson, of the action at Chateaugay, &c. transmitted by the General to the Secretary of War.*

I arrived at Cumberland-head September 16th, 1813, and on the 18th took command of the 4th regiment of infantry, stationed at that place. The army, consisting of about four thousand men, was composed principally of recruits who had been but a short time in service, and had not been exercised with that rigid discipline so essentially necessary to constitute the soldier. They had, indeed, been taught various evolutions, but a spirit of subordination was foreign to their views. On the 19th, orders were issued for the whole army, except a squadron of horse and the artillery, to embark in bateaux. The army got under way, preceded by the light corps, and flanked on the right by the navy, and arrived at Chazy at 12 o'clock at night, lay on their arms, embarked again soon after sunrise the next morning, proceeded down the lake as far as Champlain, and up Champlain river the distance of four miles, where we landed, and immediately marched to Odletown. The light corps, who preceded the other troops some hours, surprised and defeated a guard of the enemy at that place. We remained at Odletown until the middle of the next day, during which time a want of system in the management of the army was readily discovered by every military man, that led to apprehensions for the safety of the troops, should the enemy oppose with any considerable force. The army returned to Champlain the 21st, the 22d to Chazy, and the day following commenced the route to Chateaugay. The whole of this march, a distance of more than seventy miles, was very disagreeable; the officers were not permitted to take with them the necessaries, much less the conveniences of life, and were compelled to abandon clothing and other things essentially necessary to preserve the body in health. We forebore complaint, endured every privation, presuming the commanding officer had sufficient reasons for his conduct, and concluding it was pro bono publico. The scene has past, and time sufficient has elapsed to have discovered those reasons, had they existed; none have been found; on the contrary, circumstances have demonstrated that it was a useless and unnecessary sacrifice of both public and private property. The army remained at Chateaugay twenty-six days, and on the 21st October commenced an excursion into the enemy's country. The first brigade followed the course of the Chateaugay river to Spear's, the distance of eighteen miles and upwards, and there met the second brigade, which had taken a nearer and more convenient route. The march was very fatiguing, equalled only by another that soon followed. Credit is due to both the officers and soldiers for their orderly conduct, patience, and perseverance, in surmounting the incredible obstacles the enemy threw in their way. On the 25th, a difficult and very fatiguing expedition was planned, and the execution of it assigned to the first brigade, which had been for some time previous, and still remained, under my command. The design was to cut off the retreat of a body of the enemy, supposed to be encamped on the banks of the Chateaugay, six miles distant. With this intention the first brigade was ordered to cross the river at night, march silently down, and recross at a ford two miles below the enemy, and attack them in rear, giving a preconcerted signal, while the second brigade moved down the road in front. We commenced the march at sun-down, and by sun-rise the next morning had gained only six miles. Here we were discovered by the enemy, and fired on from the opposite side of the river. During that night we were repeatedly misled by the guides, who knew nothing of the country, having never been that way, and at the time we were attacked, they had led us into a thick cedar growth or swamp on the banks of the river, and immediately opposite the enemy's position, and knew not how to extricate us. Incredible as it may appear, General Hampton entrusted nearly one half of his army, and those his best troops, to the guidance of men, each of whom repeatedly assured him that they were not acquainted with the country, and were not competent to direct such an expedition. At the same time General Hampton told me he had a man by the name of Smith, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, and whom he promised to send me, but which he neglected to do. The defeat of the expedition was the consequence of this neglect of the Major General. About two o'clock, while receiving an order from Colonel King, Adjutant General, upon the opposite side of the river, to march back four miles, and then ford the river and join the 2d brigade, the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages. Unfortunately, the word "retreat" was heard, which, for a short time, spread confusion among the several corps. A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled to retire. Towards sun-down I sent General Hampton a request that a regiment might be ordered down to cover my landing on the opposite side of the river; but judge my surprise, on receiving intelligence that he had retreated with the second brigade nearly three miles. Thus was I deserted, without the smallest guard to cover my landing. To what cause shall it be attributed, that the General ordered a retreat, and that too at the moment when the presence of the second brigade was required, or could be useful, as soon afterwards he declared "he should be willing to compound with the first brigade for five hundred men." The wounded had previously been conveyed across on rafts, which made a removal of my brigade absolutely necessary for their protection. An attempt was accordingly made, and a floating bridge soon constructed of old logs, found on the margin of the river. The enemy discovering our disposition, commenced a firing from the opposite side, and killed several while crossing. Major Snelling, with about a hundred men, effected a landing, and joined the main body. The remainder of my force, exhausted by the excessive exertions of the preceding night, and weary with the fatigues of the day, not having had a moment either for rest or refreshment, were compelled to endure the privation of sleep another night. We retired two or three miles and took a position. At about twelve o'clock the enemy came up and made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at this time were formed, and lying on the ground they were to occupy in case of an attack, and were ordered to, and did immediately rise, seize their arms, and remain under them the residue of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasionally a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not to fire, but, in case of a repetition of attack, to charge bayonets; this was accordingly done. The enemy charged several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable in this place, that, so greatly were the men overpowered by fatigue, though in a situation every way dangerous, and in which they had every reason to believe they should be saluted upon by the enemy every moment, many were unable to conquer their disposition to sleep, and it was not in the power of the officers to keep them awake. It was on the morning of this last attack that the General expressed his apprehensions for the first brigade, and made the declaration above quoted. The next morning we crossed the river, and joined General Hampton; on the 28th the army retreated four miles, and on the 30th and 31st marched back to Chateaugay. The troops, at the times of the attack, were not in a situation to endure further fatigue; and it is an indubitable fact, that many of them were so debilitated they were unable to proceed with the brigade on its march from the place of its last attack, and actually did not reach the main body until the day after the brigade had joined it, and some not even until the army had reached the Four Corners of Chateaugay. Never, to my knowledge, during our march into Canada, and while we remained at the Four Corners, a term of twenty-six days, did General Hampton ever send off a scouting or reconnoitering party, (except in one or two cases at Spear's, in Canada, when he detached a few dragoons for this duty) nor did he, from the time we commenced our march from Cumberland head, to our arrival at Plattsburg, ever order a front, flank, or rear guard to be kept up, though a great part of the time we were in situations which evidently required it. True it is, these guards were occasionally sent out, not, however, by his order, but by the orders of the officers commanding brigades.

By a general order, dated Chateaugay, November 5, the General says he has paid the first attention to the sick, and has granted them indulgences, which created murmurings on the part of some officers at their posts. It is only necessary here to observe, that every officer of the army can testify that the sick were very much neglected as far as regards comfortable quarters and transportation, and that they were strewn along the roads through which we marched without care or attendance; and it is presumable that many have died in consequence of this who might have been saved to themselves if not to the service. The General, indeed, at the time this order was issued, which was after our return to the Four Corners, did order transportation for the sick to Burlington, but this is the only instance to my knowledge.

The Commissary's Department is worthy of notice. My order for provision was not sufficient; nor could I obtain any but by special licence of General Hampton. The commissary of issues has been constantly in the habit of selling the livers, &c. of the beeves to officers; and though I represented this to General Hampton as unusual and improper, he refused to take any other notice of it than saying, "the Commissary is accountable for all parts of the beef, even to a pound or ounce of tallow;" nor did he take any notice of another piece of misconduct of the Commissary, that of acting in the capacity of sutler, but sanctioned it by purchasing of him.

The common practices with General Hampton, of arresting officers and releasing them without their consent; of releasing arrested officers without the knowledge or consent of the officers by whom they were arrested (the case of Lieutenant Morris of the 33d regiment, who was arrested by me on the charge of cowardice and misconduct before the enemy on the 26th October, 1813, the time of the skirmish with the enemy at Ormstown, or Chateaugay river, being an instance;) of refusing to arrest officers whom I reported to him as having deserted their posts in time of action; of daily issuing orders and countermanding them, and of interfering in an improper manner with the subordinate commands of the army, as a reference to the orders issued by him will show, mark very strongly the capriciousness of his conduct and the total want of steadiness in his intentions.

Such has been the General's conduct on some occasions, that I have, in common with other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free use of spirituous liquors.

I must, in justice to General Hampton, say, that the expedition he planned, and which I have called "difficult and fatiguing," did, at the time it was suggested to me by him, meet my full approbation, and that I have since seen no reason for changing my opinion of its practicability or usefulness; but I must also say that it required competent guides; and these (as I said before) he promised to furnish me, but did not.

I am of opinion no officer that has served under Major General Hampton, on the late campaign, can, or will contradict this statement.

ROBERT PURDY, *Colonel 4th Infantry.*

R. H. M'PHERSON, *Captain and Secretary.*

A true copy.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Wilkinson.*

ALBANY, November 18, 1813.

"My last advices from you are of the 3d inst. Report says that the garrisons of Kingston and Prescott have found means to overtake your rear, to bring it to action, to handle it roughly, and to compel it to retreat to the main body. To this I give no credit:

"1st. Because, moving with the celerity necessary to your objects, it is highly improbable that they could by any exertion have been able to overtake you; and

"2d. Because it is quite incredible that, finding in your rear a heavy corps capable of disturbing the main action of the campaign, you should not have taken effectual measures to beat and destroy it. If 1,600 men were not sufficient for this purpose, 6,000 were so; and the garrisons of Kingston and Prescott destroyed (though we failed of getting to Montreal) the upper province was won."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

FRENCH MILLS, November 24, 1813.

"I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 15th instant from Albany, and hope my despatches have reached you which left this on the 17th.

"With respect to the unfortunate issue of the campaign, I disclaim the shadow of blame, because I know I have done my duty, and more than my duty, and so do those with whom I have acted. *To General Hampton's outrage of every principle of subordination and discipline may be ascribed the failure of the expedition;* and that I have not yet arrested him must be attributed to my respect for you, and my desire that the arrest should proceed from the highest authority: for if this act be suffered to pass unnoticed and unpunished, it will establish a precedent to justify disobedience and subvert those obligations of blind obedience on which the efficiency of military institutions exclusively depend.

"After our losses by deaths, desertions, and discharges, since we left Sackett's Harbor, I think we shall not be able to show you more than six thousand men at this point, exclusive of the dragoons, who have been ordered to Greenbush and Pittsfield, for convenience and economy."

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 25, 1813.

Sir:

It is recommended to you to consolidate your infantry and artillery into complete regiments, or as nearly so as possible, for the winter, retaining a full complement of your most efficient officers to command them, and detaching all surplus officers immediately on the recruiting service, and to the several districts indicated by the rules and regulations. This regulation should extend to General Hampton's division.

An immediate inquiry into the terms of enlistment of the men composing your army should be instituted, and endeavors should be made to re-enlist all those whose terms of service are about expiring.

The most severe attention to discipline must be begun, and the slightest departures from it, whether in officer or soldier, noticed and punished. Clerks to the several companies must be appointed, and company books kept, showing every thing received by the soldier, and charging him therewith. If, on the next, or any future inspection, it be found that any article of his clothing, or of his arms, has been lost or sold, the article is to be supplied, and the price deducted from his wages. With regard to clothing and arms, there have been the most shocking abuses.

Confidential reports are provided by the rules, and must be made agreeably thereto. The inspector who neglects or refuses to perform this duty shall be dismissed the service.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General WILKINSON.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, MALONE, MILITARY DISTRICT No. 9, December 6, 1813.

"Your three letters of the 25th ultimo came to hand on the 30th; and I am happy to find that I had anticipated the views communicated in those letters, as far as respects the security of our flanks and centre. When I ordered

Major General Hampton to reinforce the post of the Four Corners, it was under the impression that Cumberland Head was guarded; but the moment I was undeceived, and apprised of the exposed situation of our depôt at Plattsburg, the order was countermanded, as you have seen from the documents which I have transmitted you. You must also have perceived, from those documents, that I was not insensible of the importance of condensing our force, and that I had made a proposition respecting quarters preparatory to such event."

*Abstract from the Report of the Adjutant General of General Wilkinson's army, showing the whole number of non-commissioned officers, musicians, and artificers, of the several regiments and corps, on December 1, 1813.*

Light Artillery,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	472
2d Regiment Artillery,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	117
3d Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	675
5th Regiment Infantry,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	495
6th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	549
11th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	454
12th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
13th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	591
14th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	295
15th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	648
20th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	336
21st Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	841
22d Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	455
25th Ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	578
Riflemen,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	263
									8,143

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *January 27, 1814.*

A. Y. NICOLL, *Inspector General.*

NOTE.—The two regiments of light dragoons, which had made part of General Wilkinson's force in descending the St. Lawrence, are not included in this return; these corps having been detached to Utica.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

MALONE, *December 8, 1813.*

"The unavoidable delay of the express (as no reliance can be placed in the mail from this place) enables me to send you the copy of a letter from General Izard, dated the 6th instant, which exhibits additional expositions of the pernicious and unwarrantable conduct of Major General Hampton. I will not charge this man with traitorous designs, but I apprehend, in any other government, a military officer who first defeated the object of a campaign by disobedience of orders, and then, without authority, furloughed all the efficient officers of the division he commanded on a national frontier, in the vicinity of an enemy, would incur heavy penalties."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Izard to Major General Wilkinson, dated*

PLATTSBURG, *December 6, 1813.*

"There is an unavoidable delay in the returns of the regiments of this division, proceeding from the extreme inexperience of the officers of all grades, now with them; almost every efficient officer is either sick, or was furloughed by Major General Hampton, at the moment of his own departure; those that remain, are barely enough to perform the routine of duty in this cantonment."

*Extract of a letter from Major General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated*

MALONE, *December 24, 1813.*

"I believe I have not hitherto transmitted you a copy of a communication which took place between Commodore Chauncey and myself, the day before I sailed from French Creek, and I do it now, to show you what were my anticipations of the movements of the enemy left behind me, and how delusive were all the promises made to me that my rear should be protected."

FRENCH CREEK, *November 4, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

I was so ill yesterday I could not call to see you, and I now send up to say that I shall sail this evening; and if I am not obstructed by the enemy's armed vessels, which may have slipped down the other channel, I shall pass Prescott to-morrow night, or land the next morning to take the place, if I cannot pass it without too great hazard. As this operation may require three or four days, it is not improbable the enemy's squadron may make some attempts to destroy my boats; and therefore I must entreat you to watch his every motion, and to give my flotilla every protection in your power.

We are a match for the gun boats of the enemy, but inferior to armed schooners; and, therefore, could you consistently spare us the Pert, or some armed vessel, to run down to the vicinity of Ogdensburg, and immediately return, it would add security to our movements.

Major Johnson will have the honor to deliver you this; and I will thank you for any information you can give me respecting the movements of the enemy.

I wish very much to say farewell to you, but I am sensible of the delicacy of your situation; and my disease having changed into a violent inflammation of the breast, I dare not get wet. If, then, it is destined that we are not to meet again, I will leave with you my prayers for long life and laurels in this world, and everlasting happiness in that which is to come.

Farewell, my friend, and may your country understand your skill and valor as well as does

JA. WILKINSON.

Commodore CHAUNCEY.

## UNITED STATES' SHIP GENERAL PIKE,

*At anchor off East end of Long Island, River St. Lawrence, November 4, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

Your favor of this day's date has this moment been handed to me by Major Johnson.

From the best information that I can get, the enemy's fleet is at or in the vicinity of Kingston; and I think that you have nothing to apprehend from them, as I am in a situation to watch both channels.

I should deem it unsafe to separate any part of my squadron as long as the enemy remains above me: in fact, I am in hourly expectation of being attacked by Sir James, down the south channel; in that case, I shall require all my force, as he has added a number of gunboats to his fleet. If, however, Sir James should detach any part of his fleet down the north channel, I will send a sufficient force down to oppose him.

I will remain in my present station until you pass Prescott, but am anxious for that event to take place at as early a day as possible, as the fleet cannot move out of this river except with a fair wind. It is to be apprehended that, after a few days, a spell of westwardly winds will set in, which may detain us until the ice makes, which would endanger the safety of the fleet, and probably lead to its final destruction. If it is possible for you to communicate to me, in any way, when you pass Prescott, I should esteem it as a particular favor.

May your present enterprise be crowned with all the success that you yourself can wish; and that your eminent services may be duly appreciated by your country is the prayer of,

Dear sir, your friend and humble servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Major General JAMES WILKINSON,

*Commander-in-chief of the American forces in and upon the St. Lawrence, &c.*CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND COLONEL PORTER AND GENERAL  
MCCLURE, &c.WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 23, 1813.*

SIR:

As the enemy's force and defences on the Canada side of the Niagara river are understood to be weak; as your force is respectable, and supposed to be competent to a successful attack of these; and as the season has now furnished you with a bridge, as well for retreat as for advance, it is thought advisable that you do not permit circumstances so favorable to escape, without making a stroke on such points of the enemy's line as may be most within your reach. If, after feeling the enemy at Fort Erie, you should find yourself able to extend your attack to Fort George, it will be desirable; but of this you can judge best after your first experiment. To an old soldier, like yourself, it is unnecessary to go more into detail. You know what you ought to do, and you will do it. Communicate this letter to Lieutenant Colonel Boerstler, and accept the assurances of my respect and good wishes.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Colonel PORTER, *Light Artillery,**Commanding the troops of the United States on the Niagara river.**Extract of a letter from Major General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*ALBANY, *March 25, 1813.*

"Colonel Porter informs me that he had commenced the necessary preparations for an attack on Fort Erie, but the desertion of a sergeant prevented his carrying his intended attack into operation. Two officers, with six men, pursued the sergeant so far as to be surrounded on the ice, and were made prisoners. Fort Erie was immediately reinforced, and he had given over any immediate movement."

*Letter from Colonel Scott (third Artillery Regiment) to Major General Wilkinson.*FORT GEORGE, *Monday, 7 o'clock, P. M. October 11, 1813.*

SIR:

Within the last five minutes I have had the honor to receive your despatch by the Lady of the Lake.

The enemy has treated me with neglect. He continued in his old positions until Saturday last, (the 9th) when he took up his retreat on Burlington heights, and has abandoned this whole peninsula. Two causes are assigned for this precipitate movement; the succor of Proctor, who is reported to have been entirely defeated, if not taken; the other, the safety of Kingston, endangered by your movement.

We have had from the enemy many deserters, most of whom concur in the latter supposition. The British burnt every thing in store in this neighborhood; three thousand blankets, many hundred stand of arms; also the blankets in the men's packs, and every article of clothing not in actual use.

They are supposed to have reached Burlington heights last evening, from the rate of their march the night before. I have information of their having passed "the 40," by several inhabitants who have come down. They add to what was stated by the deserters, that two officers of the forty-first had joined General Vincent from Proctor's army, with the information that Proctor was defeated eighteen miles this side of Malden. I cannot get particulars.

From the same sources of intelligence, it appears that the 49th, a part of the 100th, and the voltigeurs, moved from this neighborhood the day after our flotilla left this, the 3d instant, but with what destination is not certainly known.

It was first reported (I mean in the British camp) that these regiments had marched to support Proctor, who, it is said, wrote that he would be compelled to surrender if not supported.

I am pretty sure, however, that they are gone below. The movement of our army below seems to have been known in the British lines as early as the 3d instant, together with the immediate objects in view; hence I have no difficulty in concluding that all the movements of the enemy will concentrate at Kingston.

Chapin, who has been commissioned lieutenant colonel, marched late last evening up the lake, with about one hundred volunteers under his command, and was followed this morning by Generals McClure and Porter, with about one thousand men, Indians and militia included. There is no danger of their coming up with the enemy, or they would be in great danger of a total annihilation.

Vincent took hence with him about a thousand or eleven hundred regulars. Many of the militia left this with the avowed design of plunder; but I fear, from reports, that the British have left the miserable inhabitants without any thing to be ravished. I expect General McClure back to-morrow evening, as he only took with him supplies for two days. He will probably go as far as "the 20."

On the 8th, Chapin went out with a small party and attacked one of the enemy's pickets, which brought on a skirmish, in which many of Colonel Swift's regiment participated. After a great waste of ammunition, the parties

retired to their respective camps with little loss on either side. We made and lost a prisoner, had two Indians killed, and two other men wounded. We hear the enemy had five men wounded.

I had this morning made an arrangement, on application of General McClure, to be relieved in the command of this post on the morning of the 13th instant, with an intention of taking up my line of march for Sackett's Harbor, according to the discretion allowed me in the instructions I had the honor to receive from you at this place. My situation has become truly insupportable, without the possibility of an attack at this post, and without the possibility of reaching you time enough to share in the glory of impending operations below. I am, nevertheless, flattered with the assurance that transport will be forwarded for my removal; and, to favor that intention, I propose taking up my line of march on the morning of the 13th, for the mouth of Genesee river, and there await the arrival of the vessels you are good enough to promise me. By this movement, Captain Mix thinks with me that I shall hasten my arrival at Sackett's Harbor five, possibly ten days. Captain Camp has a sufficient number of wagons to take me thither. I can easily make that place by the evening of the 15th. I hope I shall have your approbation, and every thing is arranged with Brigadier McClure.

Knowing your wishes respecting the invalids or subjects for discharge, and fearing that water transport might not be had till the season was too far advanced for their removal, I have ventured to send Lieutenant Archer (paymaster of the 20th, who was left here without orders) on command to Greenbush, with one hundred men of this description. It was a measure approved of by Doctor Mann, and I hope not contrary to your wishes and intentions. Doctor Hugo, Surgeon's Mate of the 14th, (also left here without orders) accompanied the detachment. The Quartermaster's department furnished eight wagons, on my requisition.

The sick list of the garrison is much reduced since your departure, (I have the honor to enclose my report of this morning) and Doctor Mann has discharged many patients from his hospital; I also enclose you his last report. Those marked "subjects for discharge," are part of the number sent off to Greenbush.

Doctor Mann and Captain Camp have concluded to remove the general hospital to "the Eleven Mile Creek," near Buffalo, the barracks at which place will be sufficient for the reception of the whole of the sick, with some trifling repairs.

From the morning report, enclosed; you will find seven hundred and ninety-four the "total," &c. present of the regulars of this garrison, including officers, &c. Transport will be necessary for about eight hundred and fifty persons. I wish also to take with me four iron 6's, one 5½ inch howitzer, and two caissons, the whole on field carriages. This train will form no impediment in my march to the mouth of Genesee river, as I have horses belonging to the regiment sufficient to draw it. If it meet your approbation, I can send the horses thence to Sackett's Harbor by land.

I have, by working almost night and day, greatly improved the defences of this post, and nearly filled up the idea of the engineer. I flatter myself that I have also improved the garrison in discipline.

I must apologise for the haste in which this is written, but Captain Mix proposes to sail immediately, and I fear to detain him a moment. I think I shall certainly be at the mouth of the Genesee by the 15th instant.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

W. SCOTT, *Colonel commanding.*

Maj. Gen. WILKINSON, *Commanding, &c.*

*Extract of a letter from Colonel Winfield Scott to the Secretary of War, dated*

GEORGETOWN, (COL.) *December 31, 1813.*

"At your desire, I have the honor to make the following report:

"I left Fort George on the 13th of October last, by order of Major General Wilkinson, with the whole of the regular troops of that garrison, and was relieved by Brigadier General McClure, with a body of the New York detached militia.

"Fort George, as a field work, might be considered as complete at that period. It was garnished with ten pieces of artillery, (which number might easily have been increased from the spare ordnance of the opposite fort) with an ample supply of fixed ammunition, &c. as the enclosed receipt for these articles will exhibit.

"Fort Niagara, on the 14th October, was under the immediate command of Captain Leonard, first artillery, who, besides his own company, had Captain Read's, of the same regiment, together with such of Brigadier General McClure's brigade as had refused to cross the river. Lieutenant Colonels Flemming, Bloom, and Dobbins, of the militia, had successively been in the command of this fort, by order of the brigadier general, but I think neither of them was present at the above period. Major General Wilkinson, in his order to me for the removal of the regular troops on that frontier, excepted the two companies of the first artillery then at Fort Niagara. And, under the supposition that I should meet water transport for my detachment at the mouth of the Genesee river, I had his orders to take with me the whole of the convalescents left in the different hospitals by the regiments which had accompanied him. This order I complied with."

NOTE.—By the arrangements of the War Department, Brigadier General Porter, of the United States' army, was designated for command on the Niagara frontier, and particularly for that of Fort George. In the latter trust, General Wilkinson substituted for him Colonel Scott, of the third regiment of artillery, with provisional orders to join the army at Sackett's Harbor.

WAR OFFICE, *February 8, 1813.*

*Ordered,* That Captain Leonard, (first regiment of artillery) be *arrested*, and that his place be supplied by Captain Armistead, of the same regiment.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Adj. Gen. CUSHING.

*Extract of a letter from Adjutant General Thomas H. Cushing to Captain George K. Armistead, dated at this office, February 8, 1813.*

"You will please to proceed to Niagara, in the State of New York, and relieve Captain Nathaniel Leonard in the command of the company of artillerists now at that post; which company is to be returned and mustered in your name, from and after the day on which you receive the command of it; and Captain Leonard will be instructed to deliver the said company to you, with books, papers, clothing, and every thing appertaining to it.

"You will call on Major General Dearborn at Albany, and receive his orders."

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, Jan. 22, 1814.*

The above is a true copy from the original as recorded in this office.

J. B. WALBACH, *Adjutant General.*

*Extract of a letter from Adjutant General Thomas H. Cushing to Major General Henry Dearborn, dated at this office, February 8, 1813.*

“The conduct of Captain Leonard at Niagara has been represented in a very unfavorable light to the Secretary of War, who has instructed me to send Captain George Armistead to relieve him in the command of the company at that post; and I have instructed Captain Armistead to proceed on his journey immediately, and to wait on you for any instructions you may think proper to give. Captain Leonard must not exercise command until his conduct has been inquired into.”

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, Jan. 22, 1814.*

The above is a true copy from the original as recorded in this office.

J. B. WALBACH, *Adjutant General.*

*Extract of a letter to the Secretary of War from Major George Armistead.*

FORT M<sup>H</sup>ENRY, *January 19, 1814.*

“Captain Leonard was not arrested or brought to trial during my stay on the frontier; nor was he ever instructed, to my knowledge, to give me the command of his company.”

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 4, 1813.*

SIR:

Understanding that the *defence* of the post committed to your charge may render it proper to destroy the town of Newark, you are hereby directed to apprise its inhabitants of this circumstance, and to invite them to remove themselves and their effects to some place of greater safety.

I am, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brig. Gen. McCURE, or officer commanding at Fort George, U. Canada.

*General Harrison's orders to General McCure.*

HEAD QUARTERS, NEWARK, *November 15, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

Being ordered to return to the westward, you will be pleased to resume the command which you received previous to my arrival at this place.

The orders which you heretofore have received will govern you. It will be necessary that you keep a vigilant eye over the disaffected part of the inhabitants; and I recommend that you make use of the zeal, activity, and local knowledge, which Colonel Willcocks certainly possesses, to counteract the machinations of our enemy, and ensure the confidence of our friends amongst the inhabitants. It will, however, I am persuaded, be your wish, as it is your duty, to guard the latter as much as possible from oppression.

The volunteers which were lately called out, will be retained as long as you consider their services necessary; the draughted militia, until further orders are received from the Secretary of War.

There can be little doubt of its being the intention of the enemy to send the greater part of the troops which they have at Burlington and York to Kingston, and to make York the right of their line. They may, however, have a small command at Burlington, and those may be so securely posted as to render them safe from any desultory expedition you may set on foot; but it is desirable to have any supplies which they may have collected in the neighborhood destroyed; and should the success below be not such as to promise possession of the whole of the upper province, may be destroyed.

Captains Leonard and Reed, or either of them, are appointed to muster your troops when and where you think proper.

In closing this communication, I should not do justice to my feelings, if I were not to acknowledge the zeal and talents with which you have managed your command. Your conduct appears to me to have been extremely judicious and proper throughout, and your troops exhibit a state of improvement and subordination which is at once honorable to your officers and themselves.

I am, very sincerely, your friend and obedient servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE McCURE.

FORT GEORGE, *November 17, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

Major General Harrison embarked with his troops yesterday, on board the fleet destined for Sackett's Harbor, leaving the command once more in my hands. Owing to continued opposing winds, the fleet has not yet gotten out of sight.

A correspondence which took place between the General and myself, copies of which are herewith sent, will at once explain to you my views and feelings relative to the operations proposed to have been effected on this frontier. I am confident that the expressions of regret made by General Harrison are equally sincere with mine, though we both acquiesce in the necessity which dictated his abandonment of the projected expedition against Burlington.

About 400 volunteers have repaired to this post under my late call, made in conformity with General Harrison's wishes and request. A few are still coming in. I shall take care that they shall not be unemployed. I am this moment sending out a detachment of 200 mounted volunteers, with directions to penetrate the enemy's lines as far as practicable with safety. In the mean time, I am making preparations for moving in force against them, unless the intelligence expected from this excursion should be such as to make it improper.

Accounts of the enemy's force still vary much. A deserter came in to-day, who represents their force to be 1,500 regulars, and 800 Indians, at Burlington and Stony creek. The former I think is magnified.

It is impossible to form a correct opinion of their intended movements. At one time they appear to be sending down their stores and detachments of troops to York. At this time, it is said they are reinforcing, fortifying, and building barracks.

The term of service of my troops will expire on the 9th December. It can hardly be expected that many will willingly continue in service a longer time. Your Excellency will at once see the necessity of prompt arrangements being made to supply their place, if it be contemplated to retain this garrison.

I enclose herein my late address, made under the sanction of General Harrison.

I have the honor to be, your Excellency's obedient humble servant,

GEO. McCURE, *Brigadier General.*

His Excellency JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*



FORT GEORGE, *November 15, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

The subject of our conversation this morning has occupied my most serious reflections. The deadly blow heretofore given to the patriotism of our citizens on this frontier has prepared them for murmurs and complaints; those who are not on their march have left their homes and their business under great sacrifices, with the moral certainty of being brought into action.

The last address which I issued under your directions, and which, I am happy to find, has met your approbation, gives them reason for indulging the expectation of service, and they are anxious to drive the enemy from their borders forever. The high character of General Harrison, combined with these circumstances, has excited strong interest in the public mind relative to our operations.

In this peculiar situation of affairs, I feel it to be due to the gallant volunteers and militia, who are assembled and collecting, and to my own reputation, most respectfully to solicit, that, if it is not incompatible with your instructions and your better judgment, you will not abandon our projected expedition against Burlington heights; such is the anxious wish of the militia, and I have no doubt the soldiers under your command are equally, if not more, desirous of the employment.

My anxiety on the subject I trust will excuse the appearance of any disrespect, in making this communication, which is certainly far from my feelings. My confidence in the valor, ability, and prudence, of General Harrison, will dispose me most cheerfully to submit to any arrangements he may be bound to make, however great may be my disappointment in their result.

I have the honor to be, with the utmost respect, your obedient servant,

GEO. M'CLURE.

Major General HARRISON.

HEAD QUARTERS, NEWARK, *November 15, 1813.*

DEAR SIR:

Your letter to me of this morning has been received. I feel most severely the weight of the reasons which you urge for the prosecution of the intended expedition to Burlington. The disappointment, however, to the brave and patriotic men, who have turned out under the expectation of serving their country effectually in the field, at this inclement season, is the most painful circumstance attending it, *as I am well convinced, from the information received this morning and last evening, that the enemy are removing as fast as possible from the head of the lake to Kingston*, which has been left with a very small part of the force that was lately there, and it is more than probable that, should we advance in force, the enemy having now none but effective men at Burlington, would destroy the stores which they have remaining there, and retreat too rapidly to be overtaken. There are considerations, however, which would make it extremely desirable to make an expedition of force in that quarter, but the orders I have received from the Secretary of War leave me no alternative.

*Commodore Chauncey is extremely pressing that the troops should immediately embark*, declaring that the navigation, at this season, to small vessels, is very dangerous. The force at Sackett's Harbor is ———. The troops at York are all hastening down to Kingston.

*Sackett's Harbor may be endangered by even a delay of a few days*; and should the troops that are here not get down before the lake is frozen, *our fleet may be destroyed for the want of their aid*. I cannot, therefore, take upon myself the responsibility of *delaying their going down, even a day*. Will you be so good, at a proper time, as to explain the above circumstances to the patriots who left their homes with the intention of assisting me to drive the enemy far from our borders, and assure them that I shall ever recollect, with the warmest gratitude, the partiality they have been pleased to express for me, and their preference of serving under my command.

I will direct payment to be made to the volunteers for rations and forage in coming out.

Accept my best wishes for your health and happiness, and believe me, sincerely, your friend,

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

General M'CLURE.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General M'Clure, to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT GEORGE, *Nov. 21, 1813.*

"My mounted men have returned from the head of the lake, having progressed within sight of the enemy's pickets at Stony creek. Colonel Wilcocks, who commanded, reports that, from the best information he could collect, the enemy's force consists of from twelve to fifteen hundred regulars, and nine hundred Indian warriors. They have discharged their teams, and, apparently, intend wintering there and at Burlington.

"It would be very desirable to dislodge them from their position, but I fear my force is insufficient for that object. At this inclement season it might be attended with serious consequences to attempt any thing more than desultory excursions. The volunteers who have lately come in must, however, be actively employed, or they will return to their homes. The draughted militia on this side the Niagara are, perhaps, equal to any troops in the United States. I regret that their term of service will expire so soon. Permit me to suggest the propriety of offering a small bounty to such of them as will volunteer to serve a longer time after their present term of service expires; say for one or two months, or until other troops can be sent on to supply their places.

"Should I move with my troops towards the head of the lake, the greatest advantage I can promise myself will be to destroy some contiguous mills, and to bring off a quantity of flour, which is becoming scarce with us."

ALBANY, *25th November, 1813.*

SIR:

Your letter of the 17th instant has been received, and I hasten to inform you that a requisition for one thousand militia, to take the places of those now with you, has been made, and will be complied with as promptly as possible by the Governor.

You say nothing of the volunteer corps which General Porter engaged to raise, and which was long since authorized by me. If, in this effort, he has failed, what are you to expect from militia draughts, with their constitutional scruples? On the other hand, should he have succeeded, and should General Harrison's opinion of the intentions and movements of the enemy be well founded, your force will be competent to somewhat more than defence.

The General was not under orders to quit the Niagara frontier at any particular time. His movement, in this respect, was matter of arrangement with Commodore Chauncey, and this was necessarily subject to considerations arising from weather and season.

In the application of your present force, and in the means you take to enlarge and continue it throughout the winter, you will be guided by the orders received from the commanding General, at the time he left you, and by such others as he may give to you hereafter.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General M'CLURE.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Parker, Chief Clerk of the War Department, to General M<sup>c</sup>Clure, dated*

WAR OFFICE, November 27, 1813.

"In the absence of the Secretary of War, I have had the honor to lay before the President your letters of the 19th and 21st instant, with their enclosures. The measures which you have adopted to increase your command on the Niagara frontier are approved by the President.

"Should the men, whose term of service expires in December, withdraw from the frontier, there can be no impropriety in continuing the officers who compose the court martial, until they discharge that duty.

"Although there is no law authorizing the President to give a bounty to such militia as will remain in service after their time expires, still, as it would render your force more efficient than a new draught, (even if the men could be obtained) I have no hesitation in recommending that you adopt such further measures as will ensure the protection of Fort George and the Niagara frontier, until other means of defence can be provided.

"For this purpose the Paymasters, serving with your troops, may be required to make such payments or advances as you shall think proper to order."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General M<sup>c</sup>Clure, (New York militia) to the Secretary of War, dated*

NIAGARA, December 10, 1813.

"This day found Fort George left to be defended by only sixty effective regular troops, under Captains Rodgers and Hampton, of the 24th regiment of United States' infantry, and probably forty volunteers. Within the last three days the term of service of the militia has been expiring, and they have re-crossed the river almost to a man. Foreseeing the defenceless situation in which the fort was left, I had authorized some of my most active subalterns to raise volunteer companies for two months, and offered a bounty, in addition to the month's pay. It is with regret I have to say that this expedient failed of producing the desired effect. A very inconsiderable number indeed were willing to engage for a further term of service, on any conditions.

"From the most indubitable information, I learn that the enemy are advancing in force. This day a scouting party of Colonel Wilcocks' volunteers came in contact with their advance at Twelve Mile creek, lost four prisoners and one killed; one of the former they gave up to the savages. This movement determined me in calling a council of the principal regular and militia officers left at Fort George this morning. They all accorded in opinion that the fort was not tenable with the remnant of force left in it. I, in consequence, gave orders for evacuating the fort since dusk, and, with but three boats, have brought over all the light artillery, and most of the arms, equipage, ammunition, &c. and shall doubtless have time to dispose of the heavy cannon before the enemy makes his appearance. The village of Newark is now in flames; the few remaining inhabitants in it, having been notified of our intention, were enabled to remove their property. The houses were, generally, vacant long before. This step has not been taken *without counsel, and is in conformity with the views of your Excellency, disclosed to me in a former communication.*

"The enemy are now completely shut out from any hopes or means of wintering in the vicinity of Fort George. It is truly mortifying to me that a part of the militia at least could not have been prevailed on to continue in service for a longer term; but the circumstance of their having to live in tents at this inclement season, added to that of the Paymaster's coming on only prepared to furnish them with *one, out of three months' pay*, has had all the bad effects that can be imagined. The best and most subordinate militia that have yet been on this frontier, finding that their wages were not ready for them, became, with some meritorious exceptions, a disaffected and ungovernable multitude.

"December 11.—I have this moment received a communication from the Governor of this State, covering a requisition on Major General Hall for one thousand men. It is probable that not more than six or seven hundred will rendezvous on this frontier, which will, in my humble opinion, be not more than competent to its proper protection, as some will have to be stationed at Black Rock, Schlosser, and Lewistown.

"I have written to General P. B. Porter, desiring him to employ the Indians for the protection of Buffalo, until the detachment arrives. Our shipping is in danger. No exertion will be wanting, within the pale of our limited means, to afford the protection contemplated."

*Letter from the Secretary of War to Major Lee, of the 16th regiment of Infantry, Deputy Paymaster of the Army at Ulica.*

SHELDEN'S, November 4, 1813.

SIR:

You will immediately take measures to pay off the brigade of M<sup>c</sup>Arthur (1,300 men) at Fort George, and the militia, volunteers, and Indians, under General M<sup>c</sup>Clure. Send an assistant, without loss of time, on this business. I am, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General George M<sup>c</sup>Clure to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, NIAGARA, December 13, 1813.

"Since I last had the honor of writing you the enemy has appeared in considerable force on the opposite shore; but having deprived them of a shelter, they are marching up to Queenstown, and appear to be fortifying on the heights. Several hundred Indians have appeared. I have prevailed on Lieutenant Colonel Greaves, and about one hundred of his regiment of artillery, to remain in the service one month longer, until the detachment of militia which I have ordered arrives here. I have directed the Colonel, with two pieces of artillery, to Lewistown, to open a hot shot on Queenstown, and deprive them of quarters there also. You will observe from my despatch of yesterday that every building in Newark is reduced to ashes. The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a descent on this frontier, if possible; but I shall watch them close with my handful of men, until a reinforcement of militia and volunteers arrive, when I shall endeavor to repossess myself of Fort George, and drive them back to Burlington. I am not a little apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of the exposed situation of Buffalo, and our shipping there. My whole effective force on this extensive frontier, including the garrison at Fort Niagara, does not exceed two hundred and fifty men. I have sent an express to Mr. Granger, the Indian Agent, to call out the Indians; an exhibition of two or three hundred of them will strike more terror in the British than one thousand militia. Permit me to observe to you, sir, that it is all important that payment should be made punctually to the Indians every month, or at the expiration of the term they may volunteer for. They are a people that cannot be made to understand the difficulty of having funds here at all times for that purpose. I would beg leave to mention that Mr. Granger has interested himself warmly in support of the Government, by his endeavors to have the Indians join us on every occasion, and accompanied me himself on my late expedition to the twenty—

"This day I start to Buffalo, which place I shall make my head quarters. I will reinforce this garrison as soon as possible. In the mean time, nothing shall be wanted on my part to promote the views of the Government, and protect the defenceless inhabitants of this frontier."

HEAD QUARTERS, BUFFALO, December 22, 1813.

SIR:

I regret to be under the necessity of announcing to you the mortifying intelligence of the loss of Fort Niagara. On the morning of the 19th instant, about four o'clock, the enemy crossed the river at the Five Mile Meadows, in great force, consisting of regulars and Indians, who made their way undiscovered to the garrison, which, from the most correct information I can collect, was completely *surprised*. Our men were nearly all asleep in their tents; the enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter. Such as escaped the fury of the first onset, retired to the old mess-house, where they kept up a destructive fire on the enemy, until a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender.

Although our force was very inferior, and comparatively small indeed, I am induced to think that the disaster is not attributable to *any want of troops*, but to *gross neglect* in the commanding officer of the fort, (Captain Leonard) in not preparing, being ready, and looking out for the expected attack.

I have not been able to ascertain correctly the number of killed and wounded. About twenty regulars have escaped out of the fort; some badly wounded. Lieutenant Peck, 24th regiment, is killed, and it is said three others.

You will perceive, sir, by the enclosed general orders, that I apprehended an attack, and made the necessary arrangements to meet it, but have reason to believe, from information received by those who have made their escape, that the commandant did not in any respect comply with those orders.

On the same morning, a detachment of militia, under Major Bennet, stationed at Lewistown heights, was attacked by a party of savages; but the Major and his little corps, by making a desperate charge, effected their retreat after being surrounded by several hundred, with the loss of six or eight, who doubtless were killed, among whom were two sons of Captain Jones, Indian interpreter. The villages of Youngstown, Lewistown, Manchester, and the Indian Tuscarora village, were reduced to ashes, and the inoffensive inhabitants who could not escape, were, without regard to age or sex, inhumanly butchered by savages, headed by British officers painted. A British officer, who is taken prisoner, avows that many small children were murdered by the Indians. Major Mallory, who was stationed at Schlosser, with about forty Canadian volunteers, advanced to Lewistown heights, and compelled the advanced guard of the enemy to fall back to the foot of the mountain. The Major is a meritorious officer. He fought the enemy two days, and contended every inch of ground to the Tantawanty creek. In these actions Lieutenant Lowe, 23d regiment United States' army, and eight of the Canadian volunteers, were killed. I had myself, three days previous to the attack on Niagara, left it with a view of providing for the defence of this place, Black Rock, and the other villages on this frontier. I came here without troops, and have called out the militia of Genesee, Niagara, and Chateaugay counties, *en masse*.

This place was then thought to be in most imminent danger, as well as the shipping, *but I have no doubt is now perfectly secure*. Volunteers are coming in in great numbers. They are, however, a species of troops that cannot be expected to continue in service for a long time. In a few days, one thousand detached militia, lately draughted, will be on.

I have the honor to be, your obedient humble servant,

GEO. M'CLURE,

Brigadier General, commanding.

The Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, Secretary of War.

DECEMBER 15, 1813.

*Abstract of the morning report of the garrison of Fort Niagara, commanded by Captain Leonard.*

Captain Leonard's company, total present,	-	-	-	74	Absent,	19
Captain Hampton's do. do.	-	-	-	88	do.	17
Lieutenant Peck's do. do.	-	-	-	118	do.	9
Lieutenant Frederick's do. do.	-	-	-	44		
				324	Absent,	45
				369		
				Aggregate,		

LOOMIS,

Lieutenant, and Acting Adjutant.

JOHN WILSON,

Brigade Major.

*Extract of a letter from General George M'Clure to the Secretary of War, dated*

BATAVIA, 25th December, 1813.

"It is a notorious fact that, on the night on which Fort Niagara was captured, Captain Leonard was much intoxicated, and left the fort about 11 o'clock, P. M. I am assured that he has since given himself up; that he and family are now on the Canadian side of the strait. It was not without some reluctance that I left him in immediate command of the fort; but there was no alternative, as he outranked every other officer. His uniform attachment to British men and measures, added to the circumstance of his not effecting his escape when in his power, strengthens me in a suspicion that there was a secret understanding with regard to this disgraceful transaction.

"Permit me to suggest to you, sir, that, unless regular troops are sent to this frontier immediately, the enemy will penetrate into the interior of our country, and lay waste all before them. The militia will do to act with regulars, but not without them. In spite of all my exertions to ensure subordination, my late detachment ultimately proved to be very little better than an infuriated mob. It was not, however, the fault of the privates, but of such officers as were seeking popularity, and who, on that account, were afraid of enforcing subordination and introducing strict discipline.

"I have collected from the different recruiting rendezvous, about one hundred and twenty soldiers, and put them under the command of Lieutenant Riddle, of the 15th United States' infantry, an excellent and deserving officer.

"I cannot conclude this communication without reporting the conduct of Doctor Cyrenius Chapin, (late Lieutenant Colonel of volunteers.) To him, in a great measure, ought all our disasters to be imputed. His publications in the Buffalo Gazette, that the enemy had abandoned Burlington, I fear had the desired effect. I have found him an unprincipled disorganizer. Since dismissing him and his marauding corps, he has been guilty of the most outrageous acts of mutiny, if not of *treason*. When I came to Buffalo, accompanied only by my suite, he headed a mob for the purpose of doing violence to my feelings and person; and, when marching to the Rock, at the time of an alarm, five or six guns were discharged at me by his men!"

*Extracts of a letter from General Lewis Cass to the Secretary of War, dated Williamsville, eleven miles east of Buffalo, January 12, 1814.*

"I passed this day the ruins of Buffalo. It exhibits a scene of distress and destruction such as I have never before witnessed.

"The events which have recently transpired in this quarter have been so astonishing and unexpected, that I have been induced to make some inquiry into their causes and progress; and doubting whether you have received any correct information upon the subject, I now trouble you with the detail.

"The fall of Niagara has been owing to the most *criminal negligence*. The force in it was *fully competent to its defence*. The commanding officer, Captain Leonard, it is confidently said, was at his own house, three miles from the fort, and all the officers appear to have rested in as much security as though no enemy was near them. Captain Rodgers and Captain Hampton, both of the 24th, had companies in the fort. Both of them were absent from it. Their conduct ought to be strictly investigated. I am also told that Major Wallace of the 5th was in the fort. He escaped, and is now at Erie.

"The circumstances attending the destruction of Buffalo you will have learned before this reaches you. But the force of the enemy has been *greatly magnified*. From the most careful examination, I am satisfied that not more than *six hundred and fifty* men, of regulars, militia, and Indians, landed at Black Rock. To oppose these we had from *two thousand five hundred to three thousand* militia. All, except very few of them, behaved in the most cowardly manner. They fled without discharging a musket. The enemy continued on this side of the river till Saturday. All their movements betrayed symptoms of apprehension. A vast quantity of property was left in the town uninjured, and the Ariel, which lies four miles above upon the beach, is safe. Since the 1st instant they have made no movement. They continue in the possession of Niagara, and will probably retain it, until a force competent to its reduction arrives in its vicinity."

Robert Lee, late of Lewistown, in the county of Niagara, and State of New York, gentleman, of the age of forty-two years, being sworn on the Holy Evangelists, deposed and saith, that, some seven weeks immediately preceding the 19th of December last, he, this deponent, resided in Fort Niagara, for the purpose of attending to private business; that, about four o'clock in the morning of the 19th, the said fort was attacked or entered by the British. The garrison was not alarmed when the enemy entered the gates of the fort. Some firing took place after they entered the works, particularly between the guard at the southeast block house, and the sick in the hospital at the red barracks, on the part of the Americans, with the enemy. This deponent is positive that there were about four hundred men of all descriptions in the fort, immediately before taken, and that three hundred and fifty of that number were capable and willing to bear arms in that way, viz.: firing on the enemy from the block houses, &c. The principal resistance the enemy met with was from the sick in the red barracks, and the guard at the southeast block house before mentioned. The sick in the red barracks, as this deponent is informed, and from what he saw, he believes were nearly all slaughtered. The British force that took possession of the fort were in number about four hundred, commanded by Colonel Murray, who was wounded in the arm in entering the gate, and was succeeded in command by Colonel Hamilton. From the British order of congratulation, that issued on the same morning, it appeared that the Americans had lost sixty-five killed and fifteen wounded, which wounds were principally by the bayonet, as expressed in the order; but the above order issued very soon after they took possession of the fort, and did not include a number that were afterwards found bayoneted in the cellars of the houses. This deponent thinks that our loss in killed in the whole amounted at least to eighty. It was a matter of frequent conversation and exultation among the British non-commissioned officers and soldiers, while this deponent was under guard, that they bayoneted the Americans, notwithstanding their crying out for quarter. A subaltern officer and about twenty privates made their escape from the fort by scaling the pickets. Captain Leonard, the American commander, was, at the time the fort was taken, at his farm, about two miles distant, and, hearing the attack, made towards the fort, and, at no great distance from it, was made prisoner by the enemy, and was kept in close confinement for two days and a half, and how much longer this deponent does not know. The American soldiers were kept two days in close and miserable confinement, without the use of provisions, and with a very scanty supply of wood and water; at the expiration of which the citizens and soldiers were crossed over the river, and lodged in a part of what had been the British magazine at Fort George, the residue in open plank and board huts; in both situations it was impossible to lay down. The magazine was so filthy that many of the prisoners became infested with vermin, and in that situation remained seven days. The citizens were then removed to a brick building up near Queenstown, where they were so much crowded that no kind of comfort was to be taken either by day or night. The supply of provisions was not only scanty, but of the very worst kind; beef of the most inferior and repulsive quality, and bread, the quality of which cannot be described. The water that they used, both there and at the magazine, they had to purchase. This deponent believes that through the influence of an individual in Upper Canada, himself, together with ten other American citizens, were permitted, on the 13th instant, to cross to the United States. The residue of the citizens, to the amount of about seventy, were marched, on the 12th, under a strong guard, to Burlington heights; and this deponent was informed that from thence they would be sent to Kingston. The women and children taken at and near Lewistown were stripped of their clothing, and taken across the river. And further this deponent saith not.

ROBERT LEE.

Sworn to and subscribed this 18th day of January, 1814, before me,

J. HARRISON, *Master in Chancery*.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 128.

[2d SESSION.]

### FLAGS, STANDARDS, AND COLORS, TAKEN FROM THE ENEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 4, 1814.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 13, 1814.*

SIR:

Of the standards and colors taken by the army of the United States, during the war of the Revolution, six remain in this office; others, it is understood, were deposited in Philadelphia, while Congress sat in that city. Whether they were, or were not, brought to this place with the public offices, cannot be ascertained.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

HON. W. SEYBERT, *Chairman, &c.*

Mr. SEYBERT, from the committee to whom was referred the resolution directing them "to inquire into the present condition and disposition of the flags, standards, and colors, which have been taken by the forces of the United States from their enemies, and whether it would be expedient to make any provision in relation to them, with leave to report by bill or otherwise," reported:

That the collection, preservation, and exhibition, of such flags, standards, and colors, as have been taken by the land and naval forces of the United States, from their enemies, is sanctioned by the practice of the European

nations, and more especially by the proceedings of the Congress of our Revolution. It is believed there cannot be a difference of opinion on this subject; it is natural to rejoice at the victories and the glory of our country. In Europe, the trophies which have been gained in war are preserved with uncommon care. As monuments of national power, they have ever been cherished by all civilized nations. In England they are highly prized. Not content that they should constitute the ornaments of their military institutions, such standards are deemed proper subjects for the decorations of the temples which they have consecrated to the purposes of religious worship. The sacred chapels, in common with the royal palaces, are the places in which are displayed, to every subject and traveller, the banners which the British forces have won from their enemies! It must be recollected, that the standard of our 4th regiment of infantry, which the enemy received at the lamentable surrender of Detroit, was, in haste, conveyed to Europe. Immediately after its arrival in London the public prints informed us that it was triumphantly displayed in the council chamber at Whitehall. Such is the British practice.

In France, the galleries of *Notre Dame* are blazoned with these splendid trophies; the chapel of the *Hotel of the Invalids* is richly embellished, and exhibits to the numerous visitors the many standards which that gigantic Power has, at different times, taken from its enemies.\* It affords no common satisfaction to the disabled tar, or the superannuated soldier, when he informs the inquisitive stranger that he gloriously fought in the battle which may have gained some of them; for the time, he forgets his former sufferings and his present disabled condition; his consolation rests upon the power and the glory of his country, so fully demonstrated by the sight of the numerous ensigns which have been taken from other nations. Other instances in favor of the practice could have been furnished, but your committee are persuaded, that the order of the illustrious Congress of our Revolution, *alone*, will justify the propositions which they intend to submit for legislative consideration. As early as the 23d of June, 1778, it was "Resolved, That the Board of War be directed to collect the standards and colors taken from the enemy by the army of the United States, since the commencement of the war." Had this order been strictly observed, and somewhat extended, the present proceedings would be unnecessary. Far from any regulations having been adopted in pursuance of the recited resolution, your committee lament the peculiar negligence which ensued. The Secretary of War now tells us, that, of the standards and colors which were taken by the army of the United States, during the war of the Revolution, only *six* remain in his office; he cannot give any information concerning others; *even their place of deposit is unknown to the Department!* The Navy Department possesses no knowledge of *any* flags which were taken "anterior to the declaration of the present war;" such as have been captured with the public armed ships of the enemy, subsequent to the 18th of June, 1813, "have been carefully preserved;" *thirteen* of them have been already received, as will more fully appear by the annexed statements; of these, *three* belonged to the *heavy frigates* of the enemy, viz: the *Guerriere*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*. The Navy Department is also in possession of a *royal* standard of Great Britain, which was taken at York, and a union jack and flag, which were captured at Fort George; the flags of *five* small vessels, which were captured, have not been received. Your committee regret that the journals of Congress do not exhibit statements of all the standards and colors which were taken during our Revolution, by the army and navy of the United States; the early attention of the Legislature to this subject inclines them to believe they were very numerous. The capture of Earl Cornwallis, alone, furnished *twenty-four* of them! In all probability as many were taken with General Burgoyne.

By some, the exhibitions which are contemplated may be considered as too trivial for legislative provision. Your committee would coincide with them in this opinion, did the practice only afford a momentary gratification to the curious. Experience must have taught European governments that national benefits were derived from the course which they have adopted, or it would long since have been discontinued. It is presumed that essential consequences proceed from the practice, more especially when a nation shall be engaged in war; such trophies excite the spirit of a nation—the result is national character. The arrival of an enemy's flag is sufficient to rouse the population of London or Paris! On such occasions the finest national feelings are developed; and, to the honor of our fellow-citizens be it said, they have not been found to want this species of national sensibility, when the flags of the *Guerriere*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*, &c. &c. were exhibited to them. It was indifferent whether they considered themselves of the war or of the peace party; each was ambitious to rank the victor with himself! The national taste and propensity is strongly marked by the eagerness with which *all* view representations of our late unparalleled naval victories! If, then, the art and genius of the painter can thus excite our natures, may we not look for much more when we have the *physical facts* placed before us instead of fancy? These flags, the trophies won by our gallant tars, demonstrate to us and the world, that the *invincibility* of the British naval power has been very much exaggerated. In battle will the recollection of them sustain our sailors and our soldiers, and impart additional skill and valor in support of the cause of our country! The value of standards does not depend upon the gaudy colors which they exhibit, no more than upon the nature of the stuff of which they may be fabricated. They have been at all times regarded as the *insignia* of fame and power; their surrender is the act of submission. The last wish of the proud bearer is the preservation of his eagle; too often is the loss of it sealed with the loss of life. In Europe, where military operations are on a large scale, though the result of a battle should prove destructive to thousands of those who were engaged, the capture of a single standard constitutes a prominent feature in the details of the action, and adds much to the brilliancy of the achievement. Colors taken from the enemy were considered a present, worthy the nation, to Gen. Washington, for his signal services in the capture of Earl Cornwallis! The records of the proceedings of Congress, during the whole of our Revolution, mention but two instances where this highly honorable and distinguished mark of approbation was voted! In fine, we have declared the flag shall guaranty the safety of our citizens. Can a higher value be set upon it? Can we attach more honor to it?

It may be asked, what will be the effects of a public display of the flags which have been taken from our enemies? This view is considered to be important. No one can doubt that the Government and the people of England would rather we should have taken millions of their merchandise, than that we should have it in our power to exhibit the flag of a single sloop of war, which was gained by equal force. If the enemy will expose to the view of the British nation, and every traveller who may visit them, the one or two which they have captured from us, shall we conceal the many we have taken from them, and thus lead others to doubt our possessing any? Shall we permit the numerous trophies of our Revolution to moulder into dust by a voluntary concealment, without an effort for their preservation? If this shall have happened to the proud monuments of our independence, shall the fate of those which are now perfect, and which have been so lately won on our own coast, on that of South America, off the Azores, on the Lakes, in short, in all latitudes where our tars have come in contact with the enemy, be the same? Is not the preservation of these flags a duty which we owe to the people of the United States? Are the achievements of that gallant little navy, which, a few months ago, was the object of derision with the statesmen and the people of England, but now the cause of their fears, to be buried in oblivion? Shall we put at rest the inquiry which the glorious deeds of our sailors have excited in the Parliament of Great Britain? Shall we, at our expense, approve the labored calculations of the enemy? with her, confound reason and common sense, and attribute simple truths to fallacious causes? or, shall we give in to a practice so generally cherished by other nations? Our successes on the ocean constitute the pride of our country? they have secured to us the respect of foreign nations. In Europe we again hold that rank which our ancestors had obtained by their many hard fought conflicts, which we had nearly forfeited. Have we not accomplished more than did Spain with her "invincible armadas;" than did Holland with her *De Witts*, *Van Tromps*, and *De Ruyters*; than France could achieve, when she was in the zenith of her naval power; than did Great Britain with her *Nelsons*, *Rodneys*, *Howes*, and *St. Vincents*? The naval annals of England furnish no instance in which every vessel belonging to a hostile fleet was captured.

Some may doubt our possessing a number of standards sufficient to warrant their public exhibition. Had we but few of them, we should not deny our sanction to the principle. Your committee regret that special order had not been taken by Congress immediately after the receipt of the first present of this kind: we allude to the colors which were taken by General Montgomery, from the 7th British regiment, at Chamblee, on the 18th of October, 1775.

\* The trophies of war ornament the places of worship in Prussia, Bohemia, and Austria.

† See Naval Affairs, No. 108.

The French pride themselves on their ability to exhibit the *two* which they have taken from our present enemy: for, so lately as the year 1800, they had only two of the naval flags of Great Britain! Though the War and Navy Departments can immediately furnish but twenty or twenty-five of these flags, it is probable the place of deposit will be ascertained so as to put within our power many of those which were gained during our Revolution. Where are those which were won during our dispute with France in 1798? The same may be asked of those which the defeats of Derne and Tripoli should furnish.

The only object which remains for consideration is, the place most proper for the exhibition. This should be public, and easy of access, at the same time that it should be perfectly secure from villanous attempts. These flags should be placed so as to be seen by every citizen who might wish to observe them. It will be of advantage that they should be noticed by every foreigner who may visit the United States. Can any objection be made to the spacious national apartments which are devoted to legislative purposes? What ornaments can be more suitable? Go abroad, and you may see the walls of the British House of Lords decorated with representations of some of the celebrated battles which were fought by the troops of Great Britain. At home we find the principle already established by one branch of the Legislature of the United States—in the Senate Chamber we observe engravings of some of the battles of our Revolution; and had time allowed the execution of the original design of the architect, the precedent would have had existence in the Chamber of the Representatives of the United States. It was contemplated that the frieze, over the capitals of the Corinthian columns which sustain the dome, should present, *in relief*, a regular series of the battles which secured our Independence. Such decorations might gratify the artist, and afford an opportunity to display his talents; but, in a national view, little or no effect would be produced. It must be conceded that much more will be communicated to the spectator by the display of the captured standards.

No one can pretend that any difference exists between the representations which we have noticed, and the standards which have been taken from the enemy, as will warrant the public exhibition of the one, and preclude that of the other: these subjects are most intimately connected, and their tendency must be the same. The public exhibition of these trophies is a tribute due to the very superior skill and valor which achieved them. The sight of them will bring to recollection every circumstance of cause and effect. They will constitute valuable records of illustrious portions of our history; they will form a collection of the proudest monuments to commemorate the brilliant deeds of a rising nation.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 129.

[2d SESSION.

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 15, 1814.

Mr. TAYLOR, from the committee for revising the militia laws, which was instructed to inquire and report what provision ought to be made for payment of the militia called out under the authority of any of the State or Territorial Governments, for the defence of the country against the incursions of the enemy, reported:

That no legislative provision is thought necessary for paying militia detachments called out under the authority of State or Territorial Governments, *provided the call has been sanctioned by the President of the United States*. The committee are not advised of the existence of any case in which such sanction has been refused: if there be any, it is believed that the public interest will be better promoted by requiring special application in each case to be made to Congress, than by vesting in the States and territories an uncontrolled power of charging the United States with the expenses of militia detachments, ordered into service, perhaps, without necessity, and possibly for objects inconsistent with the public welfare.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 130.

[2d SESSION.

## ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WAR HAS BEEN CONDUCTED.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; FEBRUARY 21, 1814.

WYTHE, VIRGINIA, February 8, 1814.

SIR:

For the information of the House of Representatives, or any committee of that House who may have under consideration either the manner in which the war has been conducted, or my conduct as an officer of the army of the United States, I enclose to you some documents, mostly originals, numbered from 1 to 61 inclusive.

Should those papers be necessary to me, for any purpose, at any time, no doubt they will be safe among the archives of the House of Representatives, and delivered on application to me or my order.

I have the honor to be, with all possible respect and esteem, sir, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH.

Hon. L. CHEVES, *Speaker House of Representatives*.

No. 1.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, GREEN BUSH, September 13, 1812.

Brigadier General Alexander Smyth will proceed to Niagara and take the command of the brigade composed of the fifth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and twentieth regiments of infantry, as they arrive at, or near, Niagara, and he will be respected and obeyed accordingly. On his arrival at Niagara, or in the vicinity of Major General Van Rensselaer's Head Quarters, he will report himself to that officer.

By order of Major General Dearborn.

E. BEEBE, *Acting Deputy Adjutant General*.

No. 2.

HEAD QUARTERS, GREENBUSH, October 4, 1812.

Sir:

Your letter of the 27th, by Captain Dox, has been received. Before this reaches you, I trust the reinforcements will generally have arrived. I have made every effort in my power to have sufficient quantities of ammunition, clothing, medicine, arms, &c. forwarded, but not with all the success I could have wished. I shall continue to send on until I am satisfied there will be an ample supply. It rests with you to determine the proper time for acting offensively. You will, however, perceive the expediency of consulting the principal officers.

I am apprehensive that the enemy might attempt a stroke at the naval armament preparing at Sackett's Harbor, and it being of the first importance that no interruption should retard the progress of those operations, I doubt the expediency of withdrawing any part of the force from that place at present. When the troops destined for your post shall have arrived, your total force must exceed 7,000 men, which, I presume, will be sufficient for all contemplated purposes.

I confidently calculate on a co-operation by the way of Detroit, and on important aid from the naval department. It will be advisable to strike at Kingston from Sackett's Harbor, or its vicinity, or at least to attract the attention of the enemy in that direction, by such movement as will threaten a blow. If we should be so fortunate as to obtain the command of the lake, Kingston and the country about it may be taken possession of, and all supplies in that direction may be cut off. You should have as many flat bottomed boats, (and scows, if possible) as will be sufficient to transport 5,000 men, with field pieces and artillery horses, at once, with the aid of such other vessels as can be readily procured.

The contractor should be reminded of the necessity of having a sufficient stock of provisions on hand for two months, exclusive of the current issues.

It will be proper that a correspondence be kept up by expresses, between you and General Harrison, which will enable you to ascertain his movements; but if we should be fortunate enough to command Lake Ontario, we ought to possess ourselves of that part of Canada bordering on the lake, including the vicinity of Niagara, whether Harrison succeeds or not.

I enclose to you a copy of General Amherst's order at Fort Edward, on the 12th of July, 1759. The authority must be respected by every British officer. It will be expedient for you to have such an order published, with such alterations only as the change in circumstances, in a national view, has rendered necessary; and it might be well to quote the authority referred to.

I have considered it fortunate to find such an order from so respectable a source. It is contained in the "Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America, in the years 1757, '58, '59, and '60, by Captain John Knox," published in England in 1769.

With high consideration, I am sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Major General VAN RENSSELAER.

P. S. I am just informed that General Harrison will be at Detroit by the 15th of this month at the farthest. Forts Harrison and Wayne have been relieved, and the Indians dispersed.

No. 3.

*Inspector's Report on the state of the Twelfth Regiment of Infantry, commanded by Colonel Thomas Parker.*

*Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Privates:*

The character of Colonel Parker is too well known at the War Office to require comment. Major Campbell will doubtless make a most valuable officer. The company officers are yet very ignorant of their duty; but they generally appear to be intelligent young men, and gentlemen. The non-commissioned officers and privates are, with scarcely an exception, excellent recruits.

*Arms, Accoutrements, and Ammunition.*

The muskets are good, but some few of them out of repair. No gun slings have been furnished; neither has there been a sufficiency of screw-drivers, worms, picks, or brushes, supplied. The knapsacks are very bad, as are likewise the canteens. The regiment has only about twenty-three rounds of ball cartridge, and not two flints per man; and there is no ammunition in store at this place. The cartridges are many of them very bad.

*Clothing and Pay.*

Though the month of October is partly gone, yet, strange to tell, this regiment has not received a single article of woollen clothing. All the men are without coats, and have been obliged to mount guard, during the cold and stormy weather which we have had for a week past, in their linen jackets and overalls. Unless immediate steps are taken to furnish proper clothing, the men must all fall victims to the neglect. Paid up to the 31st of August.

*Camp Equipage, Stationary, Hospital Stores, &c.*

The tents are very bad. Camp kettles and tin pans, good and complete. Axes and spades, bad and incomplete. No stationary.

The surgeon complains that he is without medicine, hospital stores, or surgical instruments.

*Provisions.*

Colonel Parker states that he receives good provisions for his regiment.

*Discipline.*

Captains Sangster's and Page's companies are very raw, and ignorant of their duty. Taking into consideration that the men are recruits, and have just come off a long and fatiguing march, the state of Captain Morgan's company does him honor, but its discipline is still very imperfect.

CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK, October 5, 1812.

WILL. KING,

*Capt. and Assistant Inspector U. S. Army.*

No. 4.

*Inspector's Report on the state of the Fourteenth Regiment of Infantry, commanded by Colonel William H. Winder.*

*Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Privates.*

The Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel appear to have taken great pains to acquire a knowledge of the duties of their stations. The company officers are almost as ignorant of their duty as when they entered service. The non-commissioned officers and privates are generally only tolerably good recruits.

*Arms, Accoutrements, and Ammunition.*

The arms of this regiment are in infamously bad order. They appear to be old muskets that have probably been bought up at reduced prices by the contractors or other public agents, and are now placed in the hands of men who are almost within gunshot of the enemy. The Inspector has no hesitation in giving it as his opinion, that at least one-fifth of them are unfit for service; and he believes, were they to undergo a critical inspection, a much larger proportion of them would be condemned. The cartridge boxes, bayonet scabbards, and belts, are good; the knapsacks are very bad. Neither gun slings, picks, nor brushes, have been furnished; nor has a sufficient number of screw-drivers and worms been supplied. This regiment has a large supply of ball cartridges, powder, and lead, but a considerable proportion of it is very bad; some of the cartridges are said to have been made up in 1794. There is a scarcity of flints.

*Camp Equipage, Hospital Stores, &c.*

The tents never were good; and have been so much abused on the march to this place, that they afford little protection from the weather. Camp kettles and tin pans, good and complete; axes and spades, very bad. No supply of stationary. The surgeon states that he is without medicine, hospital stores, and surgical instruments.

*Clothing and Pay.*

Though the month of October is partly gone, yet, strange to tell, this regiment has not received a single article of woollen clothing. All the men are without coats, and many without shoes or stockings; and have been obliged to mount guard, during the cold and stormy weather which we have had for a week past, barefooted, and in their linen jackets and overalls. Unless immediate steps are taken to supply proper clothing, the men must all fall victims to the neglect. Paid up to the 31st of July.

*Provisions.*

The Lieutenant Colonel states that the regiment is supplied with very bad provisions.

*Discipline.*

The regiment is composed entirely of recruits; they appear to be almost as ignorant of their duty as if they had never seen a camp, and scarcely know on which shoulder to carry the musket. They are mere militia, and, if possible, even worse; and if taken into action in their present state, will prove more dangerous to themselves than to their enemy.

CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK, October 5, 1812.

WILL. KING,

Captain and Assistant Inspector General U. S. Army.

No. 5.

Colonel P. P. Schuyler to General Smyth, dated

OCTOBER 9, 1812, 11 o'clock, P. M.

SIR:

The brig Adams has been on fire about twenty minutes, and will soon be consumed. We have saved some property that was on board, and taken three prisoners. Milton is now crossing to our shore. Brock has arrived opposite, with a very superior force. I wait your orders.

Respectfully,

P. P. SCHUYLER, Colonel.

No. 6.

Major General Hall to Brigadier General Smyth.

BUFFALO, October 12, 1812.

SIR:

Will you have the goodness to inform me at what time you will meet General Van Rensselaer, agreeably to his request, at Niagara?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. HALL.

N. B. I was at the Rock this morning, and there was a good deal of firing from the British shore. It was said that some troops were marching up on the other side of the river. Lieutenant Elliot was apprehensive they might get artillery on the island, and destroy his vessels, unless men were placed on the island to prevent a landing. You will be able to judge the necessary force.

Yours,

A. HALL.

Brigadier General SMYTH.

No. 7.

Brigadier General Smyth to Major General Van Rensselaer.

CAMP, NEAR BUFFALO, October 12, 1812.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter at 10 o'clock, P. M. The badness of the weather and roads harassed the troops yesterday more than can well be conceived; to-morrow, I expect their clothing, and they will wash. Next day, they might march, to the number of twelve hundred effective men, but imperfectly disciplined.

It is said the enemy are in considerable force opposite to Black Rock; and as Lieutenant Colonels Scott and Christie have arrived with you, the time for your attack is favorable; and may you conquer is my prayer.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, Brigadier General.

Major General VAN RENSSELAER.

No. 8.

Extract of a letter from General Smyth to General Sheafe, dated

OCTOBER 18, 1812.

"As I am averse to taking a single life, or occasioning a single calamity, without an object, I propose a further continuance of the armistice, indefinitely, each party to have a right to terminate it, giving thirty hours, notice to the other party; the armistice to extend along the frontier from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario."



CAMP ON THE MOUNTAIN, 6 O'CLOCK, A. M., *October 19, 1812.*

SIR:

I shall immediately proceed to Schlosser, to await your further orders. It would be pleasing to me to be ordered to proceed to our ultimate destination before the weather becomes more inclement.

I will thank you to give an order on the Quartermaster for eighty blankets, and thread to make match coats for my regiment. Indeed, if in your opinion it could be justified, I could wish that every man could be furnished with one. Those I now ask for are intended for the use of the guards.

With the highest regard and respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS PARKER, *Colonel 12th Infantry.*

No. 9.

*Brigadier General Smyth to the Secretary of War.*

NEAR BUFFALO, *October 20, 1812.*

SIR:

On the 16th instant, General Van Rensselaer, by a general order, invested me with the command of the troops between the lakes Erie and Ontario, with power to order general courts martial, and exercise the authority of commander of a great military district.

On the 18th instant, I ordered Colonel Winder (an admirable officer) to Fort Niagara; on the 19th I broke up the camp at Lewistown, ordered the militia, such as had not deserted, and excepting the artillery, to Schlosser; the artillery were put under Colonel Winder's command, and would most of them take post on the mountain opposite Queenstown. Colonel Parker, with the detachments of the 12th and 20th, will take post on a small creek near Black Rock, and collect the boats. Colonel Schuyler, with the detachments of the 5th and 13th, will take a position near him. The volunteers will encamp near Buffalo.

In the small creek I mention, I wish to have one hundred boats that will carry across at once four thousand men, and twenty or thirty scows or flats, to take over artillery or cavalry. And if you will increase my force to eight thousand men, with twenty pieces of light and field artillery, and some troops of cavalry, I will enter Canada, and leave the rest to Heaven.

Place no confidence in detached militia. They have disgraced the nation. Do not rely on the contractor for provisions. He has no salt meat, and only damaged flour. If you have any compassion on the service, send money either to Lieutenant Allison, my brigade quartermaster, or to some public agent under my orders. Without it we cannot supply the contractor's deficiencies; we cannot get transportation by land, build boats, procure forage, or any thing else, wanted by the army.

Give me here a clear stage, men, and money, and I will retrieve your affairs or perish.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH.

No. 10.

*The Secretary of War to Brigadier General Smyth.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 4, 1812.*

SIR:

Your letter of October 20th has been received. On the 21st of October Major General Dearborn reported to this Department that he had granted General Van Rensselaer's request to retire from his command; that he had directed him to give over his command to you; and that he had written you "in a particular and explicit manner." You are too well acquainted with service to require to be informed that all communications respecting your command should be directed to that officer. A copy of your letter has been enclosed to General Dearborn.

Such ordnance as he may assign to Niagara must be sent from Albany. Transportation, whether by boats or wagons, is furnished by the Quartermaster's department; and in case of failure or deficiency in rations, purchases should be made according to the provisions of the contract, for which purpose bills may be drawn on this Department, properly advised, that the contractor may be made accountable.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. EUSTIS.

Brigadier General ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Buffalo, New York.*

No. 11.

*Colonel Parker's Report to Brigadier General Smyth.*

Colonel Parker has the honor to report to General Smyth that, agreeably to his orders, he has caused to be collected all the boats that could be found last evening, and had them carried up the creek to an old field about a mile above the bridge, where they are left under a small guard.

He has also obtained a promise from Lieutenant Angus, of the navy, to send out a party of sailors to collect all the boats he can find on the coast, and convey them to the same place.

Colonel Parker would beg leave to suggest to the General, the propriety of placing these boats under the charge of a careful officer; and, as many of them are leaky and scarce of oars, have them carefully prepared for service.

From report, Colonel Parker is of opinion that the Secretary of War will probably urge a descent on Canada this fall; but he supposes that a discretionary power will certainly be given to the commanding officer on the lines. From the present state of the Quartermaster's and Commissary's departments; from the almost total want of discipline in the regular troops; and from the little confidence that can be placed in the militia force; it would appear that a successful issue could hardly be expected, and defeat might prove highly injurious to our country. If the General's attention should be entirely turned to the discipline of the troops, even to the 10th of next month, it is feared that, after that period, it would be too late to put the troops under a comfortable cover before the winter sets in, which might be attended with the most fatal consequences. Would it not, therefore, be better to detail six or eight men, best qualified for the service, from each company, to commence the building the huts whilst the residue are employed on drill?

Whilst Colonel Parker has taken the liberty of making the foregoing observations, he begs leave to assure the General of his entire submission to his better judgment, and of his determination to promote his views by every exertion that his feeble health and abilities will permit.

22d *October, 1812.*

No. 12.

*Major General Dearborn to Brigadier General Smyth.*

HEAD QUARTERS, GREENBUSH, *October 21, 1812.*

SIR:

Major General Van Rensselaer having communicated a wish to retire from his command, I have acquiesced in his request, and have desired him to give over the command which he held to you, and to give you copies of my

last two or three letters to him, and such information in relation to the enemy, his means of obtaining information, and the state of the troops, stores, &c. as he may possess. The unfortunate affair at Queenstown, on the 13th, is most seriously to be lamented; but we must endeavor, by redoubled efforts, to retrieve the state of our affairs. I have ordered Colonel Porter of the artillery to Niagara, to take command of the whole of the light and heavy artillery at that post. You will find in him all the requisite practical information and industry in his line. A fine company of light artillery, all mounted, will proceed as rapidly as possible to replace such as have been lost. On their arrival, it will, I presume, be expedient to send the greatest number of horses back to some place where forage may be conveniently obtained. I shall order Colonel M<sup>c</sup>Clure, with his battalion of uniform volunteers, to march from Onondaga to Niagara; and I yet hope that, when the troops shall have been concentrated, and put into a state of organization, that you will be able to pass into Canada, and secure good winter quarters. I had directed General Van Rensselaer to call on the contractor for a deposit of provisions for at least two months, exclusive of the current issues. It will be expedient for you to repeat the requisition on the contractor. Captain Thomas, the Deputy Quartermaster General, will join you with stores and funds for that department; and I trust you will find in him an active and attentive officer. It will be proper to give Colonel Parker the command of a brigade. In all important movements you will, I presume, consider it advisable to consult some of your principal officers. Every means in your power should be exerted to procure a sufficient number of boats and scows for transporting the troops. You should, if possible, be prepared for crossing with three thousand men, with artillery, *at once*. Faithful and experienced boatmen should be selected for managing the whole of the boats, and there should be a surplus in each boat as a provision to meet accidents. The greatest precaution should be observed in the arrangement for embarkation and debarkation. You will pardon me for being thus particular. The most important consideration will be that of ascertaining and agreeing on the best and surest points for crossing: much will depend on a judicious selection of the principal landing places. Your information will enable you, *with the advice of your principal officers, to decide* on these subjects in the most judicious manner. That you may be so fortunate as to succeed in retrieving and meliorating the state of our affairs, is my most ardent wish. You will by all practicable means endeavor to correspond with General Harrison, who, I presume, is now at Detroit, with a very respectable force. I need not impress you with the necessity of cultivating a spirit of harmony and good understanding among all the corps under your command—on which the success of your operations will materially depend. I have been establishing a line of expresses between this place and Niagara, by which despatches may pass in about forty-four hours. You will direct where the non-commissioned officers of the express will be stationed near your quarters. The line will, I trust, be completed within two or three days after this reaches you.

With esteem and consideration, your obedient and humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Brigadier General SMYTH.

No. 13.

*Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to Major General Dearborn.*

CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, October 24th, 1812.

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 21st instant, and shall fail in nothing in my power to retrieve the state of our affairs.

The affair of Queenstown probably diminished our force 2,000 men; one half of which were killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the other half deserted, or were discharged in consequence of some battalions being greatly reduced.

General Van Rensselaer transferred to me the command on the 15th, and on the 16th I broke up the camp at Lewistown; sent the 14th infantry, under Colonel Winder, to Niagara; the militia artillery to a battery opposite the heights of Queenstown; the militia infantry and riflemen to Schlosser; and I returned with the 5th, 13th, 12th, and 20th, to my camp near Buffalo; the troops of the light and 2d artillery are at Black Rock.

In a creek at Black Rock I am collecting boats; and there I propose to cross. The Canadian shore is easy of access from Erie to Chippewa. There are some batteries opposite Black Rock that I can have carried when I please.

Boats are wanting. I have sent to have those which Chrystie brought to Niagara carried to Schlosser; this will be a difficult work. Scows are wanting and essential. As yet I have no funds.

The reinforcement you mention I hope will encourage those under my command. It is said 500 soldiers have arrived at Fort George since the battle; that the Indians have gone home to gather their corn; and that three-fourths of the militia are called into service. As the enemy's regular troops and flankers amount to 3,000 men, their militia, if called out, as said, may swell their force to 10,000 men.

It has seemed to me, sir, that the three armies should strike on the same day. If not, the command of the lakes will enable the enemy to beat us in detail.

The sailors here will furnish me with excellent boatmen. I shall take the opinions of a few of my most enlightened officers at times, but I will decide.

There is some difficulty in giving Colonel Parker a brigade, as Schuyler contests his right to rank. Winder is an officer of the first class.

In consequence of the loss of five companies of the 13th, I consolidated the 5th and 13th, as was done by the Adjutant General in the case of the 12th and 20th. In consequence, Milton asked and obtained a furlough. His regiment was badly governed, and I found I had nothing to expect from him.

I do not expect the contractor to supply us with provisions. I received a number of returns at Lewistown, "unfit for duty for want of provisions."

We much want some cannon of large caliber for the fort of Niagara, and the batteries of Black Rock. A powerful battery at the latter place would protect our landing at noon day.

The ship carpenters have gone off, which I much regret.

Colonel Porter will doubtless be of great service to us; but I should have preferred his coming to Black Rock.

I shall keep you advised of our progress.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect and esteem, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General.*

Major General DEARBORN.

No. 14.

CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, October 25th, 1812.

A hospital will be immediately established at Buffalo. Houses shall be rented, and Doctor Hays will take charge of, and regulate it.

To that hospital the sick and wounded in camp and its vicinity will be removed. Doctor Hays will make requisitions for such articles as are necessary for their comfort, and matrons and nurses will be employed.

By order:

H. SMYTH, *Lieut. 3d Artillery, and Aid-de-camp.*

No. 15.

HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR BUFFALO, October 27th, 1812.

Captain Allison will to-day vacate the court house, to be used as a hospital. He will take possession of the barracks in which Captain Harris's company of militia has been stationed.

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General commanding.*

No. 16.

*Major General Dearborn to Brigadier General Smyth.*

HEAD QUARTERS, GREENBUSH, October 28th, 1812.

SIR:

Your letters of the 22d and 24th were received at 5 o'clock P. M. yesterday. This will leave here to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock. I have this day received information from General Bloomfield that about 800 men, with several field pieces, left Montreal for your neighborhood on the 14th instant; of course the sooner you are prepared to strike the better. From the accounts I have received from Fort George, I am induced to believe that, exclusive of Fort Erie and its immediate dependencies, the whole force on the British side of the river does not amount to more than twelve or fourteen hundred, including the militia which were in service at the time of the unfortunate partial attack: and the derangement the death of General Brock must have occasioned in relation to the militia and Indians must have a considerable effect on their measures of defence, if they are not allowed too long a time for procuring reinforcements, and forming a new organization. I expect that General Bloomfield will move immediately towards Montreal, and I calculate on his being able to beat up the several posts between his camp and the river St. Lawrence. You should be explicit and positive in your orders to the contractor for having at least two months' deposit of provisions on hand, exclusive of the current issues. If you should determine on crossing from the vicinity of Black Rock with your main force, will not the enemy have it in his power to destroy the bridge over Chippewa creek, and render your passage difficult? You will, I presume, think it advisable to make one or more feints at other points, while your main body crosses at the place decided on.

I am induced to suspect that the actual benefit of heavy ordnance, in facilitating a landing, has been overrated. Some twelve pounders in scows would, in my opinion, be of more service in covering a landing than the fire of heavy pieces at long shots. And when a footing is secured on the Canada shore, the ordnance in their batteries must undoubtedly fall into your hands. Neither General Van Rensselaer nor yourself have said any thing in relation to the arrival of the Pennsylvania militia. I presume they must have arrived, or that you will have sent in quest of them, with orders to hurry on as quick as possible. An additional supply of powder, balls, paper, &c. has been ordered to your post. Colonel Porter left this place on the 24th with 100 light artillerymen, all mounted, and well appointed in every respect. He will proceed in the stage to Canandaigua, and from thence to your quarters as rapidly as possible. You will perceive the propriety and necessity of a return being made of all the troops under your command, which has been too long delayed.

With esteem and consideration, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Brigadier General SMYTH.

No. 17.

*Extract of a letter from James Selden, Jun. of Troy, to General Smyth, dated*

NOVEMBER 27, 1812.

"I am informed, from an undoubted source, that the British have received a reinforcement of 800 regulars at Fort George; that is, they are not exactly at Fort George, but have encamped about one and a half miles up Chippewa creek, where the enemy have been building barracks. A cousin of mine brought me this information, who was in the British militia service, and deserted."

The new barracks erected in the vicinity of Fort George and Chippewa have, from the precipitancy of the enemy's flight, escaped being burnt.

E. BAYNES, *Adjutant General N. A.*

No. 18.

*Colonel Thomas Parker to General Smyth.*

CAMP, October 30, 1812.

SIR:

You did me the honor last evening to consult me about the propriety of forming a brigade, to be composed of the regular troops expected in camp, and some of the volunteers and militia now on the lines.

I have been made acquainted, from different sources, with the disposition of the troops at Buffalo and Colonel Swift's regiment, and I think there is only one company amongst them that would not corrupt any regular troops that they might be associated with. And even that company would not be willing to be subjected to regular discipline. What may be the disposition of the volunteer Irish Greens I do not know; but, upon the whole, I should think it best to keep the regular troops entirely distinct from them.

I would beg leave to recommend that the militia and volunteers be formed into a distinct brigade, and put under strict drill. If they will not bear this, they had better be at home.

I must beg leave, sir, to call your attention to the requisition made for flannel, as it will be of infinite service to our men.

I have the honor to be, with much respect and esteem, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS PARKER, *Colonel 12th Infantry.*

No. 19.

*Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to Major General Dearborn.*

CAMP, near Buffalo, October 30, 1812.

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive, to day, at four o'clock P. M., your letter of the 28th instant.

We may, in a few days, have together seventy boats, that would carry over three thousand five hundred men; but we have no scows. I have set all the carpenters, and some citizens, to building of scows. We want tools and materials. The Deputy Quartermaster gives it as his opinion that we can have ten scows in twenty days.

I would cross in three days, if I had the means; without them, it would be injustice to the nation and myself to attempt it. I must not be defeated.

The New York Greens, and a troop of volunteer cavalry have arrived. The twenty-third regiment, the Pennsylvania volunteers, and those from Baltimore, have not arrived.

The Deputy Quartermaster has brought on checks instead of money; and he is unable to make payments. His letter to the Quartermaster General is enclosed; and I request that money may be sent to him immediately.

If I can beat the enemy on the plains of Erie, and take that place, I will find means to get to Fort George, whatever may become of the bridge of Chippewa.

I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, your most obedient servant,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General.*

No. 20.

*Colonel William H. Winder to Brigadier General Smyth.*

FORT NIAGARA, Oct. 30, 1812.

SIR:

Captain Archer, of the 2d artillery, arrived at this post this morning; he has with him about sixty men and two six pounders. His instructions were to report himself to Lieutenant Colonel Scott, at this place.

Under the circumstances, I have deemed it advisable to recommend his waiting your orders here; which he will do. I send this by an express.

In a letter, which I addressed you by Mr. Suchet, I suggested the propriety of retaining ten or twelve boats on this end of the line; a knowledge of your wishes on this subject might prevent the labor and trouble of bringing them back from Schlosser.

The movement of troops and boats from this end of the line has occasioned a considerable movement of men, from the other side of the river, towards Erie. They have been principally, if not altogether, militia. The number expected, by the cavalry stationed between this and Lewis, as passing up, are from four to five hundred.

This morning the armed ship Earl Moira has arrived, accompanied by a small unarmed schooner, having a number of men on her deck; but how many there are cannot yet be ascertained, as they have not landed.

I shall gather all the force I can, and parade them near here to-morrow; my object will be to prevent the accumulation of force against your end of the line, by making a display here; should your movements render it necessary, I can send them on to that end of the line by a fleet.

Should not Captain Archer be necessary to you, he will be of important service here.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER, *Colonel Commanding.*Brig. Gen. ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Commanding Centre Army.*

No. 21.

*Colonel William H. Winder to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth.*

FORT NIAGARA, November 3, 1812.

SIR:

I avail myself of the opportunity, by Lieutenant Totten, of the engineers, to write you. You will find him a useful and valuable officer in his professional line, and an estimable private man.

I shall send the clothing for the fifth, which is one barrel only, and a quantity of stockings, by Quartermaster Allison. I also enclose you a return of clothing at this place, made to me by Captain Leonard. This list is exclusive of twenty-three tierces, sent on to the fourteenth, which contain coats, pantaloons, and vests, only of winter clothing.

Another vessel arrived at Fort George yesterday evening. It was near dark, and no accurate observations could be made from here. Captain Archer was at the Salt battery, directly opposite Fort George, and will be able to inform you more particularly; I have not seen him. It is said that a body of Indians landed from her, say one hundred. Every one of their brethren that we can raise should cross to meet them. I suspect the enemy relies very much upon his savage ally. As many militia riflemen as can in any sort be relied on, and can be got to cross, would be important.

Should your plans permit a notice of twenty-four hours to be given to me before I move from here, I might make some movements to draw them toward this end of the line. By selecting the twilight, of morning or evening, I might give my force the appearance of a thousand men, and make some indications of crossing.

My whole force is applied to the requisite labor of the garrison and batteries. I shall turn to drilling at every possible movement.

I am, with very great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER, *Colonel.*Brig. Gen. ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Commanding Centre Army.*

No. 22.

*Lieutenant Colonel Livingston to General Alexander Smyth.*

BUFFALO, November 4, 1812.

SIR:

I have the honor to report the result of my inspection, as far as was in my power, of General Miller's brigade of militia, and the organization of the same, as contemplated by your order of the 29th ultimo. I regret I am not enabled to make a favorable report, but the state of the brigade is such as to be little better than an undisciplined rabble, and it may be a question whether they are not of more disservice than of use; the total want of order no doubt proceeds from the ignorance of the officers, and the great familiarity that exists between them and their men; that this can be remedied, perhaps is impossible, while such materials are employed for officers. I have endeavored to select and retain in service the best, and such as I am told will not shrink from duty.

After waiting two days for the different returns, I found it impossible to obtain them, although I applied to the General and his Brigade Major, whose duty I presume it was to furnish them. This circumstance prevents my giving a statement of the exact number of men, arms, ammunition, &c. The arms in use are good, although not kept (with a few exceptions) in such order as they ought to be. I am informed there are about seven hundred and fifty men, of which four hundred and twenty were under arms on the day of inspection. On Saturday evening one hundred deserted, and no measures taken to bring them back; a spirit of mutiny seems to pervade the camp.

I shall leave this to-morrow for Geneva, and will take charge of any communication for his Excellency the Governor, or any other you may wish to forward.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

J. W. LIVINGSTON.

General ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Commanding the Army of U. S. on the N. Frontier.*

No. 23.

*Captain Benjamin Wallace to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth.*

CAMP, near the Navy Yard, below Black Rock, November 5, 1812.

SIR:

If Captain Thomas intends that the boats and scows should be built in any reasonable time, he ought to furnish a sufficient quantity of tools for the men under my command to work with; at present, more than one half of them have not proper tools to work; narrow axes are much wanted; the augers, chisels, saws, &c. were all to be

put in order, and will be of little use for some days. I have selected three men to build a scow, agreeably to my own directions, and to see what time it takes to make one.

I am, sir, with respect,

BENJAMIN WALLACE,  
Captain 5th United States' Infantry.

Brigadier General ALEXANDER SMYTH.

No. 24.

*Major General Dearborn to Brigadier General Smyth.*

HEAD QUARTERS, GREENBUSH, November 8, 1812.

SIR:

Your letter of the 30th was duly received. I have sent on an additional supply of cartridges and stockings. I trust the Pennsylvania militia have joined you. I have sent Colonel Macomb, with upwards of four hundred men, to co-operate with Commodore Chauncey, who has informed me that he shall be ready on the 15th instant to look for, and attack, the British force on Lake Ontario, and probably attack Kingston, if I should send him a body of troops, that he could rely on, to aid him. If he should succeed, I have requested him to send a part of his force to Niagara as soon as practicable. I hope you will be ready to strike as soon as he will. A movement will probably be made by that time towards Montreal; and, at the same time, I trust General Harrison will be in operation at Detroit. The campaign may still be closed with success. I shall set off this day for Lake Champlain. If you succeed at Niagara, York and Kingston will demand your early attention. That you may succeed, and cover yourself, and the troops under your command, with glory, is the ardent wish of your friend, and humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Brigadier General SMYTH.

No. 25.

*Brigadier General Smyth to Major General Dearborn.*

CAMP, near Buffalo, November 9, 1812.

SIR:

Colonel McFeely arrived on the 1st instant with about one hundred and eighty men of the 22d. Captain Archer's company of artillery arrived on the 4th instant; and, to-day, Colonel Brown, with one hundred and ninety infantry; and also the light artillery arrived.

I have sent an officer to meet the Pennsylvanians. He had gone as far as Erie, when I last heard of him, without meeting them. They are volunteers to supply that State's quota of militia. Can they be forced to cross the line? I am told they will refuse.

One of the aids of the Governor of New York has been at Schlosser in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant General, making a new organization of the militia there. I caused them to encamp by themselves, not a soldier within ten miles of them. One hundred of them deserted the next night after the Governor's Aid left them.

What most disturbs me is the ill health of the troops. The measles has affected many; and the want of salt meat, of ovens, and exposure to cold, until lately without winter clothing, has produced dysenteries and other diseases. Our hospitals are filled with sick and wounded, and new cases of disease are occurring daily.

Colonel Winder, with the 14th, is coming to this place from Niagara. I shall trust the defence of it to two companies of artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel McFeely's corps of infantry, which will march to-morrow.

The contractors have failed to supply, and I have ordered purchases of provisions for Fort Niagara.

Between the 20th and 30th instant I shall be ready to cross the river with about thirteen hundred regular infantry, three hundred artillery, six hundred volunteers, and seventy cavalry, (if you will allow me Captain Morgan's troop.) In this estimate is not included the Pennsylvania and New York militia.

Two regiments will proceed on to-morrow to commence building huts. If we cannot stay on the other side, we shall have a shelter ready for the sick and wounded.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest esteem, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brig. General.*

Major General DEARBORN.

P. S. A district paymaster, with money, is necessary. The volunteers cannot be retained in service unless paid.

Lieutenant Gansevoort, of the artillery, who states that he was appointed District Paymaster, was ordered to Albany more than three weeks since to procure funds. I have heard that he is sick. Colonel Brown's regiment mutinied at Manlius on account of their pay.

A. S.

No. 26.

General Smyth conceives the following facts should be known and considered by the Secretary of War:

1. That the 5th regiment, at Utica, on its march, did mutiny for want of their pay.
2. That the 23d regiment, at Manlius, did mutiny on account of their pay, which is still due.
3. That a company of volunteers, at Buffalo, did mutiny on account of their pay and clothing.\*
4. That the captain of another volunteer company, the best in service, has stated that he believes his men will not cross into Canada without their pay and allowance for clothing.†
5. That the Deputy Quartermaster states himself to be without money.
6. That there is no district Paymaster at Niagara supplied with money.
7. That Colonel Winder, commanding at Fort Niagara, reports, "We are literally starving on this end of the line for bread." In consequence of which the Deputy Quartermaster has been ordered to purchase provisions.
8. That eighteen hundred Pennsylvania volunteers will arrive next week.
9. That General Smyth will be ready in fifteen days to cross into Canada.

No. 27.

*Speech to Indians.*

BROTHERS:

I thank you for the tender of your services in the defence of the United States, which you have made, and in their name accept them, in case the troops and the Indians of the British King should invade the United States; which I expect they will not dare to attempt.

It is the desire of your Great Father the President, that you should take no part in the war between the United States and Great Britain, but remain at peace and take care of your wives and children.

\* Phillips's.

† Allison's.

The British nation is not able to maintain the contest against the United States on this great Island, without help. They ask the Indians for help, who have given it, and will be ruined by doing so. We are able to beat the British without help. And, although we understand that you are willing to help us if we ask it, yet we do not ask it. The quarrel is ours, and not yours; and we will fight our own battles.

BROTHERS: Hold fast the chain of friendship between you and the United States, who are great, powerful, just, and good, and will vanquish all their enemies, and protect all their friends.

No. 28.

*Colonel Winder to Brigadier General Smyth.*

CAMP, NEAR NAVY YARD, *November 20th, 1812.*

SIR:

I am informed that blankets have been supplied to the brigade for the purpose of making great coats. *They are certainly necessary, or some substitute.* I presume it would be impossible to make them up now, before a movement across the river will take place. I am informed that a quantity of great coats came up from Niagara, and I believe *they will never be better disposed of than by distributing them to the soldiers now.* The enclosed return, handed you by the Quartermaster of the 14th, will supply my regiment, with what I have already had made. *I pray you, therefore, if you deem it not absolutely inadmissible, to order the issue agreeably to the return.*

Should you not feel at liberty to order the pea coats to be issued, we must be satisfied with blankets, and do the best we can under existing circumstances; at all events, as many great coats as are necessary for guard duty may issue as a matter of course. I have drawn returns for either alternative, which the Quartermaster will present you.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER, *Col. 14th Inf. U. S. Army.*

Brigadier General ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Commanding.*

No. 29.

*Brigadier General Smyth to General Tannehill.*

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP, NEAR BUFFALO, *November 21st, 1812.*

SIR:

Will you be pleased to ascertain whether there are any companies of your brigade who will refuse to serve the United States in Canada.

I deem it essential that we should know on whom we may rely with confidence.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brig. Gen. Com'g.*

No. 30.

*Brigadier General Tannehill to General Smyth.*

CAMP AT GRANGER'S FARM, *22d November, 1812.*

SIR:

To enable me to answer your note of yesterday, I convened my field officers in camp. *The prevailing opinion appears to be that, if an efficient force can be had to cross into Canada, a very general embarkation of my brigade may be expected; if on the contrary, it is difficult for me to say what number may be calculated on.*

I am, with sentiments of respect, your obedient servant,

A. TANNEHILL,

*Brig. Gen. 1st Brigade, Pennsylvania Volunteers.*

## No. 31.

*Return of the Officers and Privates of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Volunteers, under the command of Brigadier General Adamson Tannehill, who have volunteered to cross the boundary line into the province of Upper Canada, to assist in establishing the American standard in that province.*

Regiments.	Companies, and parts of Companies.	Officers.	Number of Men.	Remarks.
First regiment Riflemen, commanded by Lieutenant Col. Irwin.	Capt. Blue's, -	Captain, lieutenant, and ensign, -	37	Unconditional.
	Dean's, -	- - - - -	1	Do.
	Alter's, -	Captain, - - - - -	0	Do.
	M'Guire's, -	Lieut'nt and ensign, -	8	Do.
	Long's, -	Lieutenant, - - - - -	10	Do.
	Hays', -	Captain, - - - - -	22	Do.
	O'Kes's, -	Lieutenant, - - - - -	1	Do.
			79	<i>Recapitulation.</i> 1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, 3 captains, 4 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 79 privates,
				- 92
Second regm't Riflemen, commanded by Lieutenant Col. Piper.	Capt. Patterson's,	Captain, - - - - -	45	Provided they are officered, furnished in clothing, arms, &c. as their commander may think necessary.
	Thompson's,	Do. - - - - -	39	
	Sparks', -	Do. - - - - -	15	
	Vance's, -	Do. - - - - -	25	
	M'Guire's, -	Do. - - - - -	7	
	Gibson's, -	Do. - - - - -	1	
	Road's, -	Do. - - - - -	1	
			133	<i>Recapitulation.</i> 7 captains, 133 privates, 1 lieutenant colonel,
				- 141
First regm't Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Col. Snyder.	Capt. Regis's -	- - - - -	5	Unconditional.
	Cannon's, -	- - - - -	15	Provided they go under their own officers.
	Hunter's, -	- - - - -	8	Provided they are commanded by their present officers.
	Harper's, -	- - - - -	2	Unconditional.
	M'Clintock's,	- - - - -	3	Do.
	Alexander's,	- - - - -	2	Do.
			35	- 35
Second regiment Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Purviance.	Capt. Cooper's, -	Captain, lieutenant, and ensign, -	29	Unconditional.
	Lithgow's, -	Do. - - - - -	35	Do.
	Turbitt's, -	Do. - - - - -	25	Do.
	Withrow's, -	- - - - -	9	Under their own officers.
	Do. - - - - -	- - - - -	1	To choose his own company.
	Heron's, -	- - - - -	4	Unconditional.
	Steuart's, -	Captain, - - - - -	4	Do.
	Brinker's, -	- - - - -	2	Do.
	Jordan's, -	- - - - -	7	Do.
	Story's, -	Captain and lieut'nt, Rev. Mr. Jones.	13	Do.
			129	<i>Recapitulation.</i> 1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, 5 captains, 4 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 1 chaplain, 129 privates,
				- 145
				Total, - 413

## No. 32.

*Paymaster Merchant to Brigadier General Smyth.*

ALBANY, November 23, 1812.

SIR:

Yesterday I received your letter of the 10th instant. I am not now, but daily expect to be, in possession of funds. I have written, about a week since, to Mr. Brent, the paymaster at Washington, for funds. Since the reception of your letter, I have written again, stating the condition of the volunteers, and also recommending that paymasters be appointed to those regiments that are without them, and that a proportionate number of assistant paymasters be appointed. By this means the regiments and detachments can be regularly paid. I do not know which of the regiments along the frontiers have paymasters. To those regiments that have not, they will, without doubt, be appointed, provided proper persons are selected and named to the paymaster at Washington, by the Colonels of the respective regiments. In a letter to Lieutenant Gansevoort, Assistant Paymaster, I requested him to notify to the regimental paymasters, to transmit me estimates of such sums as would be wanted to pay off their respective regiments, and that he would himself make an estimate of money that would be required to pay those regiments and detachments that are without paymasters. I trust, sir, that some speedy and efficient provision will be made for the regular payment of the troops along the frontiers.

I am, sir, with sentiments of respect, your obedient servant,

GEORGE MERCHANT,

*District Paymaster, United States' Army.*

Brigadier General A. SMYTH.

## No. 33.

BANKS OF NIAGARA, 8 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT, November 25, 1812.

Colonel Winder will pass over to the Canada shore, with the troops who are marched from camp this evening, and superintend the attack of the enemy's batteries and parties, distributing his force in the following manner:

Lieutenant Colonel Boerstler, with the detachment of the 14th regiment, will attack the guard at the bridge opposite the upper point of Stanberry Island. Lieutenant Colonel Coles, with the companies of Captains Sangster, Taylor, Myers, and the company late Branche's, will take the party at the Red House. Major Campbell, with the companies of Captains Buckner, Morgan, Stannard, and Page, will attack the guard house, opposite the lower point of Squaw Island. Captain King, and Lieutenant Angus, of the navy, (who is so good as to offer his services, and those of the seamen under his command) will, with the companies of Captains Wool, Sproul, and Martin, attack the batteries opposite to Black Rock. Captain Barkhead, with the companies of Captains Brooks, Wharterby, Chambers, and Dorman, will attack the enemy's batteries opposite to Fort Gibson.

The parties will support each other, as circumstances may require, and as Colonel Winder may order.

The enemy's guns are to be spiked and dismounted; the bridge rendered impassable, all boats brought off, and as many prisoners as possible taken.

Colonel Winder will bring off his detachment from the Canada shore by daylight to-morrow.

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General Commanding.*

## No. 34.

*Colonel Winder to Brigadier General Smyth.*

NOVEMBER 25, 1812.

SIR:

The indisposition of the officers to cross, is such, and the real difficulties, for the want of a little preparatory arrangement, that I fear the issue will be disgraceful and fatal. I would venture to recommend a delay of the expedition.

Yours,

WM. H. WINDER, *Colonel Commanding.*

## No. 35.

*Major Campbell, field officer of the day, to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth.*

CAMP, NIGH BUFFALO, NEW YORK, November 27, 1812.

Major Campbell, field officer of the day, reports to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, commanding the United States' army of the centre, that he has received no guard report from Captain Mills, commanding the guard.

Although it may not be strictly within the province of the officer of the day, yet he has been so forcibly struck with the melancholy and desponding state of the troops, that he feels it a duty which he owes to the friendship of the commanding General to make to him the following statement:

He has received from several Captains, reports or statements of the present state of their companies.

Captain Stannard states, that, when he marched to Lewistown, he had	-	-	-	-	92
Since that time, he has lost by death,	-	-	-	-	10
Desertion,	-	-	-	-	2
Sick,	-	-	-	-	30
	-	-	-	-	— 42
	-	-	-	-	50
	-	-	-	-	—
	-	-	-	-	36

Leaving a company of fifty strong. He further states, that many who are not reported sick, are unfit for duty, and that he is sure he will not be able to bring into the field more than thirty men.

Captain Taylor reports, that he had ninety-five men. They were the best looking men in the regiment, except Morgan's.

He has sick,	-	-	-	-	47
Deserted,	-	-	-	-	2
Absent without leave,	-	-	-	-	1
Unfit for service,	-	-	-	-	2
Dead,	-	-	-	-	3
Waiters sick,	-	-	-	-	4
	-	-	-	-	— 59
	-	-	-	-	—
	-	-	-	-	36

Five of whom are waiters, and two of the five are sick, leaving thirty-four men.

Lieutenant Payton states that, when they arrived at the present encampment, Captain Branch had eighty-seven able bodied effective men; now they have only thirty-eight, and six waiters, making forty-four. Forty-three, therefore, are either sick or dead.



Captain Morgan arrived here with ninety-nine healthy, strong men, well calculated for fatigue. Since which  
 have died, - - - - - 4  
 Sick, - - - - - 28  
 - - - - -  
 - - - - - 32

Leaving sixty-seven for duty. But such is the situation of those reported for duty, that he does not calculate on marching more than fifty men.

Captain Sangster's company is the most healthy. He will probably march seventy or eighty men. Captain Page about thirty. Our regiment will, then, when in the field, be about two hundred and sixty-four strong. From the information of the Surgeon, I am well persuaded none of those reported sick will be able to march.

The Surgeon has now in the hospital tents at camp, about forty men, most of whom he is apprehensive will not survive. The balance of the sick he is obliged to permit to remain in their tents, having no room for them. Some have the measles, others a fever, which is becoming every day more alarming.

The field officer of the day has also taken a view of the hospital tent of the 13th regiment. Five men were lying there dead. He was told they had been dead for twenty-four hours, and were not buried for want of coffins. The sides of the tent had been forced open by the wind, and the sick men were exposed to the weather. He made inquiries as to the state of the companies, and found them more distressing than those of the 12th regiment.

The field officer of the day begs leave to assure the General that he has no view of paralyzing the operations of the army, by making this report at this important period. He will only say, that, on this and every other occasion, he will perform his duty.

DAVID CAMPBELL,

*Major 12th Infantry, Field Officer of the day.*

No. 36.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, *November 27, 1812.*

The men for service in this camp, and those in the vicinity, will cook to-day two days' provision, and have it in their haversacks at retreat.

At reveille to-morrow, every soldier will put on his knapsack, shoulder his musket, and, prepared for battle, with flints and cartridges, will march to the navy yard, on his way to Canada.

The boats will be ready for the embarkation.

The tents and sick will be left under the care of guards of invalids, until a convenient time.

Friends of your country! Ye who have "the will to do, the heart to dare," the moment ye have wished for has arrived. Think on your country's honors torn; her rights trampled on; her sons enslaved; her infants perishing by the hatchet. Be strong! Be brave! And let the ruffian power of the British King cease on this continent.

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

*Brigadier General, commanding.*

No. 37.

*Brigadier General Smyth to Colonel Winder.*

NOVEMBER 27, 1812.

SIR:

Captain King will communicate the order for to-morrow. Lieutenant Colonel Boerstler, with the men fit for service of your regiment, will attack the guard at the bridge, take it, demolish the bridge, bring off or dismount any light artillery found, kill the horses, take the boats, and return to our shore.

The Lieutenant Colonel, with his party, having done what is directed at the bridge, may proceed up the coast, his boats ascending the river, to the Red House, to support Captain King and Lieutenant Angus, or act according to circumstances.

It is not intended to keep possession. That is not to be attempted.

You will remain on the bank, and give directions.

Let the wounded be hid from the public eye to-morrow.

Let a bright look-out be kept to-day, and allow no one to pass the bridge of Conajoquaty, towards Tonawanta, except an officer of the army.

Very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

*Brigadier General, commanding.*

*Copy of an order from Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to Captain King and Lieutenant Angus.*

HEAD QUARTERS, *November 27, 1812.*

The detachment under Captain King and Lieutenant Angus will go against the enemy's batteries to-night, and render them useless.

It is not intended they should keep possession; but they will return immediately, bringing off some prisoners, and taking or destroying some light artillery, and killing the horses, if possible.

It is desirable the movement of the detachment, and that under Lieutenant Colonel Boerstler, should be so timed that they might arrive at the same instant.

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

*Brigadier General, commanding.*

No. 38.

*Captain William King to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth.*

FORT GEORGE, *November 28, 1812.*

DEAR GENERAL:

At the very moment that the boats (probably coming to my relief) made their appearance yesterday morning, Major Ormsby, at the head of the British army, arrived, and halted in front of the house into which I had thrown myself, with an intention to defend it against any force not greatly superior; but, against the troops under his command, it would have been folly to resist, and I surrendered myself and thirty men prisoners.

To Captains Morgan and Sproul, and Lieutenant Houston, (the only three officers who remained with me) I refer you for an account of my conduct in the attempt on the batteries, as also of the partial success of the enterprise, which, when you receive, and take into consideration that the boats had carried off the implements for spiking the cannon and destroying the gun carriages, I flatter myself you will be convinced I did my duty as far as circumstances rendered it possible.

May I flatter myself you will exchange the prisoners of the forty-ninth I sent over, and which exceeds in number those taken with me, for the men now here, the names of which I enclose you. For myself, I am less interested; but could I be exchanged for the surgeon I sent over, it would be highly gratifying.

By releasing my prisoners, I could have made my escape with all my men; but I deemed the measure I pursued more honorable, and therefore adopted it, and flatter myself it meets your approbation.

I received a shot in the foot at the Red House. The wound itself is trifling, but having been obliged to march the greater part of the way from where I was taken to Chippewa, it caused considerable swelling, and to-day is painful. I also received a scratch on the cheek, but fear it is not even deep enough to *leave a scar*.

A trip to Quebec, at this season of the year, under any circumstances, would be extremely disagreeable, but particularly as a prisoner of war; therefore, if possible, negotiate my exchange; but whatever you may do, my dear sir, let the men taken with me be released.

Should any letters come for me, under cover to you, please keep them until you know what is to be my fate.

I am treated with a degree of politeness that entitles the officers of this garrison to my warmest gratitude.

With high esteem, I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

WM. KING, *Captain 15th Infantry.*

General SMYTH, *Commanding the Army of the Centre.*

No. 39.

Will Colonel Parker be so obliging as to state the number of the force shown by the enemy on Saturday?

It is impossible for Colonel Parker to state the force of the enemy opposite the troops on Saturday; but he supposes there were not less than five or six hundred.

No. 40.

*Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to the Commanding Officer at Fort Erie.*

NOVEMBER 28, 1812.

SIR:

You have seen a part of the hourly increasing force under my command. I propose to you the surrender of Fort Erie, to spare the effusion of blood.

I take this opportunity to assure you that the devastations you have witnessed have been committed by some sailors, not under my authority, and much against my will.

Very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General.*

P. S. I request that Captain King may be sent over on his parole, according to treaty.

The COMMANDING OFFICER at Fort Erie.

No. 41.

*Brigadier General Tannehill to Brigadier General Smyth.*

BUFFALO, 30th November, 1812.

SIR:

I am just informed by Major Mowry that you were told that I did not communicate your orders of yesterday to my brigade. Immediately after receiving them I had directed my Brigade Major to take them to camp, for the information of the brigade, but, in a few minutes after I gave this order, several of the field officers who had been ordered to command the men who had volunteered to cross into Canada, came into my quarters, who each, individually, read the orders. I ordered one of the field officers to the navy yard, to carry that part of your orders respecting the boats, into effect. I beg leave to refer you to Major Douglass for a more minute detail.

I am, with due respect, your obedient servant,

A. TANNEHILL, *Brigadier General.*

Brigadier General SMYTH.

No. 42.

HEAD QUARTERS, BLACK ROCK, November 30, 1812.

The Deputy Quartermaster will have four days' provisions for 2,500 men at the navy yard, this evening, by four o'clock. The liquor is not to be omitted.

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General Commanding.*

Monday, 30th November, 10½ A. M.

The Contractor shall be called on. Transportation is in readiness: no delay.

JAMES THOMAS, *Deputy Quartermaster.*

No. 43.

HEAD QUARTERS, BLACK ROCK, November 30, 1812.

The camp at the plains near Mr. Granger's will be broken. The sick and the camp equipage will be removed to Buffalo.

The Deputy Quartermaster is charged with the execution of this order, and to provide quarters for the sick, whatever may be the expense.

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brig. Gen. Com.*

No. 44.

*Colonel Schuyler to General Smyth.*

CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, December 1st, 1812.

SIR:

In conformity with your desire, communicated to me by the Brigade Major, I have the honor to state that I was not able yesterday morning to parade more than two hundred and fifty men, exclusive of twenty-one men detailed the preceding night for guard. The number marched to the river was two hundred and seventy-one.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,

P. P. SCHUYLER, *Colonel 13th Infantry.*

General SMYTH.

No. 45.

CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, 2d December, 1812.

There were marched from this encampment, on the morning of the 30th November, 1812, to the river Niagara, the following force, belonging to the consolidated 12th and 20th of United States' infantry, viz:

1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 1 Adjutant, 1 Surgeon, 4 Captains, 3 First Lieutenants, 6 Second Lieutenants, 3 Ensigns, 12 Sergeants, 21 Corporals, and 181 privates.

THOMAS PARKER, Colonel 12th U. S. Infantry.

ROBERT G. HITE,  
Adjutant 12th and 20th Consolidated Infantry.

No. 46.

Return of Troops of Fourteenth Regiment, embarked on 29th November, 1812.

	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Privates.	Total.
<b>FOURTEENTH REGIMENT.—November 29.</b>								
Captain Montgomery's Company, - - - -	1	1	-	1	3	5	58	
“ Kent's ditto, - - - -	1	-	1	-	2	2	23	
“ Sullivan's ditto, - - - -	1	1	-	1	1	2	42	
“ Lane's ditto, - - - -	1	1	1	-	3	4	60	
	4	3	2	2	9	13	188	221
<b>TWENTY-THIRD REGIMENT.</b>								
Captain Armstrong's Company, - - - -	1	1	-	-	2	3	24	
“ Mills' ditto, - - - -	1	1	-	-	4	2	21	
“ Van Vechten's ditto, - - - -	1	-	-	1	1	6	10	
	3	2	-	1	7	11	55	79
<b>FOURTEENTH REGIMENT.—December 1.</b>								
Captain Montgomery's Company, - - - -	-	1	-	1	2	5	46	
“ Kent's ditto, - - - -	1	-	1	-	2	2	20	
“ Sullivan's ditto, - - - -	1	-	-	-	2	1	24	
“ Lane's ditto, - - - -	-	1	1	-	-	2	32	
	2	2	2	1	6	10	122	145
<b>TWENTY-THIRD REGIMENT.</b>								
Captain Armstrong's Company, - - - -	1	1	-	-	1	2	18	
“ Mills' ditto, - - - -	1	1	-	1	3	2	23	
“ Van Vechten's ditto, - - - -	1	-	-	-	2	3	22	
	3	2	-	1	6	7	63	82

RECAPITULATION.

November 29, 1812.—Fourteenth Regiment, - - - -	221
“ Twenty-third Regiment, - - - -	79
Total officers and men, - - - -	300
December 1, 1812.—Fourteenth Regiment, - - - -	145
“ Twenty-third Regiment, - - - -	82
Total officers and men, - - - -	227

CHAS. G. BOERSTLER,  
Lieut. Col. 14th Infantry.

*Morning Report of a Corps of Artillery, stationed at Black Rock and its vicinity.*

	PRESENT.																				Total.	Aggregate.	Privates, absent.	Total present and absent.	Aggregate present and absent.	Dead since last report.			
	FOR DUTY.													SICK.															
	Colonel.	Adjutant.	Quartermaster.	Surgeon's Mate.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Drum Majors.	Artificers.	Privates.	Adjutant.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Artificers.							Privates.	Privates, under arrest or confinement.	Officers' waiters.
Light Artillery, Field and Staff, - - -	1	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	6	-	3	6	-
Second Artillery, Field and Staff, - - -	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	-	3	4	-
Detachment of Light Artillery, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	2	5	7	4	-	7	83	-	1	-	-	4	18	-	5	133	140	6	169	146	-	
Detachment of Second Artillery, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	3	6	5	1	-	5	92	-	3	2	1	2	37	1	3	98	106	-	98	106	3	
<b>Totals, - - -</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>3</b>

NOTE.—Of the above number, ten were employed in taking care of those which could not be taken over.

BUFFALO, December 1, 1812.

M. V. BOISAUBIN, *Adjutant Reg't Light Artillery.*

## No. 49.

*A Return of Men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel McClure, who were embarked on Tuesday, 1st December, 1812.*

*Captain Allison.*—One lieutenant, thirty-nine non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 40.

*Captain Moore.*—One captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one ensign, ninety-three non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 97.

*Captain Mahar.*—One captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one ensign, forty non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 44.

*Captain Richardson.*—Absent, and all his men.

*Captain Tate.*—One captain, one lieutenant, six non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 8.

*Captain Walker.*—One lieutenant, two privates. Total, 3.

*Captain Powers.*—Not embarked; he in a short time after returned for the purpose of embarking.

*Captain Dillan.*—Not embarked.

*Captain Collins.*—One captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, forty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 50.

*Captain Philips.*—One captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, thirty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 40.

*Captain Marshall.*—One captain, one lieutenant, twelve non-commissioned officers and privates. Total, 14.

Total, 20 commissioned officers,

276 non-commissioned officers and privates.

There are now a great number of men sick and unfit for duty.

FRANCIS McCLURE,

*Lieutenant Colonel United States' Volunteers.*



No. 51.

*Lieutenant Colonel M'Feely to General Smyth.*

FORT NIAGARA, December 1st, 1812.

SIR:

I beg leave to inform you, by Ensign Culverson of my regiment, (who takes charge of six deserters, arrived here this morning from the Canada side, near the Thirty Mile creek) of the situation of the force here.

By the different reports of this morning, compared with those of several mornings back, I find that there has crept into this garrison a dreadful contagion, which upon an average carries off between three and five each day.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great esteem, your obedient servant,

GEO. M'FEELY, *Lieutenant Colonel of the 22d Infantry.*

No. 52.

*Colonel Winder to General Smyth.*

CAMP CANAJOUQUATY CREEK, December 2d, 1812.

SIR:

I have understood that the 12th and 20th regiments have obtained permission to retire to the interior, for the purpose of taking up their quarters for the winter. If a permission of that kind can be granted to any of the corps, I pray you to extend that indulgence to the 14th. They have encountered a series of fatigue and hardship, so greatly beyond that of any other corps, that they not only have a claim to be relieved, but the last eight or ten days have so shattered the regiment, both officers and men, that repose and comfort are absolutely necessary to them.

With respect to myself, if you should deem my services of importance, any where, I shall most cheerfully yield them; but I beseech you to permit the balance of the regiment to retire to the interior, where vegetables and other food suited to recruit them can be procured.

I was extremely anxious to visit home this winter, to have completed the adjustment of my private affairs, upon which, in the event of my death, a family will depend for a very slender pittance. But if objects of public service can be more effectually accomplished by my remaining here, in your judgment, I shall with the utmost cheerfulness devote myself to the accomplishment of your wishes.

What order will be taken with the 23d? I have only understood that they were connected with my command in the field.

I called at General Tannehill's quarters after I saw you, but he was sick in bed, and no meeting had or was to take place so far as I could hear.

I am, with very sincere respect, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. WINDER, *Colonel 14th Infantry.*

Brigadier General ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Commanding Centre Army.*

No. 53.

*Brigadier General Tannehill to Brigadier General Smyth.*

AT MR. WATSON'S, BUFFALO, December 7th, 1812.

SIR:

I feel happy to inform you that my health is greatly restored, although not sufficiently so as to venture much out of my quarters. Major Douglass waits on you with an inspection return of my late brigade; respectable a few days since, but now reduced, by some unaccountable fatality, to less than a single regiment. You will discover from the return, that the officers, as well as the privates, are infected with the same dishonorable contagion—desertion. I am at a loss how to express my feelings on the present state of our little army.

I am at a loss to know what can, or ought to be done with the brigade staff, field and regimental staff, and company officers, who have become supernumerary. I await your special orders how I am to act on the occasion generally. The expenses have been too great already, without any public benefits arising, and to hold them longer would only be an accumulation of the same evil.

I am, with due respect, your obedient servant,

A. TANNEHILL, *Brigadier General.*

No. 54.

HEAD QUARTERS, CANTONMENT, WILLIAMSVILLE, December 8th, 1812.

By a return of the brigade of General Tannehill, of Pennsylvania volunteers, it appears that five captains, four lieutenants, eleven ensigns, eighty-three sergeants, eighty-nine corporals, twenty-five musicians, and nine hundred and thirty privates, had revolted and deserted, leaving for duty only two hundred and sixty seven privates.

In consequence thereof, General Tannehill will be pleased to organize the remaining non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, into a battalion, under the command of Major Harriett.

A furlough for the residue of the time for which he has been called into service is granted to Brigadier General Tannehill and his brigade staff.

A furlough for the residue of this month is granted to the field officers of General Tannehill's brigade, except Major Harriett; from the expiration of which furlough they shall be considered as discharged the service of the United States.

By order:

HAROLD SMYTH,  
*Lieutenant 3d Artillery and Aid-de-camp.*

No. 55.

*Probable situation of troops during the winter 1812, on the Niagara frontier, liable to vary by discharges, arrivals, and movements.*

Buffalo, about	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600	
Black Rock, about	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	
Williamsville, about	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,300	
Fort Niagara, about	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	
Fort Grey, unknown.											
										Total,	2,600

No. 56.

*Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to the Secretary of War.*

WYTHE COURT HOUSE, February 3, 1813.

SIR:

I received from General Dearborn leave of absence from the army for seventy-five days, and an order to report myself at the expiration of that time to the Secretary of War. I left the army on the 17th December, and the term will expire on the 1st of March. I have thought proper to inform you, that an order directed to this place will find me, and will be obeyed at any time.

Although I have devoted myself to the service of the United States, and all my official acts have proceeded from an ardent wish to serve them effectually, yet, not having hitherto succeeded, I would prefer not to appear at Washington until I can deserve the applause of my superiors.

I earnestly request that I may have the same command, during the ensuing campaign, I had last autumn.

If you deem necessary an inquiry into the charges made against me, of misconduct on the 28th November and 1st December last, I pray that it may be made, and the facts reported.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General.*

The Hon. Gen. ARMSTRONG.

No. 57.

*Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to the Secretary of War.*

WYTHE, May 11, 1813.

SIR:

I hope I shall not be considered as troublesome in requesting that you will cause an answer to be given to the inquiry, whether I am now considered as an officer of the army of the United States or not?

There may, I conceive, be several constructions of the law of the last session, relative to the general staff of the army, as it may affect myself. 1. That I continue a Brigadier General of the line. 2. That I am an Inspector General with reduced rank. 3. That my appointment was a mere staff appointment, the rank only brevet rank, and, consequently, my commission as a colonel of the army, unaffected. 4. That my appointment, although a mere staff appointment, vacated my commission as a Colonel in the line, and that, by the late act, I have been legislated out of office.

Rank in the army, I conceive, is either 1. Rank in the line. 2. Brevet rank, or rank in the staff. All rank that confers command is rank in the line. A promotion in the staff does not take away rank in the line. A promotion that takes away rank in the line must confer rank in the line. An officer commissioned with the rank of a Brigadier General, is an officer in the line. General Green, Quartermaster General, commanded as an officer of the line. General Steuben, Inspector General, did also. General Hamilton, Inspector General, commanded the whole army.

The late act relative to the army staff expressly provides that the Quartermaster General shall have only *brevet* rank. It has the expression "as heretofore;" but this can have no retrospective operation. It cannot make the rank held by General Hamilton mere *brevet* rank. I have commanded, and been fully recognized by my superiors as an officer of the line. (See sixty-second article Rules and Articles of War.)

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

No. 58.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Robert Smith, printer, of Pittsburg, to General Smyth, dated April 3, 1813.*

"There is a number of cases combined against you; I am satisfied that prevented you from acting. 1st. The season was gone to, in the winter. Had you gone over you must have been defeated. They had collected all their force at this point; was stronger than you could have calculated. You have done better by acting the part, saving the forces for the summer campaign. One thing, they and officers will be better trained; will act better with raw troops, who come forward the present summer."

No. 59.

*Certificate of Lieutenant John G. Camp.*

I do certify that, for several days together, I was unable to procure either flour or whiskey from the contractor, and from the 25th October till 15th December, I was unable to procure salt meat more than once or twice, notwithstanding a general order requiring salt provisions three days in a week. Soap, the contractor has been very deficient, insomuch that there has been upwards of three hundred pounds due to the twelfth and twentieth infantry at a time, not being able to get it. The kidney and suet has almost invariably been taken out before the beef was issued, and in no one instance have I been able to procure any vinegar in kind. In a word, the contractor has never issued a complete ration to the twelfth or twentieth regiment since the 25th October, from which time I have been acting a quartermaster.

Given under my hand, at Williamsville, this 1st February, 1813.

JOHN G. CAMP,

*First Lieutenant 12th infantry, and Quartermaster 12th and 20th regiments infantry.*

No. 60.

*Copies, extracts, and memorandums, relative to the purchase of provisions.*

October 24th.—Required of the contractor a deposite of two months' provisions (besides the current issues) for three thousand men, at or within a mile of the encampment at Mr. Granger's; and of two months' provisions for five hundred men (besides the current issues) at Fort Niagara. To be done without the delay of a moment.

*Colonel Winder to General Smyth, 7th November, 1812.*

"We are literally starving on this end of the line for bread, and unless the supply is more abundant, the contractors will be answerable for consequences more fatal to their country than treason."

November 8th.—Notified General P. B. Porter of the above, and ordered the Deputy Quartermaster to purchase two months' provisions for Fort Niagara, in ten days, for five hundred men.

November 22d.—The requisition of October 24th not being complied with, ordered the Deputy Quartermaster to purchase flour for five thousand troops, for two months, and deposite it at or near Buffalo.



*Major Armistead to General Smyth, dated 22d November, 1812.*

“But my greatest concern is the want of provisions, which, if not supplied, we will inevitably have to evacuate the post.” (Meaning Fort Niagara.)  
*November 24th.* Required rations for two thousand five hundred men, for four days, at the navy yard.

*Captain Thomas, Deputy Quartermaster, to General Smyth, dated 30th November, 1812, 10 o'clock, P. M.*

“Immediately on the receipt of your order of this morning, for the furnishing of provisions at the navy yard this evening, I called on the contractor, who furnished me the pork and whiskey required; thirty-five barrels of flour were all I could obtain, which is deposited at the navy yard.”

N. B. Quantity required: ten barrels whiskey; thirty-eight ditto pork; sixty ditto flour.

*General Tannehill to General Smyth, 1st December, 1812.*

“There is a complaint by the regimental quartermasters, that there is no flour to be drawn.”

No. 61 a.

*Brigadier General Smyth to General Peter B. Porter.*

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE, NEAR BUFFALO, *October 24, 1812.*

SIR:

Having the command of the army of the United States on this frontier, it becomes my duty to require of you a deposite of provision for three thousand men for two months, (beside the current issues) to be made within a mile of my present encampment; and a deposite of provisions for five hundred men, for two months (beside the current issues) to be made at Fort Niagara.

This is required to be done without the delay of a moment.

I am, sir, respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General Commanding.*

The CONTRACTOR or his Agent.

A true copy.

JAS. BANKHEAD, *Captain and Brigade Major.*

No. 61 b.

*Colonel W. H. Winder to Brigadier General Smyth.*

FORT NIAGARA, *November 7th, 1812.*

SIR:

I wrote you yesterday at considerable length by Quartermaster Allison. Major Armistead deems it necessary to go to Black Rock, to present to you his ideas of this place in a military point of view.

The Major apprehends that there is risk of enterprise against this place from the other side, and that there is danger of its succeeding, if attempted where the infantry are withdrawn; my opinion, you will recollect, has been, that the enemy would not attempt any thing against this end of the line; I am still of the same opinion. How far he might succeed, if he attempted it, would depend upon the force he employed, and the courage and firmness of the resistance here. My practical knowledge of the defence of fortified places does not enable me to form an opinion upon the subject which would be entitled to much weight. Major Armistead is informed of my views of this place as detailed in my letter of the 17th October; but his views are derived more probably from his professional knowledge and skill, than from general considerations.

My own opinion is, that a successful effort on any part of the line will be a protection to this place equal to that of any force which might be thrown in here; because I believe the enemy, so far from thinking of attacking us, is exerting every nerve to evade a blow which they dread from us.

Three vessels are just arriving, one was here before; it is not yet perceived that they bring any force.

We are literally starving on this end of the line for bread; and, unless the supply is more abundant, the contractors will be answerable for consequences more fatal to their country than treason.

I am, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

W. H. WINDER, *Colonel Commanding.*

Brigadier General ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Commanding Centre Army.*

No. 61 c.

*Brigadier General Alexander Smyth to Captain Thomas, Deputy Quartermaster.*

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, *November 8th, 1812.*

SIR:

You will proceed, on the day on which you receive this order, to purchase provisions for Fort Niagara; into which, within ten days, you will deliver rations for five hundred men for two months.

Be pleased to consider this order as one of the most peremptory. Fort Niagara, if invested a week, must surrender from hunger.

Very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Captain THOMAS, *Deputy Quartermaster.*

A true copy.

JAS.

*Captain and Brigade Major.*

No. 61 d.

*Brigadier General Smyth to General P. B. Porter.*

FORT NIAGARA, *November 8th, 1812.*

SIR:

I have just received, from the commanding officer of Fort Niagara, that we are literally starving on this end of the line for bread; and, unless the supply is more abundant, we shall be answerable for consequences more fatal to their country than treason.

Very respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

General P. B. PORTER.

A true copy.

JAS.

*Captain and Brigade Major.*

No. 61. e.

*Brigadier General Smyth to Captain Thomas, Deputy Quartermaster.*

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR BUFFALO, November 22, 1812.

SIR:

You will proceed to purchase immediately, and deposite at or near Buffalo, flour for five thousand troops for two months, besides the current issues.

Respectfully, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH, *Brigadier General Commanding.*

P. S. You are not to hesitate about price.

A. S.

CAPTAIN THOMAS, *Deputy Quartermaster.*

True copy.

HAROLD SMYTH, *Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*

No. 61. f.

*Major Armistead to Brigadier General Smyth.*

LEWISTOWN, November 22, 1812.

SIR:

I left Niagara with the intention of seeing you, but finding my horse not able to proceed, I have declined going. My business was to get, if possible, some ammunition for the garrison, as we nearly expended all we had yesterday, and which did the enemy great damage—destroyed one of their best buildings, and did the town considerable damage; sunk a schooner that was sent out of Genesee river, and dismounted several of their guns.

It gives me extreme pleasure to inform you, that the officers behaved themselves with the greatest degree of bravery. Captain Leonard was as conspicuous as to coolness and attention as I have ever seen. We, on our part, lost five men—three from the bursting of a gun, and two from the enemy's fire; several wounded from careless loading. If possible, dear sir, send on ammunition for eighteen and six pounders, and fours; but my greatest concern is, the want of provisions, which, if not supplied, we will inevitably have to evacuate the post.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. K. ARMISTEAD.

General ALEX. SMYTH.

No. 61. g.

*Deputy Quartermaster James Thomas to Brigadier General Smyth.*

CAMP AT BLACK ROCK, half past 10 o'clock, (Evening,) November 30, 1812.

SIR:

Immediately on the receipt of your order of this morning, for the furnishing "of provisions at the navy yard, this evening," I called on the contractor, who furnished me the pork and whiskey required. Thirty-five barrels of flour was all I could obtain, which is deposited at the navy yard.

Yours, respectfully,

JAMES THOMAS, *D. Q. M.*

General ALEX. SMYTH.

N. B. Quantity required: 10 barrels whiskey; 38 barrels pork; 60 barrels flour.

No. 61. h.

*Brigadier General A. Tannehill to Brigadier General Smyth.*

BUFFALO, December 1, 1812.

SIR:

Agreeably to your note of yesterday, I have convened the commanding officers of my brigade, and consulted them on the posts you denominated for my command, either Buffalo, Schlosser, or Niagara; the result has been the choice of cantonment near Buffalo. I have directed the Quartermaster of the brigade, with the assistance of five officers, to examine for situation, &c. which I expect will be near our present encampment. Your approbation to this choice will relieve my men from much fatigue of marching to a more distant place, as also from an inclement season.

There is a complaint by the regimental Quartermasters that there is no flour to be drawn.

I am, sir, with much respect, your humble servant,

A. TANNEHILL,

*Brig. Gen. 1st Brigade Pennsylvania Volunteers.*

General ALEX. SMYTH.

[13th CONGRESS.]

No. 131.

[2d SESSION.]

## SUBSISTENCE TO THE INHABITANTS OF MICHIGAN TERRITORY.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 28, 1814.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

It has appeared, that, at the recovery of the Michigan Territory from the temporary possession of the enemy, the inhabitants thereof were left in so destitute and distressed a condition as to require from the public stores certain supplies essential to their subsistence, which have been prolonged under the same necessity which called for them.

The deplorable situation of the savages, thrown by the same event on the mercy and humanity of the American commander at Detroit, drew from the same source the means of saving them from perishing by famine; and, in other places, the appeals made by the wants and sufferings of that unhappy description of people have been equally imperious.

The necessity imposed by the conduct of the enemy, in relation to the savages, of admitting their co-operation, in some instances, with our arms, has also involved occasional expense in supplying their wants; and it is possible that a perseverance of the enemy in their cruel policy may render a further expense for the like purpose inevitable.

On these subjects an estimate from the Department of War will be laid before Congress, and I recommend a suitable provision for them.

JAMES MADISON.

February 26, 1814.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 132.

[3d SESSION.

## BOUNTIES AND PREMIUMS FOR RECRUITS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 27TH OF OCTOBER, 1814.

ARMY PAY OFFICE, CITY OF WASHINGTON, *September 24, 1814.*

SIR:

Agreeably to your request, I have the honor to state, that the sum of \$1,944,828 98 has been disbursed from this office, on account of bounties and premiums for recruits, since the 27th of January, 1814, the date of the passage of the law increasing the bounty. The distribution of this sum, as nearly as can be well ascertained, has been as follows, namely:

To Massachusetts, including the District of Maine,	\$237,400 00
New Hampshire,	37,800 00
Vermont,	109,300 00
Connecticut,	78,932 00
Rhode Island,	1,000 00
New York,	475,320 00
New Jersey,	15,000 00
Pennsylvania,	188,900 00
Delaware,	10,000 00
Maryland, including the District of Columbia,	80,392 00
Virginia,	159,962 98
North Carolina,	60,000 00
South Carolina,	62,800 00
Georgia,	34,000 00
Tennessee,	98,500 00
Kentucky,	108,000 00
Ohio,	96,500 00
Louisiana,	63,530 00
The Michigan Territory,	20,000 00
The Mississippi Territory,	4,000 00
The Indiana Territory,	2,000 00
The Missouri Territory,	1,492 00
	<u>\$1,944,828 98</u>

To this sum it would perhaps be no more than just to add twenty or thirty thousand dollars, of which I am not yet fully advised, and which of course does not now regularly appear on the books of this office.

With sentiments of great respect, I am, sir, your most obedient,

ROBERT BRENT,

*Paymaster of the United States' Army.*

The Honorable GEORGE M. TROUP,

*Chairman of a Committee of Congress on Military Affairs.*

\*See No. 133.

General Return of Recruits for the Army of the United States, by Corps and Regiments, not included in the General Return No. 1.

Corps or Regiments.	Names of officers superintending the recruiting service.	Places of principal rendezvous.	NUMBER OF OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES, AT THE SEVERAL RENDEZVOUS.													
			Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieut'nts.	Third Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Total non-commissioned officers, musicians, and Privates.	Aggregate.
Regiment light artillery,	Captain Campbell,	Dedham, Massachusetts,	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	121	124	126
Regiment light dragoons.	Lieutenant Colonel House, Captain Read,	New York, Pittsburg,	-	1	-	3	-	3	-	3	2	4	96	105	112	
Corps of artillery,	Captain Johnson,	New Brunswick, New Jersey,	-	-	-	2	1	4	7	15	4	9	87	115	129	
First regiment infantry,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Second ditto.*	Colonel Milton, Major Arbuckle,	Louisville, Kentucky, Natchez.	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	4	3	2	68	77	80	
Third ditto,	Captain Way,	Concord, New Hampshire,	-	-	1	-	-	5	3	2	1	3	89	95	105	
Fourth ditto,	Major Wallace,	Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,	-	-	-	3	1	6	1	17	7	25	171	220	232	
Fifth ditto,	-	Reading, Pennsylvania,	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	3	1	63	73	82	
Sixth ditto,	Colonel Simonds,	Eddyville, Kentucky,	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	2	3	2	86	96	104	
Seventh ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Posey,	Fort Hawkins, Georgia,	-	-	1	1	4	2	-	4	4	2	9	13	20	
Eighth ditto,	Major Cook,	Pittsfield, Massachusetts,	1	-	-	1	-	1	2	2	2	2	9	96	104	
Ninth ditto,	Colonel S. Larned,	Wilkesbarre, North Carolina,	1	-	-	3	2	3	4	3	1	1	186	191	204	
Tenth ditto,	Colonel Wellborn,	Rutland, Vermont,	-	-	-	1	1	1	3	5	3	13	50	75	86	
Eleventh ditto,	Captain Gordon,	Staunton, Virginia,	-	-	1	4	6	2	4	14	5	2	118	139	159	
Twelfth ditto,	Major Nicholas,	Albany, New York,	-	-	-	1	2	1	1	7	5	8	79	99	105	
Thirteenth ditto,	Captain Haring,	Baltimore,	-	-	1	2	6	3	4	9	1	17	127	154	171	
Fourteenth ditto,	Major Lane,	Trenton, New Jersey,	-	1	-	3	2	1	4	11	5	4	102	122	134	
Fifteenth ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Carr,	Easton, Pennsylvania,	-	1	-	2	2	1	4	5	6	6	166	196	211	
Sixteenth ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Clemison,	Chillicothe, Ohio; Lexington, Kentucky,	1	-	1	7	7	5	5	11	37	34	509	610	647	
Seventeenth ditto,	Colonel Miller, Major Graham,	Charleston, Columbia, South Carolina,	1	-	-	1	3	4	1	-	-	-	22	22	32	
Eighteenth ditto,	Colonel Dennis, Captain Taylor,	Zanesville, Ohio,	1	-	-	3	6	3	4	5	34	14	393	458	470	
Nineteenth ditto,	Colonel Paul,	Fredericksburg, Virginia,	1	-	1	4	7	4	5	6	14	4	3	115	136	163
Twentieth ditto,	Major Stannard,	Portsmouth, New Hampshire,	-	1	-	2	2	2	4	11	4	6	78	99	110	
Twenty-first ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Upham,	Pittsburg, Pennsylvania,	-	-	-	2	2	-	2	8	3	5	69	85	93	
Twenty-second ditto,	Captain Cormic,	Utica, New York,	-	1	-	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	66	67	72	
Twenty-third ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Mullany,	Nashville, Knoxville, Tennessee,	1	-	1	3	3	6	5	4	13	6	203	225	251	
Twenty-fourth ditto,	Colonel Anderson, Major Armstrong,	Hartford, Connecticut,	-	1	-	4	1	1	-	11	4	7	132	154	160	
Twenty-fifth ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Smith,	Burlington, Vermont,	-	-	1	7	-	3	-	3	14	6	202	228	252	
Twenty-sixth ditto,	Major Merrill,	New York,	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	346	350	351	
Twenty-seventh ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Denniston,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

\* Colonel Milton reported on duty in district No. 7.

GENERAL RETURN—Continued.

1814.]

BOUNTIES AND PREMIUMS FOR RECRUITS.

Corps or Regiments.	Names of officers superintending the recruiting service.	Places of principal rendezvous.	NUMBER OF OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES, AT THE SEVERAL RENDEZVOUS.													
			Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieuts.	Third Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Total non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.	Aggregate.
Twenty-eighth regiment,	Major Smily,	Olympian Springs, Kentucky,	-	-	1	4	5	2	4	4	-	-	-	92	92	112
Twenty-ninth ditto,	Colonel M. Smith,	Albany, New York,	1	-	-	3	1	3	4	-	-	-	-	228	228	240
Thirtieth ditto,	Colonel Fassett,	Burlington, Vermont,	1	-	1	3	1	1	2	1	23	4	4	327	358	368
Thirty-first ditto,	Colonel Dana,	Woodstock, Vermont,	1	-	-	7	6	3	5	-	14	-	3	77	94	116
Thirty-second ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thirty-third ditto,	Colonel Lane,	Saco, Maine,	1	-	-	5	4	5	3	-	-	-	2	94	96	114
Thirty-fourth ditto,	Colonel J. D. Learned,	Portland, Maine,	1	-	-	6	4	5	3	-	-	-	-	614	614	633
Thirty-fifth ditto,	Colonel Goodwyn,	Petersburg, Virginia,	1	-	-	8	6	4	7	3	25	9	8	451	493	522
Thirty-sixth ditto,	Colonel Carbery, Major Lee,	Georgetown, D. Col. Richmond, Vir.	1	-	1	5	2	1	1	2	-	-	-	62	62	75
Thirty-seventh ditto,	Lieut. Colonel Benjamin, Maj. Hoadly,	New London, Hartford, Connecticut.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thirty-eighth ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Stewart,	Baltimore,*	-	1	-	4	1	2	4	1	13	2	11	186	212	225
Thirty-ninth ditto,	Colonel Williams,	Knoxville, Tennessee,	1	-	-	4	3	-	3	3	17	6	8	117	148	162
Fortieth ditto,	Colonel Loring,	Boston.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Forty-first ditto,	Major Wallace,	New York,	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	3	42	45	48
Forty-second ditto,	Colonel Irvine, Major Stockton,	Sunbury, Pennsylvania; Newcastle, Del.	1	-	1	2	2	1	2	1	6	6	-	83	95	105
Forty-third ditto,	Major Campbell,	Raleigh, North Carolina,†	-	-	1	6	4	6	6	4	4	4	4	64	76	103
Forty-fourth ditto,	Colonel Ross, Major Peire,	New Orleans; Nashville, Tennessee,	1	-	1	6	5	2	1	1	12	12	7	137	168	185
Forty-fifth ditto,	Colonel McCobb,	Bath, Maine,	1	-	-	4	2	3	-	3	7	1	1	101	111	124
Forty-sixth ditto,	Lieutenant Colonel Talmadge,	New York.‡	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
First rifle regiment,	Captain Swearingen, Captain Massias,	Shepherdstown, Va.; Savannah, Geo.	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	13	16	18
Second ditto,	Colonel Butler, Major Gwynne,	Lexington, Ken.; Nashville, Tenn.	1	-	1	4	3	3	3	2	7	-	1	159	167	184
Third ditto,	Colonel King, Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, Major Selden, Major Overton.	Charlotte, N. Carolina, Bath Court House, Virginia; Gallatin, Tennessee,	1	1	2	7	7	7	3	2	16	5	-	136	157	187
Fourth ditto,	Major Armstrong,	Utica, New York,	-	-	1	9	6	7	4	1	8	3	2	119	132	160
Corps of rangers.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Corps of sea fencibles.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total,	20	10	19	148	134	122	126	80	425	190	228	6,851	7,690	8,340

\* Colonel Little reported on duty in district return.

† Colonel Long and Major King reported on duty in district No. 6.

‡ No return received.

REMARK.—The commanding officer of the 46th regiment infantry has neglected to make return of the number of recruits enlisted for that regiment; it is believed, however, from the best information that can be obtained, there are about 400, which will make an aggregate of 8,740; at least two-thirds of whom have joined, or on their march to join, their respective regiments, but are not reported in the general return No. 1.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 133.

[3d Session.

## IMPROVEMENT AND INCREASE OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, NOVEMBER 5, 1814.

SENATE'S COMMITTEE CHAMBER, September 23, 1814.

SIR:

In obedience to instructions from the committee, appointed to take into consideration the accompanying resolution, I do myself the honor to ask information from you upon the following points:

- 1st. What are the defects in the present military establishment?
- 2d. What further provisions, by law, are deemed necessary to remedy such defects?

Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my high consideration.

WM. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

The Honorable JAMES MONROE,  
*Acting Secretary for the Department of War.*

COMMITTEE CHAMBER, September 24, 1814.

SIR:

In obedience to instructions, from the Committee on Military Affairs, I now do myself the honor of enclosing, for your consideration, a resolution of the Senate of the 23d instant,\* and of requesting that, in replying to the inquiries made by the committee on yesterday, you will give such information, and in such manner, in relation to the objects of the said resolution, as you may judge advisable.

Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my high consideration.

WM. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

The Honorable JAMES MONROE,  
*Acting Secretary for the Department of War.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, October 17, 1814.

SIR:

The great importance of the subject, and the other duties of the Department, which could not fail to be very sensibly felt, at so interesting a period, by a person who had just taken charge of it, are my apology for not answering your letter, of the 23d of September, at an earlier day, on the defects of the present military establishment.

Due consideration has been bestowed on the subject matter of that letter, and I have now the honor to submit to the committee the following report:

1. That the present military establishment, amounting to 62,448 men, be preserved and made complete, and that the most efficient means authorized by the constitution, and consistent with the equal rights of our fellow-citizens, be adopted to fill the ranks, and with the least possible delay.
2. That a permanent force, consisting of not less than 40,000 men, in addition to the present military establishment, be raised, for the defence of our cities and frontiers, under an engagement by the Executive with each corps that it shall be employed in that service within certain specified limits. And that a proportional augmentation of general officers of each grade, and other staff, be provided for.
3. That the corps of engineers be enlarged.
4. That the ordnance department be amended.

Respecting the enlargement of the corps of engineers, I shall submit hereafter a more detailed communication.

For the proposed amendment of the ordnance department, I submit a report from the senior officer in that department, now in this city, which is approved.

I shall be ready and happy to communicate such further remarks and details on these subjects as the committee may desire, and shall request permission to suggest, hereafter, the result of further attention to, and reflection on, our military establishment generally, should any thing occur which may be deemed worthy its attention.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your very obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

Honorable WILLIAM B. GILES,  
*Chairman of the Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs.*

## EXPLANATORY OBSERVATIONS.

In providing a force necessary to bring this war to a happy termination, the nature of the crisis in which we are involved, and the extent of its dangers, claim particular attention. If the means are not fully adequate to the end, discomfiture must inevitably ensue.

It may fairly be presumed that it is the object of the British Government, by striking at the principal sources of our prosperity, to diminish the importance, if not to destroy the political existence, of the United States. If any doubt remained on this subject, it has been completely removed by the despatches from our ministers at Ghent, which were lately laid before Congress.

A nation contending for its existence against an enemy powerful by land and sea, favored, in a peculiar manner, by extraordinary events, must make great exertions, and suffer great sacrifices. Forced to contend again for our liberties and independence, we are called on for a display of all the patriotism which distinguished our fellow-citizens in the first great struggle. It may be fairly concluded that if the United States sacrifice any right, or make any dishonorable concession to the demands of the British Government, the spirit of the nation will be broken, and the foundations of their union and independence shaken. The United States must relinquish no right, or perish in the struggle. There is no intermediate ground to rest on. A concession on one point leads directly to the surrender of every other. The result of the contest cannot be doubtful. The highest confidence is entertained that the stronger the pressure, and the greater the danger, the more firm and vigorous will be the resistance, and the more successful and glorious the result.

It is the avowed purpose of the enemy to lay waste and destroy our cities and villages, and to desolate our coast, of which examples have already been afforded. It is evidently his intention to press the war along the whole extent of our seaboard, in the hope of exhausting equally the spirits of the people and the national resources. There is also reason to presume that it is the intention to press the war from Canada on the adjoining States, while attempts are made on the city of New York, and other important points, with a view to the vain project of dismemberment or subjugation. It may be inferred likewise, to be a part of the scheme, to continue to invade this part of the Union, while a separate force attacks the State of Louisiana, in the hope of taking possession of the city of New Orleans,

\* Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be instructed to inquire into the state of preparations for the defence of the City of Washington, and whether any further provisions, by law, be necessary for that object.

and of the mouth of the Mississippi, that great inlet and key to the commerce of all that portion of the United States lying westward of the Alleghany mountains. The peace in Europe having given to the enemy a large disposable force, has essentially favored these objects.

The advantage which a great naval superiority gives to the enemy, by enabling him to move troops from one quarter to another, from Maine to the Mississippi, a coast of two thousand miles extent, is very considerable. Even a small force, moved in this manner, for the purposes avowed by the British commanders, cannot fail to be sensibly felt; more especially by those who are most exposed to it. It is obvious that, if the militia are to be relied on, principally, for the defence of our cities and coast against these predatory and desolating incursions, wherever they may be made, that, by interfering with their ordinary pursuits of industry, it must be attended with serious interruption and loss to them, and injury to the public, while it greatly increases the expense. It is an object, therefore, of the highest importance, to provide a regular force with the means of transporting it from one quarter to another, along our coast, thereby following the movements of the enemy, with the greatest possible rapidity, and repelling the attack wherever it may be made. These remarks are equally true as to the militia service generally, under the present organization of the militia, and the short terms of service prescribed by law. It may be stated with confidence, that at least three times the force, in militia, has been employed at our principal cities, along the coast and on the frontier, in marching to, and returning thence, that would have been necessary in regular troops; and that the expense attending it has been more than proportionably augmented, from the difficulty, if not the impossibility of preserving the same degree of system in the militia as in the regular service.

But it will not be sufficient to repel these predatory and desolating incursions. To bring the war to an honorable termination, we must not be contented with defending ourselves. Different feelings must be touched, and apprehensions excited, in the British Government. By pushing the war into Canada, we secure the friendship of the Indian tribes, and command their services, otherwise to be turned by the enemy against us; we relieve the coast from the desolation which is intended for it, and we keep in our hands a safe pledge for an honorable peace.

It follows, from this view of the subject, that it will be necessary to bring into the field, next campaign, not less than one hundred thousand regular troops. Such a force, aided, in extraordinary emergencies, by volunteers and the militia, will place us above all inquietude as to the final result of this contest. It will fix on a solid and imperishable foundation, our union and independence, on which the liberties and happiness of our fellow-citizens so essentially depend. It will secure to the United States an early and advantageous peace. It will arrest, in the further prosecution of the war, the desolation of our cities and our coast, by enabling us to retort on the enemy, those calamities which our citizens have been already doomed to suffer—a resort which self defence alone, and a sacred regard for the rights and honor of the nation, could induce the United States to adopt.

The return of the regular force now in service, laid before you, will show how many men will be necessary to fill the present corps; and the return of the numerical force of the present military establishment will show how many are required to complete it to the number proposed. The next and most important inquiry is, how shall these men be raised? Under existing circumstances, it is evident that the most prompt and efficient mode that can be devised, consistent with the equal rights of every citizen, ought to be adopted. The following plans are respectfully submitted to the consideration of the committee. Being distinct in their nature, I will present each separately, with the considerations applicable to it.

#### FIRST PLAN.

Let the free male population of the United States, between eighteen and forty-five years, be formed into classes of one hundred men each, and let each class furnish four men for the war, within thirty days after the classification, and replace them in the event of casualty.

The classification to be formed with a view to the equal distribution of property among the several classes.

If any class fails to provide the men required of it, within the time specified, they shall be raised by draught on the whole class, any person, thus draughted, being allowed to furnish a substitute.

The present bounty in land to be allowed to each recruit, and the present bounty in money, which is paid to each recruit by the United States, to be paid to each draught by all the inhabitants within the precinct of the class within which the draught may be made, equally, according to the value of the property which they may respectively possess; and if such bounty be not paid within — days, the same to be levied on all the taxable property of the said inhabitants; and, in like manner, the bounty, whatever it may be, which may be employed in raising a recruit, to avoid a draught, to be assessed on the taxable property of the whole precinct.

The recruits to be delivered over to the recruiting officer in each district, to be marched to such places of general rendezvous as may be designated by the Department of War.

That this plan will be efficient cannot be doubted. It is evident that the men contemplated may soon be raised by it. Three modes occur by which it may be carried into effect: 1st, By placing the execution of it in the hands of the county courts throughout the United States: 2d, By relying on the militia officers in each county: 3d, By appointing particular persons for that purpose in every county. It is believed that either of these modes would be found adequate.

Nor does there appear to be any well founded objection to the right in Congress to adopt this plan, or to its equality in its application to our fellow-citizens individually. Congress have a right, by the constitution, to raise regular armies, and no restraint is imposed on the exercise of it, except in the provisions which are intended to guard generally against the abuse of power, with none of which does this plan interfere. It is proposed that it shall operate on all alike; that none shall be exempted from it except the Chief Magistrate of the United States, and the Governors of the several States.

It would be absurd to suppose that Congress could not carry this power into effect, otherwise than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals. It might happen that an army could not be raised in that mode, whence the power would have been granted in vain. The safety of the State might depend on such an army. Long continued invasions, conducted by regular, well disciplined troops, can best be repelled by troops kept constantly in the field, and equally well disciplined. Courage in an army is, in a great measure, mechanical. A small body, well trained, accustomed to action, gallantly led on, often breaks three or four times the number of more respectable and more brave, but raw and undisciplined troops. The sense of danger is diminished by frequent exposure to it, without harm; and confidence, even in the timid, is inspired by a knowledge that reliance may be placed on others, which can grow up only by service together. The grant to Congress to raise armies, was made with a knowledge of all these circumstances, and with an intention that it should take effect. The framers of the constitution, and the States who ratified it, knew the advantage which an enemy might have over us, by regular forces, and intended to place their country on an equal footing.

The idea that the United States cannot raise a regular army in any other mode than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals, is believed to be repugnant to the uniform construction of all grants of power, and equally so to the first principles and leading objects of the federal compact. An unqualified grant of power gives the means necessary to carry it into effect. This is an universal maxim, which admits of no exception. Equally true is it, that the conservation of the State is a duty paramount to all others. The commonwealth has a right to the service of all its citizens; or, rather, the citizens composing the commonwealth have a right, collectively and in dividually, to the service of each other, to repel any danger which may be menaced. The manner in which the service is to be apportioned among the citizens, and rendered by them, are objects of legislation. All that is to be dreaded in such case, is, the abuse of power; and, happily, our constitution has provided ample security against that evil.

In support of this right in Congress, the militia service affords a conclusive proof and striking example. The organization of the militia is an act of public authority, not a voluntary association. The service required must be performed by all, under penalties, which delinquents pay. The generous and patriotic perform them cheerfully. In the alacrity with which the call of the Government has been obeyed, and the cheerfulness with which the service has been performed throughout the United States, by the great body of the militia, there is abundant cause to rejoice in the strength of our republican institutions, and in the virtue of the people.

The plan proposed is not more compulsive than the militia service, while it is free from most of the objections to it. The militia service calls from home, for long terms, whole districts of country. None can elude the call. Few can avoid the service; and those who do are compelled to pay great sums for substitutes. This plan fixes on no one personally, and opens to all who choose it a chance of declining the service. It is a principal object of this plan to engage in the defence of the State the unmarried and youthful, who can best defend it, and best be spared, and to secure to those who render this important service an adequate compensation from the voluntary contributions of the more wealthy, in every class. Great confidence is entertained that such contribution will be made in time to avoid a draught. Indeed, it is believed to be the necessary and inevitable tendency of this plan to produce that effect.

The limited powers which the United States have in organizing the militia may be urged as an argument against their right to raise regular troops in the mode proposed. If any argument could be drawn from that circumstance, I should suppose that it would be in favor of an opposite conclusion. The power of the United States over the militia has been limited, and that for raising regular armies granted without limitation. There was doubtless some object in this arrangement. The fair inference seems to be, that it was made on great consideration; that the limitation, in the first instance, was intentional, the consequence of the unqualified grant in the second. But it is said, that, by drawing the men from the militia service into the regular army, and putting them under regular officers, you violate a principle of the constitution, which provides that the militia shall be commanded by their own officers. If this was the fact, the conclusion would follow. But it is not the fact. The men are not drawn from the militia, but from the population of the country. When they enlist voluntarily, it is not as militia men that they act, but as citizens. If they are draughted, it must be in the same sense. In both instances, they are enrolled in the militia corps; but that, as is presumed, cannot prevent the voluntary act in the one instance or the compulsive in the other. The whole population of the United States, within certain ages, belong to these corps. If the United States could not form regular armies from them, they could raise none.

In proposing a draught as one of the modes of raising men, in case of actual necessity, in the present great emergency of the country, I have thought it my duty to examine such objections to it as occurred, particularly those of a constitutional nature. It is from my sacred regard for the principles of our constitution, that I have ventured to trouble the committee with any remarks on this part of the subject.

Should it appear that this mode of raising recruits was justly objectionable, on account of the tax on property, from difficulties which may be apprehended in the execution, or from other causes, it may be advisable to decline the tax, and for the Government to pay the whole bounty. In this case, it is proposed that, in lieu of the present bounty, the sum of fifty dollars be allowed to each recruit or draught, at the time of his engagement, and one hundred acres of land in addition to the present bounty in land, for every year that the war may continue.

It is impossible to state, with mathematical accuracy, the number which will be raised by the ratio of 4 to 100, or 1 to 25, nor is it necessary. It is probable that it will be rather more than sufficient to fill the present corps. The extra number, in that case, may form a part of the local force in contemplation, a power to that effect being given to the President.

No radical change in the present military establishment is proposed. Should any modification be found necessary, on further consideration, it will form the subject of a separate communication. It is thought advisable, in general, to preserve the corps in their present form, and to fill them with new recruits, in the manner stated. All these corps have already seen service, and many of them acquired in active scenes much experience and useful knowledge. By preserving them in their present form, and under their present officers, and filling them with new recruits, the improvement of the latter will be rapid. In two or three months, it will be difficult to distinguish between the new and old levies.

The additional force to be provided amounts to forty thousand men. Of this it is proposed that local corps be raised, to consist partly of infantry, partly of mounted men, and partly of artillery. There is reason to believe that such corps may be raised in the principal cities, and even on the frontiers, to serve for the war, under an engagement as to the limit beyond which they should not be carried. Every able bodied citizen is willing and ready to fight for his home, his family, and his country, when invaded. Of this we have seen in the present year the most honorable and gratifying proofs. It does not suit all, however, to go great distances from home. This generous and patriotic spirit may be taken advantage of, under proper arrangements, with the happiest effects to the country, and without essential inconvenience to the parties.

The officers who may be appointed to command these corps should be charged with recruiting them. Local defence being their sole object, it may be presumed that the corps will soon be raised. Patriotism alone will furnish a very powerful motive. It seems reasonable, however, that some recompense should be made to those who relieve others from the burthen; one hundred acres of land and fifty dollars to each recruit will, it is presumed, be deemed sufficient.

It is proposed that this additional force shall form a part of any plan that may be adopted.

#### SECOND PLAN.

This plan consists of a classification of the militia, and the extension of their terms of service.

Let the whole militia of the United States be divided into the following classes, viz.

All free male persons, capable of service, between the ages of 18 and 25, into one class; all those between the ages of 25 and 32, into another class; and those between 32 and 45, into a third class.

It is proposed, also, that the President shall have power to call into service any portion of either of these classes which, in his judgment, the exigencies of the country may require, to remain in service two years from the time each corps shall be assembled at the appointed place of rendezvous.

It is believed that a shorter term than two years would not give to these corps the efficiency in military operations that is desired, and deemed indispensable; nor avoid the evils that are so sensibly felt, and generally complained of, under the present arrangement. It requires two campaigns to make a complete soldier, especially where the corps, officers, and men, are alike raw and inexperienced. In the interim, the numbers must be multiplied, to supply the defect of discipline; and it requires the extension of the term of service, to avoid the additional proportional augmentation of having so many in the field at the same time, in marching to the frontier, and returning from it. The inconvenience to the parties, and loss to the community, in other respects, need not be repeated. It is proper to add, only, that, if substitutes are allowed in this service, it must put an end to the recruiting of men for the regular army, especially the old corps. Of the justice of this remark what has occurred in the present year has furnished full proof. It follows that, if this plan is adopted, the militia must be relied on principally, if not altogether, in the farther prosecution of the war.

The additional force for local service, amounting to forty thousand men, will likewise form a part, as already observed, of this plan.

#### THIRD PLAN.

It is proposed by this plan to exempt every five men from militia service, who shall find one to serve for the war. It is probable that some recruits might be raised in this mode, in most or all of the States. But it is apprehended that it would prevent recruiting in every other mode, by the high bounty which some of the wealthy might give. The consequence would probably be very injurious, as it is not believed that any great number could be raised in this mode.

#### FOURTH PLAN.

Should all the preceding plans be found objectionable, it remains that the present system of recruiting be adhered to, with an augmentation of the bounty in land. Should this be preferred, it is advised that, in addition to the 160 acres of land now given, 100 be allowed annually for every year while the war lasts.



These plans are thought more deserving the attention of the committee than any that have occurred. The first, for the reasons stated, is preferred. It is believed that it will be found more efficient against the enemy, less expensive to the public, and less burthensome on our fellow-citizens.

It has likewise the venerable sanction of our Revolution. In that great struggle, resort was had to this expedient for filling the ranks of our regular army, and with decisive effect.

It is not intended by these remarks, should the first plan be adopted, to dispense altogether with the service of the militia. Although the principal burthen of the war may thereby be taken from the militia, reliance must still be placed on them for important aids, especially in cases of sudden invasion. For this purpose it will still be advisable that the men be classed according to age, and that their term of service be prolonged. Even should this plan be attended with all the advantages expected of it, such an arrangement could not fail to produce the happiest effect. The proof which it would afford of the impregnable strength of the country, of the patient virtue and invincible spirit of the people, would admonish the enemy how vain and fruitless his invasions must be, and might dispose him to a speedy, just, and honorable peace.

Of the very important services already rendered by the militia, even under the present organization, too much cannot be said. If the United States make the exertion which is proposed, it is probable that the contest will soon be at an end. It cannot be doubted that it is in their power to expel the British forces from this continent, should the British Government, by persevering in its unjust demands, make that an object with the American people. Against our united and vigorous efforts, the resistance of the enemy will soon become light and feeble. Success in every fair and honorable claim is within our easy grasp. And surely the United States have every possible inducement to make the effort necessary to secure it. I should insult the understanding, and wound the feelings of the committee, if I touched on the calamities incident to defeat. Dangers which are remote, and can never be realized, excite no alarm with a gallant and generous people. But the advantages of success have a fair claim to their deliberate consideration. The effort which we have already made has attracted the attention and extorted the praise of other nations. Already have most of the absurd theories and idle speculations on our system of government been refuted and put down. We are now felt and respected as a Power, and it is the dread which the enemy entertains of our vast resources and growing importance, that has induced him to push the war against us, after its professed objects had ceased. Success by the discomfiture of his schemes, and the attainment of an honorable peace, will place the United States on higher ground, in the opinion of the world, than they have held at any former period. In future wars, their commerce will be permitted to take its lawful range unmolested. Their remonstrances to foreign Governments will not again be put aside unheeded. Few will be presented, because there will seldom be occasion for them. Our union, founded on interest and affection, will have acquired new strength by the proof it will have afforded of the important advantages attending it. Respected abroad, and happy at home, the United States will have accomplished the great objects for which they have so long contended. As a nation, they will have little to dread; as a people, little to desire.

*Extract from Marshall's Life of Washington, volume 4th, page 241.*

"In general, the Assemblies of the States followed the example of Congress, and apportioned on the several counties or towns within the State, the quota to be furnished by each. This division of the State was again to be subdivided into classes, and each class was to furnish a man by contributions or taxes imposed on itself. In some instances, a draught was to be used in the last resort; in others, the man was to be recruited by persons appointed for that purpose, and the class to be taxed with the sum given for his bounty."

*Extract from Ramsey's Life of Washington, 2d volume, page 246.*

"Where voluntary enlistments fell short of the proposed number, the deficiencies were, by the laws of several States, to be made up by draught on lots from the militia. The towns in New England, and the counties in the middle States, were respectively called on for a specified number of men. Such was the zeal of the people in New England, that neighbors would often elect together to engage one of their number to go into the army. Maryland directed her Lieutenants of counties to class all the property in their respective counties into as many equal classes as there were men wanted, and each class was by law obliged, within ten days thereafter, to furnish an able-bodied recruit during the war; and in case of their neglecting or refusing to do so, the county Lieutenants were authorized to procure men at their expense, at any rate not exceeding fifteen pounds in every hundred pounds' worth of property classed agreeably to law. Virginia also classed her citizens, and called upon the respective classes for every fiftieth man for public service. Pennsylvania centered the requisite power in the President. Mr. Reed, and authorized him to decree forth the resources of the State, under certain limitations, and, if necessary, to declare martial law over the State. The execution of these arrangements, although uncommonly vigorous, lagged far behind."

SENATE'S COMMITTEE CHAMBER, October 19, 1814.

Sir:

I lost not a moment in laying before the Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs, the report you did me the honor to address to me on the 17th, and received on the 18th instant, in reply to a former communication; and after the most respectful consideration of that report, I am, instructed by the committee to ask from you further information upon the following points:

1st. Whether any defects have been heretofore discovered in the existing provisions for filling the ranks of the regular army? If so, what are the defects?

2d. In what mode, in the opinion of the War Department, could such defects be best remedied by legislative provisions?

3d. The committee also request an outline of the plan for raising the 40,000 men proposed by your report, and particularly how far limitations are proposed to be imposed by law upon the President of the United States, in the application of that force?

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.

WM. B. GILES, *Chairman.*

The Hon. JAMES MONROE, *Secretary for the Department of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 21, 1814.

Sir:

In reply to your letter of yesterday, I have to state that I shall have the honor of an interview with the Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs, at half after nine o'clock to morrow morning, at the house in which Congress holds its session. I shall then be happy to communicate to the committee the views of this Department on the subjects adverted to in your letter.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

Honorable W. B. GILES, *Senate U. S.*

SENATE'S COMMITTEE CHAMBER, *October 21, 1814.*

SIR:

I have this moment received your letter of the same date herewith, probably by mistake; and immediately submitted its contents to the Committee on Military Affairs, by whom I am instructed to inform you, that the committee will be happy to receive your personal attendance to-morrow morning, at the time and for the objects mentioned in your letter.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

W. B. GILES, *Chairman.*The Honorable JAMES MONROE, *Secretary for the Department of War.*ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, *October 22, 1814.*

SIR:

By direction of the Secretary of War, I have the honor to enclose herewith an abstract of the general return of the army of the United States, to October 1st, 1814. Should the committee require a more general return, similar to the one furnished the Military Committee of the House, it could be furnished in the course of the next week.

I am, sir, yours, respectfully,

JOHN R. BELL, *Assistant Inspector General.*Honorable Mr. GILES, *Senate, Washington.*

*Return of the whole number of Recruits enlisted, agreeably to the act of Congress, passed 27th January, 1814, for the several Corps and Regiments of the Army, from 1st February to 30th September, 1814, inclusive, agreeably to the returns received at this Office.*

Regiment light artillery,	342	25th regiment infantry,	310
Regiment light dragoons,	174	26th ditto,	165
Corps of artillery,	345	27th ditto,	550
1st regiment infantry,	91	28th ditto,	146
2d ditto,	46	29th ditto,	503
3d ditto,	5	30th ditto,	274
4th ditto,	158	31st ditto,	161
5th ditto,	215	32d ditto,	23
6th ditto,	180	33d ditto,	181
7th ditto,	143	34th ditto,	441
8th ditto,	210	35th ditto,	362
9th ditto,	215	36th ditto,	136
10th ditto,	205	37th ditto,	330
11th ditto,	194	38th ditto,	206
12th ditto,	159	39th ditto,	192
13th ditto,	330	40th ditto,	
14th ditto,	180	41st ditto,	223
15th ditto,	213	42d ditto,	188
16th ditto,	262	43d ditto,	122
17th ditto,	262	44th ditto,	292
18th ditto,	82	45th ditto,	344
19th ditto,	346	46th ditto,	
20th ditto,	153	1st rifle regiment,	148
21st ditto,	198	2d ditto,	172
22d ditto,	162	3d ditto,	124
23d ditto,	323	4th ditto,	97
24th ditto,	108		
		Total,	9,991

It will be perceived that, from two of the above regiments, no return of recruits has been received; from many of them the returns for September have not been received. The whole number of recruits made since the passage of the law above referred to, to the present time, may be estimated at 1500 more than the above return.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *October 26, 1814.*JOHN R. BELL, *Assistant Inspector General.*

NOTE.—For a further and more accurate return, see No. 134.

SENATE'S COMMITTEE CHAMBER, *October 24, 1814.*

SIR:

The Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs being extremely anxious to come to a final determination upon the objects of its appointment, and deeming some further information from your Department essential to enable it to determine correctly, has instructed me to ask for information on the following points:

1st. To what causes is the failure in the recruiting service, heretofore, properly attributable?

2d. Has such failure arisen from any failure to place the requisite sums of money in the hands of the recruiting officers; or has it arisen from the indisposition of the citizens to enlist?

Any other information within your Department, tending to throw light upon this subject, would be particularly acceptable to the committee.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. B. GILES, *Chairman.*The Hon. JAMES MONROE, *Secretary for the Department of War.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 26, 1814.*

SIR:

In reply to the letter which I received from you of the 24th, I have the honor to transmit to you a report of the Paymaster General, of the sums of money advanced on account of the recruiting service, since the 27th of January last. I also transmit a return of the number of men recruited within that time. A more detailed return, showing how many have been recruited in each month, in each regiment, shall be furnished as soon as it can be prepared.

By these returns it appears that more money has been advanced on account of the recruiting service than was sufficient to raise a much greater number of men than has been recruited. A considerable sum remains to be accounted for by the recruiting officers. Whether any of them failed in their duty, is an object of inquiry for this De-

partment, which will not be neglected. I have been too short a time in it to make myself thoroughly acquainted with their conduct in this respect. By these returns, it would follow that the failure in the recruiting service was not owing to the want of money, if it was certain that the recruiting officers had in all instances done their duty; and that the money had been distributed in those quarters of our country where it would have been most easy to obtain recruits. How far the failure ought to be attributed to either of those causes, it is not in my power to state.

From the view which I have taken of the subject, founded on the best information I have been able to collect, I am led to believe that the failure in the recruiting service has been owing, in most of the States, principally to the high bounty given for substitutes by the detached militia.

Many of the militia detached for six months have given a greater sum for substitutes than the bounty allowed by the United States for a recruit to serve for the war.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

The Hon Wm. B. GILES, *Chairman, &c.*

ARMY PAY OFFICE, CITY OF WASHINGTON, *October 26th, 1814.*

The Paymaster of the army of the United States, to whom has been referred the letter from the honorable the Chairman of the Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs to the Secretary of War, under date of October 24th, 1814, has the honor to report:

1st. That the books of this office exhibit the disbursement of two millions and twelve thousand four hundred and thirty-nine dollars and thirty-three cents, on account of bounties and premiums for recruits, between the 27th of January, 1814, the date of the passage of the law increasing the bounty, and the date hereof: the distribution of this sum, as nearly as can be well ascertained, has been as follows, viz:

To Massachusetts, including the District of Maine, - - - - -	237,400 00	To North Carolina, - - - - -	60,000 00
To New Hampshire, - - - - -	37,800 00	To South Carolina, - - - - -	72,800 00
To Vermont, - - - - -	109,300 00	To Georgia, - - - - -	34,000 00
To Connecticut, - - - - -	78,932 00	To Tennessee, - - - - -	98,500 00
To Rhode Island, - - - - -	1,000 00	To Kentucky, - - - - -	108,000 00
To New York, - - - - -	495,320 00	To Ohio, - - - - -	96,000 00
To New Jersey, - - - - -	15,000 00	To Louisiana, - - - - -	83,530 00
To Pennsylvania, - - - - -	190,900 00	To the Michigan Territory, - - - - -	20,000 00
To Delaware, - - - - -	10,000 00	To the Mississippi Territory, - - - - -	4,000 00
To Maryland, including the District of Columbia, - - - - -	95,002 35	To the Indiana Territory, - - - - -	2,000 00
To Virginia, - - - - -	160,962 98	To Missouri Territory, - - - - -	1,492 00
			<u>*\$2,012,439, 33</u>

2d. That pressing calls for very considerable sums of money for the recruiting service have been made on him for about three months past, which he has been able but partially to supply.

Respectfully,

ROBERT BRENT, *P. M. U. S. Army.*

The Hon JAMES MONROE, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 29th, 1814.*

Sir:

Enclosed is an abstract of the law establishing the Ordnance Department, and also of the bill now prepared for the new organization of that department, which will give you a view of the contemplated changes in, and enlargements of, the duties and powers of that department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

The Hon. WILLIAM B. GILES, *Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate.*

\* See No. 132.

[13th CONGRESS.]

[No. 134.]

[3d SESSION.]

## RETURN OF ENLISTMENTS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, ON THE 10TH OF NOVEMBER, 1814.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 10, 1814.*

Sir:

Since I had the honor to enclose to you a statement of the number of men who have been recruited in the army of the United States during the present year, I have received a further statement from the Assistant Inspector General, attached to this Department.

This report shows more satisfactorily the expenditure of the money which has been advanced on that account, and number of men raised. The same data cannot, however, be adopted in estimating the future progress in recruiting, a considerable number of those who were recruited having been re-enlisted from the old corps. That resource has been exhausted. To form an estimate of the probable future success, we must take into consideration only those who were raised from the country, which is probably the number included in this return.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

Honorable Mr. GILES, *Chairman, &c.*

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON CITY, November 2d, 1814.

SIR:

The deranged state of the papers of this office by the late removals rendered it impracticable for me, when I submitted the hasty estimate on the 26th October,\* to have recourse to all the documents of the recruits made within the present year. On a further examination, the enclosed is submitted.

It may be necessary, with a view to your better information, to accompany the return I now have the honor to transmit, with some explanatory observations. The difficulty under which this office has labored, from the want of regular recruiting returns, has been considerable, and necessarily occasions the general return to be inaccurate and unsatisfactory. No pains, however, have been spared to render the accompanying document as accurate as it can be made from the data which the files of this office afford.

In January last, large sums of money were put into the hands of commanders of regiments and corps, for the purpose of re-enlisting the men whose terms of service were about to expire. These were the soldiers enlisted for the additional army of 1808, and those of 1812 enlisted for twelve and eighteen months. This money was distributed among the officers commanding companies, who employed it to its full extent in the re-enlistment of their men, who, at the next muster, were returned on the muster rolls as re-enlisted. Satisfied as the officers seem to have been with this species of return, they made no special one to this office of those they had thus re-enlisted.

Indeed the entire want of some returns, and the irregularity and defectiveness of others, render it extremely difficult to form a correct idea of the manner in which the public money has been expended. By way of illustration, I would refer you to the 46th regiment, of which no recruiting returns whatever have yet been made, when it is known by the army returns that this regiment contains 230 men, and to the 32d regiment, of which there is a return of only 42 men, when it is known, through the same channel, that it now contains more than 300. From this, the difficulty of ascertaining, immediately, to what amount, if any, officers entrusted with public money have been guilty of defalcation, must be evident. On this subject, however, it may be proper to remark, that there exist no grounds for suspecting any defalcations: for, although the returns do not show all the recruits enlisted, and by whom, yet the general return, exhibiting the strength of armies and corps, compared with that of last year, shows plainly that the number of men raised corresponds with sufficient exactness with the money issued for that purpose.

The Paymaster of the army has issued, up to the 26th October, on account of bounties and premiums, \$2,012,439, which, supposing 3,000 men to have received the second moiety of their bounty, (an estimate, it is believed, sufficiently moderate) would raise 30,023 men. By the return communicated to the committee in a letter from the Secretary of War of the 1st January last, the effective force of the army was then 6012. But, by the general return of the 30th of September, which embraces no return of a later date than August, it appears the strength of the army was then 34,029; from which it is evident that 26,017 men at least, must have been raised since January last. I say at least, because the casualties, of deaths, desertions, and discharges, during the campaign, are not included. This number would require the sum of 1,613,054 dollars. Now, estimating the casualties during the campaign at 3,000 men, which, to raise them, would require \$186,000, and adding to this the second moiety, which is presumed to have been paid to 3,000 men, viz: \$150,000, it is clear that, to raise the men borne on the return, it was necessary to expend \$1,949,054. This will leave \$63,385 in the hands of the recruiting officers, nearly the whole of which must have been since expended in the recruiting service.

With much respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN R. BELL, *Inspector General.*

\* See No. 133.

Return of the whole number of Recruits enlisted, agreeably to the act of Congress, passed 27th January, 1814, for the several corps and regiments in the army of the United States, for each month, from February to September, inclusive; according to the returns received at this office.

REGIMENT OR CORPS.	PRINCIPAL RENDEZVOUS.	TOTAL NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES.								Whole No. Enlisted.
		February, 1814.	March, 1814.	April, 1814.	May, 1814.	June, 1814.	July, 1814.	August, 1814.	Septem. 1814.	
Regiment of Light Artillery,	Dedham, Massachusetts,	8	23	100	32	24	84	71		342
Regiment of Light Dragoons,	Carlisle, Pennsylvania,	40	77	44	13					174
Corps of Artillery,			39	35	82	45	53	41		345
First regiment of Infantry,	New Brunswick, New Jersey,		6	10						91
Second regiment of Infantry,	Natchez,		4	42			16	10		46
Third regiment of Infantry,	Louisville, Georgia,							5	10	15
Fourth regiment of Infantry,	Concord, New Hampshire,		38	38	35	13	4	24	6	158
Fifth regiment of Infantry,	Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,	34	31	37	42	18	14	17	22	215
Sixth regiment of Infantry,	Reading, Pennsylvania,		9	21	33	24	33	32	28	170
Seventh regiment of Infantry,	Hopkinsville, Kentucky,		7	20	10	18		34	44	133
Eighth regiment of Infantry,	Fort Hawkins, Georgia,	3	16	65	44	32	12	16	22	210
Ninth regiment of Infantry,	Boston and Pittsfield, Massachusetts,	10	117	13	33	23		7	12	215
Tenth regiment of Infantry,	Wilkesbarre, North Carolina,	25	34	37	45	21	20	23	25	230
Eleventh regiment of Infantry,	Bennington and Rutland, Vermont,	27	33	48	29	25	32			194
Twelfth regiment of Infantry,	Staunton, Virginia,	20	44	31	30	18	2		14	159
Thirteenth regiment of Infantry,	Albany, New York,		73	78	48	31	20	15	64	329
Fourteenth regiment of Infantry,	Baltimore, Maryland,	6	45	22	30	6	32	24	15	180
Fifteenth regiment of Infantry,	Trenton, New Jersey,	23	29	29	29	19	22	21	41	214
Sixteenth regiment of Infantry,	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,	40	71	50	21	22	44	32	12	292
Seventeenth regiment of Infantry,	Lexington, Kentucky, and Chillicothe, Ohio,	20	47	62	104	29	9	25	20	316
Eighteenth regiment of Infantry,	Columbia, South Carolina,		5	25	4	14	22		130	200
Nineteenth regiment of Infantry,	Zanesville, Ohio,		74	130	63	7	9	49	14	346
Twentieth regiment of Infantry,	Fredericksburg, Virginia,	9	38	9	8	34	51	16	6	170
Twenty-first regiment of Infantry,	Portsmouth, New Hampshire,		53	80	41	29	3	5	7	218
Twenty-second regiment of Infantry,	Pittsburg, Pennsylvania,	34	30	34	21		58	28	24	229
Twenty-third regiment of Infantry,	Utica, New York,	12	31	80	59	39	30	36		287
Twenty-fourth regiment of Infantry,	Nashville and Knoxville, Tennessee,		9	4	20	55	40	51	38	217
Twenty-fifth regiment of Infantry,	Hartford, Connecticut,	96	147	33	38	46	29	37	13	439
Twenty-sixth regiment of Infantry,	Burlington, Vermont,				7	43	31	77	134	292
Twenty-seventh regiment of Infantry,	New York city,		5	13	114	159	116	141		548
Twenty-eighth regiment of Infantry,	Olympian Springs, Kentucky,	6	27	7	26	27	23	3	33	152
Twenty-ninth regiment of Infantry,	Albany, New York,	86	138	65	86	40	41	34	39	529
Thirtieth regiment of Infantry,	Burlington, Vermont,	18	56	133	90	31	20	16		364
Thirty-first regiment of Infantry,	Woodstock, Vermont,	77	89	51	22	6	25	29	29	328
Thirty-second regiment of Infantry,		20		10	2			2	5	42
Thirty-third regiment of Infantry,	Saco, Maine,		162	53	25	39	34		30	343
Thirty-fourth regiment of Infantry,	Portland, Maine,	9	120	126	112	47	32	82	32	560
Thirty-fifth regiment of Infantry,	Petersburg, Virginia,	129	72	72	40	88	42	51	71	565
Thirty-sixth regiment of Infantry,	Georgetown, D. C. Richmond, Virginia,	23	97	66	17	25	28	10	23	289
Thirty-seventh regiment of Infantry,	New London, Connecticut,		167	128	54	65	28	71	66	579

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RETURN OF ENLISTMENTS.

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RETURN—Continued:

REGIMENT OR CORPS.	PRINCIPAL RENDEZVOUS.	TOTAL NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES.								
		February, 1814.	March, 1814.	April, 1814.	May, 1814.	June, 1814.	July, 1814.	August, 1814.	Septem. 1814.	Whole No. Enlisted.
Thirty-eighth regiment of Infantry,	Craney Island and Baltimore,	99	209	69	154	15	14	95	37	692
Thirty-ninth regiment of Infantry,	Knoxville, Tennessee,			59	3	8	38	42	40	190
Fortieth regiment of Infantry,										
Forty-first regiment of Infantry,	New York city,		21	34	32	24	52	35	25	223
Forty-second regiment of Infantry,	New York, and Newcastle, Delaware,	102	49	26	26	8	8		11	230
Forty-third regiment of Infantry,	Raleigh, North Carolina,			49	32		1	6	15	103
Forty-fourth regiment of Infantry,	New Orleans,	4	15	56	55	74	53	17		274
Forty-fifth regiment of Infantry,	Bath, Maine,			136	16	17	55	77	43	344
Forty-sixth regiment of Infantry,	New York city,									
First Rifle regiment,				45	48	1		15	1	110
Second Rifle regiment,	Chillicothe, Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee,				47	69	53	18		187
Third Rifle regiment,	Virginia and the Carolinas,			19	96	50	157	156	92	570
Fourth Rifle regiment,	Pennsylvania,			57	86		3	92	11	249
Total,		980	2,357	2,501	2,138	1,445	1,486	1,687	1,304	13,898

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON CITY, November 2, 1814,

JOHN R. BELL, *Inspector General.*

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 135.

[3d SESSION.

## APPORTIONMENT OF A DETACHMENT OF 80,000 MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, NOVEMBER 12, 1814:

The bill "to authorize the President of the United States to call upon the several States and Territories thereof for their respective quotas of ——— thousand men, for the defence of the frontiers of the United States," being under consideration.

*An Estimate of the apportionment of eighty thousand Militia amongst the several States and Territories.*

	Representa- tion.	Upon the principle of the ra- tio of rep- resentation.	Free white males of sixteen and under forty-five years.	Upon the princi- ple of the white male inhabitants between the ages of sixteen & for- ty-five.	Aggregate includ- ing officers of all grades, from the latest returns of the militia of the United States.	Upon the principle of the aggregate from the latest returns of the mi- litia of the Unit- ed States.
State of New Hampshire,	6	2,580	42,732	3,100	24,938	2,803
Massachusetts,	20	8,605	138,349	10,036	70,527	7,930
Vermont,	6	2,580	41,775	3,032	20,273	2,280
Rhode Island,	2	860	15,155	1,100	8,010	900
Connecticut,	7	3,010	51,266	3,720	17,551	1,973
New York,	27	11,615	170,944	12,405	98,606	11,086
New Jersey,	6	2,580	42,553	3,087	33,765	3,796
Pennsylvania,	23	9,895	146,786	10,652	99,414	11,177
Delaware,	2	860	11,068	803	7,451	837
Maryland,	9	3,870	46,783	3,395	32,189	3,620
Virginia,	23	9,895	106,062	7,697	69,416	7,805
North Carolina,	13	5,590	71,877	5,217	50,992	5,734
South Carolina,	9	3,870	39,557	2,870	33,729	3,792
Georgia,	6	2,580	25,811	1,875	25,729	2,893
Kentucky,	10	4,300	55,431	4,025	44,422	4,995
Tennessee,	6	2,580	37,488	2,720	29,183	3,281
Ohio,	6	2,580	39,426	2,860	35,275	3,965
Louisiana,	1	430	5,900	428	No return.	
Territory of Mississippi,	1	430	3,940	283	5,291	595
Missouri,	1	430	2,800	203	No return.	
Indiana,	1	430	4,108	297	4,790	538
Illinois,	1	430	1,947	145	No return.	
Michigan,	-	-	679	50	No return.	
	186	80,000	1,102,437	80,000	711,551	80,000

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 136.

[3d SESSION.

## SYSTEM OF DISCIPLINE FOR THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 23D OF NOVEMBER, 1814.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 22, 1814.

The Secretary of War, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 10th instant, requesting information whether the army of the United States was trained by any uniform system of discipline, and, if not, what were the causes that have prevented it; and, whether any legislative provision was necessary to effect the same, has the honor to report:

1st. That no uniform system of discipline has heretofore been practised in training the armies of the United States, either in line, by battalion, or company.

2d. That, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, it would be advisable to institute a board of general and field officers, to digest, and report to this Department, a system of discipline for the army of the United States, which report, when approved by the President of the United States, should be carried into immediate effect, under the orders of this Department.

3d. That the sanction of Congress, by a resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, to this measure, if not absolutely necessary, in consideration of the powers already vested in this Department by law, would, nevertheless, have a very salutary effect.

JAMES MONROE.

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 137.

[3d Session.

## CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF WASHINGTON.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE 29TH OF NOVEMBER, 1814.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
23d of September, 1814.

*Resolved*, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against this metropolis, and the neighboring town of Alexandria; and into the manner in which the public buildings and property were destroyed, and the amount thereof, and that they have power to send for persons and papers.

Mr. Johnson, of Kentucky, Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Stockton, Mr. Miller, Mr. Goldsborough, Mr. Barbour, and Mr. Pickens, were appointed the said committee.

Mr. R. M. JOHNSON made the following report:

The committee charged with an inquiry so intimately concerning the character of administration, the sensibility of the nation, and the honor of its arms, as the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against this metropolis, &c. have endeavored to combine despatch with effect, in the manner in which they have collected the facts and views presented in the following statement:

*Proceedings of the Cabinet of 7th June, 1814.*

Previous to the 2d of July, this city composed a part of military district No. 5. Early in June last, the Secretary of War furnished the President, at his request, with a general report of the strength of the regular troops and militia then in the service of the United States, and their distribution; which was submitted to the heads of departments, by the President, on the 7th of June. The Secretary of the Navy had furnished the President with a similar estimate of our naval forces: that which was applicable to the limits of military district No. 10, will hereafter appear. By a reference to the estimate of the land forces, it appears, that the aggregate number of troops stationed in district No. 5, on the 7th of June, amounted to two thousand two hundred and eight, of which, there were two thousand one hundred and fifty-four effectives, stationed as follows: At Norfolk, two hundred and twenty-four artillerymen; the 20th, 35th, and 1st battalion of the 38th regiment of infantry, amounting to nine hundred and twelve; at Baltimore, one hundred and eleven artillerymen; 2d battalion of the 38th infantry, amounting to three hundred and sixteen; sea fencibles, one hundred and seventy-three; at Annapolis, forty artillerymen; at Fort Washington, eighty-two artillerymen; St. Mary's, 36th regiment of infantry, three hundred and fifty. The meeting of the cabinet on the 7th, and the estimates of land and naval forces, had no particular relation to the defence of any part of military district No. 5; but for measures generally, and particularly in regard to the campaign on our territorial frontiers in the North and Northwest. Nor does it appear that this city had excited more than ordinary attention at this time.

*Proceedings of the Cabinet the 1st of July.*

But, soon after, certain intelligence being received of the complete success of the allies in the subjugation of France, the President believed that the enemy had the inclination and the power to increase his military and naval forces against the United States; and, in that event, he believed that a variety of considerations would present this city as one of the prominent objects of attack. On the 26th of June, despatches were received from Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard, confirming the views of the President, which induced him to convene the heads of departments on the 1st of July; at which time he presented a plan of a force immediately to be called into the field, and an additional force to be kept in readiness to march, without delay, in case of necessity. It seemed to be his object that some position should be taken between the Eastern Branch and Patuxent, with two or three thousand men, and that an additional force of ten or twelve thousand militia and volunteers should be held in readiness in the neighboring States, including the militia of the District of Columbia, and that convenient depots of arms and military equipments should be established. The measures suggested were approved by the heads of departments; or, in other words, it does not appear that any dissent was expressed.

*Correspondence of the Secretary of War and General Winder.*

The next day, July the 2d, by a general order of the War Department, the 10th military district was created, to embrace the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannock and Potomac, under the command of Brigadier General Winder, who, being then in Baltimore, was advised of the fact by a letter from the Secretary of War of the same date. On the 4th of July, a requisition was made on certain States for a corps of ninety-three thousand five hundred men, designating the quota of each, with a request to the Executive of each State to detach, and hold in readiness for immediate service, their respective detachments, recommending the expediency of fixing the places of rendezvous, with a due regard to points, the importance or exposure of which would most likely attract the views of the enemy. Of that requisition, two thousand effectives from the quota of Virginia; five thousand from that of Pennsylvania; six thousand, the whole quota of Maryland; and two thousand, the estimated number of the militia of the District of Columbia, were put at the disposition of the commanding General, as hereafter appears, making the aggregate number of fifteen thousand, exclusive of the regular troops, viz: the 36th regiment, one battalion of the 38th, two troops of dragoons, two companies of the 10th infantry, one company of the 12th, and two companies of sea fencibles, supposed to amount to one thousand men, besides the artillerymen composing the garrisons of Forts M'Henry and Washington.

On the 9th of July, General Winder, in a letter to the Secretary of War, on the subject of the duties which devolved upon him as commander of the 10th military district, a previous conversation is alluded to as having taken place between them, in consequence of the request of the Secretary in his letter of the 2d of July. General Winder appears to have understood the intention of the Secretary of War to be, that the militia force proposed for the 10th military district should be draughted and designated, but that no part of it should be called into the field until the hostile squadron in the Chesapeake should be reinforced to such an extent as to render it probable that a serious attack was contemplated; states the difficulty of collecting a force in an emergency sufficient to retard the advance of the enemy; and suggests the expediency of calling out four thousand of the militia, with a view to station them, in equal proportions, between South river and Washington, and in the vicinity of Baltimore.

On the 12th of July, the Secretary of War, in a letter to General Winder, encloses a circular, addressed to the Governors of certain States, requiring a body of militia to be organized, equipped, and held in readiness for future service, and authorizes him, in case of actual or menaced invasion of the district under his command, to call for a part or the whole of the quota assigned to the State of Maryland; and in another, of the 17th July, the Secretary authorizes General Winder to draw from Virginia two thousand men; from Pennsylvania, five thousand men; and



informs him that the whole of the militia of the District of Columbia, amounting to about two thousand, was in a disposable state, and subject to his order; making, together with the six thousand from Maryland, the estimate of fifteen thousand militia. On the 15th of July, the Secretary of War advised General Winder that General Porter had communicated the fact of the arrival of the van of Cochrane's fleet at Lynnhaven bay, and that the agent at Point Look Out had represented that two seventy-fours, two frigates, an armed sloop and brig, ascended the bay at half past 5, post meridian, on the 14th; that he considered it proper to call into service the brigade of militia which had been for some time held in readiness at Baltimore, and not knowing whether General Winder was at Baltimore or Annapolis, he had instructed the Major General, under whose orders they were organized, to call them out.

General Winder, in a letter of the 16th of July, to the Secretary of War, among other things expresses his embarrassment in relation to the situation of Annapolis, and gives it as his opinion that a large force and many additional works would be necessary to defend it against a serious attack by land and water; states its importance to the enemy, and the ease with which it might be maintained by them with the command by water, and an entrenchment of seven or eight hundred yards, protected by batteries; represents Fort Madison as exposed, and unhealthy in the months of August and September, provided with two fifty pound columbiads, two twenty-fours, two eighteens, one twelve, and one tom, which might be turned with success against Fort Severn; that these guns should be removed, and arrangements made to blow up the fort; and represents the importance of defending the town if the means could be obtained; states the Governor of Maryland and Council had taken the necessary steps to comply immediately with the requisition of the General Government. On the 17th July a letter from General Winder to the Secretary of War states that information, that he deemed credible, was received, that the enemy was ascending the river in considerable force; that he had ordered the detachment of regulars to Nottingham, had sent out the alarm to assemble a militia force, and suggests the propriety of sending to that place the marine corps, and all the militia that could be procured from the District of Columbia. The Secretary, on the same day, acknowledges the receipt of the above letter, and states that the marine corps was not under his command; but had sent the request to the President, and, as the authority to call the militia was vested in the commanding General, he had transmitted his requisition upon the District to General Van Ness; he also reminds him that the two regiments near Baltimore had been called into actual service, and expresses the wish of the President that not less than two, nor more than three thousand of the draughts, under the requisition of the fourth of July, should be embodied and encamped at some middle point between Baltimore and this city.

From the letter of General Winder, of the 20th of July, it appears that the enemy proceeded up the Patuxent to Hunting creek, landed, and committed some depredations in Calvert county, and returned down the river. Three companies of city volunteers had marched from this district, in obedience to the call of General Winder, which he had halted at the Woodyard, and the detachments of the 36th and 38th regiments at Upper Marlborough, while he proceeded to Annapolis, to arrange with the Governor the calling out the Maryland militia; which, he states, will be immediately attended to by the Governor. He states that he had called for the largest number directed by the President, viz: three thousand, expecting thereby to get two thousand, the lowest number; that he forebore to dismantle Fort Madison, as it might alarm the people, and produce disagreeable sensations: preferring rather to risk it in case of attack. On the 23d of July, General Winder informs the Secretary of War that the Governor of Maryland had issued his order for calling out three thousand of the draughts under the requisition of the 4th July; and had appointed Bladensburg as the place of rendezvous according to his suggestion. In another letter of the same date, General Winder informs the Secretary of War that he had deemed it expedient to direct Captain Davidson, with the city volunteers, to return to the city of Washington; from the two-fold consideration that the facility with which they could turn out and proceed to any point, rendered them nearly as effective as if kept in the field, and the importance to them individually of attending to their private concerns. That the rifles used by Captain Dougherty's company were very defective, and that Captain Burch's artillery were without swords. He recommends that the camp equipage should be left in charge of the company officers to facilitate their march. On the 25th of July, General Winder, in a letter to the Secretary of War, dated at Warburton, near Fort Washington, represents that the fort in several respects to be incomplete in its preparation for defence; encloses a representation of Lieutenant Edwards on the subject; makes a requisition of ammunition, and requests that Colonel Wadsworth may cause the platform to be enlarged, so as to make the battery more effectual. The report of Lieutenant Edwards speaks of the necessity of mounting heavy artillery in the block house; states that the eighteen pound columbiads were not mounted, and that the garrison wanted means to mount them, being destitute of gin and tackle; represents the width of the platform, which ought to be twenty-one feet, to be only fourteen, and that the heavy guns, at their first discharge, would recoil to the hurtoirs, and on being heated would run over it; that five excellent long eighteens were mounted on the water battery, which would be very useful in case of attack; but there was not a single pound of ammunition for them, and that some of the gun carriages in the fort were quite out of order.

This statement of Lieutenant Edwards was referred, upon its receipt, to Colonel Wadsworth, with orders to supply what was wanting at the fort, of which the Secretary advised General Winder, bearing date 28th July; and Colonel Wadsworth, in a representation, about the same date, states, that two hands had been ordered from Greenleaf's point, on the Monday previous, to execute the necessary repairs of the gun-carriages; that the platform, as well as the parapet, was too narrow, but not so narrow as Lieutenant Edwards had stated, for it was directed to be made twenty or twenty-two feet wide; and that the disadvantage of too narrow a platform could be obviated with no great difficulty, by means of an elastic handspike introduced between the spokes of the wheels, which would prevent them from turning, and thus check the recoil of the piece. Further states, that two hundred rounds of shot and cartridges for the eighteens could be sent down if ordered; that he had long since directed some grape shot to be prepared for the eighteen pound columbiads; that a tackle and fall to mount the guns in the blockhouse should be prepared; that Captain Marsteller had just informed him that a good tackle and fall were at the fort when he left it; and that the platform was upwards of twenty feet wide. General Winder, in a letter of the 26th of July, from Piscataway, advises the Secretary of War that the enemy had descended both the Potomac and Patuxent rivers; that he expected him up the bay; and should not be surprised to find Annapolis his object; which he feared would fall before five hundred men: and that he should return to Marlborough as soon as he could ascertain the movements of the enemy. On the 27th of July, General Winder, in two letters to the Secretary of War, from Piscataway, states the force under General Stewart at eight hundred; Colonel Beall's regiment, at Port Tobacco, from three hundred to three hundred and fifty infantry, and forty dragoons; Colonel Bowen's regiment, at Nottingham, at three hundred; and the detachment of regulars, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott, was also at Nottingham; and from Gen. Winder's letter to the Secretary of War, of the first of August, from Port Tobacco, it appears that he had the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scott, at Piscataway.

*Correspondence of General Winder with the Governor of Pennsylvania.*

In relation to the quota of Pennsylvania, under the requisition of the 4th of July, and more especially as it regards the five thousand men subject to the call of General Winder, and assigned to his command, it appears that General Winder wrote to the Governor of Pennsylvania, on the 6th of August, advising him that the Secretary of War had destined a part of that quota to act under his command, in defending the country, embraced in the 10th military district, and requesting that he might be informed of the place, or places, of rendezvous, which would be fixed for such troops, and recommending places most contiguous to the cities of Washington and Baltimore. On the 8th of August, General Winder writes again to the Governor of Pennsylvania, stating that, since his first communication, he had read a letter from the Secretary of War, dated July the 17th, which had not reached him at an earlier period, in consequence of his having been in constant motion since that time; which informed him that, of the quota of militia of Pennsylvania, under the requisition of the 4th of July, five thousand were destined for the 10th military district, subject to his call as commanding officer, and requested that as great a proportion of the detachment as possible should be riflemen.

On the 11th of August, Secretary Boileau, under the direction of the Governor of Pennsylvania, in answer to General Winder, states that, in consequence of the deranged state of the militia system, great difficulties occurred to the Executive, in relation to the quota required to be held in readiness for the service of the United States. The only effort that could be made towards a compliance with the requisition, was to have ordered a designation for the service of the requisite troops, under the militia law of 1807, and before the expiration of that law; which order had been issued by the Governor, and was in a course of execution; that the militia law of 1807 expired on the first of August, and that all commissions under it became void, except of such officers as might be in service on that day; and that, by an oversight in the Legislature, no complete organization of the militia could be legally made in Pennsylvania, until the fourth Monday in October, when a classification was to take place.

On the 17th of August, General Winder makes a requisition on the Governor of Pennsylvania for one regiment, to march forthwith to the city of Washington; and on the day following, in consequence of large reinforcements of the enemy in the mouth of the Patuxent, he calls for the whole five thousand Pennsylvania militia, by virtue of his previous authority. The five thousand were ordered out, to rendezvous at York, in Pennsylvania, on the fifth of September; of course, not in time to give any aid on the occasion for which they were called; nor was General Winder's letter of the 18th received by the Governor of Pennsylvania until the evening of the twenty-third.

*Correspondence of the Secretary of War and General Winder.*

On the 13th of August, General Winder, in a letter to the Secretary of War, states that, in consequence of the acceptance of the 2d regiment draughted from General Smith's division, under the requisition of April, for part of the requisition of the 4th of July, the impracticability, besides impropriety, of calling any portion of the draughted militia from the Eastern Shore of Maryland, and the necessity of leaving all the men, immediately upon the bay, and low down on the rivers of the Western Shore, for local defence; the remaining portion of the Maryland draughts to be assembled at Bladensburg, instead of being three thousand, would not much exceed as many hundred; yet he would require the Governor to order out all the draughts that could possibly be spared from the three lower brigades, on the Western Shore; but as the whole number draughted, on the Western Shore, exclusive of the brigade drawn from General Smith's division, did not amount to fifteen hundred men; he did not expect more than one thousand under the second order of the Government, that of the 4th of July. The most immediate and convenient resource to supply this deficiency was to take the militia drawn out under the State authority, and assembled at Annapolis, to the amount of one thousand, into the service of the United States, and to call on Pennsylvania for one regiment, which would make his militia between two and three thousand men, besides the two regiments from General Smith's division.

In answer to this letter, the Secretary of War, in a letter of the 16th of August, authorizes General Winder to take into the service of the United States the Maryland militia then at Annapolis, or elsewhere, that had been called out under the State authority, as part of the quota required by the order of the 4th of July.

*Correspondence of the Secretary of War with the Governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.*

On the 27th of July the Governor of Maryland states, in a letter to the Secretary of War, that, in conformity to the request of the President of the United States, communicated in the requisition of the 4th, a detachment of five thousand five hundred infantry and six hundred artillery was directed to be organized and held in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and in order to comply with the requisition of General Winder, for calling into the field three thousand draughts of the Maryland militia, by direction of the President, the whole of the draughts from the Western Shore, about three thousand five hundred infantry, had been ordered to embody. He speaks of the exposed situation of the Western Shore, bordering upon the bay, and presumes that the draughts from that section of the country would not be drawn away; and expects Baltimore will be unwilling to have any force withdrawn from that place, by which any aid might be expected. These considerations had induced the order for the three thousand five hundred men; this force was to be embodied, and moved on the shortest route to Bladensburg; that the artillery of the State was about nine hundred men, two-thirds in Baltimore; it would create uneasiness to take from that place four hundred, the proportion, and he had suspended that order until General Smith should have some communication with the Secretary of War. In a letter of the 20th of July, General Winder made the requisition on the Governor of Maryland for the three thousand militia, urging the necessity of having them assembled and in service with the least possible delay; and on the 5th of August, the Governor of Maryland informed General Winder, by letter, that his demand for three thousand draughts could not be complied with without the brigade in service at Baltimore, from General Smith's division; that the draughts from one brigade alone were under marching orders; the orders for the march of those lying on the Chesapeake and Potomac having been suspended.

On the 14th of July Mr. Boileau, Secretary of State for Pennsylvania, acknowledges the receipt of the communication from the War Department, containing the requisition of the 14th of July, for fourteen thousand Pennsylvania militia, which was forwarded by express to the Governor, who was absent at Selim's Grove, with assurances that the Governor would execute, with promptness, the requisition of the General Government. On the 25th the Governor of Pennsylvania directs the Secretary Boileau to inform the Secretary of War that general orders had been issued in compliance with the requisition of the 4th of July; explains, as before, the difficulties resulting from the militia laws of Pennsylvania, and relies on the patriotism and voluntary services of the people.

On the 14th of July the Deputy Adjutant General of Virginia acknowledged the receipt of the communication from the War Department, containing the requisition of the 4th, and enclosed to the Secretary of War the general orders issued by the Governor of Virginia, on the 22d of June, placing in readiness a provisional force of fifteen thousand men and upwards, to repel sudden invasions, and for the purpose of defence, and the points of rendezvous designated, but not organized upon the military establishment of the United States, nor for a longer term than three months; which, with other considerations, prevented the acceptance of any part of those State troops, as a compliance with the requisition of the General Government. The Secretary of War was apprized in this letter, also, that the whole of the Virginia troops, then held in readiness, would be furnished with arms and ammunition by the State of Virginia; and on the 18th, the Secretary of War informs the Governor of Virginia that two thousand of the requisition upon the Virginia militia would be placed at the disposition of General Winder, as commander of the 10th military district.

Having presented a condensed view of the measures of the cabinet; the correspondence between the commanding officer and the War Department, the Governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and the commanding General; the correspondence with the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and the Secretary of War, in regard to the requisition of the 4th of July; it will now be proper to present some facts connected with the movements and arrangements of the commanding General up to the revocation of his command.

Towards the close of the month of June, the Secretary of War gave to General Winder the first intimation that it was in contemplation to constitute a new military district, embracing the country now composing the 10th military district, and that the President intended to invest him with its command. On the 4th or 5th of July, he received notice of his appointment to the 10th military district, and the order creating it; proceeded to Washington, and called on the Secretary of War, who enumerated the regular force, as before supposed, to amount to one thousand or one thousand two hundred; the residue of his command to be composed of militia to be draughted, and was shown the circular to certain States, making the requisition of the 4th. He then returned to Baltimore, and after writing the letter of the 9th, proceeded to Annapolis to examine it, and to explore the 10th military district generally. The

letter of the 12th, from the Secretary of War, was not received until he went to Annapolis, to Upper Marlborough, and back to Annapolis. On the 17th, at Nottingham, received intelligence that the enemy was proceeding up the Patuxent; wrote to the Secretary of War, and to General West, advising him to call out the militia of the county. The detachment of the 36th and 38th regiments was ordered from South River to Nottingham, and three companies of city militia were despatched to him promptly. On the 25th, visited Fort Washington; and on the 1st of August, fixed his permanent head quarters at the city of Washington; viewed and inspected the District militia. The people of St. Mary's and Charles had become importunate for aid and protection, and in obedience to the wish of the President, the 36th and 38th were ordered down to unite with General Stewart; but the enemy having retired, this detachment was encamped at Piscataway. He understood by letters from General Smith, of Baltimore, and the Governor of Maryland, that Stansbury's brigade, upon application of General Smith, had been accepted by the Secretary of War as part of the quota of Maryland militia, under requisition of the 4th of July. On the morning of the 18th of August, *Thursday*, intelligence was received from the observatory at *Point Look-out*, that, on the morning of the 17th, the enemy's fleet off that place had been reinforced by a formidable squadron of ships and vessels of various sizes. The commanding General immediately made requisitions on the Governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland; various officers of militia, and the militia of the District of Columbia, were ordered out en masse.

On the 19th, General Winder, in a letter to the Secretary of War, submitted several propositions to the President: 1st. Would it be expedient, under the direction of the Navy Department, to have vessels ready to be sunk in the Potomac, at Fort Washington, or other points, at a moment's warning, to obstruct the navigation? 2d. Would it not be proper to put all the boats which can be propelled by oars, that are at the city of Washington, under the control of the navy at Fort Washington, to transport troops as events may require? 3d. Would it not be convenient to put the marine corps into service? at all events, to cause them to be in readiness to reinforce Fort Washington at a moment's notice, or to be applied, as events require, to any point of defence? 4th. That the force under Commodore Barney may co-operate with the commanding General, in case of the abandonment of the flotilla. On the same day, the Secretary of War in a letter states, that the propositions had been submitted to the President, and General Winder is referred to the Navy Department on the subject of the propositions relating to the means in that department. General Winder's call upon the militia en masse is approved; and on the same day, the Secretary of War, in a letter to General Winder, advises that the cavalry be pushed into the neighborhood of the enemy without delay, if he indicated an attack upon the city of Washington, for the purpose of driving off all horses and cattle, and all supplies of forage, &c. in their route. Not a moment was to be lost. Colonel Monroe, with Captain Thornton's troop of horse, proceeded to find and reconnoitre the enemy on Friday, the 19th; on the same day the militia of Georgetown and the city of Washington, under General Smith, were mustered. On Saturday, the 20th, this and some other forces commenced their line of march towards Benedict, about one o'clock, and encamped that night about four miles from the Eastern Branch bridge, on the road to Upper Marlborough. On this day Colonel Monroe communicated the intelligence of the arrival of the enemy at Benedict in force. Same day, Colonel Tilghman and Captain Caldwell, with their commands of horse, were ordered and despatched to annoy the enemy, impede his march, to remove and destroy forage and provisions before the enemy.

On Sunday morning, the 21st, the troops were mustered, and the articles of war read to them. At 12 o'clock, the marines under Captain Miller joined the army; the regulars of the 36th and 38th also joined at the Woodyard, seven miles in advance, to which the main body of our troops were marched and encamped on Sunday night. Two letters from Colonel Monroe, on the 21st, one stating that he had viewed the enemy near Benedict, enumerated twenty-seven square rigged vessels, some bay craft and barges; the other dated from Nottingham, stating the advance of the enemy upon that place by land and water, and recommending the commanding General to despatch five hundred or six hundred men to fall upon the enemy. Colonel Monroe and Colonel Beall both joined the army at night, and gave an account that the enemy had been viewed by them. Colonel Beall calculated that he had seen four thousand, without supposing he had seen all. Colonel Monroe estimated the enemy at about six thousand; Captain Herbert joins with his troop; Colonel Lavall had joined with two companies of cavalry on the day previous; the enemy remained at Nottingham, except an advance detachment about three miles from town. Monday, the 22d, early in the morning, a light detachment was ordered to meet the enemy, composed of the 36th and 38th; Lieutenant Colonel Scott, Colonel Lavall's cavalry, and three companies from the brigade of General Smith, under command of Major Peter, viz. his own company of artillery, Captain Stul's rifle corps, and Captain Davidson's light infantry. This detachment marched on the road to Nottingham, about 9 o'clock; the remainder of the army marched about one mile in advance, to an elevated position; the commanding General with his staff, accompanied by Colonel Monroe, proceeded in advance to reconnoitre the march of the enemy. Commodore Barney had joined the army with his flotilla men, besides the marines under Captain Miller; the horse preceded the advance detachment of our forces, met the enemy, and retired before them. This induced the advance corps to take a position to impede the march of the enemy; but the advance detachment was ordered to retrograde and join the main body of the army that had remained some hours in line of battle, expecting the enemy to come that route to the city, but who took the road to Upper Marlborough, turning to his right after having come within a few miles of our forces, upon which the commanding General fell back with his whole forces to the Battalion Old Fields, about eight miles from Marlborough, and the same distance from the city of Washington. At this time, heavy explosions in the direction of Marlboro' announced the destruction of the flotilla under command of Commodore Barney. The enemy arrived at Upper Marlborough about 2 o'clock, and remained there until late next day, to be joined, it is presumed, by the detachment of the enemy which had been sent against the flotilla.

The commanding General proceeded to Marlborough, and found the enemy encamped; several prisoners taken; gave information that the enemy would remain in that position until next day; and after making observations of the enemy, till the close of the day, General Winder returned to the army. Late in the evening of this day, the President, with the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the Attorney General, joined General Winder at the Battalion Old Fields, and remained with him till the evening of the 23d. In the morning the troops were drawn up and reviewed by the President. The most contradictory reports prevailed as to the movements and force of the enemy, and it was doubtful in camp, whether Annapolis, Fort Washington, with a view to co-operate with his naval forces, or the city of Washington, was his object. As to numbers, rumors vibrated from four thousand to twelve thousand; the best opinion was from five to seven thousand. Our forces at this time at the Old Fields are variously estimated, with no material difference, at about three thousand men, in the following corps: About four hundred horse, under the command of the following officers: Lieutenant Colonel Lavall, Colonel Tilghman, Captains Caldwell, Thornton, Herbert, Williams, &c.; four hundred regular troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott, viz. 36th, 38th, and Captain Morgan's company of the 12th infantry; six hundred marines and flotilla-men under Commodore Barney and Captain Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillery, two eighteen pounders and three twelve pounders; one thousand eight hundred militia and volunteers, General Smith's brigade of Georgetown and city militia, and Maryland militia under Colonel Kramer; of which there were two companies of artillery under Captain Burch and Major Peter, with six six pounders each, making an aggregate of three thousand two hundred, with seventeen pieces of artillery. The enemy was without cavalry, and had two small field pieces and one howitzer, drawn by men; and the whole country well calculated for defence, skirmishing, and to impede the march of an enemy.

The enemy remained at Upper Marlborough till after 12 o'clock, about which time General Winder again ordered the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scott and Major Peter to advance and meet the enemy if he should be found advancing, or to attack his positions. About this time, 12 o'clock, some prisoners were taken, and from the information given by them, and the observations of the videts, General Winder was induced to believe that the enemy intended to remain stationary for the day, which induced him to think of uniting with him the forces at Bladensburg, and he despatched orders to General Stansbury, and other corps at Bladensburg, to move direct for Upper Marlborough, and proceeded himself towards Bladensburg, to meet and hurry on the forces to form a junction. When General Winder left the command with General Smith, and proceeded towards Bladensburg with several troops of cavalry, he left orders that the advance corps should march upon the enemy, and annoy him by all possible

means if in march, or if not, then in his positions; and if he advanced upon Bladensburg, General Smith, with the main body, should fall upon his flank, or be governed by circumstances in other movements.

Captain Caldwell joined the advance corps at 2 o'clock, P. M. An express brought intelligence that the enemy had left Upper Marlborough; that our advance had met the enemy about six miles in advance of our forces, and after a skirmish, in which Captain Stull's company had about four or five rounds, was compelled to retreat, and that the enemy was advancing. One of the Aids of General Smith was despatched for General Winder; the whole army was placed in a favorable attitude of defence, in which position it continued until about *sun-set*, when General Winder, who had arrived some time previous, ordered the army to march to the city of Washington. The enemy was about three miles distant, and remained there that night. Having remained till the going down of the sun, the retreat to the city was induced by several considerations, stated by the commanding General. 1st. To effect a union of his whole forces. 2d. The fear of a night attack, from the superiority of the enemy, and want of discipline in his troops. And, 3d. In a night attack, his superiority in artillery could not be used. The march of our army to the city was extremely rapid and precipitate, and orders occasionally given to captains of companies to hurry on the men, who were extremely fatigued and exhausted before the camping ground was reached, near the Eastern Branch bridge, within the District of Columbia.

General Stansbury had arrived at Bladensburg on the 22d, and the 5th Baltimore regiment, including the artillery and rifle corps, on the evening of the 23d; and at 12 o'clock at night, Colonel Monroe, in passing through Bladensburg to the city of Washington, advised General Stansbury to fall upon the rear of the enemy forthwith, as it was understood that he was in motion for the city. General Stansbury having been ordered to take post at Bladensburg, did not think he was at liberty to leave it; but independent of this consideration, the fatigue of the troops under Colonel Sterrett made it impracticable.

It is here proper to state, that, on the 22d, the Secretary of War, in a letter to General Winder, which closes their written communications previous to the 24th, except a short note of that morning, states that he had ordered General Douglass to march with his command to the district, without seeking a rendezvous with General Hungerford; that a detachment of the 12th infantry had arrived; that it should be armed, equipped, and march to the Wood-yard; that the Baltimore brigade would arrive at Bladensburg that day; and suggests the propriety of throwing Barney's seamen and some other troops on the right of Nottingham—a demonstration which would menace the rear of the enemy, and his communication with his shipping, which would, if not stop, much retard his progress. On the morning of the 24th, in a short note to the Secretary of War, General Winder says, the information up the river is threatening; Barney, or some other force, should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf's Point and Navy yard, and wishes counsel from the Government or the Secretary of War. Upon this note there is an endorsement in the hand writing of General Armstrong to this effect: "Went to General Winder, saw no necessity for ordering Barney to Greenleaf's Point or Navy Yard, advised the Commodore to join the army at Bladensburg, and ordered Minor's regiment to that place."

On the 21st, late at night, Colonel Tayloe arrived in the city from the Northern Neck, where he had been charged with orders in relation to the Virginia draughts, and reported himself to General Armstrong, who issued the following general order:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, August 22, 1814.—12 o'clock.

"GENERAL ORDER.

"General Douglass will assemble his brigade at Alexandria, and hold it there subject to orders.

"JOHN ARMSTRONG."

Colonel Tayloe executed this order, and Tuesday night, the 23d, again reported himself to General Armstrong, who issued the following orders:

"GENERAL ORDER.

"WAR DEPARTMENT.

"Lieutenant Colonel Minor will repair to Washington, with the regiment under his command, with the utmost despatch; he will report on his arrival to Colonel Carbery of the 36th regiment, and make a requisition for arms and ammunition.

"JOHN ARMSTRONG."

"WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1814.

"GENERAL ORDER.

"All the militia now in and marching to Alexandria, besides Colonel Minor, will march immediately to Washington: these orders will be communicated by Colonel Tayloe.

"JOHN ARMSTRONG."

On the 18th of August, General Van Ness ordered General Young to call out, en masse, the brigade under his command, including the Alexandria militia; the same day, two troops of cavalry, attached to the brigade, were ordered to rendezvous at Bladensburg; on the 19th, at four o'clock in the morning, to accompany Colonel Monroe, Secretary of State, and to be subject to his order. On the 20th, in the afternoon, General Young's brigade was ordered by General Winder to cross the Potomac, opposite Alexandria, and encamp in the best position, and wait further orders, which was effected—the brigade consisting of four hundred and fifty-four men, two brass six pounders and one brass four pounder. On the 22d, early, General Young, by order of General Winder, marched his brigade and took a position on a height near the head of Piscataway creek, about three miles in the rear of Fort Washington, where the ground was favorable for a small detachment to defend the country against a much greater force, and remained in this position until the morning of the 24th, when several orders were given to him; first, to march towards the Eastern Branch bridge; second, to cross the Potomac to the Virginia side, &c. This brigade was intended, in its dispositions, to aid Fort Washington, the town of Alexandria, and to be in a situation to join General Winder.

On the morning of the 24th, General Winder established his head quarters near the Eastern Branch bridge; detachments of horse were out in various directions as videttes, and reconnoitering parties, and arrangements made to destroy the Eastern Branch bridge. Colonel George Minor, with his regiment of Virginia militia, composed of six hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry, arrived at the city of Washington in the twilight of the evening of the 23d; he called on the President, who referred him to the Secretary of War for orders; the Secretary informed him that arms could not be had that night, but gave orders to report himself to Colonel Carbery early in the morning, who would furnish him with arms and ammunition, as he was charged with that duty by General Winder. From early in the morning till late in the forenoon Colonel Minor sought Colonel Carbery diligently, but he could not be found. He rode to head-quarters, and obtained an order from General Winder upon the arsenal for arms, &c. marched to the place with his regiment, and its care he found committed to a young man, whose caution in giving out arms, &c. very much delayed the arming and supplying this regiment. An instance is here given, when the flints were counted out by the officers of the regiment, to expedite business at this crisis, the young man would count them over before they could be obtained.

Colonel Carbery arrived at this moment, apologized for his absence, and informed Colonel Minor that he had the evening previous ridden out to his country seat. Colonel Minor was again delayed some small length of time, in having to remain to sign receipts, &c. His men were ordered to Capitol Hill. In the mean time, various reports were brought into head quarters, as to the movements and intentions of the enemy. The President and Heads of Departments collected at head-quarters in the following order: The President, next Secretary of State, next the

Attorney General, next the Secretary of the Navy, and last the Secretary of War and Treasury together. Col. Monroe led head quarters, upon a rumor, that gained ground, that the enemy was marching upon the city by way of Bladensburg, with a view of joining General Stansbury, advising him of the rumor, and to aid him in the formation of a line of battle to meet the enemy. General Stansbury, for reasons given in his report, had marched from his position in advance of Bladensburg, and occupied the ground west of that village, on the banks of the Eastern Branch. Here the front line of battle was formed by General Stansbury and his officers, with the aid of Col. Monroe, on the presumption that General Stansbury's brigade and the command of Colonel Sterret included the command of Major Pinkney and Baltimore artillery.

There is a bridge over the Eastern Branch at Bladensburg, and a large turnpike road leading direct to the city of Washington. About four hundred yards from this bridge, some small distance to the left of the road, the Baltimore artillery, six pieces of six pounders, occupied a temporary breast work of earth, well calculated to command the pass over the bridge. Part of the battalion of riflemen, under Major William Pinkney, and one other company, took position on the right of the artillery, partially protected by a fence and brush; and on the left of the battery, leading to the rear of a barn, two companies, from the regiment under Colonel Shutz, and the other part of the riflemen from Baltimore. Colonel Ragan was posted in the rear of Major Pinkney, his right resting on the road; Colonel Shutz, continuing the line on the left, with a small vacancy in the centre of the two regiments; and Colonel Sterret formed the extreme left flank of the infantry. At this moment, Colonels Beall and Hood entered Bladensburg, with the Maryland militia from Annapolis, crossed the bridge, and took a position on a most commanding height, on the right of the turnpike, about three hundred yards from the road, to secure the right flank. In the mean time, (about 11 o'clock) certain intelligence was received at head quarters, that the enemy was in full march towards Bladensburg; which induced General Winder to put in motion his whole force, except a few men and a piece of artillery left at the Eastern Branch bridge, to destroy it. The day was hot, and the road dusty—the march was rapid to Bladensburg. The cavalry and mounted men arrived, and were placed on the left flank, and some small distance in its rear. General Winder now arrived, and told General Stansbury and Colonel Monroe that his whole force was marching for Bladensburg, and approved the dispositions which had been made of the troops; at which moment, it had become impracticable, in the opinion of the officers, to make any essential change: for the two armies were now coming to the battle ground, in opposite directions; and the enemy appeared on the opposite heights of Bladensburg, about a mile distant, and halted fifteen or twenty minutes. This was about twelve o'clock. The troops from the city were disposed of as they arrived. Captain Burch, with three pieces of artillery, was stationed on the extreme left of the infantry of the first line; and a rifle company, armed with muskets, near the battery, to support it. About this time the Secretary of War arrived, and in a few minutes after, the President and the Attorney General, and proceeded to examine the disposition of the troops. In the mean time, as the enemy advanced into Bladensburg, the officers were forming rapidly the second line. The command of Commodore Barney came up in a trot; and formed his men on the right of the main road, in a line with the command under Colonels Beall and Hood, with a considerable vacancy, owing to the ground. The heavy artillery, Commodore Barney planted in the road; the three twelve pounders to the right, under Captain Miller, who commanded the flotilla men and marines, as infantry, to support the artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Kramer, with a battalion of Maryland militia, was posted in a wood, in advance of the marines and Colonels Beall and Hood's command. The regiment under command of Colonel Magruder, was stationed on the left of Commodore Barney, and in a line with him and Colonel Beall. The regiment under command of Colonel Brent, and Major Warring's battalion, and some other small detachments, formed the left flank of this second line, and in the rear of Major Peter's battery; and Lieutenant Colonel Scott, with the regulars, was placed in advance of Colonel Magruder, and to the left, forming a line towards Major Peter's battery, but in such a manner as not to mask it; other small detachments in various directions.

About half after twelve o'clock, while the second line was thus forming, the enemy approached, and the battle commenced: The Baltimore artillery opened a fire and dispersed the enemy's light troops now advancing along the street of the village, who took a temporary cover behind the houses and trees, in loose order, and presented objects only occasionally for the fire of the cannon. The enemy commenced throwing his rockets, and his light troops began to concentrate near the bridge, and to press across it and the river, which was fordable above. The battalion of riflemen, under Major Pinkney, now united gallantly with the fire from the battery. For some minutes the fire was continued with considerable effect; the enemy's column was not only dispersed while in the street, but while approaching the bridge they were thrown into some confusion, and the British officers were seen exerting themselves to press the soldiers on. Having now gained the bridge, it was passed rapidly, and as the enemy crossed, flanked, formed the line, and advanced steadily on, which compelled the artillery and battalion of riflemen to give way, after which Major Pinkney was severely wounded. He exerted himself to rally his men, and succeeded at a small distance in the rear of his first position, and united with the fifth Baltimore regiment.

It appears from reports of several officers, Stansbury, Pinkney, Law, Sterret, &c., that the command of General Stansbury was three or four hundred yards in the rear of the battery, and Major Pinkney's riflemen and some other small corps to the left of the battery; of course this small party had to fight with the whole force of the enemy until they retired, and the enemy occupied the ground they left without any considerable resistance, as the enemy marched on without halting after the bridge was passed. Captain Burch and Colonel Sterret were about the same distance, when Colonel Sterret was ordered to advance to support the first line. One of the pieces of artillery was abandoned, but spiked previously. The enemy soon took advantage of the trees of an orchard, which was occupied or held by the force which had just retreated, and kept up a galling fire on part of our line. Captain Burch's artillery, and a small detachment near it, now opened a cross fire upon the enemy. Colonel Sterret, with the fifth Baltimore regiment, was ordered to advance, and made a prompt movement, until ordered to halt, as at this moment the rockets assuming a more horizontal direction, and passing near the heads of Colonels Schutz and Ragan's regiments, the right gave way, which was followed in a few minutes by a general flight of the two regiments, in defiance of all the exertions of Generals Winder, Stansbury, and other officers. Burch's artillery and the 5th regiment remained with firmness; the orchard obstructed their fire; but notwithstanding the enemy's light troops were, for a moment, driven back by them, the enemy having gained the right flank of the fifth, which exposed it, Burch's artillery and Colonel Sterret, who commanded the fifth, were ordered by General Winder to retreat, with a view of forming at a small distance in the rear; but instead of retiring in order, the fifth, like the other two regiments under General Stansbury, in a very few minutes were retreating in disorder and confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of Colonel Sterret to prevent it. From reports of various officers, exertions were made to rally the men and to bring them again to the battle, which partly succeeded in the first instance, but ultimately, and in a short time, all attempts were vain, and the forces routed; and the first line, together with the horse, were totally routed, and retreated in a road which forked in three directions; one branch led by Rock Creek Church, to Tenley Town and Montgomery Court House, another led to Georgetown, and a third to the city of Washington. It does not appear that any movement was made or attempted by the cavalry or horsemen, although the enemy to the left were in open and scattered order, as they pursued or pressed upon our lines, and a most fortunate moment presented itself for a charge of cavalry and horsemen.

It may be proper here to observe that General Winder states his exertions to direct the retreating line to the capitol, with a view of rallying. This intention is corroborated by Colonel Sterret; but it appears as if this determination was not generally understood by the officers or men. Colonel Kramer, posted on the right of the road, and in advance of Commodore Barney, was next drawn from his position, after having maintained his ground with considerable injury to the enemy, and retreated upon the command of Colonels Beall and Hood, on a commanding eminence to the right. After the retreat of the militia under Colonel Kramer, from his first position, the enemy's column in the road was exposed to an animated discharge from Major Peter's artillery, which continued until they came into contact with Commodore Barney; here the enemy met the greatest resistance, and sustained the greatest loss, advancing upon our retreating line. When the enemy came in full view, and in a heavy column in the main road, Commodore Barney ordered an eighteen pounder to be opened upon them, which completely cleared the road, scattered, and repulsed the enemy for a moment. In several attempts to rally and advance, the enemy was repulsed,

which induced him to flank to the right of our lines in an open field. Here Captain Miller opened upon him with the three twelve pounders, and the flotilla men, acting as infantry, with considerable effect. The enemy continued flanking to the right, and pressed upon the command of Colonels Beall and Hood, which gave way, after three or four rounds of ineffectual fire, at a considerable distance from the enemy, while Colonel Beall and other officers attempted to rally the men on this high position. The enemy very soon gained the flank and even the rear of the right of the second line. Commodore Barney, Captain Miller, and some other officers of his command, being wounded, his ammunition wagons having gone off in the disorder, and that which the marines and flotilla men had being exhausted; in this situation, a retreat was ordered by Commodore Barney, who fell himself into the hands of the enemy.

The second line was not exactly connected, but posted in advantageous positions in connexion with and supporting each other. The command of General Smith, including the Georgetown and city militia, still remained in order, and firm, without any part of them having given way, as well as the command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott of the regulars, and some other corps. The enemy's light troops had, in the mean time, advanced on the left of the road, and had gained a line parallel with Smith's command, and, in endeavoring to turn the flank, Colonel Brent was placed in a position calculated to prevent it; the enemy also advanced and came within long shot of part of Colonel Magruder's command, which opened a partial fire, but without much effect; and, at this moment, and in this situation, General Winder ordered the whole of the troops, then stationary, to retreat, which was effected with as much order as the nature of the ground and the occasion would permit; these troops, after retreating five or six hundred paces, were halted and formed, but were again ordered to retreat by General Winder. General Winder then gave orders to collect and form the troops on the heights west of the turnpike gate, about one mile and a half from the capitol, which order was in part executed, and the forces formed by General Smith and the other officers, when Colonel George Minor came up with his regiment of Virginia volunteers, and united his forces with General Smith's command, having been detained, as before stated, in obtaining arms, ammunition, &c.; but, while in the act of forming, General Winder gave orders to retire to the capitol, with an expectation of being united with the troops of the first line. Colonel Minor was ordered to take a certain position and disposition, and cover the retreat of all the forces by remaining until all had marched for the capitol. The troops were again halted at the capitol, while General Winder was in conference with Colonel Monroe and General Armstrong.

The first line and the cavalry, except one troop of Colonel Lavall's, had taken a route which did not bring them to the capitol; the most of them had proceeded north of the District of Columbia, and others dispersed and returned home, and sought refreshment in the country. The Commanding General represented the diminution of his force, the dispersion of a large portion of it, the want of discipline, the great fatigue of the troops, and believed that it would be impossible to make effectual resistance to the invasion of the city; nor did he think it would be proper to attempt to defend the capitol, the troops being without provisions, and which would leave every other part of the city to the mercy of the enemy, and the prospect of losing his army. In this consultation, the Secretaries of State and War, it appears, concurred in their views with General Winder, and advised him to retire and rally the troops upon the heights of Georgetown; this produced an order for the whole forces to retreat from Capitol Hill through Georgetown. On receiving this order, the troops evinced the deepest anguish, and that order which had been previously maintained was destroyed. General Smith in his report uses this language: "when the order for a retreat from Capitol Hill was received, the troops evinced an anguish beyond the power of language to express." The troops were halted at Tenleytown, and an attempt was made to collect them together, which only partially succeeded. Some returned home, some went in pursuit of refreshments, and those that halted gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaustion, privation, and disappointment, produced. The force thus collected were marched about five miles up the Potomac, and, early in the morning, Thursday the 25th, orders were given to assemble the troops at Montgomery court house. General Winder seems to have taken this position with a view to collect his forces, and to interpose for the protection of Baltimore, in case the enemy marched upon it as was anticipated by him. On the 23d, General Winder despatched an order to the commanding officer at Fort Washington to place patrols on every road leading to the garrison; and, upon the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort, to blow it up and retire across the river. On the 26th, the army at Montgomery took up the line of march about ten o'clock towards Baltimore: General Winder proceeded on to Baltimore. On the 27th, General Smith's brigade marched to this district.

The distance from Benedict to the city of Washington, by Bladensburg, is upwards of fifty miles. The enemy was without baggage wagons or means of transportation; his troops much exhausted with fatigue; many compelled to quit the ranks, and extraordinary exertions used to keep others in motion; and, as if unable to pursue our forces, remained on the battle ground; the enemy's advance reached the city about eight o'clock in the evening, the battle having ended about two o'clock, or before. The main body of the enemy remained on the heights west of the turnpike gate.

Doctor Catlett, the superintending surgeon, who was admitted to attend upon the wounded, and who passed through the enemy's camps and remained at Bladensburg until the city was evacuated, had the best opportunity of estimating the loss on both sides, as well as a good opportunity to ascertain the number and force of the enemy. His estimate is as follows:

*Of the enemy.*—On Capitol Hill, seven hundred; turnpike hill, two thousand; wounded at Bladensburgh, three hundred; attendants, three hundred; wounded and attendants in the city of Washington, sixty; killed at Bladensburgh and the city, one hundred and eighty; total force, three thousand five hundred and forty. This statement is corroborated by all the information in his power, besides his own observations. Mr. Law estimated the enemy, on its march, at five thousand; but, from the best information, his estimate would be about four thousand five hundred. Colonel Monroe, who viewed the enemy on his march, estimated the number at about six thousand. General Winder states that the best opinion at the wood yard made the enemy from five to seven thousand. *Our forces* are variously estimated; and, indeed, from the manner of collecting them, and their dispersion, makes it difficult to ascertain the number with perfect accuracy. General Stansbury represents Colonel Ragan's regiment at five hundred and fifty; Colonel Schutz's regiment at eight hundred; Colonels Beall's and Hood's at eight hundred; Colonel Sterret's regiment at five hundred; Major Pinkney's command, including two companies of artillery, three hundred; making two thousand nine hundred and fifty-three; but General Winder estimates Colonel Beall six or seven hundred; deduct one hundred, this leaves two thousand eight hundred and fifty-three; to which add the command of General Smith, and militia that united with him at the Woodyard, Battalion Old Fields, &c. the regulars under Lieutenant Colonel Scott, Barney's command, the cavalry, &c. three thousand two hundred; making an aggregate number of six thousand and fifty-three. Besides this force, several detachments are spoken of by General Winder's officers, not known, amounting to several hundred. But as a small detachment was left at the Eastern Branch bridge, others, particularly some of the cavalry, were on detachment, reconnoitering, &c. the number of our forces, may be estimated at at least six thousand, including about twenty pieces of artillery, two eighteen pounders, three twelves, and the balance six pounders. Our loss on the field of battle, killed, is estimated by the superintending surgeon at ten or twelve, and the wounded, some of whom died, at about thirty. General Winder's official report estimates our loss at about thirty killed and fifty wounded.

The probable estimate of British forces on the 24th of August, total four thousand five hundred; killed at Bladensburgh and in the city, one hundred and fifty; wounded at both places, three hundred. American forces, six thousand; killed, twenty, wounded forty; besides the regiment under command of Colonel Minor, six hundred infantry and one hundred horse, which met the retreat on the west of the turnpike gate; and General Young's brigade about five hundred, which was ordered to remain on the banks of the Potomac, about twelve miles from the city of Washington, until the evening of the 24th, when he crossed over to Alexandria, and proceeded to Montgomery Court house, to join the main army.

The enemy, on the evening of the 25th, made the greatest exertions to leave the city of Washington. They had about forty indifferent looking horses, ten or twelve carts and wagons, one ox cart, one coach, and several gigs; these were sent to Bladensburgh to move off the wounded: a drove of sixty or seventy cattle preceded this party. Arriv-

ing at Bladensburg, the British surgeon was ordered to select the wounded who could walk; the forty horses were mounted by those who could ride; the carts and wagons loaded, and upwards of ninety wounded left behind. About twelve o'clock at night the British army passed through Bladensburg, and parties continued until morning, and stragglers until after mid-day. The retreat of the enemy to his shipping was precipitate, and apparently under an alarm, and, it is supposed, that it was known to him that our forces had marched to Montgomery Court house.

The Hon. Richard Rush, Gen Stansbury, Major William Pinkney, Dr. Catlett, and Mr. Law, all remark, that General Winder was active and zealous, encouraged the men, and exposed himself, and acted as a man of firmness during the engagement, and endeavored to rally, with other officers, the lines, as they gave way.

There seems to be a general concurrence of statement, that our forces were much fatigued and worn down with marching, counter-marching, and their strength much exhausted, during their service, by remaining under arms much of the night, as well as the day, by false alarms, and otherwise. Nor does it appear that it was generally known among the officers and men of the first line, that the forces from the city were formed behind in the second line, to meet the enemy and support them. This statement is made by General Stansbury, Major Wm. Pinkney, and some other officers of the first line.

#### Recapitulation.

This statement of facts has brought the committee to a recapitulation of some of the prominent circumstances in this part of the transaction. Without entering into the consideration of the means in the power of the administration, and the equal claims of every part of the extensive maritime and territorial frontier of the United States, in proportion to its importance and exposure to defensive measures, the committee are of opinion that the means authorized for the security of the 10th military district, by the President of the United States, in a cabinet council of the 1st of July, were ample and sufficient as to the extent of the force, and seasonable as to the time when the measures were authorized. On the 2d of July the 10th military district was constituted, and the command given to General Winder. On the 4th of July the requisition upon the States for ninety-three thousand five hundred men was made. On the 14th of July the Governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia acknowledged the receipt of the requisition of the 4th, and promised promptitude. About the 10th of July the Governor of Maryland was served with the requisition, and took measures to designate a corps of six thousand men, the whole quota from that State. On the 12th of July General Winder was authorized, in case of menaced or actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of Maryland. On the 17th General Winder was authorized to call into actual service not less than two, nor more than three thousand of the draughts assigned to his command, to form a permanent force, to be stationed in some central position between Baltimore and the city of Washington. On the same day, 17th of July, General Winder was authorized to call on the State of Pennsylvania for five thousand men; on Virginia, two thousand; on the militia of the District of Columbia, in a disposable state, two thousand; together with the six thousand from Maryland: making an aggregate force of fifteen thousand draughted militia, three thousand of which *authorized* to be called into actual service, the residue in case of actual or menaced invasion, besides the regular troops, estimated at one thousand—making sixteen thousand, independent of marines and flotilla men. This was the measure of defence contemplated for the military district No. 10, and the measures taken by the War Department up to the 17th of July in execution of it.

In relation to the collection of this force, several unfortunate circumstances intervened to produce a great and manifest failure.

1st. On the 17th of July General Winder was authorized, in consequence of his own suggestions, and in conformity to the wishes of the President, to call into actual service as many as three thousand, and not less than two thousand of the draughts, under the requisition of the 4th of July, assigned for the operations of his district, as a permanent corps and rallying point with his other forces, in a central position as before stated, to protect Baltimore, the city of Washington, &c. in case of invasion. General Winder, upon the receipt of this authority, proceeded direct to Annapolis, and made this requisition upon the Governor of Maryland for the actual service of three thousand men; and on the 23d of July, thirty-two days previous to the battle at Bladensburg, General Winder informs the Secretary of War that the arrangements for this force had been made, orders had issued, and Bladensburg fixed as the place of rendezvous; and encourages expectation that the collection of the force would be prompt and certain.

On the 27th the Governor of Maryland informs the Secretary of War that measures had been taken to comply with the requisition of the 4th of July, and his orders had issued, calling into actual service three thousand five hundred men, to rendezvous at Bladensburg, to comply with the demand of General Winder, in conformity to the wishes of the President. In the mean time Stansbury's brigade had been called into service at Baltimore, on account of the alarm about the 15th of July, by the Secretary of War; and although this force constituted a part of the Maryland quota of six thousand, by the consent of the Secretary of War it was to make no part of the three thousand to be called into actual service for the purposes mentioned.

To form a correct estimate of this failure, which did not bring as many hundred men into the field, in the words of General Winder, it may be proper to state, that at all times the marines, flotilla men, and regular troops, including the different garrisons, amounted to upwards of one thousand men. The militia of the District of Columbia amounted to two thousand men. These were always in a disposable state, and acknowledged by General Winder, in his letter of the 23d, to be almost as efficient as if in actual service, and the event proved this to be correct. The disposable force at Baltimore, including Stansbury's brigade, amounted to upwards of two thousand men, as the event proved, making an efficient force of at least eight thousand men, if the call for three thousand had been complied with. To this add the designated force assigned to the 10th military district, and the force to be raised on the spur of the occasion by calls upon the militia and population of the country en masse, and whose disposition is always operated upon more or less in proportion to the prospect of success. On the 13th of August, twenty-one days after the Secretary of War was informed that this arrangement had been made, General Winder advises him that there would be almost a total failure in relation to the call for the three thousand men, and, as a temporary remedy, proposes the acceptance of certain State troops, supposed to be about one thousand, under Colonels Beall and Hood, then in service at Annapolis, which was authorized; and these troops came to the battle ground, as before stated, about one half hour before the action on the 24th of August. The reasons which operated to produce this failure have been detailed, and there can be no object in having them repeated, as the committee do not consider it a duty to discuss the merit of those considerations.

2dly. On the 17th of July, the Secretary of War, by letter, authorized the commanding general to call on Pennsylvania for five thousand men; on Virginia for two thousand men, &c. as before stated. This letter was not received by General Winder until about the 8th of August, as appears by his correspondence with the Governor of Pennsylvania, after a lapse of about twenty-three days. In explaining the delay in the receipt of this letter, General Winder says it originated from his being in constant motion in traversing and examining the situation and various military positions of his command, and the letter had gone the circuit with him without having received it. It is impossible for the committee to say what particular influence this circumstance had upon the collection of the troops; and it may be proper here to state, that the difficulties explained in relation to the militia laws of Pennsylvania had no bearing upon the failure of our arms, as no specific call was made upon that State till the 17th of August, when one regiment was demanded, and on the 18th, the whole five thousand were demanded; but this requisition was not received by the Governor of Pennsylvania until the evening of the 23d, at which time the Pennsylvania detachment had been designated under the requisition of the 4th, and ready for the call which was made upon it.

3dly. The unfortunate circumstances which delayed the arming of a Virginia regiment under Colonel George Minor, consisting of six hundred infantry and one hundred horse, who arrived in the city of Washington late on the evening of the 23d. Colonel Minor called on the Secretary of War, after early candle light, for orders. Col-Carbery had been charged with supplying the various corps with arms, ammunition, &c. Colonel Minor was directed to report himself to Colonel Carbery early next morning, who would furnish him. Colonel Minor was in pursuit of Colonel Carbery from very early in the morning until late in the forenoon, without finding him, and, after

obtaining an order from General Winder, marched his regiment to Greenleaf's Point to the arsenal and magazine, where he again met with difficulties as before stated, which delayed his march and prevented him from being in the action. Having made this recapitulation of facts, the military question is presented for consideration: and having furnished the most ample means to the House to form correct opinions on this part of the inquiry, and as most of the communications from military characters enter more or less into this military view, the committee take it for granted that they have discharged their duty by the view they have taken, and submit this question to the consideration of the House.

*The Navy Department.*

As it regards the part taken by the Secretary of the Navy, including the destruction of the navy yard, &c. the solicitude of the President, in anticipation of the probable designs of the enemy against this city and the adjacent country, induced the Secretary of the Navy to cause three twelve pounders to be mounted on field carriages, and completely furnished for field service, in the month of May last, and the marines trained to act as infantry or artillery. Previous to the reinforcement of the enemy in the Patuxent, he caused to be mounted two long eighteen pounders on field carriages, and prepared for field service, to be given to Commodore Barney, in case of emergency, to co-operate with the land forces; and Commodore Barney was instructed to prepare for this eventual service in case he had to abandon his flotilla. On the 18th of August the Secretary received the first intelligence of the reinforcement of the enemy; the day on which they landed at Benedict. Commodore Barney was ordered to destroy his flotilla whenever it appeared certain that it would otherwise be captured, and to unite and co-operate with the forces under command of General Winder. Letters were despatched to Commodore Rodgers and Captain Porter, with orders to repair with their forces towards the city of Washington with the utmost expedition. With every exertion, Commodore Rodgers was unable to reach the city by the 24th. The enemy entered our waters on the 16th; it was known in this city on the 18th; marched from Benedict on the 20th; and entered this city on the 24th; and left it precipitately on the evening of the 25th. The Secretary of the Navy called on General Winder on the 20th; pointed out the volunteer mechanics of the navy yard, then in his army, who were good axe-men, and would act with effect as pioneers. It was understood that a large squadron of the enemy's fleet had passed the principal obstacle in the navigation of the Potomac, and was ascending to co-operate with their land forces. The Secretary of the Navy expressed solicitude for Fort Washington, and proposed to throw into that fort the marines and part of the seamen for its defence: the commanding general did not think it expedient to lessen his force by the abstraction of a part so efficient as the marines and seamen.

The Secretary of the Navy visited the navy yard on the 21st; inquired the means of transportation and the assistance left in the yard. The mechanics of the yard had been with the army from the first alarm: four officers and a few of the ordinary, chiefly blacks, remained: two of the old gunboats, the only craft for transportation. The wagons of this district had been pressed for the army; and the blacks usually in the market for hire, were employed at the works at Bladensburg. Orders were given for every means of transportation to be used. The public vessels afloat were, the new sloop of war Argus, the new schooner Lynx, three barges, and two gunboats. On the slip, the frigate Columbia, of the largest class, nearly ready for launching; her equipments generally made and ready, or in great forwardness. Besides the buildings, engines, fixtures, shop furniture, of the several mechanical branches in the navy yard, there were about one hundred tons of cordage, some canvass, considerable quantity of salt petre, copper, iron, lead, block tin, naval and military stores, implements, and fixed ammunition, with a variety of manufactured articles in all the branches; seventeen hundred and forty three barrels of beef and pork, two hundred and seventy-nine barrels of whiskey, some plank and timber.

The Secretary states that he had no means left to transport the sloop Argus, nor place of safety, in his opinion, if the enemy took possession of the city. He ordered the barges to the Little Falls. On the morning of the 24th the Secretary visited the head quarters of General Winder, near the *Eastern Branch bridge*. The President and some of the Heads of Departments were present. The Secretary of the Navy presented to the President the consideration of the navy yard, in the presence of the Secretaries of War and Treasury. The public vessels and public property were described; the importance of the supplies and shipping to the enemy; and no doubt seemed to be entertained of the union of the squadron and the land forces, should the enemy succeed in the capture of the city of Washington. General Winder having distinctly stated that morning that Fort Washington could not be defended. In this event, nothing could be more clear than the plunder and destruction of the public buildings and property of the navy yard; and whether a junction was formed, or the land forces alone took the city, the loss of the navy yard and public property was certain. Upon this representation, the Secretary of the Navy, in his report, says, it was distinctly understood, as the result of the conversation, that the public shipping, naval and military stores and provisions at the navy yard, should be destroyed in the event of the enemy's obtaining possession of the city. It appears that the articles to be destroyed were in store, and could not be separated from those establishments which might have been left; one of the barges was sent to Alexandria, and remained there until taken by the enemy; one gunboat, with salt provisions, has been recovered, the other was laden with provisions and gunpowder, but run aground, and was plundered by the inhabitants about the navy yard. The powder and part of the provisions have been recovered. The new schooner Lynx escaped the flames, and remains without much injury. The metallic articles are chiefly all saved, and the timber in dock, and that which is partially consumed, will be useful. The machinery of the steam engine is not much injured; the boiler is perfect. The buildings, with the exception of the house of the commandant, the lieutenant of the guards, the guard houses, the gateway, and one other building, are all destroyed; the walls of some appear entire. The monument to perpetuate the memory of the naval heroes who fell in the attack upon Tripoli, is a little defaced. The issuing store of the yard and its contents, which escaped the original conflagration, were destroyed by the enemy on the 25th.

The following estimate of the public property and buildings is the most accurate that the committee have been able to obtain, and which to them is as satisfactory and as accurate as the nature of the inquiry would admit, viz:

The capitol, from its foundation to its destruction, including original cost, alterations, repairs, &c.	\$787,163 28
The President's house, including all costs, - - - - -	334,334 00
Public offices, treasury, state, war, and navy, - - - - -	93,613 82

\$1,215,111 10

The buildings have been examined by order of a committee of the Senate. The walls of the capitol and President's house are good, and require repairs only. The walls of the public offices are not sufficient. It is supposed that the sum of four hundred and sixty thousand dollars will be sufficient to place the buildings in the situation they were in previous to their destruction, -	\$460,000 00
Loss sustained at the navy yard,	
In moveable property, - - - - -	417,745 51
In buildings and fixtures, - - - - -	91,425 52
	<u>\$969,171 04</u>

To this sum must be added the public library, estimated at - - - - -

An estimate of the expense of rebuilding, in a plain and substantial manner, the navy yard, so as to carry on all the public works with as much advantage and convenience as previous to its destruction, - - - - -	\$62,370 00
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## RECAPITULATION.

No.		Original Value.	Value Recovered.	Real Loss.
1,	Frigate Columbia, - - - - -	\$116,123 05	\$10,432 00	\$105,691 05
2,	Sloop of war Argus, - - - - -	75,000 00	10,186 55	64,813 45
3,	One large rowgalley, - - - - -	4,500 00	1,477 47	3,022 53
4,	Two small do. - - - - -	6,000 00	722 80	5,277 20
5,	One armed scow, - - - - -	1,610 54	956 09	654 45
6,	One do. - - - - -	1,096 29	586 67	509 60
7,	Gunboats, rowboats, &c. - - - - -	6,553 34	5,773 34	780 00
8,	Boatbuilder's shop, - - - - -	2,962 98	-	2,962 98
9,	Blacksmith's and plumber's shop, - - - - -	4,532 80	1,996 50	2,536 30
10,	Cooper's shop, - - - - -	7,689 75	2,854 04	4,835 71
11,	Gun carriage shop, &c. - - - - -	525 00	-	525 00
12,	Painter's shop, - - - - -	869 97	15 00	854 97
13,	Blockmaker's shop, - - - - -	1,610 00	-	1,610 00
14,	Medical store, - - - - -	2,679 84	-	2,679 84
15,	Ordnance store, &c. - - - - -	18,769 90	-	18,769 90
16,	Naval stores, cordage, &c. - - - - -	78,262 25	-	78,262 25
17,	Copper, iron, lead, &c. - - - - -	49,965 27	42,522 40	7,442 87
18,	Navy storekeeper's stores, - - - - -	20,431 77	2,921 89	17,509 88
19,	Ordnance, small arms, - - - - -	173,284 97	162,926 22	10,358 75
20,	Provisions and contingencies, - - - - -	46,962 04	4,071 44	42,890 60
21,	Timber, plank, knees, &c. - - - - -	45,000 00	-	45,000 00
22,	Anchors, - - - - -	12,400 94	12,400 94	-
23,	Miscellaneous articles, - - - - -	1,380 13	648 85	731 18
		\$678,210 71	\$260,465 20	\$417,745 51

*Capture of Alexandria.*

In relation to the conduct of the corporation of Alexandria, and its capture by the enemy in his recent enterprise, the committee have been furnished with various documents and information, and to which the committee refer; but, in justice to the town and to the public, a brief retrospect may not be deemed improper, as connecting certain events with the surrender of the town, on the 29th of August, October, 1813, a volunteer company was raised in Alexandria, amounting to about seventy, including officers, clothed by voluntary aid and donation from the citizens of Alexandria, intended for the lines, but stationed at Fort Washington; remained in garrison till December; ordered to Annapolis, and there discharged. March, 1813, Captain Marsteller's company of artillery, stationed at Fort Washington for upwards of three months. 21st of March, 1813, corporation, by committee, called on the Secretary of War for arms, &c. for the defence of Alexandria. 8th of May, corporation, by committee, waited upon the President to apprise him of the defenceless state of the town. President acknowledged that attention was due to the representations of respectable men, and the proper attention should be given; and, at the same time, apprized the committee of the impossibility, in the nature of things, to give complete protection to every assailable point of the country. 11th of May, committee of vigilance appointed to co-operate with the committees of Georgetown and city of Washington: a deputation from the three committees waited upon General Armstrong, and represented the necessity of additional fortifications at Fort Washington. Colonel Wadsworth was ordered to attend the committee, examine, and report upon their suggestions. The examination was made, and Colonel Wadsworth reported that the battery at Fort Washington was in such a state, and it so effectually commanded the channel of the Potomac, that it was not to be apprehended that the enemy would attempt to pass it while its present defences remained entire. Its elevated situation should prevent dread of a cannonading from ships; that, in case of designs against the District of Columbia, an assault by land was most probable. To guard against this, some inconsiderable work on the land was recommended; an additional fort, in the same neighborhood, was considered unnecessary. On the 5th and 13th of August, 1814, the corporation loaned to the United States thirty-five thousand dollars, upon condition that it should be expended south of Alexandria. After the defeat of General Winder at Bladensburg, the corporation, by committee, waited upon the British commander, at this city, to know what treatment was to be expected, provided Alexandria should fall into his hands. Admiral Cockburn assured the deputation that private property would be respected; that probably some fresh provisions and flour might be wanted, but they should be paid for. Without firing a gun, on the 27th, Fort Washington was blown up and abandoned by the commanding officer, Captain Dyson, who has been dismissed from the service of the United States, by the sentence of a court martial, in consequence of it.

On the 28th, after the enemy's squadron passed the fort, the corporation, by deputation, proceeded to the ship commanded by Captain Gordon, who commanded, and requested to know his intentions in regard to Alexandria; which he proposed to communicate when he should come opposite the town, but promised that the persons, houses, and furniture, of the citizens, should be unmolested, if he met with no opposition. Next day, the 29th, the British squadron was drawn up in line of battle so as to command the whole town. There were two frigates, the Seahorse, thirty-eight guns, and Euryalus, thirty-six guns, two rocket ships of eighteen guns each, two bomb ships of eight guns each, and a schooner of two guns, arranged along the town. The committee will not attempt to condense the correspondence and terms of surrender, but refer to it as a part of the report. One hour was allowed the corporation to decide. It was stated to the British officer that the common council had no power to compel the return of merchandise carried to the country, nor to compel the citizens to aid in raising the sunken vessels: these two points were yielded by the enemy. The enemy was requested to explain what was included in the term merchandise, which was to be taken; and, in answer, it was stated that it would embrace such as was intended for exportation, such as tobacco, cotton, flour, bale goods, &c. The plunder of the enemy was indiscriminate, and not confined to any particular class of individuals, and included alike non-residents and inhabitants. The plunder of the enemy was confined principally to flour, cotton, and tobacco.

*Estimate of the loss.* Three ships, three brigs, several bay and river craft, some vessels burned, sixteen thousand barrels of flour taken, one thousand hogsheds of tobacco, one hundred and fifty bales of cotton, five thousand dollars' worth of wines, sugar, &c. In relation to a letter written by Admiral Codrington to Captain Gordon, the committee will refer to the entire letter of General John Mason, who gives a satisfactory history of this transaction; and, to complete this part of the subject, reference is had to the statement of General Hungerford, giving the movements of his troops, and explains the interviews he had with the deputation from Alexandria, on his march to the city of Washington.

*Conclusion.*

In the inquiry into the causes of the success of the enemy, in his recent enterprises against this metropolis, the neighboring town of Alexandria, &c. the committee consulted a mode of investigation least embarrassing to themselves and to others. They determined that, as it was indispensable to resort to some of the parties for information not derivable

from other sources, it would be equally their duty to hear, as far as practicable, those who were deeply concerned as to character and reputation, from the agency they had in this unfortunate transaction, with a determination that, in the event of any contradictions in material circumstances, to resort to impartial sources for explanation or correction. In the mean time, the committee called upon those who may be considered as impartial observers, for statements, that a just comparison might be made of different allegations and representations. If, therefore, the committee have failed to call upon persons in possession of any additional facts and views not submitted, it has not been through a want of inclination to receive all that could be important, but from a want of a knowledge of such persons and such facts. It was a question with the committee, at its earliest meeting, whether personal examinations before the committee should be adopted, or whether resort should be had, in the first instance, to call for written communications to views and interrogatories submitted by the committee, and best calculated to extract every important fact. Several considerations induced the adoption of the latter mode.

It gave the committee command of part of their time to attend to other public duties equally imperious and obligatory. It incurred no expense to Government or individuals, who were not interrupted in either their private concerns or public duties. The committee knew the anxiety of the House to have this inquiry closed as soon as possible, and which, by a different course, would have taken up the whole of the session, and encumbered with more useless and irrelevant matter and views than will be found in the communications. The committee feel therefore confident, that the House will be satisfied with the manner in which the subject has been developed; and to correct any possible error, and to receive any important fact or additional matter, although it is not very probable that much can remain, the committee will ask leave to report, with a reservation of a right to make any other communication that may be found necessary to an impartial examination of this subject.

## APPENDIX.

In addition to the report of the committee, in order to give a more satisfactory view and detail upon the main subjects of inquiry, and a variety of incidental matter which has arisen from the investigation, the following communications are referred to as an appendix:

1. In relation to the measures adopted by administration, and the part taken by the President and the Heads of Departments, the committee refer to the letters from the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the Attorney General: one is also expected from the Secretary of the Treasury, which shall be communicated when received.
2. In relation to the steps taken and measures adopted by the Secretary of War, the committee refer to the correspondence with the commanding general, the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, the letter of Colonel Tayloe, two reports from the ordnance office, as to arms, military stores, &c.
3. The conduct of the commanding general, the collection and dispositions of the forces, and the conduct and movements of different corps, the committee refer to the narrative of General Winder, his correspondence with the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, the War Department, and various officers, the reports of General Smith, General Young, General Stansbury, Colonel Sterret, Major William Pinkney, General Douglas, Colonel Minor, Colonel Beall, and Commodore Barney's official letter.
4. In relation to the measures and arrangements and acts of the Navy Department, including the destruction of the navy yard and the public property, as well as the destruction of the public buildings in the city, the committee refer to a report from the Secretary of the Navy, a report from Commodore Tingey, and a report from Mr. Munroe, superintendent of the public buildings.
5. In relation to the capture and capitulation of Alexandria, the committee refer to the proceedings of the court martial upon Captain Dyson, the correspondence between him and the Secretary of War, as to the abandonment of the fort, the report of the corporation of Alexandria, including the terms of surrender, &c. and the letter from General Mason, relating to a letter from Admiral Codrington.
6. In relation to general information and incidental topics, the committee refer to Mr. Law, General Van Ness, and Doctor Catlett.

## A LIST OF THE DOCUMENTS.

1. A report of the army, its strength and distribution, previous to the first of July, 1814.
2. Letter of Colonel Monroe, then Secretary of State.
3. Letter of General Armstrong, late Secretary of War.
4. Letter from the Honorable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.
5. Letters from the Honorable Richard Rush, Attorney General.
6. Communication from the War Department, including the orders in relation to the tenth military district, the requisition of the fourth of July, and the correspondence with the Governors of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, and with General Winder.
7. The narrative of General Winder.
8. Reports of Generals Stansbury, Smith, Young, Douglas, and Hungerford; Colonels Sterret, Minor, Tayloe, Lavall, and Beall; Major Pinkney, and Captains Burch and Caldwell.
9. Report from the Navy Department, including the official report of Commodore Barney.
10. Letters from General Van Ness, Doctor Catlett, and John Law, Esquire.
11. Reports from the Ordnance Department.
12. Sentence of the court martial in relation to Captain Dyson, and the correspondence between him and the Secretary of War.
13. Report from the corporation of Alexandria, including the capitulation, and letter from Gen. John Mason.
14. Report from the superintendent of the public buildings.
15. William Simmons's letter.

No. 1.

A Report of the Army, its strength and distribution, previous to the 1st of July, 1814.

	Effectives.	Aggregate.	STATION.		Effectives.	Aggregate.	STATION.	
<i>District No. 1.</i>			Boston, Portsmouth, Portland, & East-port.	<i>No. 9—Continued.</i>			1st, or division of the right.	
40th Reg't Infantry,	352	379			6th Reg't Infantry,	250		518
Artillerists,	363	276			10th ditto,	254		327
<b>Total,</b>	<b>615</b>	<b>655</b>		12th ditto,	492	752		
<i>District No. 2.</i>			New London. Ditto.	13th ditto,	194	381		
Artillerists,	127	149		14th ditto,	137	262		
37th Reg't Infantry,	490	565		15th ditto,	317	549		
<b>Total,</b>	<b>617</b>	<b>714</b>		16th ditto,	299	434		
<i>District No. 3.</i>			New York.	29th ditto,	374	515		
Artillerists,	378	370		30th ditto,	274	354		
32d Reg't Infantry,	335	602		31st ditto,	90	99		
41st ditto,	628	692		32d ditto,	165	236		
42d ditto,	331	374		34th ditto,	183	240		
Sea Fencibles,	77	78		1st Rifle Regiment,				
<b>Total,</b>	<b>1,849</b>	<b>2,116</b>		2d battalion,	223	276		
<i>District No. 4.</i>			Fort Mifflin, recruiting rendezvous.	<b>Total,</b>	<b>4,908</b>	<b>7,108</b>		
Artillerists,	108	108			The recruits of the above regiments, the 48th Infant. 300 dragoons, and 264 light artillerists, under orders to join this division, will amount to	4,687	4,687	
Dragoons,	200	200			<b>Total,</b>	<b>9,595</b>	<b>11,795</b>	
<b>Total,</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>308</b>						
<i>District No. 5.</i>			Norfolk.	Light Artillery,	60	66	Buffalo, Oswego, & Sackett's Harbor.	
Artillerists,	210	224			Dragoons, (troops mounted)	443		557
20th Reg. Infant.	873	912			Artillerists,	624		687
35th ditto,			Baltimore.	9th Reg't Infantry,	227	501		
36th ditto, 1st bat.					11th ditto,	492	628	
Artillerists,	65	111			21st ditto,	458	664	
39th Reg't, 2d bat.	300	316		25th ditto,	392	606		
Sea Fencibles,	167	173		1st Rifle Regiment,				
Artillerists,	40	40		1st battalion,	345	345		
Ditto,	79	82		<b>Total,</b>	<b>3,041</b>	<b>4,074</b>		
36th Reg't Infantry,	320	350						
<b>Total,</b>	<b>2,154</b>	<b>2,208</b>		Under orders to join this division:				
<i>District No. 6.</i>			North & South Carolina & Georgia.	Artillerists,	248	248		
Dragoons,	135	141			1st Reg't Infantry,	200	214	
Artillerists,	413	430			22d ditto,	359	517	
8th Reg't Infantry,	688	728		23d ditto,	600	650		
18th ditto,	443	482		The recruits of the 1st, 9th, 11th, 21st, & 25th, under orders to join, amount to	910	910		
43d ditto,	261	269		<b>Total,</b>	<b>5,348</b>	<b>6,613</b>		
1st Rifle Regiment, 1st Company,	87	92						
Sea Fencibles,	100	102						
<b>Total,</b>	<b>2,127</b>	<b>2,244</b>						
<i>District No. 7.</i>			N. Orleans, Mobile, and the Creek nation.	ABSTRACTS OF TOTALS.				
Artillerists,	339	351			Effectives.	Aggregate.		
2d Reg't Infantry,	408	422			615	655		
3d ditto,	400	420		617	714			
7th ditto,	670	694		1,849	2,116			
39th ditto,	370	394		308	308			
44th ditto,	89	97		2,154	2,208			
<b>Total,</b>	<b>2,276</b>	<b>2,378</b>		2,127	2,244			
<i>District No. 8.</i>			Detroit, Sandwich, Sandusky, &c.	2,276	2,378			
Artillerists,	142	179			2,121	2,472		
17th Infantry,					9,595	11,795		
19th ditto,	1,591	1,762		5,348	6,613			
24th ditto,								
29th ditto,								
Rangers,	317	423						
Ditto,	71	108						
<b>Total,</b>	<b>2,121</b>	<b>2,472</b>						
<i>District No. 9.</i>			1st, or division of the right.					
Light Artillery,	458	610			27,010	31,503		
Dragoons,	97	102						
Artillerists,	181	195						
4th Reg't Infantry,	655	751						
5th ditto,	275	407						

## No. 2.

*Letter of Colonel Monroe, then Secretary of State.*

WASHINGTON CITY, November 13, 1814.

The events in France having greatly augmented the disposable force of the enemy, and his disposition to employ it against the United States being well known, the safety of this metropolis was thought to require particular attention.

On or about the first of July last, the President convened the Heads of Departments and the Attorney General, to consult them on the measures which it would be proper to adopt for the safety of this city and district. He appeared to have digested a plan of the force to be called immediately into the field; the additional force to be kept under orders to march at a moment's notice; its composition, and necessary equipment. It seemed to be his object, that some position should be taken between the Eastern Branch and the Patuxent, with two or three thousand men, and that an additional force of ten or twelve thousand, including the militia of the district, should be held in readiness in the neighboring States, to march when called on. The whole force to be put under the command of an officer of the regular army.

The measures suggested by the President were approved by all the members of the administration. The Secretaries of War and Navy gave the information required of them, incident to their respective departments. The former stated the regular force which he could draw together at an early day, infantry and cavalry; the amount of the militia of the district, and the States from which he should draw the remaining force in contemplation, and in what proportions. The latter stated the aid which he could afford, from the officers and seamen of the flotilla on the Patuxent, and the marines at the navy yard on the Eastern Branch. The result of the meeting promised prompt and efficacious measures for carrying these objects into execution. The command of this whole force, with that of the district No. 5, was given to Brigadier General Winder.

On the 5th of July I went to Virginia, whence I returned on or about the 25th. After my return I was much engaged in the affairs of my own Department.

Calling on the President on the morning of the 18th of August, he informed me that the enemy had entered the Patuxent in considerable force, and were landing at Benedict. I remarked that this city was their object. He concurred in the opinion. I offered to proceed immediately to Benedict, with a troop of horse, to observe their force, report it, with my opinion of their objects, and, should they advance on this city, to retire before them, communicating regularly their movements to the Government. This proposal was acceded to. Captain Thornton, of Alexandria, was ordered to accompany me, with a detachment of twenty-five or thirty of the dragoons of the district. I set out at about 1 P. M. on the 19th, and arrived at 10 next morning in sight of the enemy's squadron, lying before Benedict, and continued to be a spectator of their movements until after the action at Bladensburg on the 24th.

The annexed notes contain information which I communicated to the Government, of the force and designs of the enemy.

In retiring from Nottingham, late the evening of the 21st, after writing a note to the President, I observed a column of the enemy in the rear of the town, which I concluded had passed from Benedict by a road near the river, moving in concert with the barges. The number I could not ascertain, having seen its head only. I went immediately to Mr. Oden's, where I met Colonel Beall, whom I had before seen at Nottingham. He had taken a view of the enemy's column from a commanding height contiguous to the town. From his statement we both concluded that it must have amounted to between four and five thousand men. The force in the barges was supposed to exceed one thousand: so that the whole force of the enemy might be estimated at about six thousand. Hearing that General Winder was at the Woodyard, I hastened to him. He had there about two thousand two hundred men, consisting of the marines, Colonel Lavall's cavalry, and the city and Georgetown militia. I understood that he either then gave orders, or repeated those he had before given, to a part of the militia at Baltimore, and to Colonel Beall, who commanded six or seven hundred at Annapolis, to move towards Bladensburg to his support.

On the morning of the 22d General Winder put his force in motion from the Woodyard towards Nottingham. At 5 Lavall's cavalry met the enemy a mile in advance of Mr. Oden's. They were in full march, as was inferred, for Washington, with intention to attack General Winder. Our cavalry retired before the enemy, and General Winder, after reconnoitering his force as well as the nature of the ground would admit, retired the head of his column towards the Woodyard, with intention to concentrate his force, and form it in line. It was soon perceived that the enemy had taken a road to his right in a direction to Upper Marlborough, at which place they arrived about 2 P. M. on that day. General Winder retired by the Woodyard to a place called the Old Fields, which covered equally Bladensburg, the bridges on the Eastern Branch, and Fort Washington. Commodore Barney joined him there with the flotilla men, amounting to about five hundred.

Late on the evening of the 22d, the President, with the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Attorney General, joined General Winder at the Old Fields, and remained with him until the afternoon of the 23d.

After mid-day on the 23d, General Winder detached Major Peter with some field pieces, and Captains Davidson and Stull's companies, to skirmish with the enemy near Marlborough, who advanced on him, and took a position near the camp at the Old Fields, menacing it with attack, either that night, or early the next morning. General Winder retired, and passed the Eastern Branch into the city that night. Colonel Tilghman, with his cavalry, remained on the road between Marlborough and Bladensburg.

General Stansbury, with a part of his brigade, arrived at Bladensburg on the evening of the 22d, and the remainder arrived there on the evening of the 23d. This brigade amounted to between two thousand two hundred and two thousand three hundred men.

In the afternoon of the 23d, the President, with the Secretaries of War and Navy, returned to Washington. The Attorney General, and several respectable friends from the city, proceeded with me to the road leading from Marlborough to Bladensburg. Late that evening I heard of the advance of the enemy on the party under Major Peter, and against General Winder.

Not knowing the result, I hastened to General Stansbury's quarters at Bladensburg, and found him encamped on the height beyond the village on the road leading to Marlborough. He had just heard of the enemy's movement, but was likewise unacquainted with the result. I had the pleasure to meet there Colonel Sterret and Major Pinkney. I advised the General to fall forthwith on the enemy's rear, although it was then 12 o'clock at night. He observed that he had been ordered to take post at Bladensburg, and did not think himself at liberty to leave it; but, had it been otherwise, as a considerable portion of his force had just arrived, after a very fatiguing march, that it would not be in his power to march that night. I proceeded to the city, where I heard that General Winder had crossed the Eastern Branch, and taken post near the navy yard.

In the morning of the 24th, I met the President at General Winder's quarters. Among other rumors of the enemy's movements, the General had just heard that he was marching towards Bladensburg. I asked if General Stansbury was apprised of it. He presumed that he was. I offered to join him. The President and General Winder both expressed a wish that I would. I lost not a moment in complying with their desire. Between 11 and 12 I joined General Stansbury, who had moved his brigade on this side of the Eastern Branch, near the bridge. I inquired where were the enemy? He replied, advancing, not more than three miles distant. I advised the General to form his troops to receive them, which he immediately commenced. The order of battle was formed on the presumption that his brigade would alone have to meet the enemy in the first instance. Major Pinkney, with a battalion of riflemen, was placed to the right of the battery to support it; another corps was placed to the left, for the same purpose, and the fifth Baltimore regiment in the rear. On forming the line on the brow of the hill, and extending the right to cover the road leading to Washington, it was found that the left would be much exposed, as it scarcely extended to the rear of the battery. If the battery should be forced, which seemed probable, the enemy's column would turn our left, and ascending the heights and commanding the most advantageous grounds, force us

towards the city. This induced, at a late period, the removal of the fifth Baltimore regiment from the rear of the battery, to the left of the line, a measure taken with reluctance, and in haste. Colonel Beall's corps had entered Bladensburg from another route, and was at that moment approaching the bridge. Captain Thornton was sent to lead it to the height to the right of the road, which commanded the whole of the ground held by General Stansbury's brigade. It was deemed important to occupy that height to protect the line to the left, and likewise to impede the enemy's movement by the road towards the city. The cavalry were placed to the left, somewhat in the rear of the line. After General Stansbury had made this disposition, Mr. Walter Jones, junior, set out, at my request, for the city, to communicate it to the President, the Secretary of War, and General Winder, with the near approach of the enemy.

Immediately after this General Winder arrived, and informed us that his whole force was in full march to Bladensburg. On taking a view of the order which had been formed, he approved of it. This was the more satisfactory, because it had then become impossible to make any essential change. The General proceeded promptly, for the enemy were getting in sight, to make a disposition of such of his troops as had arrived. He placed one corps near the battery, to support it, and some pieces of artillery on the left of General Stansbury's line. We then passed to the right along the line. Near the road, leading from Bladensburg to Washington, we met the Secretary of War, and immediately afterwards, at the road, I met the President and Mr. Rush, who had just arrived, and who, joining with me, the Secretary of War, and General Winder, proceeded together towards the left of the line. Mr. Rush informed me that the President intended, when every arrangement should be completed, to take a position with the members of the administration in the rear of the line, that, looking to all the functions of the Government, he might be able to act with their counsel according to circumstances. Shortly afterwards the President gave me the same information. The action may be said to have commenced, when we had arrived in the rear of the battery near the bridge. The enemy had saluted us with their rockets, and, attempting to pass the bridge, our little batteries had begun to play on them. After some pause, the President remarked to the Secretary of War and myself, that it would now be proper for us to retire in the rear, leaving the military movement to military men, which we did. The Attorney General followed us. After our little batteries were carried, and the left of our line broken, the President, with the members of the administration present, retired along the eminence on which the left of the line had been formed, viewing the progress of the action to the right. On, or near the summit of this ground, I separated from the President, and the other gentlemen of the administration with him; they continuing to move slowly towards the city, I remaining to view the enemy's progress. At this moment I fell in again with Mr. W. Jones, jun. who had been charged, as already mentioned, after the line was first formed, with a communication to the President, the Secretary of War, and to General Winder. Hearing on the road that the General had passed him, he had immediately returned, and delivered to him the message in my presence, and afterwards remained with the Baltimore troops during the action. Inclining to the left, we hastened to the capitol, where we met the Secretary of War and General Winder. The General consulted the Secretary of War and me, on the propriety of making an attempt to rally the troops on the Capitol Hill. We both advised him to rally and form them on the heights above Georgetown, believing, as I did, that much would be hazarded by an attempt near the capitol. I knew that a column of the enemy had advanced from the high ground which had been held by our troops, and meeting, as they would, with no opposition, might take possession of the heights above the city, and thus force our troops, in case of a new disaster, to the plain between the capitol, the Eastern branch, and the Potomac; whereas, by occupying the heights above Georgetown, the enemy must either attack us to disadvantage, or, entering the city, expose his right flank and rear to an attack from us.

JAMES MONROE.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe to the President of the United States, dated*

ACQUASCO MILLS, seven miles from Benedict, }  
August 20, 1814, one o'clock, P. M. }

DEAR SIR:

I arrived here this morning at eight o'clock, and have been since within four miles of Benedict, at Butler's mill, where it was reported the enemy, on their march, had arrived. The report was unfounded. The enemy landed yesterday at Benedict, and had advanced their pickets within a mile and a half of that mill, for security only. From a height between that mill and the Patuxent, I had a view of their shipping; but being at the distance of three miles, and having no glass, we could not count them. We shall take better views in the course of the evening, and should any thing be seen, material, I will immediately advise you of it. The general idea is, that they are still debarking their troops, the number of which I have not obtained any satisfactory information of. The general idea also is, that Washington is their object, but of this I can form no opinion at this time. The best security against this attempt is an adequate preparation to repel it.

Respectfully, your friend and servant,

JAMES MONROE.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe to the President of the United States, dated*

HORSE HEAD, August 21, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

I quartered last night near Charlotte Hall, and took a view this morning, at eight o'clock, from a commanding height below Benedict creek, of all the enemy's shipping near the town and down the river, to the distance, at least, of eight or ten miles. I counted twenty-three square rigged vessels; few others were to be seen, and very few barges. I inferred from the latter circumstance, that the enemy had moved up the river, either against Commodore Barney's flotilla at Nottingham, confining their views to that object, or taking that in their way, and aiming at the city, in combination with the force on the Potomac, of which I have no correct information. I had, when I left Acquasco mills last night, intended to have passed over to the Potomac, after giving you an account of their vessels from the height below Benedict; but, on observing the very tranquil scene which I have mentioned, I was led, by the inference I drew from it, to hasten back to take a view of the enemy's movements in this quarter, which it might be more important for the Government to be made acquainted with. I am now on the main road from Washington to Benedict, twelve miles from the latter, and find that no troops have passed in this direction. The reports make it probable that a force by land and water has been sent against the flotilla. I shall proceed with Captain Thornton's troop immediately to Nottingham, and write thence whatever may be deserving of notice.

The enemy have plundered the country, to the distance of three or four miles, of all their stock, &c.

The intelligence of the enemy's force in the Potomac varies here as much as in Washington. I have had no means of forming a correct estimate of it.

JAMES MONROE.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe to Brigadier General Winder, dated*

NOTTINGHAM, August 21, 1814.

SIR:

The enemy are now within four hundred yards of the shore. There are but three barges at hand, and the force in view is not considerable. If you send five or six hundred men, if you could not save the town, you may, perhaps, cut off their retreat or rear.

J. M.

P. S. Ten or twelve more barges in view. There are but two muskets in town, and a few scattering militia.

Five o'clock. Thirty or forty barges are in view.

J. M.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe to the President of the United States.*

The enemy are advanced six miles on the road to the Woodyard, and our troops retiring. Our troops were on the march to meet them, but in too small a body to engage. General Winder proposes to retire till he can collect them in a body. The enemy are in full march for Washington. Have the materials prepared to destroy the bridges.

J. MONROE.

Monday, nine o'clock. You had better remove the records.

## No. 3.

*Letter of General Armstrong, late Secretary of War.*

LABERGORIE, October 17, 1814.

SIR:

An occasional absence from the place of my usual residence prevented me from receiving the letter you did me the honor to write to me on the third instant, until this morning. I now hasten to fulfil the injunctions of the committee, in giving to them "such information, views, and remarks, as are deemed pertinent to the subject of their inquiry, and best calculated for an impartial investigation of the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against the metropolis, and the neighboring town of Alexandria."

"Of the manner in which the public buildings, and other property, were destroyed, and of the amount thereof." I know nothing personally, nor have I recourse to any documents which would enable me to make a satisfactory communication on these points.

The enemy's success in his late enterprise against the city of Washington, &c. must necessarily be traced to one of two causes: the *incompetency* of the means projected and employed to repel his attack, or, the *mismanagement or misconduct* of these.

Under the *first* head may be noticed, what was the force contemplated and ordered by the Government as competent? What was that actually assembled and employed? And what other, or additional, means were at the disposal of the Government?

The *second* head would furnish an inquiry strictly military, viz: Whether all was done, that was necessary and practicable, by the commanding General and the troops under his direction? For such an inquiry I am not prepared, and what, under either head, I may be able to offer, will but be a detail of facts coming within my official cognizance, without any admixture of opinions.

Early in the month of June last, a call was made on the War Department for a general report of the numbers of regular troops and militia employed by the United States, and the distribution which had been made of these for the service of the present campaign. This statement was promptly rendered, and submitted by the President to the Heads of Departments. It is not recollected that any alteration of the provisions exhibited by this document was either made or suggested. A reference to it will show what was the force then deemed competent for the defence of military district No. 5, of which the city of Washington made part.\*

The better to secure the seat of Government, &c. from the attacks of the enemy, and to relieve the War Department from details, not making part of its regular duties, and incident to district No. 5, as then constituted, a new military district, comprehending that portion of country lying between the Rappahannock and Potomac rivers, the District of Columbia, and the State of Maryland, was created, on the second of July last, and placed under the command of Brigadier General Winder, who had been specially assigned by the President to that service.

In an interview with this officer, soon after his appointment, his attention was invited to the state of the existing defences within the limits of his command; to an examination of the different routes by which the enemy might approach the capital; to the selection of points best calculated to retard and to stop his movements, if directed thereto; and to the indication of such new defences, field or permanent, as he might deem necessary or practicable. The better to enable him to discharge these, and other duties, a military staff, composed of an Assistant Adjutant General, an Assistant Inspector General, and two assistant Topographical Engineers, were assigned to the district.

On the first of July a consultation of the Heads of Departments was had. The questions proposed for discussion were two:

1st. By what means can the seat of Government and Baltimore be defended, in case the enemy should make these cities objects of attack?

2d. Should he select the former, will his approach be made by way of the Potomac, or by that of the Patuxent?

On these questions I took the liberty of offering the following statements and opinions:

1st. That the principal defence to be relied upon, for either place, was militia; that, besides the artillerymen, composing the garrisons of Forts McHenry and Washington, about one thousand regular troops only could be collected, viz: the thirty-sixth regiment, one battalion of the thirty-eighth, two troops of dragoons, two companies of the tenth, ordered from North Carolina, and believed to be on their march, one company of the twelfth, and two companies of sea fencibles; that the number of militia called into service, should be proportioned to the known or probable strength of the enemy, and be taken from the States of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania; that it is not believed that the enemy will hazard a blow at either place, with a force less than five thousand men; that, to repel one of this extent, we should require at least double that number of militia; that these should be assembled at some intermediate point between Baltimore and the District of Columbia, leaving the sedentary, or undrafted militia of both places, an auxiliary force at the disposition of the commanding General, and that arms and ammunition were in depot and ready for their supply.

[Under this head the Secretary of the Navy stated, that the removal or destruction of the flotilla, would put at his disposition between six and eight hundred seamen, and that the marines then in barracks exceeded one hundred.]

2d. That the navigation of the Potomac is long and sinuous; and, if not doubtful, as to practicability by large ships, is at least uncertain in relation to the time its ascent may occupy; while that of the Patuxent is short and safe, and may be calculated with sufficient precision for military purposes; that, should the enemy ascend the former, his object is unmasked; he at once declares his destination, and of course leaves us at liberty to concentrate our whole force against him; that, on the other hand, should he ascend the Patuxent, (or South river) his object is uncertain; it may be the flotilla, or Baltimore, or Washington: and that, as long as his point of attack is unknown, so long must our force remain divided. That these considerations suggest the preference he will probably give to the Patuxent, but that this route is not without objections; that a separation from his fleet, and a land march of twenty miles, through a country covered with wood, and offering, at every step, strong positions for defence, becomes inevitable; that if these circumstances be turned to proper account against him, if he be not absolutely stopped, his march will be much retarded; that this state of things, on which every wise general will calculate, renders necessary a provision train, or the establishment of small intermediate posts, to keep open his communication with his shipping; that the loss of these would make his situation perilous; and that, should the main battle be given near Washington, and be to him disastrous, or even doubtful, his destruction is complete; that, after all, believing he will not hazard the movement but with a very superior force, or one he thinks such, it is also believed that he will prefer this route.

Conformably to these opinions, an order was taken to assemble a corps and form a camp, at such point between the city of Washington and Baltimore, as might be selected by the commanding general.

\* This document is in the possession of the President. No copy of it was retained by me.

On the 4th of July, the militia requisition of that date was issued, and of that requisition, two thousand effectives from the quota of Virginia; five thousand from that of Pennsylvania; six thousand, the whole quota of Maryland; and two thousand, the estimated number of the militia of the District, were put at the disposition of the commanding general. General Stewart's brigade was already in service, under the authority of the State, and had been supplied with arms, ammunition, tents, &c. by the War Department.

At a later period, when discovered that the draughts could not be brought together, but slowly, and with difficulty, a call upon the militia en masse was suggested by the General, and immediately authorized.

Of the force actually assembled and employed, I cannot speak with precision, as no return of these troops had been made to the War Department during my connexion with it. In the letter of the commanding general, of the 27th of August, he states the whole force assembled at Bladensburg, on the 24th of that month, at five thousand men; a number less by two-thirds than that which had been required. This amazing deficiency is thus accounted for by him: "The slow progress of draught, and the imperfect organization, with the ineffectiveness of the laws to compel them to turn out, rendered it impossible to procure more. The militia of this State, and of the contiguous parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, were called, en masse; but the former militia law of Pennsylvania had expired on the 1st of June or July, and the one adopted in its place is not to take effect, in organizing the militia, before October. No aid, therefore, has been received from that State."

The third and last point of inquiry under this head is, what other or additional means of defence were within the reach of Government?

Of naval means I am not a competent judge, nor do I know what, of this description, were actually employed, nor what it was possible to have superadded; but of those strictly military, I know none within the view of this question that were omitted. It may be supposed that permanent fortifications should have been multiplied; yet of works of this character, but one was suggested from any quarter entitled to respect, and this was a committee of bankers, who thought a new work on the Potomac, and below Fort Washington, desirable. To this suggestion it was answered, that a small work would be unavailing, and that, to erect one of sufficient size and strength, was impracticable, for want of money. An offer was then made to supply that want by loaning to the United States \$200,000, on condition that this sum should be devoted to the special object of defending the District. An agreement to this effect was made, and the money promised to be paid into the treasury on the 24th of August. The events of that day put an end to the business, and at the same time furnished evidence of the fallibility of the plan, had it even been executed, by showing that no works on the Potomac will, of themselves, be a sufficient defence for the seat of Government. The considerations which governed my own opinion on this subject, and which may have governed that of others, were, that to put Washington *hors d'insulte*, by means of fortifications, would, from physical causes, among which is the remoteness from each other of the several points to be defended, have exhausted the treasury; that bayonets are known to form the most efficient barriers; and that there was no reason, in this case, to doubt beforehand the willingness of the country to defend itself.

In this brief statement you are presented with a view of the force contemplated and ordered by the Government; of the means taken to assemble that force through the usual medium of the commanding general;\* of that actually assembled and employed; and lastly, of my impressions in relation to any other or additional means of defence.

I now proceed to the second subject of inquiry, the employment of the means we had, and the conduct of the troops.

On the — of August was received the first notice of the arrival of Admiral Cochrane in the bay, and on the same day advices were brought, that he was entering and ascending the Patuxent. These facts were communicated to the General, and he was instructed to take a position near the enemy. On the 22d he was advised to hang on their rear and flank a heavy corps, while he opposed to them another in their front. My reasons for thus advising him were three: if Baltimore was the object of the enemy, this disposition interposed a corps between them and that city; if they aimed at Washington, it menaced their communication with their fleet, and the security of their return, and was, therefore, most likely to hold them in check; and lastly, it did not forbid a concentration of force in their front, at a later period and by a forced march. On the evening of the 22d, I repaired to the army, and found it at the Old Fields, six or eight miles distant from the enemy. A part of the corps contemplated for the service mentioned in the preceding article had joined Gen. Winder, and of the other part (under Gen. Stansbury) no correct account could be given. I took this occasion to urge the necessity of a speedy concentration of our force, and of the usefulness of pushing our pickets frequently and freely upon those of the enemy, as the best means of circumventing their supplies; of gaining a knowledge of his strength, (of which the accounts were various) and of preventing a stolen march, which was to be suspected. I was glad to find the General entertained similar views, and that they were in a train of execution. In the afternoon of the 23d, I returned to Washington, and during the night of that day the President transmitted to me the letter of which that which follows is a copy:

"The President of the United States:

"The enemy are advanced six miles on the road to the Woodyard, and our troops retiring. Our troops were on the march to meet them, but in too small a body to engage. Gen. Winder proposes to retire till he can collect them in a body. The enemy are in full march for Washington. Have the materials prepared to destroy the bridges.

JAMES MONROE.

"Tuesday, 9 o'clock. You had better remove the records."

On the morning of the 24th, I received a note from Gen. Winder, informing me of his retreat and the approach of the enemy, and "asking counsel from me, or from the Government." This letter was late in reaching me. It had been opened, and passed through other hands. The moment I received it I hastened, with the late Secretary of the Treasury, to the General's quarters. We found there, the President, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Attorney General. Gen. Winder was on the point of joining the troops at Bladensburg, whither, it was now understood, the enemy was also marching. I took for granted, that he had received the counsel he required: for, to me, he neither stated doubt nor difficulty, nor plan of attack or of defence. This state of things gave occasion to a conversation, principally conducted by the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, which terminated in an understanding that I should repair to the troops, and give such directions as were required by the urgency of the case. I lost not a moment in fulfilling this intention, and had barely time to reconnoitre the march of the enemy, and to inform myself of our own arrangements, when I again met the President, who told me that he had come to a new determination. and that *the military functionaries should be left to the discharge of their own duties, on their own responsibilities*. I now became, of course, a mere spectator of the combat.

If our field combinations were not the most scientific, it ought to be recollected that many of our troops were incapable of receiving those of the best form,† and that circumstances had rendered the order of battle, on our part, nearly fortuitous. "Much the largest portion of our force," says the General, in his letter of the 27th of August, "arrived on the ground when the enemy were in sight, and were disposed of to support, in the best manner, the position which Gen. Stansbury had taken. They had barely reached the ground before the action commenced."

These facts may also explain why we had no guns in battery in the line of the bridge over which the enemy passed? why a brick house, which enfiladed that bridge, and was partially fortified, should not have been unroofed and occupied? and why a frame store house should have been left to cover the head of the enemy's column, and its subsequent display? &c. &c.

\* His exertions were occasionally aided, and his authority enforced, by the War Department. See Colonel Tayloe's letter enclosed, and let me pray that this gentleman may be examined on the subject of it by the committee.

† Upon my inquiring why the dragoons had not been embodied, masked, and made to charge the right flank of the enemy, the General replied that an officer of that corps had assured him that his men could not be brought to a charge.

If, also, the most efficient corps of the army was left out of the original arrangement, and but got into the line when other parts of it "were retreating, and apparently in much disorder," it will not be forgotten that this corps was distinct and independent, and that the General had no authority, of right, to command it. I witnessed the quietude of the gallant officer who led this corps, at having been assigned to a duty which, in his own strong language, "but required a corporal and six men." The lateness with which he got into a post of more distinction, I consider as one of the causes of the disasters of the day: but, without all doubt, the determining cause of these is to be found in that love of life which, in many of the corps, predominated over a love of country and of honor. In illustration of this fact, I refer to the official reports of Gen. Winder and of Com. Barney, and shall close this letter by adopting the opinion of the former, "that the contest was not maintained as obstinately as could have been desired, but was, by parts of the troops, sustained with great spirit and prodigious effect; and, had the whole of our force been equally firm, I am induced to believe that the enemy would have been repulsed, notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which we fought."

I have the honor to be, sir, with very great respect, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

P. S. On what may particularly relate to Alexandria, I beg leave to refer to my official letter to Gen. Young, of the 24th of August, and to my note to Captain Dyson, and his reply, of the 29th. It may be, that no copy of the first was kept; in which case the original may be called for.

J. A.

Hon. Col. JOHNSON, *Chairman, &c.*

No. 1.

*Letter from the Honorable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT, October 31, 1814.

SIR:

In compliance with the request, contained in your letter of the 24th instant, to state to the committee of inquiry "any thing that may be within my knowledge, as to the measures taken and adopted by the administration, and more especially those proposed and adopted at the cabinet council on the first of July last, in relation to the defence of the District of Columbia, with such other views and things as may be deemed, in my estimation, pertinent to an inquiry," I have the honor to reply: That, as the information required involves the confidential proceedings of a cabinet council, I deemed it expedient and respectful to ascertain, from the proper source, whether any obstacles existed to the development of what passed upon that occasion; and being freed from all restraint upon that question, I proceed to state, briefly, from memory, my general recollections upon the subject of the inquiry.

The serious apprehensions of invasion and devastation, which succeeded the knowledge of those extraordinary events, which liberated the powerful naval and military forces of the enemy from European hostility, and the temper of the British nation, as displayed in the language of its journals and conduct of its Government, in relation to the pacific mission which it had invited, were deeply felt, and frequently discussed, in occasional conversations between the individual members of the administration, prior to the cabinet meeting on the first of July last, in which the probable points of attack were variously considered. My own impressions inclined to the opinion that there were some points more exposed, less difficult of access, and more inviting to the enemy, upon the system of warfare he had adopted, than the metropolis; the only important objects which it presented, according to my view, being the naval depot and public shipping.

I recollect, on one of those occasions, that the President expressed very great solicitude for the safety of the metropolis; his belief that the enemy would attempt its invasion, and urged the expediency of immediate defensive preparations, with all the disposable force that could be conveniently collected. I accorded in the expediency of the preparation, but must confess I was not equally impressed with the apprehension of immediate danger, as well from the reasons I have before assigned, as from the then existing fact, that the force of the enemy, in the waters of the Chesapeake, was entirely naval, and apparently very satisfactorily engaged in conflagrating farm houses, and depredating upon slaves and tobacco, on the shores of the Patuxent. In this sentiment I was not alone.

On the 30th day of June, the members of the cabinet were invited to attend a meeting, at the President's mansion, on the following day at noon.

At or near the time appointed, the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, and the Attorney General, assembled.

The President stated the object of the meeting to be the consideration of the menacing aspect of things, in consequence of the augmented power of the enemy by the great political changes which had taken place in Europe, and the disposition manifested by the Government and people of Great Britain, to prosecute the war with the most vindictive and devastating spirit; represented the motives and inducements, which, he conceived, the enemy had, to prefer the invasion of the capital rather than any other immediate enterprise; and urged the necessity of speedy and efficient preparation for the defence of the district and capital; inquired into the existing state of its military and naval defences, and the extent of the disposable force which it would be practicable to concentrate in the District.

The Secretary of War estimated the disposable regular force, applicable to the intended purpose, to the best of my recollection, about twelve hundred, including about two hundred cavalry at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, who, I think he said, were not all mounted, but would probably be so in a short time. He brought into view the volunteer corps of the city and District, the particulars of which I do not recollect; and estimated the depot at Harper's Ferry, I think, to contain, at that time, about thirty-six thousand stands of arms.

The Secretary of the Navy enumerated the naval force, within immediate reach, as follows:

The marines, at head quarters, about	120
The force attached to the flotilla under the command of Commodore Barney, on the Patuxent, about	500

620

To the regular force, the President proposed to add ten thousand militia; to be designated, and held in readiness, in such neighboring districts as should be found most convenient. He also suggested the propriety of depositing, at a suitable place, contiguous to the metropolis, a supply of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.

These propositions produced very little discussion, the propriety and expediency of the measures appeared to be admitted, though no formal question was taken, nor any dissent expressed.

The meeting separated, with an understanding, on my part, that the measures proposed were to be carried into effect; but what order took place thereon, other than in the department of the navy, I know not; nor do I know any thing further material to the inquiry, except what is embraced in the communication which I had the honor to make to the committee on the 3d instant.

The officers of the navy yard are closely engaged in making out the estimates of the loss sustained by the conflagration at that establishment, but the loss of books and papers has retarded their operations. It shall be completed as soon as possible, and transmitted without delay.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. JONES.

Hon. RICHARD M. JOHNSON,

*Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry, House of Representatives.*



NAVY DEPARTMENT, *November 12, 1814.*

SIR:

I have now the honor to transmit the reports and statements of the commandant of the navy yard, showing the actual loss of public property by the conflagration at the navy yard on the 24th of August last.

Exhibit A shows the loss sustained in moveable property, viz: the estimated value previous to the fire; the value preserved or recovered; and the actual loss sustained; as condensed in the recapitulation on the last page.

Nett loss,	417,745 51
Exhibit B shows the loss sustained in buildings and fixtures, in like manner showing the estimated cost and real loss sustained. Nett,	91,425 53

Total loss,	\$509,171 04
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To which is annexed an estimate (believed to be founded upon such data as may be relied upon) of the "expenses of rebuilding, in a plain substantial manner," so as to carry on all the public work with as much advantage and convenience as before the fire; amount,

\$62,370 14

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

W. JONES.

The Honorable RICHARD M. JOHNSON,

*Chairman of the Committee of Investigation relative to the incursion of the enemy.*

No. 5.

LETTERS FROM THE HONORABLE RICHARD RUSH, ATTORNEY GENERAL.

*Narrative by Richard Rush, Attorney General of the United States, of such facts and circumstances as are within his knowledge, relative to the capture of Washington on the 24th of August, 1814; and of measures adopted by the Government in relation to that event, previous to, or on that day; delivered on the requisition of a committee of the House of Representatives, appointed to investigate the causes which led to the capture.*

WASHINGTON CITY, *October 15, 1814.*

As my official place in the Government embraces no connexion with the duties of either of the four Departments, farther than as I am liable to be consulted on legal questions growing out of the business of either of them, it is not to be expected that I can give information relative to the subject-matter of the committee's inquiries, except—

1st. Such as I may have derived from being present at the deliberations of the cabinet, when thereto summoned by the Executive, supposing any to be derivable from that source; or,

2dly. Such as I may have derived from my personal presence at Washington, and the opportunities thence furnished of becoming acquainted with acts or measures of Government, or other events transpiring at its seat.

In regard to the former capacity, I would beg leave to premise, that, as these deliberations imply an intercourse of confidence amongst those who participate in them, I hope I do not misapprehend the true nature of the connexion between the Executive and those whom he may invite to his consultations, or fail in my respect to the committee, when I state that I do not hold myself bound to make a public disclosure of matters which may, in this mode, have been the subject of Executive advisement or consideration. The exceptions belonging to such a rule, if any do belong to it, I forbear to advert to, inasmuch as I would be understood to have waived upon this occasion the objections which might otherwise be interposed against the development of transactions from this peculiar source of information. Upon a subject of such delicacy, and one involving future fights, I would beg to be further understood, that, in waiving all objection, I act under the full belief that it is not desired to restrain the freedom of such a course on my part, by any prohibitory injunctions from the quarter whence alone they could issue.

As introductory, then, to what I may have to disclose under this head, and to meet, as far as in my power, the inquiry made as to my knowledge of any preparatory measures adopted for the defence of the metropolis, I proceed to state—

That, in the month of June, of the past summer, when the momentous changes in Europe had become revealed to us, I had the honor of holding, individually, occasional interviews with the President. In dwelling upon our public affairs, he expressed his strong belief of the inauspicious results which these changes held out every likelihood of superinducing upon them. That the entire liberation of British military power from European conflicts, created a corresponding probability that portions of it, unexpectedly formidable, would be thrown upon our shores. In one, at least, of the conversations, he also dwelt upon the probability of an attack upon Washington; enforcing his opinion on the grounds, among others, of its own weakness, and the eclat that would attend a successful inroad upon the capital, beyond the intrinsic magnitude of the achievement. He spoke of the immediate necessity of preparing for its defence. His impressions of the danger appeared to acquire new force from the 26th of the month, upon which day despatches were received from two of our ministers abroad, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard, dated early in May. Upon the 30th of June, the Heads of Departments were desired to meet at the President's House on the following day at 12 o'clock.

They accordingly assembled. All were present. I, also, in pursuance of the President's request, attended. Our public affairs were brought into discussion; their altered, and more menacing character; the probable reluctance of the Northern Powers of Europe to regard favorably, at such a moment of European homage to the British name, the just rights for which we were contending; the fierce aspect which British military power now had the means, and probably would not want the disposition to put on towards us; the parts of our country most vulnerable to its immediate irruptions, as well as the general trials before us, were brought into view. The President mentioned what I had heard him, individually, express before, relative to Washington; stating his impression, unequivocally, to be, that, if it fell within the plans of the enemy to send out troops for operations upon the Atlantic frontier this season, he thought the capital would be marked as the most inviting object of a speedy attack. That it would be right, forthwith, to put in train measures of precaution and defence. He then declared that, to him, it appeared that a force of ten thousand men should be got in readiness for the city and District. That it would be desirable to have as large a portion of it as practicable regular troops; but that, at the least, there should be a thousand of this description, and more if more could be obtained. That the residue should be made up of the volunteers and militia of the District of Columbia, combined with that from the parts nearest adjacent of the States of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. That convenient depots of arms and military equipage should also be established. No dissent was expressed to these opinions of the President. The Secretary of War made some verbal estimate of the regiments, or parts of regiments, near at hand. By this, it appeared that, either with, or independent of, the marines at the navy yard, (for of this I am not certain) the portion of regular force mentioned could readily be had. I recollect nothing farther to have passed at the meeting about the defence of Washington. What measures were subsequently taken; how far those proposed were carried into effect; or by what causes they have been retarded or frustrated; I have not had the means of knowing with any certainty, and therefore cannot speak. In regard to what I have said, I am disposed to entertain the less distrust of its general accuracy from the habit of keeping occasional written memorandums connected with our public history, and from having refreshed my memory by a reference to some, in the present instance, made at the time.

As it appears to come within the scope of the committee's inquiries that I should also disclose such facts as I may possess a knowledge of, relative to any participation, by the Government, in the immediate events of the 24th of August, I have to state that my knowledge herein is merely incidental. As far as it extends, or may appear to have any bearing upon the interrogatories of the committee, I will proceed to unfold it.

On the morning of that day, probably at about 9 o'clock, I called at the lodgings of the Secretary of War to ask him for his latest intelligence respecting the enemy's movements. He was good enough to hand me a note he had received from General Winder, written from his head quarters, then established within the city limits, near the Eastern Branch bridge. It was dated, I think, the same morning. It was short, and stated the accounts from the river below to be more and more serious. It also expressed a wish to receive counsel either from the Secretary individually, or the Executive, as to the operations proper to be adopted in an emergency so critical. Other things may have been in it, but, reading it hastily, I would not be understood to speak with accuracy of its contents. Leaving the Secretary of War, I proceeded to the President's. Arriving there, I learned that the President had gone to the head quarters of General Winder. Thither I also next went. I there found the President, General Winder, Commodore Tingey, and two or three military officers. The Secretary of State, I understood, had previously been there, but had gone on to Bladensburg. The Secretary of the Navy came into the room not long afterwards. Of Commodore Tingey's presence I am not certain. The conversation turned upon the route by which it was thought most likely the enemy would make his approach. It was interrupted by dragoons, who had been on scouts, coming in every few minutes with their reports. The preponderance of opinion, at this period, I took to be that he would be most likely to move in a direction towards the Potomac, with a view to possess himself of Fort Warburton in the first instance. By this course, he would secure the passage of his ships, then supposed to be in the river below, and thus their ulterior co-operation, whether in the attack or retreat of his land troops. This way of thinking induced, as I supposed, General Winder to retain a large portion of his force in the neighborhood of the Eastern Branch bridge, in preference to moving it on, under the existing state of intelligence, towards Bladensburg. In anticipation of success to the enemy's attempts by water or land, or both, some conversation was had as to the proper precautions for blowing up, or otherwise rendering useless, the vessels and public property at the navy yard. After the lapse of probably an hour from the time I reached head quarters, an express arrived from General Stansbury, commanding the Baltimore troops, at Baldensburg, rendering it at length certain that the British army was advancing in that direction. General Winder immediately put his troops in motion, and marched off with them for Bladensburg.

When he had left the house, the Secretary of War, in company with the Secretary of the Treasury, arrived there. The President mentioned to the former the information which had just been received, at the same time asking him whether, as it was probable a battle would soon be brought on, he had any advice or plan to offer upon the occasion. He replied that he had not. He added, that, as it was to be between regulars and militia, the latter would be beaten. All who were in the house then came out; the Secretary of War getting on his horse to go to Bladensburg, and the Secretary of the Navy going to the marine barracks close by. Commodore Barney, with his seamen and marines, who were still remaining in or near the barracks, were ordered to push on with all despatch to Bladensburg, an order their anxiety stood anticipating. The President first went to the barracks, inviting me to accompany him. He then observed that he would ride to Bladensburg, with a view to join the two Heads of Departments, already gone there, and be of any use in his power. I proceeded on with him. Before we could reach the town, the forces of the enemy had possession of it. General Winder, as it struck my eye in riding along, had formed the troops he marched out with him on each side of the road, stretching a mile from Bladensburg, in such way as the few moments left him would allow. But, according to what particular plan they were drawn up, or by whose order, I cannot say. The President met with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State upon the field near the front ranks. The former had arrived just before him. When the President arrived, the arrangement for the battle, whatever it may have been, was apparently made. It commenced in a very few minutes, and, in not many more, some of our troops began to break. The President and two Secretaries, at about this period, retired together. I joined them very shortly afterwards, and rode into Washington with the President.

It does not, at present, occur to me that I can state any thing further relevant to the inquiries of the committee. I shall be ready to answer any questions it may think fit to propound, with a view to recall any explanatory or additional circumstances or facts, not recollecting above, or which I have not deemed it material to state.

RICHARD RUSH.

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1814.

Sir:

I have had the honor to receive your note, of the 29th of last month, requesting of me such information as I may possess relative to a report made early in June, from the War Department to the President, of the amount of regular and militia force, and its distribution throughout the country; which report was submitted by the President to the Heads of Departments; and requesting, also, that I will add any further matter to my former narrative, which may have since occurred to my recollection, that I may deem material, particularly as to the part taken by the President, or any of the members of the Government, on the day of the battle of Bladensburg.

With the same reservation which I before took the liberty to make of the privilege of being at my option as to the disclosure of facts of which I may have derived the knowledge through any confidential medium whilst engaged in public duties, I have to state—

That, at a meeting which took place of the Heads of Departments, at the President's, on the 7th of June, at which I also was present, I do remember that a paper was read by the President, which had been furnished by the Secretary of War, containing an estimate of all our land force, as well as its distribution. A similar one was exhibited of the naval force, prepared by the Secretary of the Navy. This, too, was read by the President. I remember the aggregate amount of the land force, but not the portions of it as then distributed through the respective military districts; or, at least, not that falling within district No. 5. The meeting was called, and the estimate of force submitted, for purposes quite distinct from the defence of district No. 5. The latter object being excluded, renders it, I presume, unnecessary that I should trouble the committee with any detail of the deliberations or resolutions that were had upon the occasion.

As regards the other branch of inquiry, I feel at some loss. I am not sure that I do remember any supplemental facts, which the committee might think material to be stated, relative to what took place on the day of the battle. Upon this subject I would, with the most entire deference, beg leave to suggest, that perhaps the most eligible course would be for me to answer (as I should ever be ready to do) to such interrogatories as the committee might find it in their discretion or convenience to put, rather than leave in my own hands the choice of topics. I venture upon the freedom of the remark from the fear that I may omit, or introduce, matter which, in other eyes, might wear a different aspect of relationship to the investigation, to what it had done in mine. When the President expressed his intention of going to Bladensburg, he observed, while on the road, that one motive with him was, that, as the Secretary of War, who had just gone on, might be able to render useful assistance towards arrangements in the field, it would be best that the requisite sanction to it should be at hand, preventing thereby, at a moment so important, any possible embarrassment, arising from the claims or duties of the commanding general. But when we reached the field we found the troops formed, and waiting, in their stations, the onset of the battle. The British army was already in full sight, and advancing in full march, through Bladensburg. At this juncture the President joined the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, and all approached to the spot where General Winder was. Some words of conversation seemed to pass between the President and the two latter. I was not near enough to overhear it. General Winder rode forward a few yards, exhorting the troops to be firm. The firing began almost immediately afterwards. Results took place that are known. It had been the wish of the President, as signified to me, on the ride out, that, after every military arrangement for the battle had been made, on the best advice attainable, the civil functionaries should join him, and retire to the rear of the army, with a view to any ulterior deliberations which

events might render necessary. I took it to be in conformity with this wish that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and himself, retired at the time, and in the manner, I have stated, and it was in pursuance of it that I accompanied them. Whilst still on the field, encompassed by part of our troops, I think I understood the two Secretaries to unite in opinion, that the mode in which they had been drawn up was as judicious as the time and circumstances allowed. But of this I do not speak with confidence, as my attention was partly taken up in viewing, from hill to hill, the contending movements. To me it appeared plain that entire ranks of our men, in front, were dispersed by the shock of the enemy, before any order for retreat was given by the commanding general.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

RICHARD RUSH.

The Honorable R. M. JOHNSON,  
*Chairman of the Committee of Investigation.*

No. 6.

*Communication from the War Department, including the orders in relation to the tenth military district, the requisition of the 4th of July, and the correspondence with the Governors of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, and with General Winder.*

BALTIMORE, July 9, 1814.

Sir:

The objects of the command which has been conferred upon me have consequently, since I received it, occupied my serious consideration.

The utmost regular force which it is probable can, in the present state of affairs, be placed at my command, including the force necessary for garrisoning the several forts, will not exceed one thousand men, and some weeks will necessarily elapse before the detachments from Virginia and Carlisle will reach my district: the detachments of the 36th and 38th are, therefore, the only troops that I can expect to have in the field in the mean time; and when those other detachments join, the utmost field force will be seven to eight hundred.

In conversation with you at Washington, I understood the idea, at present entertained, relative to the auxiliary militia force, proposed for the District, to be, that it shall be draughted and designated, but that no part of it is to be called into the field until the hostile force, now in the Chesapeake, shall be reinforced to such an extent as to render it probable that a serious attack is contemplated.

The enemy's fleet has now spent more than a twelvemonth in the waters of the Chesapeake, and, during that time, has visited almost every river falling into the bay; and must be presumed to have such accurate information, that, whatever expedition may be destined to these waters will have a definite object, to the execution of which, on its arrival, it will proceed with the utmost promptitude and despatch. Should Washington, Baltimore, or Annapolis, be their object, what possible chance will there be of collecting a force, after the arrival of the enemy, to interpose between them and either of those places? They can proceed, without dropping anchor, to within three hours' rowing and marching of Baltimore; within less of Annapolis; and upon arriving off South river, can debark, and be in Washington in a day and a half. This celerity of movement, on their part, is not probable, owing to adverse weather and other causes; but if the enemy has been active, while in our waters, to acquire a knowledge of our country, of which there can be no doubt, and should be favored with weather, on the arrival of reinforcements, he can be in Washington, Baltimore, or Annapolis, in four days from entering the Capes. But allowing, liberally, for all causes of detention, he can be in either of those places in ten days from his arrival. What time will this allow us to hear of his arrival, to disseminate through the intricate and winding channels the various orders to the militia, for them to assemble, have their officers designated, their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, delivered, the necessary supplies provided, or for the commanding officer to learn the different corps and detachments, so as to issue orders with the promptitude and certainty so necessary in active operations? If the enemy's force should be strong, which, if it come at all, it will be, sufficient numbers of militia could not be warned and run together, even as a disorderly crowd, without arms, ammunition, or organization, before the enemy would already have given his blow.

Would it not then be expedient to increase the force of my command, by immediately calling out a portion of militia; so that, by previously selecting the best positions for defence, and increasing, as far as possible, the natural advantages of these positions, the advance of the enemy might be retarded, his force crippled, and time and opportunity thus gained for drawing together whatever other resources of defence might be competent to resist the enemy? The small force of regulars will be incompetent to accomplish any material works at favorable positions, for strengthening the defences, and to supply the various vidette parties, which it will be necessary to station, on the prominent points of the bay, to watch the enemy, and communicate his movements with the greatest possible despatch.

Allow me, sir, respectfully to propose that four thousand militia be called out without delay. I propose to station these in equal proportions, in the most eligible positions between South river and Washington, and in the vicinity of Baltimore. Baltimore could not be aided by a force stationed between South river and Washington, unless a force were on the spot to retard the advance of the enemy until it could arrive, and so with respect to the force at Baltimore, in co-operating with that intended to defend Washington. Each could assist the other if of this magnitude, and it appears to me that, with materially less means actually in the field and ready for instant action, no hope can be entertained of opposing the enemy in assailing either of those places.

I shall proceed to Annapolis to-morrow, and have but little doubt that the Executive of Maryland will cordially co-operate in affording such means as it may be deemed advisable to call for; and I beg you will permit me to procure this, or such other militia force as the President may think proper immediately to be called out.

I sent an order from Washington for the detachments of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth to move up to the head of South river, where I propose to meet them, and fix upon the most eligible spot for the camp intended to defend Washington.

You will please, therefore, to direct any communications to me, to Annapolis, which will enable me to make the requisite arrangements with the Executive of Maryland at once.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

W. H. WINDER,  
*Brigadier General, commanding the 10th military district.*

HON JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

UPPER MARLBOROUGH, July 16, 1814.

Sir:

I reached this place last evening, in my tour of examining the country. From what I have seen and learned, it appears to me that there cannot be found a place of tolerable convenience with reference to the objects of defence, for an encampment, except in this neighborhood. Two places near here offer many conveniences: the one, two and a half miles on the Western branch and the road to Bladensburg, which I have seen; the other, about five miles on the road to Washington and Piscataway, near the Woodyard, which I shall examine to-day. The former is represented as unhealthy during August and September, but possesses all other requisites; the latter is said to be healthy, and unless there should be some considerable deficiency towards the comfort and convenience of a camp, I presume will be preferable; and if, upon examination, I shall find it eligible, I shall order the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth immediately to proceed thither. I am much embarrassed about the situation of Annapolis: it cannot be defended against a serious attack by land and water, without a large force and many additional works; and yet

it appears to me that, should the enemy contemplate serious operations in this quarter, with any considerable force, it will be of the utmost importance to him to occupy it. With the command of the water, an entrenchment of seven or eight hundred yards, properly protected by batteries, renders it secure against any attack by land. It furnishes a position in every respect desirable and useful to him for making enterprises against any other point, and a safe retreat against every calamity; in short, it appears to me to be the door to Washington, and it is not possible for us to shut it with our present means. Fort Madison, besides its exposed and defenceless situation, except from an approach direct by water, is so very unhealthy during the months of August and September, that it is not possible to keep a garrison in it. It is provided with two fifty pound columbiads, two twenty-four pounders, two eighteen pounders, one twelve and one six pounder. These guns will be exposed to certain capture if they are left there, and will be turned against the town and Fort Severn, with decisive effect, unless we can find the means of making a substantial defence of the place.

It appears to me that these guns should be removed, and the post mined, ready to be blown up whenever an attack of the town may be contemplated. I cannot, however, but again remark that the importance of the place to the enemy, in every point of view, renders it of the last importance to be defended, if the means can be obtained. But a considerable force ought to be instantly sent there to prepare the works necessary to give a chance of successful defence. On my arrival here last evening, I learned that an express had passed through this place to the Governor of Maryland, who stated that he was the bearer of information that two seventy-fours, with a number of small vessels, had made their appearance near the mouth of the Potomac. It is of importance that I obtain the earliest intelligence, if this be true; and I beg, if you have any intelligence worthy of attention, that you would communicate it to me here without delay. By the return of the express to Point Lookout, I shall write to the person employed there to give intelligence, and direct him to transmit me by express, intelligence of all the movements of the enemy. I shall also establish express lines from all the prominent points of observation on the bay, unless these may be already established, of which I beg you to inform me. The Governor and Council of Maryland have taken steps immediately to comply with the requisition of the General Government; but I fear, from my recent experience, it will be in vain to look for any efficient aid upon a sudden call upon the militia.

W. H. WINDER,

*Brig. Gen. commanding 10th Military District.*

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

NOTTINGHAM, July 17, 1814.

SIR:

We have information, deemed credible here, that the enemy are advancing up this river in considerable force. I have called the detachment of regulars to this place, who will be here to-morrow. The alarm is going out to assemble what militia force can be collected; and I take the liberty of suggesting the propriety of sending to this point, with the utmost expedition, the marine corps, and all the militia force that can be procured from the District.

Yours, respectfully,

WM. H. WINDER,

*Brig. Gen. commanding 10th Military District.*

Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR.

ANNAPOLIS, July 20, 1814.

SIR:

Your letter of the 17th reached me on the 18th. The enemy proceeded no further up the Patuxent than Hunting creek, where he landed and committed some depredations in Calvert county. He has since returned down the river, leaving us in doubt where he will next appear. I, in consequence, halted the three companies of city volunteers at the Woodyard, and the detachments of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth at Upper Marlborough, until some further indication shall be made by the enemy.

I have seized this moment to proceed to this place to arrange the calling of the Maryland militia, demanded by the requisition of the fourth instant. This will be immediately attended to by the Governor of this State. I have deemed it advisable to call for the highest number directed by the President, supposing that, by this means, we might possibly get the lowest.

I shall immediately proceed to Baltimore, to see and understand the means of defence there, to make the necessary arrangements and orders. I shall leave this to-morrow afternoon, or next day morning at farthest, (unless some movement of the enemy renders it unnecessary) and proceed to the country between Potomac and Patuxent.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,

*Brig. Gen. commanding 10th Military District.*

Hon. Gen. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

N. B.—The Governor informs me that it will not be in his power to supply the arms, camp equipage, &c. to the quota. The requisition already made and expected for local defence have exhausted the State arsenal.

I have delayed dismantling Fort Madison, only because it will excite greater sensation and clamor, and by that means proclaim to the enemy that it was not to be, or could not be, defended, and thus invite him to take possession of it. It would be impossible to dismantle it without making it public; and I have deemed it more expedient to risk the loss of the guns there, than, by removing them, invite the enemy to take the place, which he may possibly abstain from while he supposes the place will be defended.

W. H. W.

UPPER MARLBOROUGH, July 23, 1814.

SIR:

I availed myself of a suspension of the enemy's movements to proceed to Annapolis and Baltimore, to attend to the militia calls on Maryland. I returned here yesterday at two o'clock. The Governor has issued orders for calling out three thousand of the draughts, under the requisition of the fourth of July; and, at my suggestion, has appointed Bladensburg as the place of rendezvous. I preferred this place, because it was near the proposed line of defence, and contiguous to the supplies which Washington can afford. It will be necessary that arms, ammunition, accoutrements, tents, and camp equipage, be deposited there for them. I have no knowledge where these articles are in store, nearest that point, nor under whose charge they are. I must pray you give the necessary orders for having the requisite depositories made at that place. I have notified the contractor.

The two thousand militia called from General Smith's division, and who are to rendezvous near Baltimore, will, I believe, need no supplies but provision and ammunition from the United States. Upon these points I have taken orders. I fear some time will elapse before either of these requisitions can be complied with, in having the men assembled, especially the former, the draught being yet to be made. Major Marsteller, if not too much occupied at Washington, ought to be with me in the field; but his duties will call him, probably, to so many different points, that it appears to me he will require an assistant. The enemy's force is divided between the Potomac and Patuxent. The accounts which ought most to be credited, give five hundred as having landed from the Patuxent squadron, and from one thousand to fifteen hundred from the Potomac squadron; and although, from repeated experience, we are forbid to rely on this intelligence, yet, as it is the only direct intelligence we have, and comes from respectable people having had opportunities of observation, it cannot be wholly disregarded. I shall, therefore, for the present, still retain the city volunteers, and keep them and the regulars in a post of observation and readiness. I shall myself proceed nearer the enemy, for the purpose of better information and observation.

As I do not know whether only the quota of the District militia is to be draughted and placed at my disposal, or whether, on occasion, they are all considered as liable to requisition, I would thank you for information on that subject. As that part of the Pennsylvania militia, assigned for my district, are remote, and could not be called out upon emergency, might it not be expedient to draw from remotest points, leaving that portion of the militia nearest the probable scene of action, to be called out on the spur of the occasion? A deserter from the British, whose examination I have seen, says they talk of attacking Annapolis. If they know their own interest and our weakness, in fact incapacity, to defend that point, they certainly will possess it.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

W. H. WINDER,

*Brig. Gen. commanding 10th Military District.*

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

WOODYARD, *July 23d, 1814.*

SIR:

Since I wrote you this morning, I have, under all circumstances, deemed it expedient to direct Captain Davidson to return to Washington with his detachment of volunteers.

The facility with which they can turn out and proceed to any point, renders them nearly as effective as if actually kept in the field; and the importance to them individually of attending to their private affairs, decides me, even in the doubt of the enemy's probable movements, to give this order.

I take the liberty of suggesting, upon the information of Captain Doughty, that the rifles they have are very defective for service; and it would be useful, especially at the present moment, if they could be supplied with better. Captain Burch's artillery are also without swords. Whether both those articles are supplied to the militia of the District by the Government, I know not; but if they are and can be, the probable demand for the services of the militia of the District, and their importance in the scale of our force, would render it desirable they should be supplied.

I beg leave also to suggest, upon the information of the commanding officers of companies, that, if the tents and camp equipage were respectively left under their charge, it would enable them to march when called upon with much greater promptitude.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,

*Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.*

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

WARBURTON, NEAR FORT WASHINGTON, *July 25th, 1814.*

SIR:

From the enclosed representation of Lieutenant Edwards, and my own observation in confirmation thereof, Fort Washington is, in several respects, incomplete in its state of preparation for defence. If the eighteen pound columbiads are not mounted even in the block house, ammunition ought to be sent down for them and the eighteen pounders on the water battery. Lieutenant Edwards will send a requisition for the quantity and kind of ammunition necessary. Can Colonel Wadsworth, or the proper department at Washington, have the platform enlarged, which will be necessary to render the battery of the fort effectual?

I shall proceed down as far as Port Tobacco to-day.

I am, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,

*Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.*

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

*Report of Lieutenant Edwards.*

FORT WASHINGTON, *July 25, 1814.*

SIR:

I deem it my duty to report to you the defenceless situation of this post. The necessity of mounting heavy artillery in the block-house is apparent to every military character who is acquainted with the ground adjacent to the works. It is true a few eighteen pound columbiads have been sent here, but there are no means to enable us to mount them: we are destitute of a gin and tackle. The width of the platform in the fort is another subject upon which frequent representations (I understand) were made to General Bloomfield, but without effect. The depth of platforms for heavy pieces is generally from three to four toises, but seldom less than three. The width of this is but fourteen feet, very little more than two toises: at the first discharge of our heavy guns, I have known them to recoil to the hurtoirs. When they are heated they would undoubtedly run over it, and thus be rendered useless for a time.

On the water battery there are mounted five excellent long eighteen pounders (ship guns) but there is not a pound of ammunition for them. In case of an attack by water, the utility of these guns would soon be discovered. In defending ourselves against maritime attacks, it is of the first importance to have a battery near the level of the water, so as to strike the hull of the ship in a horizontal line; for the chance of hitting the object is much greater than when firing from an elevation; when it is only an intersection of the line of fire by the line of the surface that the ball can strike a ship's hull. In the first case the gunner has only to move his piece horizontally; in the other he must combine his direction with those of his elevation and the progress of the ship.

Some of the gun carriages in the fort are in bad order, but not so much so as to render them unserviceable. You will perceive by this morning's report, which I enclose, what is the strength of my force: those reported sick are invalids; those on extra duty, are men employed in the bake-house, garden, &c. and who are from bodily defects incapable of guard duty, but would be serviceable in an action.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JAMES L. EDWARDS,

*Lieutenant, commanding Fort Washington.*

*Colonel Wadsworth's Report.*

A couple of hands were ordered from Greenleaf's Point on Monday, to execute the necessary repairs of the gun carriages at Fort Washington. The platform is undoubtedly too narrow, as well as the parapet, but I think Lieutenant Edwards is mistaken in representing it to be but fourteen feet. It was directed to be made twenty or twenty-two feet, if I do not misrecollect. The disadvantage of two narrow a platform may be obviated with no great difficulty, by checking the recoil of the piece by means of an elastic handspike introduced between the spokes of the wheels to prevent them from turning. The defect of an insufficient parapet is not so easily obviated. It would be advisable I think, at a proper time, to make a new wall in front, fifteen or twelve feet in advance of the present, which would give sufficient extent, as well for the platform as parapet, without disturbing the magazine, &c. The whole original design was bad, and it is therefore impossible to make a perfect work of it by any alterations.

Two hundred rounds of shot and cartridges for eighteen pounders can be sent down, if thought proper. I directed some grape shot for the eighteen pound columbiads to be prepared long ago. A tackle and fall, to mount those guns in the block house, will be provided.

Captain Marsteller, whom I have just seen, informs me there was a good tackle and fall at Fort Washington when he left there. He says the platform was made above twenty feet wide.

D. WADSWORTH.

PORT TOBACCO, July 26, 1814.

SIR:

From the uniform train of information yesterday, the enemy are descending both the Potomac and the Patuxent. I cannot, however, rely implicitly on the intelligence. I expect more certain intelligence this morning. I expect the enemy will move up the bay next, and I shall not be surprised to find Annapolis his object, which I fear would fall before five hundred men. As soon as I am certain of the movements of the enemy, I shall return to Marlborough, and thence as circumstances may require.

What prospect of the cavalry from Carlisle, and the detachment from Virginia? I have received intelligence of neither.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,  
Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.

Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

PISCATAWAY, July 27th, 1814.

SIR:

I returned to this place from Port Tobacco this morning.

One of the enemy's frigates, the Loire, it is said passed through the Kettle Bottoms, but returned the day before yesterday to Clement's bay, where two seventy-four's still remain. I have not obtained information where the remainder of the fleet are. If there are any of their vessels in the Patuxent, they are at or near the mouth of the river. I expect to hear of them next up the bay. I shall go on immediately to Marlborough, where, or near it, I shall remain until the movements of the enemy may call me away.

General Stewart has a very considerable force at or near Cedar Point; Colonel Beall has his regiment and a troop of cavalry at Port Tobacco; and Colonel Bowie with his regiment is at Nottingham; the regulars under my command are at Marlborough, between the enemy and any possible approach to Washington. The Governor is exerting himself to collect a force at Annapolis.

I have employed myself without intermission in examining the country, and have acquired a knowledge of its topography, which will be extremely useful to me.

I should have proceeded lower down had the enemy's force up the rivers Potomac or Patuxent; but the retrograde movements on both the rivers induces me to suppose they will proceed to some other point, and I return to Marlborough to be ready whenever he may appear.

I have heard nothing as yet of the dragoons from Carlisle, or the detachments of infantry from Virginia. Are there not enough recruits of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth, to form a company each? If either have fifty men, would it not be advisable to organize and order them to join?

This will be delivered you by Major Stewart, who goes by the way of Washington, will join me at Marlborough, and take any commands you may have for me.

I am, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,  
Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

PISCATAWAY, July 27th, 1814.

SIR:

In the third paragraph of my letter, just finished, and which will accompany this, I have used general expressions relative to the force, in order that, should it be deemed advisable to use any information I have communicated to tranquilize the morbid sensibility of the people of the District, no injurious disclosure may be made; and I add a more specific account of the force in a separate letter, for your information.

General Stewart states his force at eight hundred; Colonel Beall has three hundred to three hundred and fifty, and forty dragoons; Colonel Bowie has, I presume, three hundred. The Governor has been, in vain, endeavoring to assemble the neighboring militia at Annapolis; he had called on Frederick county, and some militia were coming in from thence, when I last was at Annapolis. All this force is, however, called out by the authority of the State laws, and is not under my command. But they do and will co-operate toward the general defence.

I am, &c.

WM. H. WINDER, *Brigadier General.*

Honorable J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

PORT TOBACCO, August 1, 1814.

SIR:

I learn this morning, in a manner which leaves me no doubt of the fact, that the enemy have retired down near to the mouth of the river, if he has not left it, with all his ships. A rumor, not so well authenticated, but very probable, states the force in the Patuxent to be increased and ascending that river.

I have halted the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scott at Piscataway, where they will wait until some ascertained movement of the enemy shall render it necessary for them to move to some other point.

I shall see General Stewart, of the militia, this morning, and then be able to speak more decidedly.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,  
Brigadier General commanding.

Honorable J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

BALTIMORE, August 13, 1814.

SIR:

In consequence of the two regiments which were draughted from General Smith's division, under the requisition of April last, being accepted as part of the quota of Maryland, under the requisition of the 4th of July last, of the impracticability, besides impropriety of calling any portion of those draughted from the Eastern Shore, and the necessity of leaving all the men immediately upon the bay, and low down upon the rivers, for local defence on the Western Shore, the remaining portion of the Maryland draughts to be assembled at Bladensburg, instead of being three thousand, will not much exceed as many hundred. I shall require the Governor to order out all the draughts that can possibly be spared from the three lower brigades on the Western Shore; but since the whole number draughted on the Western Shore, exclusive of those drawn from General Smith's division, do not amount to fifteen hundred, I apprehend that, after all shall be assembled, under this second order from the Governor of Maryland, they will not exceed one thousand men. The most convenient and immediate resource to supply this deficiency, which occurs

to me, will be to take the militia drawn out under the State authority, and now assembled at Annapolis, to the amount of one thousand men, into the service of the United States, and to call on the Governor of Pennsylvania for one regiment. This would make the militia force (independent of the two regiments near this place) under my command between two and three thousand men, and would complete the views of the President in the order communicated to me by you, to call for not more than three nor less than two thousand over and above the two regiments here.

The objects for which the militia were called to Annapolis, were such as to make it proper that the force should be under the direction of the commander of the 10th military district. Some force ought and must be kept at Annapolis, and if it should be deemed proper to authorize me to accept them, I should leave them there until some necessity occurred requiring them elsewhere; and the trouble and expense of advancing a detachment there, would be avoided.

These men are only called out for sixty days, which may, perhaps, be long enough, and will, at all events, afford sufficient time to ascertain whether a further force will be necessary. They are already in the field, equipped in all respects, and organized. A saving of their equipments will be gained by the United States, and all the time and trouble of calling a force in their place.

I shall proceed for Bladensburg and Washington to-morrow, or the day following.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

W. H. WINDER,

*Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.*

HON. J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

DEAR GENERAL:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 22, 1814.*

Your letter of the 21st is received.

Of the force in the Potomac we do not know as much as we ought. Their fleet is said to consist of six frigates, one of which had got aground on the Kettle Bottoms. They have on board some troops or marines which had been previously encamped on St. George's island. General Parker is observing them on the Virginia side of the river, at the head of a small brigade of militia, about fourteen or fifteen hundred.

Enclosed is a letter from General Douglas, of Loudoun. I have ordered him to come on directly, without seeking a rendezvous with General Hungerford. A detachment of the 12th infantry (recruits) arrived here yesterday. They shall be armed, equipped, and marched to the Woodyard this morning. The Baltimore brigade will be at Bladensburg to-day. Would it not be well to throw Barney's seamen (six hundred) and some other troops on the right of Nottingham? A demonstration which shall menace the rear of the enemy and their communication with the shipping, will, if it does not actually stop, at least very much retard their progress.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General WINDER, *Long Old Fields, Prince George's county, Md.*

WASHINGTON CITY, *August 19, 1814.*

SIR:

I beg leave to suggest, through you, for the consideration of the President, the following propositions:

Would it be expedient, under the direction of the Navy Department, to have vessels ready to be sunk in the Potomac, at Fort Washington, or other proper point, at a moment's warning, to obstruct the navigation?

Would it not be proper to put all the boats, which can be propelled by oars, that are at this place, under the control of the Navy Department, at Fort Washington, to transport troops across the river from either side, as circumstances may require?

Would it not be expedient, in our present destitute condition for military force, to put the marine corps into service, or at all events to cause them to reinforce Fort Washington at a moment's notice, or to be applied, as circumstances require, to any point of defence?

From the great and overwhelming force of the enemy on water, it is no longer useful to keep the flotilla armed in the Patuxent; might not that force be applied to some stationary point of defence on land, or be subjected in some way to co-operate in the general arrangements which the commander of the district may make?

Serious difficulties have already arisen from collision, in the Patapsco, with the command of Fort M<sup>Y</sup>Henry and the flotilla, in performing the duty of guard and look-out, the flotilla boat having stopped and kept in custody all night the look-out boat of the fort.

Would it be advisable for the commander of the district, or any other public authority, to make an appeal to the patriotism of the country, at the present moment, for volunteers, without regard to their legal obligations as militia men? A large force very useful might be obtained, probably, in this way, which would cost only provision and ammunition. In fine, would it not be advisable, without regard to forms, too slow for the emergency, to invite and call in every man that can be found? This is, perhaps, more expedient, because I have received official information that the Pennsylvania militia are not in a state to be called out legally; the former law having expired the 1st of July, and the law of last session not taking effect as to organization till October next. I take this occasion to state that I have called for the militia of the District of Columbia, en masse; for General West's brigade in Prince George's county, and General Williams's, of Anne Arundel, also en masse; and the Baltimore brigades, also en masse. I shall forward by expresses immediately, demands for five hundred men each, from all the brigades on the Western Shore of Maryland, and the counties which border the Potomac on the Virginia side. General Hungerford, Northern Neck, has a force in the field which I have called on him to march without delay to this place. The result of all these operations will be certainly slow, and extremely doubtful as to the extent of force produced.

Most respectfully,

W. H. WINDER,

*Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.*

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WASHINGTON, *August 21, 1814.*

SIR:

The calls which have been made upon the militia officers, and the appeals to the people to turn out, is likely to produce in haste an uncertain force in its amount and armament; probably very considerable in numbers. I beg leave, therefore, to suggest the propriety of augmenting the quantity of arms immediately at this place or its vicinity; perhaps Foxall's works would be a good and safe depot, and sufficiently convenient. They can be drawn, by immediate exertions in sufficient time. All the flints that the utmost efforts can produce, ought to be collected here without delay.

I am, &c.

W. H. WINDER.

HONORABLE J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD QUARTERS, COMBS'S, NEAR THE EASTERN BRANCH BRIDGE,  
*Wednesday morning, 24th of August, 1814.*

SIR:

I have found it necessary to establish my head quarters here, the most advanced position convenient to the troops, and nearest information. I shall remain stationary as much as possible, that I may be the more readily found, to issue orders, and collect together the various detachments of militia, and give them as rapid a consolidation and organization as possible.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER, *Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.*

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

P. S.—The news up the river is very threatening. Barney's, or some other force, should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf's Point and the Navy Yard. I should be glad of the assistance of counsel from yourself and the Government. If more convenient, I should make an exertion to go to you the first opportunity.

NOTE.—The following memorandum was endorsed on the back of the foregoing letter, in the hand writing of Secretary Armstrong:

"Went to General Winder; found there the President; Mr. Monroe had also been there, but had set out to Bladensburg to arrange the troops, and give them an order of battle, as I understood; saw no necessity for ordering Barney to Greenleaf's Point or Navy Yard. Advised the Commodore to join the army at Bladensburg, and ordered Minor's regiment to that place. Advised General Winder to leave Barney and the Baltimore brigade upon the enemy's rear and right flank, while he put himself in front with all the rest of his force. Repeated this idea in my letter to him of the 23d."

BALTIMORE, *August 27, 1814.*

SIR:

When the enemy arrived at the mouth of the Potomac, of all the militia which I had been authorized to assemble, there were but about one thousand seven hundred in the field; from thirteen to fourteen hundred under General Stansbury, near this place, and about two hundred and fifty at Bladensburg, under Lieutenant Colonel Kramer; the slow progress of draught, and the imperfect organization, with the ineffectiveness of the laws to compel them to turn out, rendered it impossible to have procured more.

The militia of this State, and of the contiguous parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, were called on en masse, but the former militia law of Pennsylvania had expired on the first of June or July, and the one adopted in its place is not to take effect in organizing the militia, before October. No aid, therefore, has been received from that State.

After all the force that could be put at my disposal in that short time, and making such dispositions as I deemed best calculated to present the most respectable force at whatever point the enemy might strike, I was enabled, by the most active and harassing movements of the troops, to interpose before the enemy at Bladensburg about five thousand men, including three hundred and fifty regulars and Commodore Barney's command. Much the largest portion of this force arrived on the ground when the enemy were in sight, and were disposed to support in the best manner the position which General Stansbury had taken. They had barely reached the ground before the action commenced, which was about one o'clock, P. M. of the 24th instant, and continued about an hour.

The contest was not as obstinately maintained as could have been desired, but was by parts of the troops sustained with great spirit, and with prodigious effect; and had the whole of our force been equally firm, I am induced to believe that the enemy would have been repulsed, notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which we fought. The artillery from Baltimore, supported by Major Pinkney's rifle battalion, and a part of Captain Doughty's from the navy yard, were in advance to command the pass of the bridge at Bladensburg, and played upon the enemy, as I have since learned, with very destructive effect; but the rifle troops were obliged, after some time, to retire, and, of course, the artillery. Superior numbers, however, rushed upon them, and made their retreat necessary, not, however, without great loss on the part of the enemy. Major Pinkney received a severe wound in his right arm, after he had retired to the left flank of Stansbury's brigade. The right and centre of Stansbury's brigade, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Ragan's and Shutz's regiments, generally gave way very soon afterwards, with the exception of about forty rallied by Colonel Ragan, after having lost his horse and a whole or a part of Captain Trower's company, both of whom General Stansbury represents to have made, even thus deserted, a gallant stand. The fall which Lieutenant Colonel Ragan received from his horse, together with his great efforts to sustain his position, rendered him unable to follow the retreat; we have, therefore, to lament that this gallant and excellent officer has been taken prisoner: he has, however, been paroled, and I met him here recovering from the bruises occasioned by his fall. The loss of his services at this moment is serious. The 5th Baltimore regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Sterrett, being the left of Brigadier General Stansbury's brigade, still, however, stood their ground, and except for a moment, when part of them recoiled a few steps, remained firm, and stood until ordered to retreat with a view to prevent them from being outflanked.

The reserve under Brigadier General Smith, of the District of Columbia, with the militia of the city and Georgetown, with the regulars, and some detachments of Maryland militia, flanked on their right by Commodore Barney and his brave fellows, and Lieutenant Colonel Beall, still were to the right on the hill, and maintained the contest for some time with great effect.

It is not with me to report the conduct of Commodore Barney and his command, nor can I speak from observation, being too remote; but the concurrent testimony of all who did observe them, does them the highest justice for their brave resistance, and the destructive effect they produced on the enemy. Commodore Barney, after having lost his horse, took post near one of his guns, and there unfortunately received a severe wound in the thigh, and he also fell into the hands of the enemy.

Captain Miller, of marines, was wounded in the arm fighting bravely. From the best intelligence, there remains but little doubt that the enemy lost at least four hundred killed and wounded, and of these a very unusual portion killed. Our loss cannot, I think, be estimated at more than from thirty to forty killed, and fifty or sixty wounded.

You will readily understand that it is impossible for me to speak minutely of the merit or demerit of particular troops so little known to me from their recent and hasty assemblage. My subsequent movements, for the purpose of preserving as much of my force as possible, gaining reinforcements, and protecting this place, you already know.

I am, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER, *Brigadier General, commanding 10th M. D.*

P. S.—We have to lament that Captain Sterrett, of the fifth Baltimore regiment, has also been wounded, but is doing well; other officers no doubt deserve notice, but I am as yet unable to particularize.

HON. J. ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*



*General Order erecting the Tenth Military District, and letters from the Secretary of War to General Winder.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, July 2, 1814.

GENERAL ORDERS:

The State of Maryland, the District of Columbia; and that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannock and Potomac rivers, will constitute a separate military district (No. 10) under the command of Brigadier General Winder.

By order:

JNO. R. BELL;  
*Assistant Inspector General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 2, 1814.

SIR:

Your letters of the 30th instant have been received.

Enclosed is an order constituting a new military district, and assigning you to the command thereof. Major Stewart has permission to serve in your staff. It would be desirable to see you here as soon as it may be convenient for you to come.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brig. Gen. WM. H. WINDER, *Baltimore.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 18th, 1814.

SIR:

In addition to my circular letter of the 4th instant, which subjects to your call the quota of Maryland militia, you are also authorized to draw, from that of Virginia, two thousand men, and from the quota of Pennsylvania, five thousand. The whole of the militia of the District of Columbia, amounting to about two thousand, is kept in a disposable state, and subject to your orders.

NOTE.—The detached militia of Maryland amounted to six thousand.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General WINDER.

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 28, 1814.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 25th and 27th instant.

Lieutenant Edwards's representation is referred to Colonel Wadsworth, with orders to supply what may be wanting at Fort Washington. Lieutenant Colonel Lavall states that he is waiting the arrival of horses. The detachment of the 10th is in march, and the recruits of the 36th and 38th ordered to join their corps: they, I fear, are very few.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General WINDER,  
*Commanding 10th Military District.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 19th, 1814.

SIR:

Your letter of this date has been received, and submitted to the President. On the two first subjects, you are referred to the Navy Department. The marines are ordered to move. Orders have been given to Commodore Barney.

You will adjust, with the Secretary of the Navy, what relatés to guard and vidette duty at Baltimore.

The call you propose making on volunteers is approved. It will be so worded as to guard against interfering with the legal draught, and putting it in the election of the militia to fulfil, or not to fulfil, their public engagements.

The calls you have actually made are also approved.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General WINDER.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 19, 1814.

SIR:

If the enemy's movements indicate an attack on this place, means should be taken to drive off all horses and cattle, and remove all supplies of forage, &c. on their route; a moment is not to be lost in doing both. For this purpose, the whole of your cavalry may be pushed into the neighborhood of the enemy, without delay.

Colonel M'Lean could be usefully employed with them. Lavall will be at Montgomery Court House to-day: he has with him one hundred and thirty mounted dragoons, under excellent officers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Brigadier General WINDER.

*Correspondence with the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.*

CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF STATES.

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 4, 1814.

SIR:

The late pacification in Europe offers to the enemy a large disposable force, both naval and military, and with it, the means of giving to the war here, a character of new and increased activity and extent.

Without knowing, with certainty, that such will be its application, and still less that any particular point or points will become objects of attack, the President has deemed it advisable, as a measure of precaution, to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic, and (as the principal means of doing this will be found in the militia) to invite the Executives of certain States to organize, and hold in readiness, for immediate service, a corps of ninety-three thousand five hundred men, under the laws of the 28th of February, 1795, and 18th of April, 1814.

The enclosed detail will show your Excellency what, under this requisition, will be the quota of ——. As far as volunteer uniform companies can be found, they will be preferred.

The expediency of regarding (as well in the designations of the militia as of their places of rendezvous) the points, the importance or exposure of which will be most likely to attract the views of the enemy, need but be suggested.

A report of the organization of your quota, when completed, and of its place or places of rendezvous, will be acceptable.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, your Excellency's most obedient and very humble servant.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF ———.

*Detail for Militia Service, under the requisition of July 4, 1814.*

States.	Number and kind of Troops.	Total number.	Number of Regiments.	GENERAL STAFF.
New Hampshire,	350 artillery, 3,150 infantry,	3,500	3 regiments & one battalion,	{ One Major General, two Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Adjutant General. Two Major Generals, four Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, three Assistant Deputy Quartermaster Generals, and two Assistant Adjutant Generals.
Massachusetts,	1,000 artillery, 9,000 infantry,	10,000	10 regiments,	
Rhode Island,	50 artillery, 450 infantry,	500	1 battalion.	{ One Major General, one Brigadier General, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Adjutant General. Three Major Generals, seven Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, six Assistant Deputy Quartermaster Generals, and three Assistant Adjutant Generals.
Connecticut,	300 artillery, 2,700 infantry,	3,000	3 regiments,	
New York,	1,350 artillery, 12,150 infantry,	13,500	13 regiments & one battalion,	{ One Major General, two Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, and one Assistant Adjutant General. Three Major Generals, seven Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, six Assistant Deputy Quartermaster Generals, and three Assistant Adjutant Generals.
New Jersey,	500 artillery, 4,500 infantry,	5,000	5 regiments,	
Pennsylvania,	1,400 artillery, 12,600 infantry,	14,000	14 regiments,	{ One Major General, three Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, and one Assistant Adjutant General. Three Major Generals, six Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, five Assistant Deputy Quartermaster Generals, and three Assistant Adjutant Generals.
Delaware,	100 artillery, 900 infantry,	1,000	1 regiment.	
Maryland,	600 artillery, 5,400 infantry,	6,000	6 regiments,	{ One Major General, three Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, and one Assistant Adjutant General. One Major General, three Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, and one Assistant Adjutant General.
Virginia,	1,200 artillery, 10,800 infantry,	12,000	12 regiments,	
North Carolina,	700 artillery, 6,300 infantry,	7,000	7 regiments,	{ One Major General, two Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, and one Assistant Adjutant General. One Major General, two Brigadier Generals, one Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, and one Assistant Adjutant General.
South Carolina,	500 artillery, 4,500 infantry,	5,000	5 regiments,	
Georgia,	350 artillery, 3,150 infantry,	3,500	3 regiments & one battalion,	{ One Maj. Gen. two Brig. Gens. one Dep. Qr. Mast. Gen. one As. Dep. Qr. Mast. Gen. and one As. Adj. Gen. One Brigadier General, one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, one Assistant Adjutant General.
Kentucky,	5,500 infantry,	5,500	5 regiments & one battalion,	
Tennessee,	2,500 infantry,	2,500	2 regiments & one battalion,	Louisiana and Mississippi, one Brigadier General, and one Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General.
Louisiana,	1,000 infantry,	1,000	1 regiment,	
Mississippi Territory,	500 infantry,	500	1 battalion,	

SECRETARY'S OFFICE, July 14, 1814.

Sir:

In the absence of the Governor, I deem it my duty to inform you, that your communication containing a requisition for a detachment of fourteen thousand Pennsylvania militia came to the office this morning, and was immediately forwarded by express to the Governor, at Selin's Grove. Be assured the requisition will be met with all the promptness the circumstances possibly will permit.

With high considerations of respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

N. B. BOILEAU, *Secretary.*JOHN ARMSTRONG, Esq. *Secretary of War.*

SECRETARY'S OFFICE, July 25, 1814.

Sir:

The Governor has directed me to enclose to you copies of general orders issued by him in compliance with a late requisition for a military force from Pennsylvania, by the President, communicated by yours under date of the 4th instant. He has not, as you will perceive, designated places of rendezvous: he thinks it will be in time to do so in subsequent orders, which must issue before the troops can march: the threatened point of attack by the enemy will, it is probable, then be better ascertained, and a more prudent selection of place can be made. The repeal of our militia law of 1807, and its several supplements, on the 1st of August next; the disannulling of all militia commissions on that day, by a new law of the last session, granted under the old law, except the commissions of such officers as may then be in actual service; the ordering by the new law; the holding of elections of officers by the militia, after the said 1st of August; the notice of election; returns to be made; and the protracting to the 4th Monday of October next, the classification of the militia; causes an almost total disorganization of our militia system, between the 1st of August and the 4th of October, and presents difficulties, in yielding perfect compliance with the requisition of the President, insurmountable. It is hoped, however, that the patriotism of the people will obviate the difficulty, by a voluntary tender of services, which the Governor has invited, growing out of the unaccountable oversight of the Legislature. It is strongly doubted whether any orders can be enforced under the present state of things.

The requisition refers to the act of Congress, passed 28th February, 1795; under which militia can be held in service three months only; and to the law of 1814, which authorized the President to keep them six months in service. The law of Pennsylvania, passed at the last session of its Legislature, requires the Governor to mention, in general orders, the period for which any militia ordered into service is to remain on duty. It is desirable, therefore, to know whether the requisition is intended for three or six months' service. The offices of Deputy Quarter-Master General, and Assistants, and Assistant Adjutant Generals, are not recognized by our State laws.

I have taken the liberty of enclosing to you a copy of the militia law of this State, passed at the last session of the Legislature; from a perusal of which you will perceive the difficulties under which the Executive at present labors, in attempting to comply with the requisition.

With high considerations of respect, sir, your obedient servant,

N. B. BOILEAU, *Secretary.*JOHN ARMSTRONG, Esq. *Secretary of War.*

SECRETARY'S OFFICE, August 27, 1814.

Sir:

I am directed by the Governor to enclose to you a copy of general orders, issued yesterday. The letter of General Winder, containing the requisition, under date of the 18th instant, was not received until the evening of the twenty-third. The deranged state of our militia system prevented a more prompt compliance with the demand. To obviate as far as practicable the inconvenience of delay, the Governor has directed the flank and volunteer companies to push on as rapidly as possible, without any regard to the time fixed on for the general rendezvous of the ordinary draughts. The commanding officers of the companies or detachments are instructed to report themselves, and the number of their men, to General Winder, as the officer who may have command of the troops in the service of the United States, in the 10th military district.

The tents, camp-equipage, as well as arms and accoutrements, belonging to the State, being insufficient to accommodate the troops called into service, the Governor relies on the deficiency being supplied by the United States as promptly as practicable, to render the men comfortable and efficient.

With high respect and esteem, sir, your obedient servant,

N. B. BOILEAU, *Secretary.*JOHN ARMSTRONG, Esq. *Secretary of War.*

ANNAPOLIS, July 29, 1814.

Sir:

In conformity to the request of the President of the United States, signified in your communication of the 4th instant, a detachment of five thousand four hundred infantry, and six hundred artillery, was directed to be organized and held in readiness to march at the shortest notice, and in consequence of General Winder having, by direction of the President, requested three thousand of the draughts of the militia of this State may be called into the field, and in order to comply as fully as practicable with the request, the whole of the draughts of the militia from the Western Shore, being about three thousand five hundred infantry, have been ordered to be embodied. You will observe by the map and line drawn from Washington to Baltimore (not far east of which I presume these men will be encamped) will have a very considerable portion of the militia between that line and the bay shore; and consequently, I presume the draughts from this section of the country would not be drawn back from that part most exposed. Baltimore, I fear, will be unwilling that any part of that force from which they expected to derive aid, should be withdrawn from them. Under these circumstances, it was thought most prudent to order the whole: They have been directed to be embodied in their several brigade districts, and move on the shortest route to Bladensburg, where, I presume, on the receipt of this information, arrangements will be made (under your directions) for their accommodation. What number will arrive there in any given time, I am not yet advised of. The whole artillery of the State does not amount to more than nine hundred; and more than two-thirds of that number are in Baltimore; consequently the proportion from thence would be more than four hundred. So great a proportion, or any thing like it, being taken from what is their most efficient force, would create great uneasiness. The order, therefore, with respect to them, is suspended, until General Smith can have some communication with you.

I am, sir, with great respect, yours, &c.

LEVIN WINDER.

Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, RICHMOND, 14th July, 1814.

Sir:

Your requisition on the militia of this State, bearing date the 4th instant, has been received.

Apprehending that the object of this measure is to have in readiness a provisional force to repel a sudden invasion, I have enclosed the general orders from this department, of the 22d ultimo, placing in a state of preparation for such an event upwards of fifteen thousand men. They are not organized, other than on the plan of the militia generally; but you will perceive that the points of rendezvous are designated. In addition to this force, the 8th, and a greater part of the 9th brigade, (amounting to seven thousand, and all convenient to Norfolk) are placed in the same situation, and directed to co-operate with General Porter in resisting an attack on Norfolk.

Arms, ammunition, &c. will be placed in the hands of the whole. Should these arrangements meet your views, it will be necessary to make a detail on all the regiments in the State for the twelve thousand called for; unless it is desirable that this number be set apart to perform a regular tour of duty. But, as the troops now in readiness are adequate to the emergency contemplated, and the requisitions for those that are to perform regular duty will be made in future in time for every preparation to be made, it is believed that the object of your requisition has been anticipated. If this is the fact, his Excellency the Governor is desirous that the regiments now held in requisition, and subject to be called out en masse, be considered by you as a provisional force only, and not subject to perform service beyond the continuance of the emergency which may call them into the field.

As concert in the measures of the General and State Governments is all important, permit me earnestly to solicit your earliest attention to this subject. In the mean time, arrangements will be made to take our quota from the militia, generally, as that measure cannot be avoided, under existing circumstances, unless the force required be provisional. Rest assured, sir, that nothing will be wanting on the part of this State to co-operate cordially and effectually with the General Government.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CLAIBORNE W. GOOCH, *Deputy Adjutant General.*

The Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 18th, 1814.*

SIR:

A letter of the 14th instant, from Deputy Adjutant General Gooch, enclosing a copy of your general orders of the 23d ultimo, and requesting to know whether the corps put into requisition by these orders would not supply the call of the 4th instant, made through this Department on the State of Virginia, has been received and submitted to the President. In reply thereto, I am instructed to state, that, inasmuch as the service of the militia required by your Excellency is declared to be provisional, limited, in point of time, to the emergency that calls it forth, and, in point of place, to the State of Virginia, and not subjected to the direction of any officer of the United States, it cannot be considered as fulfilling the views of the President.

Permit me to take this occasion to state to your Excellency that two thousand of the quota of Virginia will be put at the disposition of General Winder, as commanding officer of this district.

I have the honor to be, Your Excellency's most obedient servant;

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA.

No. 7.

NARRATIVE OF GENERAL WINDER.

O'NEALE'S, *September 26, 1814.*

SIR:

The readiest mode in which I can meet the inquiries which you have made, on behalf of the committee of which you are the chairman, will be to give a narrative of my agency as commander of the 10th military district, and to accompany it with the correspondence which I have had, by letter, with the General and State Governments, and their respective officers, while in that command.

Within the few last days of June, and before it was known that my exchange was perfect, although intelligence to that effect was momentarily expected, I was at the city of Washington, and the Secretary of War informed me that it was in contemplation to create another military district, to embrace the country from the Rappahannock northward, to include the State of Maryland; and that the President intended to vest me with the command of it.

On my return to Baltimore I addressed to the Secretary of War copies of the letters herewith transmitted, marked 1 A, 2 A.

About the 4th or 5th of July, I received a letter, a copy of which, marked 1 B, accompanies this, which enclosed an order constituting the 10th military district, a copy of which is annexed to the letter above referred to.

In obedience to the requisition of the letter, I immediately went to Washington, and waited on the Secretary of War. He stated to me that, in addition to the garrisons of the several forts within my district, and the detachments of the 36th and 38th infantry, then at Benedict, it was contemplated to order a detachment of cavalry, then at Carlisle, under orders to be mounted, amounting to about one hundred and fifty, a company of the 12th, and from one or two companies of the 10th regular infantry, which would be ordered to be collected from their several recruiting rendezvous and to march to the city of Washington, and that the whole regular force, thus to be collected, might amount to one thousand or twelve hundred; and that the balance of my command would be composed of militia. That a requisition was about to be made upon certain States for upwards of ninety thousand militia, intended for the defence of the maritime frontier of the country, and showed me a blank circular which had been printed but not filled up, nor sent to the respective Governors of the States.

I took the liberty of suggesting to the Secretary of War, at that time, my idea of the propriety of calling immediately into the field at least a portion of the militia intended for my district, and encamping them in the best positions for protecting the probable points at which the enemy would strike if he should invade the district of my command. The Secretary was of opinion that the most advantageous mode of using militia was upon the spur of the occasion, and to bring them to fight as soon as called out. I returned within a day or two to Baltimore, to prepare myself for visiting the different parts of my district, and to explore it generally, and particularly those parts of it which might be considered as the approaches to the three principal points of it, to wit: Washington, Baltimore, and Annapolis.

My impressions of the necessity of having a respectable force immediately called into the field were strengthened instead of diminished by subsequent reflection, and I, in consequence, on the 9th of July, addressed the letter to the Secretary of War, a copy of which is herewith sent, marked 3 A.

Agreeably to the suggestion contained in that letter, I proceeded to Annapolis to visit the military posts there, and to be ready on the spot, when the Governor should receive the requisition, and myself such instructions as might be thought proper to be given me, to take the most immediate steps to accomplish them.

The Governor received the requisition, and immediately issued the necessary orders to have the quota required draughted.

On the 12th July, the Secretary addressed me a letter, (the copy of which is herewith marked 2 B,) but which, being directed to Baltimore, did not reach me until after I had been to Upper Marlborough and again returned to Annapolis, where it followed me. I proceeded from Annapolis to Upper Marlborough, and on the 16th addressed two letters to the Secretary of War, of which copies are sent, marked 4 A, 5 A.

The apprehension that the enemy would proceed up the Patuxent and attack the flotilla at Nottingham, in consequence of the reinforcement he had just received, gaining strength, I proceeded immediately to Nottingham, instead of going to the Woodyard as I intended. During the 16th we received no information of a movement of the enemy up the river, but on the 17th, about 9 o'clock, Mr. Fitzhugh arrived, express from the mouth of the Patuxent, and stated that about twenty barges, several frigates, and some small armed vessels, were proceeding up the river. I, in consequence, wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, a copy of which is herewith sent, marked 6 A; and wrote a note to Brigadier General West, of the Maryland militia, advising him to call out the militia of the county.

I ordered the detachments of the 36th and 38th to hasten from the head of South river, by forced marches, to Nottingham. Three companies of the city militia were promptly despatched, in consequence of my letter of the 17th. But, by the time these latter had reached the Woodyard, and the regulars Marlborough, the enemy had entered Hunting creek, on the Calvert side of the river, had proceeded to Huntingtown, burned the tobacco warehouse,

after having taken off the principal part of the tobacco, and were retiring down the river. I halted the city militia at the Woodyard, and the regulars at Marlborough.

In answer to my letter of the 17th from Nottingham, I received the following answer from the Secretary of War, marked 3 B. As soon, therefore, as I ascertained that the enemy had retired to the mouth of the Patuxent, I proceeded to Annapolis, to make the requisition upon the Governor, as directed by the Secretary of War; and thence to Baltimore, to lend my aid and power to draw out the force authorized there.

While at Annapolis, I addressed to the Secretary of War the letter dated 20th of July, a copy of which is sent, marked 7 A, and at the same time made the requisition on the Governor, herewith sent, marked 1 C. After remaining at Baltimore a day, and leaving orders to Brigadier General Stansbury, who had been called on to command the militia to be assembled there, relative to their muster and inspection, under the laws of Congress, I returned to Marlborough, to fix upon an encampment for the militia I had required from the Governor, and to be more at hand to be informed of the enemy's movements. From Upper Marlborough, on the 23d of July, I wrote the Secretary of War the accompanying letter, marked 8 A; and then proceeded to the Woodyard, from whence, on the same day, I wrote to the Secretary of War the following letter, marked 9 A.

The enemy still remaining inactive, or rather confining himself to depredations upon the lower parts of the rivers Patuxent and Potomac, I seized the opportunity of visiting Fort Washington, and on the 25th required from Lieutenant Edwards, the commanding officer, a representation of what he deemed necessary to complete the equipment of the fort, with its then works, and received from him a representation, which I enclosed in a letter to the Secretary of War on the 25th, of which copies are sent, marked 10 A. A copy of his answer, marked 4 B, is herewith sent.

Learning that some of the enemy's ships were proceeding up the Potomac, I proceeded down to Port Tobacco, with a view of ascertaining more precisely his views, and of informing myself of the country; and on the 26th wrote the Secretary of War the following letter, marked 11 A.

Having ascertained, the next morning, that the enemy's ships had descended the river, I returned to Marlborough, and availed myself of the first opportunity I had, to review and inspect the detachment of the 36th and 38th; and thence proceeded to Washington city, where I established permanent head quarters of the district, on the 1st of August. I availed myself of a day, at this time, to review and inspect the two brigades of District militia, in Alexandria and this place, and reported the result to Major General Van Ness, commanding the District militia, in the letter herewith, marked No. 1.

The people of St. Mary's and Charles's had become extremely sore under the harassing service to which they had been subjected, and the devastation and plunder which the enemy had been so long committing on their shores; and the remonstrances of Brigadier General Stewart, commanding the militia there, under the State authority, had become extremely importunate with both the Secretary of War and the President, to receive aid and protection from the General Government. The danger of throwing a force so far down into that neck of land, which exposed them to the danger of being cut off, besides that they would be lost for the defence of Washington, Baltimore, or Annapolis, had hitherto prevented me from pushing any part of my command so low down. But the President, in conversation, told me, that their situation required aid, and directed me to move the detachments of the 36th and 38th down to unite with, and aid, General Stewart. I accordingly ordered Lieutenant Colonel Scott, to move from Marlborough to Piscataway, and I proceeded directly down myself on the 3d. On the morning of the 4th of August I wrote the following letter from Port Tobacco, marked 13 A, to the Secretary of War, and agreeably to the intention therein expressed, proceeded twelve miles below, to General Stewart's camp. I there learned, beyond doubt, that the enemy had returned down the river; and after assuring the General of support, if they again advanced up the river, I returned back again to the city of Washington, directing Lieutenant Colonel Scott, commanding the regulars, to take up his encampment at a very convenient place, two miles from Piscataway, on the road to the Woodyard and Marlborough.

On my arrival at Washington, I found that the requisition, made upon the Governor of Maryland for three thousand men, to be assembled at Bladensburg, had brought to that place only one company; but I learned that other detachments were about marching to that place, and, in order that no delay might occur in organizing and equipping them, I ordered Major Keyser, of the 38th regular infantry, to proceed to Bladensburg, to muster, inspect, and drill the detachments as they came in.

I thence proceeded to Baltimore, to ascertain more precisely the effect of the requisition made on Major General Smith for two thousand from his division; when arrived, I found about one thousand two hundred only assembled. I reviewed and inspected them, and gave Brigadier General Stansbury orders to endeavor, by the most speedy means, to get in the delinquents and absentees.

I had just learned, by a letter from the Governor of Maryland, and also from General Smith, that, upon General Smith's application to the Secretary of War, he had determined that the two thousand men, now called to Baltimore, and which had been detached, under a requisition of the Secretary of War, directly on General Smith, of the 20th of April, were to be considered as part of the quota of Maryland, under the requisition of the 4th of July. I had drawn a different conclusion, and had so informed both the Governor and General Smith, in the visits I made to Annapolis and Baltimore, about the 20th of July, immediately after receiving the letter from the Secretary of War of the 17th of July, above exhibited. In order to supply the deficit, in my calculation upon this force, I addressed the letter of the 13th of August to the Secretary of War, of which a copy, marked 14 A, is here presented; proceeded the same or the following day to Washington, by the way of Annapolis, and on the 17th, at Washington, the day following my arrival, received the letter from the Secretary of War, of which a copy, marked 5 B, is sent.

I should have stated, that, two days after my return to the city of Washington, about the 6th of August, I received two letters from the Secretary of War, the one dated the 15th, the other the 17th of July, which, having been addressed to me at Baltimore, had followed me backward and forward from place to place, and unfortunately only reached me at this late period; copies of them are herewith sent, marked 6 B and 7 B.

I had, in the mean time, addressed the letter of the 6th of August to the Governor of Pennsylvania, a copy of which is sent, marked 1 D, and upon the 8th, on the receiving the letter of the Secretary of War of the 15th, I wrote another letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania, of which, from haste or much occupation, I did not take a copy, or have mislaid it; it substantially, however, informed him of the number of militia I was authorized to call from him, requesting him to hasten their draughting and organization, and to transmit a list of the officers, from brigadiers down, who would command. Should this letter be deemed material, a copy can be obtained from the Governor, and I have written to procure it.

I addressed, on the 16th, also, a similar letter to the Governor of Virginia. On the 16th or 17th of August, I received from the Secretary of State of Pennsylvania an answer, dated the 11th, of which a copy, marked 2 D, is herewith sent; and from the Adjutant General of Virginia, the answer and enclosures herewith sent, marked E.

On the morning of Thursday the 18th, intelligence was received, from the observatory on Point Lookout, that, on the morning of the 17th, the enemy's fleet off that place had been reinforced by a formidable squadron of ships and vessels, of various sizes.

I immediately made requisitions upon the Governors of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and to various militia officers, copies of which are herewith sent, marked as follows: to the Governor of Pennsylvania, 3 D; to the Governor of Maryland, 2 C; to Major General Smith of Baltimore, 1 F; to Brigadier General West, of Prince George's, Maryland, No. 18; to Major General Van Ness, No. 4; to Brigadier General Hungerford, Virginia, No. 14; to Brigadier General Douglas and Colonel Chilton, of Virginia, and Brigadier Generals Ringgold, Swearingen, Barrack, and Foreman, of Maryland, No. 5.

Besides the letters and correspondence here referred to particularly, a mass of correspondence occurred with various persons, relative to my command, and which, as far as I suppose they can have any influence on the investigation, are herewith sent.

That with the Governor of Maryland will be found in bundle C, and numbered, in addition to those already mentioned, from 3 C to 11 C, both inclusive. That with General Smith in bundle F; and that with other persons,

not before referred to, with the numbers before referred to, are exhibited from No. 1 to number 53, inclusive. Much other correspondence, necessary to be carried on, and which occupied much time, took place; which, however, is not sent, as I deemed them not calculated to illustrate the inquiry, and only calculated uselessly to encumber and embarrass the inquiry. They will be furnished, if thought requisite.

I will state as nearly as possible the forces which were in the field under these various demands and requisitions, the time of their assembling, their condition, and subsequent movements.

The returns first made, when I came into command, gave me,	
Fort McHenry, under the command of Major Armistead, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, for duty,	194
At Annapolis, in Forts Severn and Madison, under Lieutenant Fay,	39
At Fort Washington, under Lieutenant Edwards,	49
The detachments of the 36th and 38th, and a small detachment of artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Scott,	330
	612

These corps received no addition, but were gradually diminishing by the ordinary causes which always operate to this effect.

The two thousand Maryland militia, who were ordered to assemble at Baltimore, had been draughted in pursuance of a requisition, made by the Secretary of War on General Smith, of the 20th of April, and, as full time had been allowed to make the draught deliberately, they were, as far as practicable, ready to come without delay; notwithstanding Brigadier General Stansbury was unable to bring to Bladensburg more than one thousand four hundred, including officers, and arrived at Bladensburg on the evening of the 23d of August.

From General Stricker's brigade in the city of Baltimore, which had been called out en masse, I required a regiment of infantry, the battalion of riflemen, and two companies of artillery—not deeming it practicable to reconcile the people of Baltimore to march a greater number, and leave it without any force, and being strongly persuaded that the exigency would have drawn in time a greater force from the adjacent country. The detachment from Stricker's brigade, under Colonel Sterett, arrived at Bladensburg in the night of the 23d of August, and the total amount was nine hundred and fifty-six.

The detachment which had been stationed at Annapolis, under Colonel Hood, and which had been at the moment transferred by the Governor of Maryland to my command, arrived at the bridge at Bladensburg about fifteen minutes before the enemy appeared, and I suppose was six to seven hundred strong. I have never had any return of it.

The brigade of General Smith, consisting of the militia of the District of Columbia on this side the Potomac, were called out on Thursday, the 18th of August; on Friday were assembled, and on Saturday, the 20th, they crossed the Eastern Branch bridge, and advanced about five miles towards the Woodyard. They amounted, I suppose, to about twelve hundred; a return was never had before they separated from my command, as there was not an interval of sufficient rest to have obtained one.

General Young's brigade, from Alexandria, between five and six hundred strong, crossed the Potomac, Saturday or Sunday, the 19th or 20th, and took post near Piscataway.

The call for three thousand militia, under the requisition of the 4th July, had produced only two hundred and fifty men at the moment the enemy landed at Benedict. In addition to the causes herein beforementioned, the inefficacy of this call is to be attributed to the incredulity of the people on the danger of invasion; the perplexed, broken, and harassed state of the militia in St. Mary's, Calvert, Charles, Prince George's, and a part of Ann Arundel counties, which had rendered it impossible to make the draught in some of them, or to call them from those exposed situations where they had been on duty two months, under the local calls for Maryland.

Several other small detachments of Maryland militia, either as volunteers, or under the calls on the brigadiers, joined about the day before the action, whose numbers or commanding officers I did not know. They may have amounted to some four or five hundred.

Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman, of the Maryland cavalry, under an order of the Governor of Maryland, with about eighty dragoons, arrived at the city of Washington on the 16th of August, on his way to join General Stewart, in the lower part of Charles or St. Mary's county.

Under the permission I just then received, to accept all the militia, then in the field, under the State of Maryland, I informed Colonel Tilghman that I had no doubt of the Governor's sanction, for which I had applied, and recommended him to halt here. He agreed not only to this, but, by the consent of General Stewart, who happened then to be in the city, sick, agreed to take my orders.

Lieutenant Colonel Lavall, of the United States' light dragoons, with a small squadron of about one hundred and twenty, who had been mounted at Carlisle the preceding Monday, arrived at Montgomery Courthouse on the evening of the 19th of August, reported himself to the War Office, and received orders to report to me. He moved on the next morning and crossed the Eastern Branch.

Captain Morgan, with a company of about eighty of the 13th United States' infantry, joined at the Long Old Fields on the evening of the 22d.

Colonel Minor, from Virginia, arrived at the city on the evening of the 23d, with about five hundred men, wholly unarmed and without equipments. Under the direction of Colonel Carbery, who had been charged with this subject, they received arms, ammunition, &c. next morning, but not until after the action at Bladensburg.

No part of the 10th had yet arrived.

There had been no Adjutant or Inspector General attached to my command, from its commencement. Major Hite, Assistant Adjutant General, joined me, on the 16th of August, at Washington, and Major Smith, Assistant Inspector General, on the 19th.

This was the situation, condition, and amount, of my force and command.

It will be observed that this detail is continued up to the moment of the battle of Bladensburg; but, as the time at which the different corps respectively joined is stated, it will be readily seen what troops were concerned in the different movements which will now be detailed.

The innumerable multiplied orders, letters, consultations, and demands, which crowded upon me at the moment of such an alarm, can more easily be conceived than described, and occupied me nearly day and night, from Thursday, the 18th of August, till Sunday, the 21st, and had nearly broken down myself and assistants in preparing, dispensing, and attending to them.

On Thursday evening, Colonel Monroe proposed, if I would detach a troop of cavalry with him, to proceed in the most probable direction to find the enemy, and reconnoitre him. Captain Thornton's troop, from Alexandria, was detailed on this service, and, on Friday morning, the Colonel departed with them. At this time, it was supposed the enemy intended up the bay, as one of his ships was already in view from Annapolis, and his boats were sounding South river. It was Colonel Monroe's intention to have proceeded direct to Annapolis; but, before he had got without the city, he received intelligence that the enemy had proceeded up the Patuxent, and were debarking at Benedict. He therefore bent his course to that place. By his first letter, on Saturday, which reached the President that evening, he was unable to give any precise intelligence, except that the enemy were at Benedict in force.

On Saturday, Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman, with his squadron of dragoons, was despatched by way of the Woodyard to fall down upon the enemy, to annoy, harass, and impede their march, by every possible means, to remove or destroy forage and provision from before the enemy, and gain intelligence. Captain Caldwell, with his troop of city cavalry, was despatched with the same views towards Benedict, by Piscataway, it being wholly uncertain what route the enemy would take, if it was his intention to come to Washington.

On Sunday, I crossed the Eastern Branch, and joined Brigadier General Smith, at the Woodyard, where Lieutenant Colonel Scott, with the 36th and 38th, and Lieutenant Colonel Kramer, with the militia from Bladensburg, had arrived by previous orders. On the road to the Woodyard, I received a letter from Colonel Monroe, of which

a copy is sent, marked—; and, at about eight o'clock in the evening, I received another letter from him, of which a copy is sent, marked—; and, in a very short time after, he arrived himself, and, immediately after, Colonel Beall, who had seen a body of the enemy, which he estimated at four thousand, (without supposing he had seen the whole) enter Nottingham, on Sunday evening. Colonel Monroe, being much exhausted, retired to rest. I gave Colonel Beall, on account of his experience, orders to proceed and join Colonel Hood, on his march from Annapolis, and take command of the detachment. I occupied the night in writing letters and orders to various officers and persons, and, at day-light, ordered a light detachment from General Smith's brigade, under Major Peter, the regulars, under Lieutenant Colonel Scott, and Lavall's cavalry, to proceed immediately towards Nottingham, to meet the enemy.

I proceeded immediately in advance myself, accompanied by Colonel Monroe, and the gentlemen of my staff. I had learned that Colonel Tilghman, with his cavalry, on the advance of the enemy, had fallen back upon Marlborough, the evening before, and had, during the night, sent him an order to proceed upon the road from Marlborough to Nottingham, and meet me at the Chapel. Having got considerably in advance of Lieutenant Colonel Scott's and Major Peter's detachments, and also to obtain intelligence, I halted at Mr. Oden's, within half a mile of the junction of the roads from Marlborough and the Woodyard to Nottingham, directing Lavall to gain the Marlborough road, post himself at the Chapel, and push forward patrols upon all the roads towards Nottingham. In less than half an hour, and before the detachments of Scott and Peter had come up, intelligence was brought that the enemy was moving on from Nottingham in force towards the Chapel. I immediately proceeded, with the gentlemen who were with me, to gain an observation of the enemy, and came within view of the enemy's advance about two miles below the Chapel. The observation was continued until the enemy reached the Chapel, and Scott and Peter being then near two miles distant from that point, and it being therefore impossible for them to reach the junction of the Marlborough and Woodyard road before the enemy, I sent orders for them to post themselves in the most advantageous position, and wait for me with the body of the cavalry. I turned into the road to the Woodyard, and detached a small party, under Adjutant General Hite, on the Marlborough road, to watch the enemy's movements on that road; and give information. Upon arriving at Oden's, himself, or some other person of the neighborhood whom I knew, and on whom I could rely, informed me that there was a more direct road, but not so much frequented; leading from Nottingham to the Woodyard, and joining that on which I then was, two miles nearer the Woodyard.

A doubt, at that time, was not entertained by any body of the intention of the enemy to proceed direct to Washington, and the advantage of dividing their force, and proceeding on two roads running so near each other, to the same point, so obvious, that I gave orders to Scott and Peter to retire, and occupy the first eligible position between the junction of that road and the one we were on, and the Woodyard; despatched a patrol of cavalry to observe that road, and give the earliest notice of any advance of the enemy upon it. I still continued the observation of the enemy myself, and he turned a part of his column into the road to the Woodyard, and penetrated a skirt of wood, which hid the junction of the Marlborough and Woodyard road from view, and there halted it within a quarter of a mile of Oden's house. I hesitated for some time whether to attribute his delay to a view which he may have had of Scott's and Peter's detachment, or to a design to conceal his movement towards Marlborough, the road to that place being concealed by woods from any point of observation which could be gained.

It appeared afterwards that his whole force halted here for an hour or upwards, and thus continued in an uncertainty as to his intended route. I had, in the mean time, rode back and assisted Peter and Scott to post their detachments in a favorable position, from whence I entertained a hope to have given the enemy a serious check, without much risk to this detachment. Orders had been previously sent to General Smith to post his whole detachment in conjunction with Commodore Barney, who had by this time joined him from Marlborough, with about four hundred sailors and marines, and had taken also command of the marines, under Captain Miller, who had arrived from the city the night before. I presumed, from the appearance of his force, it was about one hundred or one hundred and twenty. As soon as I had satisfied myself as to the position and disposition of Scott's and Peter's detachments, I advanced again towards the enemy, to ascertain his situation and intentions. It had now become certain that he had taken the road to Marlborough; and Colonel Monroe crossed over to that place, to join Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman, and observe his movements.

I sent an order immediately to Scott and Peter, to retire back to General Smith, and the latter to take post at the points where the roads from Washington city and the Woodyard, to Marlborough, unite. This order was incorrectly delivered, or misunderstood, and he took post, instead, at the point where the roads from the Woodyard and Marlborough, to the city of Washington, unite. The mistake, however, produced no inconvenience, but, on the contrary, was perhaps better than the position to which I had directed; because it threw my force more between Marlborough and Bladensburg, and also in command of the road by which the enemy did finally advance, which the other position would not have done. Its inconvenience was, that it left open the road to Fort Washington, and rendered General Young's junction, if it should become proper to advance him, hazardous on that road. It further became necessary to retire still further back, and the only position where the troops could be tolerably accommodated, or posted to advantage, was at Dunlap's, or, as it is generally called, the Long, or Battalion Old Fields.

General Smith was therefore ordered to retire to that point, with the whole of the troops, except the cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman, and Captain Herbert, were charged with hovering upon the enemy on all the roads leading from Bladensburg, from the north, and from Annapolis to Marlborough. With Lavall's cavalry, I advanced to the nearest and most convenient positions between the Woodyard and Marlborough, and found the enemy quietly halted at Marlborough. Tilghman's cavalry picked up one or two prisoners, who had straggled beyond the enemy's pickets, and my examination of them confirmed me that the enemy did not contemplate leaving Marlborough that day.

After remaining near Marlborough, in observation, till toward the latter part of the afternoon, I returned to General Smith, where I arrived toward the close of the day. About dark I learned that the President and Heads of Departments had arrived at a house about a mile in the rear of the camp. I detached a Captain's guard to his quarters; advanced the cavalry of Lavall on the roads towards Marlborough, with orders to patrol as close upon the enemy as possible during the course of the night; and after having waded through the infinite applications, consultations, and calls, necessarily arising from a body of two thousand five hundred men, not three days from their homes, without organization, or any practical knowledge of service on the part of their officers, and being obliged to listen to the officious but well intended information and advice of the crowd, who, at such a time, would be full of both, I lay down to snatch a moment of rest.

A causeless alarm from one of the sentinels placed the whole force under arms about three o'clock in the morning. A short time after sun-rise, I rode over to the quarters of the President, to inform him and the Secretary of War of the state of things. Upon my return, rumors prevailed that the enemy had taken the road to Queen Ann, which was directly leading to Annapolis. I could not, however, suppose that Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman and Captain Herbert would fail to advise me if the fact were so. The rumor, however, gained ground; and just at this time, Mr. Luffborough, of this city, with some fifteen or twenty mounted men, offered himself ready to perform any duties on which I could employ them. I immediately despatched him to ascertain the truth of this report, by penetrating to that road, and also to obtain whatever information he could relative to the enemy. About twelve o'clock he sent me decisive information that the enemy were not on the Annapolis road.

I received constant intelligence that the enemy still remained in Marlborough; and, therefore, felt no doubt that, if he intended to take the road to Annapolis, any movement upon that road was only an advance party for observation, and preparatory to a general movement; and as the morning advanced, and the information brought still confirmed the impression that the enemy intended no movement from Upper Marlborough, I resolved to endeavor to concentrate the force (which I hoped had now considerably accumulated within my reach) down upon the enemy's lines near Marlborough.

I accordingly ordered a light detachment to be sent forward by General Smith, under Major Peter, and having also learned by Major Woodyear, of General Stansbury's staff, that he had arrived the evening before at Bladens-

burg, I sent orders to him to advance toward Marlborough, and to take post at the point where the Old Fields to Queen Ann crosses the road from Bladensburg to Marlborough, which brought him within four miles of the Old Fields, and within from six to eight of the enemy. I was anxiously waiting to hear of Lieutenant Colonel Beall's progress with the detachment for Annapolis, and of Lieutenant Colonel Sterett's, from Baltimore.

The President and Heads of Department had been upon the field since about eight o'clock. I communicated my views and intentions, as above detailed, and informed them that I proposed myself to pass over the road from Bladensburg to Marlborough, to meet General Stansbury, to make closer observations upon the road direct from the enemy to Bladensburg, and to establish more thoroughly a concert between Stansbury and Smith's command; to be also nearer to Beall, to give him also a direction towards the enemy on the road leading into Marlborough from the north, if my intelligence should continue to justify it, and to draw down Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, with his force, as soon as I should ascertain where it was. I accordingly, with a troop of Lavall's cavalry, proceeded about 12 o'clock: upon arriving at the Bladensburg road I halted, and pushed a patrol of cavalry down toward Marlborough.

In a few minutes after, three of Captain Herbert's troop, who were observing down the same road, arrived, with two prisoners, who they had just seized in a very bold and dexterous manner. The information of these prisoners confirmed the impression that the enemy did not intend to move from Marlborough that day; and as it was now one o'clock, I felt little doubt of it. After remaining some time for intelligence from the United States' dragoons, that I had sent down with orders to press down as closely as possible upon the enemy, a slight firing was heard in the direction of the enemy, which I concluded was from the enemy's picket upon this party; a few moments confirmed this conjecture by the return of a dragoon with this intelligence. A more considerable firing was then, however, heard, which I concluded to be a skirmishing by Peter's detachment with the enemy, put upon the alert and advance by the firing at the dragoons.

The firing soon after ceased, and after having sent for the purpose of ascertaining the fact, with directions to follow with intelligence on toward Bladensburg, in which direction I proceeded with the expectation of meeting General Stansbury, and with the intention to halt him until my intelligence should decide my further proceedings.

I had proceeded within four or five miles of Bladensburg, without meeting General Stansbury, when I was overtaken by Major McKenney, a volunteer aid with General Smith, who informed me that Peter had skirmished with the advancing enemy, who had driven him back on General Smith, and that the enemy had halted within three miles of the Old Fields: that agreeably to my directions upon the probability of an attack, General Smith had sent off the baggage across the Eastern Branch; and that himself and Commodore Barney had drawn up the forces ready to receive the enemy, should he advance. On my way toward Bladensburg I had left orders with Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman's cavalry to continue their observation on the Bladensburg and Marlborough roads, and in case the enemy should move on that road, to give General Stansbury immediate notice, and fall back on him. In proceeding to the Old Fields I met Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman himself, and renewed these directions. Captain Herbert was also between General Stansbury and the enemy, with the same instructions.

When Major McKenney gave me the intelligence of the advance of the enemy, I despatched an aid to General Stansbury, with directions to him to fall back, and take the best position in advance of Bladensburg, and unite Lieutenant Colonel Sterett with him, should he arrive at Bladensburg, as I expected, that evening; and should he be attacked, to resist as long as possible, and if obliged to retire, to retreat toward the city.

I reached the Old Fields about five o'clock in the afternoon, and found General Smith and Commodore Barney had judiciously posted their men in expectation of the enemy, and were expecting his approach. The head of the enemy's column was about three miles from our position, and five miles from Marlborough. He must have reached that point by or before three o'clock, and his halt there, at that period of the day, so short a distance from Marlborough, and apparently only drawn out by my parties pressing upon him, and at the point from whence he could take the road to Bladensburg, to the Eastern Branch bridge, or Fort Washington, indifferently, or it might be to cover his march upon Annapolis; to which place he had strong temptations to proceed. His force was very imperfectly known, the opinions and representations varying from four to twelve thousand; the better opinion fixed it from five to seven thousand. If he supposed his force insufficient to proceed to Washington, and further reinforcements were expected, which all information concurred to state, the natural conclusion was, that he would seek some place where he could in security refresh his men, and place them in comfortable quarters, near a convenient port for his ships, and whence, upon receiving reinforcements, he would be ready to act against the important points of the country. Having, therefore, already accomplished one great object of the expedition—the destruction of Commodore Barney's flotilla—if he was not in a condition to proceed further into the country, Annapolis offered him a place in all respects such as he would desire. It brought him to a fine port, where his ships could lie in safety; it afforded abundant and comfortable quarters for his men; magazines and store houses for all his stores and munitions of every description; was capable, with very little labor, of being rendered impregnable by land, and he commanded the water; it was the nearest point of debarkation to the city of Washington, without entering a narrow river, liable to great uncertainty in its navigation from adverse winds; and was at hand to Baltimore; equally threatening those two great points, and rendering it absolutely necessary to keep a force doubly sufficient to resist him—one for the protection of Washington, the other for Baltimore. The squadron which was ascending the Potomac, and had now passed the Kettle Bottoms, the only obstruction in the navigation of the river, might be only a feint, the more effectually to conceal their intentions against Annapolis; or, what was more probable, was intended to unite with the land force, and co-operate in a joint attack on Washington. It was, therefore, strongly believed, that the land force was destined to proceed and take Fort Washington in the rear, where it was wholly defenceless, while it was capable of offering a very formidable resistance to the ascent of ships up the river, and, imperfect as it was, perhaps capable of repulsing them altogether. And it was therefore that I sent to General Young when the force under General Smith fell back to the Old Fields, to take a position so as to protect Fort Washington, and avoid being taken in the rear by the enemy.

If the object of the enemy was to proceed direct to Washington, the road by Bladensburg offered fewer obstructions than that over the Eastern Branch bridge, although it was six miles further; and yet, if I had retired toward Bladensburg, I should have been removed so much further from annoying or impeding the enemy if he proceeded to Fort Washington; and I should have left the road to Washington city, by the Eastern Branch bridge, open to him, which, although I had, as I supposed, left a secure arrangement for its destruction, yet the importance of leaving that bridge as long as possible, on account of its great value to us, and the danger that, in the multitude of business which was accumulated on every person during such alarm, confusion, and disorder, arising at such a moment, with such raw, undisciplined, inexperienced, and unknown officers and men, rendered it hazardous to trust this direct and important pass unguarded.

It was under all these circumstances, that, after waiting for the enemy at the Old Fields till sun-down, that I determined to retire over the Eastern Branch bridge, in which Commodore Barney concurred, and his force with mine proceeded accordingly.

My reasons for not remaining at the Old Fields during the night was, that, if an attack should be made in the night, our own superiority, which lay in artillery, was lost, and the inexperience of the troops would subject them to certain, infallible, and irremediable disorder, and probably destruction, and thereby occasion the loss of a full half of the force which I could hope to oppose, under more favorable circumstances, to the enemy.

The reasons for retiring by the Eastern Branch bridge, were, the absolute security it gave to that pass, the greater facility of joining General Young, and aiding in the protection of Fort Washington, the greater facility of pursuing the enemy should he recede and proceed to Annapolis, and the certainty that I could draw General Stansbury and Lieutenant Colonel Sterett to me if the enemy advanced too rapidly for me to advance and unite to support them.

Under the harassing and perplexing embarrassments, arising from having a mass of men suddenly assembled, without organization, discipline, or officers of any, the least, knowledge of service, except in the case of Major Peter, or, if possessing it, unknown to me as such, and the wearied and exhausted state in which incessant applica-



tion and exertion, for nearly five uninterrupted days and nights, had left me, these views offered themselves to my mind, and determined me to fall back, on Tuesday evening, to the bridge, instead of Bladensburg. Since the event has passed, and if a movement to Bladensburg, had it been made, would not have induced the enemy to pursue another course, it is easy to determine that a retreat to Bladensburg might have been better; but those who undertake to pass a judgment, should place themselves back to the moment and situation I was in when I formed the resolution, and it will be very difficult to find it an error; or if one, it is of that sort which is supported, when viewed in perspective, by stronger reasons than those which oppose it; and is only found to be an error by experience, which so often confounds all reason and calculation.

Upon arriving at the bridge, about eight o'clock, I directed General Smith to halt his men in the most convenient position near the bridge on this side; and I passed over and rode directly to the President's, and informed him of the then state of things. I had expected I should probably have found the Secretary of War and other Heads of Departments there, but they had respectively retired to their homes. I returned towards the bridge, leaving at M<sup>r</sup> Keowin's hotel the borrowed horse on which I rode. Both those I had with me being exhausted and worn down, and as I knew no one who had a horse in a different situation, I proceeded on foot to the camp. General Smith was not at the moment there. I proceeded on to the bridge, where I found about thirty men with axes, for the purpose of cutting the bridge down, and no other preparation for destroying it made. I proceeded again to the camp; detached a party of volunteers to burn the upper bridge at once; detached a party of regular infantry across the bridge, in advance toward the enemy about half a mile, to prevent him from seizing it by surprise, and posted Burch's artillery to command the pass of the bridge on this side. I learned at the bridge that some persons from the navy yard had been to the bridge to take some steps for destroying it, and knowing that this was the nearest and the only place indeed from whence I could draw the powder, boats, and combustibles, for the purpose of rendering its destruction sure at any moment, I proceeded, accompanied by Major Cox, of Georgetown, to ascertain what preparations had been made. I arrived there about twelve or one o'clock, saw Colonel Wharton, who referred me to Commodore Tingey, to whom I then proceeded, and roused him from bed. He informed me that several casks of powder were ready in boats to be sent from the navy yard to blow up the bridge when necessary. I begged him to increase the quantity of powder, to furnish a quantity of combustibles, also to be laid upon the bridge, that its destruction, when necessary, in one way or other, might be put beyond doubt. Commodore Tingey undertook to have what I requested provided, sent without delay to the bridge. I returned to the bridge to see that the different detachments which I had stationed there were upon the alert, and understood the objects for which they were detached. And I thence returned to the camp, between three and four o'clock, much exhausted, and considerably hurt in the right arm and ankle from a severe fall which I had into a gully or ditch on my way to the navy yard. I snatched about an hour or two of sleep, rose, and proceeded to gather my attendants and horses, much exhausted and worn down by the incessant action of the three preceding days, and proceeded to establish my head quarters at a house near the bridge.

My patrols and videttes not having yet brought me any intelligence of a movement of the enemy, and being still doubtful whether he might not move upon Annapolis, Fort Warburton, or toward the bridge, rather than Bladensburg, I held the position near the bridge, as that which, under all circumstances, would enable me best to act against the enemy in any alternative. I learned, about this time, with considerable mortification, that Gen. Stansbury, from misunderstanding or some other cause, instead of holding a position during the night, in advance of Bladensburg, had taken one about a mile in its rear; and that his men, from a causeless alarm, had been under arms the greater part of the night, and moved once or twice, and that he was at that moment on his march into the city. I instantly sent him an order to resume his position at Bladensburg; to post himself to the best advantage; make the utmost resistance, and to rely upon my supporting him if the enemy should move upon that road. I had, at a very early hour in the morning, detached Captain Graham, with his troop of Virginia cavalry, to proceed by Bladensburg down upon the road toward the enemy, and ensure, by that means, timely notice to General Stansbury and myself, should the enemy turn that way. With this addition to the cavalry, already on those roads, it became impossible for the enemy to take any steps unobserved. Additional cavalry patrols and videttes were also detached upon all the roads across the bridge, to ensure the certainty of intelligence, let the enemy move as he might.

Colonel Minor had also arrived in the city the evening before, with five or six hundred militia from Virginia, but they were without arms, accoutrements, or ammunition. I urged him to hasten his equipment, which I learn was delayed by some difficulty in finding Colonel Carbery, charged with that business; and he had not received his arms, &c.; when, about 10 o'clock, I received intelligence that the enemy had turned the head of his column towards Bladensburg. Commodore Barney had, upon my suggestion, posted his artillery to command the bridge, early in the morning.

As soon as I learned the enemy were moving toward Bladensburg, I ordered General Smith, with the whole of the troops, to move immediately to that point.

The necessary detention arising from orders to issue, interrogations, and applications to be answered from all points being past, I proceeded on to Bladensburg, leaving the President and some of the Heads of Departments at my quarters, where they had been for an hour or more. I arrived at the bridge at Bladensburg about 12 o'clock, where I found Lieutenant Colonel Beall had that moment passed with his command, having just arrived from Annapolis. I had passed the line of Stansbury's brigade, formed in the field upon the left of the road, at about a quarter of a mile in the rear of the bridge; and, on the road, a short distance in the rear of Stansbury's line, I met several gentlemen; and, among the others, I think Mr. Francis Key, of Georgetown, who informed me that he had thought that the troops coming from the city could be most advantageously posted on the right and left of the road near that point. General Smith being present, Mr. Key undertook, I believe, being sent for that purpose, to show the positions proposed. I left General Smith to make a disposition of these troops, and proceeded to the bridge, where I found Lieutenant Colonel Beall as before stated.\* I inquired whether he had any directions as to his position; he replied he had been shown a high hill upon the right of the road, ranging with the proposed second line. It being a commanding position, and necessary to be occupied by some corps, I directed him to proceed agreeably to the instructions he had received. I then rode up to a battery which had been thrown up to command the street which entered Bladensburg from the side of the enemy and the bridge, where I found the Baltimore artillery posted, with the Baltimore riflemen to support them. Upon inquiry, I learned that General Stansbury was on a rising ground upon the left of his line. I rode immediately thither, and found him and Colonel Monroe together. The latter gentleman informed me that he had been aiding General Stansbury to post his command, and wished me to proceed to examine it with them, to see how far I approved of it. We were just proceeding with this view, when some person rode up and stated that news had just been received of a signal victory obtained by General Izard over the enemy, in which one thousand of the enemy were slain and many prisoners taken. I ordered the news to be immediately communicated to the troops, for the purpose of giving additional impulse to their spirits and courage. The column of the enemy at this moment appeared in view, about a mile distant, moving up the Eastern Branch, parallel to our position. From the left, where I was, I perceived that, if the position of the advanced artillery were forced, that two or three pieces upon the left of Stansbury would be necessary to scour an orchard, which lay between his line and his artillery, and for another rifle company to increase the support of this artillery. These were promptly sent forward by General Smith, and posted as hastily as possible, and it was barely accomplished before I was obliged to give orders to the advanced artillery to open upon the enemy, who was descending the street toward the bridge. All further examination or movement was now impossible, and the position where I then was, immediately in rear of the left of Stansbury's line, being the most advanced position from which I could have any commanding view, I remained there. The fire of our advanced artillery occasioned the enemy, who were ad-

\* Since writing the above, I have seen General Smith, who informs me that Mr. Key had been examining the grounds with him, and that it was his views that Mr. Key had been stating. He came up at the moment Mr. Key had given me the information. I have been under the impression, till thus corrected, that it was the suggestion of Colonel Monroe and General Stansbury, that had suggested that position. The circumstance is immaterial, except for the purpose of literal accuracy when necessary.

vancing, and who were light troops, to leave the street, and they crept down, under the cover of houses and trees, in loose order, so as not to expose them to risk from the shot: it was therefore only occasionally that an object presented at which the artillery could fire.

In this sort of suspension, the enemy began to throw his rockets, and his light troops began to accumulate down in the lower parts of the town, and near the bridge, but principally covered from view by the houses. Their light troops, however, soon began to issue out and press across the creek, which was every where fordable, and in most places lined with bushes or trees, which were sufficient, however, to conceal the movements of light troops, who act in the manner of theirs, singly. The advanced riflemen now began to fire, and continued it for a half a dozen rounds, when I observed them to run back to the skirts of the orchard on the left, where they became visible, the boughs of the orchard trees concealing their original position, as also that of the artillery, from view. A retreat of twenty or thirty yards from their original position toward the left brought them in view on the edge of the orchard: they halted there, and seemed for a moment returning to their position, but in a few minutes entirely broke, and retired to the left of Stansbury's line. I immediately ordered the fifth Baltimore regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, being the left of Stansbury's line, to advance and sustain the artillery. They promptly commenced this movement; but the rockets, which had, for the first three or four, passed very high above the heads of the line, now received a more horizontal direction, and passed very close above the heads of Shutz's and Ragan's regiments, composing the centre and left of Stansbury's line. A universal flight of these two regiments was the consequence. This leaving the right of the fifth wholly unsupported, I ordered it to halt; rode swiftly across the field toward those who had so shamefully fled, and exerted my voice to the utmost to arrest them. They halted; began to collect; and seemed to be returning to their places. An ill-founded reliance that their officers would succeed in rallying them, when I had thus succeeded in stopping the greatest part of them, induced me immediately to return to the fifth, the situation of which was likely to become very critical, and that position gave me the best command of view. To my astonishment and mortification, however, when I had regained my position, I found the whole of these regiments (except a few of Ragan's, not more than forty, rallied by himself, and as many perhaps of Shutz's rallied, I learn by Captain Shower and Captain —, whose name I do not recollect) were flying in the utmost precipitation and disorder.

The advanced artillery had immediately followed the riflemen and retired by the left of the fifth. I directed them to take post on a rising ground which I pointed out in the rear. The fifth, and the artillery on its left, still remained, and I hoped that their fire, notwithstanding the obstruction of the boughs of the orchard, which, being below, covered the enemy, would have been enabled to scour this approach and prevent his advance. The enemy's light troops, by single men, showed themselves on the lower edge of the left of the orchard, and received the fire of this artillery and the fifth, which made them draw back. The cover to them was, however, so complete, that they were enabled to advance singly, and take positions from which their fire annoyed the fifth considerably, without either that regiment or the artillery being able to return the fire with any probability of effect. In this situation I had actually given an order to the fifth and artillery to retire up to the hill, toward a wood more to the left and a little in the rear, for the purpose of drawing them further from the orchard, and out of reach of the enemy's fire, while he was sheltered by the orchard. An aversion, however, to retire before the necessity became stronger, and the hope that the enemy would issue in a body from the left of the orchard, and enable us to act upon him on terms of equality, and the fear that a movement of retreat might, in raw troops, produce some confusion, and lose us this chance, induced me instantly to countermand the order, and direct the artillery to fire into a wooden barn on the lower end of the orchard, behind which I supposed the enemy might be sheltered in considerable numbers. The fire of the enemy now began, however, to annoy the fifth still more in wounding several of them, and a strong column of the enemy having passed up the road as high as the right of the fifth, and beginning to deploy into the field to take them in flank, I directed the artillery to retire to the hill, to which I had directed the Baltimore artillery to proceed and halt, and ordered the fifth regiment also to retire. This corps, which had heretofore acted so firmly, evinced the usual incapacity of raw troops to make orderly movements in the face of the enemy, and their retreat in a very few moments became a flight of absolute and total disorder.

The direct line of retreat to the whole of this first line being to the hill on which I had directed the artillery to halt, and immediately in connexion with the positions of General Smith's corps, which were not arrayed in line, but posted on advantageous positions in connexion with and supporting each other, according as the nature of the ground admitted and required; I had not for a moment, dispersed and disordered as was the whole of Stansbury's command, supposed that their retreat would have taken a different direction. But it soon became apparent that the whole mass were throwing themselves off to the right on the retreat toward Montgomery Court House, and flying wide of this point; the whole of the cavalry, probably, from the pressure of the infantry that way, were also thrown wide of the line of retreat toward the right. After making every effort to turn the current more toward General Smith's command and the city, in vain, and finding that it was impossible to collect any force to support the artillery, which I had directed to halt, and finding also that the enemy's light troops were extending themselves in that direction, and pressing the pursuit, I directed the artillery to continue their retreat, on the road they then were, toward the capitol, it being impossible for them to get across to the turnpike road or unite with General Smith's brigade.

The hope of again forming the first line at this point, and there renewing the retreat, or, at all events, of being able to rally them between the capitol and that point, and renewing the contest, induced me, at the moment I directed the fifth regiment to retreat, to request Mr. Riggs, of Georgetown, to proceed to the President, and inform him that we had been driven back, but that it was my hope and intention to form and renew the contest between that place and the capitol.

As soon as I found it vain longer to endeavor to turn the tide of retreat toward the left, I turned toward the positions occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Beall, Commodore Barney, and General Smith. By this time the enemy had advanced up the road, had driven back Lieutenant Colonel Kramer's command, posted on the right of the road, and in advance of Commodore Barney, after having well maintained his position and much hurt the enemy, and also continued to fire during his retreat. He had come under the destructive fire of Commodore Barney, which had turned him up the hill towards Lieutenant Colonel Beall, whose detachment gave one or two ineffective fires and fled. Their position was known to me, was very conspicuous, and the extreme right. The enemy, therefore, had gained this commanding position, and was passing our right flank; his force pursuing on the left, had also advanced to a line with our left, and there was nothing there to oppose him. To preserve Smith's command from being pressed in front by fresh troops of the enemy, who were coming on at the same time, while they were under the certainty of being assailed on both flanks and the rear by the enemy, who respectively gained them; in which circumstances their destruction or surrender would have been inevitable, I sent (my horse being unable to move with the rapidity I wished) to General Smith, to retreat. I am not acquainted with the relative position of the different corps composing his command, and cannot therefore determine who of them engaged the enemy, nor could I see how they acted; but when I arrived in succession at his different corps, which I did as soon as practicable, I do not recollect to have found any of them that were not in order, and retreating with as little confusion as could have been expected. When I reached the road I found Commodore Barney's men also retiring on the road, he having been overpowered by those who drove off Beall's regiment about the time I sent the order to retreat.

I still had no doubt but that Stansbury's command, and the cavalry, would have fallen down upon the capitol, by the roads which enter that part of the city from the north, and still solaced myself with the persuasion that I should be able there to rally them, upon the city and Georgetown troops, who were retiring in order; and make another effort in advance of the capitol to repulse the enemy.

After accompanying the retreating army within two miles of the capitol, I rode forward for the purpose of selecting a position, and endeavoring to collect those whom I supposed, from the rapidity of their flight, might have reached that point. A half a mile in advance of the capitol I met Colonel Minor with his detachment, and directed him to form his men, wait until the retreating army passed, and protect them if necessary.

When I arrived at the capitol I found not a man had passed that way, and notwithstanding the commanding view which is there afforded to the north, I could see no appearance of the troops. I despatched an order to call in the cavalry to me there.

In a few moments the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War joined me, besides that they had been witnesses to the dispersion of the troops and the exhaustion of those just halted by me. I stated the diminution of my force, and the extent of the positions which rendered it impossible to place the force I then had in such a position as to prevent the enemy from taking me on the flank as well as front, and that no reasonable hope could be entertained, that we had any troops who could be relied on to make a resistance as desperate as necessary, in an isolated building which could not be supported by a sufficiency of troops without; indeed it would have taken nearly the whole of the troops to have sufficiently filled the two wings, which would have left the enemy masters of every other part of the city, and given him the opportunity, without risk, in twenty-four hours, to have starved them into a surrender. The same objection equally applied to the occupation of any particular part of the city.

Both these gentlemen concurred that it would subject the whole of my force to certain capture or destruction; and in its reduced and exhausted condition it was wise and proper to retire through Georgetown, and take post in the rear of it, on the heights, to collect my force. I accordingly pursued this course, and halted at Tenley town, two miles north of Georgetown, on the Frederick road. Here was evinced one of the great defects of all undisciplined and unorganized troops; no effort could rouse officers and men to the exertion necessary to place themselves in such a state of comfort and security as is attainable, even under very disadvantageous circumstances. Such of them as could be halted, instead of making those efforts, gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaustion, and privation produced, and many hundreds, in spite of all precautions and efforts, passed on and pursued their way, either towards home or in search of refreshments and quarters. After waiting in this position until I supposed I collected all the force that could be gathered, I proceeded about five miles further on the river road, which leads a little wide to the left of Montgomery court house, and in the morning gave orders for the whole to assemble at Montgomery court house.

This position promised us shelter from the rain that began to fall an hour before day; was the most probable place for the supply of provisions, which the troops very much needed; and was a position from which we could best interpose between the enemy and Baltimore, and to which place, at that time, nobody doubted he intended to go by land from Washington.

In pursuance of this view, among the first acts after my arrival at Montgomery Court House, was, to direct a letter to General Stricker, who commanded at Baltimore, informing him that it was my intention to gather my force together there, receive what reinforcements I could, show myself to the enemy as strong as possible, hang on his flank, should he move to Baltimore, intimidate and harass him as much as possible in his movements, and endeavor always to preserve the power of interposing between him and Baltimore; directing him to re-establish the dispersed command of Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, multiply his means as much as possible, stop all reinforcements of militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, and present himself to the enemy at the crossing of the Patapsco, in as imposing a form as possible.

This letter I sent by Captain Aisquith, whom I found at Montgomery, with fifteen or twenty others, the only part of the Baltimore detachment which had not returned home.

The first object was, in the absence of quartermaster and contractor, to make efforts to provide quarters and refreshments for my men; a few provisions were found there, belonging to the contractor, and a person temporarily appointed to issue, and the most active men of the place called upon and authorized to get in provisions.

The next object was to obtain a return of the different corps, which, from causes that can easily be understood, among undisciplined men and unskilful officers, proved abortive before we moved next day. The arrival of several detachments of reinforcements, the reports of officers bringing on detachments who wanted orders and instructions, and the multiplied complaints and wants of men and officers, crowded together in small quarters, or entirely out of doors in a rainy, tempestuous day; the calculations and arrangements necessary for ulterior operations, and to meet the demands and wants of the great force which my calls were likely to produce, may be supposed to have been as much as could be borne by the attention and efforts of one man, which he was obliged to encounter, for the want of a skilful, or even organized staff of any kind.

No regular details for service of any kind could be performed, and all the duties of this description were necessarily performed by the voluntary zeal of those corps who could not be borne down or discouraged by difficulties. My efforts were devoted to endeavor to prepare the detachment to move down toward the city, and hang upon and strike at the enemy whenever an opportunity occurred. The next morning, however, before a return of the corps could be had, and their situation known, I received intelligence that the enemy had moved from Washington the preceding night, and was in full march for Baltimore. I instantly put my command under arms, multiplied and strengthened my patrols to gain intelligence, and advanced as rapidly as was practicable to Baltimore. When the forces arrived at Snell's bridge, on the upper branch of the Patuxent, I had concluded that, if the enemy was, as we had still reason to believe, proceeding to Baltimore, that it would be most advisable for me to proceed directly thither, to lend the whole force of my power, as commander of the district, to call out and bring into activity the resources of the place, and also because it was likely to become the most important station of the command. I accordingly left the command with General Stansbury, senior brigadier, and proceeded that night to Baltimore. On the road I met an express from Major General S. Smith, who delivered me a letter, in which he informed me he had been called out into service, and had assumed the command, according to his rank; and by the time I reached Baltimore, I also learned that the enemy was proceeding to Marlborough, and not toward Baltimore.

If I had had longer time, or to repeat the action of Bladensburg, I could correct several errors which might materially have affected the issue of that battle. The advanced force ought to have been nearer to the creek along the edge of the low ground, where they would have been skirted with bushes, and have avoided the inconvenience of the cover which the orchard afforded the enemy. The edge of the low grounds on the right of the road ought to have been lined with musketry, and a battery of cannon also planted in the field, on the right of the road, directly fronting the bridge; and if Commodore Barney's heavy artillery, with his more expert artillerymen, had occupied the position which the advanced artillerymen did, and these posts been obstinately defended, the enemy would not have crossed the river at that point, but would have been obliged to make a circuit round to his right, and have crossed above, and at the upper end of the town; or, if the whole force had been posted at the position of the second line, with all the advantage which it afforded, and have acted with tolerable firmness and courage, the event might have been different; but no advantage of position is proof against groundless panic and a total want of discipline, skill, and experience.

On the night of my retreat to the city, I sent Assistant Adjutant General Hite down to General Young, to inform him of the movement, and to direct him to take the best position to secure Fort Washington, and his junction with me; or, in case the enemy should interpose between him and me, to have his boats ready to transport his men across the river; or, if he could not do that, to fall down the river, and unite with General Stewart, and harass the enemy in the rear; and, above all, to be alert, and keep a vigilant guard upon every avenue of approach, to prevent a surprise. I also sent, by Major Hite, directions to the commanding officer of Fort Washington, to advance a guard up to the main road, upon all the roads leading to the fort; and, in the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort by the enemy, to blow up the fort, and retire across the river.

The distance of General Young, and the necessity of retaining a position near the fort as long as the designs of the enemy remained uncertain, rendered it impossible to have the assistance of his force at Bladensburg.

There was not a bridge on the road which the enemy pursued, from his debarkation to Washington, the destruction of which would have retarded his advance ten minutes. I believe, in fact, that the bridge at Bladensburg is the only one, and the facility with which that stream is every where fordable above the bridge rendered useless the destroying it. Indeed, I believe that, had artillery been posted as advantageously as it might have been, and well served, the bridge would have acted as a decoy to the enemy to lead him into danger, and have been useful to us.

Those who have that happy intrepidity of assurance in their own capacity to see with certainty, in all cases, the means by which they could have avoided the errors of others, and by which past calamities might always have been averted, will find my condemnation easy. Those who are disposed to measure difficulties by the limits of human capacity, and who will impartially place themselves in my situation, will find it difficult to decide that any errors

have been committed which might not have been equalled or surpassed by any other commander, or that the calamities which have followed could have been averted or mitigated.

This narrative is accompanied by a map, with explanations, which will facilitate the understanding of it.

## No. 8.

REPORTS OF GENERALS STANSBURY, SMITH, YOUNG, DOUGLAS, AND HUNGERFORD; COLONELS STERETT, MINOR, TAYLOR, LAVALL, AND BEALL; MAJOR PINKNEY, AND CAPTAINS BURCH AND CALDWELL.

*General Stansbury's Report.*

BALTIMORE, November 15, 1814.

By general orders from the War Department, of the 20th April, 1814, Major General S. Smith was directed to draught from his division, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, two thousand men, officers included.

By Major General Smith's division orders, of the 29th of April, I was directed to furnish, by draught, from my brigade, as its quota, one thousand of this requisition, and hold them in readiness to march, at a moment's warning, to Baltimore, for its defence. The first of May those orders were complied with, agreeably to a detail accompanying said orders.

On the 18th of July, Major General Smith issued division orders, requiring the quota from my brigade, the 11th, and that from the 2d and 9th, to march, and rendezvous at Baltimore. My orders were issued on the 19th; the troops began to assemble on the 24th, and were encamped about one and a half miles northward of the city, at a place called Camp Fairfield.

On the 21st of July, by Major General Smith, I was directed to take charge of this brigade, and commenced preparing for their reception. Early in August, General Winder being vested with the command of the tenth military district, superseded General Smith in the command.

On Saturday, August the 20th, about one o'clock P. M., I received, by express, letter No. 1, directing me to move down with my whole force for Washington.

By this morning's regimental reports, the force of my brigade, then in camp, appeared as follows:

The first regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Ragan, officers included, 550; second regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Shutz, officers also included, fit for duty, 303.

I immediately issued orders for wagons to be procured, provisions served out, tents struck, and every thing prepared to march that evening. But the difficulty of obtaining wagons to transport tents and camp equipage prevented my moving more than part of the brigade this evening. The residue followed on the morning of the 21st. The advance party encamped at the Stag Tavern; the rear three miles short of it, on the evening of the 21st.

About 10 o'clock P. M. I received from General Winder, by express, letter No. 2, dated the 21st, directing me to halt until further orders.

August 22d, at ten o'clock A. M. received from General Winder letter No. 3, dated at the Woodyard, the 21st, ten o'clock P. M. directing me to advance with all speed to Bladensburg. In consequence thereof, the line of march was taken up immediately, and at seven o'clock P. M. we arrived at Bladensburg. The first regiment encamped on the hill southeast, the second, on the northwest of the town; and, on Tuesday morning, the 23d, joined the first regiment on Lowndes' Hill, near Bladensburg. About ten o'clock A. M. received from General Winder letter No. 4, dated at Head Quarters, Battalion Old Fields, August 22, containing orders to march my brigade (with the troops under Colonel Sterett, if they had joined me) slowly towards Marlborough, and take a position on the road not far from that place, and that he would join me some time that day.

The troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sterett had not joined me, nor was I certain at what time they would arrive. The brigade was instantly put in motion, and the march commenced towards Marlborough, with a view of complying with General Winder's orders. I immediately despatched my aid-de-camp, Major Woodyear, to General Winder, to communicate all the information which he might require as to my force; to receive particular orders as to the position I should take in the vicinity of Marlborough; and to obtain a knowledge of the country, and of the situation of the enemy. After proceeding about one mile on the road to Marlborough, I met Captain Moses Tabbs riding express to inform me that the enemy, with their whole force, had left Marlborough, and were on their march toward me, distant about six miles. This information made me determine to avail myself of the high grounds I occupied in the morning, to which I immediately returned, and made the necessary preparations to receive the enemy. I directed Captain Tabbs to return and reconnoitre the enemy, and give me every information. About four o'clock P. M. he returned, and informed me that the enemy, on leaving Marlborough, had taken a different route. Soon after, my aid-de-camp, Major Woodyear, returned from General Winder, and informed me that the intelligence I had received of the movements of the enemy were, in part, incorrect, and that General Winder wished me to encamp on the direct road from Bladensburg to Marlborough, at about seven miles distant from the latter place. The Assistant Adjutant General, Major Hite, accompanied Major Woodyear. By letter No. 4, I was first informed that Lieutenant Colonel Sterett's detachment, consisting of the fifth regiment, about five hundred strong; Major Pinkney's rifle battalion, about one hundred and fifty; and Captains Myer's and Magruder's companies of artillery, about one hundred and fifty, were attached to my command. These troops had not joined me, but were on their march. I despatched an express with this letter to Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, as soon as received, requesting him to move on with all possible expedition.

About sunset, on the 23d, he arrived with his command, and encamped near my brigade. The fatigued situation of his troops induced me to halt for the night, on the hill near Bladensburg, with the intention of moving towards Marlborough at reveille, on the 24th. At about eight o'clock P. M. a militia captain, who resided near Bladensburg, came into camp, attended by one of my sentinels, and informed me he was from General Winder's camp, at the Battalion Old Fields; that General Winder was not in camp when he left it; and that it was apprehended he had been taken prisoner; as he had gone out to reconnoitre the enemy, and had not returned: that a detachment from the army had skirmished that day with the British; and that Brigadier General Smith, of the District of Columbia, had taken the command of the army, and would certainly join me in the course of the night. About eleven o'clock P. M., the Secretary of State, Colonel Monroe, with several gentlemen, came to my tent; and, as well as I recollect, Colonel Monroe observed that he was from Washington; that he had been at, or heard from, the camp of Gen. Winder; that there was an alarming silence with respect to General Winder, who had gone out to reconnoitre the enemy, and had not been heard of; and it was feared he was taken: that General Smith had, by persuasion, taken the command; and that they would move towards, and join me before morning, he expected, from the Battalion Old Fields; and advised vigilance to prevent surprise. Soon after the departure of Colonel Monroe, the advance pickets, on the road by which we expected the enemy, and which was the direct one from Marlborough, fired; and, in a few moments, my whole command were under arms, and prepared for action. The cavalry, under Colonel Tilghman, who had come into town a little after dark for refreshments, were ordered down the Marlborough road, except Captain Herbert, with his troop, who was directed to push down the road, toward the Battalion Old Fields, until he should fall in with General Winder's army, which I was confident would join me that night.

The troops were under arms until after two o'clock A. M. of the 24th, when being advised by the cavalry that the enemy were not near, I ordered them to retire to their tents, but to be ready to turn out at a moment's warning; and strong picket guards were placed on the road in every direction. Supposing my right and rear covered by General Winder's force, I felt no apprehensions of surprise there; and no expectation that the enemy, without first beating General Winder, could approach me, either by the Battalion or river road. But, about half after two o'clock A. M. Major Bates, Assistant Adjutant General of militia, came to me from Washington, with a message from General Winder, informing me that General Winder had retreated from the Battalion Old Fields into the city

of Washington, across the bridge; which he had ordered to be burnt; and that the General expected I would resist the enemy as long as possible, should he move against me in that direction. Thus was my expectation of security from the Battalion and river roads cut off, my right flank and rear uncovered, and liable to be attacked and turned, without the possibility of securing it, in the position I then lay.

I instantly sent for Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, of the 5th, Major Pinkney, of the rifle corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Ragan, Lieutenant Colonel Shutz being present, officers in whom I placed the highest confidence, and stated to them the information and orders I had just received from General Winder, and our situation with respect to the enemy; they were unanimous in opinion that our situation on that hill could not be defended with the force then under my command, worn down with hunger and fatigue as they were, and that it was indispensably necessary, for the security of the army, that we should immediately retire across the bridge of Bladensburg, and take a position on the road between Bladensburg and the city, which we could defend. Colonel Tilghman of the cavalry observed he thought we had no time to lose. In this opinion I perfectly coincided. Orders were instantly given to strike tents, and prepare to march, and in about thirty minutes, without noise or confusion, the whole were in motion, and about half past three o'clock in the morning, passed the bridge at Bladensburg leading to the city of Washington. Securing our rear from surprise, we halted in the road until the approach of day, with a view of finding some place where water could be had, in order that the men might cook their provisions, and refresh themselves for a few moments. The provisions consisted of salt beef of an inferior quality, the flour old and musty. At day-light, I moved on to the foot of a hill near a brick-yard, and there ordered the troops to refresh themselves. This was about one and a half miles from Bladensburg.

Early in the morning, I had despatched Major Woodyear to Washington, to inform General Winder of my movements and situation; of the exhausted state of the troops, and the impracticability of their meeting the enemy, in their present fatigued state, with any prospect of success, unless reinforced. I rode to the top of the hill to examine the country. On my descending it again, a note was presented to me, by an express from General Winder, dated at Washington, (written I presume without a knowledge of my movements) directing me to oppose the enemy, as long as I could, should he attempt a passage by the way of Bladensburg. This note I have mislaid.

I called a council of war, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, Lieutenant Colonel Ragan, and Major Pinkney. I laid the letter before them. Colonel Sterett observed, that he marched from Baltimore with a determination to defend the city; that his men, the day before, by a forced march from the Buck tavern, or Snowden's, reached Bladensburg without halting to cook; that they had been under arms nearly the whole of the night, without any sleep or food; that Major Pinkney's riflemen, and the two companies of artillery, were in the same situation; and that they were so completely worn down and exhausted, that he should consider it a sacrifice of both officers and men, to seek the enemy at any considerable distance from General Winder's force, as no good could result therefrom. Major Pinkney and Colonel Ragan expressed themselves to the same effect; and, with Colonel Sterett, urged the propriety of moving further on the road towards the city, with a view of taking a stand on some more favorable ground for defence, with a better prospect of being joined by the forces under General Winder; and expressed their willingness to give their opinions in writing. I could not but admit the correctness of their views, and ordered the wagons to move on slowly towards the city; intending to follow on with the troops.

At this moment, Major Woodyear returned from Washington with positive orders from General Winder, to give the enemy battle at Bladensburg, should he move that way, and that he would join me if necessary.

I immediately ordered the troops to retrace their steps to Bladensburg, determined to maintain, if possible, the ground, at all hazards.

On arriving in the orchard near the mill, I directed the artillery to post themselves behind a small breastwork of dirt, that lately had been thrown up by Colonel Wadsworth. This battery commanded the pass into Bladensburg and the bridge southwesterly of the town. Our artillery consisted of six six pounders; Major Pinkney's battalion of riflemen on their right, under cover of the town and bushes, also commanding the pass by the bridge: two companies from Lieutenant Colonel Shutz's regiment, under the command of Captains Ducker and Gorsuch, acting as riflemen, although principally armed with muskets, on the left of the artillery, near, and protected by, the barn, intended to defend the road leading by the mill on the left of the battery into the field; Colonel Sterett's regiment was halted in the orchard, on the right and in the rear, and the regiments of Colonels Ragan and Shutz were also halted in the orchard in the rear, and on the left flank near the creek. My intentions were, that they should remain here to refresh themselves as long as possible, and as soon as the enemy appeared, to form Colonel Sterett's regiment (in whom I placed great confidence) on the right, their left resting on, and supporting, the right of Major Pinkney's riflemen, in view of the bridge, and fronting the road, along which ran a fence, and act as occasion should require. Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regiments were to be drawn up in echelon, their right resting on the left of Captains Ducker's and Gorsuch's rifle companies, in order to prevent the enemy from pressing and turning our left, hoping that General Winder would join me before the battle would commence, and occupy the ground in my rear, as a second line.

About eleven o'clock, A. M. I was informed by a dragoon from Lieutenant Colonel Beall, that he was on the road from Annapolis to Bladensburg, with about eight hundred men, distant from me about five miles, and wished to know the distance and situation of the enemy. I directed the dragoon to return and inform him, that I had that moment received information, that the British, with their whole force, were approaching Bladensburg by the river road, and that they were only three and a half miles distant; and advised the Colonel to file off to his right, and cross above Bladensburg, to fall into an old road, which I understood led to our left towards Washington; and take a position on the high grounds, N. and N. W. of Bladensburg, which would completely protect my left by preventing the enemy from out-flanking us that way, and force their main body across the bridge, in the face of my artillery and riflemen on the main road, and expose them to the fire of the fifth regiment, under Colonel Sterett, who would be protected by the fence.

This advice it appeared Colonel Beall only took in part, I presume from an anxious wish to place himself between the enemy and the city. He sent his baggage off to the right, and with his troops passed the bridge at Bladensburg, about thirty minutes before the enemy appeared on Mr. Lowndes' hill, and took his station on the hill, as I was informed, near the brick kiln where we halted in the morning, about one and a half miles in my rear, and on the left of the road leading to the city. About meridian, the enemy could clearly be seen making towards us by the river road.

While I was giving some directions to the artillery, I found Lieutenant Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regiments had been moved from the place where I had stationed them, and marched out of the orchard up the hill, and formed in order of battle about two hundred and fifty yards above the orchard, and upwards of five hundred yards in the rear of the artillery and riflemen. Thus uncovered by the trees of the orchard, their situation and numbers were clearly seen by the enemy from Lowndes' hill, and the flanks of the artillery and riflemen unprotected, and laid liable to be turned, our main body being placed too far off to render them any aid. On riding up the hill to know who had ordered this movement, I was informed that General Winder was on the ground. At this time I met with Brigadier General Smith, of the District of Columbia, and some conversation took place between us respecting the order of battle, and seniority; the particulars I do not recollect. I immediately rode to the mill, where I understood General Winder was, and found him reconnoitering the position of the enemy. While in conversation with him, the fifth regiment was taken out of the orchard, marched up the hill, and stationed on the left of Col. Shutz's regiment, that of Colonel Ragan's being on the right, its right resting on the main road; but, as I before observed, the whole at so great a distance from the artillery and riflemen, that they had to contend with the whole British force, and so much exposed, that it has been a cause of astonishment they preserved their ground so long, and ultimately succeeded in retreating. Whose plan this was, I know not; it was not mine; nor did it meet with my approbation; but finding a superior officer on the ground, I concluded he had ordered it, consequently did not interfere. General Winder asked me where I meant to take my station? I answered, about the centre of my brigade. He said he would take his on the left of the fifth regiment. General Winder was extremely active in giving directions and in encouraging the men. I took my station in the centre of Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regiments, but

occasionally rode along the line, encouraging the men, and giving orders to the officers. Major Woodyear I directed to keep with the left of Colonel Shutz's regiment, to cheer up the men, and assist the officers. Major Randall rode with me. Soon after, the action commenced by the artillery and riflemen at the battery. The fire of the artillery had great effect, and evidently produced confusion in the ranks of the enemy, who took shelter behind a warehouse, from whence they fired rockets; but a few well directed shots drove them from this position. A flanking party, concealed by the banks and bushes, pushed up the river to turn our left, whilst a strong force attempted the bridge; but the incessant and well directed fire from our artillery and riflemen at the battery occasioned evident confusion amongst their ranks, so much so, that their officers could be seen actively engaged preventing their retreating, and pushing them on to the bridge; and here I think the enemy suffered considerably. At length they succeeded in passing the bridge in small parties, at full speed, which formed after crossing. I had ordered forty horsemen with axes, to cut away this bridge before the near approach of the enemy, and saw them with their axes. Why this order was not executed, I never could learn. It is certain the enemy could have forded the stream above; but I considered it would, in some degree, impede their progress, and give our artillery and riflemen more time and opportunity to act with effect against them.

The artillery under the command of Captains Myer and Magruder, and the riflemen, the whole under the command of Major Pinkney, behaved in the most gallant manner; (his gallant officer in the course of the action was severely wounded) but the superior force of the enemy, and the rapidity with which he moved, compelled them to retire; but one of the pieces was lost, and this was rendered harmless before it was abandoned.

The enemy took every advantage of the cover afforded them by the trees of the orchard, and their light troops from thence kept up a galling fire on our line. On this party, when advanced nearer, the fifth regiment, under Colonel Sterett, opened a steady and well directed fire, which was followed by the fire from the right, and ultimately from our centre, when the firing on both sides became general. After a few rounds, the troops on the right began to break. I rode along the line, and gave orders to the officers to cut down those who attempted to fly, and suffer no man to leave the lines. On arriving at the left of the centre regiment, I found Lieutenant Colonel Shutz's men giving way, and that brave officer, with Major Kemp, aided by my aid-de-camp, Major Woodyear, exerting themselves in rallying and forming them again. Captain Gallaway's company, and part of Captains Randall's and Shower's companies were rallied and formed again, and behaved gallantly. The rest of Colonels Shutz's and Ragan's regiments fled in disorder, notwithstanding the extraordinary exertions of their officers to prevent it. On the left, I soon after discovered a part of the fifth regiment giving way, and that excellent officer Lieutenant Colonel Sterett, with those under him, most actively engaged forming them again. Soon after, the retreat became general, and all attempts to rally them, and make a second stand, were fruitless. With a body of United States' cavalry, I endeavored to protect the rear and right of the retreating men, so as to prevent their falling into the enemy's possession.

The men under my command were worn down and nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, want of food, and watching. They had been, with very little intermission, under arms and marching from the time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity to cook. They certainly were not in a situation to go into battle; but my orders were positive, and I was determined to obey them.

Before and during the action, I did not see any of the force I was led to expect would support me. I understood since, they were on their way to my assistance, and I presume exertions were made to bring them up.

Before and during the retreat, I heard the thunder of Commodore Barney's artillery; but till then I did not know he was near. I believe there were few if any other troops in the field when the action commenced, than the three regiments of infantry, under Lieutenant Colonels Sterett, Ragan, and Shutz, Major Pinkney's battalion of riflemen, Captains Myer's and Magruder's companies of artillery, amounting to about two thousand one hundred and fifty, exclusive of two regiments of cavalry, who did not act.

General Winder, on the field of battle, displayed all possible zeal, activity, and personal bravery, in encouraging the men to fight, and after they broke, in his exertions to rally them.

I saw the President and some of the Heads of Departments in the field, but did not perceive that any of them took any part in the arrangement made for battle. Colonel Monroe, the then Secretary of State, appeared extremely active in his efforts to aid the officers in the discharge of their duties, and exposed himself to much danger.

To my aid-de-camp, Major Edward G. Woodyear, and my acting Brigade Major, Major Beall Randall, I am much indebted for their unremitting exertions in encouraging the men before and during the action, and the zeal displayed by them in their attempts to keep the ranks unbroken, and to rally the men, in which they in some degree succeeded; for the company of Captain Gallaway, and part of Shower's and Randall's were rallied, and were among the last troops who left the field, and did not retreat until directed: some of them were killed, and several severely wounded.

On arriving at the city, with part of Colonel Laval's United States' cavalry covering the retreat, and collecting the rear of our scattered troops, I found General Winder's command had passed through it towards Georgetown. I proceeded there, and then followed to a village a few miles beyond it, where I overtook him with troops collecting under his command, and some of those of my brigade. The army thence proceeded to Montgomery Court House on the 25th of August, where it was hourly reinforced by those who fled from the field.

As there had been no place assigned by the Commanding General, previous to the action, to which the men should retreat in case of a defeat, many of those under my immediate command had fled from the field towards Baltimore.

On the 25th I directed my aid, Major Woodyear, to push on from Montgomery Court House to that place, organize the draughted men, and bring them on to any point that General Winder should direct.

On Friday, August 26th, at about 10 o'clock A. M. we took up the line of march from Montgomery Court House on the road leading to Baltimore, with the United States' infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Scott; Major Peter's corps of artillery; General Smith's brigade of District troops; the regiment of militia from Annapolis and Ann Arundel county, commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Beall and Hood; some riflemen from Frederick, Alleghany, and other places; a large body of cavalry and part of my brigade of draughted militia—a force respectable as to numbers and appearance; and that night encamped about half way between Montgomery Court House and Ellicott's upper mills. General Winder having received some information respecting the enemy, indicating intentions of moving against Baltimore, concluded his presence there was indispensable. He set out for that place, leaving me in command of the army, with directions to follow him in the morning. Colonel Monroe was with us.

During this night several expresses arrived from the city of Washington, by whom I was informed of the retreat of the enemy, said to be in such haste and confusion that many of their soldiers were straggling about in every direction; that the main army, after reaching Bladensburg, had taken the road to Marlborough, leaving their wounded. I ordered the cavalry to follow them, harass their rear, and pick up the stragglers. Reports from Georgetown and the city reached me, that the arms of many of the enemy had fallen into the hands of the blacks, and it was apprehended that they would take advantage of the absence of the men to insult the females, and complete the work of destruction commenced by the enemy; and at the earnest solicitation of Brigadier General Smith and Major Peter, who expressed much anxiety respecting their families, and considering it all important to prevent further injury to the city, I ordered the troops of the District of Columbia to move thither for its protection.

Having ascertained that the enemy had retreated to their shipping, I ordered the Prince George's troops down to Bladensburg, and those under the command of Lieutenant Colonels Beall and Hood, to remain encamped on the ground then occupied, until they had orders from General Winder; and in the morning of the 27th, with the United States' infantry, my brigade, and part of Colonel Laval's cavalry, marched for Baltimore in a very heavy rain. On my arrival there in the evening, I waited on General Winder, and detailed to him what I had done since he left me, with which he appeared well pleased.

Before I conclude, I must observe that Major Pinkney, with most of his battalion, and part of the two companies of artillery, retired from their advanced position to the left of the fifth regiment, and with that regiment continued to behave with that gallantry which had distinguished them in the onset, and only retired when pressed by superior numbers, and then, as I am informed, by orders from the Commanding General.

TOBIAS E. STANSBURY.

General W. Smith's statement.

CAMP, WASHINGTON, October 6, 1814.

Sir:

In compliance with the request contained in your favor of the 28th ult. enclosing a copy of a resolution of the Honorable the House of Representatives of the United States, appointing a committee to investigate the causes which led to the success of the enemy in his late enterprise against this city, I have the honor respectfully to submit, for the consideration of the committee, the following detailed report, as connected with the inquiry, and embracing, as you wish, a view of the numbers, the movements, the conduct, and disposition of the troops of Washington and Georgetown, under my command, from the period they were called into service, until the 24th of August, the disastrous day of battle at Bladensburg, together with such facts and circumstances relative to the subject as present themselves.

Late at night on the 18th August, I received orders to call out the whole of the brigade under my command, to rendezvous on the evening of the following day on the banks of the Tiber, in Washington, and to report to General Winder. The troops assembled according to orders, but being deficient in many essential supplies for actual service, were, after an inspection; dismissed until the ensuing morning, the 20th, when every exertion on the part of the officers being made to perfect their equipment, they moved off from the capitol about 3 P. M. crossed the Eastern Branch, and halted four miles therefrom, on the road leading to Nottingham. They were here overtaken by the baggage, when it was ascertained there was a great deficiency of necessary camp equipage, the public stores being exhausted; many of the troops were compelled to lay out in the open field; and of the essential article of flints, upon a requisition of one thousand, only two hundred could be had. Means were immediately adopted to supply the latter defect from private resources; the former was never accomplished. On the following morning, the 21st, the militia companies deficient in numbers were consolidated, and the supernumerary officers detached to bring up delinquents. The force on the ground amounted to about one thousand and seventy, comprised into two regiments, commanded by Colonels Magruder and Brent, and consisting of the following description of troops; two companies of artillery, twelve six pounders, and two hundred and ten men; two companies of riflemen, nominally, *but armed with muskets*, the Secretary of War having declined or refused to furnish rifles, one hundred and seventy men; one company of grenadiers, forty men; and five companies of light infantry, about two hundred and fifty men, in all about six hundred and seventy of volunteers, the residue common militia. Having here done all that could be done for the organization of the troops, and to enable them to move with celerity, they were, according to previous orders from General Winder, put in motion, and after a hot and fatiguing march, encamped that evening after dusk near the Woodyard. At this place I found the United States' 36th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Scott, about three hundred and fifty strong, and a squadron of cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman; the latter soon after moved off to reconnoitre on the different roads between the Woodyard, Marlborough, and Nottingham. Whilst the troops were occupying the ground, I received a message from General Winder, then at the Woodyard, requesting an interview at his quarters; after which I returned to camp at 9 o'clock, and again, at his request, joined him at 12, where Colonel Monroe soon after arrived with the intelligence of the arrival at Nottingham, (distant about twelve miles) of the enemy, in considerable force, both by land and water. I received orders immediately to return to camp and hold the troops in readiness to march at the shortest notice, and was instructed by General Winder to direct Lieutenant Colonel Scott, of the 36th United States' regiment, to get his men immediately under arms, and to march according to orders previously given him. I reached the camp about two o'clock A. M. the troops were roused, the tents struck, the baggage wagons loaded, and the men got immediately under arms, and so remained until sunrise the 22d, when General Winder arrived and directed an advanced corps to be formed and march immediately, to consist of about three hundred men, artillery and infantry. This was promptly done, and placed under the direction of Major Peter, consisting of his own artillery, Captain Davidson's light infantry, and Captain Stull's rifle corps, *armed with muskets*. They moved immediately on the road to Nottingham, and were soon after followed by the main body to support them. Major Peter with the advance corps moved on for four or five miles, when he fell in with Colonel Lavall's cavalry, a part of Colonel Tilghman's, and the 36th United States' regiment, retiring. The troops were halted, and a position taken to repel the enemy, now rapidly approaching. General Winder here joined our troops, and soon after, orders were given to fall back, which was done. The main body had mean while arrived at a position within two miles of the advance, where they found the marine corps, under the command of Captain Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillery, judiciously posted.

This position not being deemed favorable for the infantry, they were directed to rest on their arms, whilst I rode briskly forward to discover one more adapted to them; but none presented, except for light troops, a body of which was thrown in advance into the woods, and the residue of the troops disposed of to act according to circumstances. Here we received advice, about 11 o'clock, of the advance of the enemy and of the retiring of our troops, and immediately after, orders from General Winder to send off the baggage from where it had been left in the morning, to the "Long Old Fields," and for the troops to retire slowly upon the same road. About this time, successive heavy explosions from the direction of Marlborough, announced the destruction of Commodore Barney's flotilla, which was known to be in that vicinity, and also that this course would be adopted, should the enemy approach in such force, by land and water, as to render resistance unavailing. It was hence inferred, that the enemy had ascended the Patuxent in force, that a column of troops had co-operated, by taking the road in that direction, which was soon afterwards confirmed; and with the advices subsequently, that the whole of their army had filed off on that road, and taken possession of Marlborough. Our troops halted, and assembled at the fork of the roads, on this side of the Woodyard, one of which leads to Marlborough, the other to this place. We here fell in with Commodore Barney and his sailors, and after a short rest the whole moved on, and about 4 P. M. arrived at the Long Old Fields. Here, pursuant to directions from General Winder, I assumed the command of the assembled forces, those of Commodore Barney excepted, consisting now of the following troops, viz: District volunteers and militia, one thousand and seventy; Lieutenant Colonel Scott's 36th United States' regiment, three hundred and fifty; Lieutenant Colonel Kramer's battalion of draughted militia, two hundred and forty; and Major Waring's battalion of Prince George's militia, about one hundred and fifty; total about eighteen hundred men. An encampment was formed for the night, and such positions taken as were best calculated to resist a night attack; the cavalry being already stationed in advance, on the different roads leading to Marlborough, with orders to keep patrolling parties constantly upon the enemy's quarters, and to advise of all his movements. The troops being greatly fatigued, sought in sleep that repose they so much wanted; in this they were disappointed: an alarm gun aroused them about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 23d; they were quickly formed in front of their encampment, and dispositions made to meet and repel the expected attack, but in a short time it was ascertained to be a false alarm, and the troops were dismissed, but with orders to hold themselves ready for their posts at a moment's warning. At daylight General Winder gave orders to have the tents struck, and the baggage wagons loaded, and that the whole should be ready to move in one hour. Those orders were complied with, with all possible expedition. Shortly after, the troops were got under arms, and were joined by another small detachment of Prince George's militia, under the command of Major Maynard, about one hundred and fifty. The whole were held ready to move according to orders. About this time I received directions from General Winder to have formed an advance corps, constructed as the one of the preceding day, and to be prepared to move as his subsequent orders should designate. Peter's, Davidson's, and Stull's companies were again selected for this purpose, and formed accordingly. The President of the United States, accompanied by the Secretary of War, and others of his cabinet, now came upon the ground and reviewed the troops. About 10 o'clock, General Winder left the camp, accompanied by, and having under his command or direction, several troops of cavalry, intending to reconnoitre on the road leading from Marlborough to Bladensburg, as well as to be situated in a position where he might more conveniently communicate with the troops expected from Baltimore, leaving directions that I should report to him at the Cross Roads, it being the intersection of a road, proceeding from the Old Fields, and crossing the before mentioned road, about five miles distant. His orders were, that the advance troops should move forward in the direction of Marlborough, reconnoitre the enemy, approach him as near as possible,

without running too much risk, and to annoy him, either in his position or in his movements, by all the means in their power, and that I should remain with the main body at the Old Fields, and act according to the intelligence I should receive of the movements of the enemy. If they moved upon Bladensburg, by the road before mentioned, that I should approach them by the intersecting road from the Old Fields, and attack their left flank, or, if upon the road we now occupied, that we should make the best possible dispositions in our power, and receive him there, unless circumstances imperiously forbade; otherwise, to retire by a road in our rear to Bladensburg or to Washington, as, at the time, should seem most advisable. In conformity with this arrangement, Major Peter, with the advance corps, and with Captain Caldwell's cavalry, which had joined us, marched about 11 o'clock. About a quarter of a mile in front of our then camp, the road forks, both leading to Marlborough, one, on the main stage road, by which the distance was about eight miles, the other turning to the left, a more direct route, but not so good a road, about six miles. This last mentioned road was taken by our advancing troops. The commander was instructed to report every hour. The residue of our troops were dismissed to refresh. From this period until 2 o'clock, several deserters and prisoners were brought into camp, and I was engaged in examining them, when intelligence was received from Major Peter that the enemy had left Marlborough, and were advancing rapidly upon the road which we then occupied, in great force; that, according to his estimation of their column, and the best information he could obtain, their force was not less than six thousand men; that he had had a skirmish with them, in which they had endeavored to out-flank him; and that he was then retiring before them. A part of Colonel Laval's cavalry having then joined us, were immediately detached to cover the retreat, and the whole of our troops ordered under arms. Conferring with Commodore Barney on the subject, I proposed making a stand in our then position, with which, with his characteristic gallantry, he promptly acquiesced, professing his willingness to co-operate in any measures that might be deemed most advisable. The troops were immediately formed in order of battle, extending nearly a quarter of a mile on each side of the road; those of Commodore Barney, with his heavy artillery, the marines under Captain Miller, and the 36th United States' regiment, being posted on the right of the road; the District troops, and the residue of those attached to them, on the left—our advanced troops, as they arrived, taking their stations in the line, and the artillery, in which it was ascertained we were greatly their superior, and for which the ground was admirably adapted, so posted, as to have the best effect; indeed, so strong did we deem our position in front, that we were apprehensive that the enemy, upon viewing us, would forbear to assail us by day-light, or that, availing of his numbers, he would endeavor to outflank us. To guard against this last, parties of light troops and cavalry were detached to cover both flanks. We remained thus, two or three hours, calmly awaiting the approach of the enemy, our videts successfully announcing his continued progress. About 5 P. M. General Winder, who had been apprised of the approach of the enemy, arrived in camp. He examined the different positions, and approved of them, but the day being now nearly spent, and it being ascertained that the enemy had not arrived within a distance in which he would now, probably, be able to make his attack, whilst it lasted, and it being deemed unadvisable to receive a night attack there, when our advantage of artillery would be unavailing, he gave the orders to retire about sunset, and the whole of the troops, much wearied and exhausted, encamped, late in the night, within this city.

Thus terminated the four days of service of the troops of this District, preceding the affair at Bladensburg. They had been under arms, with but little intermission, the whole of the time, both night and day; had traversed, during their different marches in advance and retreat, a considerable tract of country, exposed to the burning heat of a sultry sun by day, and many of them to the cold dews of the night, uncovered. They had, in this period, drawn but two rations, the requisition therefor, in the first instance, having been but partially complied with, and it being afterwards almost impossible to procure the means of transportation, the wagons employed by our quartermaster for that purpose being constantly impressed by the Government agents, for the purpose of removing the public records, when the enemy's approach was known, and some of them thus seized whilst proceeding to take in provisions for the army.

Those hardships and privations could not but be severely distressing to men, the greater part of whom possessed and enjoyed at home the means of comfortable living, and from their usual habits and pursuits in life but ill qualified to endure them. They, however, submitted without murmuring, evincing by their patience, their zeal, and the promptitude with which they obeyed every order, a magnanimity highly honorable to their character. Great as was their merit in this respect, it was no less so in the spirit manifested whenever an order was given to march to meet the foe; and, at the "Long Old Fields," where his attack was momentarily expected in overwhelming force, they displayed, in presence of many spectators, although scarce any of them had ever been in action, a firmness, a resolution, and an intrepidity, which, whatever might have been the result, did honor to their country.

On Wednesday morning, the 24th August, at 11 A. M. I received orders from General Winder to detach one piece of artillery and one company of infantry, to repair to the Eastern Branch Bridge, and there report to Colonel Wadsworth; and to proceed with the residue of the troops to Bladensburg, and take a position to support General Stansbury. This order was put in immediate execution, and the troops for Bladensburg moved off with all the expedition of which they were capable. Having put them in motion I passed on ahead, in order that I might select my position against their arrival. I found General Stansbury posted on the west side of the Eastern Branch, his right resting on the main road, distant from the bridge at Bladensburg five or six hundred yards, and extending northeastwardly, his left approaching nearer to the creek. An extensive apple orchard was in his front, and one hundred to two hundred yards in advance, a work thrown up, commanding the bridge, occupied by a corps of artillery, with five or six pieces, and appeared to be supported by some rifle and light companies. In his rear, on the right, was a thick undergrowth of wood, and directly behind that a deep hollow or ravine, open or cleared, of about sixty yards in width, which the main road crosses. The ravine terminates on the left in a bold acclivity, about two hundred yards from the road; the rest of the ground in his rear was open, unbroken, and gradually ascending fields. Having hastily examined the grounds, and concluded on the dispositions I should make, I apprised General Stansbury of my views, as to the troops under my command, suggesting, that if his line should be forced, and he could again form on my left, that the nature of the ground there would be favorable for a renewal of the action, which might then become general. By this time we received advice that the enemy were near Bladensburg, and I left him, to hasten the arrival of my troops. They moved rapidly on, notwithstanding the excessive heat of the day, covered with clouds of dust, and were promptly disposed of as follows:

Lieutenant Colonel Scott, with the 36th United States' regiment, was posted in a field on the left of the road, his right resting upon it, and commanding the road descending into the ravine before mentioned, in the rear of General Stansbury's right, and the rest of his line commanding the ascent from the ravine. This position was about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the front line, but extending to the right. In the same field, about one hundred yards in the rear of the 36th regiment, Colonel Magruder was posted with a part of the 1st regiment of District militia, his right also resting upon the road, the left advanced, presenting a front obliquely to the road, and situated to cover and to co-operate with the 36th regiment; Major Peter, with his artillery, six six pounders; Captain Davidson's light infantry, and Captain Stull's rifle corps, armed with muskets, all of the same regiment, were ordered to take possession of the abrupt acclivity before mentioned, terminating the ravine. This was deemed a desirable position, because it commanded completely the ravine and the road crossing it, and a considerable extent of the ground over which the front line would necessarily retire if forced back; but, after a short space of time, report was made to me, that broken grounds interrupted the approach to it with artillery, but by a circuitous route that would consume much time, and that, in case of retreat, the ground in the rear was such as might endanger the safety of the guns. It was mentioned, at the same time, that near to it was a commanding position for artillery, and easy of access from and to the road. I yielded with reluctance to the abandonment of the position first ordered, but time did not admit of hesitation. Mean while I had posted Lieutenant Colonel Kramer, with his battalion of Maryland draughted militia, in the woods, on the right of the road, and commanding the ravine which continued in that direction, with orders that, if forced, he should retire by his right, through a body of woods in that direction, and rally and form with the troops stationed in the rear, on the extreme right. Upon examining the position taken by Major Peter's battery, it was found that the range of his guns was principally through that part of the field occupied by the 36th regiment. To remove one or the other became necessary, and the difficulty of the ground for



moving artillery, and the exigency of the movement, left no alternative. The 36th fell back about one hundred yards, losing, in some measure, the advantage of its elevated ground, and leaving the road. The position of the 1st regiment District militia, from this circumstance, was also necessarily changed. It fell back about the same distance, its right still resting on the road, and now formed, nearly in line with the 36th. Of the 2d regiment District militia, two pieces of artillery and one company of riflemen, armed with muskets, were, by directions of General Winder, sent on to the front; with those he flanked the extreme left of the front line; two pieces more of artillery were posted in the road near the bridge at Bladensburg; the residue of that regiment, about three hundred and fifty strong, under the command of Colonel Brent, was formed as a reserve a short distance in the rear of Major Peter's battery, and so disposed as to act on the right, or left, or in front, as occasion might require. Near them was posted, in the same manner, Major Waring's Prince George's battalion of militia, about one hundred and fifty. Colonel William D. Beall, with a regiment of troops from Annapolis, passed through Bladensburg as our troops arrived, and took a position on the right of the road and nearly fronting it, a distance about two hundred and fifty yards. Previous to the arrival of the troops on the ground, General Winder came up from the city, and being made acquainted with the intended dispositions of the troops, as well as the ground reserved for Commodore Barney and the marines, approved of and confirmed them.

About half past twelve o'clock, and whilst the troops were yet taking their different positions, innumerable rockets thrown from the heights of Bladensburg announced the arrival of the enemy there; and, at this period, Commodore Barney's sailors and marines, in quick march, arrived, and took possession of the ground previously assigned them, his artillery being posted in and near the road upon its right, commanding the road and open field in front, and his infantry, together with the marines under Captain Miller, extending to the right, thus occupying the interval of ground between Colonel Magruder's first regiment District militia, and Colonel Beall's Maryland regiment.

The firing of artillery in front soon commenced, and immediately after, that of musketry, in quick and rapid succession. In a few minutes the whole right and centre of the front line, with some small exceptions, were seen retiring in disorder and confusion. The firing still continued on the extreme left, but shortly after, it also broke, and although it retired in more order, yet none could be rallied so as to renew the action with effect, and also soon entirely quitted the field.

Mean while the left of the enemy, in heavy column, passed along the road crossing the ravine. They were here encountered by the troops of Colonel Kramer, posted in the woods on the edge of the ravine. These, after a short conflict, were compelled to retire; which they did principally under cover of the adjacent woods, and formed with the troops of Colonel Beall on the right. The enemy's column now displayed in the field on the right of the road. They here became exposed to the oblique fire of Major Peter's battery, which was kept up with great animation. Still pressing on to the front of our right, they came in contact with the heavy artillery of Commodore Barney, and of the troops posted there. Here the firing became tremendous. They were repulsed, again returned to the charge, succeeded in forcing the troops on the right, and finally carried the position of Commodore Barney.

The dispersion of the front line caused a dangerous opening on our left, of which the enemy in that quarter promptly availed. He advanced rapidly, then, wheeling on his left, soon gained, and was turning our left flank. To oppose this alarming movement, I directed Colonel Brent, with the second regiment of District militia, to take a position still more to the left; and he was proceeding in the execution of this order, when orders came from General Winder for the whole of the troops to retreat. The efforts of the enemy had hitherto been directed principally against the right and left of our whole line of battle. The troops of this District, and a part of those attached to them, occupying positions mostly in the centre, and some of them difficult of access, were consequently but partially engaged, and this principally with light troops and skirmishers, now pressing forward, supported by a column of infantry.

I here beg leave to refer to the reports of Colonels Brent and Thompson, Nos. 1 and 2, showing the positions, and the part taken by their respective commands during the action.

The order to retreat was executed by regiments and corps, as they had been formed, and with as much order as the nature of the ground would permit. The first and second regiments halted and formed, after retreating five or six hundred paces, but were again ordered by General Winder to retire. At this moment I fell in with General Winder, and, after a short conference with him, was directed to move on, and collect the troops, and prepare to make a stand on the heights westward of the turnpike gate. This was done as fast as the troops came up. A front was again presented towards the enemy, consisting principally of the troops of this District, a part of those who had been attached to them in the action, and a Virginia regiment of about four hundred men, under Colonel Minor, which met us at this place. Whilst the line was yet forming, I received orders from General Winder to fall back to the capitol, and there form for battle. I took the liberty of suggesting my impression of the preferable situation we then occupied; but expecting that he might be joined there by some of the dispersed troops of the front line, he chose to make the stand there. Approaching the capitol, I halted the troops, and requested his orders as to the formation of the line. We found no auxiliaries there. He then conferred for a few moments with General Armstrong, who was a short distance from us, and then gave orders that the whole should retreat through Washington and Georgetown. It is impossible to do justice to the anguish evinced by the troops of Washington and Georgetown on the receiving of this order. The idea of leaving their families, their houses, and their homes, at the mercy of an enraged enemy, was insupportable. To preserve that order which was maintained during the retreat, was now no longer practicable. As they retired through Washington and Georgetown, numbers were obtaining and taking leave to visit their homes, and again rejoining; and with ranks thus broken and scattered, they halted at night on the heights near Tenlytown, and, on the ensuing day, assembled at Montgomery Court House.

I have thus, sir, given a detailed, and what will, I apprehend, in many respects, be deemed too minute an account, of the short tour of service of the District troops under my command, which preceded the capture of this capital. I fear its length may trespass too much on the patience of your honorable committee. I thought it, however, due to the occasion, and conformable to the spirit and purport of your inquiries. I had another object. The troops of Washington and Georgetown have been assailed, in the public prints and elsewhere, with calumnies as unmerited as they are cruel and wanton. They have heard of them with indignant astonishment. Conscious that in no instance have they been wanting in the duty they owed to their country or to themselves, but, on the contrary, in obedience to the call of their Government, have, with alacrity, obeyed its orders, and intrepidly fronted an enemy vastly their superior in force, and never yielded the ground to him, but by orders emanating from superior authority, they cannot restrain the feelings excited by such manifest, such unprovoked injustice. They have seen with satisfaction the resolution of Congress to inquire into this subject; and persuaded of the justice and impartiality of your honorable committee, entertain a confident assurance that the result of your investigation will afford relief to their injured feelings. Connected with this subject, I beg leave to refer to a letter of General Winder, No. 3, in answer to an inquiry made of him, as to the general conduct of the brigade whilst under his command.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. SMITH,

*Brigadier General First Columbian Brigade.*

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON.

P. S. I ought to have mentioned that parts of two companies of the United States' twelfth and thirty-eighth regiments were attached to the thirty-sixth regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Scott. Previous to the march to Bladensburg, eighty men of his command had been stationed near the Eastern Branch bridge, and did not join until after the action. His force then was less than three hundred men.

W. S.

*Brigadier General Robert Young's statement.*

ALEXANDRIA, October 3, 1814.

SIR:

In compliance with your letter of the 28th of September, written in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives of the United States, requiring such information as may be in my power to give, more especially the part assigned my command, my numbers, orders, movements, and dispositions, previous and subsequent to the 24th of August last, and on that day; as also the conduct of my officers and men, their ideas upon the subject of the enemy's numbers, their confidence in success, and whether any thing like a panic prevailed; with such other views as it may be in my power to communicate, pertinent to an impartial investigation of the subject: I have the honor respectfully to report, that, since the declaration of war, I am enabled, with great truth, to say, that the officers and a great portion of the privates of my command have manifested to me every disposition to defend the District of Columbia from the approach of the enemy; and this disposition has been communicated to the Secretary of War, requesting to be furnished with the necessary means of enabling the militia under my command to do so with effect.

On or about the 25th of July, 1814, General Winder visited the town of Alexandria, and was made acquainted with most of the officers of my brigade, and at that interview mentioned his intention of having a general inspection of the brigade. The men were accordingly assembled, on the first day of August, under an order of General Van Ness, when General Winder attended, and inspected the brigade, minutely, in person. And I beg leave here to remark, that, on General Winder's first visit to the town of Alexandria, he was furnished, by an officer of my brigade, with a topographical sketch of the river Potomac, from a place called Indian Head, about twenty-three miles below Alexandria, containing the course of the river, the depth of the water, width of the channel at particular places, and pointing out Indian Head as the first proper point of defence against the approach of the enemy by water; the White House as the second point of defence; and suggesting a plan of increasing the defence at Fort Warburton. This was done with an understanding that General Winder would receive any communication upon that subject, in writing, from any of the inhabitants of Alexandria.

On the 18th day of August last, I received orders from General Van Ness to order out immediately the whole of my brigade, to encamp at some convenient place, and report myself to General Winder; which order was obeyed. See No. 1.

On the same day I received orders from the same officer, to detach two troops of cavalry attached to my brigade, to rendezvous at Bladensburg the next day, at four o'clock in the morning, to attend Colonel Monroe, Secretary of State, and be subject to his particular orders; which was complied with, as will appear by document No. 2.

On the twentieth of August I was directed by General Winder to hold my brigade ready to move at a moment's warning, with ammunition, and a supply of three days' provisions, as will appear by No. 3; and, on the same day, about four o'clock, P. M. I received orders from the same officer, to cross the Potomac, without delay, at Rozier's ferry, and take a position on the most convenient spot adjacent thereto, encamp, and there await further orders. See No. 4.

I accordingly the same evening took up my line of march, with the remaining part of my brigade, containing, in the whole, officers and privates included, four hundred and fifty-four strong. I had with me two brass six pounders, one brass four pounder, and attempted to take two long twelve pounders, belonging to the corporation of Alexandria, but found them too unwieldy to move, with our means, across the river, and returned them. I was, at first, accompanied by a company of marine artillery, composed of volunteers from the seafaring persons in Alexandria, but the difficulty of transporting the twelve pounders occasioned several of them to return; the others remained with a brass four pounder, and joined the artillery commanded by Captain Griffith. On the twenty-first of August I received orders to move with my detachment, at reveille next morning, and pitch my tents at the most convenient spot, nigh Piscataway, between that place and the Woodyard, and there await further orders, which was complied with. See No. 5.

On the twenty-second of August I received orders to fall back with my detachment, and take the most convenient position on the road from Piscataway to Washington, to defend the approach from below to Fort Warburton. This order was complied with, see No. 6; and here we received information of the approach of the enemy from the Patuxent towards Washington, and also of the approach of the fleet coming up the Potomac, and of their having passed the Kettle Bottoms. I accordingly took a strong position on a height called Hatton's Hill, near the head of Piscataway creek, about three miles in the rear of Fort Warburton, reviewed the ground of the fort, which is favorable for a small number to defend against a greater, and made a disposition of the brigade in case of an attack, and communicated the information, and marked the ground, and made known to the troops their respective posts in the line, in case of an attack, in doing which both officers and privates exhibited to me the strongest and most determined resolution to make a proper and successful resistance. I saw no wavering or want of confidence, nor any symptoms of panic.

On the twenty-third of August I received information from Colonel Tayloe, of the cavalry, that he had in charge to inform me, that General Smith's brigade was retreating to Washington, and the enemy pursuing rapidly, and, in case we were compelled to retreat, the mayor of Alexandria would send every boat that could be had to Fort Washington, or Rozier's ferry, for the purpose of transporting the troops across the Potomac. See No. 7.

On the receipt of this letter I addressed one to General Winder, by my Brigade Major, informing him of its contents, and observed, that as Colonel Tayloe did not say from whom he had the charge, I requested that he would please give Major Triplett his orders on the subject. See No. 8. On the morning of the 24th August I received a message from General Winder, by Assistant Adjutant General Hite, directing me to take up my line of march, and move on the road from Piscataway to the Eastern Branch bridge, and take a position at the cross roads, and send out videttes towards Marlborough and the city, to watch the movements of the enemy, then on their march, about — miles on our flank. Our position was on Oxen Hill, where Major Hite again visited us, on his return from Fort Warburton.

On our march, and when the brigade had advanced about three miles, Major Triplett returned with orders from General Winder, directing the brigade to cross to the Virginia shore, in the boats which were directed to be left at the fort, for the purpose of crossing troops, and if the boats were not there to retire on to Washington; but, in case we could cross the river, to fall into the road through which the Virginia troops would pass, and co-operate with them, unless the advance of the enemy up the river should make it necessary to retire on Alexandria; and if there should be no Virginia troops retiring, to fall back immediately to Alexandria, and act in the best manner for the defence of that place, or, retreating to Washington, if necessary; and leaving a latitude, in case of events, to pursue such measures as would best secure us from disaster. See No. 9. Soon after the receipt of this letter, we were advised of the approach of the enemy up the river, above Port Tobacco, and I was also advised that the enemy were, that morning, advanced of Marlborough about five miles; and, without perceiving any want of steadiness in my men, I determined, in obedience to orders, to cross the Potomac to the town of Alexandria, at Rozier's ferry, and sent for the boats left at the fort, and also for boats from Alexandria, which were immediately sent in a great abundance; and, after some part of the brigade had embarked and left the shore, I received orders from General Armstrong, dated the 24th of August, but whether written before or subsequent to that of General Winder I was unable to ascertain, informing me that the most the enemy did the day before, was to move about two miles in advance of Marlborough, and that the ships in the Potomac had no troops; and directing me to hold my present post until assured that the enemy was in force and about to attack me, or until I should receive further orders; and to keep my videttes well posted on every road. See No. 10.

I accordingly recalled the troops embarked, and resumed my position back of Oxen Hill, on the road leading to the Eastern Branch bridge, and near its junction with the road leading to Marlborough, and sent out my videttes on each road. We were at this moment apprised of the enemy's being on his march to Bladensburg, and soon after, by the commencement of the action, which was distinctly heard; the videttes soon returned, and gave me infor-

mation of the Eastern Branch bridge being blown up, and others, of the retreat of our troops through Washington. I had, in this interval, despatched the trooper who brought me General Armstrong's letter, with an answer, informing him that I had, in obedience to his letter, returned to my position on the heights back of Oxen Hill, and should there wait further orders.

The trooper, with great despatch, returned, and informed me that he could not see General Armstrong, but had inquired of the President and General Winder, both of whom he met with the army, retreating through Washington city, and they being unable to give any information of him, General Winder despatched the same trooper back, with verbal orders for my brigade to cross the Potomac, and form a junction with his army in Montgomery county, Maryland. I accordingly crossed the troops over to Alexandria, on the night of the twenty-fourth of August, and took a position a small distance in the rear of Alexandria, and during the night and next morning crossed my artillery and baggage. I had sent a vidette into the city of Washington, and learnt that the enemy were in possession, and were firing the public buildings. I took up my line of march for Conns' ferry, a small distance above the Great Falls of the Potomac, and immediately opposite Montgomery Court House, where I was informed General Winder's army then were. The troops were, on the twenty-sixth, delayed on their march, near Carper's mills, opposite the Great Falls of the Potomac, by an alarm of a domestic nature, which I was credulous enough to give credence to, from the respectability of the country people who came to me for protection, and I accordingly halted my brigade, and sent out my light troops, and one troop of cavalry, which had joined me from Fauquier, to ascertain the fact, which finally proved erroneous. See letter No. 12, from the mayor of Alexandria.

On my passing the road which led to the Little Falls bridge, I was apprised by a vidette that the enemy's pickets were still in view from Georgetown, and by several persons from the city, that I was in danger of being cut off, should the enemy make a sally out across the Little Falls bridge, which determined me to pursue my original intention, and not pass the bridge.

On the evening of the twenty-seventh of August I crossed my troops over the Potomac, at Conns' ferry, and the river being rocky, and but one boat, and owing to high winds, I was unable to pass the artillery and baggage across until late in the evening of the twenty-eighth of August, when I immediately despatched a vidette to General Winder, informing him of my movements, and that I should continue my march to reach his camp, unless otherwise ordered. See No. 12.

About one o'clock of the night of the twenty-eighth, I received an order from Colonel Monroe, Secretary of State, informing me that the British squadron had passed the fort, and was approaching the city; that the fort surrendered without opposition; and that the President of the United States desired that I should move with all possible despatch for Georgetown, to be in a situation to aid either Alexandria or the city, as circumstances might require. See No. 13. I soon after took up my line of march, and reached Georgetown, distant about twenty miles, at half past twelve o'clock, and were marched to the city, and encamped near the President's house, in full view of the enemy's fleet lying at the town of Alexandria.

On the thirty-first of August I was ordered to march across the Potomac, and join General Hungerford, from whence the brigade was marched to the White House. See No. 14. It may be proper for me here to remark, that, on my route to Conns' ferry, I gave directions for moving two twelve pounders, belonging to the corporation of Alexandria, out of the enemy's reach, and on my march to the White House I carried them with me, and caused to be removed from the gun house in Alexandria, and while it was in possession of the enemy, the screws, sponges, rammers, and apparatus, belonging to the guns, as also the powder from the powder house, and, as facts are better than opinions, permit me to bring in view the artillery so handsomely mentioned by Captain Porter. Two of the infantry killed, and two wounded, that had been detailed under the command of Captain Janny, show the materials of the brigade from which they were drawn; the rifle corps were also on the flank of battery, and did their duty, and more to their honor, from knowing that their arms had previously been condemned. Whilst the troops lay at the White House, some opportunity was afforded me during the bombardment of that fort, as well as on the day the enemy's fleet passed it, from the quantity of large and grape shot and rockets which fell among them, of forming a correct judgment of their firmness, as well as from the circumstance of the defence of a particular spot having been previously assigned to me and my command, to which, on the first notice of the action, the remainder of the brigade repaired, with a cheerful serenity of mind free from agitation or appearance of panic, which warranted the highest expectations from them: and, considering that the brigade was called into service en masse, drawing persons from all situations in life, on so short a notice, I am happy to say that they endured fatigue and privation without a murmur; and I most sincerely lament, both for them and myself, that so fair an opportunity should have passed by—an opportunity above all others which could have presented itself to the mind of an American freeman, the most desirable; that such an opportunity, from circumstances beyond their control, should have passed, without all the officers and privates of the brigade being brought to a more earnest test of their professions and dispositions, both for the honor of their town, themselves, and beloved country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT YOUNG,  
Brigadier General second brigade, M. D. C.

The Hon. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, Chairman, &c.

NOTE.—Fort Warburton and Fort Washington is the same place, it being differently called in the different despatches received.

*Brigadier General Hugh Douglas's statement.*

ELLCOTT'S MILLS, November 20, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

In answer to the inquiry contained in your letter of the fifteenth, I hasten to inform you, that I received the order calling me to Alexandria, and thence to the city of Washington, on the Monday immediately preceding the destruction of the public buildings. This was on the twenty-second of August. It directed me to march my brigade immediately to Washington. In pursuance of these orders, my brigade, or rather the greater part of it, marched on the next day, the twenty-third; the residue overtook them on their march.

In relation to the arms, I will add, that the Loudoun-regiments under my command brought on some arms from Virginia, which were partly deposited at Ellicott's Mills, and partly delivered up, to be brought to this place from Baltimore, the troops having met with Harper's Ferry arms, with which those were supplied whose muskets were out of order.

The Fairfax regiment, under Colonel Minor's command, was armed at Washington, when he was detached from me. From him you may learn when he arrived in Washington; at what hour after his arrival he applied for arms; how long he was delayed, and what were the causes of delay.

It is not in my power to give further information that I deem material; but, as the committee have demanded of me all the information I possess, I feel it my duty to refer them to Colonel Minor, whose information, in relation to the arming the regiment under his command, and the delays attending it, may be perhaps important.

I have the honor to be, dear sir, &c.

HUGH DOUGLAS,  
Brigadier General sixth brigade, V. M.

*Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Sterett's statement.*

BALTIMORE, November 22, 1814.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, and will, with pleasure, give such information as I possess, relative to the unfortunate affair of Bladensburg.

On the 19th of August last, the 3d brigade of Maryland militia was called into the service of the United States. On the 20th, the 5th regiment, the rifle battalion, under Maj. Pinkney, and two companies of artillery, under Captains Myer and Magruder, making, together, about eight hundred men, were ordered by General Stricker to proceed to Bladensburg, under my command, where I was to report myself to General Winder. On the 21st, the whole took up the line of march. At Elk Ridge Landing, I received a communication from General Winder, directing me to proceed to Snowden's by convenient marches, and there await his further orders. As the detachment set out without being completely equipped, I halted at the landing, to give an opportunity for the further supplies to come on. However, on Monday, the 22d, about 2 o'clock, P. M., I received an order from General Winder, by express, to advance by forced marches to Bladensburg. The whole of my detachment instantly struck their tents; and, with the greatest alacrity, took up the line of march. We arrived at the Buck, or Snowden's, at a late hour, and encamped for the night. Early the next morning we were in motion, and that evening arrived at Bladensburg, where, by order of General Winder, I was placed under the command of General Stansbury. The whole encampment was alarmed about 9 o'clock that night, soon after my detachment had pitched their tents, and before the men could refresh themselves. They, however, formed with cheerfulness and alacrity, and remained under arms until about 1 o'clock. We were scarcely dismissed before we were again called to arms, and about 2 o'clock were ordered to strike our tents; and, finally, before daylight, we marched, and crossed the bridge at Bladensburg, and took the road to Washington. We were occasionally halted and advanced, until about 11 o'clock, when we were counter-marched, and formed in the orchard on the west side of Bladensburg bridge, to await the enemy, who, we were informed, was advancing in full force. I knew nothing of any second line or reserve being formed to support us, and no man of any judgment, acquainted with the fatigued, undisciplined, and inexperienced troops, under the command of General Stansbury, could, for a moment, suppose them capable of making a successful resistance to a superior, brave, and veteran enemy, conducted by officers of great experience and high reputation. In this situation, I concurred in opinion with Colonel Ragan and Major Pinkney, that we ought to fall back, and, by uniting with the other troops under General Winder, which were supposed to be between us and Washington, enable the General to make a better disposition of his whole force; and so advised General Stansbury, who, in reply, observed that the order was positive; that he must make his stand where he was; to which, of course, we submitted.

The two companies of artillery and the riflemen, under Major Pinkney, were detached from me, and stationed near the bridge at Bladensburg. The 5th was formed under the directions of Colonel Monroe, the present Secretary of War, on the left, and in line with General Stansbury's brigade, from which period my attention was principally confined to this regiment. The men beheld the gradually approaching dangers of battle with a firm and undaunted countenance. The action commenced about one, by an attack on the redoubt, where the riflemen and artillery were placed. These soon retired, and the 5th covered their retreat, and kept up a lively fire, and supported their place in line with firmness, until the enemy had gained both flanks, and the order to retreat was given by General Winder himself. I was directed to take a road to the right, as we retired, leading to the city of Washington; but we were so annoyed by the enemy's flankers, followed by his whole force, and finding no reserve to support us, or upon which to form, it became impossible for me, though ably assisted by my field and other officers, to preserve order. On my arrival at Washington, I was informed that General Winder had passed through Georgetown, and taken the Fredericktown road. We followed, and came up with him about three miles from Georgetown, and reported ourselves. By this time it was nearly dark. General Winder here informed me that he should retire upon Montgomery Court House. I obtained his permission to seek for refreshment and quarters, and discretionary orders to endeavor to turn the course of the retreat towards him. This night I had the mortification of witnessing the conflagration of the city of Washington, being only distant about four miles. Early the next morning, with my field officers, I crossed the country to the Baltimore road, with a view of turning the troops we might meet or overtake towards Montgomery. We soon fell in with numbers of General Stansbury's brigade, and those who marched from Baltimore under my command. But our exertions were again ineffectual, from the knowledge all possessed of the destruction of the public buildings in the city, and that our baggage wagons had passed into Virginia. In fine, I concluded that it would be impossible to collect any force short of this place, and so came on. General Winder soon after arrived here, and seemed satisfied with what I had done.

I ought to notice, that the first line, formed on the battle ground, was changed under the direction of Colonel Monroe. On this occasion he observed to me, "Although you see that I am active, you will please to bear in mind that this is not my plan," or words to this effect.

The fall of the capital must be ascribed chiefly to the insufficiency in point of numbers, and total inadequacy in point of discipline of the troops assembled for its defence. No General, however great his talents or exertions, with such means, against such a foe, could have saved it. The imposing front of the enemy was never disconcerted by the fire of the artillery or riflemen; and the brigade of General Stansbury was seen to fly as soon as the action became serious. No second line or reserve appeared to advance or support us, and we were outflanked and defeated in as short a time as such an operation could well be performed.

I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

JOSEPH STERETT.

*Lieutenant Colonel 5th Regiment M. Md.*

The Hon. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, in Congress, Washington.

*Colonel George Minor's statement.*

In answer to the several interrogatories made by Colonel R. M. Johnson, chairman of the committee of inquiry into the causes of the destruction of the public buildings in the city of Washington, as hereunto annexed, state as follows, viz:

On Friday, the 19th of August last, was informed (not officially) of the collecting of the enemy's forces in our waters, namely, the Potomac and Patuxent. Immediately issued orders for the regiment under my command to assemble at Wren's tavern on the Tuesday following, it being the nearest point of the county of Fairfax to the city; and, on Sunday the 21st, received orders, through Brigadier General Douglas, to repair with a detachment of ninety men, that had been previously placed in detail, to march at a moment's warning to the aid of General Hungerford, whose head quarters were either in the counties of Westmoreland, King George, or Northumberland; and to make one other requisition of one hundred and forty men, exclusive of officers, and order them to the aid of General Winder, city of Washington. And on Monday evening, the 22d, received a verbal message from the President, by Mr. John Graham, to hasten on the troops which had been ordered from my regiment, which will more fully appear by said Graham's letter to General Winder, to which I beg leave to refer the committee; and, after informing Mr. Graham the purport of the orders I had received, we both concluded it would be proper for him to return to Washington, and have the orders, first alluded to, countermanded, so as to justify me in marching with my whole force to the city; which consisted, as well as I can recollect, of six hundred infantry and about one hundred cavalry; and the said Graham returned to Wren's tavern on Tuesday evening, the 23d, with General Winder's orders, written on the same letter to which I have referred the committee. On the receipt of which, I took up my line of march immediately, and arrived at the capitol between sunset and dark, and immediately made my way to the President and reported my arrival, when he referred me to General Armstrong, to whom I repaired, and informed him

as to the strength of the troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, &c. which made it as late as early candle light, when I was informed by that gentleman the arms, &c. could not be had that night, and directed me to report myself next morning to Colonel Carbery, who would furnish me with arms, &c.; which gentleman, from early next morning, I diligently sought for, until a late hour of the forenoon, without being able to find him, and then went in search of General Winder, whom I found near the Eastern Branch; when he gave an order to the armorer for the munitions wanting, with orders to return to the capitol, there to await further orders.

On my arrival at the armory, found that department in the care of a very young man, who dealt out the stores cautiously, which went greatly to consume time; as, for instance, when flints were once counted by my officers, who showed every disposition to expedite the furnishing the men, the young man had to count them over again, before they could be obtained, and at which place I met with Colonel Carbery, who introduced himself to me, and apologized for not being found when I was in search of him, stating he had left town the evening before, and had gone to his seat in the country. After getting the men equipped, I ordered them on to the capitol, and waited myself to sign the receipts for the munitions furnished; and, on my arrival, was informed by Major Hunter, who commanded in my absence, orders had been given to march to Bladensburg, when we took up our march for that place, and met the retreating army on this side the turnpike gate, and was ordered by one of General Winder's aids to form the line of battle on a height near that place, and was soon after ordered by the General in person to throw back my regiment from that position, into sections, and to wait until the retreating army had passed, and cover their retreat; and immediately after sent his aid to direct me to countermarch immediately, and come on to the capitol.

After returning there, halted the troops, to wait further orders, until General Winder directed me to march them on, without telling me where; of course I marched with the other troops until I came to the six buildings, where I took the left hand road, leading to the foundry, and there occupied the nearest height to that place, and sent the adjutant to find where the General had made his rallying point, and was informed at Tenlytown, where I marched that evening, and found the troops moving off to encamp at some convenient place on the river road, where I followed on until I saw two barns, where I made to, and rested for the night. Next morning sought for General Winder; met him on the road leading from Tenlytown, to where my troops lay, when he ordered me to Montgomery Court House, and from thence to Baltimore. Given under my hand, city of Washington, 30th of October, 1814.

GEORGE MINOR,

Colonel Commandant 60th Regiment Virginia Militia.

*Lieutenant Colonel John Tayloe's statement.*

FRANKLIN HOUSE, WASHINGTON, November 4, 1814.

SIR:

In obedience to your request, as chairman of the committee of investigation, &c. I have the honor to make to you the following statement: on my return from the Northern Neck army, commanded by Major General Parker, of the Virginia militia, which I left on the 20th August, with despatches from that officer, in reply to a communication I had been charged with, concerning the Virginia draughts, I arrived at Washington on Sunday night late, (the 21st,) and reported myself early the next morning to General Armstrong, who ordered me to meet him at the War Office at 12 o'clock, from whom I received the following order:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, August 22, 1814.—12 o'clock.

“GENERAL ORDER.

“General Douglas will assemble his brigade at Alexandria, and hold it there, subject to orders.

“J. ARMSTRONG.”

I immediately proceeded with all speed, and executed the above order. Having received General Douglas's communication, I hastened to Washington, and handed it to General Armstrong on Tuesday night, the 23d; when he instantly sent me back to Virginia, charged with the following orders, and with verbal directions to forward on the Virginia draughts *with all possible speed.*

“WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1814.

“GENERAL ORDER.

“Lieutenant Colonel Minor will repair to Washington with the regiment under his command, with the utmost despatch. He will report, on his arrival at Washington, to Colonel Carbery, of the 36th regiment of United States' infantry, and make a requisition for arms and ammunition.

“J. ARMSTRONG.”

“WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1814.

“GENERAL ORDER.

“All militia now in, and marching to, Alexandria, (besides that of Colonel Minor) will march immediately to Washington.

“J. ARMSTRONG.”

“These orders will be communicated by Colonel Tayloe.”

For the purpose of executing these orders without loss of time, and after communicating, by a dragoon, with Col. Minor, I proceeded down the Northern Neck, to General Hungerford's brigade, then encamped at camp Selden, near Potomac creek. On the 27th August, I moved from the brigade at Occoquan, on its march to Washington, and came on with a despatch from the General to Colonel Monroe, which I delivered at two o'clock in the morning, at Washington.

General Armstrong manifested much zeal and earnest solicitation for the defence of Washington, and instructed me to use my best exertions in hastening the troops for the attainment of that desirable object.

I have thus made you acquainted with the orders I received from the late Secretary of War, previous to the capture of Washington by the enemy, and stated to you, as concisely and accurately as I can recollect, at this distant period, the manner in which these orders were executed.

I am, very respectfully, &c.

JOHN TAYLOE,

Lieutenant Colonel of Cavalry, M. D. C.

*Lieutenant Colonel J. Lavall's statement.*

WASHINGTON CITY, October 31, 1814.

SIR:

I have been honored with your letter of the 26th instant, in behalf of the committee appointed to inquire into the causes which gave success to the enemy in his late enterprise against this city, desiring to know the part taken by my command; my orders, positions, and duties; number of cavalry under my command, and the different corps of cavalry, &c.; in answer to which, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

It is necessary, first, I should beg leave to commence my narrative from Carlisle, the place which had been assigned me by the Secretary of War, to collect, equip, mount, and instruct, the dragoons, for whom that place was selected as a depot, and at which I received my orders for this city; this is the more necessary, as it is highly important to me to exhibit the true state in which I set off, and thus redress the erroneous opinion the public had formed of my command, both in point of strength and capacity as dragoons.

I took command early in March last, of the depot at Carlisle, and as fast as the recruits arrived, they were instructed in the sword exercise, marched through the drilling movements, and received all other instructions that could be given them, without horses, having none then. After a few months, one troop was completed, mounted, equipped, and trained, but it was ordered to Buffalo, under command of Captain Hopkins, who carried with him all the horses, except the lame and sick. Thus I had to begin again, and wait for men arriving from the different rendezvous; and patiently wait also for horses, which came on slowly, until about the 25th of July, when I received the following orders from the War Department, to which letter I must call your particular attention, it being an essential document to prove the state I was in, and the condition in which I left Carlisle to meet the enemy, as it happened in ten days:

“ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, July 20, 1814.

“SIR:

“As soon as you have assembled the recruits for the light dragoons, arrange them into two troops, with the requisite number of officers, if within your command, and as soon as Lieutenant Darrah has furnished you with a sufficient number of horses to mount them, you will, without delay, move to Montgomery Court House, Maryland, taking the nearest and best road to that place, &c.

“The equipment, complete, cannot probably be furnished in time at Carlisle; you will, in that case, order them to Baltimore.

“On your arrival at Montgomery, you will report to Brigadier General Winder for orders.

“By order of the Secretary of War.

“JOHN R. BELL,  
“Assistant Inspector General.

“Lieutenant Colonel LAVALL, of the *Light Dragoons*.”

The above orders were executed with the utmost activity and punctuality. I despatched, immediately, an express to the officer mentioned, as purchaser of the horses, (Lieutenant Darrah) who was then at Pittsburg, upwards of two hundred miles from Carlisle; I enclosed the tenor of my orders, in return of which, as soon as practicable, he sent what horses he had, being about twenty, and came himself some time after, with about the same number: and then, with all reasonable despatch, purchased what was wanted to mount what number of men, fit for duty, I then had, being about one hundred and forty, arranged as directed, into two troops, the one commanded by Captain Burd and two lieutenants, and the other by Captain Littlejohn and two lieutenants. The purchase of horses was completed on Saturday, the 13th of August, and I marched off with the squadron the Monday following, 15th. I arrived at Montgomery on Thursday, the 18th. On Friday, the 19th, I came to Washington for orders, and returned to Montgomery same day. And on Saturday, the 20th, about ten o'clock in the morning, I marched my troops through the city. I crossed, according to orders, the Eastern Branch bridge, and encamped nearly opposite the navy yard. There we remained until Sunday afternoon, 21st, when we were ordered to the Woodyard, between which place and Nottingham, and Marlborough, and the Old Fields, we were kept on constant duty, in reconnoitering, in patrolling, in escorting, furnishing videttes, to and fro, until Tuesday, the 23d, when we recrossed the Eastern Branch bridge, about eleven o'clock at night, both men and horses hungry, and harassed with fatigue. We remained in that situation until about ten o'clock in the morning, Wednesday, 24th. A stack of hay had just been discovered and directed to be purchased, when I received the following order, to wit:

“HEAD QUARTERS, WASHINGTON, August 24.

“Lieutenant Colonel Lavall will proceed immediately with his detachment to Bladensburg, and report to Brigadier General Stansbury.

“WM. WINDER, *Brigadier General*,” &c.

The men, extremely anxious to feed their horses, were in the act of fetching the hay on their heads, and it was with much difficulty they could be persuaded to drop it before they reached their horses. The trumpet sounded, the men ran to their horses, and in a few minutes I was under way for Bladensburg. A number of the horses were unable to proceed; several of the men sick; and from other casualties, my command was reduced to about one hundred and twenty-five. This, sir, was the total amount of the dragoons under my command. The report which has circulated, of my having, on that day, from four to five hundred dragoons, is erroneous. There were several other troops of volunteer cavalry, but, sir, I had no command nor control over them. What might have been their orders I know not; they did not join me, nor did I receive, at any time, any orders to take command of them, or any of them.

I have, in compliance with your request, sir, procured the names and probable strength of each troop, which, as near as I have been able to obtain, is herewith subjoined.

I proceeded to Bladensburg; I had never been there before; the enemy was in sight; my orders were to report to General Stansbury; I stopped my troops in the road near the river; I looked for the General; I could not come up with him; he was visiting his troops. Our horses being much in want of water, we marched to the river. The enemy was then advancing rapidly towards it; I retired without having met the General, whom I had never seen. On my retiring from the river, I was met by Colonel Monroe, (then Secretary of State); I informed him I was in want of orders, and being totally unacquainted with the place, I was indebted to him for the place he pointed out, which I occupied immediately with the squadron. At the moment of my entering the ravine, General Stansbury passed by and approved of it. I was then satisfied that the General knew my position: the action began immediately, and the front of the ravine being too high for me to observe the movements of the enemy, I advanced in front with one of my officers, Lieutenant Brakin, to judge better of the opportunity which might offer. Our being elevated, and in a conspicuous situation, the balls and rockets soon showered around us. I had no other chance to form any idea, having never been at the place before. We were too late to form any judicious arrangements, not knowing how the troops and batteries were disposed in Bladensburg, and we arrived too much before our own troops from Washington, to know the disposal of them in the rear.

The engagement was but short. I will not enter into the details of it, as you have, no doubt, sir, been furnished by a better authority, nor is it your desire. I will only state what leads to any reference to my share. All of a sudden our army seemed routed; a confused retreat appeared to be about in every corner of the battle ground, and the place we were occupying seemed to have been the one by which it was to be effected. They poured in torrents by us; my right wing being outside of the ravine, covered, unfortunately, a gate which it appeared was much wanted. An artillery company drove through before we could clear it; several of my men were crushed down, horses and all, and myself narrowly escaped having my thigh broken by one of the wheels which nearly took me off my horse. All this created much confusion in the right wing of the squadron; they, however, soon got in order, and the stream of the running phalanx considerably abated.

In the midst of a confusion, the like of which I had never seen in a field of battle, one of my troops was carried off the field, either through some mistaken or improper orders, as it was unknown to me, who ought to have been first directed or consulted: the moment that so important a point of discipline is trampled upon, a commanding officer loses all responsibility as well as credit, and risks his honor for the name of having a command.

Captain Burd's troop, which then did not consist of more than fifty-five men, was all the command I was then left with, hardly half of a captain's command. Yet it has been wondered at why I did not cut to pieces four or five

thousand of the British veteran troops with fifty-five men, all recruits, and upon raw horses; the most of them had not yet been purchased two weeks; the consequences are so obvious, that I did not think myself justifiable to make so certain, so inevitable a sacrifice, without a hope of doing any good: there is a distinction between madness and bravery.

Regular troops never act or retreat without orders; I had no other orders than those I have stated above, I therefore remained as long as I could. I consulted with Captain Burd before we left the field, who had no more desire to leave it than I had, but it was high time; when we saw all going, I could no longer doubt of the order being general; I could not account for its not being more generally communicated. The enemy was then advancing rapidly under a shower of fire, besides a column of about seven or eight hundred which had gained considerably on our right; we then, and only then, sir, marched off on a walk between the flanking column and our disordered army. We continued in that order, walking our horses as slow as horses could walk, when we were again met by Colonel Monroe, who walked his horse with us better than a mile, until he was satisfied that the enemy on our right required to be kept in observation. He left us and advised to proceed in the order we then were, and we did so.

The pleasing hope to meet all our forces collected at Washington, and that there we would be better able to receive the enemy, from various motives and resources which we could not have had at Bladensburg, filled my mind with anxiety, and helped to comfort me in our retreat; for it was not in the power of imagination to have indulged itself with a moment of doubt, whether we should fight or not at Washington, and defend the capitol to the last man. I have not met a man who was not of the same opinion with me on that score; by what fatality we were made to pass through the city and leave it unprotected I know not, nor is it within the reach of my comprehension.

Having arrived at the capitol, I formed my troop. It had been rumored or ordered (I do not remember which) that we were all to form near it; but, after remaining there half an hour, I saw no troops in the neighborhood. I was then informed that the President's house was the place before which the army was to be formed. I then marched through the avenue, and soon arrived before the President's house, but saw no army nor symptoms of any, which would indicate a probability of resistance. After remaining in that situation for about three quarters of an hour, I could not, nor would not, believe that the city was to be given up without a fight. When I received orders to follow the army, which it appeared had passed through Georgetown two hours before us, I then, sir, with a heart full of sorrow, grief, and indignation, ordered my troop to follow the army, and met it about three or four miles above Georgetown. What follows that period, I presume, sir, is of little importance to you and the Committee of Inquiry; I, therefore, will close by saying that, from that day to this, I have not ceased to lament the event, without being able to penetrate into the cause.

I have now given you, sir, all the information in my power, relative to the several points, the subject of your request in the letter you have honored me with in behalf of the committee, of whom

I have the honor to be, &c.

J. LAVALL,

*Lieutenant Colonel Commandant-Squadron U. S. L. D.*

The Honorable R. M. JOHNSON.

*Strength and names of the several Mounted Volunteer Corps on the ground at Bladensburg.*

Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman, about	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70
Major Ridgely,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	110
Captain Graham,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
Lieutenant Williams,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
Captain Herber,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25
Total,										260

*Colonel William D. Beall's statement.*

GEORGETOWN, November 23, 1814.

SIR:

I have the honor to reply to your request, directed by the honorable committee "appointed to inquire into the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against this city," &c. that, on my march to Bladensburg, on the 24th August, I received General Winder's order, in reply to a letter I had written him the day before, to join General Stansbury at Bladensburg; that, on my arrival at the mill, I was met by a gentleman (General Winder's aid I supposed) who informed me my ground was Veitch's Hill; he conducted me to the ground, where I formed and received the enemy, after he had done with the army below the hill. On our retreat, at the Capitol Hill, I received an order to march through Georgetown to the heights above it; but we reached Tenlytown, and, from thence, about twelve o'clock at night, were ordered to move on the river road, no point designated; the next day, we arrived at Montgomery Court House; the next day we encamped at Gaither's heights, thence to Ellicott's Mills, thence to the two mile stone towards Baltimore.

I have been informed by a gentleman, who acted as one of General Winder's aids, that he brought me an order to retreat; but I do not remember it.

This is as short a statement as I can make, to comprehend the design of the committee.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WM. D. BEALL

N. B. Having marched about sixteen miles that morning, before the battle, my men were fatigued and exhausted. Although it is not my impression that my command gave way as early as is represented by some, I must acknowledge that the contest with the enemy was not of a character corresponding with my wishes in defending the capital of the United States, and, therefore, made every exertion to rally the men, and partially succeeded; but they ultimately gave way, in despite of exertions, like the other troops. My command consisted of about seven or eight hundred men.

*Major William Pinkney's statement.*

BALTIMORE, November 16, 1814.

SIR:

I have the honor to make the following communication, in compliance with the request contained in your letter of the 17th of last month.

The detachment, of which my battalion of riflemen (or rather three companies of it) formed a part, marched from Baltimore on the 21st of August, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sterett of the 5th regiment, and arrived at Bladensburg about sunset on the 23d, where it encamped below, and at a short distance from, the brigade of General Stansbury, who had fixed his encampment on Lowndes' Hill, by the side of the road from Marlborough, and between that road and the river road. The detachment was wholly from the third brigade of Maryland militia, and consisted of the 5th regiment, between four and five hundred strong; of two companies of artillery, (with six six pounders) commanded by Captains Myer and Magruder, amounting to about one hundred and fifty men; and of three companies of my battalion, commanded by Captains Dyer, Aisquith, and Baden, amounting to about one hundred and eighty rank and file.

In the night of the 23d, (about eleven o'clock) we were called to arms by several discharges of single muskets, in quick succession, by General Stansbury's pickets. Our detachment, of which only I had much opportunity to observe the conduct, turned out with alacrity, and exhibited, during the alarm, great spirit and firmness. The dispositions made by General Stansbury to meet the enemy, who was supposed to be advancing by the upper road, appeared to be prompt and judicious. It was a false alarm, however, and, after a few hours, we were permitted to return to quarters.

We had scarcely reached our encampment, before Colonel Stérett and myself were summoned to the tent of General Stansbury, where we found his principal officers assembled. The General stated to us that he had just received intelligence from General Winder that he had retired upon Washington, across the Eastern Branch; and he asked our advice as to the course which, in consequence of that movement, it was proper for him to pursue, apprising us, at the same time, (as I think) that General Winder expected him to fight the enemy, if he should take the route of Bladensburg. It appeared to be certain that the enemy *would* take that route, without loss of time; and that General Stansbury's force, fatigued and exhausted as a portion of it was, consisting altogether of militia unused to service, amounting to little more than two thousand men, and deprived of all prospect of support from any quarter, was in no condition to withstand nearly thrice its number of regular troops, in a position which presented no peculiar facilities for defence, especially when it was considered that General Winder's force, more numerous than General Stansbury's, consisting partly of regulars, high in character and discipline, furnished with more and heavier artillery, and with a powerful body of horse, had just been compelled to place the Eastern Branch between it and those troops. For these, and other reasons, the officers present were of opinion that General Stansbury ought immediately to break up his encampment, and, by drawing nearer to Washington, consult the safety of the force under his command, and put it in a situation to co-operate with that of General Winder, and to receive and execute the orders of that General, whatever they might be, for the protection of the capital. General Stansbury was himself of that opinion; and, in conformity with it, we retired across the bridge, in good order, to a high ground, on the edge of the main road, about a mile and a half from Bladensburg, from whence the enemy could be reconnoitred, if he should advance, as had been anticipated. We halted at this place, about sunrise on the 24th, after General Stansbury had (as he informed me) despatched his aid-de-camp (Major Woodyear) to General Winder, to give him notice of his march, and take his orders upon it. While he remained here, General Stansbury mentioned, or showed to me, (I forget which) a letter just received by him from General Winder, written, I believe, before General Winder knew of his late march, from which it appeared that General Winder still calculated on his engaging the enemy, if he should attempt to approach by Bladensburg. I was still of opinion, and so expressed myself to General Stansbury, that, although it seemed to be his duty to prepare his troops to dispute, alone, and to the last extremity, the enemy's passage to the city, and it was possible the military views of his superiors might impose such an undertaking upon him, he ought not, unless his orders were pre-emptory, (and they were not yet understood to be so) to seek the enemy at a distance from General Winder, without whose immediate aid he could not fail to sacrifice his men, already broken down by toil and fasting, and want of sleep; and thus to produce the destruction of the capitol; that Major Woodyear would soon return with precise orders from General Winder, founded upon a knowledge of his situation and the designs of the enemy; and that, even if Major Woodyear's return should be unexpectedly retarded, and a removal from his actual position should become necessary, it would be far more prudent that General Stansbury should proceed to occupy one of the strong grounds yet nearer to Washington, with which the road abounded, where he might not only encounter the enemy to advantage, but readily be succored by the Commander in Chief, than that he should go back to his old encampment, or its neighborhood, while General Winder's co-operation continued to be precarious. I believe that Colonel Stérett and Colonel Ragan gave to General Stansbury the same opinion, in substance, and that General Stansbury concurred in it. He did not, however, move nearer to Washington, for Major Woodyear shortly afterwards (about 9 o'clock) brought him verbal orders from General Winder to retrace his steps, and contest with the enemy the pass at Bladensburg, together with an assurance that he would join him without delay. These orders were immediately obeyed, and, between ten and eleven o'clock, A. M. the troops were halted in a field, where there is an orchard, on the left of the road as you approach Bladensburg from Washington, not far from the bridge. The passage at Bladensburg may be effected, as I comprehend, by two routes: by the bridge, and deep ford just above it, and by the more shallow ford in the old Baltimore road, a little above the fork made by the northeast and northwest branches; which ford is reached from Bladensburg, by first crossing the northeast branch in the present Baltimore road, and then turning to the left; and we halted at the point from which a passage by either, or both of those routes, might best be opposed.

While the enemy was expected, a cloud of dust announced the advance of a body of troops upon the upper road, and they soon showed themselves upon Lowndes' Hill, which they descended rapidly. As General Winder had not yet appeared, preparations were made to receive them by General Stansbury, assisted by Colonel Monroe. At the bottom of the field, between four and five hundred yards from the bridge, as I conjecture, was a sort of a battery, *en barbette*, which had been hastily constructed for heavy artillery, under the direction of Colonel Wadsworth. The Baltimore companies had been employed, from their first arrival in the field, (with such tools as they could get) in cutting embrasures through the parapet, which was much too lofty for their six pounders, and which there was not time to reduce through its whole extent, and in masking them with brush wood. In this battery they were now stationed. I was ordered to place my companies in ambush on its right, with a view to afford protection to it, and to annoy the enemy in his approach, if he should succeed in crossing the bridge, or in fording the stream in its neighborhood. I conducted my battalion accordingly to the place prescribed, and there distributed them behind a fence, and among the bushes, upon the slope of the bank which terminates the field, and also beyond the slope, as near to the bridge and ford as was practicable, taking my own station some yards in the rear, (with the Adjutant and Sergeant Major) on the top of the bank in the field, where there was nothing to interrupt my view of an advancing enemy. The 5th regiment was posted about fifty yards in our rear, (outstretching us of course) and gave confidence to my companies and the artillery. Two companies of General Stansbury's brigade (acting as riflemen, but principally armed with muskets) were posted near the barn, behind the battery, at a small distance from us. The residue of that brigade was, (I think) stationed to the left of the battery, near to and beyond the road which flanks it, called the Mill Road, to watch, as I suppose, that road and the upper ford, and to march, or to supply detachments, as occasion might require, to sustain the other parts of our force. A few horse paraded on the main road, sometimes as far as the bridge. Such appeared to be our means of resistance, and such the distribution of them. It was soon ascertained, however, that the troops, whom we had believed to be foes, were a regiment of Maryland militia, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Beall; and my battalion was consequently withdrawn into the field, where it rested upon its arms. The newly arrived regiment passed on to the rear, and took post out of my view, and (as I have since heard) on the opposite side of the main road, where we had halted in the morning, as before stated. It is but justice to the men under my command to observe, in this place, that they went to their posts with cheerfulness, although they were about to contend, as they supposed, with veteran troops, greatly superior in numbers.

Soon after the arrival of Colonel Beall's regiment, the enemy was discovered in full march for Bladensburg, along the river road, and we once more prepared for battle. I had now from General Winder (who had recently come upon the field) the same orders I had before received for the employment of my men; with this difference only, that General Winder's orders imported, that it might be proper to place a portion of them upon the left of the battery, which it was undoubtedly of great importance to protect, and which the new order of battle, hereinafter in part explained, seemed to leave without protection, unless a detachment from my battalion should be so applied. In consequence, I detached Captain Aisquith, with the whole of his company, with directions to take, and maintain, as long as possible, the most advantageous position there, for the objects indicated by General Winder's orders. I remanded the other two companies to their former stations among the bushes; and, after visiting the battery, and remaining there until the first and second shots were fired from it, I resumed my own station, (with the battal officers before mentioned) upon the top of the bank, in the field. A company of militia, under the command



of Captain Doughty, (having muskets only, but acting as riflemen) placed itself, at my instance, on our right, near to the main road, under cover of some bushes and a fence. The fifth regiment, which had been moved from its first position, (where it might have contributed to repulse the enemy in his attempts to leave the vicinity of the bridge) had now, to the great discouragement of my companies and of the artillery, been made to retire to a hill several hundred yards in our rear, but visible, nevertheless, to the enemy, where it could do little more than display its gallantry. The two companies of General Stansbury's brigade, acting as riflemen, had changed their station, so that I no longer perceived them; but I have heard that they still continued at no great distance from their old ground, although concealed from me by the barn or by trees; my impression, however, is, that they did not, and could not, come into action there. The residue of General Stansbury's brigade had been moved from the left, and made to take ground (invisible to us by reason of the intervening orchard) on the right of the fifth regiment, with its own right resting upon the main road, and disclosed to the enemy. A small body of troops (but under whose command I am uninformed) were drawn up in advance of the left flank of the fifth regiment, and nearly at right angles with it, but, on account of the barn, I did not see it until the two companies of my battalion, which were stationed on the right of the battery, retreated, as will hereafter be mentioned. Of Colonel Beall's very distant station, I have already spoken from hearsay, but, at the time of the action, I knew only that it must be considerably in the rear. Of some artillery in the rear of our right, I had no knowledge, until, during the engagement, I heard its fire, apparently well maintained.

I did not know that Brigadier General Smith's brigade was in or near the field, until the action had ceased; nor was I aware that the artillery of Commodore Barney, Major Peter, Captain Burch, and others, (which, if it had been brought up in time to act upon the bridge, and the road at each of its ends, could not well have failed to ensure a triumph over the enemy, especially if supported by a part of the infantry, of which no use was made, and if sufficient care had also been taken to observe the upper ford, to which, perhaps, the enemy might have had recourse, if beaten at the bridge) was at any time near to us. In a word, I was ignorant of any reinforcements which either preceded, accompanied, or followed General Winder, except only, that I supposed that Captain Doughty's company, and the few troops in advance of the left flank of the fifth regiment, (just before mentioned) and a large body of horse, which was kept idle, had come from Washington.

The enemy having reached Bladensburg, descended the hill, about twelve o'clock, in a very fine style, and soon showed his intention to force his way by the bridge. Assisted by some discharges of rockets, (which were afterwards industriously continued) he made an effort to throw across the bridge a strong body of infantry, but he was driven back at the very commencement of it, with evident loss, by the artillery in the battery, which principally acted upon the street or road near the bridge, and he literally disappeared behind the houses. The effort was not immediately repeated; but the artillery continued its fire, with a view, as it seemed, to interrupt the discharge of rockets, as in some degree it did, and otherwise to check the enemy's operations.

After a long pause, during which I conjectured (erroneously, as I have since been told) that the enemy, less confident than before of the passage of the bridge, detached a corps of some strength to make its way by the ford, in the old Baltimore road, a second attempt was made to cross the bridge, with increased numbers and greater celerity of movement. This, too, was encountered by the artillery in the battery, but not with its former success, although it was served with great spirit, and commanded by officers of acknowledged skill and courage. In consequence, a large column of the enemy, which was every moment reinforced, either by the way of the bridge or by the ford immediately above it, was able to form on the Washington side, and to menace the battery, and the inadequate force by which it was to be supported. While the enemy was yet at a distance, the company on our right (commanded by Captain Doughty) discharged their pieces and fled, although he appeared to do all in his power to restrain them, as I myself did. My two companies were now (without other known aid than the other company on the left) to protect the artillery, and to receive the whole force of the enemy, which was rapidly accumulating. Following the example which had been set them by the company on their right, they too began to fire somewhat too soon; but in its progress, their fire was manifestly destructive, and for a short time seemed to produce disorder and hesitation in the enemy's ranks. The enemy, however, soon pressed forward again, and was close at hand when the artillery discontinued its fire. Its danger had become imminent, and it was apparent that it could do nothing more in its actual station to retard the enemy's progress. His advance, which threatened the right of my position, and had almost reached it, was probably out of the line of any fire which the half formed embrasures of the battery would admit; and I should presume that it would have been difficult, if not impracticable, to depress the guns in those embrasures (the ground of the battery being considerably elevated) so as to touch the enemy after his near approach.

My companies were now in that situation that their right was on the point of being turned; and, as the battery was evidently about to be evacuated, and Captain Aisquith's company was too weak to keep the enemy in check on the left, it followed that they were in that quarter exposed to the same peril. Our small force, moreover, (somewhat more than one hundred men) could not hope to make an effectual stand against the enemy, even if he should attack it only in front, where there was very little in the shape of natural obstructions to break his column or impede his march. The line of our retreat, too, to the fifth regiment, (the nearest visible rallying point) was of necessity across the open field in our rear, and only one of my companies had bayonets. Under these circumstances of urgent peril, both the companies began at the same instant to move towards the artillery, now in the act of limbering its guns. The retreat of my men and of the artillery appeared to be simultaneous. The whole fell back upon the fifth regiment, (on the left flank of which great part of my two companies were halted, and formed by Captain Dyer, by the adjutant, and sergeant-major) and the enemy succeeded instantly to their places. I followed in the rear of this retreat, narrowly escaping capture, and found my men in the situation above described, ready once more to act against the enemy. It is here my duty to say, that, although the predicament in which my two companies were placed, when they moved from the right of the battery, was almost as desperate as it could be, I had given no orders to retire, and did not at that moment intend to do so. I cannot, and certainly do not, blame them for anticipating such orders, when they saw their desolate condition, and discovered that the artillery, with which they had been connected as a supporting force, could not continue its fire, or hope to maintain its ground. My justification for withholding my orders to retreat, is, that I had none myself, and further, that having found that the enemy had neither artillery nor cavalry, I thought we might venture upon another fire, which could not be otherwise than deadly, now that the enemy was at a small distance from our muzzles. I have this other justification, (which I hope I shall be pardoned for mentioning) that, as I was myself on foot, and had no horse near me, I incurred my full share of the hazard of too long a delay. It is not improbable, however, that I was wrong, and that I owed it to these brave men to withdraw them, even at an earlier period, from a post where, beyond all question, if they had remained much longer, they must have been taken prisoners or cut to pieces; at any rate, I take pride in bearing my testimony to their bravery and skill, of which I had many proofs during the severe trial to which they were exposed on that most disastrous occasion, amidst such privations, discouragements, and hardships, as might have subdued the spirit, and beaten down the strength of veteran soldiers.

The fifth regiment had now to receive the enemy; and, with slight exceptions, it kept its ground with exemplary steadiness, and maintained a regular and spirited fire, until after it was ordered by General Winder to retreat, and after the necessity of retreat was perfectly obvious. My men adhered to its left, and did their duty there, and finally retired with it, the whole in considerable disorder. The troops of which I have spoken, (in advance of its left) appeared to behave well, but were soon withdrawn or driven from their station, which the enemy could, indeed, reach with his shot without being seen by them.

Nothing could be more critical than the situation of the fifth regiment when it began to retire. Its right had been thrown open to the enemy by the precipitate retreat of the greater part, if not the whole, of General Stansbury's brigade. Its left had nothing to protect it; and, even if the enemy had sent no force by the ford, on the old Baltimore road, to gain its rear, that which he had pushed on by the mill road, and the ground adjacent, was sufficiently formidable. Its front was singularly liable to be galled with impunity from the orchard, from the barn, and from other covers, within striking distance of which it had been posted, while itself was not covered by any thing, and could hardly act upon any thing. I speak with the more confidence of the good behavior of this regiment, be-

cause I was constantly with my men while they acted with it, except only for two or three minutes, when I was employed in going to, and returning from, the mill road, immediately on their left, from whence I expected an attack. I was, during all this time, too, on horseback, (having obtained a horse after we were driven from our first position) and had thus the best opportunities of observation. During a part of this time I saw General Winder zealously engaged in the discharge of his very anxious and arduous duties, and manifesting the courage which becomes a gentleman and a soldier.

Of the conduct of Captain Aisquith's company I know no more than he and others have told me. I feel assured that it did well, and that the enemy felt the effect of the activity and resolution which distinguished it. My battalion sustained some small loss in wounded; and Captain Baden was made prisoner.

A wound inflicted in the field, (from which the 5th regiment and my men retreated, as above stated) by a musket ball, which struck my right arm in front, a little above the elbow, and passing through it broke the bone, disabled me from further service, and made it necessary that I should not long delay to obtain surgical assistance. In this state I left the field, with (or a little after) the last of our friends, about five or six in number, among whom, I believe, was Mr. Meredith of the 5th. The enemy was then very close, and his fire was incessant but inaccurate. I have no further knowledge of the transaction to which your letter relates.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WM. PINKNEY.

/ The Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, &c.

*Captain Burch's statement.*

SIR:

CITY OF WASHINGTON, October 12, 1814.

In answer to your request, I make the following statement:

On the 19th of August last, early in the day, I was ordered to call out my company for actual service, being, at the time, informed that the whole body of the militia were ordered into actual service, as it was ascertained that the enemy had landed near Benedict, and were about to proceed to this city. In the evening of that day, the first brigade was paraded, and about one o'clock, P. M. on the 20th, we marched from the city in the direction of Benedict, and encamped, for that night, about three miles beyond the Eastern Branch, when General Winder took the command. On Sunday, the 21st, we marched on, and encamped that night at the Woodyard, about fourteen miles from this place. On Monday morning it was understood in camp, that the enemy had, by rapid marches, got within a short distance of our encampment; upon which the commanding General detached Major Peter, with his company of artillery, Captain Davidson's infantry, and Captain Stull's riflemen, as an advanced party, to reconnoitre and hold the enemy in check. They advanced some distance, and were soon after followed by the brigade, for two miles, when it was halted, and partially formed in order of battle. Major Peter met the enemy, who immediately filed off on the left, and took the road to Upper Marlborough. Major Peter having returned with his command, the whole of the troops were immediately marched back to the Old Fields, where we encamped that night. On Tuesday morning, the same party, under the command of Major Peter, was again sent out to reconnoitre and skirmish with the enemy; and between four and five o'clock of that evening, we learned that they were actually engaged with the British forces. The line of battle was then formed without delay, and we remained so until Major Peter came up and took his position in the line. In a few minutes orders were carried through the line, for an immediate retreat to Washington, as it was said the enemy was too strong for us. I received orders to remain on the ground upon which we were formed, until all the troops had marched, and then, every fifteen minutes, to send off two of my pieces, with the proper number of men, until I had despatched all six of them. That, if the enemy appeared in the mean time, (and his appearance was every moment expected) to open my battery upon him, and continue to fire as long as I could do so in safety, and then retreat as fast as possible, and join the main body. Just as I had despatched the second division of my guns, the aid-de-camp of Brigadier Smith, of the District militia, gave me orders to move off with the whole as fast as possible. As the main body had, by this time, got a considerable distance ahead, I was unable to get up with the rear until they arrived at the Eastern Branch bridge, when my men were so greatly fatigued, that they could scarcely stand by their guns. After we had crossed the bridge into the city, and pitched our tents, between twelve and one o'clock at night, General Winder came to my tent and called me out: he observed, that he knew my men were worn down with fatigue and from the loss of rest; but that, in all probability, one of the last good acts which it might ever be in my power to do for my country, would be that night. He wished me to take thirty of my men, with three of my guns, and defend the passage of the lower Eastern Branch bridge, as he had reason to believe that the enemy would attempt the passage of it that night. General Winder further observed, that he had some time before left directions at the navy yard, for a boat to be sent to the bridge, with combustibles to blow it up, in case it became necessary, but that his orders had not been attended to, and that he should not go to rest until he had sent me the boat. I took my thirty men and three guns, and proceeded to the foot of the bridge, with orders to open upon the enemy, if he appeared, as soon as our rear guard had come over, and that if the enemy succeeded in getting upon the bridge, to set fire to the boat and blow it up, and then to resume my position and recommence my fire. A little before day break the boat arrived, and was placed under the arch next the draw. I kept this position without rest or refreshment, until ten o'clock on Wednesday morning, the 24th, when I was relieved by Commodore Barney. I was then ordered to leave one of my pieces and fifteen men at the bridge, under the direction of Colonel Wadsworth, and proceed on with the balance immediately to Bladensburg. I did so, and when I had arrived near the latter place, I was again ordered to leave two of my guns and a party of men in the main road, and push on with the remaining three and the residue of my men, and to report myself at Bladensburg to General Winder. I proceeded until I arrived within a short distance of Bladensburg, when I found much difficulty in finding the General. I rode up and down the whole line in search of him, and when I returned, I found that my guns had been moved off to the left; I followed on and overtook them just as they were formed in battery, near the extreme left of the line. I there discovered the General, and applied to him for directions; he replied, "Captain, there is the enemy, (pointing to the British who were then in plain view) take charge of your pieces." I dismounted, and took charge of my pieces, and in a few moments we opened our fire, which proved to be very galling to the enemy, and after firing about fifteen rounds, the 5th regiment of Baltimore advanced and commenced their fire. By the advance of this regiment one of my guns was masked, which rendered it useless; the other two continued the fire with much effect. The infantry, who were posted on my right as a protection to my pieces, having given way, General Winder, in person, ordered me to limber and retreat. I did not do so immediately, but fired two or three rounds, when the General repeated his order in a peremptory manner. We retreated a few yards, when he observed to me that he thought I might venture to unlimber one of my pieces and give them another fire. I was in the act of doing so, but as the enemy advanced so rapidly, he countermanded it, and again ordered me on. I saw no more of the General that day: the reason was, that after retreating a mile or two, I was so exhausted from fatigue, fasting, and heat, that I was unable to keep up with my guns, and fell behind them some yards. I fainted by the side of a fence unobserved by my men. After missing me, they supposed I had been taken prisoner. When I came to my recollection, I found myself ill of a fever, notwithstanding which, I procured a horse, and found and joined my company on the route from Montgomery Court House to Baltimore, and marched with them to Snell's bridge, where we were halted, and afterwards countermarched to this place.

BENJ. BURCH,  
*Captain of the Washington Artillery.*

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON.

*Captain Caldwell's statement.*

The following is believed to be nearly a correct estimate of the cavalry on the ground, at the battle of Bladensburg, 24th August last:

Colonel Lavall's United States' troops, about	-	-	-	-	120
A squadron of Colonel Tilghman's regiment M. M. about	-	-	-	-	75
Do. command of Major Ridgely, do. about	-	-	-	-	100
Captain Herbert's troop, do. about	-	-	-	-	40
Captain Graham's troop, Virginia, about	-	-	-	-	40
				Total, -	375

The Alexandria troop, under Captain Thornton, and the Georgetown troop, under Lieutenant Williams, (both small) accompanied Colonel Monroe on the first day of the alarm, to reconnoitre the enemy, and had so many detached on different duties, as left but a few scattering ones on the field.

Part of the Washington troop were attached to General Winder, and had been generally detached in carrying expresses or conveying orders. The remainder were on vidette duty. On the morning of the 24th, they were sent to patrol the road between the Eastern Branch bridge and the enemy, and did not leave the rear of the enemy in time to cross the bridge and join the army, till the army was on the retreat, except three or four, who were employed in conveying orders, &c. or wherever they could be useful.

E. B. CALDWELL.

*Statement of General Hungerford.*

On the 23d of July was called on by the Executive of Virginia, to take command of the militia in the Northern Neck. After which General Madison was called into service, and Major General Parker, to take the command of the two brigades under Hungerford and Madison. On the eighteenth of August, General Winder wrote to General Hungerford to march with expedition to the city, with the forces under his command. This letter was received on the 21st, at camp Nominy Hall, in the Northern Neck, about one hundred and twenty-five miles from Washington. His force consisted of three regiments, under Colonels Boyd, Branham, and Parker. About fourteen hundred men, effectives, marched on towards the city; and Colonels Downey and Chavning, who were in the counties of Northumberland and Lancaster, were directed to follow with their regiments.

A letter was received from Colonel John Tayloe on the 24th, dated the 23d, stating that the Secretary of War required despatch, and directed the troops to march on by regiments, or even companies, if necessary. On Sunday, the 28th, was at Neabsco, about twenty-four miles from Alexandria; was waited upon by a committee from Alexandria about two o'clock, who delivered a communication from the corporation of Alexandria, stating that the town had no artillery or military force to protect it, and they intended to surrender at discretion to the enemy; and that the town being under the control of the civil authority, it would be injurious to the town for any military forces to march to Alexandria. General Hungerford informed the committee that he should move on, and be governed by circumstances. He received a line on the same day from Colonel Monroe, directing him to march with all possible despatch to Alexandria, and if the enemy had passed Alexandria, to march on to the city.

On the morning of the 29th, about ten miles from Alexandria, another deputation waited on General Hungerford, with a printed order of the corporation, amounting to a request that he should not proceed on to Alexandria, and interrupt the arrangement entered into with the enemy. To this communication General Hungerford replied, that he was acting under the orders of the Government, and should execute those orders, and accordingly proceeded on his march. When within three miles of Alexandria, he was met by Walter Jones, Esquire, who informed him that the President and Colonel Monroe desired him to station his forces in the rear of Alexandria; detach five hundred men to the height just below Mason's Island, and send one hundred and fifty or two hundred to Aquia to co-operate against the enemy. A written order was received from Colonel Monroe to the same effect that evening. General Hungerford arrived with the three first mentioned regiments in the rear of Alexandria, on the 29th, about five o'clock in the evening, where he remained till the first day of September. He was then ordered to the White House, with a part of his forces, to co-operate with the naval forces under Commodore Porter.

## No. 9.

## REPORT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF COMMODORE BARNEY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *October 3, 1814.*

SIR:

In compliance with your letter of the 26th instant, as chairman of the committee appointed by the Honorable House of Representatives, "to inquire into the causes of the success of the enemy in his enterprises against this metropolis, and the neighboring town of Alexandria; and into the manner in which the public buildings and property were destroyed, and the amount thereof;" and with your request "for such information on the subject, as may be in my power, and more particularly in relation to the destruction of the navy yard, and the amount of public property destroyed;" I have the honor to present the following report of the measures adopted by this Department, and of the facts within my knowledge, in relation to the objects of the inquiry:

In obedience to the general instructions and early solicitude of the President, in anticipation of the probable designs of the enemy to harass the country in this vicinity, and to attempt the invasion of this metropolis, I directed, in the month of May last, three twelve pounders to be mounted on field carriages, by the mechanics of the navy yard, and completely equipped and furnished for field service. To these the marines at head quarters were trained, under the command of Captain Miller, and prepared to act either as artillerymen or infantry, as the service might require. A short time previous to the reinforcement of the enemy in the Patuxent, I caused two long eighteen pounders to be mounted on field carriages, and prepared in like manner for field service, ready to be attached to the command of Commodore Barney, should the enemy at any time compel him to abandon the flotilla under his command on the Patuxent, and the emergency call for the aid of his force in defence of the capital or of Baltimore.

For this eventual service that officer was instructed to prepare; and by his zeal and activity his men acquired the expert use of their muskets, and a capacity, as well as an ardent disposition, to be useful to their country on either element.

On the 26th of July, in consequence of the menacing movements of the enemy near the Kettle Bottoms, in the Potomac, which it was said they were sounding and buoying off, the letter A was written; but, on account of information received on the same day, the letter B, countermanding the former, was written.

The enemy in the Patuxent was occupied in depredate upon its shores, until large reinforcements arrived at the mouth of that river on the 18th of August, the account of which was communicated on the 19th to the Department, by Commodore Barney, in the letter C, with a list of the naval force of the enemy annexed.

On the morning of the 19th, information was received at the Department from Captain Gordon, commanding the United States' naval force at Norfolk, that, on the morning of the 16th, came in from sea, and proceeded up the bay, twenty-two sail of enemy's vessels, viz: two seventy-fours, one sixty-four, one razeed, seven frigates, seven transports, and two or three brigs or schooners; which, it appears by the letter C, joined the force at the mouth of the

Patuxent on the 18th; the whole of which ascended the Patuxent near to Benedict, on the 18th and 19th, and commenced debarking the troops. The letter marked D was immediately written to Commodore Barney; and the letter E to Commodore Rodgers; and the letter F to Captain Porter, urging the two latter to repair with their forces towards this city, with the utmost expedition.

Commodore Rodgers had previously made the most judicious arrangements to transport, with celerity, the marines and the principal part of the seamen, under his command on the Delaware station, to the head waters of the Chesapeake, or to Baltimore, upon any sudden emergency; and had organized and disciplined his men with a view to such service. It appears, however, by his letters G and H, that, with every possible exertion, he did not reach Baltimore until the 25th, consequently too late to participate in the defence of the metropolis, against a force, the greater part of which came in from sea on the 16th, was first known to the Department to have arrived on the 19th, marched from Benedict on the 20th, and entered the capital on the 24th.

Having sent to General Winder on the 19th a copy of letter C, on the 20th I called on him at his quarters, at M<sup>r</sup>Keowin's, to show him the letter I had just received from Commodore Barney, and my order to that officer to join and co-operate with the force under his command, (see letter K) also, to point out those volunteer corps in his army that comprised the mechanics of the navy yard, who, being excellent axemen, would act with great effect as pioneers. As it was understood that a strong squadron of the enemy's ships, in co-operation with his land force, had passed the principal obstacle in the Potomac, and was only retarded in its ascent by contrary winds, against which it was warring with great exertion, I expressed to him my solicitude for the defence of Fort Washington, and proposed to throw the marines, who had been trained to artillery exercise, and a part of the seamen, into that fort, for its defence.

The General did not conceive the state of his force such as to warrant the abstraction of so efficient a part as that of the marines and seamen, from the main body, which was to oppose the direct advance of the enemy's army on the city; and, indeed, his objection appeared to have weight. He did not, however, consider Fort Washington as tenable.

On the 21st the letter L was received from Commodore Barney, and a detachment of about one hundred and ten marines, with three twelves and two eighteen pounders, under the command of Captain Miller, marched from the head quarters to join Commodore Barney, and reached the Woodyard that evening.

In the course of this day and the following, I visited the navy yard, and inquired of the commandant what were the means of transportation, and what assistance he had in the yard? He stated that all the mechanics of the yard were, and had been, with the army, from the first alarm; that no persons remained but the officers of the yard, three besides himself, and a very few of the ordinary, chiefly blacks; that two of the old gunboats were the only craft for transportation; that all the wagons in the district had been hired or impressed for the army; and that those blacks who were usually to be had for hire, were employed on the works at Bladensburg.

I directed him to employ all the means he had, or could procure; to load the gunboats with provisions and powder, and send them up to the Little Falls; employ as many wagons as could be either hired or impressed, and convey as much of the navy powder as possible from the magazine, on the Eastern Branch, to Mr. Dulany's barn, on the Virginia side of the Potomac, about nine miles above the city; to direct Messrs. Grayson, Stull, and Williams, to transport the public powder from their works to the same place; and to continue transporting the most valuable and portable articles from the yard to any place of safety, with all the means he could command.

The public vessels afloat at the navy yard were the new sloop of war Argus, with her guns mounted, her topmasts launched, and her sails and detached equipments complete on shore in store; the new schooner Lynx, and three new barges, one of the first and two of the second class, completely equipped; with the two gunboats before mentioned.

On the slip was the new frigate Columbia, of the largest class, caulked, ready for coppering, and nearly so for launching. Her masts, spars, tops, &c. almost finished in the mast house; gun carriages nearly completed; her sails made, and in the loft; her rigging fitted; blocks all made; and her equipments, generally, in great forwardness.

Besides the buildings, engines, fixtures, and shop furniture, of the several mechanical branches in the navy yard, there were about one hundred tons of cordage, some canvass, a considerable quantity of saltpetre, copper, iron, lead, block tin, blocks, ship chandlery, naval and ordnance stores, implements, and fixed ammunition, with a variety of manufactured articles in all the branches; seventeen hundred and forty-three barrels of beef and pork, two hundred and seventy-nine barrels of whiskey, and a moderate stock of plank and timber.

Had there been a prospect of transporting the sloop of war Argus to a place of safety, the representations of the commandant will show that he had not the means of transporting her, and there appeared to be no situation in which she could be placed in which she would not fall into the hands of the enemy, in the event of his getting possession of the city. It, therefore, only remained to endeavor to save all the stores that could be transported, and the small vessels, particularly the barges, if practicable, by running them up to the Little Falls. This was directed to be done.

On the 22d the letter M was received from Commodore Barney. In the evening of that day I accompanied the President to General Winder's camp at the Old Fields, and passed the night in Commodore Barney's tent; the army of the enemy at Upper Marlborough, eight miles distant. On the morning of the 23d, reviewed the seamen and marines, whose appearance and preparations for battle promised all that could be expected from cool intrepidity, and a high state of discipline.

In the hope that Commodore Rodgers might arrive that evening at Baltimore, and not doubting that the enemy would be retarded on his march by obstacles and annoyance, until the seamen from Baltimore could reach Bladensburg, I wrote to Commodore Rodgers the letter marked N, and sent it by a vidette.

About 2 o'clock, P. M. I accompanied the President on his return to the city, and, in the course of the evening, was informed of the sudden retreat of our army from the Old Fields to the city, over the Eastern Branch bridge.

On the morning of the 24th, I proceeded to General Winder's quarters, at Doctor Hunter's house, near the Eastern Branch bridge, where the President, and the Secretaries of War, State, and Treasury, soon after arrived.

I found Commodore Barney employed, by order of the General, in planting his battery on the hill, near the head of the bridge. He was charged to defend that pass, and to destroy the bridge on the approach of the enemy; for which purpose, scows and boats, with combustible materials, were placed under the bridge, ready to explode. At this time the enemy was apparently advancing on the road to the bridge; but, shortly after, advice was received that he had turned off on the road towards Bladensburg, about six miles from that place. General Winder set off for Bladensburg, leaving Commodore Barney, with his seamen and marines, in charge of the bridge.

It was soon observed that a very efficient part of the force had been left to destroy the Eastern Branch bridge, which could as well be done by half a dozen men, as by five hundred. The subject was discussed by the President, Heads of Departments, and Commodore Barney, which resulted in the order for his immediate and rapid march, to join the army near Bladensburg, which he reached just in time to form his men for battle. Captain Creighton was left in charge of the bridge, to destroy it on the near approach of the enemy.

I here presented, for consideration, the subject of the navy yard, to the view of the President and Secretary of War, in the presence of the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury. I described the situation of the public vessels, and the nature of the public property, at that establishment; the vast importance of the supplies, and of the shipping, to the enemy, particularly as there appeared to be no doubt of his squadron forming a junction with his army, should it succeed in the conquest of the capital; (General Winder having distinctly stated on the same morning that Fort Washington could not be defended;) and as, in this event, nothing could be more clear than that he would first plunder, and then destroy the buildings and improvements, or, if unable to carry off the plunder and the shipping, he would destroy the whole; and if the junction should be formed, it would be a strong inducement to the enemy to remain, in order to launch the new frigate, which the force at his command would accomplish in four or five days. He would then carry off the whole of the public stores and shipping, and destroy the establishment, and, in the mean time, greatly extend the field of his plunder and devastation. Thus, in either case, whether the junction was formed, or whether the army alone entered the city, the loss or destruction of the whole of the public property at the navy yard was certain.

It was, therefore, distinctly agreed and determined, as the result of this consultation, that the public shipping, and naval and military stores, and provisions at the navy yard, should be destroyed, in the event of the enemy's obtaining possession of the city.

I went to the navy yard about two o'clock, and ordered the commandant to prepare the necessary trains for the destruction of the public shipping, and of the naval and military stores, and provisions, in the navy yard, and to destroy the same, so soon as he should ascertain that the enemy had taken possession of the city; first removing such articles of most value, as might be found practicable, particularly the new barges, if possible, and then retire in his <sup>etc.</sup>

Subsequent events prove the justness of these conclusions, if, indeed, further evidence had been at all wanting.

The only *legitimate* objects of the enterprise of the enemy to this place, were the public shipping and the naval and military establishments; and none can believe that these would have escaped the torch of the destroyer of our civil edifices, of private rope-walks, and every thing in the most remote degree connected with navigation; but, above all, with the American navy.

The order for the destruction of the public shipping and property at the navy yard was not issued without serious deliberation and great pain by him, under whose auspices and direction those noble ships had been constructed, and a degree of activity, usefulness, and reputation, imparted to the establishment, which it had never known before. It was given under the strongest obligations of duty. It is conceived that no military maxim is better established, nor duty better understood, than that which enjoins the destruction of public ships, arsenals, naval and military stores, and provisions, when they can be no longer defended, or prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy; and that this duty becomes the more imperative, as the ratio of the value of the objects is enhanced to the enemy. To defend the shipping or navy yard was out of the question; all the mechanics and laborers of the yard, as well as all the seamen and marines in the District, were with the army.

The commandant of the navy yard is a captain in the navy; the vessels and property were under his charge and command; and if no special order from the Department had been issued, and he had suffered the public shipping and property to have fallen into the hands of the enemy, he would have committed a high military crime, for which he would have been amenable before a court martial. The objects which it was proper to destroy, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, could not be separated from those which might have been left for his destruction. They were in store, or in the midst of other combustible materials, and the fire from one would necessarily communicate to the other. Indeed, the whole surface of the yard was covered with ships, timber, pitch, tar, and other combustible matter, so that to set fire to any one object, must produce the successive conflagration of the whole.

On returning from the navy yard, towards the western part of the city, I learned that our army had retreated by the road to Tenlytown, and that of the enemy was rapidly advancing towards the city. I soon after received a message from the President, by Mr. Tench Ringgold, at Mr. Charles Carroll's, informing me that he had proceeded to cross the river, and requested that I would follow and meet him on the other side.

I returned to the city on the morning of the 28th, immediately on hearing of the retreat of the enemy, and wrote the letter O to Commodore Rodgers.

The paper P is a copy of the detailed report of the commandant of the navy yard, of the manner in which he carried into execution the order I had given.

The barge he states to have been saved was sent to Alexandria, and, it appears, remained there until the enemy took possession of her.

One gun boat was sunk near Foxall's, laden with salted provisions, and has since been recovered. The other was laden with provisions and gunpowder, but ran aground in the Eastern Branch, in attempting to transport her to the Little Falls, and was plundered by the inhabitants near the navy yard; the powder and part of the provisions have since been recovered.

The new schooner Lynx escaped the flames in an extraordinary manner, and remains entire.

The metallic articles have nearly all been saved, including a vast quantity of iron work, which, with little labor, will answer the original purpose.

The timber that was in the dock is saved; and a great deal of that which was partially consumed, will still be useful.

Almost the whole of the machinery of the steam engine is reported to be in good condition; the boiler is perfect.

The buildings, with the exception of the houses of the commandant and lieutenant of the yard, the guard-houses, and gateway, and one other building, have been destroyed. The walls of some appear to be entire, and but little injured; of others they are destroyed.

The monument was but slightly injured.

Paper Q is a list of the cannon remaining perfect in the yard, and of those which were injured by the enemy.

The issuing store of the yard, and its contents, which had escaped the original conflagration, were totally destroyed by the enemy.

Orders have been issued to the officers of the yard to prepare their statements and estimates of the value of the public property destroyed, which shall be furnished as soon as possible.

With the circumstances attending the abandonment and destruction of Fort Washington, and the fate of Alexandria, I am no otherwise acquainted than by the accounts which have been published.

After the capitulation of Alexandria to the enemy's squadron, a considerable force, in seamen, was ordered from Baltimore, (see letter R) under the command of Commodore Rodgers, with Captains Porter, Perry, and Creighton. The former attacked and annoyed the enemy in his rear, in boats and with fire vessels, whilst the other commanders planted their batteries on White House Point and Indian Head.

Those measures precipitated the departure of the enemy, and greatly annoyed him in descending the river; but there was not time sufficient to prepare the means to render that annoyance effectual. All that the limited means employed could possibly effect, was accomplished, by the gallantry, skill, and patriotism, of those distinguished officers, and the brave seamen, marines, and volunteers, under their command.

The measures pursued by this Department, in order to co-operate in the defence of the metropolis, were not, in their nature, strictly sanctioned by the regulations and usages of the naval service, but were adopted with an ardent desire that they might prove effectual; with a certain knowledge that the zeal and patriotism of the naval corps would induce them to seek the enemy, with equal vigor and cheerfulness, in the field as on the main; and a conviction that the emergency fully justified any step which could contribute to the defence of the national capital.

Whether more or less has been done than duty required, is cheerfully and respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. JONES.

The Hon. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, *Chairman, &c.*

NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, *October 18, 1814.*

SIR:

On a review of the consequences which emanated from the retreat of our army, and the entrance of that of the enemy into this city, on the twenty-fourth August last, so far as relates to this establishment, I respectfully submit the following general statement:

After receiving repeated contradictory reports, relative to the strength and position of the enemy, during the afternoon and evening of that day, at twenty minutes past eight, P. M. I received incontestable proof (by Captain Creighton, and Mr. M. Booth, my clerk, both of whom had been voluntarily active to obtain me positive information) that the enemy was in complete possession of the city, having themselves been within the range of, and exposed to, the fire of his musketry.

The boats for our conveyance from the yard being stationed according to order, we immediately repaired down the yard, applying fire to the trains leading to the store houses, the principal of which were almost instantly in irresistible flames.

Advancing towards the boats, those to the new frigate Essex,\* and to the sloop of war Argus, were touched, and they also immediately enveloped in a sheet of inextinguishable fire.

From a momentary impulse, and faint hope of recovering the new schooner Lynx, I directed her not to be fired, and have the satisfaction to say, that, by an almost miraculous escape, she is still "ours."

The frigate Essex's hull, in the shipwright's department, was very near complete, her bottom ready for coppering, and she could have been launched in ten days; her masts and spars were nearly finished, with timber sufficient on the wharf to complete them; all her blocks, dead-eyes, and the major part of her gun carriages, ready; two suits of her heavy sails, and nearly the same quantity of her others, were finished in the sail loft, ready for bending; her standing rigging, &c. fitted in the rigging loft, and sufficient running rigging in store for her complete equipment; her largest boats nearly ready for launching; all her water casks, and every material of cooper's work, ready to go on board.

The sloop of war Argus lay at the wharf, with all her armament and equipment on board, except her sails, which were in the sail loft, and her provisions in the stores, and therein consumed; and except her powder, which had not been shipped.

A large quantity of timber, plank, knees, &c. were in different parts of the yard, and the seventy-four gun ship timber, stored in the appropriate sheds, all fell a prey to the devouring element; also one large and one smaller row galley, both armed, rigged, and prepared for service; and three heavy armed scows, with their guns, &c. on board, also ready.

The buildings destroyed by the fire from the frigate, &c. were, the mast shed and timber shed; the joiners' and boat builders' shops, and mould loft; all the offices; the medical store; the plumbers' and smiths' shops, and block-makers' shop; the saw mill and block mill, with their whole apparatus, tools, and machinery; the building for the steam engines, and all the combustible parts of its machinery and materials; the rigging loft; the apartments for the master and the boatswain of the yard, with all their furniture; the gun-carriage makers' and painters' shops, with all the materials and tools therein at the time; also, the hulls of the old frigates Boston, New York, and General Greene.

The storehouses first fired were the provision stores, gunner's and ordnance store, cordage store, and sail loft; which, with all their perishable contents, were consumed.

The navy storekeeper's detail issuing store, containing, in its different departments, a large quantity of new canvass, twine, lines, bunting, and colors; together with all our stocks of mathematical instruments, and nautical apparatus, appertaining to navigation; ship chandlery, tools, nails, oils, paints, &c. had escaped through the night the effect of the fire, but was fired by the enemy on the succeeding morning, the twenty-fifth, and entirely consumed, with all its contents; as were also the coopers' shop, two small frame timber sheds, and that in which our tar, pitch, rosin, &c. were deposited.

The general loss of our papers prevents the possibility of forming a just estimate of the loss in the mechanical departments heretofore enumerated. Of that relative to the stores on hand, in the navy storekeeper's peculiar charge, it is presumed a tolerable accurate estimate may be formed, and will be the subject of a future communication, which shall be transmitted as soon as it is possible to effect.

On my return to the yard on the twenty-sixth, I had the mortification to observe, that the provisions which had been laded on board the old gunboat, No. 140, (and with which she had grounded in endeavoring to get out of the branch, on the twenty-fourth) had become a prey to numerous unauthorized persons, some of whom, however, instantly offered to deliver up all in their possession, which was subsequently done, but several barrels are yet to be accounted for.

A subject of still greater regret is the loss of upwards of two hundred barrels of powder, which were wantonly and unauthorizedly taken out of the magazine, and chiefly thrown into the water, the cause of which, however, being under investigation by a court martial, on the corporal of the marine guard then there, I forbear to enlarge on the subject as my feelings would dictate.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THOMAS TINGEY.

HONORABLE WILLIAM JONES.

NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, August 27, 1814.

SIR:

After receiving your orders of the twenty-fourth, directing the public shipping, stores, &c. at this establishment to be destroyed, in case of the success of the enemy over our army, no time was lost in making the necessary arrangements for firing the whole, and preparing boats for departing from the yard, as you had suggested.

About four P. M. I received a message by an officer, from the Secretary of War, with information that he "could protect me no longer." Soon after this I was informed that the conflagration of the Eastern Branch bridge had commenced; and, in a few minutes; the explosion announced the blowing up of that part near the "draw," as had been arranged in the morning.

It had been promulgated, as much as in my power, among the inhabitants of the vicinity, the intended fate of the yard, in order that they might take every possible precaution for the safety of themselves, families, and property.

Immediately several individuals came, in succession, endeavoring to prevail on me to deviate from my instructions, which they were invariably informed was unavailing, unless they could bring me your instructions in writing, countermanding those previously given. A deputation also of the most respectable women came on the same errand, when I found myself painfully necessitated to inform them, that any further importunities would cause the matches to be instantly applied to the trains; with assurance, however, that, if left at peace, I would delay the execution of the orders as long as I could feel the least shadow of justification. Captain Creighton's arrival at the yard, with the men who had been with him at the bridge, (probably about five o'clock) would have justified me in instant operation, but he also was strenuous in the desire to obviate the intended destruction, and volunteered to ride out and gain me positive information as to the position of the enemy, under the hope that our army might have rallied and repulsed them. I was myself, indeed, desirous of delay, for the reason that the wind was then blowing fresh from the south southwest, which would most probably have caused the destruction of all the private property north and east of the yard, in its neighborhood. I was of opinion, also, that the close of the evening would bring with it a calm, in which happily we were not disappointed. Other gentlemen, well mounted, volunteered, as Captain Creighton had done, to go out and bring me positive intelligence of the enemy's situation, if possible to obtain it.

The evening came, and I waited with much anxiety the return of Captain Creighton, having almost continual information that the enemy were in the neighborhood of the marine barracks; at the Capitol Hill; and that their "advance" was near Georgetown. I therefore determined to wait only until half past eight o'clock, to commence the execution of my orders; becoming apprehensive that Captain Creighton had, from his long stay, fallen into the hands of the enemy. During this delay I ordered a few marines, and other persons who were then near me, to go off in one of the small galleys, which was done, and the boat is saved. Colonel Wharton had been furnished with a light boat, with which he left the yard probably between seven and eight o'clock. At twenty minutes past eight Captain Creighton returned; he was still extremely averse to the destruction of the property, but having informed him that your orders to me were imperative, the proper disposition of the boats being made, the matches were applied, and in a few moments the whole was in a state of irretrievable conflagration.

\* The Columbia, as designated in my report of the third instant, but called the Essex, by the commandant, upon the presumption that her name was to have been changed.

When about leaving the wharf I observed the fire had also commenced at the works at Greenleaf's Point, and in the way out of the Branch we observed the capitol on fire. It had been my intention not to leave the vicinity of the navy yard with my boat, during the night; but, having Captain Creighton and other gentlemen with me, she was too much encumbered and overladen to render that determination proper. We therefore proceeded to Alexandria, in the vicinity of which I rested till the morning of the 25th, when, having also refreshed the gig's crew, we left Alexandria at half past seven o'clock, and proceeded again up to the yard, where I landed, unmolested, about a quarter before nine.

The schooner *Lynx* had laid along side the burning wharf, still unhurt; hoping, therefore, to save her, we hauled her to the quarter of the hulk of the New York, which had also escaped the ravages of the flames. The detail issuing store of the Navy Storekeeper had remained safe from the fire during the night, which the enemy, (being in force in the yard) about eight o'clock, set fire to, and it was speedily consumed.

It appeared that they had left the yard about half an hour when we arrived. I found my dwelling house, and that of Lieutenant Haradan, untouched by fire; but some of the people of the neighborhood had commenced plundering them; therefore, hastily collecting a few persons known to me, I got some of my most valuable materials moved to neighbors' houses, out of the yard, who tendered me their offers to receive them; the enemy's officer having declared private property sacred. Could I have staid another hour, I had probably saved all my furniture and stores; but being advised by some friends, that I was not safe, they believing that the admiral was, by that time, or would very speedily be, informed of my being in the yard; he having expressed an anxious desire to make me captive; but had said that the officers' dwellings in the yard should not be destroyed.

I, therefore, again embarked in the gig, taking along, out of the Branch, one of the new launches, which lay safe, although alongside of a floating stage enveloped in flames. I had no sooner gone than such a scene of devastation and plunder took place, in the houses, (by the people of the neighborhood) as is disgraceful to relate; not a moveable article from the cellars to the garrets has been left us, and even some of the fixtures, and the locks of the doors, have been shamefully pillaged. Some of the perpetrators, however, have been made known to me.

From the number and movements of the enemy, it would have appeared rash temerity to have attempted returning again that day, though my inclination strongly urged it; therefore, reconnoitering their motions, as well as could be effected at a convenient distance, in the gig, until evening, I again proceeded to Alexandria for the night.

Yesterday morning, the 26th, it was impossible to form (from the various and contradictory reports at Alexandria) any sort of probable conjecture, either of the proceedings or situation of our army, or that of the enemy.

Determining, therefore, to have a positive knowledge of some part thereof, from ocular demonstration, I again embarked in the gig, proceeding with due caution to the yard, where I learned with chagrin the devastation and pillage before mentioned, and found, also, to my surprise, that the old gunboat, which had been loaded with provisions, and had grounded, in endeavoring to get out of the Branch, on the evening of the 24th, was nearly discharged of her cargo, by a number of our people, without connexion with each other.

Having landed in the yard, I soon ascertained that the enemy had left the city, excepting only a sergeant's guard, for the security of the sick and wounded. Finding it impracticable to stop the scene of plunder that had commenced, I determined instantly on repossessing the yard, with all the force at my command; repairing, therefore, immediately to Alexandria, Lieutenant Haradan, the ordinary men, and a few marines there, were ordered directly up, following myself, and got full possession again at evening.

I am now collecting the scattered purloined provisions, ready for your orders, presuming they will now become very scarce indeed; the quantity saved, you shall be informed of, when known to me.

The *Lynx* is safe, except her foremast being carried away, in the storm of the 25th, about four P. M. We have also another of the gunboats, with about one hundred barrels of powder, and one of the large yard cutters, nearly full with the filled cylinders, for our different guns, previously mounted; the powder of those, however, is probably much wetted by the storm. I would most willingly have an interview with you, but deem it improper to leave my station without some justifiable cause, or in pursuance of your instructions, under which I am ready to proceed, wherever my services may be thought useful.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THOS. TINGEY.

Honorable W. JONES.

P. S. *Sunday morning, 28th.*—After terminating the foregoing, last evening, I had scarcely laid down my pen, when a smart cannonading commenced at, or from, Fort Washington; which continued from heavy cannon, until after seven o'clock, during which it appeared as if two or three severe explosions had taken place. No doubt that it was between the enemy's frigates and the fort; but as to the result, I am entirely without information; nor have I at command the means of obtaining it; the wind blowing too fresh up the river, for a light boat to make any progress down. I shall hire sufficient hands, as soon as practicable, and collect all the materials unhurt by the fire; which shall be suitably deposited and protected.

T. T.

FARM AT ELK RIDGE, August 29, 1814.

Sir:

This is the first moment I have had it in my power to make a report of the proceedings of the forces under my command, since I had the honor of seeing you at the camp at the "Old Fields." On the afternoon of that day, we were informed that the enemy was advancing upon us. The army was put under arms, and our positions taken; my forces on the right, flanked by the two battalions of the 36th and 38th, where we remained some hours; the enemy did not make his appearance. A little before sunset, General Winder came to me, and recommended that the heavy artillery should be withdrawn, with the exception of one twelve pounder to cover the retreat. We took up our line of march; and, in the night, entered Washington, by the Eastern Branch bridge. I marched my men, &c. to the Marine barracks, and took up quarters for the night; myself sleeping at Commodore Tingey's, in the navy yard. About two o'clock General Winder came to my quarters; and we made some arrangements for the morning. In the morning I received a note from General Winder, and waited upon him: he requested me to take command, and place my artillery to defend the passage of the bridge, on the Eastern Branch, as the enemy was approaching the city in that direction. I immediately put my guns in position, leaving the marines and the rest of my men at the barracks, to wait further orders. I was in this situation when I had the honor to meet you, with the President and Heads of Departments; when it was determined I should draw off my guns and men, and proceed towards Bladensburg, which was immediately put into execution; on our way, I was informed the enemy was within a mile of Bladensburg; we hurried on. The day was hot; and my men very much crippled from the severe marches we had experienced the days before; many of them being without shoes; which I had replaced that morning. I preceded the men; and when I arrived at the line, which separates the District from Maryland, the battle began. I sent an officer back to hurry on my men; they came up in a *trot*; we took our position on the rising ground; put the pieces in battery; posted the marines, under Captain Miller; and the flotilla men, who were to act as infantry, under their own officers, on my right, to support the pieces; and waited the approach of the enemy. During this period the engagement continued, and the enemy advancing; our own army retreating before them, apparently in much disorder. At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road, in force, and in front of my battery, and on seeing us, made a halt. I reserved our fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an eighteen pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made, by the enemy, to come forward, but all were destroyed. They then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to flank our right; he was there met by three twelve pounders, the marines under Captain Miller, and my men, acting as infantry; and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred, posted on a height, on my right, from whom I expected much support, from their fine situation.

The enemy from this period never appeared, in force, in front of us; they pushed forward their sharp shooters; one of which shot my horse under me; who fell dead between two of my guns. The enemy, who had been kept in check by our fire, for nearly half an hour, now began to out-flank us on the right: our guns were turned that way; he pushed up the hill, about two or three hundred, towards the corps of Americans stationed as above described; who, to my great mortification, made no resistance, giving a fire or two, and retired. In this situation we had the whole army of the enemy to contend with. Our ammunition was expended; and, unfortunately, the drivers of my ammunition wagons had gone off in the general panic. At this time, I received a severe wound in my thigh; Captain Miller was wounded; Sailingmaster Warner killed; Acting Sailingmaster Martin killed; and Sailingmaster Martin wounded; but, to the honor of my officers and men, as fast as their companions and messmates fell at the guns, they were instantly replaced from the infantry.

Finding the enemy now completely in our rear, and no means of defence, I gave orders to my officers and men to retire. Three of my officers assisted me to get off a short distance, but the great loss of blood occasioned such a weakness that I was compelled to lie down. I requested my officers to leave me, which they obstinately refused; but, upon being ordered, they obeyed; only one remained. In a short time I observed a British soldier, and had him called, and directed him to seek an officer; in a few minutes an officer came, and, on learning who I was, brought General Ross and Admiral Cockburn to me. Those officers behaved to me with the most marked attention, respect, and politeness, had a surgeon brought, and my wound dressed immediately. After a few minutes' conversation, the General informed me (after paying me a handsome compliment) that I was paroled, and at liberty to proceed to Washington or Bladensburg; as, also, Mr. Huffington, who had remained with me, offering me every assistance in his power, giving orders for a litter to be brought, in which I was carried to Bladensburg. Captain Wainwright, first Captain to Admiral Cochrane, remained with me, and behaved to me as if I was a brother. During the stay of the enemy at Bladensburg, I received every marked attention possible from the officers of the navy and army.

My wound is deep, but I flatter myself not dangerous: the ball is not yet extracted. I fondly hope a few weeks will restore me to health, and that an exchange will take place, that I may resume my command, or any other that you and the President may think proper to honor me with.

Yours, respectfully,

Hon. W. JONES.

JOSHUA BARNEY.

No. 10.

LETTERS FROM GENERAL VAN NESS, DOCTOR CATLETT, AND JOHN LAW, ESQUIRE.

*General Van Ness's statement.*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1814.

SIR:

To your request to me to "report to the committee appointed to inquire into the causes which led to the success of the enemy against this city, &c. such information, facts, and views, as are in my power," I would have answered sooner, making such report, but for a very severe and protracted nervous attack, and a consequent considerable accumulation of indispensable private business. In the narrative which I have now the honor to transmit you, I shall, from the very nature of the case, be drawn into an egotism, which, I trust, the committee will be good enough to excuse.

In the campaign of 1813, we had a call from the War Department, produced by the approach of the enemy in the Potomac, for a part of the militia of the District of Columbia, which was promptly attended to on our part; but, owing to the great want of preparation by the Government, in respect to arms, ammunition, camp equipage, provisions, and the consequent delays and confusion, the troops would have been inadequate to an efficient resistance, until after they had been out some days: that fact, and those circumstances, were then evident to all. The incompetency of Fort Washington, on the East bank of the river, a few miles below Alexandria, and the necessity of its improvement, were then seen, and freely spoken of by Secretary Armstrong. Indeed, the importance and necessity of erecting a new-fortification or battery, at some one of the several favorable sites on the river, so as completely to shut out from the upper part of it, or repel, a hostile fleet, was strongly and repeatedly suggested and admitted by the Secretary. He frequently told me, then and afterwards, substantially, that he had "such a project, and was about to execute it; that he was only balancing between several different points which had been proposed or presented to his view; and he believed he must go down himself to reconnoitre and select." After the lapse of some time, not seeing or hearing of any step towards the execution of this project, I several times reminded him of it, and he, as often, still encouraged me, by words, to expect it, whilst he, generally otherwise, appeared rather indifferent, and expressed an opinion that the enemy would not come, or even seriously attempt to come, to this District.

About the opening of the present campaign, I pressed again upon the Secretary the subject generally of our defence; suggesting, in addition to the occlusion of the river, the convenience and importance of a central camp, intermediate between Baltimore, Annapolis, Washington, Alexandria, Georgetown, and the neighboring towns and country. And in frequent interviews, (in number, to be sure, very much increased by the importunate applications and solicitations to me, of both the civil and the military branches of the community, whose confidence in the Secretary appeared, at an early period, at best wavering, if not declining,) sometimes official, at other times not so, which I had with him, as the campaign progressed, I did not fail to repeat the suggestion. I still received assurances, generally verbally, favorable, accompanied by an otherwise apparent indifference, and confidence in our security. In April last, Colonel Clinch, with about one hundred men, (I believe recruits) arrived in this city, where he, with those troops, together with a few hundred who had been garrisoned through the winter at Greenleaf's Point, remained encamped for a few weeks. This was the only force of a regular character, excepting a small marine corps attached to the navy yard, which I recollect had been at all stationary in the place; and even the greater part of that was here only at a season when there was no actual danger, or even apprehension of it, and the whole was presently sent to the Northern frontiers.

Sometime in June last, the enemy appearing in or about the mouth of the Patuxent, the Secretary of War called on me for a detachment of militia. Several companies of light troops were immediately, in conformity with his instructions, ordered and marched to that river. After a short period of service, and the departure of the enemy, they were discharged.

Thus had the campaign progressed, without any visible steps towards works of defence, either permanent or temporary, either on the land, or the water side, (I never having heard of a spade or an axe being struck in any such operation) or towards forming a rendezvous or camp of regular troops in the neighborhood, to the great anxiety, inquietude, and alarm, of the District and surrounding country; the Secretary generally treating with indifference, at least, if not with levity, the idea of an attack by the enemy.

When the conclusion of European hostilities, and the rumors and accounts of expeditions fitting out for this country by England, excited apprehensions more general and more serious than before, I again renewed the subject of our defence, and it was still treated by him as before. I had occasionally, though seldom, introduced it personally to the President himself, who, without going much into particulars, referred me, generally, on that subject, to the War Department, on which he seemed fully to rely for the proper arrangements. In my anxiety and solicitude, I also occasionally mentioned this business to Secretary Monroe, who always appeared to take a warm interest in it, and gave me strong assurances that he would do "every thing that he could with propriety do." At length, nothing visible having yet been done, and the danger being supposed constantly to increase, about the latter end of June, or beginning of July last, I inquired of Secretary Monroe whether it was the intention of Government to



abandon and sacrifice the District or not, adding, that if it were so, it would be well for us, at least, to know it. He answered me, that, so far from that, every inch of ground about it was determined to be contested, and the last drop of blood to be spilt in its defence. He said it was decided (I then understood, or inferred, that there had been a recent cabinet consultation on the subject) to form a camp of regular troops, say between two and three thousand, at a central position, such as I have before spoken of; who, together with the local troops, would constitute an adequate defence for the surrounding points, to either of which they might be promptly and conveniently drawn. When I saw Secretary Armstrong again, soon afterwards, I expressed my satisfaction at what I had thus understood. He confirmed the information, and added that there would also be drawn from Carlisle, about two hundred cavalry, commanded by Colonel Lavall. In answer to my inquiry, when we might expect them, he said the troops were ordered on, and would begin to assemble in a few days' time, and that orders had been given to procure horses for those of the cavalry corps who were not yet mounted. This period, however, elapsed without the arrival of any of them. There appeared not to be taken into the calculation, a small detachment, or fragment or two, of a regiment or two of the regular army, who were in some part of the neighboring country, and who, at best, were supposed to be very inefficient. I afterwards, several times, reminded Secretary Armstrong of our disappointment, considering the strong assurances given us, &c.; and I suggested the utility and propriety of ordering out our militia in successive or alternate detachments. I further informed him (which I was authorized to do, by the pressing, voluntary offers of many of my fellow-citizens) that both the citizens and troops of the District of Columbia were ready and anxious to be made use of, in any way that the Government might prescribe or direct, for the public good. He continued to tell me that the troops would soon be on. To my inquiries about the cavalry, more than once, he replied that he had sent orders for purchasing horses to mount the corps, and that it would soon be here. Colonel Lavall did not, however, arrive here until a day or two after the enemy had landed at Benedict.\*

Some time in July last, the Secretary of War told me that General Winder (who was in the neighborhood of the Patuxent) had informed him that the enemy were ascending that river in force, and that he (General Winder) required that as many of the militia of the District of Columbia as could be procured should be immediately sent to him; and the Secretary directed me to order out three companies to satisfy this call, which was immediately done. After having been in service nine days, they were discharged.

A few weeks before the incursion of the enemy here, a project was originated among the banks, generally, of the District, to offer the Government a loan for its defence. The Secretary was informed of it in its progress, and appeared to approve it, observing that the arrangement must be made with the Treasury Department. Although, owing to the necessity of some formalities at the offices, and the tedious delays in collecting the general sentiment of the different banks, as to certain arrangements and terms among themselves, this project was not matured until about a week before the capture of the city, the Secretary of War was before informed that the money would certainly be raised. This was done without any intimation or suggestion from any branch of the Government, of the want of means for an adequate defence, although I recollect the Secretary of War had, some time before, in a conversation I introduced relative to the purchase of some more ground about Fort Washington, for an extension of the works, observed, substantially, that the proprietor asked too much for it, considering how poor the Government was, and that, if we found it was really wanted in any pressing emergency, it would, of course, be taken and used.

At length, in August last, when the increased and reinforced fleet, with the troops, ascended the Chesapeake, and were known, from authentic information, to have entered the Patuxent, I called on Secretary Armstrong again, and expressed, as usual, my apprehensions, arising from want of means and preparations, adding that, from the known naval and reputed land force of the enemy, he probably meant to strike a serious blow. His reply was, "oh yes! by G—d, they would not come with such a fleet without meaning to strike somewhere, but they certainly will not come here; what the d—l will they do here," &c. After remarking that I differed very much from him, as to the probable interest they felt in destroying or capturing our seat of Government, and that I believed a visit to this place would, for several reasons, be a favorite object with them, he observed, "no, no! Baltimore is the place, sir; that is of so much more consequence."

The public confidence in the Secretary of War had, for some time, been evidently rapidly declining, and the frequent and unreserved expressions by individuals to that effect, sometimes temperate, and sometimes otherwise, were really disagreeable and troublesome to me. The President must, I presume, have been aware of the fact of this want or decline of confidence, as well from the ordinary sources of information, as from that which I have understood (from one of the members themselves) he received from a joint committee or deputation of the municipal authorities of the city and Georgetown; who had, sometime before, a formal interview with him, relative to the general state of the District.

On the 18th of August last, I furnished Secretary Monroe, at his request, and by instructions of Secretary Armstrong, with two small troops of horse, to accompany him to the Patuxent. On the same day, General Winder (after a conference with me, in which he was hesitating and undecided as to the force he might want from the District of Columbia, and in which I advised him, unequivocally, to call for all its militia) required my whole division of troops. They were accordingly immediately ordered out. Beginning to suspect, from circumstances, that some difficulty might arise between General Winder and myself, on the score of command, and not meaning to create any not absolutely necessary, I determined not to raise the point until it should become *certain* that my troops were to go into *actual operation*. It soon became so, by the near and direct approach of the enemy to the city. I then called on General Winder, and, after observing to him that, all my troops being in service, I considered myself so also, (as I was a part of, or inseparably connected with, the division). I informed him that I should, of course, expect to take the command the law had assigned to me—of the whole—which I was prepared to do. He replied that I would certainly be entitled to the command, if I were *really in service*; and that he would, in such case, yield it to me cheerfully, and without hesitation: but he said he did not consider me necessarily in service, because *the two brigades* (which composed the whole) of my division had been required, and were in the field; and, inasmuch as this military district had been committed to him, he was compelled to retain the command, until he should be regularly notified by the Government that an officer of superior rank was *actually in service* within the district. General Winder, in a conversation of some minutes between us, made a distinction (which I could not comprehend) between calling or having *the two brigades* of my division in service, and calling or having *the division itself*, which consisted wholly of those two brigades. In support of this claim to the command of my division, he instanced the case of General Smith, of Baltimore, who, although a considerable part of his troops were in requisition and service, had not claimed the command, although he said he had, at first, made some intimation to that effect. I observed, that General Smith's conduct might be explained by the circumstance of his whole division not being in service. I concluded my interview with General Winder by informing him that I would immediately apply to the Secretary of War to determine the principal fact on which the case rested—whether I was or was not in service, and thus to decide the question between us, in which he appeared cordially to concur. Had there been as little confidence *then* in that gentleman's generalship as there is *now*, my course would have been different. I accordingly instantly called on the Secretary of War, who expressly declared it was "an embarrassing case;" and, after some minutes' general and indecisive conversation on the subject, concluded by assuring me that he would immediately state it to the President for his decision, and would, without delay, advise me of the result. This was early in the morning of (I think) Saturday, immediately preceding the Wednesday of the affair of Bladensburg.

After leaving Secretary Armstrong, dissatisfied as I was with the general tenor of his language and conduct, relative to the business, during the interview, I also called on the President, stating to him substantially the case, and adding, as I had before done to both the other gentlemen, that, if it were the particular wish and determination of the Executive (which I began to think not improbable) that General Winder should have the principal com-

\* Colonel Lavall has since informed me, that no effectual means were taken to mount his men, notwithstanding his frequent applications to the War Department for that purpose; and that, learning that the enemy was actually approaching us, he, on his own responsibility, adopted means for procuring horses, on the spur of the occasion, or he could not have been on at all for the particular service.

mand, in meeting the column of the enemy marching directly on the city from the Patuxent, that probably some separate station or command might be assigned me, as there were said to be other menaces and approaches. The President declined a decision until after the Secretary of War should have been consulted. I returned to my house, where I waited impatiently with my aids, Majors Brent and M'Kenny, who were ready and anxious to accompany me to camp, until half after twelve o'clock; and, although, upon reflecting on what had passed between the Secretary, General Winder, and myself, I was suspicious that it was predetermined, and arranged or understood between them, that I was not to have the command, or, at least, that an attempt should be made to withhold it from me, still, not hearing from the Secretary, I sent a messenger to him requesting a decision. After detaining the servant about two hours, he sent me, by him, a written communication, giving me to understand that I was not considered in command or service. I determined not to attempt to create any discordance or schism at a moment of imminent peril, and when the cordial co-operation of all was so important; and, at the same time, whilst I held my commission of Major General, not being able to serve under General Winder, I instantly sent my resignation to the Secretary, taking an early opportunity of assuring General Winder that, although I felt the injury done me, there was nothing personal in my motive, and, further, offering and pledging myself to him for any service in my power, either civil or military, which the public exigencies might require.\* I continued to see General Winder occasionally, as before, and to be astonished at the apparent sluggishness or procrastination in the preparation for the reception of the enemy, who was on his advance. I recollect well that, even after he had, according to authentic and undoubted information, ascended to the head of the ship navigation of the Patuxent, and had, for about twenty-four hours, been debarking on the hither bank of that river, and marching his troops to their encampment on the heights of Benedict, (about forty miles from this, on the usual route) General Winder, in answer to an inquiry of mine, whether he had ordered on any troops from Baltimore, and whether he thought they would be here in time, said that they were ordered on, and that all his fear was, that they would be here *too soon*. Expressing to him my astonishment at the apprehension, he said he thought it very probable that the enemy would suddenly turn about, and make a blow at Baltimore. Having been surprised, for several days, at not having seen or heard of any actual attempt or movement towards throwing up works, of any description, in this vicinity, from behind which the enemy might be resisted with great advantage and effect, I proposed, at a meeting of our citizens, on the Saturday evening (after I had resigned) next preceding the day of the affair at Bladensburg, that a committee should be appointed to wait on General Winder, and suggest to him the importance of some such works at Bladensburg, through which village the enemy would certainly pass; and, in case the General should approve the proposition, to request him to assign an engineer or officer to prescribe or superintend the work, the citizens furnishing the laborers, &c. gratis. A committee accordingly waited on him: he approved the idea, assigned or procured Colonel Wadsworth, of the ordnance department, to locate, superintend, &c. and, according to that officer's project and directions, (after having reconnoitered nearly a day, an operation in which, at his request, I accompanied him) were the works completed by the citizens, although, to the universal astonishment, not a man occupied, during the action, the principal one; and most advantageous parts of the ground, also, which had been reconnoitered, (and where the enemy might have been cut up and slain by hundreds) were not even occupied by our troops! Owing to accident and misinformation, I was not in the commencement of the action; but the whole scene, during my advance towards the right front, where Commodore Barney, with his men and the marine corps, did themselves so much honor, whilst I continued there, and afterwards, in retiring from one point to another as far as Georgetown, contained disgusting and inglorious circumstances. How what was called the first line of our troops, on their left, generally, was formed, I do not know. In that part of the field on which I moved, and afterwards, during the retreat, I could discover or learn nothing like a system or an order of battle, of retreat, or of rallying, or reforming; and several of the officers of the militia of the city and Georgetown, (General W. Smith's brigade) whom I met with in the course of the affair, (and who, with their men, were generally in good order, and deeply regretted the want of opportunity to act efficiently) appeared, in this respect, to be in the same predicament with myself.

A cardinal error in this whole business was, in my opinion, that the great body or mass of the Baltimore force† was not ordered on this way so soon as the direction of the enemy's movement was ascertained, with instructions, whilst they (the Baltimore force) were advancing, always to keep themselves between Baltimore and the enemy, so that they might, and would, have been ready, as the two branches of our army and the enemy approached each other, always to co-operate, either before or after a junction, with the troops assembling here, (who would, of course, have followed the enemy had he wheeled towards Baltimore) in case of an attempt either on this place or Baltimore; and thus an overwhelming and operative force would have been collected. Another very great error, I think, was, that the enemy were suffered undisturbedly to encamp on the heights of Benedict, where the local circumstances are well calculated for resistance, and to advance from thence to Bladensburg, without having been harassed or annoyed in their progress; this was probably, in part, and perhaps principally, owing to the want of a central camp, and, generally, of means and preparations, on our part, when the enemy landed.

Another error was, that our men were, for a short period before the action, unnecessarily harassed and worn down by fatiguing and ill-timed marches; which, in addition to the fatigue many of them underwent from running, as it were, from their homes (from which they were hurried and dragged at the moment, instead of having been ordered out in proper season) to this city, almost exhausted them. Another, a want of attention and promptness in having the reinforcements, as they arrived in the city, supplied with arms, ammunition, provisions, &c. and in accustoming them to the familiar use of the former. Another, that the enemy were suffered to advance too far, even at Bladensburg, before they were met; owing, doubtless, to the absence of our troops, who had been encamped the preceding night within about three or four miles only of the field of battle. Another, a want of the most advantageous order or arrangement in the battle itself; one of the causes of which doubtless was, that the enemy were suffered really to anticipate us in the occupation of the ground intended for ourselves. Another, the evident want of a concerted plan of retreat to, or rallying at, some one or more of the advantageous positions between the battle ground and the capitol. Another, a premature order (as generally understood) of retreat. Another, that a respectable body of apparently excellent troops, (the Fairfax regiment of militia) who had been in the city since a late period of the preceding day, were not in the action. I understand, from a gentleman who was present, that, early in the evening of the preceding day, after the arrival of those troops in the city, their commander made application to the Secretary of War, for arms and ammunition for them; and that, owing to objections made by the Secretary, he did not obtain them until the morning, which probably was a principal cause of his detention from the engagement. Another error, I think, was, that General Young's brigade of Alexandria, which was encamped on the east side of the Potomac, opposite to Alexandria, within a few miles of the Eastern Branch bridge, was not sent for immediately (if not before) when it was ascertained that the enemy was rapidly approaching Bladensburg. If this had been done, General Young might either have marched towards that place by the road South of the Eastern Branch, where he might have distracted and annoyed the enemy in flank or rear, or he might, (crossing the Eastern Branch bridge) if he could not have reached the field of battle, have met our retreating troops at some point in the city, and might thus have been very instrumental in restoring the fortune of the day; and in either case, he might, in a few hours' time, have returned to his former station: whereas, he remained, in obedience to an order (as he has himself informed me) that day given by the Secretary of War, at his position, not an enemy near him, or in sight, whilst his men distinctly heard the affair at Bladensburg, and were mortified at their absence from it. Another error was, that the woods, fences, ravines, &c. by the sides of the turnpike road were not lined with our light troops, to annoy the enemy in his advance from the battle ground. At all events, on the rising ground southwest of the turnpike gate, if not before, our troops ought to have made another stand. By the extraordinary exertions of private gentlemen, as well as officers, and by the opportune arrival at this favorable spot of the Fairfax troops, (I think about six hundred) who had not yet been engaged, a body of about ten or twelve hundred men was already formed, including several pieces of artillery, well planted, and their number was rapidly increasing, by the rallying of fugitives, the

\* Annexed are copies of my resignation, a subsequent letter from the War Department, and my answer thereto.

† A part only of the Baltimore force came this way.

arrival of fresh troops, &c.; and I am confident that, had they remained there, (in a position as well covering the navy yard as the city generally) the British would not have advanced that night, they being at least two or three miles off, wearied, and, partially, severely handled; and, by the morning, such advantages of system, arrangement, rest, increase of numbers, confidence, &c. might have been improved by us, as would have led to the discomfiture and defeat of the enemy; but, unfortunately, even from here those troops were ordered to retreat towards the Capitol Square, and thence to a more distant place; against both of which movements I took the liberty, at the time, of remonstrating to General Winder. Another unfortunate error was, that our troops, after it was determined to abandon the city itself, were not halted on some of the commanding heights around it, from which they might constantly have operated with effect, either by detachment, or otherwise, on the enemy, during his continuance here; and from which, if it had become necessary to retire, we might, at all times, have retired with safety. Another error was, that a considerable and unnecessary number of wagons and carts were in the field, or its immediate vicinity, from which, at an early period of the engagement, they fled, and in their flight contributed much to the dismay and confusion of the day. Another error was, that the enemy was not pursued and annoyed, in his precipitate departure to his ships. Many of those errors, doubtless, arose from the want of correct information relative to the enemy; which, in itself, was an extraordinary circumstance, as, for some days before they (the enemy) entered the city, there were several hundred cavalry among our troops. Many of the evils of the day also, unquestionably, arose from the rawness of a considerable part of our militia force; indeed, considering what the description of the great mass of our troops was, and that they had to contend with about an equal number of veterans, nothing but judicious and skilful management, added to our decided superiority of artillery and cavalry, the native valor of our men, fighting for all they held dear, and the local advantages within our reach, could have authorized the expectation of success.

Although I cannot think the means we had, on the spot were used to the best advantage, still I think General Winder was by no means furnished with sufficient or timely means; which I always considered it the special duty of the War Department to have attended to.

From a certain degree of delicacy, sir, in my situation, as regards both the late Secretary of War and General Winder, it is not without some reluctance that I have given the committee the above view; but, considering your call as imperative, and having always been of opinion that it was due to the American people that the facts and circumstances connected with the fall of the capital should be fully developed, I transmit it to you, after having necessarily prepared it in great haste. Possibly other circumstances relative to the subject may hereafter occur to me; should that be the case, I will take the liberty of communicating them. I presume, also, that I shall have the privilege hereafter of correcting any errors, either in form or substance, that may have crept into the statement.

JOHN P. VAN NESS.

Honorable R. M. JOHNSON, &c.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, August 20, 1814.

SIR:

Give me leave hereby to resign the command which I have for some time past had the honor to hold, as Major General of the militia of the District of Columbia. My commission would have been enclosed, had I been able to lay my hands upon it. A principal regret which I feel upon this occasion, is, that my resignation occurs at a moment when I would have been happy to have been permitted to participate in the defence of my country, and particularly of the District.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN P. VAN NESS.

Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 12, 1814.

SIR:

I am instructed to state, that your resignation of the command of the militia of this District, as Major General, has not been accepted, and that it would be satisfactory to the President that you should resume it.

That you were not called into service with the troops of the District did not proceed from a want of respect for your merit, which is acknowledged, but from the impossibility of doing it, at the time, without displeasing the commander of the district, from which the most serious injury was apprehended, the enemy having just landed at Benedict, and being on his march for this city. Great confidence is entertained in your patriotism, zeal in support of the cause of your country, and fitness for the trust, regarding your comparative experience, with that of others of our fellow-citizens, in active service. I add, with pleasure, that your conduct, after presenting your resignation, and particularly at Bladensburg, after joining our troops as a volunteer on the preceding day, has increased these favorable impressions.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JAMES MONROE.

Major General JOHN P. VAN NESS, City of Washington.

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1814.

SIR:

On my return to the city, after a few days' absence, I had the honor of receiving your communication of the twelfth instant, advising me that my resignation of the command of the militia of this District, offered some time since, has not been accepted, and that it would be satisfactory to the President that I should resume it.

Injured as I felt by the treatment I received, in relation to my military command, I adopted, as a proper expression of that feeling, what I considered the only course which, whilst it was just to myself, was not inconsistent with the public service—a course which I am gratified that my friends, both public and private, have universally approved. At the same time, sir, without at present hazarding an opinion, or going into any argument as to the sufficiency of the reason for disregarding my claim to the command, or to service, on the approach of the enemy to the metropolis, permit me to state, that I am perfectly satisfied that the President was actuated solely by a regard for the public good.

For the general politeness of your letter, for acknowledging the correctness of my conduct subsequent to my resignation, and particularly in the unfortunate affair at Bladensburg, although I have due sensibility, and fully appreciate the honor done me by the intimation of the President's wishes, it is out of my power to comply with them upon this occasion; which, I presume, cannot be regretted, inasmuch as other gentlemen, better qualified for the purpose, must be within the view of the Government.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN P. VAN NESS.

To the Hon. JAMES MONROE, Esq. Secretary of War.

*Doctor Catlett's statement.*

SIR:

In compliance with your request, I will endeavor to make as concise and correct a statement of the circumstances, which came within my view, of the late campaign in this neighborhood, as is in my power.

On the evening of the 21st, (being attached to the suite of General Winder, as staff surgeon) we were met by Colonel Monroe at the Woodyard, who had left Nottingham about sunset, where he saw the advance of the enemy

with their barges and small vessels. Next morning Colonel Monroe, General Winder, and suite, proceeded down and met them within three or four miles of Nottingham. After taking such positions as would afford the best view of the enemy, and remaining under cover of the woods until they advanced within three or four hundred yards of us, those gentlemen retired with Colonel Lavall's troop, which was also in advance, until we met an advanced detachment of our troops, about four or five hundred, which were immediately ordered to retreat to the main body at the Woodyard. Major Hite had been ordered to remain near the forks of the road, to observe whether the enemy took that leading to Marlborough, or the other we were on to the Woodyard. The country here, from the heights and fields, was admirably calculated to afford observations of the enemy. Their entire want of cavalry was observable, from their being none with their advance, to which we had been so near. Videttes were placed in our rear. General Winder proceeded towards the Woodyard: Colonel Monroe took a direction across the country towards Marlborough; I accompanied him. We soon (about twelve o'clock) began to hear the explosion and see the smoke from the flotilla. We were overtaken by some of the videttes, who stated that there were fifteen or twenty horsemen on our left, supposed to be of the enemy, attempting to cut us off. We immediately shaped our course towards the Woodyard; met General Winder, who returned; passed a number of our troops, and, arriving at the Woodyard, found the main body moving off towards the Long Old Fields, where the army encamped in the evening. Next morning, 23d, the President and all the Heads of Departments were in camp, having (I understood) come down that night. The President reviewed the troops, supposed about three thousand five hundred, having been joined at the Woodyard by Commodore Barney's men, and other corps, at this place. About two thousand five hundred Baltimore troops were at Bladensburg. This day an advanced detachment, I believe under the command of Major Peter, met the advance of the enemy in the neighborhood of Marlborough, some firing took place, and our troops retreated. General Winder was some miles over to the left, observing on the direct road from Marlborough to Bladensburg. Towards evening we returned to the Old Fields, and found our army advantageously posted to receive the enemy. A retreat was soon after ordered to this city, leaving some flour and whiskey destroyed on the camping ground. This night I slept within a mile of the field, and at daylight sent a man over in that direction to learn whether the enemy were there. He reported in the negative, and I went directly into the road and came on to the city, before eight o'clock, believing that the enemy could not reach Bladensburg until late in the day. The upper bridge was on fire, and the other prepared to be blown up as I crossed it. The first news I heard on entering the city, was, that the enemy were within two and a half miles, coming towards the bridge, and there appeared to be a continual succession and industrious circulation of false reports and false alarms. The enemy were pertinaciously represented to be at least nine thousand, and many were disposed to believe their number greater, although several prisoners taken yesterday could only enumerate four regiments, and name but one General, and one Colonel, acting as Brigadier. I examined several myself, with all the address I could, and would certainly have risked my life upon their almost entire want of artillery and their want of cavalry. There appeared to be an impression with our troops, generally, that the enemy were much more formidable than appearances could justify. About 11 o'clock the main body of our troops moved off from near the Eastern Branch bridge towards Bladensburg, and, by a necessarily extraordinary effort, for men immediately from ship board, the British reached the opposite side of the village nearly at the same time with our troops, about 1 o'clock. They halted in front about twenty minutes, until their rear got up. Some officers were seen observing us from the opposite heights. The two armies were about three fourths of a mile apart, pretty much in view of each other. The position of our troops will be better described to you by others. A few minutes before the action commenced, by request of General Winder I delivered an order to Major Pinkney, in front, to take the most judicious position with his riflemen to protect the artillery at the battery, within two hundred yards of the Bladensburg bridge, and three or four hundred in advance of our first line. The enemy were now coming down a street in the village, in thick column. This battery, of about seven pieces, commenced a destructive fire upon them, which immediately threw their advance out of the street, among the houses, but they were very soon crossing the bridge in great numbers, notwithstanding an additional cross fire from several pieces from our right. They advanced with great steadiness towards the battery. The artillery retreated; the rifles received them handsomely, but soon retreated also. They began by firing a few rockets about the time that our fire commenced, which passed a considerable distance over our first line, immediately in the rear of which were the President, and several other gentlemen of the cabinet. It was suggested to them, I think by General Winder, to take a more respectful distance, and they did so. General Winder rode along the line, encouraging the men to disregard the rockets. The enemy having carried the battery in front of us, began to flank irregularly, but a considerable number, also, advancing directly upon this line, (through an orchard) which soon commenced a fire upon them, from an elevated position, and too soon after, before they came within point blank shot, retreated. They were, however, a number of them, easily rallied by another officer and myself; but on part of the line giving way, which had stood fast, further on the left, they all broke off again. The fire now became very hot in the centre, from our musketry and artillery: the musketry too distant, although with great advantage of position, but the artillery evidently with great execution. The musketry continually, and successively (without being rallied) retreating as the enemy advanced upon them; and as soon as they closed up with Commodore Barney's command, a general retreat took place, before they had reached a considerable portion of our infantry. Being in the rear, I observed that the enemy seemed to halt when the firing ceased, about a mile and a half on this side of Bladensburg; there was nothing like pursuit. When I got to Capitol Hill, there were no troops formed there. As I passed through the city, it was reported that the enemy were coming in from towards the race ground. I observed that it was false, and only intended to produce panic. The few citizens I saw at their houses, appeared as if resigned to meet an awful fate. The main body of our army were now retreating through Georgetown, where I met a deputation, the Mayor and several others, going out to meet the enemy. They can best tell, but I do not think it probable that the enemy were advancing, or knew the extent of our retreat before this deputation met them, for I had seen them halting; and the next day, when I came in with a flag, to attend our wounded, I learned from some of their officers that they suspected our troops were still on the heights above Georgetown, though they were at Montgomery Court House, from which place General Winder had ordered me back to Bladensburg, with permission of the British commander, for the purpose mentioned. I met the advance of the British army on Capitol Hill, supposed to be about seven hundred, and passed their main body, supposed about two thousand, on the hill this side the turnpike. They appeared to be preparing to move; had about forty miserable looking horses haltered up, ten or twelve carts and wagons, one ox cart, one coachee, and several gigs, which the officers were industriously assisting to tackle up, and which were immediately sent on to Bladensburg, to move off their wounded. A drove of sixty or seventy cattle preceded this cavalcade. On our arrival at Bladensburg, the surgeons were ordered to select all the wounded who could walk, (those with broken arms and the like) and send them off immediately. The forty horses were mounted with such as could ride, the carts and wagons loaded, and ninety odd wounded left behind. I estimated their wounded at three or four hundred, besides forty or fifty left in this city. One of the British surgeons informed me they had buried that day about one hundred on the field; and the men who were sent out next day after the retreat of the enemy, to bury three or four Americans, reported that they also buried fifty or sixty red-coats, or British. I found at Bladensburg Commodore Barney, Captain Miller, of marines, and seventeen other Americans, badly wounded. I estimate our whole loss at ten or twelve killed on the field, and thirty odd wounded; though others, who had less opportunity of judging, estimate it at more than double. About midnight (being up all night) I heard the sound of a bugle, and was informed that the whole British army were passing through the lower end of the village. In the morning, early, I saw them still going off in small squads, and some stragglers were moving off till noon, about which time we learned that their main body were halted about eight miles on the road to Marlborough. About sunset Captain Burd came down from Montgomery Court House, and informed Commodore Barney and myself, that our troops were marching on to Baltimore, and about the same time we were informed by several persons, that the British were within a few miles of Marlborough. The Commodore expressed a wish that General Winder could be immediately informed of the certainty and manner of their retreat; and, not being able to find any one else, to be depended on, to go for one hundred dollars, having engaged Doctors Martin and McCulloch to attend to our wounded until my return, with the advice of Commodore Barney, I set out, about dark, with one dra-

goon, and reached our camp, beyond Snell's bridge, twenty-eight miles, about one o'clock. The troops were intended, about this hour, to march on to Baltimore. General Winder was gone on; Generals Smith, Stansbury, and others, held a council on my information, and it was determined to send off (I think) the principal part of the cavalry in pursuit of the enemy, immediately; the troops to remain until daylight, and the militia of the District of Columbia to return to the District. I have never been able to learn what cavalry were actually sent off, or the success of their enterprises. After this I was, and have ever since been, confined to the attendance of a hospital, and can relate little further from my own observation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

HANSON CATLETT,  
Surgeon 1st Regiment Infantry.

Respecting the condition of the enemy's troops, I was informed by several of the British officers, that, just previous to their reaching Bladensburg, (with excessive fatigue or entire exhaustion) they were dropping off in considerable numbers; that, in the action, it was only by the most extraordinary exertions that the main body could be goaded on. Although I observed some of their flankers at times advance on the run a small distance, these were said to be only the most active of their light companies of, and attached to, their 85th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thornton, acting as Brigadier; they appeared to me to halt, as if exhausted with fatigue, at or near the place where the firing ceased on our part, about a mile and a half on this side of Bladensburg, about two o'clock, P. M. Their advance, however, reached the capitol about dark or eight o'clock; the main body, I am informed, never came further than the height on this side the turnpike. You ask further for information as to their numbers. Although I had a better opportunity of observation after the battle than any other of our officers, I cannot pretend to state, with any degree of confidence, on this subject; but my estimate was, on Capitol Square, 700; Turnpike Hill, 2,000; wounded at Bladensburg, 300; attendants and guard, 300; wounded and attendants in the city, 60; and from information, killed at Bladensburg and city, 180; total, 3,540. However incorrect these estimates may be in the detail, they are corroborated, in the aggregate, by the best information I could get from the surgeons, sergeants, and men left in hospital.

Respectfully,

H. CATLETT.

*Mr. John Law's statement.*

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1814.

SIR:

In compliance with your request, I beg leave to submit to you the following statement of the movements and operations of the troops to whom I was attached, from the period of their march against the enemy, who had landed at Benedict, until their return on the 27th of August.

On Friday, the 19th of August, the militia of this county were mustered near Mr. Ringgold's rope-walk, and, on being dismissed, were ordered to equip and hold themselves in readiness to march the next morning. The second regiment, under Colonel Brent, accordingly assembled near the capitol; and, by nine o'clock, A. M., were prepared to take up the line of march. About one o'clock, the first regiment, under Colonel Magruder, arrived at the Capitol Hill. Shortly after, the whole force, collected from this county, commenced its march; and, after proceeding about five miles from the Eastern Branch bridge, encamped that night on the road to Upper Marlborough. The next morning the troops were again mustered, and the articles of war read to them. About twelve o'clock, the detachment of marines, under the command of Captain Miller, passed our encampment with five pieces of artillery, and shortly after, our two regiments of militia again took up the line of march, and, after advancing about seven miles, encamped on a field belonging to the Woodyard estate. We here joined the regulars of the 36th and 38th regiments. The main body of the enemy stayed that night at or near Nottingham, having an advance party stationed at a church about three miles this side of that town. About one o'clock the same night, our troops were beat up and ordered to strike their tents; although the principal part of the force did not move until nine or ten o'clock the next morning. About sunrise the regulars, together with a small detachment of about three hundred men, consisting of Captain Peter's company of artillery, Captain Stull's rifle corps, and Captain Davidson's light infantry, were sent in advance on the road to Nottingham. About nine or ten o'clock the same day, the remainder of our force marched about a mile, to an elevated position near the dwelling house of Mrs. West, and remained there about two hours, under the expectation that the enemy would take that road on his way from Nottingham to Washington. It was, however, ascertained that the enemy had taken the road to Upper Marlborough, and that the detachment of our troops, who had been sent that morning in advance, were retreating. All the troops were then ordered to retreat; and, instead of being marched towards Upper Marlborough, where the enemy remained that night, (waiting, it is presumed, to be joined by the detachment which had been sent against Commodore Barney's flotilla) we were marched to the Battalion Old Fields, about eight miles distant from Upper Marlborough, and about the same distance from Washington. The same day we were joined by the crews of Commodore Barney's flotilla. On Tuesday, the 23d of August, the troops were drawn up in three or four lines, and reviewed by the President of the United States. The most contradictory reports prevailed at this time in our camp, respecting the strength and movements of the enemy. Our force at this place, from the best information I could collect, consisted of about four hundred horse, the flotilla men amounting to about four hundred and fifty, one hundred and ten marines, about four hundred regulars of the 36th and 38th regiments, and about eighteen hundred militia from Maryland and the county of Washington. The militia of Alexandria county never joined us. About 12 o'clock the same day, the detachment of three hundred militia, which had been sent on the day before, were again ordered to advance towards the enemy. They met him on his march, about six miles in advance of our encampment, but with so great a disparity of force, that it was impossible for them to make a stand. After Captain Stull's rifle company had fired about four rounds, the detachment was compelled to retreat, to prevent being surrounded by the enemy. About five o'clock, P. M., after having remained some time in line of battle, we were ordered to retreat to Washington, and, although our march on the retreat was extremely rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to the captains of companies to hurry on their men. The march, therefore, literally became a run of eight miles, and the propriety of this rapid movement, which unnecessarily fatigued and dispirited the men, may be tested by the fact, that the main body of the enemy *bivouacked* that night on the Melwood estate, more than three miles distant from the ground we had left.

On our arrival at the city, we encamped about half a mile from the Eastern Branch bridge. About midnight, a detachment of Captain Burch's company, to which I was attached, was called up and ordered to move with three pieces of artillery to an eminence near the bridge, which was done. During the night, a boat, containing eight barrels of powder, was stationed underneath the bridge, under the charge of Mr. Forrest, of the navy, with orders to blow it up on the approach of the enemy. About sunrise, the remainder of our company joined us. We were shortly after ordered to pull down the rails of a neighboring fence, and place them on the bridge, in order that it might be effectually burnt, in case the explosion of gunpowder should not succeed in preventing the enemy from passing it. For the same purpose, the toll house was ordered to be pulled down, and the planks placed on the bridge. About ten o'clock the same day, our company was ordered to give up its position to Commodore Barney, who had a number of heavier guns with him, and who immediately after took possession of the eminence we had occupied. About eleven o'clock, we were ordered to march, and on arriving at the boundary line of the city, we halted a short time, until we were joined by the remainder of the troops, when we continued our march to Bladensburg. At the distance of about a mile and a quarter from that town, the troops were halted, and shortly after Captain Burch, with three of his pieces of artillery, was ordered to advance and report himself to General Winder. Captain Burch immediately advanced with three of his pieces; and, on reaching the left of the line of Baltimore militia, halted the men in the road, in order that he might look for General Winder and receive his orders.

At this time the advance of the British was just entering the outskirts of Bladensburg, and the arms of a large body of them were seen glittering in the sun, about a mile from the town. Finding that Captain Burch did not return as soon as might have been reasonably expected, and hearing that General Winder was a short distance from us, I marched our detachment of artillery towards the spot where he was, and, on coming up to him, inquired what position I should take with our artillery. He addressed me as Captain, and ordered me to place our pieces in battery on the left of the Baltimore line of infantry, which was immediately done. Shortly after he came up to us, and, again addressing me, said, "When you retreat, take notice you must retreat by the Georgetown road;" at the same time he pointed to a road which led from Digges's mill into the country, and passed near the position we had taken. Captain Burch soon after joined us. The time occupied in taking our position was sufficient to have enabled us, and also the troops that marched from the city, to take any position on the fields this side of Bladensburg. About a quarter of an hour after we had taken our position, the Baltimore artillery, which was posted in advance near the mill, (and shortly after, the Baltimore riflemen) commenced firing on the enemy. The artillery fired about ten rounds, as far as I could judge, and then retreated, with some of the Baltimore riflemen, towards our left. A few scattering British soldiers were soon after visible in the orchard before us, and they appeared to be forming behind a barn, which was about three hundred and fifty yards from our guns. We immediately commenced our fire upon them; and, shortly after, General Winder came behind our guns, and ordered us to direct our shot at the barn. We had scarcely fired three rounds, when the line of the Baltimore militia began to break; several of the 5th Baltimore regiment also fled. After we had fired about five rounds from our pieces, General Winder ordered us to retreat, in consequence, I presume, of the flight of the militia on our right. The British column had just then begun to advance from the barn. Not a man of our company had been touched by the fire of the enemy, and I thought that the battle was only then seriously commencing. After retreating about a hundred yards, we were again ordered to unlimber our pieces; but this order was immediately after countermanded, and we were directed to continue our retreat. Our pieces were never after ordered into action; nor were we, at any time, told where to rally. The road, by which we had been directed to retreat, and by which the principal part of the Baltimore troops also retreated, forked, some miles from the battle ground, in three directions; one branch led by Rock Creek Church to Tenlytown and Montgomery Court House; another branch led to Georgetown; and the third to the city of Washington. Each individual, on the retreat, took the road that suited his inclination. For myself, having been separated, together with several of Capt. Burch's company, from our guns, which were before us, and presuming that the principal part of the force had gone to Washington, I took the road leading to this place. On arriving at the capitol, I understood that the city had been abandoned by our troops, without further struggle, to the enemy. Our forces encamped that night at Tenlytown, about three miles back of Georgetown. The next day they marched to Montgomery Court House; and, on the 26th of August, to Snell's bridge, on the road to Baltimore, where I joined them, having never had it in my power before to do so. On Saturday, the 27th, the troops belonging to this District returned here. The enemy left the city on the night of the 25th.

From what I could discern of the line of the enemy's march on his entrance into Bladensburg, before the battle, I conjectured that his force amounted to about five thousand men. I afterwards collected, from conversations with British prisoners, and from comparing together the several accounts they gave me, that it did not exceed four thousand four hundred men, including about one hundred or one hundred and fifty sailors, who were armed only with cutlasses. The enemy's artillery consisted of one howitzer, and two small pieces, drawn by men; and his whole force actually engaged in the battle did not exceed twelve hundred men, as I was informed by two British officers and some prisoners. Our force, on the other hand, consisted of the troops that were with us on the Battalion Old Fields, amounting, in my opinion, to about three thousand one hundred and sixty men, together with about two thousand troops from Baltimore, and about five hundred militia under Colonel Beall, who joined us on the field of battle. Our artillery consisted of eighteen six pounders, under Captains Peter, Burch, and Magruder, and two eighteen pounders and three twelves under Commodore Barney. The enumeration which I have given of our troops may, in some instances, be incorrect, as it is merely the result of general observation and inquiry. I would beg leave further to state, that the distance between Benedict and Washington, by the way of Bladensburg, is at least fifty miles, and that the whole of the intervening country is admirably calculated for every species of military operation. I shall refrain, sir, from expressing any opinion on the manner in which our force was conducted and employed; but, in justice to General Winder, I will add, that he evinced no deficiency of personal courage or military coolness during the action.

With respect, I am, &c.

JOHN LAW.

No. 11.

*Reports from the Ordnance Department.*

UNITED STATES' ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, November 28th, 1814.

SIR:

In addition to the information which I have had the honor to give to the committee of investigation upon the subject of the late invasion of this District by the enemy, I have to state:

That I have perused letters recently written by Colonel D. Wadsworth to Daniel Carroll, Esq. of this District, respecting the burning of the Potomac bridge, and the destruction of the military stores deposited on the Virginia side thereof; which in substance contain a specific denial of either circumstance having taken place by his orders or advice. He explicitly states, that the latter was occasioned by the corporal or non-commissioned officer commanding the guard, who, on the draws of the bridge having been broken by a violent tornado, and perceiving a body of the British ready to pass over, concluded the surest and best measure to prevent it, was to destroy, by fire, that end and part where he was posted; and that the other end, on the Washington side, was fired by the enemy.

The military stores which had been placed at the end of the bridge were destroyed by the event of firing that end.

I beg leave to take this occasion to repeat what I had the honor to state to you verbally, that, having been personally conversant with Colonel Wadsworth on the evening of the day of the battle of Bladensburg, and on the subsequent invasion of the city, the colonel at no time suggested to me (though the next officer in command) the necessity or expediency of firing the Potomac bridge; and I have, consequently, no belief that such was his intention or order.

Lieutenant Baden, who was directed to post the guard at the Virginia end of the bridge, and for the protection of the military stores, unequivocally and explicitly denies having given any similar order.

I beg leave to transmit here a more particular account of the stores furnished to Fort Washington; rendered, however, by the late decision of a court martial, less necessary than before.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN MORTON,

*Captain and Deputy Commissary, acting for the Commissary General.*

Hon. Col. R. M. JOHNSON.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, October 21, 1814.

SIR:

In the absence of the Commissary General, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to this department, of the 15th current, requesting, in behalf of the committee of which you are chairman, "all the information in its power on the subject of their inquiry; more especially to state what was the quantity and situation of the munitions of war within the District of Columbia, previous to, and at the time of, the invasion of the enemy in his recent enterprises against this metropolis."

The hurry with which many of those munitions were distributed, previous to, and at the time of, the invasion, and the dispersion and loss of some papers which gave some details thereof, necessarily render the reports from the several persons having charge of them, somewhat imperfect, and will render it difficult to give from this department more than (as follows) a general statement. This statement, however, will be substantially correct; and will, perhaps, tend to answer or satisfy the committee on the leading objects of the inquiry made of this office.

Presuming that the expression, "munitions of war," was intended to include the ordnance within the District, I shall commence therewith, by stating, that there were, at the period alluded to, the following mounted cannon, viz:

Eight 24 pounders, cannon, mounted on garrison carriages, and forming the battery, Greenleaf's Point.	
One 50 ditto, columbiad,	do. do. do. do.
One 18 ditto, do.	do. do. do. do.
Two 18 pounders, cannon, complete for the field, on travelling carriages,	
Five 12 ditto, do. do.	do. do.
Six 6 ditto, do. do.	do. do.
Three 24 howitzers, do.	do. do.

These last were in charge at the United States' arsenal, Greenleaf's Point; but occasionally distributed previous to the actual invasion of the city, as ordered; for instance, two eighteen pounders, on travelling carriages, were placed in front of the capitol, for its defence; two twelve pounders in front of the President's House, and two near the General Post Office, for the same purposes.

In addition to the foregoing, there were twelve six pounders, field artillery, furnished by the order of the late Secretary of War, to, and in the service of, the District corps of artillery; and two twelve pounders loaned to the marine corps of the United States.

The number of field artillery attached to the brigade of Alexandria, is not known to me; but it is presumed to have been four or six pieces.

Of ordnance stores, there were on hand at the United States' laboratory, exclusive, of course, of what had before been distributed, viz:

140 bbls. (14,000 lbs.) gun powder of different kinds,	
5 tons lead,	
7,180 cannon cartridges, filled and empty (the empty are soon filled.)	
8,650 rounds of round grape and canister shot.	
150 ten inch shells, with other stores of ordinary consumption, or expenditure, too numerous to detail.	
In the military store and laboratory, viz:	
Stands of arms complete,	- - - - - 2,993
Cartridge boxes and belts,	- - - - - 1,595
Bayonet scabbards and belts,	- - - - - 2,584
Flints,	- - - - - 13,700
Musket cartridges of different kinds (single ball, and ball and buck shot,)	- - - - - 271,000

The foregoing were on hand immediately preceding the invasion, after considerable distributions had been occasionally made to the regular troops and the militia, employed in different situations or parts of this section of the country; and equal, it is believed by me, to all their requisitions.

Of rifles it was impossible, though every exertion was made by this department, to procure a seasonable supply.

What is here offered to the honorable committee embraces, perhaps, all which is expected from this department; but, if any additional objects of inquiry should occur, the undersigned will hold himself in readiness to furnish, either personally or in writing, whatsoever may be required and remain further within his means of information.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN MORTON,  
Deputy Commissary United States' Ordnance.

Hon. Col. R. M. JOHNSON.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, November 4, 1814.

SIR:

In compliance with your verbal request, I have the honor to state to you that, by an ordnance return, bearing date the 30th June, ultimo, received at this office, there were at Fort Washington, on the Potomac—

Two 32 pounders on fixed carriages (cannon.)
Eight 24 pounders do. do.
Two 50 pounders (columbiads) on fixed carriages, do.
Three 6 pounders on travelling carriages, do.

Of ordnance stores there were—

132 rounds, 32 pounders, round shot.
432 do. 24 pounders, do.

564 round shot.

99 flannel cartridges, 32 pounders, filled.
86 do. 24 pounders, do.
88 do. 32 pounders, empty.
405 do. 24 pounders, soon filled.
44 paper cartridges, 32 pounders, empty.
177 do. 24 pounders, do.

899 cartridges, filled and empty.

3,100 pounds cannon powder.
246 pounds musket powder.
100 musket cartridges.
291 pounds lead.
200 pounds junk.
137 musket balls.
31 stand small arms.

From the 30th June to August 27, there were furnished at Fort Washington the following:

Four 18 pounders (columbiads) July 16.
Forty-eight stands of arms, complete.
117 rounds ammunition for 18 pounders, columbiads.
205 do. 18 pounders, cannon.
48 do. 18 pounders, grape shot.
200 do. 18 pounders, round shot.
240 do. 6 pounders, strapped shot.
60 do. 6 pounders, case shot.
48 do. 18 pounders, case shot.
232 tubes.
34 portfires.
33 pounds slow match.

The number of men stationed at Fort Washington is not precisely known at this office, but it is supposed by me not to have exceeded sixty.

I regret that circumstances have delayed your receipt of this communication; but, as your former written request confined my report to the District, more time has been required to ascertain the facts here stated, (particularly the supplies since the 30th June) than would otherwise have occurred.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JNO. MORTON,  
Captain, and Dep. Com. United States' Ordnance,

Hon. Colonel JOHNSON.

*Return of Fixed Ammunition and Ordnance Stores delivered to Fort Washington, in the month of August, 1814, previous to the 24th of that month.*

18 pound round shot.	18 pound grape.	Flannel cartridges filled for 18 pound columbiads.	18 pound cannon cartridges, flannel bottoms, filled.	6 pound strapped shot, fixed.	6 pound case shot, fixed.	18 pound case shot, filled.	Tubes filled.	Portfires.	Pounds slow match.	Muskets cartridges, buck and ball.	Musket cartridges, single ball.	Ammunition boxes.	Kegs.	Barrels.
200	48	117	205	140	60	48	232	34	33	8,126	22,050	19	43	17

GREENLEAF'S POINT, November 9, 1814.

N. BADEN, Lieut. Com. at Greenleaf's Point.

No. 12.

*Sentence of the Court Martial in relation to Captain Dyson, and the correspondence between him and the Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 29, 1814.

SIR:

I send Captain Manigault with orders to receive your written or verbal report of the causes under which you left the post committed to your charge. In this you will state the orders under which you acted, and from whom received.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Captain Dyson, Corps of Artillery.

CAMP AT MASON'S ISLAND, August 29, 1814.

SIR:

I had the honor to receive your communication of the 29th instant. The orders received from Brigadier General Winder, through Major Hite, verbally, on the 24th instant, were, in case I was oppressed by, or heard of, an enemy in my rear, to spike our guns, and make my escape over the river. The enemy approached by water on the 27th, and we had learnt on that day, through several channels, that the enemy had been reinforced at Benedict two thousand strong, and that they were on their march to co-operate with the fleet, in addition to the force which left the city. Under all these circumstances, the officers under my command were consulted, and agreed it was best to abandon the fort, and effect a retreat. The force under my command was thought not equal to a defence of the place.

I have the honor to be, &c.

SAM. T. DYSON, Captain Corps of Artillery.

Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG, Secretary of War, Washington.

HEAD QUARTERS, TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT, BALTIMORE, Nov. 17, 1814.

GENERAL ORDERS.

At a general court martial, whereof Brigadier General Smith, of the militia of the District of Columbia, was president, which met at Washington city, and continued its sittings, by divers adjournments, until the 12th instant, Captain Samuel T. Dyson, of the United States' corps of artillery, was tried on the following charges and specifications:

*Charge First.* Violating the fifty-second article of the rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States.

*Specification First.* In that the said Samuel T. Dyson, being commanding officer of the United States' Fort Washington, did, on or about the 27th of August, 1814, when an enemy was approaching said fort, misbehave himself before the enemy, run away, and shamefully abandon the fort, post, and guard, which he then and there commanded, and which it was his bounden duty to defend, and speak words inducing others to do the like.

*Specification Second.* In that the said Samuel T. Dyson did, on or about the 27th day of August, aforesaid, at the post called Fort Washington, aforesaid, cast away and destroy his arms and ammunition, contrary to the said fifty-second article of the rules and articles of war, aforesaid, and to his duty as commanding officer.



*Charge Second.* Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

*Specification First.* In that the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson, being commanding officer of the United States' fort and garrison, at a place called Fort Washington, did, on or about the 27th day of August, 1814, misbehave himself, by dismantling and destroying said fort, which it was his bounden duty to preserve and defend.

*Specification Second.* In that the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson did, on or about the 27th day of August, aforesaid, quit his post, called Fort Washington, without any attempt to defend the same; and, without any necessity therefor, from the presence of an enemy did march off the garrison of the same, in violation of his duty, and contrary to his orders.

*Specification Third.* In that the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson, on or about the 27th day of August, 1814, being commanding officer of the garrison at Fort Washington, and an enemy being then in his vicinity, was so drunk and intoxicated, while on duty, that he abandoned and destroyed the fort which had been entrusted to his defence, and suffered the garrison of the same to disperse, without being pressed to the measure for the safety of himself and the garrison aforesaid.

R. H. WINDER, *Army Judge Advocate.*

The court having heard all the evidence adduced, whether on the part of the prosecution or the defence, and after due deliberation thereon, pronounce the following sentence:

On the first specification of the first charge, the court find that Captain Samuel T. Dyson, of the United States' corps of artillery, being commanding officer of the United States' fort, Fort Washington, did, on or about the 27th day of August, 1814, when an enemy was approaching said fort, misbehave himself before the enemy, and shamefully abandon the fort and post which he then and there commanded, and which it was his bounden duty to defend.

The court find the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson guilty of the second specification of the first charge.

The court find the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson guilty of the first charge.

In like full and deliberate manner, the court took into consideration the second charge, and the three specifications attached to that charge.

The court find the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson guilty of the first specification of the second charge.

The court find the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson guilty of the second specification of the second charge.

The court acquit the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson of the third specification of the second charge.

On the second charge the court find the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, but do not find him guilty of conduct unbecoming a gentleman.

The court do sentence the said Captain Samuel T. Dyson to be dismissed the service of the United States.

The Major General commanding the district approves of the proceedings and sentence of the general court martial in the foregoing case, and accordingly pronounces Samuel T. Dyson dismissed the service of the United States.

The general court martial, whereof Brigadier General Smith is President, is hereby dissolved.

W. SCOTT.

By command.

FRANCIS S. BELTON,

*Assistant Adjutant General 10th Military District.*

No. 13.

*Report from the Corporation of Alexandria, including the capitulation, and letter from General John Mason.*

ALEXANDRIA, September 28, 1814.

SIR:

I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th instant, by this day's mail, and hasten to comply with your request therein contained. The enclosed printed statement is an official act of the Common Council of Alexandria, and contains a full and true account of the occupation of this town by the enemy, and of the circumstances connected with that event, and a copy of the terms imposed by Captain Gordon, the commander of the British squadron, on the town of Alexandria. There was no correspondence between the Common Council and the enemy, other than that mentioned in the statement.

As you request a statement of any other proceedings of the town of Alexandria, in a corporate capacity, touching the inquiry embraced in the resolution enclosed in your letter, I think it proper to state that, on the 8th of May, 1813, the Common Council appointed a deputation to wait on the President of the United States, and apprise him of the defenceless state of the town of Alexandria: accordingly, the persons appointed waited on the President, and represented to him the defenceless state of the town, and the fears of the citizens that the navy yard, public buildings, and cannon foundry, would tempt the enemy to make an attack on the District. He observed, that the representation of any respectable body of men was entitled to attention; and that the subject should be taken under consideration, or words to that effect.

On the 11th of May, in the same year, the Common Council appointed a committee to confer and co-operate with committees appointed by the constituted authorities of the city of Washington and Georgetown, relative to the defence of the District. Those several committees soon afterwards met in the city of Washington, and appointed a sub-committee to wait on the Secretary of War, and on the Secretary of the Navy, and to solicit them to take measures for the defence of the District, and application on that subject was accordingly made to them by the sub-committees. The common council of Alexandria has appointed a committee to attend the committee of Congress, appointed to inquire into the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against the metropolis and Alexandria, who will give every information which may be required, of the proceedings of the Common Council, and of the citizens of Alexandria, in relation to the enemy.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CHARLES SIMMS.

*A Report of the Committee of Council on the late occupation of Alexandria, by a British squadron, under the command of Captain James A. Gordon.*

IN COUNCIL, September 7, 1814.

Present: Thomas Herbert, President, John Gird, Andrew Fleming, Henry Nicholson, J. B. Paton, John Cohagen, James Millan, John Hunter, Reuben Johnston, R. I. Taylor, William Veitch, Anthony Rhodes.

The following narrative of the occupation of this town by the enemy, and of the circumstances connected with that unfortunate transaction, having been submitted to council, and duly considered and examined, the council do unanimously concur therein; and it is thereupon ordered, that it be published in both of the papers printed in this town.

THOMAS HERBERT, *President.*

At a meeting of the committee of vigilance, this 7th of September, 1814,

Present: Charles Simms, Mayor, Joseph Dean, Matthew Robinson, Jonah Thompson, William Herbert, Thos. Vowell, Edmund I. Lee.

The following narrative of the occupation of the town of Alexandria by the British squadron, was submitted to the committee, who, upon examining the same, unanimously concur in it.

THOMAS VOWELL, *Secretary.*

CHARLES SIMMS, *Chairman.*

A respect for the opinions of others, and a due regard for the character of the citizens of Alexandria, have induced the municipal authorities of the town to exhibit to the public a faithful narrative of the occupation of Alexandria, by the British squadron, under the command of Captain Gordon, together with the causes which led to that distressing event.

To those who are unacquainted with the situation and condition of Alexandria, in regard to its means of defence, it will be proper to state that it is situate in the District of Columbia; upon the west bank of the river Potomac, about six miles below the city of Washington, the depth of water admitting large frigates to come to the very wharves of the town.

It is totally destitute of fortifications of any kind, and its protection against invasion by water depended entirely upon a fort about six miles below the town, commonly known by the name of Fort Warburton, which was exclusively under the control of the Government of the United States.

About the month of July last, it was announced that General Winder was appointed to the command of the 10th military district of the United States, comprehending the District of Columbia, and a portion of the adjoining States of Virginia and Maryland, including the city of Baltimore.

In consequence of reports that the enemy contemplated an attack upon the city of Washington, the municipal authority of Alexandria thought it advisable to appoint a committee of vigilance, for the purpose of procuring information of the approaches of the enemy, and of obtaining assistance and advice as to the measures which it might be proper to pursue for protection and defence. As soon as this committee was appointed, they caused representations to be made to General Winder, of the defenceless condition of the town, and earnestly entreated that some measures should be taken for its protection. General Winder was called on, because it had been distinctly understood that the Secretary of War would receive our communications through this channel only. From General Winder every assurance was made that could have been wished, that every thing in his power should be done for the protection of the town. His means, however, were very inconsiderable: he had no money to expend in fortifications, or even in the erection of batteries; and unless some defence of this sort could be obtained, the town would be exposed to the mercy of the enemy if he should approach by water, and should succeed in passing the fort. The committee of vigilance was duly impressed with the necessity of providing some adequate defence against an attack by water, and some of its members, under the authority of the committee, had repeated interviews with General Winder on this subject; in one of them, the President of the United States was present, and he was distinctly given to understand that, unless there was provided an adequate defence for the town, it would be at the mercy of the enemy, and would be compelled to make the best terms in its power. These representations and requests produced no other effect than the repetition of the assurance of an earnest desire, on the part of General Winder, to afford every assistance in his power.

On the 19th of August a levy en masse was made of the militia of the town and county of Alexandria, and on the 20th and 21st they were ordered to cross the Potomac, and stationed between Piscataway and Fort Warburton. They took with them all the artillery which had been mounted at the expense of the corporation, except two twelve pounders, which were left without ammunition, and nearly all the arms belonging to the town. They left no men but the exempts from age and other causes, and a few who had not reported themselves, or had found substitutes, and it is not believed that, after their departure, one hundred effective armed men could have been mustered in town. The two iron twelve pounders remained until the 25th, when Alexandria being open to the enemy, then in full possession of Washington, they were removed at some distance from the town, by orders received from General Young.

On the night of the 24th the Alexandria militia were ordered to recross the Potomac; they did so, and were marched through town, without halting, into the country, and without giving information to the authorities or inhabitants of the place of their destination; and on the evening of the 27th, when the fleet approached, the municipal authorities of the town knew not where they were. It has since appeared, that they were then stationed about nineteen miles from town, by the orders of General Winder. It is here proper to state, that General Winder, on the morning of the 24th, informed the members of the committee of vigilance, who waited on him, that he could send no part of the forces with him to Alexandria, but that he had ordered General Young to cross over to Alexandria, if practicable, if not, to fall down the river: The committee of vigilance, on receiving this information, sent boats over to the Maryland shore, sufficient in number to bring over the whole of General Young's force at once; but when the boats reached him, he had received orders from the Secretary of War to retain his position, as General Young, in a communication to the Mayor, stated.

The committee of vigilance, despairing of obtaining any assistance from the General Government, and having information of the rapid approach of the enemy towards the capital by land, and that their squadron was approaching Alexandria by water, deemed it their duty to recommend to the common council a resolution to the following effect: "That, in case the British vessels should pass the fort, or their forces approach the town by land, and there should be no sufficient force, on our part, to oppose them, with any reasonable prospect of success, they should appoint a committee to carry a flag to the officer commanding the enemy's force, about to attack the town, and to procure the best terms for the safety of persons, houses, and property, in their power." This recommendation was made on the day of the battle at Bladensburg, and, on the same day, was unanimously adopted by the Common Council.

The battle of Bladensburg having terminated in the defeat of our troops, and General Winder having been obliged to retreat from the capital towards Montgomery Court House, about fifteen miles to the west of it, the city of Washington was left in the entire possession of the enemy. The citizens of Alexandria saw nothing to impede the march of the British to their town; saw nothing to restrain them from committing the most brutal outrages upon the female portion of the society, having neither arms nor men to make defence with. The President of the United States and the Heads of the Departments were absent, and it was not known where they were to be found; no military commander or officer of the General Government was present to direct or advise.

In this state of things, it was considered by the Common Council as their duty to send a flag to the British commander at Washington, to know what treatment might be expected from him, in case his troops should approach Alexandria, and should succeed in obtaining possession of the town. Admiral Cockburn, to whom the communication was made, assured the very respectable gentlemen who bore that flag, that private property, of all descriptions, should be respected; that it was probable that fresh provisions and some flour might be wanted, but that, whatever they did take, should be paid for.

While these things were going on in the city of Washington, the British squadron had been gradually ascending the Potomac, and on the 27th of August, three days after the battle at Bladensburg, it reached Fort Warburton. No change had taken place in relation to the means of the defence of the town of Alexandria. Upon the fort did the safety of Alexandria now entirely depend. The citizens looked with great anxiety to this point for protection; but, to their great surprise and mortification, and without the concurrence or the wish of the municipal authority of the town, or of any member of it, the fort was abandoned, and the magazine blown up, by the United States' garrison, on the evening of the 27th, without firing a single gun. The following correspondence between the Secretary of War and the commander at the fort, shows by what authority he acted:

*Copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to Captain Dyson, dated*

Sir:

August 29th, 1814.

I send Captain Manigault with orders to receive your written or verbal report of the causes under which you left the post committed to your charge. In this you will state the orders under which you acted, and from whom received.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. ARMSTRONG.

Capt. Dyson, Corps of Artillery.

CAMP AT MACON'S ISLAND, August 29, 1814.

SIR:

I had the honor to receive your communication of the 29th instant. The orders received from Brigadier General Winder, through Major Hite, verbally, on the 24th instant, were, in case I was oppressed by, or heard of, an enemy in my rear, to spike our guns and make my escape over the river. The enemy approached by water on the 27th, and we had learned that day, through several channels, that the enemy had been reinforced at Benedict two thousand strong, and that they were on their march to co-operate with the fleet, in addition to the force which left the city. Under all these circumstances the officers under my command were consulted, and agreed it was best to abandon the fort and effect a retreat. The force under my command was thought not equal to a defence of the place.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration, your obedient servant,

SAM. T. DYSON,  
Captain Corps of Artillery.

The Hon. JOHN ARMSTRONG,  
Secretary of War, Washington.

This relinquishment of the fort decided the fate of Alexandria. Nothing was left to oppose the progress of the squadron, and on the morning of the 28th it passed the ruins of the fort on its way to the town; their barges had sounded a considerable distance above. About ten o'clock of the morning of the 28th, after the squadron was above the fort, the committee appointed by the Council to bear the flag to the enemy, *in case they should pass the fort*, set out upon their mission, and proceeded to the ship commanded by Captain Gordon. They requested to know what his intentions were in regard to the town of Alexandria. They were informed by Captain Gordon that he would communicate his terms when he came opposite the town. But he assured them that, in the mean time, if the squadron was not molested by the inhabitants, the persons, houses, and furniture, of the citizens, should not be injured. One of the gentlemen who attended the flag was the mayor. Upon his return from the squadron, he was informed that a small detachment of cavalry, from the army of General Hungerford, had been in town, probably for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy; that it had remained but a short time. Upon inquiry, it was understood that the army of General Hungerford was at that time about sixteen miles from Alexandria, on its march to that place, having followed the British squadron along the shores of the Potomac a great part of its way up. The force of General Hungerford was composed of infantry and cavalry, with two or three small pieces of artillery, not calculated to afford any protection to the town.

The municipal authority of the town had received no advice of the approach of this army; and after the return of the flag, it was too late to enter into any arrangement with General Hungerford for defence: he was too distant to afford relief.

The squadron having suspended its approach to the town, did not reach it until the evening of this day. On the morning of the next day, to wit, the 29th of August, it arranged itself along the town, so as to command it from one extremity to the other. The force consisted of two frigates, to wit: the Seahorse, rating thirty-eight guns, and Euryalus, rating thirty-six guns; two rocket-ships, of eighteen guns each; two bomb-ships, of eight guns each; and a schooner, of two guns, which were but a few hundred yards from the wharves, and the houses so situated that they might have been laid in ashes in a few minutes. About ten o'clock in the morning of the 29th, Captain Gordon sent to the Mayor the following terms:

HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP SEAHORSE,

Off Alexandria, August 29, 1814.

GENTLEMEN:

In consequence of a deputation yesterday received from the city of Alexandria, requesting favorable terms for the safety of their city, the undermentioned are the only conditions in my power to offer:

The town of Alexandria, with the exception of public works, shall not be destroyed, unless hostilities are commenced on the part of the Americans; nor shall the inhabitants be molested in any manner whatever, or their dwelling houses entered, if the following articles are complied with:

Article 1. All naval and ordnance stores, public and private, must be immediately delivered up.

Article 2. Possession will be immediately taken of all the shipping, and their furniture must be sent on board by the owners, without delay.

Article 3. The vessels that have been sunk must be delivered up in the state they were in on the 19th of August, the day of the squadron passing the Kettle Bottoms.

Article 4. Merchandise of every description must be instantly delivered up; and, to prevent any irregularities that might be committed in its embarkation, the merchants have it in their option to load the vessels generally employed for that purpose, when they will be towed off by us.

Article 5. All merchandise that has been removed from Alexandria, since the 19th instant, is to be included in the above articles.

Article 6. Refreshments of every description to be supplied the ships, and paid for at the market price by bills on the British Government.

Article 7. Officers will be appointed to see that the Articles Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, are strictly complied with; and any deviation or non-compliance, on the part of the inhabitants of Alexandria, will render this treaty null and void.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JAMES A. GORDON,

Captain of his Majesty's ship Seahorse, and  
Senior Officer of his Majesty's ships before Alexandria.

To the Council of the town of Alexandria.

Upon the mayor's receiving them, he sent for the members of the committee of vigilance. These terms were borne by one of the officers of Captain Gordon's frigate, who stated but one hour was allowed him to wait for a reply to them. Upon their being read by the mayor and the committee, it was observed to the officer by the mayor and one of the committee, that it would be impossible that the Common Council could accede to several of them; that the municipal authority of the town had no power to recall the merchandise that had been sent out subsequent to the 19th of August. The reply of the officer was, in that case it would not be expected.

He was further informed, that it would not be in the power of the Common Council to compel the citizens to assist in getting up the sunken vessels. The officer answered, that their sailors would then do it. He was required to explain what was intended by the term merchandise, as used in the fourth article. He answered, that it was intended to embrace that species of merchandise only which was intended for exportation, such as tobacco, flour, cotton, bale goods, &c.

The Mayor, and one of the committee, requested to know whether the Commodore intended to require a delivery of any more of the merchandise than he could take away with him. He answered, it would not be required. This explanation was afterwards recognized by Captain Gordon. With these verbal explanations, the preceding terms were submitted to the Common Council. It will be here proper to remark, that, when these terms were proposed and submitted to the Common Council, General Hungerford had not arrived with his army, nor did it reach the suburbs of the town until the night of that day. The town was still without any means of defence, and it was evident that no defence could avail, but that species of force which would be calculated to drive the ships from their moorings. No communication had been received from the officers of the General Government, and the town appeared to be abandoned to its fate. Under these circumstances the Common Council could have no hesitation as to the course to be pursued. The citizens of the town, of all descriptions, with an immense value

of property, were entirely in the power of the enemy, whose naval commander, according to the proclamation of the President of the United States, dated on the first of September, has declared his "purpose to be to employ the force under his direction in destroying and laying waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable." A similar declaration had been made by Captain Gordon to the committee who bore the flag. Against the attack of such an enemy was the town of Alexandria without any means of defence whatever. The people of the town were at his mercy, and compelled to yield to such terms as the "victor" might think fit to prescribe. If the members of the municipal authority, and citizens of the town, had given loose to the feelings of indignation which the occasion had excited, and had sacrificed the town, and exposed their wives and daughters to the wanton insults of an unrestrained enemy, they would have betrayed their trusts, and have deplored the consequences.

The Common Council, therefore, were obliged to yield submission to the terms as explained, and did, thereupon, pass and publish the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the Common Council of Alexandria, in assenting to the conditions offered by the commander of the British squadron, now off the town, has acted from the impulse of irresistible necessity, and solely from a regard to the welfare of the town; that it considers the assent by it given as only formal, inasmuch as the enemy had it already in their power to enforce a compliance with their demand by a seizure of the property required from us; and believing the safety of the persons of the inhabitants, of their dwellings, and of such property as is not comprehended within the requisition, to depend entirely on the observance of the terms of it, the Common Council recommends to the inhabitants an acquiescence, at the same time that it does expressly disclaim the power of doing any act on its part to enforce compliance, its authority, in this particular, being limited to recommendation only."

In the execution of the terms imposed by the enemy, it is proper to state, that the verbal explanations made by the officer to the Mayor, were generally adhered to. No merchandise was required to be brought back to the town; no assistance was required of, or offered by, the citizens, in getting up the sunken vessels. The depredations of the enemy, with a few exceptions, were confined to flour, cotton, and tobacco, which they carried off in some of the vessels then at the town. Only one vessel was burnt; no private dwelling was visited or entered in a rude or hostile manner, nor were citizens personally exposed to insult.

The loss sustained from the enemy, it is believed, will not exceed the following: three ships, three brigs, several bay and river craft, the number of which has not been ascertained; all of which were carried away, and one ship burnt. The quantity of flour carried away, it is believed, will not exceed sixteen thousand barrels; about one thousand hogsheads of tobacco, and one hundred and fifty bales of cotton; and of wine, sugar, and other articles, not more than five thousand dollars' worth.

I, Israel P. Thompson, clerk of the Common Council of Alexandria, do certify that the above is a true copy from the original.

ISRAEL P. THOMPSON, C. C.

October 6, 1814.

ALEXANDRIA, October 7, 1814.

SIR:

In pursuance of the enclosed resolutions of the Common Council of Alexandria, dated the 27th September, 1814, marked A, appointing us a committee, on the part of the town, for the purpose therein mentioned, we beg leave to lay before the committee of Congress the following statement and accompanying documents.

Misrepresentations of the conduct of the citizens of Alexandria, when the British squadron approached this place, having been circulated through the Union, the Common Council have deemed it their duty to lay before Congress a true history of the steps which the citizens have, from time to time, taken, in order to guard against that misfortune which has come upon them—a misfortune they deplore as much on the national, as on their own individual account. The citizens of Alexandria rejoice that an opportunity has been afforded them to lay before Congress a faithful narrative of the proceedings which self-preservation compelled them to adopt. It will show that they did all in their power to avert the blow.

In the month of October, 1812, a volunteer company was raised in Alexandria, and stationed at Fort Washington, in the manner stated in the letter of Captain M'Guire, marked B. In the month of March, 1813, the artillery company of Alexandria, then commanded by Captain Marsteller, was stationed at Fort Washington. See Captain Griffith's certificate, marked C. On the 21st March, 1813, the Common Council appointed the Mayor of the town, and the President of the Council, to wait upon the Secretary of War, in company with the Colonel of the second legion, to request a supply of arms and ammunition for the use of the militia, in the defence of the town. See document D. On the 8th of May, 1813, the Common Council appointed four respectable citizens to wait upon the President of the United States, and apprise him of the defenceless state of the town; which order is marked E. That committee, in compliance with the wishes of the Corporation, did wait on the President. The result of the interview they had with him will be found in the paper marked F. On the 8th of May, 1813, the Council appropriated \$1,500, out of the funds of the Corporation, for mounting the cannon belonging to the town. See document marked D. On the 11th May, 1813, the Common Council appointed a committee of vigilance, to confer and co-operate with the committees of Washington and Georgetown, in requiring assistance from Government, for the general defence of the District of Columbia. See document E. A deputation from the committees of the three towns waited upon General Armstrong; the result of their conference was such as is stated in the certificate of Colonel George Deneale, one of the persons who waited upon the Secretary of War. See his certificate, marked G.

The Secretary of War did send an engineer, as he promised, who made a report to him, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and is marked H. The Common Council, on the 23d of July, 1814, passed two resolutions, and appointed a committee of vigilance, for the purposes in said resolution expressed. See E. In pursuance of these last resolutions, the committee of vigilance proceeded to take such measures as they could, towards complying with the object of their appointment; they passed the resolutions which are marked I. In pursuance of the first resolution of the committee of vigilance, General Winder was waited upon, and, a few days after, he visited Alexandria, had an interview with some of the committee of vigilance, and Colonel Deneale, as will appear by the certificate of Colonel Deneale, marked K.

The banks of Alexandria and Potomac, on the 6th and 13th of August, loaned to the General Government, the one ten thousand, and the other, twenty-five thousand dollars, upon the conditions that the same should be applied to the erection of fortifications for the District of Columbia south of Alexandria. See the letters of the Presidents of those banks, marked L and M. The corporation, on the fifteenth of September, 1814, appropriated out of the funds of the town twelve hundred dollars, for the purpose of paying the expenses of laborers and carts to be employed in the erection of fortifications for the defence of the District. See document D.

The committee having laid before you the documents which exhibit the efforts of the citizens of Alexandria to have the town defended from invasion, beg leave to lay before the committee a report of the Common Council and committee of vigilance, dated on the 7th of September last, of the conduct of the citizens, when the British squadron approached Alexandria. See document marked N. When the first attempt was made, on the 25th of August, to blow up the south end of the Potomac bridge, six hundred stand of arms were blown up, about two hundred of which remained uninjured, and fit for use; these were collected together by Mr. Joseph Dean, one of the committee of vigilance, and sent to the Little Falls of Potomac for safety. When General Hungerford's army arrived in the neighborhood of Alexandria, these arms were ordered to be delivered to General Hungerford. See Mr. Dean's certificate, O. On the 30th of August, the Mayor apprised General Hungerford where two twelve pounders, which had been, by the order of General Young, removed from town, could be found. See the Mayor's letter, marked P, and the reply of General Hungerford, signed by James Mercer, his aid, marked Q.

The day on which the enemy left Alexandria, a letter, purporting to be from Admiral Codrington, dated 28th August, 1814, addressed to the commanding officer of the British squadron in the Potomac, with the cover which

now encloses it, was handed from the post office in this place to Mr. Joseph Dean, one of the committee of vigilance; how it got into the post office we know not; we can refer the committee to Mr. Thomas P. Gilpen, the deputy postmaster here, and to Mr. Basil Spalding, of Maryland, who, we have reason to believe, can give some account of the route the letter came to Alexandria; this document is marked R. If the committee should require any further information, or explanation, we shall be ready, at all times, to give it as far as we can.

We are, with great respect, &c.

WM. NEWTON,  
EDM. I. LEE,  
JOSEPH DEAN,  
G. DENEALE.

Honorable R. M. JOHNSON, &c.

ALEXANDRIA, November 20, 1814.

SIR:

From the appearance of the enemy's squadron in sight of Alexandria, on the evening of the 27th August last, until its departure on the 3d of September, I remained in town, with the exception of an absence of a few hours on the day last mentioned.

Amongst the many base calumnies propagated respecting our unfortunate town, by men more profligate than the enemy who plundered us, there is none more cruel and unfounded than the charge of the inhabitants having surrendered the property of strangers to procure safety for their own.

The printed narrative of the Common Council contains all the material facts connected with the capture of the town, and it is not in my power to add any thing of importance. The charge above mentioned, which you have particularly noticed in your letter of the 19th instant, I can assure you, is totally destitute of truth. The people of Alexandria did not afford the enemy any assistance in removing or shipping the plundered property; nor did any instance, to my knowledge, occur of any individual having attempted to save his own property by turning the attention of the enemy towards that of another. In respect to persons, the plunder was indiscriminate. The enemy not having the aid of horses or carriages for the removal of the property, from a regard to their own convenience, and not from the suggestions of others, confined their depredations to the warehouses on the water, in which large quantities of produce were contained, belonging to the inhabitants as well as to strangers; all sufferers alike.

After the Common Council had passed their resolution of the 29th of August, declaring their want of authority to require the observance of the terms to which they had been compelled to accede, and recommending submission, they did no other act at all connected with the seizure or surrender of property.

I remain, with respect, &c.

R. I. TAYLOR.

The Honorable R. M. JOHNSON.

*To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, the memorial of the subscribers, citizens of the town of Alexandria, respectfully represents:*

That the late capture by the British squadron of their town, has afforded a pretext to wanton defamers to brand the citizens of Alexandria with every epithet of ignominy and disgrace. Not content with proclaiming their slanders through the papers of the day, some have been so unprincipled as to whisper in the ears of some of the honorable members of your body, the most illiberal accusations; one of which is, that the property of the citizens, taken from them by the violence of the invading enemy, had been voluntarily parted with by the inhabitants, and an equivalent received for it; a charge totally unfounded in fact, and without the smallest ground of truth for its support; as your memorialists can venture to assert that not a solitary instance of the kind can be produced. When, therefore, your memorialists find the reputation of the town assailed in public and private, by those dark and restless spirits whose delight it is to devour reputation, every virtuous and honorable mind must feel it a solemn duty to solicit, as a right, from their constitutional governors, a strict and just investigation into the whole of their conduct. The citizens of Alexandria, in the aggregate, can fear the result of no inquiry which may be made into their conduct on the occasion alluded to. They know their motives have been pure, and that the course they took can be justified by those immutable principles of self preservation, for the exercise of which no just Government will condemn them, and the surrender of which cannot of right be demanded. Your memorialists cannot forbear, on this occasion, to express their indignant surprise to find their town traduced for a conduct which every citizen in the nation would have pursued had they been abandoned, as Alexandria was, to the mercy of a victorious and powerful enemy. In this situation, what alternative had we but to tell the enemy we could not resist, because we had not the means? This is all we did. We yielded to superior power. Our weakness has been our crime. Our reliance upon the protection of our Government has been our misfortune. For this misfortune, have the citizens of Alexandria been publicly charged as traitors to their country. To submit to calumny of this nature without a murmur is more than could be calculated upon. To ask an investigation is what ought to be expected from the virtuous and innocent. This request is the more reasonable when it is recollected that the President of the United States has deemed it proper, in his public proclamation, to state that Alexandria had, in yielding to the terms imposed upon them, "inconsiderately" surrendered to the enemy. Your memorialists deem it a duty which they owe to the reputation of the town, concisely to state what have been the efforts, at different times, of the citizens, to obtain an adequate defence of the town and District.

In the month of October, in the year 1812, a few months after the declaration of war, a company of about seventy volunteers was raised in Alexandria, and equipped at the expense of some of the citizens. This company was under the orders of the General Government, who had them stationed at Fort Washington, where they continued for some months, and from thence removed to Annapolis, at which place they were disbanded.

In the month of March, in the year 1813, the artillery company, forming a part of the militia of the town, consisting of about seventy men, rank and file, was stationed for about three months at Fort Washington. The municipal authority of the town, conscious of its unprotected state, and justly considering it the duty of the General Government to defend every portion of that territory which was placed under its exclusive authority, on the 21st of March, 1813, appointed the Chief Magistrate of the town, the President of the Common Council, together with the commanding officer of the second legion of the militia of the District, to wait upon the Secretary of War, and request a supply of arms and ammunition for the use of the militia in the defence of the town. Your memorialists have reason to believe that arms were furnished a short time after this request.

In the month of May, 1813, the Common Council sent four respectable citizens to the President of the United States, to apprise him of the then defenceless state of the town. These gentlemen did wait upon and communicate to him what was the condition of Alexandria as to the means of defence; that the citizens felt great anxiety on account of the dangers with which they were threatened from the vicinity of the enemy in our waters, and the defenceless state of the District, and requested him to have some measures of defence and protection adopted as speedily as possible. To this request the President stated, that every portion of the community was entitled to the protection of the Government, and that representations of any respectable body of men had a claim upon its attention, and gave the gentlemen who waited upon him to understand that their representation should be properly attended to; he also stated it was impossible to extend protection to every *assailable point* of the country. The committee urged upon him the various circumstances which would invite the attack of the enemy upon the city of Washington in particular, which would of course involve the whole District in its dangers. The committee, at the same time, assured him of the perfect readiness of the citizens of Alexandria to co-operate, by their personal services, or in any other way, with the Government, in any measure of defence which it might adopt for the security of the District.

The Common Council, solicitous to provide for the defence of the town and District, as far as their limited powers and means would permit, did, in the month of May, 1813, appropriate, out of the funds of the corporation, fifteen hundred dollars, to pay for mounting some cannon which were in the town, and had been in the use of the militia while under the State Government. In the month of May, 1813, a deputation from Alexandria, Washington, and Georgetown, had an interview with the Secretary of War, relative to the defenceless situation of the District. This committee did urge that a more efficient defence might be afforded for the District than then existed. It was particularly urged upon the Secretary that the fortifications at Fort Washington, commonly known by the name of Fort Warburton, should be increased. In consequence of this representation, the Government sent an engineer to examine the fort, who, on the 28th of May, 1813, reported to the War Department, as the result of his examination, that "an additional number of heavy guns at Fort Warburton, and an additional fort in the neighborhood, are both to be considered unnecessary." Notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of the citizens of Alexandria, in the year 1813, nothing was done towards its defence, except sending an engineer to examine the fort. In silence did Alexandria submit to this neglect of their safety, until the month of July, 1814, when the Common Council again endeavored to procure an adequate defence. Gentlemen, acting under the authority of the corporation, in the month of July, waited upon the military commander of the tenth district, with the view of ascertaining what measures of defence had been taken, or were intended to be adopted, for the defence of the town of Alexandria and District. The General, who seemed to be anxious to do his duty, as far as the means within his control would enable him, stated to those gentlemen the number of militia he expected would join him, and which seemed to be all the defence he calculated upon. This was a species of defence which certainly could be of no use against an attack by water. It is too obvious, that the town of Alexandria could not be defended in any other manner than by a proper fort or forts below it, with a competent garrison. The General commanding the tenth military district visited Alexandria. The mode of defending it from a water attack was pointed out to him. To adopt it, required money; this he was not furnished with. This difficulty, however, was removed by the offer of three of the banks in Alexandria to loan the Government fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of erecting proper defences for the District: which loan was accepted, and the money paid to the Government. No steps were taken towards securing the town from attack by water, but it was left to be defended at the fort by a garrison not exceeding eighty men, rank and file. On the 24th of August, a few hours before the battle at Bladensburg, the Commanding General and President of the United States were, by the authority of the committee of vigilance of Alexandria, reminded of the destitute state of the town as to the means of defence, and informed what would be the deplorable alternative the citizens would be reduced to if the British squadron, which was approaching the town, and was then from twenty to thirty miles below, should find their town unprotected as it was at that time. In the afternoon of the 27th of August the squadron arrived at the fort, (the magazine having been blown up, and it abandoned by the few troops of the United States which had been stationed there) without opposition. On the morning of the 28th, after the fort had been destroyed by the enemy, and after their vessels had passed it, and were in full view of the town, and not before, no officer, military or civil, of the United States, being, on this emergency, in the town or District to defend or direct, (the military of the town having been previously marched off, en masse, by public authority) the municipal authority of the town were, from extreme necessity, compelled to take such steps as were best calculated to save the town from conflagration. They authorized a flag to meet the advancing foe. The result of that interview was, that the town, and a certain part of the property, was saved from destruction and plunder, upon condition that the enemy, during their continuance before the town, should not be molested. It is due to the citizens of Alexandria, who were in it, during that distressing period, to state, that no aid or assistance was offered by them to the enemy. They remained passive but indignant spectators of that plunder which they had not the means of preventing. In support of the various allegations, stated in the preceding part of this memorial, your memorialists beg leave to refer to documents laid before the committee of the House of Representatives, upon the subject of the capture of Alexandria and Washington. Your memorialists feel it their duty, more particularly, to call the attention of Congress to a subject connected with the capture of Alexandria, and which is enveloped in a mystery, that can be dissipated only by the power of your honorable body.

On the 29th of August, the British squadron commenced taking off from the warehouses the flour and tobacco. They continued until Friday morning, the 2d of September, when the last loaded vessel was sent down the river. The post office in Alexandria had, during the time the fleet lay opposite the town, been removed into the country some miles. On Friday, the 2d of September, the Postmaster found in the letter box of the house which had been used as the post office, the following letter, to wit:

"IPHIGENIA, 28th August, 1814.

"The object of the expedition being accomplished, and the inhabitants of the country upon the banks of the Potomac being alarmed for their property, on account of the presence of the British squadron in that river, the Commander-in-chief has directed me to forward openly, by the hands of one of the inhabitants, this order, for the ships in the Potomac to retire and rejoin his flag.

EDWARD CODRINGTON,  
Rear Admiral, and Captain of the Fleet."

This letter is directed as follows:

"On H. B. M. service, to the commanding officer  
of H. B. M. ships in the river Potomac."

The preceding letter was found in the post office, enclosed in a letter without name, date, or post mark, addressed "to the committee of vigilance or safety of the town of Alexandria," which is in the following words:

"GENTLEMEN: Motives of a personal nature prevent my delivering the enclosure. You will best judge of the propriety of doing it in your official character, without loss of time."

The above did not come to the knowledge of the committee of vigilance until after the squadron had left the town with their plunder. Your memorialists have been enabled to ascertain, that the letter from Admiral Codrington was in the Office of State, early in the morning of the 31st of August, and that it was there read. Among those who saw it there was a member of your honorable body. How or when it was sent from the Department of State, or why it was sent in the manner it was, or by whom it was deposited in the deserted post office at Alexandria, your memorialists have not been able to ascertain, nor is it in their power to do so. Your memorialists have deemed it their duty to lay the transaction, so far as it has come to their knowledge, before your honorable body. It remains for Congress to take such further steps for the development of the transaction as in their wisdom shall seem to be proper, and which justice to the citizens of Alexandria demands.

All which is most respectfully submitted.

Jacob Hoffman,  
Bathurst Daingerfield,  
John Roberts,  
George Coleman,  
V. Veitch,  
R. F. Degge,  
A. Faw,  
Thomas Steel,  
James Keith,  
Thomas Moore,  
Charles Simms,  
Ephraim Gilman,  
William S. Moore,

William Newton,  
Charles J. Catlett,  
John Hooff,  
Henry T. Compton,  
John Muncaster,  
John Gird,  
John B. Paton,  
Joseph Smith,  
Thomas Laurason,  
Nehemiah Carson,  
C. P. Thompson,  
Isaac Gibson,  
John D. Brown,

William N. Mills,  
William H. Brown,  
Grafton Cawood,  
Joseph Rowen,  
Sandford Reid,  
Henry B. Deager,  
Mark Butts,  
Robert N. Windsor,  
Jm. Plummer,  
Peter Saunders,  
Thomas Neill,  
John Violett,  
Gerrard Plummer,

Jacob Curtis,  
John Potter,  
Ch. Whiting,  
Jonathan Ross,  
Barnard Crook,  
Philip G. Marsteller,  
Thomas Preston,  
Alexander McKenzie,  
J. Laurason,  
William Fowle,  
John Lloyd,  
John Harper,  
Townshend Waugh,  
Matthias Snyder,  
Isaac Entwisle,  
Samuel Harper,  
Thomas M. Davis,  
William Harper,  
Joseph Harris,  
S. Snowden,  
Henry Bayne,  
Thomas Jacobs,  
Thomas Vowell,  
Thomas Herbert,  
William Smith,  
Jacob Leap,

Ebenezer Vowell,  
Anthony Rhodes,  
Matthew Robinson,  
Bryan Hampson,  
James Kennedy, sen.  
Silas Reed,  
Guy Atkinson,  
Benjamin Baden,  
Joseph Mandeville,  
Samuel B. Larmour,  
Joseph Fowler, Jr.  
A. Newton,  
N. Herbert,  
John Jackson,  
William Bartleman,  
William Tilham,  
Thomas F. Herbert,  
J. D. Simms,  
J. B. Nickolls,  
C. T. Chapman,  
Samuel Smith,  
Charles M<sup>c</sup>Knight,  
Israel P. Thompson,  
William Herbert,  
James Campbell,  
James Fleming,

Robert Anderson,  
William Harper, Jr.  
Thomas Janney & Co.  
Samuel Mark,  
Thomas Brocchus,  
Jacob Morgan,  
William Gregory,  
Thomas K. Beall,  
Andrew Flemius,  
John H. Phillips,  
Henry Nicholson,  
John D. Longdon,  
Daniel M<sup>c</sup>Clean,  
Frederick Koons,  
David Koons,  
Charles Bennett,  
James Shefhar,  
John H. Crease,  
Joseph Cowing,  
Newton Keene,  
William Fox,  
Thomas White,  
William Ramsay, of D.  
John Ross,  
John F. Smith,  
James Allison.

GEORGETOWN, *October 31, 1814.*

Sir:

In reply to your letter of the 28th instant, requesting, on the part of the committee of investigation, "all the information I have on the subject of a letter from Admiral Codrington to Captain Gordon," I have the honor to state that, on the morning of the 31st August, some hours before day, I was called up by a dragoon, express from one of our camps below, who delivered a packet addressed to me by Admiral Cochrane; while I was opening and examining the despatch, the dragoon, who seemed to be an intelligent man, remarked to me that the British ships before Alexandria had been ordered down the river by the Admiral in the Patuxent. On questioning him, he stated that an open note to that effect, addressed to the British commander at Alexandria, had been brought to the camp from which he came, by the same messenger who had charge of the despatch I had just received from him; that he had understood both had been put into the hands of a countryman, on the shores of the Patuxent, by the enemy, from which countryman they had been taken by an American officer, and conveyed to the camp; that he heard the officer who had given him charge of the packet for me, speak of the manner in which they came, and mention the contents of the open note to other officers then near him; that the officers, as he heard them say, intended to send the note across the country, and have it put on board the British fleet by a citizen.

The letter addressed to me by Admiral Cochrane was dated on the 29th of August. Under the same envelope was a letter directed to the Secretary of State. Believing that it might be of importance he should receive this without delay, I immediately, although not yet day, called on Colonel Monroe, then acting as Secretary of War, delivered the letter, and informed him of what the dragoon had reported to me relative to the open note, said to be on its way to the enemy's fleet before Alexandria. This, I am confident, was the first information received at Washington of the note in question. During the latter part of the same day, being at Colonel Monroe's quarters, (I think about one o'clock) he told me that the open note of which I had apprised him in the morning had now found its way to him, having been brought up by one of our officers from the camp, at which the dragoon had stated he had left it, and he showed it to me. I have no recollection of its date. I remember that it was addressed to Captain Gordon, and signed by Codrington, I think, as captain of the fleet, and by order of Admiral Cochrane. The substance, I well recollect, was to direct Captain Gordon to descend the Potomac, lest alarm for their property should be given to the inhabitants by the presence of his squadron.

The contents of this note, as well as the manner chosen by the enemy for its conveyance, if it did come from him, were thought not a little singular and suspicious. The communication by water was open to him; and to express his anxiety for the fears of the inhabitants about the safety of their property from a force which had been for two years in the constant habit of burning and carrying it off in every direction on these waters, and which was at that moment emptying the stores of Alexandria of private property to an immense amount, could hardly be considered earnest; and particularly when this expression was contrasted with his determination to destroy and lay waste every district of country within his power, made known by the letter of Admiral Cochrane to the Secretary of State, of the 18th August, (since published) which was the letter delivered by me that morning, and with which this note was understood to have come from Admiral Cochrane's fleet. Colonel Monroe took this view of the subject, and expressed his suspicions that the note was a forgery, and the possibility, if it was genuine, that, by previous concert, it might be intended to convey something different from, perhaps the very reverse of, what appeared on its face. Under these circumstances, and in the then same state of things, a preparation going on to intercept the British ships below Alexandria, some doubts were entertained of the propriety of permitting it to pass to them; he, however, determined that it should be disposed of in such a way as to let the citizens of Alexandria have the benefit of it, if benefit there was, and at the same time to keep the enemy in ignorance that the Government had any knowledge of it. He requested me to take charge of the note, to deliver it to a gentleman of Alexandria, and to ask of him to give it such a course immediately. I did accordingly, in about an hour after, put it into the hands of a highly respectable citizen of that town, accompanied by the request enjoined on me. He undertook the charge with great cheerfulness, and suggested as the best mode of answering the purpose intended, that he would place it in the post office at Alexandria, under cover, addressed to one of the acting committees of the town, remarking that it would reach them in that way almost as speedily as if he were to deliver it himself, and that by this means the committee and himself would be relieved from embarrassment, if the committee were called upon to answer by the officers of the enemy, in whose power they were, as to the channel through which it had been received. I thought his reasons good, and approved of the mode he proposed to adopt. That he did so deposit the note, in the course of the same afternoon, I was informed by him on the next day; and I have no question of the fact.

Whether the enemy received this note, or when, and, if received, what influence it may have had on his conduct, I have never learned; but there is one fact notorious on this subject—that he ceased to levy contributions on the town of Alexandria about the middle of the day on which Commodore Porter's battery reached the White House, (the position below Alexandria, selected from which to annoy him in his descent) and that he immediately after began to draw off his ships from the station he had taken before the town. This was on the 1st day of September. Commodore Porter's artillery and General Young's brigade crossed the ferry at Georgetown, on the expedition, at the commencement of the night of the 31st August. That this movement was known to the enemy on the next day, and instantly arrested his devastations at Alexandria, I have never had the slightest doubt. As to the time and circumstance of the movement, I cannot be mistaken, as I was with both the corps during that night, one at their encampment, and the other on their march.

In relation to the remaining part of your letter, there are no particular facts within my knowledge, that I am aware of, pertinent to the inquiry of the honorable committee into the cause of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against Washington and Alexandria.

With very great respect, &c.

J. MASON.

The Hon. RICHARD M. JOHNSON.

No. 14.

*Report from the Superintendent of the Public Buildings.*

OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, Oct. 29, 1814.

SIR:

In answer to the inquiries you made of me yesterday, I have the honor to state that the whole cost of the under mentioned public buildings, from the commencement to the burning by the enemy, appears as follows:

North wing of the capitol, including the foundation walls of both wings, and of the centre or main building, and of alterations and repairs,	\$457,368 36
South wing of the capitol,	329,774 92
President's house,	334,334 00½
Public offices,	93,613 82
	<u>\$1,215,111 10½</u>

At the instance of a committee of the Senate, the remains of those buildings have been examined by architects and master builders, all of whom report it as their opinions, that the walls of the President's house, and both wings of the capitol, with some inconsiderable repairs, will be safe and sufficient to rebuild on. The walls of the two offices, particularly of the upper stories, are deemed insufficient to bear new roofs, and will require taking down and renewing, as far as shall be found necessary. The amounts of the estimates for repairing and rebuilding the five edifices, making the offices fire proof, with some other improvements suggested, are from three hundred and fifty thousand dollars to upwards of six hundred thousand dollars. The largest estimate, however, embraces an expense of considerable amount, for completing the west part of the north wing for a library, which none of the lower estimates includes. The average amount estimated, of putting all the buildings in the state the enemy found them, appears, by dividing the aggregate amount of the estimates by the number of them, to be about four hundred and sixty thousand dollars, allowing for the materials of the burnt buildings, which may be used in rebuilding.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNROE.

The Hon. R. M. JOHNSON.

No. 15.

*William Simmons's Letter.*

WASHINGTON CITY, November 28, 1814.

SIR:

In answer to your note of to-day, I have to state, that, on the morning of the 24th August last, when the alarm was given that the enemy were on their march to this city, and it was expected that they would come by the way of the Eastern Branch bridge, being myself well armed, and mounted on horseback, I rode there under the wish to render all the service in my power to oppose them. When I arrived near the Eastern Branch, I found a few of the city and Georgetown uniform companies there, laying upon their arms, and understood that the President, the Secretary of War, and other officers, were at the house of a Mr. Minnifee, (where I observed their horses at the door) and that they were holding council. I then rode down to the bridge, where there were a few sailors, with a piece or two of cannon in front of the bridge, who, I understood, were to destroy the bridge in case the enemy approached. After but little delay, I rode back to the uniform troops, who, I found, were getting in motion to march to Bladensburg, to which way it was then said that the enemy were coming. I immediately rode on towards Bladensburg with all expedition. When I arrived upon the hill, on this side of the Bladensburg bridge, I observed Colonel Monroe, the then Secretary of State, just in the rear of our troops, which were posted on both sides of the road, between there and Bladensburg; the cry was, that the enemy were coming, but no person appeared to be able to give any correct account of them. I then observed to Mr. Monroe, that I would go on and see the enemy, and would let them know when they were coming. I accordingly rode into Bladensburg, and halted a few minutes at Ross's tavern, where there were a few militiamen, from whom I could get no other information than that the enemy were coming on the river road. I then proceeded to a height, a little west of Ross's tavern, called Lowndes' Hill, which had a commanding prospect of the river road for a considerable distance, and which was almost fronting the hill. After remaining there for some time, I observed, at a considerable distance, a great cloud of dust rise to a great degree, which satisfied me that they were coming in great force. Sometime after, I observed a few horsemen, not in uniform, on the road, who appeared to be reconnoitering, and were soon followed by troops that filled the road. They appeared to march very slow, and in close order, not less than twenty-four or thirty abreast in front, and the horsemen before spoken of, sometimes in front, and at other times a little to the right of the front; which position they marched in until they nearly approached the foot of the hill, and not more than a gunshot from me, where I was sitting on my horse, and the road in full sight for near a mile, and that filled with British troops, and still approaching. At this time there was not a person in sight of me, other than the enemy, except one dragoon, who appeared to have been posted there a little to my left, upon the same hill, where I left him, and have since understood he was taken by the advance party of the enemy. When they approached to the foot of the hill, and I expected they might attempt to cut off my retreat to the bridge, I fell back, and descended the hill in the front of Mr. Lowndes' house; and, immediately after I crossed the bridge, I looked back, and found that the advance party of horse had got into the Annapolis road, to the east of Lowndes' house, and about twenty-four of them went up a lane in Bladensburg, towards the Baltimore road, leaving six or eight at the entrance of the lane.

I then was proceeding to our troops, to give information, when I met the President, General Armstrong, Colonel Monroe, and Mr. Rush, the Attorney General, considerably in advance of all our troops, going immediately into Bladensburg. I observed, on meeting them, "Mr. Madison, the enemy are now in Bladensburg?" He exclaimed, with surprise, "the enemy in Bladensburg!" and, at the same moment, they all turned their horses and rode towards our troops with considerable speed. I called out aloud, "Mr. Madison, if you will stop I will show them to you; they are now in sight." He paid no attention. They all rode off very fast, except Mr. Rush, who halted, and I observed to him that there are part of the enemy stopping at that lane; he said, that cannot be the enemy, they are not in uniform. I told him that they were a part of the advance party, that the others had gone up the lane, and that not any of them were in uniform. At this moment the red-coats began to heave in sight, in two sections, some in the rear, and others in the front, of Lowndes' house, and were forming in the Annapolis road. Mr. Rush, on seeing them, observed, "I am satisfied;" and turned his horse very suddenly to ride away, when his hat fell off, and he rode some distance without it, when I called out to him, "Mr. Rush, come back and take up your hat;" which he did, and then pursued his company with all speed. Our troops, before I could get up to them, began to fire, from the left of the



line, with cannon and small arms, into the town of Bladensburg. I supposed, at the time, it was from the information communicated by Mr. Madison from me, as I was the last person from Bladensburg. I immediately rode up the hill, expecting to find some of the Heads of Departments, to endeavor to get them to stop the firing, till it could be more effectual. I could not see the President or any of the gentlemen that were with him when I gave him the information. But I observed General Winder in the rear of the line, who I found to be the commanding officer. I immediately addressed him, and informed him that I was just from Bladensburg, and that there was but a very small party of the enemy in the town; that they had commenced firing too early; and that, if they would reserve their fire for a few minutes, the British troops were then coming down the hill, and were about to form on the Annapolis road, when they would be able to do some execution: for they were then heaving their fire away. I found that General Winder appeared to pay but little attention to what I had said. I remained upon the battle ground for some time, and until the retreat was ordered, and every thing and every body appeared to be in the greatest confusion, no point fixed for rallying, or bringing the enemy to action, and the greater part of our troops were retreating in the greatest disorder. I returned to the city, and stopped at the President's house, which I found entirely abandoned, excepting one white servant, who informed me that the President had returned from the battle ground, and that he had gone out of the city. I observed at the President's door two pieces of cannon, well mounted on travelling carriages, which had been fixed there for the defence of the house, under a guard of soldiers, for some time, which was also abandoned. This being late in the day, and the most of the retreating soldiers having passed by, there was, however, still some coming on, very much fatigued, and worn down with hunger and thirst. I stopped a number of them, and plied them with plenty of brandy, which I got the President's servant to bring forward from the house. I then prevailed upon the soldiery to remove the cannon, by hand, towards Georgetown, where they were saved from falling into the hands of the enemy, who took possession of the house soon after. This now being near night, and not seeing a single military man in the city, I retired a few miles in the country, where I soon was a spectator to the conflagration of the capitol, President's house, &c.

I remained in the vicinity of the city until after the enemy had abandoned it, when I returned; and in a day or two after, when stopping at the door of Colonel Monroe, who was present, as well as Mr. Madison, Mr. Rush, and several other gentlemen, Mr. Rush observed to me, sir, we consider ourselves under obligations to you for preventing our falling into the hands of the enemy at Bladensburg; observing, at the same time, that they were going immediately into Bladensburg, understanding that part of General Winder's troops were there, and that they should have supposed the advance part of the enemy, not in uniform, were a part of General Winder's troops. The foregoing is as correct a narrative of facts as I can at this time recollect.

I am, sir, with great respect, &c.

WM. SIMMONS.

The Honorable R. M. JOHNSON, &c.

SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS.

GEORGETOWN, December 16, 1814.

SIR:

I had the honor to receive yours of yesterday. My statement shall be concise as possible. On perusing, in the National Intelligencer, of the 10th instant, the report of the committee of which you are chairman, the following passage arrested my attention: "From early in the morning till late in the afternoon, Colonel Minor sought Colonel Carbery diligently, but he could not be found. He rode to head quarters and obtained an order from General Winder upon the arsenal, for arms, &c.—marched to the place with his regiment. Colonel Carbery arrived at the moment, and apologized for his absence, and informed Colonel Minor that he had, the evening before, ridden out to his country seat."

Without adverting to the information on which the committee may have thought proper to rely, for what is stated in the above extract, I shall merely proceed to state some facts, supported by respectable testimony, which, it is believed, will, in the opinion of the committee, completely invalidate what is there set forth.

1. It will appear that, on the night of the 23d of August, between the hours of nine and eleven, I was seen between Capitol Hill and the camp. See the certificate of Major Marsteller, Deputy Quartermaster General, No. 1. That, late at night of the 23d, I arrived at Mr. Semmes' hotel, in Georgetown; that I lodged there that night; was seen about sunrise next morning, near M'Leod's hotel, on the Pennsylvania avenue; and that afterwards I returned to my quarters in Georgetown, and breakfasted. See Nos. 3 and 4, given by Mr. Semmes, my landlord, and Captain Cassin, of the District militia. That, on the morning of 24th August, between seven and nine, I signed requisitions for arms, &c. for Colonel Minor, and gave them to the surgeon of his regiment. See Lieutenant Hobbs, No. 2. That Doctor Jones, who was with our troops when the action commenced, returning to his hospital to attend to his duties there, saw Colonel Minor's troops halted on Capitol Hill, and thinks they were getting their dinners. See his certificate, No. 5. That, in the opinion of Lieutenant Baden, of the ordnance department, Colonel Minor's troops, from the time they arrived at the arsenal, had sufficient time to have got their arms, &c. and have marched to the battle ground before the action commenced. See his certificate, No. 6.

These certificates being in your hands can easily be referred to.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

HENRY CARBERY, Colonel 36th U. S. Infantry.

The Honorable RICHARD M. JOHNSON,  
Chairman of a Committee of Congress.

George W. Campbell's letter.

NASHVILLE, (TEN.) December 7, 1814.

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 29th October last. You request that I should give the committee, of which you are chairman, such facts and views as may be in my power respecting the proceedings of a cabinet council on the 1st of July last, in relation to the defence of military district No. 10; and on the subject of a conversation that took place between the President and myself, on the 24th of August, respecting the part General Armstrong was to take at Bladensburg; and also any other facts and views that may be thought pertinent to a fair and impartial inquiry into the causes of the fall of the capital of the United States.

The information requested by the committee shall be given without reserve so far as my recollection and state of health will enable me. I deem it, however, proper, previously, to state, that, according to the views I entertain of the relations existing between the Executive and the other members of the Government, usually called on to assist in council, I should not consider myself bound, on such application as the present, to disclose, in all cases, the proceedings which may have taken place at such council, or what may have passed at a conversation held with the President individually, such as that above referred to, as such disclosure might justly be considered as restrained; in the former case, on the ground of official, and in the latter, on that of personal confidence; and, without taking into consideration the effect of the restraint that would naturally be imposed on such deliberations and interchange of sentiments, by establishing the precedent that they were liable to public disclosure whenever called for, there might be cases in which the public interest would be compromised by such development. I do not, however, consider the present such a case; and I have no motive for withholding the information required on account of any bearing

it might be supposed to have on my own conduct on that occasion, or on that of any other member of the Government, as I am perfectly satisfied it is the desire of the Executive, and presume it is so also of the other members, that every circumstance calculated to throw light on the subject before the committee, and develop the real causes which led to the late events at the Seat of Government, should be disclosed without reserve. Under these impressions, therefore, I act, in giving the information desired.

At the cabinet council referred to; held on the 1st of July, by the members of the Government, convened by request of the President, I was present. Despatches had been received, a few days previously thereto, from two of our ministers (Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard) in Europe, the consideration of which, according to my present impressions, was the principal object of the conference. They were accordingly taken up for deliberation, and the changed aspect of affairs in Europe, as unfolded by them, as well as by information derived from other sources, was brought into view. The subject of our foreign relations, generally, was taken into consideration, and the effect the late great events on the continent would be likely to produce upon them was freely spoken of. It was stated as probable, first, I believe, by the President, that England, considering her own relative power and influence greatly increased, would be disposed to employ a considerable portion of her military and naval forces, lately disengaged from the great European contest, in prosecuting the war against this country; that she might be expected to strengthen herself in Canada, and carry on her depredations against our Atlantic coast on a scale more extended than heretofore. Some general remarks were also made on the propriety of adapting our measures to that state of things an increase of the enemy's forces would produce; and there appeared a concurrence of opinion among the members as to the importance of providing the means, and making the requisite arrangements, for defending not only district No. 10, including the Seat of Government, but, as far as practicable, every other portion of the Union, against which an attack might reasonably be expected; but I do not at present recollect any specific proposition, made while I was present, in relation to the defence of that district, or any other place in particular. I cannot, however, undertake to state in detail all the proceedings that took place in relation to this subject on that occasion. The state of my health was very imperfect, and some official duty, according to my present recollection, requiring to be attended to at a certain hour, occasioned me to withdraw before the subject of the defence of the Seat of Government was formally taken up for decision; nor do I now recollect of being present when the question on that subject was decided. The President, either on my return the same day, or shortly after, informed me it had been determined to call forth and organize a force deemed sufficient for the defence of the district, and particularly the Seat of Government, of which measure I approved; and, from the Secretary of War, I afterwards understood the number to be called on for that purpose was fifteen thousand men, which appeared to me amply sufficient. Nothing further occurs to me, at present, in relation to what passed at that conference, while I was present, on the subject of the defence of the Seat of Government. I recollect that, about this time, the President, in conversation, stated his impressions to be, on the fullest consideration he had been able to give the state of affairs in Europe, in connexion with the disposition of Great Britain, as far as it could be ascertained from the late despatches of our ministers, as well as from other sources of information, that we ought to calculate she would direct a considerable portion of her numerous forces, liberated from the late great conflicts on the continent, and left entirely at her disposal, against this country, either to produce a favorable effect on the pending negotiation, and, if disposed to peace, close the war with some brilliant achievement calculated to give her arms the air of eclat; or, if not, so disposed, for the purpose of prosecuting the war more vindictively, and possibly with a view to other more ambitious objects; and that, whatever might be her ulterior views, we ought to expect that Washington city, being the seat of the National Government, and, from its local situation, more accessible, as well as less capable of defence, than most other places, would be among the first objects of her attack, and that we ought, therefore, to make the requisite preparations to meet such event. With this view, I understood, General Winder was appointed to the command of the district, and orders given for concentrating, in the neighborhood of the city, such force, to consist of regulars and militia, as was deemed sufficient for its defence.

The conversation between the President and myself, on the 24th August, respecting which the committee requests information, having taken place incidentally, and under peculiar circumstances, it will not be expected that I should recapitulate it at length; and it may be difficult to communicate its substance with precision, or the causes that led to it, without going more into detail than would be acceptable to the committee, or accord with my own inclination.

When it was known, on the evening of the 23d of August, that the troops under General Winder had retired across the Eastern Branch, and encamped in the city, it occasioned, as may be readily supposed, considerable agitation in the minds of the citizens. It appeared to have been expected, that, in case our force was not considered sufficient to meet and repulse the enemy on his landing, his advance would be opposed, and his progress, at least, retarded as far as practicable, by harassing him on his march, erecting defensive works at suitable positions, and throwing such other obstructions in his way, as was best calculated to check his movements; for all which operations the nature of the country through which he must pass was said to be very favorable; when, therefore, it was stated that he was near the city, without such means having been either at all, or but partially resorted to, it produced some surprise, as well as inquiry into the causes that led to such a result. Falling in conversation with the Secretary of War, on this subject, I expressed my apprehensions that suffering the enemy to approach so near (if his progress could by any possible means have been checked) as to make the fate of the city depend on a single battle, to be maintained, on our part, principally by raw, inexperienced troops, was hazarding too much. He appeared to concur in this opinion. And when I inquired whether the late movements of the troops were made pursuant to his advice, or with his approbation; and what plan of operations was determined on to oppose the further progress of the enemy; and, also, whether our army would have the benefit of his suggestions and advice, in directing its future movements; he gave me to understand, that the movements which had taken place were not in pursuance of any plan or advice given by him; that General Winder, having been appointed to the command of the district, including the city, and the means assigned for its defence placed at his disposal, he was considered as having the direction of their application; and it was to be presumed he had formed such plans for defending the city, as he deemed best suited to the emergency and the means he possessed; and that interposing his opinion might be considered indelicate, and perhaps improper, unless he had the approbation of the Executive for so doing; in which case, any assistance that his suggestions or advice could render, should be afforded.

It appeared to me an occasion so highly important and critical demanded the united efforts of all the military skill and ability within the reach of the Government; and that feelings of delicacy, if their cause could be removed, should not be allowed to come in collision with the public interest; and, I believe, I so expressed myself to General Armstrong.

On the following morning, I set out with the Secretary of War for General Winder's head quarters, then near the bridge on the Eastern Branch. When we proceeded as far as the President's house, we learned he had gone on before. Some other company joining us, I proceeded in advance, and arrived there before the Secretary; where I found, with General Winder, the President, the Secretary of the Navy, and, I believe, the Attorney General of the United States, with some military officers. Some conversation took place in relation to the route the enemy would be most likely to pursue in approaching the city; when a messenger arrived, bringing the commanding general information, considered by him decisive, that they would advance by Bladensburg, and he immediately proceeded with the troops to that place. At this time the Secretary of War had arrived. All the members of the Government, that were present, left the house. Falling in conversation with the President, I took occasion to state to him the impressions of the Secretary of War, as to the line of conduct his duty required him to observe on that occasion; and added, in substance, according to my present recollection, that the very critical situation of affairs appeared to me to require all the aid that military skill and ability could afford; that, on so important an occasion, considerations of delicacy, as to conflicting authority, should not, I presumed, be allowed to jeopardize, in any degree, the public interest; that I regretted the reserve apparently observed by the Secretary of War; but understood from him, he acted on the ground that, as General Winder was appointed to the command of the district, and the means designed for its defence placed at his disposal, he was considered as possessing the right to direct the

manner of their application; and that, in interposing his opinion, without Executive approbation, might be considered indelicate, and perhaps an improper interference with the commanding general's authority; but that, if it was known to be the President's pleasure, he would afford any aid in his power, by his presence and advice; and I believe I also stated that, considering the extraordinary and menacing aspect of our affairs, I thought it my duty to make him this communication, that, in case he should think proper, the ground on which the Secretary acted might be removed. The President replied, as I understood him, that General Armstrong might have known, any proper order given by him would readily meet with the Executive sanction; and that there was no doubt, any suggestions from him would be duly attended to by General Winder. Upon my remarking I had reason to believe, without his approbation, the Secretary would not interpose his opinion, or take any part in the business of the day, the President observed, he would speak to him on the subject. The President, the Secretary of War, and myself, were then on horseback. The President joined the Secretary, and some conversation took place between them, the purport of which I did not hear.

The President, after parting from the Secretary, observed to me he had spoken to General Armstrong on the subject I had named to him, and that no difficulty, he presumed, would occur in the case; that any suggestions, made by the Secretary, would, without doubt, receive due attention from the commanding general, and, should any objection be made on the ground of authority, the matter might readily be adjusted, as he would not himself be far distant; and the Secretary's order, (I presume it was meant in writing) given on the field, if necessary, would be considered as carrying with it the Executive sanction.

The foregoing is, according to the best of my recollection, the substance of what the President communicated to me after conversing with General Armstrong. It, however, occurred in the midst of much bustle, and where various other subjects presented themselves for consideration; it is therefore possible I may not have understood him correctly, or may not now recollect all that passed.

Some general conversation took place about this time respecting the probable force, movements, and objects, of the enemy; also respecting the direction to be given to certain portions of our own troops, particularly those under Commodore Barney, who had not then been put in motion, and whom the Commodore appeared very desirous should be permitted, with himself, to take a share in the expected battle. Mention was also made of the precautionary measures proper to be taken, in the possible event of the enemy's success against the city; respecting the public property at the navy yard, &c.; and, also, the propriety suggested in such case, of the members of the Government convening at some suitable place, to determine on ulterior arrangements; and Fredericktown was agreed on as best calculated for that purpose.

After parting with the President, I joined the Secretary of War, then on his way to Bladensburg; he observed the President had spoken to him respecting the operations of the day; that he would proceed to the scene of action; and, if there should be occasion, would suggest, to the commanding general, whatever occurred to him as likely to be useful; and, should it become necessary, he would, on the field, give a written order that would carry with it, of course, official authority. He did not, however, state to me the particulars of the conversation that passed between the President and himself. Near the turnpike gate I parted with the Secretary; the state of my health required that I should return to my lodging.

The foregoing contains all that occurs to me at present, in relation to the specific inquiries of the committee.

On the subject of their general inquiry, respecting the causes of the capture of the seat of Government, it is not probable I can add any thing to the information they already possess, derived from other sources. A combination of circumstances, not easily accounted for, some of which could not probably have been anticipated, and others against which it might have been difficult to provide by any precautions that could have been adopted, led, it is believed, to that event.

The sudden advance of the enemy, after his arrival on our coast, so considerable a distance into the country; destitute as he was known to be of cavalry, and, in a great degree, of artillery, as well as of the means of transporting provisions; without delaying to establish garrisons, or otherwise to provide for keeping open his communication with his shipping and supplies; was a measure that could not, it is presumed, be justified on any military principle, and may not, therefore, have been anticipated in time to provide effectually against its consequences. On the other hand, the tardy movements of the militia, called on from the neighboring States for the defence of the city, and their consequent failure to arrive in time, at the scene of action, whatever may have occasioned it, may undoubtedly be considered as the principal cause of the catastrophe that followed.

How far the troops who had arrived, and were present, might, under the guidance of different management, have succeeded in retarding the enemy, and, with the aid of the reinforcements hourly expected, in finally repulsing him, is not for me to decide: and it is a question on which even military men may not perhaps agree.

I have the honor to be, &c.

G. W. CAMPBELL.

Honorable R. M. JOHNSON, &c.

[13th CONGRESS.]

No. 138.

[3d. SESSION.]

### SUBSISTING THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 25, 1815.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *November 12, 1814.*

SIR:

I am instructed by the Committee on Military Affairs to ask information on the following points:

1. What is the present mode of subsisting the army?
2. If by contracts, what are the defects, if any, and the remedy?
3. Whether any other mode can be adopted, combining, in a greater degree, certainty and promptitude with economy and responsibility?
4. Whether the alternative offered by law, of substituting commissaries to contractors, has been adopted; and if yes, what has been the general result?

I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect,

G. M. TROUP.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 23, 1814.*

SIR:

Not wishing to rely altogether on my own judgment in replying to your inquiries relating to the best mode of subsisting the troops of the United States, I have consulted the officers of greatest experience who were within my reach, on the presumption that I should best promote the views of the committee, by collecting all the light that I could on the subject. I have the honor now to submit to you a letter from General Scott, one from General Gaines, and one from Colonel Fenwick, which meet fully those inquiries in every circumstance. These officers give a de-

cided preference to the system of supply by commissaries, in preference to that by contractors; and I have reason to believe that the officers generally concur with them in that preference. It has my unqualified assent.

Should the proposed plan be adopted, it will readily occur to the committee that the commissaries to be appointed should be placed on a very respectable footing; so high a trust should be committed to such of our citizens only as are most distinguished for their abilities, their patriotism, and integrity. I shall be happy to furnish details on this subject, should the honorable committee desire it.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

Hon. Mr. Troup.

GENERAL SCOTT'S REMARKS.

*Observations on the mode of subsisting an Army by Contract and by Commissariat.*

The first method is believed to be impolitic, and is vicious in time of war; also liable to many objections in a state of peace. In time of war, contractors may betray an army; they are not confidential and responsible agents, appointed by the Government. The principal only is known to the War Office, and therefore may be supposed to be free from this objection; but his deputies and issuing agents are appointed without the concurrence or knowledge of the General or the Government. The deputies or issuing agents are necessarily as well acquainted with the numerical strength of the army to which they are attached, as the Adjutant General himself. For a bribe they may communicate this intelligence to the enemy, or fail to make issues at some critical moment, and thus defeat the best views and hopes of the commander-in-chief. The movements of an army are necessarily subordinate to its means of subsistence; or, as Marshal Saxe expresses it, to considerations connected with the belly. The present mode of subsisting our armies, puts the contractor above the General. If a contractor corresponds with the enemy, he can only be tried by the civil courts of the United States, as in the case of other persons charged with treason; (courts martial having decided that contractors do not come within the meaning of the 60th article of the rules and articles of war;) and if a contractor fails to make issues, he can only be punished by civil actions. I speak of cases arising within the limits of the United States. In the enemy's country, I suppose, a General, who knows his duty, would not fail to hang a contractor who should, by guilty neglect or corruption, bring any serious disaster upon the army. A sudden event frequently obliges a General to order troops to a distant and new station; notice is given to this contractor to supply, &c.; but the latter, finding that prompt arrangements will diminish his profits, pleads a want of reasonable notice. This term is indefinite, and if the General and contractor differ, it can only be settled by a court of common law. It is no reply to his objection to say, that, on a sudden emergency, like that supposed, the General may appoint a special agent to supply the troops, by purchases on account of the United States. This would only show the superiority of a commissariat.

The interests of the contractor are in precise opposition to those of the troops. The checks provided by the contract may be sufficient to prevent abuse, if the officers are vigilant and have leisure to resort to those checks; but when the army is on a forced march, or is manœuvring in the face of the enemy, the contractor has it in his power to practise many impositions with impunity, as in the case of an army or detachment ordered to march on short notice, to take with it subsistence for a given time. In such case, there is no time for a formal survey or minute inspection of the rations offered by the contractor, according to the mode pointed out in the contract. The contractor avails himself of the hurry of the moment, and issues provisions deficient in quantity and quality. Unless the rations, before they are received by the regimental quartermaster, are surveyed and condemned, there is no remedy except by a civil action on the case, as between citizen and citizen. Contractors, as before observed, are not amenable to courts martial. Every option given to the contractor under the contract, operates to the prejudice of the troops, and frequently embarrasses the General: as in the case of bread or flour, either of which the contractor may issue at pleasure. Eighteen ounces of flour will yield twenty-seven of bread; therefore, when the soldier finds it convenient to bake his own bread, or to commute his flour for twenty or twenty-two ounces of bread, the contractors will not choose to issue flour, because he too finds the same convenience, and reserves to himself the profit. Under other circumstances, when both the soldier and contractor find it inconvenient or impossible to bake bread, the latter avails himself of his option, and issues flour. Under this uncertainty, it is impossible for the General to calculate any march with precision. When the troops receive flour instead of bread, more time must be allowed for cooking. It is this option which prevents the General from obliging the contractor to provide magazines of hard bread for prompt movements and expeditions, in which bread wagons cannot follow the troops. Hard bread occupies, comparatively, but little space. To attain an important object, every soldier may very well carry in his haversack five or six days' bread (without meat) and thus march more than one hundred miles independent of ovens, wagons, or contractors. Our armies have sometimes been supplied with hard bread in the following manner: The contractor delivers flour, and has credit for so many rations of that article as are contained in the barrels delivered at once. The quartermaster general causes the flour to be converted into hard bread, at the expense of the United States. The bread is then turned over to the contractor, who issues it to the troops, receiving a certain per centage for his trouble. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the necessity of appointing commissariats to supply the army in the place of contractors. It is almost impossible for the General to compel the contractor to supply the troops regularly with soap and vinegar (component parts of the rations) because the trouble of procuring them generally exceeds the contract prices of these articles; and yet, nothing can be more essential to the cleanliness and health of troops. The contractor generally endeavors to give whiskey in the way of commutation, which costs the officers much exertion to prevent. If the contract system is continued, I would recommend diminishing the allowance for whiskey, and the reverse for vinegar, soap, and candles.

It would be endless to trace the petty villainies which contractors are daily tempted to commit, to the prejudice of the troops, arising out of this opposition of interests before noticed. The interests of the contractor put him perpetually on the alert. The vigilance of the officer is sometimes necessarily relaxed. There is no such opposition between duty and interest in the case of commissariats, who purchase and issue on account of Government. A commissary, if destitute of character, might be disposed to charge the government more for a barrel of whiskey, or a bullock, or flour, than the article cost him; but it can never be his interest to impose unsound provisions on the troops. It is presumed that, if a commissariat be resorted to, the officers composing it will be appointed on the usual evidences of character, and subjected to martial law. It will not be necessary to give them rank, except as it respects each other, as commissary general, deputy and assistant commissary general. Such is the practice in the French and English armies.

W. SCOTT.

*General Gaines's remarks on Contracts for Provisions, &c.*

SIR:

I regret to be under the necessity of troubling you with complaints, but my own exertions to enforce the contract, and ensure regular supplies of rations, having failed, I am compelled to resort to this mode of seeking a remedy.

The sub-contractor at Wilmington has not furnished a day's rations for near two weeks past. The sub-contractor at Billingsport, New Jersey, as well as the one at Marcus Hook, our principal encampment, have, in defiance of my frequent orders and threats, and contrary to their contract, contrived to palm upon the troops the coarsest and cheapest provisions, and such as are often damaged. To effect this criminal species of speculation, they keep

in store little more, and often not as much, as is necessary to meet the returns from day to day; hence the troops are often compelled to draw damaged provisions, or draw none at all. This conduct, on the part of the sub-contractors, occasioned yesterday, at Marcus Hook, such serious disorders in some of the corps; that it became necessary to confine two young officers, and some twenty men; and I this evening received a report from Billingsport, that the troops there have been all day without provisions, the rations offered for issue in the morning being so much damaged as to require their condemnation. I have just now purchased and forwarded a supply. The New Jersey militia are very orderly.

I have uniformly given the best attention in my power, ever since the commencement of the war, to the supply of rations, and the conduct of contractors; and if I were called before Heaven to answer, whether we have not lost more men by the badness of the provisions, than by the fire of the enemy, I should give it as my opinion that we had; and if asked what causes have tended most to retard our military operations, and repress that high spirit of enterprise, for which the American soldiers are pre-eminently distinguished, and the indulgence of which would not fail to veteranize our troops, by the annoyance and destruction of the enemy, I should say, the irregularity in the supply, and badness of the rations, have been the principal causes.

Original contractors seem to be a privileged order of men, who, by virtue of the profits of the contract, are elevated above the drudgery which a common sense view of the contract would seem to impose on them. They take care to secure to themselves at least one cent per ration, leaving a second, and sometimes a third order of miserable under contractors to perform the duties, and each of these must calculate on making money. Thus the contract, after being duly entered into at Washington, is bid off, until it falls into the hands of men who are forced to bear certain loss and ultimate ruin, or commit frauds, by furnishing damaged provisions; they generally choose the latter, though it should tend to destroy the army. I know the opinion of no officer on this subject, who does not think with me.

It is true, that in most cases where purchases have been ordered by the General, on the failures of the contractor, the provisions have cost more than the ordinary contract price; but this proves nothing in favor of the contract system; but, on the contrary, proves that the contractor, when unable to purchase below the contract price, withdraws himself from the service, and leaves the troops to suffer, or be supplied by order of the General, with little or no previous notice, so that the purchasing officer is obliged to take what can be got, at the highest prices; and these failures generally take place when near the enemy, and where regular supplies are most wanted. The purchases are ordered by the General, and made by the officers when their time is most precious, and their attention constantly called to their regular duties; under these circumstances, it is vain to expect purchases at very low prices. But if, instead of a contractor, a commissioned officer should be authorized to supply the rations at the original cost of the provisions, and should be allowed a little time to look out for the best markets, and be enabled, by punctual payments, to support the public credit, I have no doubt that the supplies would not only be good and regular, but even lower than they can be under any contract system. Commissioned officers only should be employed in this duty; men who stand most solemnly pledged to serve the United States honestly and faithfully, and to obey orders; men who may be cashiered or capitally punished by military law, for neglect of duty, or for fraudulent practices.

I feel persuaded that I could, with the assistance of one of the general staff, and the regimental quartermasters, supply the troops altogether and completely, without being more frequently called from my other duties than the neglects in the contractor's department have usually called me. If you should deem an experiment desirable, I will most cheerfully undertake it, and pledge myself that the rations shall not cost more than eighteen cents, and, probably, not so much.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES.

Hon. JAMES MONROE, *Secretary of War.*

*Colonel Fenwick's remarks on supplying the army with Provisions.*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1814.

In conformity with your commands, I have the honor of reporting to you the present means of victualling our army by contract, the impositions and danger attending such a mode of supply, and the necessity of destroying the evil, by substituting a commissariat. Contracts are never fulfilled to the letter, and never will be so long as avarice exists; and where so many opportunities present themselves to the military contractor for imposition and fraud, we must expect he will avail himself of them; that his fortune may be made with too great rapidity for the comfort and health of the soldier, every expedient is resorted to, to increase their profits. Bread half baked, sour flour, damaged meat, are amongst the many resources they employ; more than half the issues are made without the smaller parts of the rations; *vinegar, soap, and candles*, are retained under the most frivolous excuses; and you are, sir, sensible, how conducive to the soldier's health must be both soap and vinegar; these evils I have witnessed in every part of the country. Seldom could the wrong be redressed, because the commanding officer had not the means; the abuse could not be punished; the contractor was beyond his control. Discontent was excited amongst the men, but complaint is often found unprofitable, for, if the provisions are condemned, the agent is so dilatory in replacing them, that the men get no food for the greater part, if not the whole, of that day.\* These are the causes of complaint with the army, and the best planned operations may be frustrated by the perverse or tardy contractor, or his dishonest agent, who, if base enough to defraud the soldier, would be equally so in communicating with the enemy. The history of all the wars in Europe is big with treachery, whenever a Power depended for its supplies on contractors. Numerous are the instances of failures of expeditions in the wars of Marlborough and Frederick. Contractors, or their agents, were the principals in the mischief. In our own campaigns† we have already experienced this evil. Many other reasons might be adduced how, and why, supplies will fail, if this system of contract is continued; it does not exist in any army of Europe; it has proven itself fallacious and expensive in a high degree. Even the British, riveted as they are to old habits, have been compelled to abandon it, and assume the commissariat of the continent. Lord Wellington speaks of the impossibility of supplying his army in Spain by any other means. There is not an officer or soldier in the army who would not petition you to do away this destructive system, and substitute commissaries, who would be actuated by feeling, honor, and the fear of disgrace.

I have the honor to be, sir, with very great respect and consideration, your obedient servant,

JOHN R. FENWICK.

\* Occurred at New York.

† At Black Creek, Upper Canada.

[13th CONGRESS.]

No. 139.

[3d SESSION.]

## DEFENCE OF THE CITY OF BALTIMORE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 1, 1815.

*To the President of the United States, and the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, the memorial of the Committee of Vigilance and Safety of the city and precincts of Baltimore.*

Your memorialists beg leave to draw your attention to the necessity of providing a force adequate to the defence of the city of Baltimore, during the next campaign, and, in doing so, they would take the liberty to submit the following statement and reflections for your consideration.

Nothing has so strikingly illustrated the easy accessibility of the city of Baltimore to an invading enemy, as the demonstration made upon it during the last summer. It then appeared that large frigates, and any number of bomb vessels, could, without molestation from the shore, approach and lie within shell range of Fort McHenry, the chief strong hold of the city; and that, unless the channels should be seasonably and effectually obstructed, they might approach within reach of the city itself along a prong of the Patapsco, called Ferry Branch. It also appeared that any number of troops may with easé be landed on that long narrow slip of land, called Patapsco Neck, the most remote point of which is about twelve miles from Baltimore, and that, when landed, unless checked or repelled by an equal or superior force, they may, in a very short time, be marched to the assault of any part of the city. Thus much has been clearly evinced by the late attack of the enemy. The other directions from which assaults were seriously apprehended, it might be highly imprudent to point out and explain in a paper, with the contents of which the enemy may hereafter become acquainted; and the more especially since that enemy, every where barbarous and malignant, may well be supposed to cherish a peculiarly rancorous spirit of hostility against a city from which he has been driven back with disappointment and disgrace, and to be anxiously attentive to all the means by which he may best explore every avenue to assault, and be enabled to select the weakest and most vulnerable.

The people of Baltimore, apprized of the power and temper of the enemy with whom they had to contend, have, during the last summer, exerted every means in their power to render their city as strong and as defensible as possible. They hold in readiness obstructions prepared to be thrown into the channels of the river leading to the city, at the shortest notice; have, chiefly by their own personal labor or contributions, caused forts, redoubts, or breast-works, to be thrown up, and nearly completed, under the direction of the military authority, round about the whole extent of the city; and they have aided, as far as in their power, in procuring and mounting the ordnance necessary and suitable to the works so erected. When those lines and forts shall be well and fully manned, Baltimore will feel perfectly secure; its citizens may then with confidence set the enemy at defiance; but not till then.

Your memorialists deem it unnecessary to state the strength of the regular force now stationed here, because the most correct sources of information upon this subject are at the seat of Government. It is, however, confessedly very inferior, and inadequate to the defence of the city. Your memorialists have not been able to ascertain with precision the number of men requisite for the defence of Baltimore; but from a consideration of the ease with which the city may be approached, both by land and water, as manifested in the late attack; of the various points to be defended; of the reported threats and disposable force of the enemy; and also of information obtained from some of the most experienced and intelligent military characters, they are strongly impressed with a belief that a considerable permanent force of regulars is indispensable to the safety of the city. Whether such a force can be detached from the military establishment now on foot, is more than your memorialists can undertake to say; but every expectation that it would be done, has thus far been withheld from them, and they have uniformly been given to understand that their reliance must be placed, during the next campaign, as heretofore, on the militia to be called together as occasion may require. Against such an arrangement your memorialists, on behalf of their fellow citizens, the people of Baltimore and its precincts, must beg leave warmly to remonstrate and most decidedly to protest. The inefficiency of militia alone for any regular or important operation of war, has been so often and so fully tested that it cannot now be necessary to adduce either proofs, or arguments, to show what has been so long and universally admitted. The experience of this, as well as that of the Revolutionary war, shows that, to repel the hasty predatory incursions of an enemy, militia may often be brought to act with much effect, and that they are a useful, and often powerful auxiliary force in partisan warfare; it also shows that it would be extremely unsafe to rely upon them solely for the defence of the extensive lines of a large city against any very considerable invading regular force. An army of militia, to be equal in strength to that of a regular one, must always be vastly superior in numbers; yet, however, the history of military affairs in all times has shown, that a mere mass of armed men, or undisciplined militia, beyond a certain number, brings with it little or no additional strength. Taking this principle as correct, your memorialists do humbly conceive that scarcely any militia force that could be hastily collected about their city, could secure it against a large invading army of well disciplined regulars. Your memorialists have no reason to doubt the courage of their fellow citizens composing the militia; far otherwise; they insist only that, without the combined movement, concert, and discipline, of a regular army, courage can do nothing, and numbers produce only confusion and disorder. A militia force, hastily assembled, is not only the most unsafe, it is also the most expensive. They are not, it is true, usually retained in service during a whole campaign; but being necessarily far more numerous than regulars, and infinitely more wasteful of all the munitions of war, they are in the end much more costly and burthensome. But the exclusive use of a militia force brings with it other evils, of a nature so striking and fatal, as, even if it were not liable to the charge of prodigality and insecurity, might induce us to avoid it. It interrupts the pursuits of husbandry, and embarrasses every branch of industry, to the impoverishment of individuals and the ruin of the State. It draws into the field men who are not prepared, either in mind or body, for its hazards or fatigues; possessing little capacity to annoy the enemy, and yet less to endure the privations and hardships of a camp. It is known to destroy by disease and to break down the constitutions of more than double the numbers of those who perish or are permanently injured by sickness in a regular army; and to augment the sum of human misery, far more than enlistments could, by diffusing more widely anxiety among families in proportion to the superior numbers of the militia force, and the superior importance of the greater part of it to those who are connected with or depend upon them.

Your memorialists are aware that it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to provide a body of regulars, enlisted upon the terms of the existing laws, in season for the defence of their city during the next campaign, but they flatter themselves that a law might be framed and passed, by virtue of which the necessary number of able bodied men might be called into the field for local, stationary, or limited service, during one campaign, at the least, if not longer.

Your memorialists would here beg leave to observe that, as among the most important of the powers of the General Government is that of the right to declare war, so the providing supplies, and all the means for its active prosecution, and the superintending its faithful and vigorous management, are among its most sacred trusts and binding obligations. The rapid and decisive movements of war imperatively require, to ensure even safety, much more success, a corresponding promptitude and decision of the Government by which it is waged; a war of enterprise and vigor not only drives danger from the door of every citizen, calls forth a bold manly spirit of patriotism, and adorns the nation with rays of imperishable glory, but is also the least costly, the least wasteful of human life, the least tedious, and almost always terminates in the most sure and lasting peace. While, on the other hand, the shrinking policy of bare defence paralyzes the powers of the nation, imperceptibly wastes its resources, and invites the aggressions of an enemy. Under such impressions, it would be the earnest wish of your memorialists that the energies of their coun-

try should be so actively and forcibly exerted as to drive their present enemy, with his barbarous system of warfare, far from their homes; but, since that seems to be at present impracticable, owing to his greatly superior powers, they do, therefore, humbly beg and entreat that the means for their defence may be provided by a timely and adequate exercise of the legitimate and wholesome powers of the nation. Unless the General Government does, by a seasonable and vigorous effort, provide for the common defence along the Atlantic border, your memorialists are very seriously apprehensive that they will be amongst the first, and, perhaps, the most signal, of the victims of the ruinous policy of relying altogether upon an inefficient militia force, or of leaving every State to defend itself according to its ability: for a crisis has now arrived, when not only the city of Baltimore, but the State of Maryland itself, can only hope for protection and safety through the powers and means of the National Government. Exposed and vulnerable as Maryland is, to its centre, harassed and plundered as it has been, it feels, with the most lively sensibility, that it is now, indeed, wholly dependent upon the Union for salvation; for, alone, it is utterly unequal to the contest. The present war has, however, clearly shown that the most potent of the States is not altogether equal to its own defence, and that one of the smallest has compelled the enemy to fly from its territory, when aided by the powers of the Union. When your memorialists consider how very obvious it must be to the mind of any one, who will reflect only for a moment upon the subject, that a single campaign, undertaken by Maryland alone, in defence of its own shores would not only prostrate its finances, but, perhaps, mortgage its resources for ages to come, without, in the end, effecting any valuable purpose; they feel inspired with the highest degree of confidence that their National Government, so eminently characterized for its impartial and liberal justice, will, with alacrity and promptitude, afford them the succor so necessary to their safety; nor do they feel less confident that there is not a single citizen of Maryland, so lost to a just regard for his own best interests, as to hesitate one moment in co-operating with the General Government in the lawful and vigorous exercise of those powers of conducting war, by which alone they can be protected, defended, or even saved, from absolute ruin.

Your memorialists, in speaking of the merits of Baltimore, and her pretensions to the special consideration and regard of the Government, feel very sensibly the delicacy and embarrassment of the undertaking. The relative commercial importance of this city is best known at the Seat of Government; it will, therefore, be sufficient barely to refer to official documents there, by which it will appear that, in this respect, it ranks as the third city of the Union. But the commercial loss and ruin, consequent upon the fall of Baltimore, certainly is not the only, nor is it, perhaps, the greatest evil to be apprehended. It is the loss of a post, the relative position of which would be so highly advantageous to the enemy, that will produce in the mind of every impartial and thinking man the greatest alarm. The prodigious extent of country commanded by Baltimore, and the facility with which the enemy might, from thence, push his predatory incursions in every direction, are obvious, and may more properly be left to the reflections of Government, than, under existing circumstances, be strongly urged or fully explained. Lest the people of Baltimore should be numbered among those who forget the duty of a citizen, when every man should struggle to be foremost in discharging it, your memorialists will take leave to say a few words of their patriotism. What they have to say shall be comprised in a small compass, and shall be no more than what they believe will be the award of an impartial world. The people of Baltimore have dearly earned the privilege of speaking in the most frank and unreserved terms to the representatives of the nation. Yet they feel too tenderly for the honor and welfare of their country, even if they could be so indulged, publicly to rebuke and reproach the rulers of their choice for any errors that are past; they had rather aid than weaken, applaud than condemn. Let the following unequivocal acts and sufferings speak their ardent love for their Government and country. The metropolis of the nation was threatened; a portion of the militia of Baltimore was called on; at a very few moments' warning, they marched, with alacrity, to the aid of their country, and, on the unfortunate 24th August, they were posted in front; the loss sustained by the enemy was produced, in a great degree, by its militia, and some amongst the best of its citizens bled or fell. The enemy next threatened Baltimore itself, upon which its people, old and young, of all classes, exerted themselves to the utmost, and with the most uncommon energy, in erecting works of defence, and making preparations to meet him, and, by the most unremitting and indefatigable labors, their city was put into a tolerable state of defence by the time he appeared before it. And the city feels great pride in the recollection that, on the day so memorable to it, the 12th of September, the constancy, fortitude, and courage of its citizens-soldiers will bear a comparison with those of any other people on earth. Its citizens, some of whom had borne arms in their country's defence in the war of the Revolution, and her youth, met the enemy in advance, and were every where the first among the foremost in every perilous encounter. The banking institutions and the citizens of Baltimore, it is believed, have been as prompt and as liberal in their loans to the Government as those of any other portion of the Union.

Such are the people for whom your memorialists beg and entreat aid, protection, and defence. The Government may yet provide means in time, if prompt and vigorous measures are adopted; but there is no time to be lost. And your memorialists cannot, for a moment, entertain the painful thought that the constituted authorities of their country will turn with apathy from the earnest entreaties of a people so highly deserving their regard, and leave them to the mercy of a brutal enemy, whose hostility against them, in particular, has been so lately manifested, and so strongly excited.

EDWARD JOHNSON,

*Chairman of the Committee of Vigilance and Safety.*

BALTIMORE, January 26, 1815.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 140.

[3d Session.]

VETERINARY SURGEONS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 9, 1815.

Mr. GILES, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 7th instant, relative to veterinary surgeons, reported the following resolution:

*Resolved,* That it is *inexpedient* to provide for the appointment of veterinary surgeons, to be attached to the army of the United States.

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 141.

[3d SESSION.

## NATIONAL ARMORIES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 24, 1815.

WAR DEPARTMENT, February 20, 1815.

SIR:

In conformity to the 5th section of the act of the 2d of April, 1794, I have the honor to transmit to Congress a statement of the amount of expenditures on account of the national armories at Harper's Ferry and Springfield, during the year 1814, and of the number of arms made and repaired at each place, during the same period.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

The Honorable LANGDON CHEVES.

*Statement showing the expenditures on account of National Armories, and of the number and kinds of arms manufactured and repaired at the same, in the year 1814.*

PLACES.	Expenditures.	Muskets and Bayonets manufactured.	Muskets repaired.	Rifles (short) manufactured.	Rifles repaired.	Pattern Rifles (short.)	Total manufactured.	Total repaired.
Harper's Ferry, -	\$170,122 03	10,400	548	1,600	16	4	12,004	564
Springfield, -	73,500 00	9,585	5,190	-	-	-	9,585	5,190
Total, -	\$243,622 03	19,985	5,738	1,600	16	4	21,589	5,754

13th CONGRESS.]

No. 142.

[3d SESSION.

## RELATIVE POWERS OF THE GENERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS OVER THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 28, 1815.

Mr. GILES made the following report:

The Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs, understanding that serious differences of opinion existed between the Executive authority of the United States and the authorities of some of the individual States, respecting the relative powers of the General and State Governments over the militia, deemed it an incumbent duty on them to call for information upon that highly interesting subject, with a view of interposing, if found practicable, some legislative provisions for the mutual accommodation of such differences. For this purpose, on the 7th January last, in virtue of instructions from the committee, a letter was addressed to the honorable Secretary for the Department of war, a copy of which accompanies this report; and, in reply thereto, the committee received from him the letter and documents which also accompany this report.

Although the return of peace has, for the present, relieved the committee from the necessity of providing a legislative remedy for these unfortunate differences, yet the committee conceive that the points in question are of vital importance to the essential rights and powers of the Government of the United States, and that the pretensions of the authorities of the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, set up in opposition thereto, if now acquiesced in, might be resumed by the State authorities in the event of a future war, and thus deprive the Government of the United States of some of its most efficient legitimate means of prosecuting such war with vigor and effect; the committee have therefore thought proper to present the papers concerning this subject to the Senate, for consideration.

Whilst the committee will refrain from entering into arguments to fortify the grounds taken by the Executive Government on this subject, and explained in the letter of the Secretary for the Department of War, they feel themselves impelled by a sense of justice to express a decided approbation of its conduct, in supporting and preserving the constitution of the United States against the effects of the pretensions of the State authorities aforesaid, which, after full consideration, the committee believe not warranted by the constitution, nor deducible from any fair and just interpretation of its principles and objects. The direct and inevitable tendencies of those pretensions, in the opinion of the committee, would be, to deprive the Government of the United States of powers essentially necessary to ensure the common defence, one of the great objects committed to its charge; to introduce discordant and contradictory counsels into the national deliberations, upon a point, too, of all others, most requiring union of thought and of action; to change the fundamental character of the constitution itself, and thus eventually to produce its destruction, by debilitating the Government, and rendering it incompetent to the great objects of its institution; and to substitute in its stead the dismemberment of these United States, with all the horrible consequences respectively resulting from disunion.

COMMITTEE CHAMBER, January 7, 1815.

SIR:

The Committee of the Senate on Military Affairs having observed that differences exist between the authorities of the United States and of some of the individual States, respecting the relative command of the officers of the regular army and of the militia, when called to act together in certain cases, has instructed me to ask for such information upon that subject as may be in possession of your Department; and to inquire, whether, in your judgment, some legislative provisions might not be adopted, which would tend to heal such differences, to prevent the recurrence of others from the same cause, and to facilitate the operations of your Department in that respect?

Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my high consideration, &c.

WM. B. GILES, Chairman.

The Honorable JAMES MONROE,  
Secretary for the Department of War.



DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 11, 1815.*

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 7th ultimo, stating that the Military Committee of the Senate had observed that difficulties had arisen between the authorities of the United States and some of the individual States, respecting the relative command of the officers of the regular army and of the militia, when called to act together, and were desirous of such information on the subject as this Department might possess, and of its opinion whether some legislative provisions might not be adopted which would tend to heal such differences, to prevent the recurrence of the like for the same causes, and to facilitate the operations of the Department in other respects.

My late indisposition will, I trust, explain satisfactorily to the committee the cause of the delay of my answer, which I have much regretted.

In complying with the request of the committee, it has appeared to me advisable to communicate all the documents in this Department relating to the objects of its inquiry. By a detailed view of the several measures which have been adopted by the President, since the war, for the defence of the country, in discharge of the duties imposed on him by the constitution and laws of the United States; of the objections to those measures by the Executives of some of the States; and of the correspondence between this Department and the military authorities acting under it, with the Executives of such States, the committee will see the grounds of the differences which have attracted attention, and be enabled to judge how far any legislative interposition may be useful or proper.

The paper A contains a copy of the letters of the Secretary of War to the Governors of the several States, detailing their respective quotas of militia, under the acts of Congress.

B is a copy of a report of the Secretary of War to the Military Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, bearing date on the 21st day of December, 1812, communicating a division of the United States into military districts, then contemplated by the Department of War, with the reasons for it; which division, with certain modifications, was afterwards adopted. This report treats on some subjects not immediately within the scope of the call of the committee, yet, treating in all its parts on the important subject of defence, and thereby intimately connected with the object of the call, I have thought that a view of the whole paper, at this time, would not be unacceptable.

C is a copy of the answers of the Governors of several of the States to the Department of War, on the requisitions made for parts of their quotas of militia under the several acts of Congress, and of the correspondence which passed between them and the Department of War, and the commanders of the military districts, acting under it, within which those States were.

D is a copy of a correspondence between the Governor of New Jersey and the Department of War, relating to the appointment of the Governor of New York to the command of the military district No. 3; a copy of this correspondence is presented, to communicate to the committee every circumstance that has occurred relating to the command of the militia in the service of the United States.

It appears by these documents, that the Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, have objected to the requisitions made on their several States, for parts of their respective quotas of militia, on the following grounds: 1st. That the President has no power to make a requisition for any portion of the militia, for either of the purposes specified by the constitution, unless the Executive of the State, on whose militia such call is made, admits that the case alleged exists, and approves the call. 2d. That, when the militia of a State should be called into the service of the United States, no officer of the regular army had a right to command them, or other person, not an officer of the militia, except the President of the United States in person. These being the only difficulties which have arisen between the Executive of the United States and the Executives of any of the individual States, relative to the command of the militia, known to this Department, are, it is presumed, those respecting which the committee has asked information.

By these documents it is also shown, that certain portions of the militia were called out by the Executives of these States, and a part of them put into the service of the United States. These doctrines were nevertheless adhered to. I do not go into a detail on these points, deeming it unnecessary, as all the facts will be found in the documents.

Respecting, as I do, and always have done, the rights of the individual States, and believing that the preservation of those rights, in their full extent, according to a just construction of the principles of our constitution, is necessary to the existence of our Union, and of free government in these States, I take a deep interest in every question which involves such high considerations. I have no hesitation, however, in declaring it as my opinion, that the construction given to the constitution, by the Executives of these States, is repugnant to its principles, and of dangerous tendency.

By the constitution, Congress has power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The President is likewise made commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

The power which is thus given to Congress by the people of the United States, to provide for calling forth the militia, for the purposes specified in the constitution, is unconditional. It is a complete power, vested in the National Government, extending to all these purposes. If it was dependent on the assent of the Executives of the individual States, it might be entirely frustrated. The character of the Government would undergo an entire and radical change. The State Executives might deny that the case had occurred which justified the call, and withhold the militia from the service of the General Government.

It was obviously the intention of the framers of the constitution, that these powers, vested in the General Government, should be independent of the States' authorities, and adequate to the ends proposed. Terms more comprehensive than those which have been used cannot well be conceived. Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union. What laws? All laws which may be constitutionally made. Whatever laws are adopted for that purpose, within the just scope of that power, which do not violate the restraints provided in favor of the great fundamental principles of liberty, are constitutional, and ought to be obeyed. They have a right to provide for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections. This right is also unqualified. It extends to every case of insurrection against the legitimate authority of the United States. It may be said that the Government may abuse its authority, and force the people into insurrection, in defence of their rights. I do not think that this is a probable danger under our system; or that it is the mode of redress, even if such abuse should be practised, which a free people, jealous of their rights, ought to resort to. The right which they have to change their representatives, in the Legislative and Executive branches of the Government, at short intervals, and, thereby, the whole system of measures, if they should think proper, is an ample security against the abuse, and a remedy for it, if it should ever occur. Congress have also a right to provide for calling forth the militia to repel invasions. This right, by fair construction, is, in my judgment, an exemplification of the power over the militia, to enable the Government to prosecute the war with effect, and not the limitation of it, by strict construction, to the special case of a descent of the enemy on any particular part of our territory. War exists; the enemy is powerful; his preparations are extensive; we may expect his attacks in many quarters. Shall we remain inactive spectators of the dangers which surround us, without making the arrangements suggested by an ordinary instinctive foresight, for our defence? A regular army, in sufficient extent, may not exist. The militia is the principal resource. Is it possible that a free people would thus intentionally trammel a Government which they had created for the purpose of sustaining them in their just rank, and in the enjoyment of all their rights, as a nation, against the encroachments of other Powers, more especially after they had experienced that reliance could not be placed on the States individually, and that, without a General Government, thus endowed, their best interests would be sacrificed, and even their independence insecure? A necessary consequence of so complete and absolute a restraint on the power of the Ge-

neral Government over the militia, would be to force the United States to resort to standing armies for all national purposes. A policy so fraught with mischief, and so absurd, ought not to be imputed to a free people in this enlightened age. It ought not, more especially, to be imputed to the good people of these States. Such a construction of the constitution is, in my opinion, repugnant to their highest interests, to the unequivocal intention of its framers, and to the just and obvious import of the instrument itself.

The construction given to the constitution by the Executive is sanctioned by legislative authority, by the practice of the Government, and by the assent and acquiescence of all the States, since the adoption of the constitution, to the period of the late unhappy differences, respecting which the committee has desired to be informed. By the law of 1795, the President is authorized to call forth the militia, for the purposes mentioned in the constitution, by a direct application to the militia officers, without any communication with, or reference to, the Executives of the individual States, and penalties are prescribed for carrying the law into effect, should resort to them be necessary. It merits attention, in regard to the question under consideration, that the power given to the President to call forth the militia, is not made dependent, by this law, on the fact of an invasion having actually occurred, but takes effect in case of imminent danger of it. In the year 1795, the President of the United States, on the certificate of a Judge of the Supreme Court, that an insurrection existed in the western parts of Pennsylvania, called out the militia of several of the States, including the militia of Pennsylvania, to suppress it; which call was obeyed. In this instance, the assent of the Governor of Pennsylvania to the existence of an insurrection was not asked. General Washington, who then held the office of Chief Magistrate, relied exclusively on the powers of the General Government for the purpose. The opinion of the same Chief Magistrate, of the power of the General Government over the militia, was also made known by another distinguished act of his administration. By a report of General Knox, the then Secretary of War, to Congress, this doctrine is maintained to the utmost extent, and exemplifications of it insisted on, which prove, that, from the nature of our population, the militia was the force which, in his judgment, ought principally to be relied on for all national purposes.

In the instances under consideration, powers are granted to Congress for specified purposes, in distinct terms. A right to carry powers, thus granted, into effect, follows of course. The Government to whom they are granted must judge of the means necessary for the purpose, subject to the checks provided by the system. It adopts a measure authorized, supervises its execution, and sees the impediments to it. It has a right to amend the law to carry the power into effect. If any doubt existed on this point, in any case, on general principles, and I see cause for none, it cannot in the present—a power having been explicitly granted to Congress, by the constitution, to pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the powers which are vested in the General Government.

Equally unfounded, in my opinion, is the other objection of the Executives of the States above mentioned, that, when the militia of a State are called into the service of the United States, no officer of the regular army, or other person, not a militia officer, except the President of the United States, in person, has a right to command them.

When the militia are called into the service of the United States, all State authority over them ceases. They constitute a part of the national force, for the time, as essentially as do the troops of the regular army. Like the regular troops, they are paid by the nation. Like them, their operations are directed by the same Government. The circumstance, that the officers of the militia are appointed by, and trained under, the authority of the State, individually, (which must, however, be done according to the discipline prescribed by Congress) produces no effect on the great character of our political institutions, or on the character and duties of the militia, when called into the service of the United States.

That the President, alone, has a right to command the militia in person when called into the service of the United States, and that no officer of the regular army can take the command in his absence, is a construction for which I can see nothing in the constitution to afford the slightest pretext. Is it inferred from the circumstance, that he is appointed commander-in-chief of the militia when called into the service of the United States? The same clause appoints him commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the United States. In construction of law he is commander-in-chief, though not present. His presence is not contemplated in either case. Equally necessary is it in the one as in the other. What has been the practice under the constitution, commencing with the first chief Magistrate, and pursuing it under his successors, to the present time? Has any President ever commanded, in person, either the land and naval forces, or the militia? Is it not known that the power to do it is vested in him, principally, for the purpose of giving him the control over military and naval operations, being a necessary attribute of the executive branch of the Government? That, although he might take the command of all the forces under it, no President has ever done it? That a provision for the actual command is an object of legislative regulation, and the selection of the person to whom committed, of executive discretion.

Under the commander, all the officers of every species of service and corps, regular and militia, acting together, take rank with common consent, and perfect harmony, according to an article of war, sanctioned by the constitution. By this article, the officers of the regular army take rank of those of the militia of the same grade, without regard to the dates of their commissions, and officers of any and every grade of the militia take rank of all officers of inferior grade of the regular army. When these troops serve together they constitute but one national force. They are governed by the same articles of war. The details for detachment, guard, or any other service, are made from them equally. They are, in truth, blended together, as much as are the troops of the regular army when acting by themselves only.

The idea advanced by the honorable Judges of Massachusetts, that, where the regular troops and militia act together, and are commanded in person by the President, who withdraws, there can be no chief commander, of right, of either species of force, over the whole, but that the regulars and militia, as implied, may even be considered as allied forces, is a consequence of the construction for which they contend. It pushes the doctrine of State rights further than I have ever known it to be carried in any other instance. It is only in the case of Powers who are completely independent of each other, and who maintain armies, and prosecute war, against a common enemy, for objects equally distinct and independent, that this doctrine can apply. It does not apply to the case of one independent Power who takes into its service the troops of another: for then the command is always at the disposal of the Power making war, and employing such troops, whether regular or militia. How much less does it apply to the case under consideration, where there is but one Power, and one Government, and the troops, whether regular or militia, though distinguished by shades of character, constitute but one people, and are, in fact, countrymen, friends, and brethren.

The President is in himself no bond of union in that respect. He holds his station as commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces, and of the militia, under a constitution which binds us together as one people, for that and many other important purposes. His absence would not dissolve the bond. It would not revive discordant latent claims, or become a signal for disorganization.

The judicious selection of the chief commander, for any expedition or important station, is an object of high interest to the nation. Success often depends on it. The right to do this appears to me to have been explicitly vested in the President, by the authority given to Congress to provide for calling forth the militia, for organizing, arming, disciplining, and governing them, when employed in the service of the United States, and by the powers vested in him as Chief Executive of the United States. The rights of that highly respectable and virtuous body of our fellow-citizens, are, I am persuaded, completely secured, when the militia officers commanding corps are retained in their command—a Major General over his division, a Brigadier over his brigade, a Colonel over his regiment, and the inferior officers in their respective stations. These rights are not injured or affected by the exercise of the right of the Chief Magistrate; a right incident to the Executive power, equally applicable to every species of force, and of high importance to the public, to appoint a commander over them, of the regular army, when employed in the service of the United States, if he should deem it expedient. The rights of the militia officers and those of the General Government are strictly compatible with each other. There is no collision between them. To displace militia officers for the employment of regulars, or to multiply commands of a separate character, especially of small bodies, for that purpose, would be improper.

In dividing the United States into military districts, and placing a General of the regular army in command in

each, with such portion of the regular force, artillery, and infantry, as could be spared from other service, it was the object of the President to afford the best protection to every part of the Union that circumstances would admit of, with the least burthen which might be possible to the people. These commanders were specially charged with the defence of their respective districts. It was enjoined on them to watch the movements of the enemy, to communicate them to the Government, and to execute its orders in summoning to the field, on menace of invasion, such portions of the quotas of the militia of each State, within their respective districts, as had been provided for by act of Congress, and detailed by this Department, as were thought necessary.

When this arrangement was entered into, it will be observed that there was no menace of immediate invasion, and but few militia in the field. It was intended as a measure of precaution, to guard against possible, but, as was hoped and presumed, distant dangers. The Executive had then no alternative between that arrangement and any other. The militia officers of rank afforded none. They were at home; for the Executive has no power, under existing laws, to call them into the field, without a command of men suited to their rank; and even when thus called forth, their term of service must expire with that of the men whom they command. These facts show, that nothing was more remote from the intentions of the Government, than to disregard the just claims of our fellow-citizens of the militia. They show, also, how difficult it is to provide, by any arrangement which can be adopted, for a general and permanent defence of our principal cities and seaboard, without employing officers who are always in service, in the principal commands at least, for the purpose.

It is admitted that, by the increased pressure of the war, in consequence of which much larger bodies of militia have been called into service, and with them many general officers of experience and merit, these difficulties have proportionably diminished. Of these officers, several have been already advanced to distinguished commands, with great satisfaction to their fellow-citizens, and advantage to their country. The committee may be assured that opportunities of this kind, regarding the obligation of a just responsibility, will be seized by the Executive with pleasure.

How far these differences may be healed, or the recurrence of the like in future be prevented, by legislative provisions, the committee, on a full view of these documents, and on a due consideration of the whole subject, will be able to decide. It is proper, however, to remark, that the divisions of the country into military districts, so far as relates to that special object, requires no legislative sanction, if indeed it admits of one. The definition of boundary was intended for the purpose of prescribing a limit to the civil duties, if they may be so called, rather than the military, of the commander of each district; rather to the period preceding an invasion, with a view to the necessary preparatory measures for repelling it, than after it should take place. An invasion by a large force would probably require the concentration of all our troops along the sea coast, who might be brought to act in it. In such an event, all limitations of boundary, to the several commanders, would cease. The march of the enemy would regulate that of our armies, who would from every quarter be directed against them.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JAMES MONROE.

A.

*Copy of a letter from William Eustis, Secretary of War, to the Governors of States, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 15th, 1812.

I am instructed by the President of the United States to call upon the Executives of the different States to take effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness, to march at a moment's warning, their respective proportions of one hundred thousand militia, officers included, by virtue of an act of Congress, passed the 10th instant, entitled "An act to authorize a detachment from the militia of the United States."

This, therefore, is to require your Excellency to take effectual measures for having — of the militia of — (being her quota) detached and duly organized in companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions, within the shortest periods that circumstances will permit, and, as nearly as possible, in the following proportions of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, viz: one-twentieth part of artillery, one-twentieth part of cavalry, and the residue infantry.

There will, however, be no objection, on the part of the President of the United States, to the admission of a proportion of riflemen, duly organized in distinct corps, and not exceeding one-tenth part of the whole quota of the States, respectively. Each corps should be properly armed and equipped for actual service.

When the detachment and organization shall have been effected, the respective corps will be exercised under the officers set over them, but will not remain embodied, or be considered as in actual service, until, by subsequent orders, they shall be directed to take the field.

Your Excellency will please to direct that correct muster rolls and inspection returns be made of the several corps, and that copies thereof be transmitted to this Department as early as possible.

*Copy of a letter from William Eustis, Esq. Secretary of War, to the Governor of Massachusetts, dated*

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 12, 1812.

SIR:

I am directed by the President to request your Excellency to order into the service of the United States, on the requisition of Major General Dearborn, such part of the quota of the militia of Massachusetts, detached conformably to the act of the 10th April, 1812, as he may deem necessary for the defence of the seacoast.

I am, &c.

NOTE.—A similar letter addressed to the Governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire.

*Copy of a letter from William Eustis, Secretary of War, to His Excellency Caleb Strong, Governor of Massachusetts, dated*

SIR:

JULY 21, 1812.

By information received from Major General Dearborn, it appears that the detachment from the militia of Massachusetts, for the defence of the maritime frontier, required by him under the authority of the President, by virtue of the act of the 10th April, 1812, have not been marched to the several stations assigned them.

Inasmuch as longer delay may be followed with distress to a certain portion of our fellow-citizens, and with injurious consequences to our country, I am commanded by the President to inform your Excellency that this arrangement of the militia was preparatory to the march of the regular troops to the Northern frontier. The exigencies of the service have required, and orders have accordingly been given, to Major General Dearborn, to move the regular troops to that frontier, leaving a sufficient number to man the guns in the garrisons on the seaboard. The execution of this order increases, as your Excellency cannot fail to observe, the necessity of hastening the detached militia to their several posts, as assigned by General Dearborn; in which case they will, of course, be considered in the actual service and pay of the United States.

The danger of invasion, which existed at the time of issuing the order of the President, increases, and I am specially directed by the President to urge this consideration on your Excellency, as requiring the necessary order to be given for the immediate march of the several detachments, specified by General Dearborn, to their respective posts.

I have the honor to be, &c.

*Extract of a letter from John Armstrong, Secretary of War, to the Governor of Connecticut, dated*

AUGUST 9, 1813.

Whenever militia are called out, the contractor or his agent should be required to supply according to the contract.

*Circular letter from John Armstrong, Secretary of War, to the Governors of the respective States, dated*

JULY 4, 1814.

SIR:

The late pacification in Europe offers to the enemy a large disposable force, both naval and military, and with it the means of giving to the war here a character of new and increased activity and extent.

Without knowing, with certainty, that such will be its application, and, still less, that any particular point or points will become objects of attack, the President has deemed it advisable, as a measure of precaution, to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic, and (as the principal means of doing this will be found in the militia) to invite the Executives of certain States to organize and hold in readiness, for immediate service, a corps of ninety-three thousand five hundred men, under the laws of the 28th of February, 1795, and 18th of April, 1814.

The enclosed detail will show your Excellency what, under this requisition, will be the quota of ——. As far as volunteer uniform companies can be found, they will be preferred.

The expediency of regarding (as well in the designations of the militia, as of their places of rendezvous) the points, the importance or exposure of which will be most likely to attract the views of the enemy, need but be suggested.

A report of the organization of your quota, when completed, and of its place or places of rendezvous, will be acceptable.

I have the honor to be, &c.

*Extract of a letter from John Armstrong, Secretary of War, to Nathaniel Searle, Jun. Adjutant General of Militia, State of Rhode Island, dated*

JULY 9, 1814.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, accompanied by sundry documents in relation to the defence of the Atlantic frontier of the State of Rhode Island.

The State troops, if considered part of the militia, or as substitutes therefor, will be taken into the service of the United States as the quota of Rhode Island, under the requisition of the 4th instant, and will be designated for the defence of that State.

B.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe, acting Secretary of War, to the Chairman of the Military Committee, dated*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 23, 1812.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 21st instant, requesting such information as this Department may possess, respecting the defects in the organization of the general staff of the army, and in the laws relating to volunteers; and requesting, also, the opinion of this Department, as to the propriety of augmenting the present military force, and, in case of augmentation, of what description of troops it ought to consist.

The committee of each House of Congress having called on the Department of War for information on the same points, I shall have the honor to make to each committee the same report. The enclosed remarks go to several of the inquiries suggested in your letter, and contain the views of the Department on the several subjects to which they relate. The pressure of business has forced me to give them a shape rather informal. A copy of them I have sent to-day to the Committee of the House of Representatives, and hasten to forward a like copy to you.

#### EXPLANATORY OBSERVATIONS.

To make this war effectual, as to its just objects, so much of the physical force of the country must be brought into activity as will be adequate. The force exists in an abundant degree, and it is only necessary to call it forth, and make a proper use of it. This force must be employed alike in defensive and offensive operations. The exposed parts of our own country claim a primary attention. After providing for their defence, all the remaining force may be employed in offensive operations. I will begin with that part which requires protection.

#### *Defence of the Coast.*

The whole coast, from our Northern limits to St. Mary's, should be divided into military districts.

Boston, including New Hampshire and Massachusetts, to constitute one.

Newport, including Rhode Island and Connecticut, another.

New York, including the State of New York and Jersey, a third.

Philadelphia, including Pennsylvania and Delaware, a fourth.

Norfolk, including Maryland and Virginia, a fifth.

Charleston, including North and South Carolina, and Georgia, a sixth.

At Boston, and at each of the other posts, let a company of artillery, or more than one, according to circumstances of the regular army, and a small portion of its infantry, be stationed. Let them be placed under the command of a Brigadier, in the following manner, and let him have attached to him an engineer. This force will constitute the nucleus of a little army, to be formed in case of invasion of the militia, volunteers, or such other local force, as may be specially organized for the purpose.

This apportionment is intended to give an idea. It would be carried into detail by the Executive.

At Boston, including a suitable proportion of artillery, and at Eastport, and other ports eastward,	600
At Newport, with a company of artillery,	350
At New York, with a suitable proportion of artillery,	1,000
At Philadelphia, with a company of artillery,	200
Norfolk, with a company of artillery at Annapolis,	300
North Carolina, one company of artillery,	100
Charleston, with a company of artillery,	300

By placing a general officer of the regular army, of some experience, in command, at each of these stations, charged with the protection of the country, to his right and left, to a certain extent suitable provision will be made for the whole. The country will have confidence, and, by degrees, a system of defence, suited to any emergency, may be prepared for the whole coast. This may be done by the local force with economy, and what is also of great importance, without drawing at any time for greater aid on the regular force of the nation, which may be employed

in offensive operations elsewhere. There should be some flying artillery at each station, ready mounted, and prepared to move in any direction which may be necessary. An engineer will be useful, to plan and execute any works which may appear proper for the defence of the principal station, or any other within each military district.

It may be said that it is not probable that the enemy will attempt an invasion of any part of the coast described, with a view to retain it, and less so for the purpose of desolation. It is nevertheless possible, and, being so, provision ought to be made against the danger. An unprotected coast may invite attacks which would not otherwise be thought of. It is believed that the arrangement proposed will be adequate, and that none can be devised, to be so, which would prove more economical.

For Savannah and East Florida, special provision must be made. Whether East Florida is left in possession of Spain, or taken immediate possession of by the United States, in either case, it menaces the United States with danger to their vital interests. While it is held by Spain, it will be used as a British province, for annoying us in every mode in which it may be made instrumental to that end. The ascendancy which the British Government has over the Spanish regency, secures to Great Britain that advantage while the war lasts. We find that, at present, the Creek Indians are excited against us, and an asylum afforded to the slaves of the Southern States who seek it there. To guard the United States against the attempts of the British Government, in that vulnerable quarter, the province remaining in the hands of the Spanish authorities, a force of about two thousand regular troops will be requisite. It will require no more to hold it, should possession be taken by the United States.

For New Orleans and Natchitoches, including the Mobile and West Florida, about two thousand five hundred men will be necessary. A local force may be organized in that quarter in aid of it, which, it is believed, will be adequate to any emergency.

The next object is Detroit and Malden, including the protection of the whole of our Western frontier. For these, it is believed that two thousand regular troops, with such aids as may be drawn from the States of Kentucky and Ohio, will be amply sufficient.

The following, then, is the regular force requisite for the defence of those places:

Boston,	-	-	-	-	600
Newport, Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	350
New York,	-	-	-	-	1,000
Philadelphia,	-	-	-	-	200
Norfolk,	-	-	-	-	300
North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	100
Charleston,	-	-	-	-	300
Savannah and East Florida,	-	-	-	-	2,000
New Orleans, Mobile, &c.	-	-	-	-	2,500
Detroit, Malden, &c.	-	-	-	-	2,000
					9,350

This leaves a force of about twenty-six thousand regular troops, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, provided the whole force contemplated by law is raised and kept in the field, to be employed in offensive operations against Niagara, Kingston, Montreal, and all Lower Canada, and likewise against Halifax. This whole force, however, even if raised, cannot be counted on as effective. The difference between the force on the muster rolls, and the effective force in the field, through a campaign, is generally estimated at a deficiency in the latter of one-fourth, with troops who have already seen service. With young troops, it may be placed at one-third. Take from the nominal force ten thousand, and it would leave about sixteen thousand for these latter purposes.

Will this force be sufficient? This will depend of course on the number of the British force which may be opposed to us. It is believed that the British force at Niagara, and its neighborhood; at Kingston, Montreal, Quebec, and in all Lower Canada, ought to be estimated at twelve thousand regulars, and several thousand militia; say, in all, sixteen or eighteen thousand, and at Halifax, at three thousand.

To demolish the British force, from Niagara to Quebec, would require, to make the thing secure, an efficient regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of ten thousand. The commander ought to have power to dispose of them as he thought fit. The movement against Niagara and Lower Canada ought to be in concert, and of course under the control of the same commander, who, alone, could be a competent judge of the suitable time and manner. A corps of reserve is indispensable to guard against casualties, especially with raw troops. Nothing should be left to hazard. The expedition should be of a character to inspire a certainty of success, from which the best consequences would result. Our troops would be more undaunted, and those of the enemy proportionably more dismayed. In the interior, on both sides, the effect would be equally salutary; with us, it would aid in filling our ranks with regular troops, and drawing to the field such others as occasion might require; with the enemy, the effect would be equally in our favor. It would soon drive from the field the Canadian militia, and, by depressing the spirits of the people, interrupt and lessen the supplies to the British army.

If the conquest of Canada should prove to be easy, a part of this force might be directed against Halifax; but for that purpose a force should be specially provided, to consist of not less than six thousand men. Before this time next year, the honor and interest of the United States require that the British forces be driven into Quebec and Halifax, and be taken there, if possible. They must, at all events, be excluded from every foot of territory beyond the reach of their cannon. This may be done, if timely and suitable measures are adopted for the purpose, and they be executed with vigor and skill.

If the Government could raise and keep in the field thirty-five thousand regular troops, the legal complement of the present establishment, the deficiency to be supplied, even to authorize an expedition against Halifax, would be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be amply sufficient; but there is danger of not being able to raise that force, and to keep it at that standard. The estimate, therefore, of the force to be raised for the next campaign, in addition to the legal complement, should cover any probable deficiency in it, as well as the addition which ought to be made to it. My idea is, that provision ought to be made for raising twenty thousand men in addition to the present establishment. How shall these men be raised? Shall new regiments be added to the standing army to constitute a part of it; the volunteer acts be relied on; or any other expedient adopted?

The first question to be answered is, can more than the force contemplated by the present military establishment be raised in time for the next campaign, and that force be kept in the field by new recruits to supply losses produced by the casualties of war? Will the state of our population, the character and circumstances of the people who compose it, justify a reliance on such a resource alone?

The experiments heretofore made, even under the additional encouragement given by the acts passed at the last session of Congress, and the excitement produced by the war, though great, forbid it. Abundant and noble proofs of patriotism have been exhibited by our citizens in those quarters where the approach and pressure of the enemy have been most felt. Many thousands have rallied to the standard of their country; but it has been to render voluntary service, and that for short terms. The increase of the regular army has been slow, and the amount raised, compared with the number sought, inconsiderable. Additional encouragement may produce a more important result; but still there is cause to fear that it will not be in the degree called for by the present emergency. If, then, there is cause to doubt success, that doubt is a sufficient motive for the Legislature to act on, and to appeal, in aid of the existing resource, to another, not likely to fail.

In rejecting a reliance on the regular military establishment alone, for the force necessary to give effect to the next campaign, the alternative is too obvious to be mistaken by any one. The occurrences of the present year designate it in the most satisfactory manner. The additional force must be raised for a short term, under every encouragement to the patriotism of the people which can be given consistently with the circumstances of the country, and without interfering with enlistments into the old corps. The volunteer acts of the last session may be the basis on which this additional force may be raised; but those acts must be radically altered to enable the President

to raise the force. Experience has not been less instructive on this very important point. Although whole sections of our country, and among them many of our most distinguished and estimable citizens, have risen in arms and volunteered their services, and marched in the ranks, it has not been done under the volunteer acts. Those acts contemplate a beginning at the wrong end, and require too long an engagement to produce the desired effect. They contemplate a movement in no particular quarter, and by no particular person; they require that the people shall take the affair up of their own accord, enrol themselves into companies, and then recommend their officers to the President; and that the President shall not appoint the field officers until a sufficient number of companies are formed to constitute a regiment. Thus it may happen that companies from different States, all strangers to each other, may be thrown into a regiment, and that the field officers appointed to command them may be strangers alike to all the company officers and men. They contemplate, also, an enrolment for three years, with a service only of one; conditions, which, in themselves, could not fail to defeat the object, as they enlist on their side not one motive to action. The patriot citizen, who really wished to serve his country, would spurn the restraint imposed on him of two years of inactivity out of three, and enter the regular army, where he would find active employment for the whole term of his enlistment. And the farmer, the merchant, and the artist, willing to make a sacrifice of a certain portion of their time to the urgent calls of their country, would find a check to that impulse by the obligation they must enter into for so long a term; and by allowing no bounty, no pecuniary inducement nor aid to enable a man to leave home is offered. It is impossible that such a project should succeed on an extensive scale. The ardent patriotism of a few, in detached circles of our country, may surmount these obstacles; but such examples will be rare.

To give effect to such a measure the President alone should have the appointment of all the officers under the rank of Colonel, and it should be made in the following manner: He should first select such prominent men as had merited, and acquired, by a virtuous conduct, the confidence of their fellow-citizens, and confer on them, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the rank of Colonel, and then confide to them the selection and recommendation of all their officers, to be approved by the President. These men would go to their homes, look around the country where they were known, and where they know every one, select the prominent men there, such as enjoyed the esteem and confidence of their fellow-citizens, and recommend them, according to their respective pretensions, as field officers, captains, and subalterns under them. Thus the service would be truly voluntary, as every man would act under officers to whose appointment he had essentially contributed. The several corps would consist of neighbors, friends, and brothers; example would animate to action; generous motives would be excited; patriotism roused; and the ties of kindred would unite with the love of country and of free government to call our young men to the field.

The first object is to complete the regular establishment to its legal complement, and to keep it there. The pay of the soldiers has already been raised during the present session of Congress; but this, it is feared, will not afford a sufficient inducement to fill the ranks within the requisite time. Let the bounty be raised to the sum of forty dollars to each recruit, and let the officers receive the sum of five dollars per man, for all whom they may recruit. These additional encouragements will, it is presumed, secure the desired success. When filled, how keep the regiments full? The presence of all the officers will be necessary, in that state, for their command; none could be spared to recruit. Different expedients have occurred to supply supernumerary officers for the recruiting business. It has, for example, been proposed to add a certain number of regiments, from fifteen to twenty, to the present military establishment; but this would be to rely on that establishment alone; which, as is presumed, it would be highly improper to do. This plan is further objectionable, on account of the expense attending it; and likewise, as it would create delay in the organization of the corps and appointment of the officers. The same objections are applicable to the addition of a company to each battalion, not to mention others. On much consideration, the following expedient has occurred as most eligible. Let one field officer, a major, be added to each regiment, and a third lieutenant to each company. This will allow a field officer and ten company officers from each regiment, for the recruiting service, which would be sufficient.

The additional force proposed for one year is intended to supply the probable deficiencies in the present military establishment. This force being to be raised for a shorter term, and for a special purpose, it is presumed that much aid may be drawn from that source, and with great despatch, for the purposes of the next campaign. It is probable, also, that it may be done without essentially interfering with enlistments into the old corps, as most of the men who may enter into this, might not be willing to engage in them.

If a lingering war is maintained, the annual disbursements will be enormous. Economy requires that it be brought to a termination with the least possible delay. If a strong army is led to the field early in the spring, the British power on this continent must sink before it; and when once broken down, it will never rise again. The reconquest of Canada will become, in the opinion of all enlightened men, and of the whole British nation, a chimerical attempt. It will, therefore, be abandoned: but if delay takes place, reinforcements may be expected, and the war be prolonged. It is to save the public money, and the lives of our people, and the honor of the nation, that high bounties and premiums, and the most vigorous exertions in other respects, are advised. The prolongation of the war, for a single campaign, would exceed these expenditures more than ten-fold.

C.

BOSTON, August 5, 1812.

SIR:

I received your letter of the 21st of July, when at Northampton, and the next day came to Boston. The people of this State appear to be under no apprehension of an invasion. Several towns, indeed, on the sea coast, soon after the declaration of war, applied to the Governor and Council for arms and ammunition, similar to the articles of that kind which had been delivered to them by the State in the course of the last war, and in some instances they were supplied accordingly. But they expressed no desire that any part of the militia should be called out for their defence; and, in some cases, we were assured that such a measure would be disagreeable to them.

You observe, in your last letter, that the danger of invasion, which existed at the time of issuing the orders of the President, increases.

It would be difficult to infer, from this expression, that, in your opinion, that danger is now very considerable; as the President's order must have been issued before war was declared, your former letter being dated the 12th of June, and General Dearborn's, who was then at Boston, on the 22d of that month; besides, it can hardly be supposed that, if this State had been in great danger of invasion, the troops would have been called from hence to carry on offensive operations in a distant province; however, as it was understood that the Governor of Nova Scotia had, by proclamation, forbid any incursions or depredations upon our territories, and as an opinion generally prevailed that the Governor had no authority to call the militia into actual service, unless one of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution exists, I thought it expedient to call the Council together, and having laid before them your letter, and those I had received from General Dearborn, I requested their advice on the subject of them.

The Council advised, "That they are unable, from a view of the constitution of the United States, and the letters aforesaid, to perceive that any exigency exists which can render it advisable to comply with the said requisition; but, as upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, the Governor and Council have authority to require the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, it is advisable to request the opinion of the Supreme Court upon the following questions, viz.:

"1st. Whether the commanders-in-chief of the militia of the several States have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution of the United States exist, so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the President, to be commanded by him pursuant to acts of Congress?

"2d. Whether, when either of the exigencies exist, authorizing the employing the militia in the service of the

United States, the militia, thus employed, can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the President of the United States?"

I enclose a copy of the answers given by the judges to these questions.

Since the Council were called, a person deputed by the towns of Eastport and Robinston, on our eastern boundary, at Passamaquoddy, applied to me, representing that they had no apprehensions of invasion by an authorized British force, but that there were many lawless people on the borders, from whom they were in danger of predatory incursions, and requesting that they might be furnished with some arms and ammunition, and that three companies of militia might be called out for their protection. The Council advised that they should be supplied with such arms and ammunition as were necessary for their present defence, which has been ordered. They also advised me to call into the service of the United States, three companies of the detached militia, for the purpose above mentioned. I have this day issued an order for calling out three companies of the detached militia, to be marched forthwith to Passamaquoddy, and to be commanded by a major; two of the companies will be stationed at Eastport, and one company at Robinston, until the President shall otherwise direct.

I have no intention officially to interfere in the measures of the General Government; but, if the President was fully acquainted with the situation of this State, I think he would have no wish to call our militia into service in the manner proposed by General Dearborn.

It is well known that the enemy will find it difficult to spare troops sufficient for the defence of their own territory, and predatory incursions are not likely to take place in this State: for, at every point, except Passamaquoddy, which can present an object to those incursions, the people are too numerous to be attacked by such parties as generally engage in expeditions of that kind.

General Dearborn proposed that the detached militia should be stationed at only a few of the ports and places on the east; from the rest, a part of their militia were to be called away. This circumstance would increase their danger; it would invite the aggressions of the enemy, and diminish their power of resistance.

The whole coast of Cape Cod is exposed as much as any part of the State to depredations; part of the militia must, according to this detailing order, be marched from their homes; and yet no place in the old colony of Plymouth is assigned to be the rendezvous of any of the detached militia.

Every harbor or port within the State has a compact settlement; and, generally, the country around the harbors is populous. The places contemplated in General Dearborn's specification, as the rendezvous of the detached militia, excepting in one or two instances, contain more of the militia than the portion of the detached militia assigned to them. The militia are well organized, and would undoubtedly prefer to defend their firesides, in company with their friends, under their own officers, rather than be marched to some distant place, while strangers might be introduced to take their places at home.

In Boston the militia is well disciplined, and could be mustered in an hour, upon any signal of an approaching enemy; and in six hours, the neighboring towns would pour in a greater force than any invading enemy will bring against it.

The same remark applies to Salem, Marblehead, and Newburyport; places whose harbors render an invasion next to impossible. In all of them there are, in addition to the common militia, independent corps of infantry and artillery, well disciplined and equipped, and ready, both in disposition and means, to repair to any place where invasion may be threatened, and able to repel it, except it should be made by a fleet of heavy ships; against which, nothing, perhaps, but strong fortifications, garrisoned by regular troops, would prove any defence until the enemy should land, when the entire militia would be prepared to meet them.

Kennebunk is unassailable by any thing but boats, which the numerous armed population is competent to resist. Portland has a militia and independent corps, sufficiently numerous for its defence; and the same is the case with Wiscasset and Castine.

Against predatory incursions, the militia of each place would be able to defend their property, and in a very short time they would be aided, if necessary, by the militia of the surrounding country. In case of a more serious invasion, whole brigades, or divisions, could be collected seasonably for defence. Indeed, considering the state of the militia in this commonwealth, I think there can be no doubt that, detaching a part of it, and distributing it into small portions, will tend to impair the defensive power.

I have thus freely expressed to you my own sentiments, and, so far as I have heard, they are the sentiments of the best informed men. I am fully disposed to afford all the aid to the measures of the National Government which the constitution requires of me; but, I presume, it will not be expected or desired that I shall fail in the duty which I owe to the people of this State, who have confided their interests to my care.

I am, sir, with respect, your most obedient and humble servant,

CALEB STRONG.

The Hon. WM. EUSTIS, *Secretary of War.*

*To his Excellency the Governor and the Honorable the Council of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the undersigned, Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, have considered the questions proposed by your Excellency and Honors for their opinion.*

By the constitution of this State, the authority of commanding the militia of the commonwealth is vested exclusively in the Governor, who has all the power incident to the office of commander-in-chief, and is to exercise them personally, or by subordinate officers under his command, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution, and the laws of the land.

While the Governor of the commonwealth remained in the exercise of these powers, the Federal constitution was ratified; by which was vested in the Congress a power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and to provide for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers.

The Federal constitution further provides, that the President shall be Commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.

On the construction of the Federal and State constitutions must depend the answers to the several questions proposed. As the militia of the several States may be employed in the service of the United States, for the three specific purposes of executing the laws of the Union, of suppressing insurrections, and of repelling invasions, the opinion of the judges is requested, whether the Commanders-in-chief of the militia of the several States have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies aforesaid exist, so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the President, to be commanded by him, pursuant to acts of Congress.

It is the opinion of the undersigned, that this right is vested in the Commanders-in-chief of the militia of the several States.

The Federal constitution provides that, whenever either of those exigencies exist, the militia may be employed pursuant to some act of Congress, in the service of the United States; but no power is given, either to the President or to Congress, to determine that either of the said exigencies do in fact exist. As this power is not delegated to the United States by the Federal constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, it is reserved to the States, respectively; and from the nature of the power, it must be exercised by those with whom the States have respectively entrusted the chief command of the militia.

It is the duty of these commanders to execute this important trust, agreeably to the laws of their several States, respectively, without reference to the laws or officers of the United States, in all cases, except those specially provided in the Federal constitution. They must, therefore, determine when either of the special cases exist, obliging them to relinquish the execution of this trust, and to render themselves, and the militia, subject to the command of the President. A different construction, giving to Congress the right to determine when these special cases exist, authorizing them to call forth the whole of the militia, and taking them from the Commanders-in-chief of the several

States, and subjecting them to the command of the President, would place all the militia, in effect, at the will of Congress, and produce a military consolidation of the States, without any constitutional remedy, against the intentions of the people when ratifying the constitution. Indeed, since passing the act of Congress of February 28th, 1795, chapter 101, vesting in the President the power of calling forth the militia; when the exigencies mentioned in the constitution shall exist, if the President has the power of determining when those exigencies exist, the militia of the several States is, in effect, at his command, and subject to his control.

No inconveniences can reasonably be presumed to result from the construction which vests in the Commanders-in-chief of the militia in the several States, the right of determining when the exigencies exist, obliging them to place the militia in the service of the United States. These exigencies are of such a nature that the existence of them can be easily ascertained by, or made known to, the Commanders-in-chief of the militia; and when ascertained, the public interest will produce prompt obedience to the acts of Congress.

Another question proposed to the consideration of the judges, is, whether, when either of the exigencies exist, authorizing the employing of the militia in the service of the United States, the militia thus employed can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the President of the United States?

The Federal constitution declares, that the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United States. He may, undoubtedly, exercise this command by officers of the army of the United States, by him commissioned according to law. The President is also declared to be the Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. The officers of the militia are to be appointed by the States, and the President may exercise his command of the militia by officers of the militia duly appointed; but we know of no constitutional provision, authorizing any officer of the army of the United States to command the militia, or authorizing any officer of the militia to command the army of the United States. The Congress may provide laws for the government of the militia, when in actual service; but to extend this power to the placing them under the command of an officer, not of the militia, except the President, would render nugatory the provision, that the militia are to have officers appointed by the States.

The union of the militia in the actual service of the United States, with troops of the United States, so far as to form one army, seems to be a case not provided for, or contemplated in the constitution. It is, therefore, not within our department to determine on whom the command would devolve, on such an emergency, in the absence of the President. Whether one officer, either of the militia or of the army of the United States, to be settled according to military rank, should command the whole; whether the corps must be commanded by their respective officers, acting in concert, as allied forces; or what other expedient should be adopted, are questions to be answered by others.

The undersigned regret that the distance of the other justices of the Supreme Judicial Court renders it impracticable to obtain their opinions seasonably upon the questions submitted.

THEOPHILUS PARSONS,  
SAMUEL SEWALL,  
ISAAC PARKER.

*Extract of a letter from General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 1, HEAD QUARTERS, BOSTON, July 14, 1814.

SIR:

From the exposed and unprotected situation of the military posts in this harbor, and the seaboard of this State generally, and the threats and daily depredations of the enemy, I have concluded it my duty to exercise the authority vested in me by the President of the United States, by requesting the Governor to order out a detachment of artillery and infantry.

A copy of my letter to Governor Strong, and of his answer, are enclosed.

*Copy of a letter from General Dearborn to his Excellency Caleb Strong, Governor of the State of Massachusetts, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 1, HEAD QUARTERS, BOSTON, July 8, 1814.

SIR:

The existing state of alarm on the seaboard of this commonwealth, arising from the daily depredations committed by the enemy on our coast, renders it desirable to afford some additional protection to the citizens generally on the seacoast, and especially to the principal towns and villages; and, by virtue of authority derived from the President of the United States, I deem it my duty, at this time, to request that your Excellency will be pleased to give the necessary orders for having detached, as early as circumstances will permit, armed and equipped as required by law, one major of artillery, two captains, eight lieutenants, thirteen sergeants, eleven corporals, six musicians, and two hundred privates; and one lieutenant colonel of infantry, two majors, ten captains, thirty subalterns, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one paymaster, one sergeant major, one quartermaster sergeant, two principal musicians, fifty sergeants, fifty corporals, twenty musicians, and nine hundred privates, to remain in the service of the United States for the term of three months, unless sooner discharged by order of the President of the United States. As it will be necessary to have the artillery and infantry placed at the different posts on the seaboard of this State, it would be desirable that, as far as practicable, they would be detached from the vicinity of the respective posts. The intended distribution of the detachment will be communicated to the Adjutant General of the State, previous to his issuing the necessary orders. The proportion of officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, is in conformity with the present regulations of the Department of War, from which I am not authorized to admit of any material deviation.

*Copy of a letter from his Excellency Caleb Strong, Governor of the State of Massachusetts, to General Dearborn, dated*

NORTHAMPTON, July 12, 1814.

SIR:

This morning I received your letter of the eighth instant. As you propose to communicate to General Brooks your views, concerning the particular destination of the militia to be called out for the defence of the towns on the seacoast of this State, I have written to him on the subject.

Your suggestion that the men should be detached, as far as may be, from the vicinity of the respective posts, I think is perfectly proper, and I have no doubt you will be able to make such arrangements with General Brooks as will be satisfactory.

*Extract of a letter from General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 1, HEAD QUARTERS, BOSTON, Sept. 5, 1814.

SIR:

Having received such information as is entitled to full credit, that the enemy, with a formidable naval and land force, has arrived in Penobscot bay, and taken possession of Castine; and presuming his force, after forming a place of arms at Castine, will, with such reinforcements as he may receive from Halifax, in addition to the naval



force now in Boston Bay, attempt the destruction of the public ships, and other public and private property on the seaboard, I have deemed it necessary to request the Governors of this State and New Hampshire to order out, for the defence of Boston harbor, Portsmouth, Portland, and that part of the District of Maine between Kennebec river and Penobscot, five thousand two hundred infantry and five hundred and fifty artillery, for the term of three months, unless sooner discharged.

*Extract of a letter from H. Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD QUARTERS, DISTRICT No. 1, BOSTON, October 15, 1814.

SIR:

In obedience to the direction in your letter, of the 27th ultimo, on the 2d instant I made a formal requisition on Governor Strong for three hundred militia, to guard the prisoners at Pittsfield, and I enclosed to him a copy of your letter, for the purpose of showing him the necessity of his compliance. Having waited until yesterday morning without any answer from his Excellency, I directed one of my aids to call on the Adjutant General of the State, to ascertain whether he had received any order for making out the detachment for Pittsfield. The answer was, that no direction had been received from the Governor to make such detachment.

*Copy of a letter from his Excellency Caleb Strong, Governor of the State of Massachusetts, to the Secretary of War, dated*

BOSTON, September 7, 1814.

The troops of the United States which, at different periods, were stationed on the seacoast of this State, have been afterwards ordered to join the army on the Western frontiers, so that very few have remained in the State. We have, therefore, found it necessary, in the course of the last and present year, to call out small bodies of the militia, as guards to the towns most exposed. As the danger has increased, the number of detached militia has been augmented, and I have now issued the enclosed general order for the protection of Boston, and the towns and property in its neighborhood, and shall immediately issue an order of a similar kind for the security of the District of Maine.

A few weeks since, agreeably to the request of General Dearborn, I detached eleven hundred militia, for three months, for the defence of our seacoast, and placed them under his command as Superintendent of this military district; but such objections and inconveniences have arisen from that measure, that it cannot now be repeated. The militia called out on this occasion will be placed under the immediate command of a Major General of the militia.

I will thank you, sir, to consult with the President, and inform me whether the expenses thus necessarily incurred for our protection will be ultimately reimbursed to this State by the General Government; and I shall be particularly obliged if you will favor me with an answer as soon as may be, as the Legislature of the State will meet on the 5th of the next month.

#### GENERAL ORDERS.

#### COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

HEAD QUARTERS, BOSTON, September 6, 1814.

The war between the United States and Great Britain having lately become more destructive, in consequence of violations of our territory, by the forces of the enemy, which continue to menace our cities and villages, the shipping in our harbors, and private property on shore, his Excellency the Commander-in-chief orders the whole of the militia to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning, with arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, as the laws of the United States, and of this State, require. Every man must likewise be provided with a good knapsack and blanket. Captains of companies must realize it to be one of their most solemn and imperious duties to see the law respecting arms and equipments efficaciously executed: but the Commander-in-chief relies on the concurring aid of all the general and field officers, in encouraging the company officers in the discharge of their duty. The Major Generals, and commanding officers of divisions, will give the necessary orders for an immediate inspection of their several regiments, by companies. Every instance of deficiency of arms or equipments should be forthwith supplied by the delinquent individual, or by the town to which he may belong, agreeably to the requirements of the militia law.

The officers commanding regiments, battalions, and companies of artillery, will pay special attention, at this interesting moment, to the state of their field pieces, their carriages, and tumbrils, and see that every thing appertaining to them is in the most perfect order for marching, and for action, and, particularly, that suitable horses are always engaged, and ready, at any moment, to be attached to their pieces, that they may be moved to any point required, with celerity. All the companies of artillery now to be called into immediate service, besides the requisite supplies of fixed and other ammunition, will be furnished by the Quartermaster General, with prolonges and bricoles. The Legislature of this State, always proud of its militia, has been particularly liberal in its artillery establishment: and the Commander-in-chief promises himself, that, emulating the brilliant example of Knox, and his heroic associates, in the artillery of the Revolution, they will be equally distinguished for their discipline as soldiers, and for their gallantry in the field.

Under possible events, the cavalry of the several divisions may be in requisition. Every motive, therefore, of love of country, of honor, and sympathy for their fellow-citizens who may be suffering the perils of war, will prompt them to maintain the most perfect state of preparation, and to move, when called to the scene of action, with all the rapidity of which cavalry is susceptible. The general officers, and the field officers of cavalry, as well as the company officers, will direct their attention to the quality of the horses, and suffer no man to be mounted but upon a horse sound and fit for actual service. A few bad horses may occasion irretrievable disaster.

The Commander-in-chief having thus called the attention of all officers and soldiers of the militia to the observance of their several duties, at this eventful crisis, the more effectually to meet impending danger orders that all the flank companies, whether of light infantry, grenadiers, or riflemen, of the 1st and 2d brigades of the 1st division; two companies, viz: the one at Andover, and the other at Haverhill, of the 2d division; all the companies of the 3d division, excepting the two companies in Charlestown; four companies of the 4th division; five companies of the 5th division; eight companies of the 7th division; and two companies of the 9th division, do immediately march to the town of Boston, unless (in the mean time) otherwise directed. Each company will march to its place of destination by itself, without waiting for any other corps.

These companies, when assembled, will be arranged into regiments, or otherwise, as circumstances may dictate; and, with the addition of twelve companies of artillery, will form the elite, or advance corps of the Massachusetts militia. The field officers to command the regiments, and a general officer to command the whole, will hereafter be designated in general orders. The several companies of artillery, to be annexed to the advance corps, will be furnished by the following divisions, viz: two companies from the 1st brigade, and one company from the 2d brigade of the 3d division; four companies from the 4th division; one company from the 5th division; and four companies from the 7th division.

Besides the abovementioned companies, the Commander-in-chief orders a detachment of sixteen companies of infantry to be immediately made from the fourth division, properly officered, and arranged into two regiments, which will march to Boston without the least unnecessary delay. Major General Mattoon is charged with the arrangement of the regiments.

From the 9th division, the Commander-in-chief orders eight companies of infantry to be detached, properly officered, formed into a regiment, and marched to Boston. Major Generals Mattoon and Whiton will assign field officers for the troops to be detached from their respective divisions; and the Commander-in-chief relies on their experience and zeal to carry this order into the most prompt and energetic effect. As soon as the troops shall commence their march, each Major General will give notice of it to the Adjutant General.

All the troops must be well armed, accoutred, and equipped, and provided with ammunition, provisions, knapsacks, and blankets, as the law requires. The men will be supplied with rations when they arrive at the place of destination, and will receive pay from the time of their being embodied.

The security of the town and harbor of Boston being an object of primary importance, the Commander-in-chief, while he wishes to direct the principal energies of the State to the attainment of this end, is solicitous to render the militia of Boston itself as efficient as possible. With this view he orders the infantry of the 3d brigade of the 1st division, commanded by Brigadier General Welles, to be called out by regiments, in rotation, two days successively, for the purpose of improving their discipline, already respectable, and of enabling them to practise the higher duties of the field. This order is committed to Brigadier General Welles, whose knowledge in tactics, and animated zeal in the service of his country, must ensure to his exertions the highest effect. The order will be continued in operation until revoked. The flank companies of this brigade will be reserved for other service.

The troops called into actual service by this order, will serve three months after they arrive at their ultimate rendezvous, unless sooner discharged. By his Excellency's command.

Adjutant General.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe, Secretary of War, to his Excellency Caleb Strong, Governor of Massachusetts, dated*

Sir:

SEPTEMBER 17, 1814.

I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter of the 7th instant.

The attack of the enemy on Baltimore, and probable eventual attack on other places, with the heavy duties incident thereto, pressing on this Department, have prevented my answering it at an earlier day.

It may be satisfactory to your Excellency for me to explain the views and principles on which this Government has acted, in regard to the defence of our Eastern frontier.

It was anticipated, soon after the commencement of the war, that, while it lasted, every part of the Union, especially the sea board, would be exposed to some degree of danger, greater or less, according to the spirit with which the war might be waged. It was the duty of the Government to make the best provision against that danger which might be practicable, and it was proper that the provision should continue while the cause existed.

The arrangement of the United States into military districts, with a certain portion of the regular force, artillery, and infantry, under an officer of the regular army, of experience and high rank, in each district, with power to call for the militia as circumstances might require, was adopted, with a view to afford the best protection to every part that circumstances would admit.

It was presumed that the establishment of a small force of the kind stated, constituting the first elements of an army, in each district, to be aided by the militia, in case of an emergency, would be adequate to its defence. Such a force of infantry and artillery might repel small predatory parties, and form a rallying point for the militia at the more exposed and important stations, in case of more formidable invasion. A regular officer, of experience, stationed in the district, acting under the authority, and pursuing the will, of the Government, might digest plans for its defence; select proper points for works, and superintend the erection of them; call for supplies of ordnance, for tents, and camp equipage; for small arms, and other munitions of war; call for the militia, and dispose of the whole force. These duties, it was believed, could not be performed with equal advantage by the officers of the militia, who, being called into service for short terms, would not have it in their power, however well qualified they might be in other respects, to digest plans, and preserve that chain of connexion and system in the whole business which seemed indispensable. On great consideration; this arrangement was deemed the most eligible that could be adopted under the authority of the United States; indeed, none other occurred that could be placed in competition with it. In this mode the National Government acts, by its proper organs, over whom it has control, and for whose engagements it is responsible.

The measures which may be adopted by a State Government for the defence of a State must be considered as its own measures, and not those of the United States. The expenses attending them are chargeable to the State, and not to the United States.

Your Excellency will perceive that a different construction would lead into the most important, and, as is believed, into the most pernicious consequences. If a State could call out the militia, and subject the United States to the expense of supporting them, at its pleasure, the national authority would cease, as to that important object, and the nation be charged with expenses, in the measures producing which the National Government had no agency, and over which it could have no control. This, however, though a serious objection to such a construction, is not the most weighty. By taking the defence of the State into its own hands, and out of those of the General Government, a policy is introduced, on the tendency of which I forbear to comment. I shall remark, only, that, if a close union of the States, and a harmonious co-operation between them and the General Government, are, at any time, necessary for the preservation of their independence, and of those inestimable liberties which were achieved by the valor and blood of our ancestors, that period may be considered as having arrived.

It follows, from this view of the subject, that, if the force which has been put into service by your Excellency has been required by Major General Dearborn, or received by him, and put under his command, the expenses attending it will be defrayed by the United States. It follows, likewise, as a necessary consequence, that, if this force has been called into service by the authority of the State, independently of Major General Dearborn, and be not placed under him, as commander of the district, that the State of Massachusetts is chargeable with the expense, and not the United States. Any claim which the State may have to reimbursement must be judged of hereafter, by the competent authority, on a full view of all the circumstances attending it. It is a question which lies beyond the authority of the Executive.

Your Excellency will perceive that this Government has no other alternative than to adhere to a system of defence, which was adopted, on great consideration, with the best view to the general welfare, or to abandon it, and with it a principle held sacred, thereby shrinking from its duty, at a moment of great peril, weakening the guards deemed necessary for the public safety, and opening the door to other consequences not less dangerous.

By these remarks it is not intended to convey the idea that a militia officer, of superior grade, regularly called into service, shall not command an officer of the regular army of inferior grade, when acting together. No such idea is entertained by the Government. The militia are relied on essentially for the defence of the country: in their hands every thing is safe. It is the object of the Government to impose on them no burthens which it may be possible to avoid, and to protect them, in the discharge of their duties, in the enjoyment of all their rights.

The various points which are attacked and menaced by the enemy, especially in this quarter, where they are waging, in considerable force, a predatory and desolating warfare, make it difficult to provide immediately for all the necessary expenditures. Any aid which the State of Massachusetts may afford to the United States to meet those expenditures, will be cheerfully received, and applied to the payment and support of the militia of that State in the service of the United States.

It will be proper that the money thus advanced should be deposited in some bank in Boston, that the disbursement of it may be made under the authority of the Government of the United States, as in similar cases elsewhere. Credit will be given to the State for such advances, and the amount be considered a loan to the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

[A similar letter was written to the Governor of Connecticut.]

SHARON, CONNECTICUT, July 2, 1812.

SIR:

His Excellency Governor Griswold has received from Major General Henry Dearborn a letter, under date of the 22d of last month, requesting that five companies of the militia of this State, detached conformably to the act of Congress, of April 10, 1812, may be ordered into the service of the United States, to wit: two companies of artillery, and two companies of infantry; to be placed under the command of the commanding officer at Fort Trumbull, near New London; and one company of artillery, to be stationed at the battery at the entrance of the harbor of New Haven.

Impressed with the deep importance of the requisition, and the serious consideration it involves, his Excellency deemed it expedient to convene the Council, at Hartford, on Monday, the 29th ultimo. He has taken their advice upon this interesting subject, and has formed his own deliberate opinion; but, as he is under the necessity of leaving the State, on a journey, for the recovery of his health, it becomes my duty, as Lieutenant Governor, to communicate to you the result. The assurance contained in the Governor's letter of the 17th June last, in answer to yours of the 12th of the same month, was necessarily given in full confidence that no demand would be made by General Dearborn, but in strict conformity to the constitution and laws of the United States. His Excellency regrets to perceive that the present requisition is supported by neither.

The constitution of the United States has ordained that Congress may "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Accordingly, the acts of Congress, of February, 1795, and of April, 1812, do provide for calling forth the militia, in the exigencies above mentioned.

The Governor is not informed of any declaration, made by the President of the United States, or of notice by him given, that the militia are required "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions," or that "the United States are in imminent danger of invasion." As, therefore, none of the contingencies enumerated in the constitution, and recognized by the laws, are known to have taken place, his Excellency considers that no portion of the militia of this State can, under existing circumstances, be withdrawn from his authority.

Further, if the call had been justified by either of the constitutional exigencies already recited, still, in the view of his Excellency, an insuperable objection presents itself against placing the men under the immediate command of an officer or officers of the army of the United States.

The appointment of the officers of the militia is, by the constitution, expressly reserved "to the States, respectively." In the event of their being called into the actual service of the United States, in the cases before specified, the laws of the United States provide for their being called forth as militia, furnished with proper officers by the State. And, sir, it will not escape your recollection that the detachment from the militia of this State, under the act of Congress of the 10th of April last, is regularly organized into a division, consisting of brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, and supplied, conformably to law, with all the necessary officers. His Excellency conceives, then, that an order to detach a number of companies, sufficient for the command of a battalion officer, and place them under the command of an officer of the United States, cannot, with propriety, be executed, unless we were also prepared to admit that the privates may be separated from their company officers, and transferred into the army of the United States; thus leaving the officers of the militia without any command, except in name, and, in effect, impairing, if not annihilating, the militia itself, so sacredly guaranteed by the constitution to the several States.

Under these impressions, the Governor has thought proper, by and with the advice of the Council, to refuse a compliance with the requisition of Major General Dearborn.

His Excellency is sincerely disposed to comply promptly with all the constitutional requests of the National Executive—a disposition which has ever been manifested by the Government of this State; and he laments the occasion which thus compels him to yield obedience to the paramount authority of the constitution and laws of the United States. He trusts the General Government will speedily provide an adequate force for the security and protection of the sea-coast. In the mean time, his Excellency has issued the necessary orders to the general officers commanding the militia in that quarter, to be in readiness to repel any invasion which may be attempted upon that portion of the State, and to co-operate with such part of the national forces as shall be employed for the same purpose.

With great respect, I am, &amp;c.

JOHN COTTON SMITH.

The Hon. WILLIAM EUSTIS, *Secretary of War*.*Extract of a letter from His Excellency John Cotton Smith to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEW LONDON, June 7, 1813.

I arrived at this place on the 5th instant, and found about six hundred of the militia of this State stationed on the two sides of the river, who had been assembled under the circumstances mentioned in my letter from Hartford, of the 2d instant.

I shall not disband any part of the militia until a communication is received from Commodore Decatur, being heartily disposed to assist his views in affording all possible protection to the squadron and harbor. I will address you again before my departure from this place, and, in the mean time, am desirous of receiving the instructions of the President as to the course proper to be pursued.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency John Cotton Smith to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEW LONDON, June 12, 1813.

On a consultation with Commodore Decatur, as proposed in my last, it was concluded to retain the whole of the militia then assembled, until their places could be supplied by two regiments to be drawn from the neighborhood. Orders were issued accordingly.

But, on the arrival of the two regiments, information was received that a bomb ketch had been added to the enemy's squadron, and that preparations were evidently making for an attack. At the instance of Commodore Decatur, who knows best his own capacity of meeting the exigency, and on whose opinion, therefore, I must greatly rely, the whole force was directed to remain, excepting such individuals as were under a pressing necessity of returning to their homes. The number of militia now here is about fifteen hundred, including officers.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency John Cotton Smith to the Secretary of War, dated*

NEW LONDON, June 16, 1813.

Your favor of the 12th instant is received, and has afforded me much pleasure.

The details in my letter of the 12th instant, I trust, will fully justify, in the view of the President, the additional force it was then thought necessary to employ. After closing my despatches on that day, the hostile fleet got under sail, approached the harbor, fired several shots at the guards, and, to all appearance, were meditating an attack.

Whether the display of so respectable a body of troops, or some other cause, discouraged them from the attempt, is not known. The enterprise was, for that time, abandoned, and, on the 14th, two of their ships passed eastward, out of the Sound.

As soon as information of this diminution of the squadron was received, orders were issued to disband the two regiments which were first brought into the field, and a further reduction of the troops is this day made, to the number mentioned in your letter.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency John Cotton Smith to the Secretary of War, dated*

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, SHARON, August 1, 1814.

Your letter of the 4th July last reached me on the 16th of the same month.

Although there appears to be no act of Congress expressly authorizing a detachment from the militia, for the purpose mentioned in your communication, yet the respect due to a recommendation from the President, having for its object the defence of the country, induced me, without necessary delay, to convene the Council of the State, and to submit the proposition to their consideration.

That honorable body having advised the Executive to detach the number of militia suggested, as the proportion of Connecticut, orders were immediately issued to that effect, and you will be speedily informed, by the proper officer, of their execution.

*Copy of a letter from General Cushing to His Excellency Governor Smith, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, NEW LONDON, August 1, 1814.

SIR:

I have been notified by the Secretary of War, that, on the 4th day of July last, a requisition was made on the Executive of the State of Connecticut for a body of militia, to be organized and held in readiness for immediate service; and I am instructed by him, "in case of actual or menaced invasion of the district under my command, to call for a part or the whole of the quotas assigned to the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, which shall have been organized and equipped under the aforesaid requisition." But, in the performance of this duty, I am charged "to avoid all unnecessary calls; to proportion the calls to the exigency; and to have inspected, without delay, all corps entering on the service, to the end that men, who, from any cause, are unfit therefor, be promptly discharged, and that a due proportion, in all cases, be maintained between officers and privates."

It is not deemed necessary to call any part of the quota of Connecticut into the service of the United States at this time; but it is desirable that the draught be made, and the men held in readiness for immediate service, whenever circumstances may indicate an intention on the part of the enemy to invade any part of the State. And I have, therefore, to request your Excellency to inform me whether the quota of militia required of this State by the aforesaid requisition, has been, or will be, "organized and held in readiness for immediate service?" whether, on my requisition, the whole or any part of the said militia, will be ordered into the service of the United States, for the purposes before mentioned? whether my requisition, for this purpose, must be made to your Excellency, in the first instance, or to such general and field officers as may have been detailed for this service? and, generally, that your Excellency would be pleased to favor me with such information and opinions, in relation to the objects and designs of the enemy, and to the defence of this State, as you may think proper to communicate.

I have only to add, that, as commanding officer of this military district, it will be my constant endeavor to preserve the strictest harmony and good will between the national troops and the militia; and that the rights of the latter, as secured by the constitution and laws of our country, shall be duly respected by every officer and soldier under my command.

*Extracts of a letter from John C. Smith to General Cushing, dated*

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, SHARON, August 4, 1814.

"I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant.

"The Adjutant General is directed to send you a transcript of the general orders, issued on the 28th ultimo, for organizing and holding in readiness a body of militia, pursuant to a recommendation from the President of the United States. To that document I must refer you for answers to most of your inquiries."

"The militia, whenever their services are required, will expect to march under orders received from their commander-in-chief; and such orders as the exigency demands, you may rest assured shall be promptly given."

#### GENERAL ORDERS.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, HARTFORD, July 28, 1814.

The Commander-in-chief has received a communication from the President of the United States, inviting the Executives of certain States to organize, and hold in readiness for immediate service, a corps of ninety-three thousand five hundred men, "as a measure of precaution to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic," and assigning as the quota of Connecticut, three hundred artillery, and two thousand seven hundred infantry, with a detail of general and staff officers.

The Commander-in-chief having thought proper, by advice of the Council, to comply with the recommendation, directs that dispositions be immediately made for carrying the same into effect.

Accordingly, the number of artillery and infantry above mentioned, including the usual regimental officers, will be detached from the militia of the State, exempting from the draught such as have, either in person or by substitute, performed a tour of duty the present season. Volunteer uniform companies will be accepted. The whole to be formed into four regiments, and duly officered. Their places of rendezvous as follows, to wit: for the first regiment, Hartford; for the second, New Haven; for the third, Norwich; and for the fourth, Fairfield. One Major General and one Brigadier General will be detailed in the usual manner; also, one Deputy Quartermaster General; and, instead of an assistant Adjutant General, (there being no such officer in the militia of this State) there shall be detailed one Division Inspector.

The troops thus detached are to be completely armed and, equipped according to law, and until otherwise directed, will be held in readiness to march at a moment's warning, for the purpose of repelling invasions of the enemy, under such orders as they shall receive from the Commander-in-chief.

Notwithstanding this arrangement, it is confidently expected that the whole body of militia, and every other description of military force, will bear in mind the general orders issued on the 19th of April last, and will stand in complete readiness for the defence of the State, at this unusual period of difficulty and danger.

By order.

EBEN. HUNTINGTON, *Adjutant General.*

NORWICH, *August 11, 1814.*

SIR:

By desire of His Excellency Governor Smith, I have forwarded a copy of his general order, of 28th July, for your information, on some points of inquiry made to him.

I am, &c.

EBEN. HUNTINGTON, *Adjutant General.*

Brigadier General CUSHING.

*Copy of a letter from General Cushing to the Governor of Connecticut, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, *August 10, 1814.* }

SIR:

By Major General Williams's communication of this date, your Excellency will be fully informed of the state of things in this quarter; and by the enclosed district order, that the militia ordered out by him, at my request, are to form a brigade, in the service of the United States, under the command of Brigadier General Isham.

Your Excellency's communication of the 4th instant was received this morning, since which General Williams has furnished me with your general order of the 28th of July; but I have heard nothing from the Adjutant General on this subject.

It is my opinion that the safety of this State requires that fifteen hundred infantry, and two companies of artillery, duly officered, and to be commanded by a Brigadier General of this State's quota of ninety-three thousand five hundred men, required by the President of the United States "to be organized and held in readiness for immediate service," should be immediately detached from the said quota, and ordered to this place, for the purpose of relieving the militia now on duty here, if circumstances should justify the measure, or to increase our means of defence, in the event of more formidable and vigorous operations on the part of the enemy. And I have the honor to request your Excellency to make and place the said detachment under my command. It is desirable that the Brigadier General to be detached on this service should be instructed by your Excellency to report himself to me, by letter, immediately after he shall have been so detached, to inform me of his route to this place, and the probable time of his arrival; and to receive and obey any orders he may receive from me, while on his march.

*Copy of Adjutant General P. P. Schuyler's orders, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, *August 10, 1814.* }

DISTRICT ORDERS:

The militia of this State, ordered into service yesterday, by Major General Williams, at the request of the Commanding General of the district, are to be considered in the service of the United States, and will form a brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Isham, who will furnish a return, by regiments, to the Adjutant General of the district, the soonest possible.

Until the proper returns of General Isham's brigade can be obtained, the contractor will issue provisions on the requisitions of Major Goddard, countersigned by the Commanding General; and the Major will be held responsible for the proper application of all provisions so received, and which must be covered by regular returns, so soon as the strength of the brigade can be ascertained.

By order of the Commanding General.

P. P. SCHUYLER, *Adjutant General.*

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General T. H. Cushing to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, *August 12, 1814, 10 o'clock, P. M.* }

"By the letter of the 11th instant, from Governor Smith, of which I enclose a copy, you will see that he has ordered the militia called for on the 10th; but, for the reasons therein stated, claims the right of placing a Major General at their head. I shall endeavor to satisfy him that, with the number of men called for, a Major General cannot be received; but, if he should persist, how is the difficulty to be gotten over?"

*Extract of a letter from John Cotton Smith to General Cushing, dated*

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, }  
SHARON, *August 11, 1814, 9 o'clock, A. M.* }

"Your communication, by express, is this moment received.

"Major General Williams is directed to retain the militia now on duty until they shall be relieved by the force ordered out, conformably to your request, or unless circumstances shall justify an earlier dismissal.

"It is probable the draught for the new detachment is not completed; but Brigadier General Lusk, detailed under the orders of the 28th ultimo, is instructed, by the return of the express, to hasten it as fast as possible, and to march, without a moment's delay, with the *first* and *third* regiments, whose places of rendezvous are Hartford and Norwich. Their numbers will make the compliment you require, including artillery.

"As the force requested by you will constitute a majority of the detachment, there is an evident propriety that it should be commanded by the Major General detailed pursuant to the recommendation of the President. He will accordingly be directed to enter the service, as soon as the necessary arrangements will permit. In the mean time, Brigadier General Lusk is ordered to report himself to you, agreeably to your desire."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General T. H. Cushing to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, August 29, 1814. }

"I deem it proper, at this time, to lay before you a copy of my correspondence with Governor Smith, from the 14th to the 28th, inclusive. Unwilling to relinquish his project for introducing a Major General of militia into the service of the United States, the Governor has attempted to prevail on me to accept a command of six hundred men, to be posted at New Haven, under the command of Major General Taylor, who, it appears, must be provided for.

"I have agreed to accept the men, if properly officered, because it will enable me to discharge an equal number, which must otherwise be marched from this neighborhood; but I have pointedly refused to recognize the Major General, or to have the men mustered and supplied, on any other consideration but that of their being subject to my orders."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Cushing to His Excellency John Cotton Smith, Governor of the State of Connecticut, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, August 14, 1814. }

"A brigade in the army of the United States should consist of two thousand men, and the detachment of militia required of your Excellency, by my letter of the 10th instant, does not exceed one thousand seven hundred, which is probably less than any brigade of militia in the State of Connecticut. In asking for a Brigadier General to command this force, I have certainly gone as far as I am authorized by my instructions from the War Department; which are, "that a due proportion, in all cases, be maintained between officers and privates;" and I trust that, on reflection, your Excellency will relinquish the idea of ordering a Major General to assume the command of less than a complete brigade.

"Should circumstances require a further call for men, to an extent equal to a Major General's command, including the one thousand seven hundred, I shall not fail to include that officer in my requisition."

*Copy of a letter from Brigadier General Cushing to His Excellency John Cotton Smith, Governor of the State of Connecticut, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, August 24, 1814. }

A copy of your Excellency's letter to me of the 11th instant, has been transmitted to the Secretary of War, and I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter from him on the subject of militia draughts, and a copy of the rules referred to in his letter.

In acting on the late requisition of the President, for three thousand men, to be organized for the service of the United States, I had presumed that your Excellency would have pursued the course suggested by that requisition, and formed the State's quota into three regiments, of one thousand men each; and, under that impression, in my letter of the 10th instant, I did not express the number of privates, non-commissioned and commissioned officers, required. It now appears that a different course, has been adopted, and the quota of the State formed into four regiments; but, although, in point of form, there is considerable difference between the three thousand men, as organized by your Excellency, and the same number, as organized in the army of the United States, yet, as a due proportion between officers and privates will be maintained, and no additional expense incurred, I shall consider the spirit and intention of the rule as having been fully complied with, by the organization which your Excellency has been pleased to direct.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency John Cotton Smith, Governor of the State of Connecticut, to Brigadier General Cushing, dated*

HARTFORD, August 25, 1814.

"As you seem, sir, not to have understood, correctly, the views of this Government, with respect to the late detachment, it is fit that I state them to you distinctly:

"The communication from the War Department, under date of the 4th July last, relative to a detachment from the militia, for the purpose therein mentioned, did not assume the style of a "requisition," and for the obvious reason, that there existed no law to authorize it. The invitation (for such was its purport) was accepted by the Executive of this State, from a desire to co-operate in what appeared to the President a proper measure of defence for the Atlantic Coast. The terms of compliance are contained in the general orders issued on the 28th July, a transcript of which you have received. In organizing the regiment, I conformed as nearly as possible to the act of Congress, passed the 8th May, 1792. I am not informed that there is now in operation any other act of the National Legislature on that subject. If your instructions from the War Department materially interfere with the requirements of this act, it is indeed a subject of regret, but not of doubt, as to the authority which ought, in such case, to prevail.

"I am happy, however, to perceive, that you do not consider the difference as essentially varying the result."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Cushing to His Excellency John Cotton Smith, Governor of the State of Connecticut, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
August 28, 1814. }

"Your Excellency's letter of the 25th instant was received last evening, and shall be submitted to the Secretary of War by the next mail.

"Not having the communication from the War Department, under date of the 4th July, before me, when my letter to your Excellency, of the 24th instant, was written, I inadvertently used the term requisition, when I should have employed that of invitation; and I beg leave to assure your Excellency that this was done without any intention or desire of giving to the invitation of the President, or the acceptance of your Excellency, a different understanding from that originally intended."

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General T. H. Cushing to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS,  
NEW LONDON, September 2, 1814. }

"I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter from Governor Smith, of the 30th of August, with my reply of this date.

"It is now pretty evident that the Governor and Council have determined that their militia shall not be commanded by an officer of the United States; and it is possible an attempt may be made to withdraw the brigade now in service. I am, however, of opinion, that this will not be done before the meeting of the Legislature."

*Copy of a letter from His Excellency John C. Smith to Brigadier General Cushing, dated*

SIR:

HARTFORD, August 30, 1814.

Colonel Waid has delivered me your letter of the 28th instant.

In referring you to the views of this Government respecting the detachment lately organized, it was my design not to criticise your language, but to point your attention to the precise conditions upon which that detachment was formed. The right of command, you will perceive, is expressly reserved. The detachment thus constituted is accepted; and with a knowledge of the reservation just mentioned, you requested a large portion of the troops for public service. Whatever sentiments, therefore, may be entertained as to the right of the Executive of the State to direct its military force, when ordinarily employed in the national service, it surely cannot be questioned in the present instance. If, at your particular desire, Brigadier General Lusk was ordered to report himself to you, in the manner suggested in my letter of the 11th instant, I trust it evinces a spirit of accommodation which will be duly appreciated.

I think, sir, you will be satisfied, upon reflection, that you should have requested the Major General, when you called for a majority of the detachment; especially if you consider that another brigade of militia was at that time on duty; and, from appearances, the services of both might become necessary. That a Brigadier General of the regular army, with no troops in the field, should insist on the command of two entire brigades of militia, whose Brigadier Generals held senior commissions, would have produced a case which neither precedent nor principle could justify. To avoid so unusual and embarrassing a state of things, it became my duty to order the Major General into service. Having been properly detailed, no casual diminution of numbers can affect his right of command.

I enclose you the opinion of the Council in relation as well to this point as to the employment of a larger force at New Haven and Bridgeport. Their opinion is in perfect accordance with my own, and, therefore, will be carried into effect. The troops destined for these posts will arrive at New Haven on the 8th, and at Bridgeport on the 13th, of September next. If no officer of the United States appears to muster them, that duty will be performed by an officer of the militia, agreeably to the late act of Congress. If supplies are withheld by your order, they will be furnished by the proper officers of the State, and charged over to the United States.

It is hoped the services of the third regiment may be dispensed with for the present.

From the harmony with which the service was conducted the last season, under an arrangement not essentially dissimilar, I flattered myself that a temper equally conciliatory would distinguish the present campaign. Whilst I lament that any difference of opinion should exist as to the particular mode of defending our country, at a moment when its dearest interests are in jeopardy, I cannot lose sight of the high duties which I am solemnly bound to discharge.

*Extract from the proceedings of the Governor and Council, at a meeting held at Hartford, the 24th day of August, A. D. 1814.*

His Excellency the Governor laid before the Council a correspondence between him and Brigadier General Cushing, in regard to the command of two regiments of the militia of this State, now in service, and requested the advice of the Council thereon.

The Council, on mature deliberation, cannot doubt the right or expediency, under existing circumstances, of having in service, from this State, a Major General, authorized to command such portions of the military force as is, or may be, in service for its defence.

*Extract of a letter from General Cushing to John C. Smith, Governor of Connecticut, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, NEW LONDON, September 2, 1814.

Your Excellency's letter of the 30th of August was received this morning by the Southern mail.

Whether I have understood "the views of the Government, (Connecticut) respecting the detachment lately organized," or not, is, in my estimation, a question of no importance at this time, since, by referring to my letter of the 10th of August, your Excellency will there find the conditions on which the draughted militia, now in service, were asked for, and have been received into the service of the United States. If these conditions did not accord with the "views of this Government," it is not for me to assign the motive which induced your Excellency to make the detachment; but, while I regret that any misunderstanding should exist on this subject, I feel confident that my communications have been too explicit to leave a doubt as to the course authorized and enjoined by the Government of the United States.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency John Cotton Smith to the Secretary of War, dated*

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, HARTFORD, September 3, 1814.

In consequence of the exposed and defenceless situation of the town of New Haven, and borough of Bridgeport, I have thought proper, by the advice of the Council, to order into service six hundred men, for the protection of these places.

The general officer of the United States, located at New London, has been advised of this procedure, and has also been requested to cause the troops to be duly mustered and supplied.

He admits the propriety of the measure, but, as I understand, refuses to comply with the request, and on grounds which, in my view, are wholly inadmissible.

It is my duty, sir, to inform you of these circumstances, and to express the assurance I feel that you will order the requisite supplies to be immediately furnished.

*Extract of a letter from his Excellency John Cotton Smith to the Secretary of War, dated*

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, HARTFORD, September 14, 1814.

I am informed the agent of the United States, at New London, has refused any further subsistence to the militia now on duty in that vicinity, upon the unfounded pretext, that they are withdrawn from service by my

authority. Unwilling to hazard the safety of those posts, and the national property in the river, by disbanding the troops, I have directed the Commissary General of the State to provide for them, until the pleasure of the President shall be known.

You will perceive the importance, sir, of apprising me, without delay, whether the agent is to be countenanced in the course he has thought proper to adopt; and, also, how far I am to rely on the General Government for assistance, in the necessary defence of the State.

[NOTE.—A letter was written to the Governor of Connecticut, in reply to these letters to the Department of War, to the same effect with that to the Governor of Massachusetts, of September 14, 1814.]

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe, Secretary of War, to his Excellency John C. Smith, Governor of Connecticut, dated*

SIR:

OCTOBER 17, 1814,

I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's communication of ——. The letters mentioned in it had been before received.

The regulations of this Department, in conformity to the laws of the United States, having designated commands for different grades of general officers of the militia—two thousand men for a Brigadier General—and General Cushing not having called for more than two thousand men at any time, and there not being more than that number of militia in the field, it was thought that the command of them ought not to be committed to a Major General of the militia.

The tendency of such an arrangement would be to take the force assembled for the defence of the military district No. 2, out of the hands of the officer to whom the President had entrusted it. It was on this principle that my letter to your Excellency, of the 17th of September, was addressed, and with intention to explain the principles on which the arrangements of this Government were made, for the defence of every part of the United States; which explanation I gave on a belief that it would be satisfactory, and that it was particularly my duty to give it at this very important crisis of our affairs.

It is, however, distinctly to be understood that, if the whole quota assigned to Connecticut had been called into service, it would have been proper to have committed the command to a Major General of the militia, who, in cases where he and a Brigadier General of the army of the United States acted together, would take the command of him.

I have the honor to be, &c.

*Copy of a letter from T. H. Cushing, Brigadier General, to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, NEW LONDON, September 12, 1814.

SIR:

The enclosed copies, marked (a.) (b.) (c.) and (d.) will show you the situation in which I am placed, with respect to the militia in the State of Connecticut, and that it will be impossible for me to repel any attack of the enemy within its limits, not directed against the forts in this harbor, or the very small and inconsiderable battery in the neighborhood of New Haven.

The letter of Governor Smith was delivered to me yesterday morning, by the aid of Major General Taylor. I inquired whether his General had been ordered into service by the Government of the United States, and assured him, if this was the case, I would, most cheerfully, resign to him, not only the command of the draughted militia, but of this military district. He replied that General Taylor had no such orders; but that he had been ordered by Governor Smith to take command of the draughted militia of Connecticut, in the service of the United States, and would immediately assume the command, and issue his orders agreeably to the Governor's instructions.

Finding that the usual report of the brigade was not furnished by Brigadier General Lusk, I sent for him to inquire the reason for this neglect, and to admonish him of the consequences which would ensue, in the event of his failing to discharge the duties of his station, as an officer in the service of the United States, and, as such, not accountable to Governor Smith, or any of his militia Generals.

The Brigadier requested a short time to make up his mind, as to the course he should pursue; and I heard nothing more from him until two o'clock this day, when his answer to my note was received, and the enclosed district order immediately issued.

I understand that General Taylor is making arrangements for the supply of Lusk's brigade at this place, and in its neighborhood; and it will readily occur to you that the power to call militia into service, vested in me by the President's proclamation, cannot be exercised to any beneficial result, since, the moment such militia shall have assembled, in pursuance of my requisition, they will be taken from me by State authorities.

(a.)

*Copy of a letter from his Excellency John Cotton Smith, Governor of the State of Connecticut, to Brigadier General Cushing, dated*

HARTFORD, September 9, 1814,

SIR:

Conformably to the original arrangement, Major General Taylor now goes to take the command of the militia on duty at New London and its vicinity.

He will retain or reduce their present number, according to existing circumstances. Upon this and other subjects, connected with the safety of those posts, he is instructed, and will be disposed to confer with you freely, and to promote, by all means in his power, that concert of operation on which the success of the service must essentially depend.

(b.)

*Copy of a letter from Brigadier General Cushing to Brigadier General Lusk, commanding militia, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, NEW LONDON, September 12, 1814.

SIR:

The usual reports of the brigade of draughted militia under your command, in the service of the United States, were not delivered to the Adjutant General of the district yesterday, and report says that you have received, and are acting under, the orders of a militia officer, not in the service of the United States.

It has, therefore, become necessary that you assign a reason, in writing, for withholding your reports, and contradict or admit the fact of your having received, and actually executing, the orders of an officer not in the service of the United States.



(c.)

*Copy of a letter from Brigadier General Lusk, of the militia, to Brigadier General Cushing, dated*

NEW LONDON, September 12, 1814.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this morning. The following is an extract of the order of his Excellency the Captain General, dated the 28th of July, 1814:

"The troops thus detached, are to be completely armed and equipped according to law, and, until otherwise directed, will be held in readiness to march at a moment's warning, for the purpose of repelling invasions of the enemy, under such orders as they shall receive from the Commander-in-chief."

The following is an extract of a letter of instruction to me, from Governor Smith, dated Sharon, 11th August, 1814. "You will inform General Cushing, by letter, of your state of readiness, and take his directions as to the route, and place or places of destination, and to conform to his instructions, until the arrival of Major General Taylor, who will take the command as soon as his health and the necessary arrangements will permit."

In addition to the above, Major General Taylor issued his orders to me, under date of the 11th of September, 1814, directing me to discontinue calling at the office of the Commanding General of the district for orders, and to obey no orders excepting such as shall be issued under the authority of this State.

He has also required of me regularly to make report to him of the forces under my command.

From a perusal of the foregoing extracts, you will readily infer the only answer to your interrogations which I have the power to make.

(d.)

*Copy of District Orders, dated*MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
NEW LONDON, September 12, 1814. }

The brigade of draughted militia from the state of Connecticut having been withdrawn from the service of the United States by his Excellency Governor Smith; and Brigadier General Lusk, the commanding officer of the said brigade, having refused to receive and obey the orders of the Brigadier General commanding this military district, no further supplies, of any description, are to be delivered to him, or his brigade, for and on account of the United States, without an express written order from the Brigadier General commanding, or from his superior officer, actually in the service of the United States.

By order of the commanding General.

P. P. SCHUYLER, *Adjutant General.**Copy of a letter from His Excellency William Jones to the Secretary of War, dated*

PROVIDENCE, April 22, 1812.

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive your letter, under date of the 15th instant, requiring me to take effectual measures to detach five hundred of the militia of Rhode Island, and that they be armed and equipped for actual service within the shortest period that circumstances will permit.

The General Assembly of this State will be in session in a few days, when I shall embrace the earliest opportunity to lay the request before them.

*Copy of a letter from His Excellency William Jones to the Secretary of War, dated*

PROVIDENCE, June 18, 1812.

SIR:

Your communication of the 12th instant came to hand by last evening's mail; and, in reply, permit me to state, that, for the quota of militia required by the act of Congress of April 10, 1812, the General Assembly of this State, at their session, in May last, ordered a return of our militia made on or before the 4th of July next, and that therefrom a draught of the number required will be made, as soon as practicable, and ready for service.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency William Jones to the Secretary of War, dated*

PROVIDENCE, August 22, 1812.

I have not been able to obtain an entire return of the men draughted, as this State's quota of militia, alluded to in my last, until the 11th instant. It is now done, and the detachment organized, as per enclosed roll, and will be held in readiness to act, when, in my opinion, any of the exigencies provided for by the constitution, and referred to by the late act of Congress, under which they are detached, exists, agreeably to the opinion and advice of the Council of this State, given me on the occasion.

*Extract of a letter from His Excellency William Jones, Governor of the State of Rhode Island, to the President of the United States, dated*

PROVIDENCE, June 29, 1814.

The views of the General Assembly, the Council of War, and myself, will be discovered from the act of the Assembly, passed at their late session, a copy of which Mr. Searle will present to you, with whom I request you will make all the necessary arrangements for carrying it into full effect.

He will discuss the subject of his mission fully, and, I trust, to your satisfaction, so that the State will, by the assistance of the United States, be placed in a posture of defence, at least, against the predatory incursions of the enemy.

*Extract of a letter from Nathaniel Searle, junior, to the President of the United States, dated*

WASHINGTON CITY, July 6, 1814.

The views of the General Assembly, of the Council of War, and of the Governor, will be clearly discovered, in relation to this subject, from an act of the Assembly, passed at their late June session, a copy of which I herewith present.

I beg leave, therefore, in behalf of the State by whose authority I am deputed, to solicit the peculiar attention of the President to her perilous and calamitous situation; to request of him a reimbursement of the expenditures already made, and the prompt provision of a military force for her protection; or that he will furnish, herewith, pecuniary means by which she can place herself in an attitude of defence.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS.

IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, *June Session*, A. D. 1814.

AN ACT providing for the defence of the State.

Sec. 1. *Be it enacted by the General Assembly, and by the authority thereof it is enacted*, That his Excellency the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Council of war, be, and he is hereby, authorized and requested to order into immediate service, according to the provisions of the constitution, and of the laws of the United States, such portion of the militia and chartered companies of this State *as he may think necessary* for the defence of the most exposed parts thereof.

Sec. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That his Excellency the Governor may draught or detach the said militia and chartered companies *as he may think expedient*; and that any private soldier of the militia, draughted or detached, may furnish an able-bodied man as a substitute.

Sec. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That each and every non-commissioned officer and private soldier shall receive two dollars per month, out of the general treasury, in addition to the pay allowed by the United States.

Sec. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That his Excellency the Governor be, and he is hereby, requested to cause the draughted or detached militia and chartered companies to be relieved as often as the nature of the service will permit.

Sec. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That all process, for the recovery of debt or taxes, against the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, draughted or detached as aforesaid, shall be stayed during the time they are in service.

Sec. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That his Excellency the Governor be authorized and empowered to raise a State corps, and to appoint officers therefor, as soon as the President of the United States consents to receive them into service for the defence of this State; and that the officers, appointed as aforesaid, be commissioned by his Excellency the Governor in the usual manner.

Sec. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That his Excellency the Governor and Council of War be authorized and requested to furnish to the towns most exposed, such ordnance, on travelling carriages, and such equipments and ammunition, as they shall think proper; and to furnish the militia with tumbrils for transporting their ammunition.

Sec. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That his Excellency the Governor be authorized to draw on the general treasury for any sum not exceeding ten thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying this act into effect.

A true copy.

Witness,

SAMUEL EDDY, *Secretary*.

*Extract of a letter from Brigadier General T. H. Cushing to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILITARY DISTRICT, No. 2, HEAD QUARTERS, }  
PROVIDENCE; July 21, 1814. }

Your letter of the 11th instant, with enclosures, reached me at this place on the evening of the 15th, and on the next morning I had an interview with Governor Jones, who is, at this time, deliberating with his Council as to the mode of selecting the State's quota of 500 men, which he assures me shall be raised, either by enlistment or draught, in a very few days.

*Extract of a letter from his Excellency William Jones, Governor of the State of Rhode Island, to the Secretary of War, dated*

PROVIDENCE, August 15, 1814.

Since the arrangement was entered into with you, relative to raising a State corps, rendezvous have been opened in different parts of the State, officers appointed, and the recruiting service progresses in a manner and with a rapidity that promises success.

Should we be disappointed, however, in raising the number proposed by enlistment, the militia will be detached to make up the deficiency, for the defence of the State, according to the *invitation* of the President of the United States of the 4th of July last.

*Extract of a letter from his Excellency William Jones, Governor of the State of Rhode Island, to the Secretary of War, dated*

PROVIDENCE, September 8, 1814.

SIR:

I am ready, as I have by letter, and through the Adjutant General, Colonel Searle, repeatedly expressed to your Department, to call out the militia, and particularly the five hundred men ordered by the President, on the 4th day of July last, as our quota of the ninety-three thousand five hundred men; but we are destitute of almost every necessary for the comfort and subsistence of those men, and for making them effective, as soldiers. We are without tents, equipage, and provisions, and have a very inadequate supply of cannon, muskets, and ammunition. I have attempted to raise a corps of five hundred men, to be accepted as substitutes for our quota of the militia. In this I have not yet succeeded, having been able to enlist only about one hundred and fifty men, notwithstanding a bounty was offered by the State. I have also detached four companies of militia for the defence of Newport, who have been called into actual service, one company at a time, and who were agreed to be mustered under the authority of the United States, as appears by the letter of General Armstrong, dated July 9, 1814. Five companies of militia were also called out by General Stanton, of Washington county, to assist in the defence of Stonington, in Connecticut. In the actual state of affairs, the militia must be draughted or detached to make up the five hundred men; and it may very probably be necessary to call out a much larger force; but you must be perfectly sensible of the inefficiency of any force, without further supplies of the munitions of war.

## D.

*Copy of a letter from His Excellency William Pennington, Governor of the State of New Jersey, to the Secretary of War, dated*

TRENTON, October 29, 1814.

SIR:

I am informed that Governor Tompkins, as Governor of the State of New York, has taken command of the third military district of the United States: this district comprehends the principal part of New Jersey, and between two and three thousand Jersey militia are now in actual service in this district, at Sandy Hook, in the State of New Jersey. It might certainly appear, on first view, novel, at least, that a Governor of a State, as such, should have the command of the militia of a neighboring State, within the actual territory of that State. I am far from entertaining a disposition, especially in the present state of our country, to throw the least obstruction in the way of the operations of the General Government in any measure of defence which it may think proper to adopt, but I conceive it my duty to inquire as to the fact, and the views of the War Department on the subject.

*Copy of a letter from James Monroe, Secretary of War, to His Excellency William Pennington, Governor of New Jersey, dated*

NOVEMBER 22, 1814.

SIR:

I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter of the 29th ultimo, requiring information whether Governor Tompkins, as Governor of the State of New York, has been appointed commander of the third military district, comprehending a part of the State of New Jersey. Your Excellency seems to doubt whether the Governor of one State can have command of the militia of another State, within the limits of the latter; and it is to ascertain the views of the General Government on that point that the inquiry has been made.

The patriotic and national sentiments which you have expressed on this subject have afforded much satisfaction to the President, who desires that all the information which you have sought should be fully communicated.

Governor Tompkins has been appointed commander of the military district of the United States, No. 3, by virtue of which, his command extends to that part of the State of New Jersey, and to such of her militia, as have been called into the service of the United States within that limit.

The city of New York being menaced by the enemy with a formidable invasion, and the United States not having a regular force sufficient to repel it, a large body of the militia were called into their service for the purpose. It was this circumstance which led to the appointment of Governor Tompkins to the command of the military district No. 3, he being, in the opinion of the President, well qualified for the trust.

It is a well established principle, that, when any portion of the militia are called into the service of the United States, the officers commanding it ought to retain their command, and enter with it into that service: a Colonel with his regiment; a Brigadier with his brigade; a Major General with his division. On the same principle, when several divisions of the militia of any State are called into the service of the United States, the Governor of the State may be authorized to take the command of them, he being the highest officer of the militia in the State. In such a case the Governor of a State is viewed in his military character only. He becomes, it is true, the military commander, by virtue of his office as Governor; but every *other* feature of that character is lost in the service of the United States. They relate to his civil functions, in which the State alone is interested. The militia of one State, when called into the service of the United States, may be marched into another State. We have seen the militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia serving in Maryland, and of North Carolina in Virginia, with many other examples of a like kind. In all these instances, the militia officers go with their respective corps, and, as such, no discrimination can be made to the exclusion of the Governor of a State, commanding the militia of a State; like other militia officers he may march with the troops of his State into another State, and retain there his appropriate command, either as commander of the district, or acting under another Governor, to whom the President has already given the command.

Your Excellency will find these principles fully illustrated, and more than fully established, by an example which took place soon after the adoption of the present constitution. In the year 1794, when President Washington thought it proper, on the certificate of a judge that an insurrection existed in the western parts of Pennsylvania, to order the militia of other States there, to aid the militia of that State in suppressing it, he committed the command of the whole force to the Governor of a neighboring State, who commanded the Governor of Pennsylvania. The relative rank and command of the Governor employed in the service was settled by the President himself.

In general it is not desirable to impose on the Governors of States the duty of commanding the militia of their respective States, when called into the service of the United States, where they supersede the officer of the latter, commanding the military district in which such State is, because, as Governors, they have other duties to perform, which might interfere, if they did not conflict, with those incident to such command. A Governor, for example, under the influence of local feeling, might think the danger more imminent, than it really was, and call into the service of the United States a greater force than would be necessary. He might even set on foot expeditions, which the General Government could not approve. It would be improper that the charges incident thereto should be defrayed by the United States. The constitution contemplates the exercise of the national authority, in contradistinction to that of the State, whenever the militia of a State are called into the service of the United States. The call must be made by the President, or by his authority, to be obligatory on the nation. If made by the Governor of a State it is the act of the State, and obligatory on it only. These objections, however, to the union of both trusts in the same person, did not apply to the employment of the Governor of New York. All the force necessary for the defence of that State had already been called for, by order of this Government, and put into the service of the United States, and although the Governor is authorized to dismiss a part of the militia, in certain cases, he is instructed not to call out any without a special sanction from this Department.

Your Excellency will observe, that the objection to the command of the militia of a State by its Governor, when called into the service of the United States, does not apply except to cases in which the command of the military district of the United States is superseded. In every other case, even in those having that effect, under similar circumstances with that under consideration, such active, patriotic service, by persons so highly entrusted by their country, will be seen by the President with great interest and satisfaction. Its example could not fail to produce the happiest effect.

I have the honor to be, &c.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 143.

[1st SESSION.]

## MILITIA CLAIMS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 11, 1816.

Mr. WRIGHT, from the committee on that part of the President's message, which relates to an arrangement of the expenses of militia incurred by States without the authority of the General Government, made a report on the petition of P. Andrews and others; and on the petition of the Legislature of the Mississippi territory, relating to the pay of Nixon and Hind's cavalry, as follows:

That, although they are satisfied that the cases so referred to them are not within the purview of the original reference, yet they have taken the same under their consideration, and have come to the conclusion that no legislative act is necessary for the relief of the petitioners.

In the first case, the committee were satisfied that the muster-rolls of the militia, by their own officers, was legal evidence of their claims, particularly when remote from any regular corps; in which opinion they were confirmed, by an inquiry of the Secretary of War, who informed the chairman of the committee, that the regulation requiring the militia being mustered by a regular officer, proceeded from an order of the Secretary of War, which had been recently superseded; and that the necessary order had been given to effect the payment of these militia, on their muster-rolls by their own officers; whereby the benefits required will be had without an act of Congress for that purpose.

The committee were also of opinion that the militia of a territory, called out as sanctioned by the executive authority of a territory, were to be considered as acting under the authority of the United States, and that the laws sufficiently provided for their payment, on the requisite evidence of their services; in which opinion, also, they were confirmed by the concurrent opinion of the Secretary of War.

On the last case, to wit, the propriety of paying the holders of the *due bills* or certificates of soldiers' claims, to their assignees, the Legislature of Mississippi admits the wisdom of the policy that interdicted it, in the case of the regulars, but suggests the different characters of the militia and regulars as a principle to induce the excepting the case of the militia out of the law. The committee are not sufficiently impressed with the suggestion of the memorialists to induce them to concur in that opinion, but are satisfied that if it was a wise policy in the case of the regulars, it can be fraught with but little mischief in the case of the militia. That it will introduce different rules of evidence in the case of the claims of the militia and the regulars, inconsistent with the equanimity of sound legislation, and contrary to the opinion of the Secretary of War.

All which is submitted, &c.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 144.

[1st SESSION.]

## CONTRACTS FOR 1815.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 25, 1816.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, January 23, 1816.

SIR:

In compliance with an act concerning public contracts, passed April 21, 1808, I have the honor to transmit to Congress a statement of the contracts that were made by this Department in the year 1815, for supplying rations to the troops of the United States; and statements showing the contracts that were made by the purchasing and ordnance departments for the same period; excepting two contracts made by the purchasing department in 1814, that were reported too late to this Department to be reported to Congress before the close of the last session.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD.

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE of the United States.

*A statement of contracts entered into by individuals with the War Department, for the supply of rations to the troops of the United States, from the 1st of June, 1815, to the 31st of May, 1816; both days included.*

Date of Contract.	Contractors.	Where to be delivered.	Price of Ration.
1815.			
January 1,	Robert M. Penoyer,	Within the State of New Jersey,	16 cts. 8 mills
" 1,	James Morrison,	Within the Illinois, Missouri and Indiana Territories,	17 to 36 cents.
" 10,	Peter H. Green,	Within the State of Massachusetts,	19 cents.
" 14,	John Swartwout,	Within the State of Vermont and its northern vicinity	19 cents.
" 14,	Ditto,	Within that part of the State of New York, north of West Point and its northern and western vicinities,	19 cts. 5 mills.
" 16,	Matthew L. Davis,	Within that part of the State of New York, South of the Highlands, including West Point,	16 cts. 7 mills.
" 20,	John Byers,	Within the State of Connecticut and Rhode Island,	17 cents.
" 20,	Ward and Johnson,	Within the Mississippi Territory and State of Louisiana,	15½ to 17½ cents.
February 13,	Pentland, Hegin & Steele,	Within the Michigan Territory, the vicinity of the Upper Lakes and State of Ohio,	16½ to 25 cts.
" 13,	Ditto,	Within the State of Pennsylvania,	17 to 18 cents.
March 1,	Charles Tyler, Junior,	Within the State of Virginia,	15 cents.
" 1,	James Roddey,	Within the State of South Carolina,	20 cents.
" 9,	Polk, Walker and Williams,	Within the States of Kentucky and Tennessee,	14 to 15 cents.
" 22,	Peter H. Green,	Within the State of New Hampshire, District of Maine and their northern vicinities,	18 cts. 7½ m.
May 1,	Benjamin G. Orr,	Within the States of Delaware and Maryland and the District of Columbia,	16 to 17½ cts.
" 25,	Joseph Hutchinson,	Within the State of Georgia and its southern vicinity,	17 cts. 7½ m.
" 25,	Jarvis and Brown,	Within the State of North Carolina,	17½ cts.

*A statement of existing unexecuted contracts with the Commissary Department, entered into at the periods, and with the persons, hereafter named.*

Date.	Names of contractors.	Quantity.	Articles contracted for.	Price.	Where to be delivered.	Duration of contract.	Remarks.
Jan. 31, 1815.	Lewis Ghriskey, - -	100	Rifles, with equipments complete,	\$17 00 each,	Philadelphia, - -	One year, - -	
Feb. 9, "	J. Joseph Henry, - -	2,277	Stands of arms, -	14 25 each,	Do. - -	On or before the 1st of Nov. 1816. -	
Feb. 14, "	Daniel Henkel, - - -	1,700	Ditto, - - -	14 25 each,	Do. - -	On or before the 1st of Feb. 1816. -	
Feb. 24, "	Lewis Enters, - - -	8,000	Rifle stocks, -	25 each,	Do. - -	One year.	
April 27, "	Ditto, - - -	500	Powder Horns, -	90 each,	Do. - -	Do.	
Aug. 14, "	Owen and Edward Evans, -	25	Stands of arms, -	14 25 each,	Do. - -		To close an account.
Feb. 26, 1814.	James Rundlett, - -	20,000	Yards 6-4 blue cloth,	3 pr. yard,	Portsmouth, N. H. "	Nine months. -	This contract was made with John Langdon, Deputy Commissary—9,764 yards are yet to be delivered.
Dec. 1, "	Daniel Bussard, - -	15,000	Blankets, - -	3 50 each,	City of Washington,	One year. - -	This contract was made with John McKinney, Deputy Commissary. The number yet to be delivered is not known to the Commissary General.

Hon. WM. H. CRAWFORD, *Secretary of War.*

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, PHILADELPHIA, *January 13, 1816.*

CALLENDER IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

*Statement of contracts for ordnance service, made with the following persons in the year 1815.*

Date.	Names of contractors.	Quantity.	Articles contracted for.	Prices.	Where to be delivered.	Remarks.
Jan. 24, 1815.	Peter Townsend, - - -	500 tons, -	Iron castings, cannon, shot, &c.	For mortars of 10 inch caliber, and for cannon of 32 and 24 pdrs., \$133½ per ton; for medium 18 pdr. cannon, \$220 per ton; for light 12 pdr. cannon, for field service, \$140 each; for light 6 pdr. cannon, \$70 each; for light 3 pdr. cannon, \$50 each; for howitzers, of 5-8-10 inches caliber, or 24 pdrs., (so called,) \$60 each; for heavy 10, 8, and 5½ inch shells, \$150 per ton; for carcasses, so called, of 10, 8, and 5½ inches, \$160 per ton; for light 24 pdr. Shrapnel shells, so called, \$112½ each; for the same, for 18 pdr. cannon, \$90½ each; for the same for 6 pdr. cannon, \$55 each; and for the same, for 3 pdr. cannon \$40 each; for 100, 50, 42, 32, 24, and 18 pdr., round shot, \$95 per ton; and for 12, 6, and 3 pdr., round shot \$105 per ton; for grape and canister shot, \$145 per ton.	On the banks or margin of the river Hudson.	
Feb. 4, 1815.	Randolph Ross, - - -	200,000 lbs.	Gunpowder, - - -	55 cents per pound,		Richmond.
" 15, "	Charles Munns and McClean,	6,000 "	Do. - - -	60 cents per pound,	Supposed at W. city.	Contracted for by
" 16, "	Elias Earle, - - -	10,000 "	Stands of arms, - - -	\$15 per stand,	Centreville, S. C.	Col. J. McKinney.
Mar. 10, "	Wirt and Clarke, - - -	300 tons	Iron castings, cannon, shot, &c.	Prices given Mr. Townsend as quoted above.	Richmond.	

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 145.

[1st Session.]

## ARMY REGISTER FOR 1816.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 27, 1816.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR.

SIR:

In obedience to the resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives of the 22d instant, I have the honor to transmit the enclosed documents; which, it is believed, contain all the information required, which it is in the power of this Department to give.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient, humble servant,

WM. H. CRAWFORD.

The Honorable the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, January 25, 1816.

SIR:

I have the honor to lay before you such copies of the records as contain all the information in this office, relative to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, of January 22d, 1816, viz:

A register of the army, corrected on the 1st of January last, together with a resolution of the Senate of the United States, of March 2d, 1815, containing a list of all the promotions which have been made in the army since the peace.

No officer is retained on the peace establishment who was not in service during the war, and none have been promoted since the passing of the act for reducing the army.

I have the honor to be, sir, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

D. PARKER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

JANUARY 25, 1816.

SIR:

In addition to the official report which I had the honor to lay before you this morning, I take the liberty to state, that there being no third lieutenants provided for in the peace establishment, (except in the corps of artillery,) it appears to have entered into the views of the Board of Officers, who reported a selection, to retain all of that rank who had been promoted from cadets of the military school; and, it appears, that none, except those, were brought in from other corps. One third lieutenant, however, declined remaining in the army on the peace establishment; and third lieutenant W. H. C. Wright was brought in with his original rank in the regiment of light artillery. He would have ranked all the cadets who were appointed on the 2d March, after the peace. The promotion and selection of cadets seems to have been considered an exception to the general rule, as well by the Board of Officers as by the War Department.

I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

D. PARKER.

HON. W. H. CRAWFORD.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1815.

Resolved, That the Senate do advise and consent to the following appointments:

Cadet Henry Middleton, to be second lieutenant in the corps of engineers.	Cadet Michael F. Van Deventer, do.	do.
Henry R. Dulany, to be third lieutenant of light artillery.	Milo Johnson, do.	do.
John R. Sloo, do.	Aaron G. Gano, do.	do.
Henry Griswold, do.	Robert M. Forsyth, do.	do.
James Monroe, do.	Thomas W. Lendrum, do.	do.
Robert C. Brent, do.	William W. Rigal, to be third lieutenant of ordnance.	do.
Abraham Wendall, do.	James Simonson, do.	do.
George A. Washington, to be third lieutenant in the corps of artillery.	John Hill, do.	do.
Robert J. Scott, do.	James R. Stubbs, do.	do.
Alonzo Brower, do.	Simon Willard, do.	do.
Francis W. Berrier, do.	John Symington, do.	do.
George Cooper, do.		
Henry Smith, do.		
Alexander F. Cochrane, do.		

NOTE.—Cadet Stubbs declined the promotion, and remained a cadet at the Military Academy.

D. PARKER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

Attest:

CHARLES CUTTS, Secretary.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, January 25, 1816.

A true copy of the original on file in this office.

D. PARKER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

Residence of the within officers when they were appointed cadets.

Middleton, South Carolina.	Brewer, Vermont.	Lendrum, Alexandria, D. C.
Dulany, Maryland.	Berrier, New York.	Rigal, New York.
Sloo, Ohio.	Cooper, do.	Simonson, do.
Griswold, do.	Smith, do.	Hill, Massachusetts.
Monroe, Virginia.	Cochrane, Washington city,	Stubbs, Ohio.
Brent, Maryland.	Van Deventer, New York.	Willard, Massachusetts.
Wendall, New York.	Johnson, do.	Symington, Maryland.
Washington, Maryland.	Gano, Ohio.	
Scott, Virginia.	Forsyth, Georgia.	

## ARMY REGISTER.

## General Staff.

Names and Rank.	Date of appointment.	Brevet and former commissions.	Remarks.
Jacob Brown, major general,	Jan. 24, 1814,	-	Division of the north.
Andrew Jackson, do.	May 1,	-	Division of the south.
Alexander Macomb, brigadier general,	January 24,	September 11, 1814,	Detroit.
Edmund P. Gaines, do.	March 9,	Maj. Gen. brevet. August 15, 1814,	Augusta, Georgia.
Winfield Scott, do.	Do.	Maj. Gen. brevet. July 25, 1814,	
Eleazer W. Ripley, do.	April 15,	Maj. Gen. brevet. July 25, 1814,	Boston.
Daniel Parker, adjutant and inspector general,	November 22,	Maj. Gen. brevet.	
Robert Butler, adjutant general,	March 5,	Brig. Gen. brevet.	Divis. of the sou.
Arthur P. Hayne, do.	April 12,	Colonel brevet,	Divis. of the nor.
Robert Swartout, quartermaster general,	March 21, 1813,	Do.	} Provis'ly retained.
S. Champlain, deputy quartermaster general,	March 1,	Brig. Gen. brevet.	
Samuel Brown, do.	March 26,	Major brevet,	Divis. of the sou.
William Linnard, deputy quartermaster,	April 12,	Do.	Divis. of the nor.
N. B. Four brigade inspectors, and four brigade quartermasters, to be taken from the line.			
<i>Ordnance Department.</i>			
Decius Wardsworth, colonel,	July 2, 1812,	Colonel brevet.	
George Bomford, lieutenant colonel,	Feb'y 9, 1815,	Lieut. Col. brevet, Dec. 22, 1814.	
John Morton, captain,	Sept. 11, 1812,	Captain brevet.	
A. R. Woolley, do.	December 4,	Do.	
George Talcot, jun. do.	August 5, 1813,	Do.	
James Dalaby, do.	Do.	Do.	
John H. Margart, do.	Do.	Do.	
R. D. Richardson, do.	Do.	Do.	
Thomas L. Campbell, do.	Do.	Do.	
Edwin Tyler, do.	Do.	Do.	
J. H. Rees, do.	Feb'y 16, 1814,	Do.	
J. D. Hayden, do.	May 17, 1815,	Brevet March 13, 1813.	
M. I. Magee, 1st lieutenant,	August 14, 1812,	Captain brev. March 17, 1814.	
William Wade, do.	March 12, 1813,	1st Lieut. brevet.	
Rufus L. Baker, do.	Do.	Do.	
William C. Lyman, do.	April 19,	Do.	
David T. Welsh, do.	April 30,	Captain brevet.	
James Baker, do.	August 6,	June 20, 1814.	
Neheni Baden, do.	Do.	1st Lieut. brevet.	
Christopher Keiser, do.	Do.	Do.	
Thomas L. Hawkins, do.	Do.	Do.	
J. Livingston, do.	March 5, 1814,	Do.	
James Hall, 2d lieutenant,	May 1,	2d Lieut. brevet.	
Thos. T. Stephenson, do.	July 21,	Do.	
J. C. De Hart, do.	August 1,	Do.	
James Wilson, do.	December 26,	Do.	
R. C. Pomeroy, do.	Do.	Do.	
Charles F. Morton, do.	Do.	Do.	
Aeneas McKay, do.	December 2,	Do.	
J. W. Phillips, do.	Do.	Do.	
O. O. Bangs, do.	Do.	Do.	
James Elsinore, do.	Do.	Do.	
William F. Rigal, 3d lieutenant,	March 2,	3d Lieut. brevet.	
James Simonson, do.	Do.	Do.	
John Hills, do.	Do.	Do.	
Simon Willard, do.	March 2, 1815,	Do.	
John Symington, do.	Do.	Do.	
W. E. Williams, do.	December 2,	Do.	
W. B. Davidson, do.	Do.	Do.	
W. H. Sass, do.	Do.	Do.	
James Howard, do.	Do.	Do.	
<i>Medical Department.</i>			
David C. Kerr, hospital surgeon,	April 30, 1812.		
Samuel Shaw, do.	April 6, 1813.		
Benjamin Waterhouse, do.	June 29.		
Tobias Watkins, do.	March 30, 1814,		Provisionally retained.
James C. Bronaugh, do.	April 15.		
Joseph Lovell, do.	June 30.		
James Stevenson, hospital surgeon's mate,	May 27, 1812.		
William H. Buckner, do.	July 6.		
Edward Purcell, do.	May 2, 1813.		
William W. Hazard, do.	May 14.		
Joseph Wallace, do.	July 15.		
William Williams, do.	August 1.		
William Stewart, do.	March 30, 1814.		

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and Rank.	Date of appointment.	Brevet and former commission.	Remarks.
William Marshall, hospital surgeon's mate,	March 30, 1814.		
Joseph Eaton, do.	April 15.		
Robert Archer, do.	May 13.		
Hugh F. Rose, do.	May 21.		
James Trimble, do.	July 17.		
Thomas Russell, do.	July 21.		
Tobias P. Cambridge, do.	September 12.		
Isaac Foot, do.	November 22.		
Foster Swift, garrison surgeon,	February 18,		Provisionally retained.
James H. M'Culloch, do.	July 17,		Do. do.
John F. Heilman, garrison surgeon's mate,	June 2, 1802,		Do. Fort Mifflin.
George W. Maupin, do.	November 5,		Do. Norfolk.
Joseph Goodhue, do.	Feb. 8, 1803,		Do. Portsmouth.
Abraham Stewart, do.	March 6, 1806,		Do. St. Louis.
James H. Sargent, do.	Do.		Do. Boston.
Charles Slocum, do.	March 25, 1807,		Do. Natchitoches.
Lemuel B. Clark, do.	January 4, 1808,		Do. Norfolk.
William T. Davidson, do.	June 13,		Do. Fort Stoddert.
Cornelius Cunningham, do.	Oct. 15, 1810,		Do. New London.
Jonathan S. Cool, do.	Feb. 8, 1811,		Do. Fort Osage.
William Ballard, do.	March 24, 1812,		Do. Castine.
Alexander Wolcott, do.	March 25,		Do. New York.
William Turner, do.	September 29,		Do. New London.
John H. Sackett, do.	March 22, 1813,		Do. New York.
William M. Scott, do.	April 8, 1814,		Do. Detroit.
John Trevelt, do.	Do.		Provisionally retained.
P. Macauley, do.	Do.		Do. Fort Washing- ton.
Solomon Wolcott, do.	Do.		Do. Charleston.
Arnold Elzy, do.	April 15,		Do. Washington.
W. C. Lane, do.	September 15,		Do. Vincennes.
<i>Apothecary's department.</i>			
Francis Le Baron, apothecary general,	June 11, 1813,		Provisionally retained.
Christopher Backus, assistant apothecary,	August 12, 1814,		Southern division.
James Cutbush, do.	Do.		Northern division.
<i>Judge Advocates.</i>			
James T. Dent,	July 19, 1813,		Southern division.
Henry Wheaton,	August 6,		Northern division.
<i>Chaplains.</i>			
Robert Elliott,	May 20, 1813,		Northern division.
C. Tarrant,	Dec. 10, 1814,		Southern division.
<i>Pay department.</i>			
Robert Brent, paymaster of the army,	July 1, 1808.		
Washington Lee, deputy paymaster general,	April 13, 1813,		Northern division,
Jonathan Bell, assistant deputy do.	August 1, 1814,		provisionally ret'd.
Ambrose Whitlock, deputy paymaster general,	May 17, 1815,		Do. do.
Thomas Hempstead, assistant deputy do.	June 15, 1814,		Southern division,
			provisionally ret'd.
			Do. do.
<i>Purchasing department.</i>			
Callender Irvine, commissary general,	August 8, 1812,		Philadelphia.
John M'Kinney, deputy commissary,			Southern division.
Darby Noon, do.			Northern division.
Robert Irvine, assistant commissary,			Detroit.
James E. Herron, do.			Brownsville, N. Y.
Maurice Prevost, do.			New Orleans.
Joseph W. Pinder, do.			Savannah.
Edwin Starke, do.			Norfolk.
William Carson, do.			St. Louis.
Archibald Steel, military store-keeper,			Philadelphia.
Samuel Devans, do.			Boston.
Lynott Bloodgood, do.			Albany.
John Fellows, do.			New York.
Jonathan Snowden, do.			West Point.
Thomas Martin, do.			Newport, Ky.
Robert Wilson, do.			Charleston, S. C.
John Chaffee, do.			Springfield, Mass.
Lloyd Beall, do.			Harper's Ferry, Va.
Thomas B. Rutter, do.			Baltimore.
James Gibson, do.			Pittsburg.
George Hackett, do.			Carlisle.
Samuel Lane, do.			Washington.
Augustus H. Putman, do.			Savannah.



## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and Rank.	Date of appointment.	Brevet and former commission.	Remarks.
<i>Military Academy.</i>			
Senior officer of engineers, superintendent military academy.			
Jared Mansfield, professor of natural and experimental philosophy,	Oct. 7, 1812.		
D. B. Douglass, assistant do.			
Andrew Ellicott, professor of mathematics,	Sept. 1, 1813.		
J. Wright, assistant do.			
Alden Partridge, professor art of engineering,	Do.		
William Evilyth, assistant do.			
Samuel Walsh, surgeon,	August 9, 1813.		
Adam Empie, chaplain and professor of ethics.			
Claudius Beraud, teacher of French language,	Jan. 3, 1815.		
C. E. Zoeller, teacher of drawing.			
Pere Thomas, sword-master.			

*Lineal rank of Regiments and Corps.*

Names and Rank.	Date of appointment.	Brevet and former commission.	Remarks.
<i>Lineal rank of Regiments and Corps.</i>			
COLONELS.			
Moses Porter,	1 artillery, brig. general brevet.	Richard Whartenby,	6 infantry, major brevet.
Thomas A. Smith,	rifle, brigadier general brevet.	Alden Partridge,	engineers.
Hugh Brady,	2 infantry.	E. Cutler,	4 infantry, major brevet.
John Miller,	3 infantry.	P. Muhlenburg,	4 infantry, major brevet.
Joseph G. Swift,	engineer, brig. general brevet.	James Dinkins,	4 infantry, major brevet.
Daniel Bissell,	1 infantry, brig. general brevet.	Alexander Cummings,	4 infantry.
William King,	4 infantry.	James Dorman,	8 infantry, major brevet.
James Miller,	5 infantry, brig. general brevet.	Daniel Baker,	3 infantry, major brevet.
Henry Atkinson,	6 infantry.	James Reed,	artillery.
R. C. Nicholas,	8 infantry.	Angus M'Dowell,	1 artillery.
James M'Donald,	7 infantry.	W. Morgan,	rifle, major brevet.
		F. W. Armstrong,	7 infantry, major brevet.
		Isaac D. Barnard,	4 infantry, major brevet.
		Angus L. Langham,	7 infantry, major brevet.
		Robert Gray,	2 infantry, major brevet.
		J. B. Crane,	artillery, major brevet.
		R. Jones,	artillery, lieut. col. brevet.
		James H. Boyle,	artillery, major brevet.
		Alexander S. Brooks,	artillery, major brevet.
		Nathan Towson,	1 artillery, lieut. col. brevet.
		S. B. Archer,	artillery, major brevet.
		Saunders Donoho,	artillery.
		Thomas Biddle, jun.	artillery, major brevet.
		John Sproull,	2 infantry, major brevet.
		Josiah H. Vose,	5 infantry, major brevet.
		William Bradford,	rifle major brevet.
		Samuel D. Harris,	1 artillery, lieut. col. brevet.
		John A. Burd,	4 infantry, major brevet.
		Joseph Selden,	rifle, lieut. col. brevet.
		Turner Crooker,	6 infantry, major brevet.
		J. T. B. Romayne,	artillery.
		David E. Twiggs,	7 infantry, major brevet.
		Alexander Gray,	1 infantry.
		Thomas Sangster,	4 infantry.
		White Youngs,	8 infantry, major brevet.
		William Taylor,	4 infantry.
		William J. Adair,	3 infantry.
		William O. Allen,	artillery.
		John T. Chunn,	3 infantry, major brevet.
		A. L. Madison,	4 infantry.
		J. G. Totten,	engineers, lieut. col. brevet.
		Thomas Stockton,	6 infantry, major brevet.
		C. Larrabee,	3 infantry, major brevet.
		S. Babcock,	engineers.
		William Davenport,	8 infantry.
		Thomas Ramsey,	rifle.
		William Whistler,	3 infantry.
		A. W. Thornton,	1 artillery.
		Thomas Murray,	artillery.
		William Gates,	artillery.
		A. C. W. Fanning,	artillery, major brevet.
		John M. O'Conner,	artillery.
		William S. Foster,	6 infantry, major brevet.
		S. Burbank,	5 infantry, major brevet.
		Stephen W. Kearney,	2 infantry.
		J. L. Baker,	1 infantry, major brevet.
		W. O. Butler,	1 infantry, major brevet.
		J. Roach, jun.	artillery.
		Thomas M. Read, jun.	6 infantry.
		Peter B. Van Beuren,	2 infantry.
		J. F. Heileman,	artillery.
		George Bender,	5 infantry.
		John Bliss,	6 infantry.
		Hopley Yeaton,	artillery.
		James H. Hook,	4 infantry.
LEUTENANT COLONELS.			
John R. Fenwick,	1 artillery, colonel brevet.		
David Brearly,	7 infantry, colonel brevet.		
W. K. Armistead,	engineers.		
George E. Mitchell,	artillery, colonel brevet.		
James House,	artillery.		
Joseph L. Smith,	5 infantry.		
William Lindsay,	artillery.		
Duncan L. Clinch,	4 infantry.		
William S. Hamilton,	rifle.		
George Croghan,	1 infantry, brevet.		
J. Snelling,	6 infantry.		
Matthew Arbuckle,	3 infantry.		
Ninian Pinkney,	2 infantry.		
William M'Rea,	artillery.		
William A. Trimble,	8 infantry brevet.		
MAJORS.			
Abraham Eustis,	1 artillery, lieut. col. brevet.		
George Bomford,	engineers, lieut. col. brevet.		
William M'Ree,	engineers, colonel brevet.		
George Armistead,	artillery, lieut. col. brevet.		
Thomas S. Jesup,	1 infantry, colonel brevet.		
John E. Wool,	6 infantry lieut. col. brevet.		
James B. Many,	artillery.		
J. Hindman,	artillery, colonel brevet.		
Charles K. Gardiner,	3 infantry, lieut. col. brevet.		
James Bankhead,	artillery.		
Henry Leavenworth,	2 infantry, col. brevet.		
J. M'Neal, jun.	5 infantry, colonel brevet.		
T. Chambers,	rifle, lieutenant col. brevet.		
Daniel Appling,	7 infantry, colonel brevet.		
William Lawrence,	8 infantry, lieut. col. brevet.		
George M. Brooke,	4 infantry, colonel brevet.		
CAPTAINS.			
Charles Woolstoncraft,	artillery, major brevet.		
John B. Walback,	artillery, lieut. col. brevet.		
Moses Sweet,	artillery.		
Charles Grafiot,	engineers.		
William Wilson,	artillery.		
John Nicks,	8 infantry, major brevet.		
Enoch Humphreys,	artillery, major brevet.		
Uriah Blue,	8 infantry, major brevet.		
John Machesney,	7 infantry, major brevet.		
Gad Humphreys,	6 infantry, major brevet.		

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

*Lineal rank of Regiments and Corps.*

George Stockton, 3 infantry.  
 Willis Foulk, 8 infantry.  
 Thomas Bennett, artillery.  
 Robert G. Hite, artillery.  
 M. Marston, 5 infantry, major brevet.  
 John Jones, 1 infantry.  
 G. H. Manigault, 1 artillery.  
 R. H. Bell, 7 infantry.  
 S. Churchill, artillery.  
 Benjamin Watson, 6 infantry, major brevet.  
 George M'Glassin, 6 infantry, major brevet.  
 A. Brownlow, 8 infantry.  
 Dantel Ketchum, 6 infantry, major brevet.  
 B. K. Pierce, artillery.  
 Armstrong Irvine, 1 artillery.  
 John Biddle, artillery.  
 H. Chotard, 1 infantry, major brevet.  
 Sylv. Thayer, engineers, major brevet.  
 W. L. Foster, 5 infantry.  
 Francis Stribling, 1 artillery.  
 George Vashon, 7 infantry.  
 John S. Peyton, 1 artillery.  
 H. K. Craig, 1 artillery.  
 M. M. Quackenbos, 8 infantry.  
 William Laval, 1 infantry, major brevet.  
 George P. Peters, artillery.  
 J. Robertson, 7 infantry.  
 Peter Pelham, 5 infantry.  
 Anatole Psychaud, 1 infantry.  
 Ferd. L. Amelung, 1 infantry.  
 Abner P. Spencer, 2 infantry.  
 Joseph Kean, rifle.

W. Martin, rifle.  
 Benjamin Birdsall, rifle, major brevet.  
 John O. Fallon, rifle.  
 Henry Shell, 2 infantry.  
 H. Bradley, 3 infantry.  
 L. Austin, 8 infantry, major brevet.  
 G. H. Grosvenor, 3 infantry.  
 Elijah Montgomery, 7 infantry, major brevet.  
 Alexander R. Thompson, 2 infantry.  
 Edmund Ship, rifle.  
 William Christian, 1 infantry.  
 J. Fowle, jun., 5 infantry.  
 J. S. Allison, 7 infantry.  
 G. D. Smith, 2 infantry, major brevet.  
 Lewis Bissell, 8 infantry.  
 H. H. Villard, artillery.  
 John Reed, 1 infantry, major brevet.  
 E. Childs, 5 infantry.  
 W. L. Dufphey, rifle.  
 W. J. Worth, 2 infantry, major brevet.  
 Henry Whiting, 2 infantry.  
 H. J. Blake, artillery.  
 David Perry, 5 infantry.  
 William Cutbush, engineers.  
 John Green, 3 infantry.  
 James Pratt, 5 infantry.  
 N. N. Hall, artillery.  
 Newman S. Clarke, 6 infantry.  
 John R. Bell, 1 artillery.  
 William M'Donald, 3 infantry, major brevet.  
 M. P. Lomax, artillery.

*Corps of Engineers.*

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
<b>COLONEL.</b>	
Jos. G. Swift, July 31, 1812.	Br. Gen. brev. Feb. 19, 1814.
<b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b>	
Walker K. Armistead, July 24, 1812.	
<b>MAJORS.</b>	
Geo. Bomford, July 6, 1812.	Lt. col. brev. Dec. 22, 1814.
William M'Ree, " 31,	Col. brev. Aug. 15, "
<b>CAPTAINS.</b>	
C. Gratiot, Feb. 23, 1808.	
A. Partridge, July 23, 1810.	Professor military academy.
J. G. Totten, " 31, 1812.	Lt. col. brev. Sep. 11, 1814.
S. Babcock, Sept. 20.	
S. Thayer, October 13, 1813.	Maj. brev. Feb. 20, 1815.
W. Cutbush, Sept. 7, 1814.	
<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
E. de Russey, July 6, 1812.	Capt. brev. Sept. 11, 1814.
Fred. Lewis, Sept. 20.	
J. Gadsden, March 17, 1813.	
T. W. Maurice, Oct. 13.	
H. Dumas, Feb. 20, 1814.	
D. B. Douglas, Sept. 17,	Capt. brev. Sept. 17, 1814.
<b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
G. Trescott, Oct. 16, 1813,	1st lt. brev. Sept. 11, 1814.
J. L. Smith, "	
H. C. Story, Mar. 11, 1814.	1st lt. brev. Sept. 17, 1814.
John Wright, " 30.	
S. H. Long, Dec. 12, 1814.	
H. Middleton, Mar. 2, 1815.	

*Regiment of Light Artillery.*

**COLONEL.**  
 M. Porter, Mar. 12, 1812, Br. Gen. brev. Sep. 10, 1813.

*Regiment of Light Artillery—Continued.*

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
<b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b>	
J. R. Fenwick, Dec. 2, 1811.	Col. staff & brev. Mar. 18, 1813.
<b>MAJORS.</b>	
A. Eustis, Mar. 5, 1810.	Lt. col. brev. Sep. 10, 1812.
<b>CAPTAINS.</b>	
A. M'Dowell, Apr. 1, 1812.	
N. Towson, July 6,	Lt. col. brev. Aug. 15, 1814.
S. D. Harris, "	Lt. col. brev. July 25, "
Arthur W. Thornton, Jan. 20, 1813.	
Gabriel H. Manigault, Aug. 1, 1813.	
Arms. Irvine, Oct. 1, 1813.	Maj. staff, Sept. 9, 1815.
Fras. Stribling, Nov. 1.	
J. S. Peyton, Dec. 15.	
H. K. Craig, Dec. 23.	
J. R. Bell, Oct. 10, 1814.	Col. staff, Oct. 23, 1814.
<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
W. F. Hobart, Apr. 5, 1813,	Maj. staff, July 27, 1814.
G. N. Morris, Oct. 23.	
J. H. Wilkins, Dec. 3.	
John Gates, jun. "	
N. Freeland, Feb. 21, 1814.	
T. Lamar, March 11.	
W. Lyman, June 10.	
J. F. Ross, July 20.	
S. M. Mackay, Oct. 10.	
Fred. Kinloch, " 10.	Aid to Maj. Gen. Brown.
<b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
G. E. Wells, Oct. 2, 1813.	
E. Lyon, " 23.	
S. Washburn, Dec. 13.	
H. Stanton, Mar. 7, 1814.	Capt. staff, July 12, 1813.
G. Drane, " 17.	
W. Smith, May 12.	
H. F. Evans, June 2.	
R. F. Massie, Aug. 31.	
J. Irvine, Sept. 19.	
W. Wells, Oct. 10.	

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.	Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
<b>SURGEON.</b>		<b>SURGEON.</b>	
L. Dunham, Dec. 12, 1808.		F. Whiting, June 20, 1813. Edwin Sharpe, June 26. G. Dearborn, October 1, Felix Ansart, do. William King, do. Th. C. Legate, October 29. Nat. Clarke, May 1, 1814. S. Spotts, May 22. L. Whiting, June 14. Lewis Morgan, Nov. 17. W. H. Nicoll, Nov. 22.	Adjutant.
<b>SURGEON'S MATE.</b>		<b>SURGEON'S MATE.</b>	
W. H. Livingston, July 26, 1814.			
<i>Corps of Artillery.</i>			
<b>LIEUTENANT COLONELS.</b>		<b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
G. E. Mitchell, Mar. 3, 1813, James House, do. Wm. Lindsay, March 12. Wm. Macrea, Apr. 19, 1814.	Col. brevet, May 5, 1814.	Adrian Neil, July 6, 1812, J. W. Kincaid, do. Robert Goode, do. Francis O. Byrd, do. Thos. Reynolds, do. J. W. Lent, jr. Mar. 12, 1813. Jos. Bosque, April 12. C. D. Cooper, April 16. J. P. Prince, do. Richard Bache, April 17, P. I. Neville, April 20. M. S. Massey, May 13. C. Anthony, May 20, W. M. Clintock, June 20. L. H. Osgood, do. J. Henderson, June 26. P. Melendy, June 29. Jas. D. Brown, August 15. R. M. Kirby, October 1, H. M. Campbell, October 12, Robert Beall, November 14. John A. Dix, March 1, 1814. S. W. Gordon, March 11, R. Lyman, do. I. L. Gardner, March 28. T. I. Harrison, March 19. I. Watnaugh, do.	1st Lieut. br. July 6, 1812.  Do. Feb. 20, 1815. Do. Mar. 13, 1813.  Do. Apr. 17, 1813.  Adjutant.  Capt. brev. Sept. 17, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Ripley. Capt. brev. July 25, 1814.  1st Lieu. br. Mar. 11, 1814.  1st Lieu. br. Aug. 15, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Gaines.
<b>MAJORS.</b>		<b>MAJORS.</b>	
G. Armistead, Mar. 3, 1813, Jas. B. Many, May 5. J. Hindman, June 26, J. Bankhead, Aug. 15,	Lt. Col. brev. Sep. 12, 1814.  Col. brev. May 17, 1815. Col. staff, Sept. 9, 1813.	J. W. Gardiner, May 1. C. S. Merchant, do. Nathl. G. Dana, do. John Monroe, do. J. S. Allanson, do. L. G. De Russy, do. Thomas Childs, do. Jac. Schmucke, do. Thos. V. Earle, do. Charles Mellon, do. George H. Britt, do. John S. Pierce, do. Allen Lowd, do. G. S. Wilkins, May 3. P. A. Dennis, May 20. J. Ripley, June 1. F. G. de Lamos, July 7. Isaac E. Craig, July 21. C. M. Thruston, do. H. W. Fitzhugh, do. Jacob Davis, do. E. Humphrey, do. S. Whetmore, do. D. S. Andrews, July 22. N. G. Wilkinson, do. Tim. Green, jr. July 25. William G. Shade, Aug. 31. Elis. Brimhall, Sept. 1, H. H. Minton, Sept. 12. A. C. Towler, Sept. 30. J. S. Abeel, October 1, James Archer, do. W. S. Willard, do. James Gignilat, October 11. M. F. de Graffenreidt, Nov. 26, 1804.	Capt. brev. Sept. 17, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Ripley. Capt. brev. July 25, 1814.  1st Lieu. br. Mar. 11, 1814.  1st Lieu. br. Aug. 15, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Gaines.
<b>CAPTAINS.</b>		<b>CAPTAINS.</b>	
Chs. Wollstoncraft, March 15, 1805, J. B. Walbach, Jan. 31, 1806, Moses Swett, June 30, 1807. Wm. Wilson, May 3, 1808. E. Humphreys, Jan. 9, 1809, Jas. Reed, March 12, 1812. J. B. Crane, July 6, Roger Jones, do. J. H. Boyle, do. A. S. Brooks, do. S. B. Archer, do. S. Donoho, do. Th. Biddle, jr. do. J. T. B. Romayne, do. Wm. O. Allen, do. Th. Murray, Feb. 10, 1813. Wm. Gates, March 3. A. C. W. Fanning, Mar. 13, J. M. O'Conner, do. I. Roach, jr. April 13. J. F. Hieleman, May 5. H. Yeaton, May 20. Th. Bennet, June 20. Robt. G. Hite, June 26, S. Churchill, August 15, B. K. Pierce, October 1. John Biddle, do. G. P. Peters, Feb. 21, 1814, H. H. Villard, July 14. H. J. Blake, September 1. Nathl N. Hall, Sept. 30, M. P. Lomax, November 17,	Major brev. Mar. 15, 1815.  Lt. Col. br. May 17, 1815-  Major brev. Dec. 28, 1814,  Major brev. Nov. 13, 1813. Lt. Col. br. Sept. 17, 1814. Major brev. May 5, 1814. Do. Sept. 11, 1814. Do. April 27, 1815. Do. Aug. 15, 1814. Major staff, Febr. 11, 1815.  Major brev. Aug. 15, 1814. Major staff, June 20, 1814.  Do. Aug. 6, 1813. Do. Aug. 29, 1813.  Do. do.  Do. April 25, 1814. Do. March 3, 1814.	Major brev. Dec. 28, 1814,  Major brev. Nov. 13, 1813. Lt. Col. br. Sept. 17, 1814. Major brev. May 5, 1814. Do. Sept. 11, 1814. Do. April 27, 1815. Do. Aug. 15, 1814. Major staff, Febr. 11, 1815.  Major brev. Aug. 15, 1814. Major staff, June 20, 1814.  Do. Aug. 6, 1813. Do. Aug. 29, 1813.  Do. do.  Do. April 25, 1814. Do. March 3, 1814.	Adjutant.  Do. Apr. 17, 1813.  Adjutant.  Capt. brev. Sept. 17, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Ripley. Capt. brev. July 25, 1814.  1st Lieu. br. Mar. 11, 1814.  1st Lieu. br. Aug. 15, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Gaines.
<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>		<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
Milo Mason, Feb. 29, 1812, C. Vandevanter, Mar. 12, J. L. Tracy, March 6. John Farley, do. Wm. M. Read, do. Harold Smyth, do. L. Brown, do. Luther Scott, do. R. R. Ruffin, do. J. H. Daring, do. J. Erving, jr. August 16, A. L. Sands, Feb. 10, 1813. T. J. Beall, March 3, Rd. A. Zantzinger, Mar. 13, W. R. Duncan, do. Chester Root, do. T. Randall, do. J. L. Edwards, March 28. Gus. Loomis, May 5, P. D. Spencer, May 13, J. Mountfort, May 20,	Aid to Brig. Gen. Porter. Major staff, Mar. 20, 1813.  Capt. brev. Sept. 11, 1814.  Do. Feb. 20, 1815.  Major staff, April 1, 1813.  Capt. brev. Mar. 17, 1814. Do. Aug. 15, 1814.  Do. Sept. 11, 1814. Aid to Maj. Gen. Macomb. Capt. brev. Dec. 1, 1814.  Capt. staff, April 19, 1813. Major staff, Oct. 17, 1814. Capt. brev. Sept. 11, 1814.	J. W. Gardiner, May 1. C. S. Merchant, do. Nathl. G. Dana, do. John Monroe, do. J. S. Allanson, do. L. G. De Russy, do. Thomas Childs, do. Jac. Schmucke, do. Thos. V. Earle, do. Charles Mellon, do. George H. Britt, do. John S. Pierce, do. Allen Lowd, do. G. S. Wilkins, May 3. P. A. Dennis, May 20. J. Ripley, June 1. F. G. de Lamos, July 7. Isaac E. Craig, July 21. C. M. Thruston, do. H. W. Fitzhugh, do. Jacob Davis, do. E. Humphrey, do. S. Whetmore, do. D. S. Andrews, July 22. N. G. Wilkinson, do. Tim. Green, jr. July 25. William G. Shade, Aug. 31. Elis. Brimhall, Sept. 1, H. H. Minton, Sept. 12. A. C. Towler, Sept. 30. J. S. Abeel, October 1, James Archer, do. W. S. Willard, do. James Gignilat, October 11. M. F. de Graffenreidt, Nov. 26, 1804.	1st Lieu. br. July 25, 1814.  At ord.  1st Lieu. br. Sept. 1, 1814.  Do. Oct 1, 1814.  Do. Sept. 17, 1814.
<b>THIRD LIEUTENANTS.</b>		<b>THIRD LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
		R. H. Lee, March 17, 1814, Rice L. Stuart, July 15. W. L. Booth, July 21.	Do. Sept. 17, 1814.

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.	Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
T. J. Baird, July 21, 1814. J. Parkhurst, do. R. L. Armstrong, do. James Badolet, do. G. W. Gardner, do. B. S. A. Lowe, do. T. R. Broome, do. Pat. Galt, September 16. Upt. S. Frazer, October 1. N. G. Pendleton, Nov. 22. B. H. Rutledge, Dec. 12. John R. Sloo, Mar. 2, 1815. Henry Griswold, do. James Monroe, do. Robert C. Brent, do. Abr. Wendell, do. G. A. Washington, do. Robert J. Scott, do. Alonzo Brewer, do. F. N. Berrier, do. George Cooper, do. Henry Smith, do. A. F. Cochrane, do. Milo Johnson, do. Aaron G. Gano, do. Robt. M. Forsyth, do. Thos. W. Lendrum, do. Henry R. Dulany, do.	Aid to Maj. Gen. Gaines.	<b>SURGEON'S MATES.</b> W. S. Madison, Dec. 12, 1812. C. G. Gerrard, Mar. 11, 1814.  <i>Second Regiment of Infantry.</i>  <b>COLONEL.</b> Hugh Brady, July 6, 1812.  <b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b> Nimian Pinckney, April 15, 1814,  <b>MAJOR.</b> Henry Leavenworth, Aug. 16, 1813,  <b>CAPTAINS.</b> Robt. Gray, July 6, 1812, John Sproul, do. Stephen W. Kearney, April 1, 1813. Peter B. Van Beuren, April 30, 1813. Abner P. Spencer, March 14, 1814. Henry Shell, March 21. Alex. R. Thompson, May 1, 1814. G. D. Smith, June 30, W. J. Worth, Aug. 19, Henry Whiting, Sept. 1.  <b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b> Chas. J. Nourse, May 7, 1812, W. Browning, Oct. 15, 1813, Wm. Hoffman, Nov. 11. B. A. Boynton, Nov. 25. Owen Ransom, April 19, 1814. John Kirby, May 19, Jas. Young, June 30. Wm. G. Belknap, Aug. 19, 1814. S. B. Griswold, Sept. 1. Walter Bicker, Jr. do.  <b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b> John G. Munn, March 13, 1813, Jas. Palmer, Dec. 20, John Wood, May 1, 1814. Joseph Hopkins, May 2. W. Kendall, June 16, 1814, R. M. Harrison, June 30. Elisha Clark, July 25. Seth Johnson, Aug. 20. Joshua Brant, Oct. 1. John Clitz, October 19,  <b>SURGEON.</b> Franklin Bache.  <b>SURGEON'S MATES.</b> S. H. Littlejohn, April 3, 1813. Josiah Everett, July 21.  <i>Third Regiment of Infantry.</i>  <b>COLONEL.</b> John Miller, July 6, 1812.  <b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b> Matthew Arbuckle, March 9, 1814.	Col. staff, Dec. 1, 1814.  Col. brvt. July 25, 1814.  Maj. brvt. Aug. 15, 1813. Maj. brvt. July 25, 1814.  Maj. brvt. July 25, 1814. Major brvt. do.  Maj. staff, Sept. 14, 1814, Capt. brvt. Aug. 15, 1813. Capt. brvt. Oct. 31, 1814.  Adjutant.  1st lt. brvt. Aug. 15, 1813. 1st lt. brvt. Aug. 5, 1814.  1st lt. brvt. Jan. 1, 1815.  1st lt. brvt. Sept. 17, 1814.
<i>First Regiment of Infantry.</i>  <b>COLONEL.</b> Dan. Bissel, Aug. 15, 1812,  <b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b> Geo. Croghan, Feb. 21, 1814,  <b>MAJOR.</b> Th. S. Jesup, April 6, 1813,  <b>CAPTAINS.</b> Alex. Gray, July 6, 1812. I. L. Baker, April 5, 1813, Wm. O. Butler, do. John Jones, July 29. Henry Chotard, October 9,  Wm. Laval, Feb. 15, 1814, Anatole Peychaud, Mar. 11. Ferd. L. Amelung, do. Wm. Christian, May 31. John Reed, July 15,  <b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b> Nat. Smith, July 29, 1813. S. Farrow, Jr. Aug. 1. Jac. Whistler, Aug. 15. Jn. C. Kouns, Feb. 20, 1814. J. P. Thibault, March 11. Wm. Gibbs, do. John Tarrant, April 15. A. Donoho, April 15. Henry Saunders, July 14. Richd. K. Call, July 15,  <b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b> Geo. Watts, Aug. 1, 1813, Robt. L. Coomb, Aug. 4. R. B. Hyde, Feb. 18, 1814. Geo. W. Boyd, March 9. W. Christie, do. Chas. Cooper, May 1. Trueman Cross, do. Sam. Houston, May 20. T. C. Hindman, do. Robt. Davis, June 30.	Br. Gen. br. Mar. 9, 1814.  Brevet, August 2, 1813.  Col. brevet, July 25, 1814.  Major brev. Dec. 23, 1814. Do. do. Major staff, Oct. 17, 1814. Major brev. Dec. 23, 1814. Major brev. Nov. 7, 1814.  Do. Dec. 23, 1814.  Capt. brevet Dec. 23, 1814.  Capt. brevet, Nov. 7, 1814.  1st lt. brvt. July 5, 1814.		
<b>SURGEON.</b> Edw. Scull, April 8, 1814.			

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.	Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
<b>MAJOR.</b>		<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
Charles K. Gardiner, June 26, 1813,	Col. staff, April 12, 1814.	Kenneth M'Kenzie, July 6, 1812,	Capt. brevet. July 6, 1812.
<b>CAPTAINS.</b>		F. S. Belton, Jan. 20, 1813,	Major staff, Oct. 18, 1814.
Dan. Baker, March 12, 1812,	Major brvt. April 15, 1814.	Mm. Neilson, June 7.	
Wm. J. Adair, July 6.		Oth. W. Callis, June 26.	
John T. Chunn, do.	Major brvt. Aug. 15, do.	Dan. Sacket, Nov. 11.	
Chas. Larrabee, Sept. 12,	Major brvt. Aug. 9, 1812.	Wm. P. Pendleton, May 30, 1814.	
W. Whistler, Dec. 31, 1812.		J. M'Gavock, Jr. June 24, 1814.	
G. Stockton, May 20, 1813.		Jas. H. Gale, June 29.	
Hez. Bradley, April 19, 1814.		J. M. Glassell, July 12,	Adjutant.
G. H. Grosvenor, April 21.		E. B. Randolph, Dec. 31,	Ist lt. brevet. July 25, 1814.
John Green, Sept. 25.		<b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
Wm. M'Donald, Nov. 11,	Major brvt. July 25, 1814.	Bev. Turpin, July 6, 1812,	Ist. lt. brevet. July 6, 1812,
<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>		F. H. Lissenhoff, Aug. 1, 1813.	
James Hackley, Jr. March 13, 1813.		John Strother, Nov 20.	
T. Mountjoy, March 13.		F. L. Dade, Jan. 31, 1814.	
John Garland, March 31.		Philip Wager, March 17.	
Chas. L. Cass, May 20.		J. Shommo, March 24.	
Rt. Sturgis, March 9, 1814.		C. Wright, April 19.	
Dan. Curtis, April 15.		Henry Wilson, do.	
Henry Conway, April 19.		J. P. Dieterich, June 14,	Ist. lt. brevet. Feb. 5, 1815.
Lawrence Talliaferro, June 30, 1814.		R. M. Sands, July 9,	Quartermaster.
Yurley F. Thomas, do.		<b>SURGEON.</b>	
Collin M'Claud, Aug. 4.		M. C. Buck, July 2, 1813.	
<b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b>		<b>SURGEON'S MATES.</b>	
Ash. Philips, May 20, 1813.		J. B. Hill, July 6, 1812.	
Jon. B. Clarke, Apr. 9, 1814.		R. C. Lane, March 11, 1814.	
Ed. E. Brooks, May 1.		<i>Fifth Regiment of Infantry.</i>	
Sma. Keeler, Jr. June 7.		<b>COLONEL.</b>	
Jas. Dean, June 28.		Jas. Miller, March 9, 1814,	Brig. Gen. brevet July 25, 1814.
Raimey G. Saunders, July 14, 1814.		<b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b>	
Cy. Saunders, July 14.		Jos. L. Smith, Mar. 12, 1813.	
Hillary Brunot, July 22.		<b>MAJOR.</b>	
Gab. J. Floyd, Oct. 1.		J. M'Neal, Jr. Aug. 15, 1813,	Col. brevet, July 25, 1814.
J. Beckwith, Dec. 1.		<b>CAPTAINS.</b>	
<b>SURGEON.</b>		J. H. Vose, July 6, 1812,	Maj. brvt. Aug. 4, 1814.
A. G. Goodlet, Feb. 10, 1812.		S. Burbank, Mar. 13, 1813.	Maj. brevet. July 25, 1814.
<b>SURGEON'S MATES.</b>		Geo. Bender, May 13,	Maj. brevet. Aug. 15, 1814.
John Gale, July 9, 1812.		M. Marston, June 26.	
Alf. Foster, April 15, 1814.		W. L. Foster, Oct. 15.	
<i>Fourth Regiment of Infantry.</i>			
<b>COLONEL.</b>		P. Pelham, Feb. 28, 1814.	
Wm. King, Feb. 21, 1814,	Col. staff, July 18, 1813.	J. Fowle, jun. June 10.	
<b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL.</b>		E. Childs, July 20.	
Duncan L. Clinch, Aug. 4, 1813.		David Perry, Sept. 1.	
<b>MAJOR.</b>		James Pratt, " 30.	
G. M. Brooks, May 1, 1814,	Col. brevet, Sept. 17, 1814.	<b>FIRST LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
<b>CAPTAINS.</b>		H. Whiting, Aug. 20, 1811,	Capt. brevet. Mar. 17, 1814.
Enoch Cutler, Sept. 3, 1810,	Major staff, Mar. 18, 1813.	G. Gooding, Feb. 15, 1812,	Capt. brevet. June 15, 1814.
	brevet, May 1, 1814.	I. Plymton, July 31, 1813.	
P. Muhlenburg, Oct. 1,	Major brevet May 1, do.	G. W. Hovey, Aug. 15.	
Jas. Dinkins, Feb. 6, 1811,	Major brvt. May 15, do.	J. Cilley, March 7, 1814,	Capt. brevet. July 25, 1814.
A. Cummings, Nov. 1.		Otis Fisher, July 20,	
J. D. Barnard, July 6, 1812,	Major brvt. June 26, 1813.	Jos. Gleason, " 25,	Capt. brevet. Aug. 15, 1814.
John A. Burd, do.	Major brvt. Oct. 31, 1814.	J. W. Holding, 31,	Capt. brevet. July 25, 1814.
Th. Sangster, do.		B. F. Larned, Aug. 4,	Capt. brevet. Aug. 15, 1814.
Wm. Taylor, do.		I. Clark, Jr. Sept. 1.	
A. L. Madison, do.		<b>SECOND LIEUTENANTS.</b>	
Jas. H. Hook, July 13.		S. Butterfield, Jan. 3, 1812,	Ist lt. brevet. Feb. 21, 1814.
		N. Clark, May 19, 1813.	
		Edm. Kirby, July 31, 1813,	Adjutant.
		Sam. Keeler, Jan. 31, 1814.	
		T. Hunt, March 19.	

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.	Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
J. Craig, June 23, 1814.			
G. H. Belding, July 25, "			
A. B. Dake, Sept. 13, "			
P. R. Green, Oct. 1, "			
C. Blake, " 31, "	Quartermaster.		
SURGEON.		MAJOR.	
S. Day, March 13, 1813.		D. Appling, April 15, 1814.	Col. brev. Sept. 11, 1814.
SURGEON'S MATES.		CAPTAINS.	
E. L. Allen, July 21, 1813.		J. Machesney, June 10, 1809,	Maj. brev. Mar. 21, 1814.
J. P. Russell, May 25, 1814.		R. Whartenby, May 3, 1810,	Maj. brev. May 1, 1814.
<i>Sixth Regiment of Infantry.</i>		F. W. Armstrong, July 6,	
COLONEL.		1812,	Maj. brev. June 26, 1813.
H. Atkinson, April 15, 1814,	Col. staff, April 25, 1813.	A. L. Langham, July 6, 1812,	Maj. brev. Aug. 15, 1813.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.		D. E. Twiggs,	Maj. brev. Sept. 21, 1814.
J. Snelling, Feb. 21, 1814,	Col. staff, April 12, 1814.	R. H. Bell, Aug. 15, 1813.	
MAJOR.		G. Vashon, Nov. 29,	
J. E. Wool, April 13, 1813,	Lt. col. brev. Sep. 11, 1814.	J. Robertson, Feb. 21, 1814.	
CAPTAINS.		E. Montgomery, May 1.	
G. Humphreys, Dec. 31,		J. S. Allison, June 25.	
1809,		FIRST LIEUTENANTS.	
T. Crooker, July 6, 1812.	Maj. brev. Apr. 18, 1814.	G. Birch, Nov. 1, 1811.	
T. Stockton, Sept. 10,	Maj. brev. July 4, 1814.	J. R. Corbaly, July 6, 1812.	Capt. brev. June 28, 1814.
W. S. Foster, Mar. 13, 1813,	Maj. brev. Apr. 15, 1814.	W. Bailey, "	Capt. brev. July 19, 1814.
T. M. Read, Apr. 16,	Maj. brev. Aug. 15, 1814.	J. H. Mallory, May 5, 1813.	
John Bliss, May 13,		W. Bee, Jun. Aug. 14.	
B. Watson, Aug. 15,	Maj. brev. July 25, 1814.	J. J. Clinch, " 15.	
G. M'Glassin, "		J. Gassaway, " 18.	
D. Ketchum, Sept. 30,	Maj. brev. July 25, 1814.	John Hays, April 9, 1814.	
N. S. Clarke, Oct. 1, 1814.	Capt. brev. July 25, 1814.	T. Blackstone, May 15, 1814.	
FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		A. Ross, June 9.	
E. Boardman, May 3, 1810,	Capt. brev. Aug. 1, 1813.	SECOND LIEUTENANTS.	
W. Hale, Aug. 15, 1813.		G. R. Bridges, Mar. 24, 1814.	
E. Shaylor, Aug. 15,		E. Hall, April 19.	
G. M'Chain, Sept. 30,		F. S. Gray, May 2.	
F. A. Sawyer, Dec. 12,		M. Crupper, June 24.	
J. P. Livingston " 19,	Capt. brev. July 25, 1814.	J. W. Alston, " 30.	
S. Tappan, June 14, 1814.		H. L. Oneale, July 11.	
A. Wetmore, July 9.		R. H. Goodwyn, 24.	
T. Staniford, Sept. 1.		J. Leftwich, Aug. 13.	
De La Fayette Wilcox,		W. R. Scott, Oct. 1.	
Oct. 2, 1814.		Lewis Lawshe, "	
SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		SURGEON.	
Jon. Ellison, Mar. 17, 1814.		T. Lawson, May 21, 1813.	
J. A. Harding, Apr. 28.		SURGEON'S MATES.	
T. Tupper, May 2.		R. C. Walmsey, July 1, 1813.	
Caleb B. Campbell.		S. M. Ingersoll, Sep. 16.	
Hazen Bedell, June 15.		<i>Eighth Regiment of Infantry.</i>	
Jas. M'Ilvain, July 19.		COLONEL.	
Ben. Fitch, " 25.		R. C. Nicholas, Sep. 4, 1814.	
J. Brown, Sept. 1.		LIEUTENANT COLONEL.	
J. Mansfield, Sept. 30.		W. A. Trimble, Nov. 30,	Lt. col. brev. Sep. 17, 1814.
SURGEON.		1814,	
T. G. Mower, June 30, 1814.		MAJOR.	
SURGEON'S MATES.		W. Lawrence, April 19,	Lt. col. brev. Sep. 15, 1814.
C. Loring, May 20, 1813.		1814,	
W. Sterne, Mar. 11, 1814.		CAPTAINS.	
<i>Seventh Regiment of Infantry.</i>		John Nicks, July 1, 1808,	Maj. brev. Oct. 9, 1813.
COLONEL.		Uriah Blue, May 9, 1809,	Maj. brev. Mar. 13, 1814.
J. M'Donald, Sep. 17, 1814,		J. Dorman, Nov. 2, 1811,	Maj. brev. June 28, 1814.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.		White Youngs, July 6, 1812,	Maj. brev. Sept. 11, 1814.
D. Brearley, July 6, 1812,	Col. brevet Mar. 12, 1813.	W. Davenport, Sep. 28,	
FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		W. Foulk, June 20, 1813.	
L. B. Willis, July 6, 1812,		A. Browlow, Sept. 7.	
CAPTAINS.		Mangle M. Quackenbos,	
		Jan. 7, 1814.	
		L. Austin, April 21, 1814,	Maj. brev. July 5, 1814.
		Lewis Bissel, June 30.	
		FIRST LIEUTENANTS.	
		L. B. Willis, July 6, 1812,	Capt. brev. Jan. 31, 1814.

## ARMY REGISTER—Continued.

Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.	Names and rank.	Brevets and former commissions.
D. Riddle, Mar. 13, 1813. J. Culberton, Oct. 1. C. B. Hopkins, " 5. D. Frazier, Dec. 31. T. Wright, Mar. 17, 1814. W. Ligon, " 30. John R. Guy, May 3. W. Arnold, " 11. Sam. Brady, Oct. 1.	Maj. brevt. Sept. 17, 1814.  Maj. brevt. July 25, 1814.	CAPTAINS.	
		Wm. Morgan, July 6, 1812, Joseph Selden, do. Wm. Bradford, do. Thos. Ramsey, Nov. 30. Jos. Kean, Mar. 17, 1814. Wm. Martin, do. Benj. Birdsall, do. John O'Fallan, do. Edm. Shipp, March 26. W. L. Dufphey, Aug. 12.	Major brev. June 26, 1813. Lieu. Col. br. May 1, 1815. Major brev. Aug. 20, 1814.  Major brev. Aug. 15, 1814.
SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		FIRST LIEUTENANTS.	
L. Hand, Sept. 30, 1813. C. Stephens, April 15, 1814. Thos. Rogers, " W. Bryan, " 25. W. V. Cobbs, May 1. R. Humphreys, " 19. N. Young, June 2. G. R. Horter, " 15. S. Riddle, Sept. 21 John Brady, " 25.	1st Lt. brevt. July 20, 1814.       1st Lt. brevt. Feb. 5, 1815.	Louis Leval, July 28, 1813. J. S. M'Intosh, Dec. 31. J. Calhoun, jr. Jan. 24, 1814. J. H. Ballard, March 17. Lewellen Hickman, do. Stoughton Gantt, do. J. M'Gunnegle, April 28. Sam. V. Hamilton, Sept. 17. A. Fine, do. J. Hedderson, Sept. 30.	
SURGEON.		SECOND LIEUTENANTS.	
P. Woodbury, Mar. 30, 1814.		W. Armstrong, Jan. 24, 1814. W. J. Gordon, March 17. Thos. Griffith, do. A. Harrison, do. J. Hollingsworth, Mar. 26. Bennet Riley, April 15. W. Markle, jr. April 19. James S. Gray, May 11. T. F. Smith, do. T. F. Hunt, June 29.	
SURGEON'S MATES.		SURGEON.	
C. Reily, March 22, 1813. S. C. Muir, April 7.		W. Thomas, Feb. 18, 1814.	
<i>Rifle regiment.</i>		SURGEON'S MATES.	
COLONEL.		S. P. Hugo, Mar. 12, 1812. W. H. Henning, April 20, 1814.	
Th. A. Smith, July 6, 1812,	Bri. Gen. br. Jan. 24, 1814.		
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			
W. S. Hamilton, February 21, 1814.			
MAJOR.			
T. Chambers, Feb. 21, 1814,	Lieu. Col. br. Sep. 17, 1814.		

## GENERAL ORDERS.

The preceding register contains the corrections of the army list since its reduction, on the 17th of May, 1815. Selections will be made from the disbanded officers, who served in the late war, to fill vacancies, until the 17th of May, 1816; after which, promotions will be regularly made throughout the army.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. PARKER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
January 1, 1816.

*Divisions and Departments of the army.*

The northern division comprises five military departments, to wit:

- No. 1. New York, (above the Highlands,) and Vermont.
- No. 2. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
- No. 3. New York, (below the Highlands,) and that part of New Jersey which furnishes the first division of militia.
- No. 4. Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and that part of New Jersey which furnishes the second division of militia.
- No. 5. Ohio, and the Territories of Michigan and Indiana.

The southern division comprises four military departments, to wit:

- No. 6. Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia.
- No. 7. South Carolina and Georgia.
- No. 8. Louisiana, and the Mississippi Territory.
- No. 9. Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Territories of Missouri and Illinois.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 146.

[1st SESSION.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 6, 1816.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 27, 1815.

SIR:

In replying to your letter of the 21st instant, inquiring into the expediency of providing by law for the staff appointments which have been provisionally retained, and for such others as the interest of the service may require, it is presumed that the intention of the committee over whose deliberations you preside is to give to the military peace establishment that organization which is necessary to secure to it all the efficiency which can be expected from its numerical force. The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which has furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, has incontestably established not only the expediency, but the necessity of giving to the military establishment, in time of peace, the organization which it must have to render it efficient in a state of war. It is believed also to be demonstrable, that a complete organization of the staff will contribute as much to the economy of the establishment as to its efficiency.

The stationary staff of a military establishment should be substantially the same in peace as in war, without reference to the number or distribution of the troops of which it is composed. It is, therefore, respectfully proposed that this branch of the general staff be organized in the manner following, viz:

One adjutant and inspector general, at Washington.  
 One quartermaster general, at Washington.  
 One paymaster general, do.  
 One commissary general, at Philadelphia.  
 One apothecary general, do.

The organization of the division of staff should be regulated by the number of independent corps into which the military force is distributed. By general order of the 17th May last, the United States were divided into military divisions, commanded by generals, independent of each other, within their respective divisions. As nothing has occurred, since this distribution of the military force has been made, to change the opinion which was then entertained of its expediency, it is proposed to organize the division staff so that each division shall comprehend

One adjutant general, and two assistant adjutant generals;  
 One inspector general, and two assistant inspector generals;  
 One quartermaster general, and two deputy quartermasters general, with regimental quartermasters, as at present authorized;  
 Three judge advocates;  
 Two chaplains;  
 One deputy commissary general, and two assistant commissaries of issues; four hospital surgeons, and eight hospital surgeons' mates; and as many posts' surgeons, with the pay and emoluments of hospital surgeons' mates, as the distribution of the forces into garrisons and posts may require, not exceeding twelve;  
 Four assistant apothecaries;  
 Two assistant deputy paymasters, with regimental paymasters, as now established.

It is not deemed necessary to change the organization of the corps of artillery, the corps of engineers, or the ordnance department, unless the committee should be disposed to increase the corps of engineers. Considering the qualifications of the officers of that corps, and the great utility which may be derived from transferring them into the line of the army, when a sudden augmentation of the military establishment should become necessary at the approach of war, some increase of that scientific corps is respectfully submitted.

The act fixing the military peace establishment has produced some inequalities in the pay and emoluments of the officers, which, owing to the particular circumstances under which that act was passed, it is probable were neither foreseen nor intended. One case of this nature is, the allowance of forage to a major general of twenty dollars a month, whilst the adjutant general is allowed thirty. The allowance of a clerk to one of the major generals, and not to the other, must have proceeded from the same cause. The fact of these inequalities are mentioned here with a view to attract the attention of the committee to the pay and emoluments of the officers of the army generally.

Should any explanations growing out of this communication be required, it will afford me great pleasure to give them, in writing or verbally, to the committee, whenever it shall suit their convenience.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your very humble servant,

WM. H. CRAWFORD.

HON. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, *Chairman of the Military Committee,*  
*House of Representatives of the United States.*

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 147.

[1st SESSION.

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, MARCH 11, 1816.

MARCH 9, 1816.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

I lay before Congress a statement of the militia of the United States, according to the latest returns received by the Department of War.

JAMES MADISON.



Statement of the Militia of the United States, taken from the latest returns of States and Territories, received at the War Department.

18

STATES AND TERRITORIES.

	GENERAL AND REGIMENTAL STAFF.																INFANTRY.								
	Date of return.	Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Aids-de-camp.	Brigade Inspectors.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum and Fife Majors.	Chaplains.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants and Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and file.	
New Hampshire,	1813	3	6	1	1	6	6	6	37	37	.	37	34	37	35	71	.	37	74	297	586	1,107	716	18,690	
Massachusetts,	1815	13	28	.	.	40	26	26	144	144	.	93	92	99	81	170	92	96	193	894	1,849	3,590	2,411	52,474	
Vermont,	1809	4	10	.	.	8	4	.	34	34	.	33	32	29	29	57	.	33	64	285	572	1,063	739	15,543	
Rhode Island,	1814	1	4	1	1	6	4	4	14	14	12	12	10	14	12	21	.	14	28	96	194	616	187	6,645	
Connecticut,	1815	4	8	1	1	.	.	.	40	37	35	42	33	42	39	71	39	40	75	358	689	1,437	912	14,377	
New York,	1814	11	47	1	1	47	42	40	174	171	161	158	122	172	.	298	67	152	290	1,201	2,367	4,928	3,085	72,497	
New Jersey,	1815	4	13	1	1	13	13	10	48	41	86	38	44	39	.	52	.	41	85	395	762	1,426	460	29,244	
Pennsylvania,	1812	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	*94,723
Delaware,	1813	1	3	1	1	5	2	.	9	8	8	9	8	6	.	20	.	10	19	75	148	288	76	6,465	
Maryland,	1811	3	12	1	1	6	12	.	42	33	.	40	33	7	.	.	.	40	82	47	571	1,633	448	28,123	
Virginia,	1815	4	18	.	.	18	.	3	110	113	27	108	114	84	63	114	.	110	202	1,009	2,150	.	.	.	.
North Carolina,	1815	6	16	.	1	20	.	.	64	39	38	31	13	27	12	60	.	.	124	599	1,178	2,104	1,029	36,043	
South Carolina,	1815	5	10	1	1	16	.	6	39	38	32	19	10	8	1	.	.	30	70	389	743	1,426	329	24,055	
Georgia,	1815	5	11	1	1	21	.	11	42	42	39	42	40	37	33	.	.	38	72	382	639	1,164	28	23,264	
Kentucky,	1815	9	21	.	1	17	.	13	81	79	82	67	43	72	7	109	.	82	160	608	1,162	2,458	572	41,732	
Tennessee,	1812	2	8	.	1	.	6	.	40	1	.	3	1	.	3	28	.	44	86	446	763	915	495	25,910	
Ohio,	1815	4	19	5	.	23	22	19	63	60	63	60	41	52	48	100	19	58	124	565	1,133	2,053	739	37,373	
Louisiana,	1815	2	5	1	1	13	5	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
District of Columbia,	1812	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	1	1	1	1	.	.	.	.	2	5	23	29	16	10	2,088	
Mississippi Territory,	1812	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	10	7	7	7	2	9	.	.	.	12	16	69	139	292	40	4,372	
Indiana Territory,	1814	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	8	7	5	4	3	6	4	6	.	7	18	87	179	325	70	4,281	
Illinois Territory. No return.																									
Missouri Territory,	1814	.	1	.	1	2	.	.	3	2	3	2	.	.	.	6	.	5	11	45	90	135	.	.	2,506
Michigan Territory. No return.																									

\* Including officers.

STATEMENT—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	ARTILLERY.							DRAGOONS.							RIFLEMEN.					Total of Non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, and Rank and File.	Aggregate.				
	Date of return.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants & Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Lieutenant Colonels Commandant.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.			Sergeants.	Musicians.	Rank and File.	
New Hampshire, . . . . .	1813	-	-	28	56	110	56	735	-	-	33	65	31	123	65	1,776	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,521	24,902
Massachusetts, . . . . .	1815	5	27	65	142	281	166	2,905	4	27	66	142	72	278	91	2,349	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64,895	69,175
Vermont, . . . . .	1809	-	-	10	28	35	27	303	-	-	28	56	27	105	31	1,035	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,996	20,259
Rhode Island, . . . . .	1814	1	1	1	1	12	5	100	-	-	3	6	3	16	3	193	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,824	8,255
Connecticut, . . . . .	1815	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16,878	18,309
New York, . . . . .	1814	4	12	82	156	367	203	3,794	9	21	78	157	75	326	98	3,612	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	89,380	95,026
New Jersey, . . . . .	1815	1	2	21	40	63	31	738	5	10	41	78	36	123	35	1,636	25	61	-	78	35	1,041	35,051	36,966	
Pennsylvania, . . . . .	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	*246	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1,759	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	99,414	-
Delaware, . . . . .	1813	-	-	2	4	7	4	81	-	-	4	8	4	12	3	116	1	1	1	4	2	32	7,116	7,448	
Maryland, . . . . .	1811	-	-	12	29	36	6	403	-	1	32	62	32	106	18	1,135	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31,708	32,189
Virginia, . . . . .	1815	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79,769	83,847
North Carolina, . . . . .	1815	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	19	42	77	36	122	31	1,475	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40,903	43,217
South Carolina, . . . . .	1815	2	2	23	49	81	30	1,057	5	14	47	89	44	170	20	2,297	20	19	19	75	18	893	30,460	32,202	
Georgia, . . . . .	1815	-	-	4	7	6	6	162	4	7	23	34	12	55	22	1,112	3	3	2	9	3	94	25,995	27,480	
Kentucky, . . . . .	1815	-	-	2	4	5	-	102	-	-	7	13	6	30	3	445	28	28	27	110	23	1,511	47,179	49,719	
Tennessee, . . . . .	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	13	13	12	33	9	357	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,950	29,193
Ohio, . . . . .	1815	-	-	4	7	16	2	176	-	-	21	42	23	84	23	1,138	39	41	34	139	44	2,356	44,143	46,852	
Louisiana, . . . . .	1815	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,741	8,768
District of Columbia, . . . . .	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	3	-	-	62	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,176	2,252
Mississippi Territory, . . . . .	1812	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	12	6	-	23	21	240	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,997	5,291
Indiana Territory, . . . . .	1814	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,692	5,010
Illinois Territory, No return.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missouri Territory, . . . . .	1814	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,647	2,812
Michigan Territory, No return.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
																								615,021	748,566

[\* Including officers.]

REMARKS.

Rhode Island returns 1 deputy quartermaster general, 1 colonel, not included in the above. Connecticut returns 1 captain general, 1 lieutenant general, 1 commissary general, 1 paymaster general, not included in the above. New Jersey returns 1 commander-in-chief, 2 deputy quartermasters general, 4 deputy adjutants general, not included in the above.—The return does not distinguish the different arms, and the whole force is therefore put down to the infantry. Virginia returns 2 division quartermasters, 4 division inspectors, 21 brigade majors, not included above.—The several arms are not distinguished in the return. North Carolina returns 59 colonels, 9 cadets, not included in the

above. South Carolina returns 1 commander-in-chief, 1 commissary general of purchases, 1 commissary general of issues, 1 paymaster general, 1 surgeon general, 1 physician general, 1 apothecary general, 1 wagonmaster general, 1 foragemaster general, 10 brigade majors. Georgia returns 1 paymaster general, 5 division quartermasters, 10 brigade majors, not included above. Kentucky returns 6 division inspectors, 21 brigade majors, 6 division quartermasters. Missouri returns 1 inspector general, 1 division quartermaster, 1 judge advocate, not included above.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, March 1, 1816.

D. PARKER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 148.

[1st SESSION.

## MILITIA CLAIMS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 12, 1816.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *March 7, 1816.*

SIR:

In obedience to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 21st ult. I have the honor to transmit the enclosed documents.

In addition to the sum advanced to the State of Virginia by the paymaster general, the sum of four hundred thousand dollars have been paid to that State, for expenses incurred by the employment of the militia in its defence. The claims of that State have been admitted on the ground that the Governor of Virginia was invested with discretionary power, by the War Department, to call forth the militia in such numbers as the emergency should require, and that the force actually employed was, at that time, not believed by the Secretary of War to be excessive. It is now believed that the number of militia kept in service, when compared with that called into the field by the President for the defence of Baltimore, against the same hostile force, which could be brought to act against the capital of Virginia from various points, was not beyond what the emergency required. The force here referred to, and the expense intended to be sanctioned, are those which the letter of the commissioners, and the statement of the Adjutant General of that State, herewith enclosed, exhibit. The claims of North Carolina and Rhode Island have been sanctioned, because they are founded upon expenses actually incurred upon militia called out under the authority of the United States, or had received the sanction of that authority after they were called into service. The claims exhibited by Delaware and New Hampshire have been suspended until evidence shall be produced to show that the emergency was such as to require the service without waiting the intervention of the Executive authority of the Union.

The State of New York has exhibited claims for arms and ammunition furnished the militia, or captured by the enemy in our military depots; and also for additional pay allowed their militia when in the public service. The claims of Virginia embrace items of the former, and that of New Hampshire of the latter character. No decision has been made upon these claims; but it is believed that the powers of the Department do not extend to their liquidation and admission, without further legal provision for that purpose.

It is believed that no other State has presented any specific claim for money expended upon militia service during the war; but it is proper to state, that in the correspondence between the Governor of Massachusetts and the Secretary of War, it was distinctly declared, that reimbursement would not be made of any expenses incurred upon militia called into service by State authority, with the declared intention of excluding the authority of the United States over such militia force.

Time and reflection, so far from having changed the opinion then formed, have tended only to strengthen and confirm it. The several States have a right, in time of war, to raise and maintain regular troops: more strongly have they the right to employ their militia in military operations, where it can be done without infringing the rights of the national Executive over the same force. But it never can be admitted, that expenses incurred by raising and supporting regular troops can be a charge against the nation; and it is equally clear, that expenses incurred upon militia service, under State authority, with the declared intention of directing and controlling that force to the exclusion of the national authority, can form no such charge. No claims of this nature will be recognised by the Executive branch of the Government, unless provision shall be made by law for that purpose.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient, and very humble servant,

WM. H. CRAWFORD.

Hon. HENRY CLAY, *Speaker of the House of Representatives, U. S.*DEPARTMENT OF WAR, ACCOUNTANT'S OFFICE, *February 29, 1816.*

SIR:

I have the honor to state in relation to the resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives directing the Secretary of War to lay before the House,

1st. A statement of the expenses incurred for the services of the militia called forth by authority of the United States during the late war.

2nd. Statement of the accounts which have been exhibited, and claims which have been made, by the respective States for services rendered by the militia of said States, when called forth with or without such authority, together with the sums which have been paid, and the accounts and claims which have been allowed therefor, and in case the claims of any State or States have been rejected or allowed, to state the grounds of such rejection or allowance, designating for what services, and to what States respectively such sums have been paid, or accounts allowed, and designating also such items of claims as have been rejected in the cases where the calls were made by authority of the United States, and the grounds of such rejection.

That, in regard to the first clause of the resolution, the accounts of expenditures during the war have not been kept in a manner to designate, what amount has been expended for militia, distinct from the regular army. According to the directions contained in the act of the 3d March, 1809, "further to amend the several acts for the establishment and regulation of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments," accounts of expenditures are kept, under each specific appropriation, and there having been no distinct appropriation made for militia, after the year 1812, the whole expenses of the military establishment, including militia, having been included in the same appropriation, the expenditures have been made, and the accounts kept correspondently with the appropriations.

As it regards the other sections of the resolutions, I have to state that claims have been exhibited to this office by the States of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, Delaware, and New Hampshire.

The amount claimed by the State of Virginia	is	\$1,029,319 95
Pennsylvania	is	268,556 82
North Carolina	is	56,513 29½
Delaware	is	30,619 79
New Hampshire	is	64,552 20

These claims have not yet been acted upon definitively in this office, that part which relates to services referring itself in the first instance to the paymaster of the army, whose duty it is to discharge all claims in relation to the pay of the militia, and thereafter report them to this office, which has not yet taken place. What portion of these claims have been sanctioned by proper authority can only be ascertained on settlement.

It is not recollected that any claims of the respective States have been presented at this office, which have been rejected or allowed, and consequently no information can be furnished by me, in relation to that part of the resolution.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

TOBIAS LEAR.

The Hon. W. H. CRAWFORD.

ARMY PAY OFFICE, WASHINGTON CITY, *February 27, 1816.*

The Paymaster of the Army, to whom has been referred the resolution passed in the House of Representatives on the 21st ultimo, has the honor to report:

That sufficient data to enable him to ascertain, with a due degree of precision, the amount of "expenses incurred for the services of the militia called forth, by authority of the United States, during the late war," are not within his reach.

That from the immethodical manner in which the services have, on some occasions, been performed, many claims doubtless exist that have not yet made their appearance in a specific form; some detachments have been called into service and discharged therefrom without ever having been mustered, whilst the muster-rolls of others are so very imperfect as to render it utterly impossible to act on them and make payments.

That many claims are paid, the accounts of which have, in company with those of the regular army, been rendered to this office, and are in a due course of examination and final settlement; but, from their great magnitude, and from the laborious task this office necessarily has to perform, more time and more labor will be required to get through with the whole.

That many claims, to a vast amount, are now in actual train of adjustment and payment, throughout the whole country, from appropriations made during the present session of Congress.

That the manner in which the appropriations have, for a few years past, been made by Congress, did not require a separate and distinct account of expenditures upon militia to be kept from those of the regular army; and indeed, if it had been required, the nature of the service, particularly during a state of war, would have rendered it extremely difficult, if not totally impracticable.

It is to be understood that the foregoing statement relates to such services of militia only, as have been performed in virtue of orders issued by the Executive of the United States, or being performed without those orders, have been recognised by that authority, and payment sanctioned accordingly.

That so far as relates to expenditures by States themselves upon their own militia, independent of the sanction or authority of the General Government, the paymaster of the army is in possession of no official information. It is true, however, that two claims *partly* of this character have, not long since, been presented here, and advances, by special direction of the honorable the Secretary of War, have been made by me upon them: one to the State of Virginia, of two hundred thousand dollars, and another to the State of Rhode Island, of not quite twenty-two thousand dollars; but these services were, as I understood, recognised by the United States, so that they partook but in part of the nature of those alluded to, namely, that they have been paid from the funds of those States, respectively, which, when the services were thus recognised, the United States were bound to re-imburse.

Respectfully,

ROBERT BRENT, *Paymaster.*

The Hon. WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD, *Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, D. C. *January 14, 1815.*

SIR:

This note has been delayed by the expectation of some explanatory documents from Richmond. We have now the honor of submitting to you the grounds on which we expect the President's sanction to the calls of militia which were made by the Governor of Virginia for the defence of Richmond in August and September, 1814; being the only calls, as we understand, of the propriety of which a doubt is entertained, in the Department of War.

It is to be remembered that Richmond is assailable by the channels both of York and James rivers, within eight and forty hours after the enemy's squadron shall have entered our Capes. Arnold, during the revolutionary war, had that city in flames, within twenty-four hours after the first notice of his approach. Hence the utter impracticability of announcing the approach to the President, and receiving his instructions in time to call forth the militia to an effectual defence. The enemy could have entered Richmond before an express could return from Washington. Hence it is obvious, that against a maritime enemy, like Great Britain, a place so situated is defensible in only one or two modes, either by keeping a standing force before it, equal to any force which the enemy could lead to the assault, or by vesting the Executive of the State with the discretionary power of calling forth the militia in such numbers as to meet the particular emergency, whatsoever it might be. The latter course was adopted by the President of the United States in relation to Richmond. We do not say that any instruction to this effect was given to the Governor of Virginia previously to the calls in the month of August; but the letters of the Secretary of War to the Governor of Virginia immediately thereafter, and indeed almost contemporaneously, do, in the most explicit manner, ratify that course of action; and a subsequent ratification, we understand, is equal to a prior command. Thus in the Secretary's letter of the 31st of August, (herewith, numbered 1,) written after the destruction of Washington, he announces the descent of the enemy's barges down the Patuxent, and the reason given for the communication is, because *it might have a bearing on the Governor's arrangements for the defence of his section of the country*; but what those arrangements were to be, instead of being defined, is left exclusively to the discretion of the Governor. The same gentleman, in his letter of the next day, (September 1, No. 2.) apprizes the Governor that Richmond *was known to be one of the enemy's objects*, and closes his letter with these emphatic words: "Be on your guard, *prepared at every point, and in all circumstances, to repel the invaders.*" In what light is it possible to construe these words, but as a clear and explicit recognition of the principle that the General Government placed the defence of the State of Virginia and its metropolis at the discretion of its Governor? The letter, of which we have just quoted an extract, was followed by the President's proclamation of the 3d of September, calling, in terms which no American bosom could resist, upon all officers, civil and military, and upon the nation, to rise to arms, and exterminate the ferocious and sanguinary invaders.

The effect of such a proclamation on such a State as Virginia will be easily conceived by you, sir, when you come to re-peruse the terms of the proclamation and bear in mind the character of the State, which you so well know. The shock was electric and universal. The commonwealth rose *en masse*. Her mountains, fields, and forests poured forth their armed multitudes, who rushed from all directions to surround and cover their metropolis from British outrage and pollution, and chastise the insolence which had just triumphed over Washington. It was, no doubt, the presence of this numerous concourse at Richmond, or upon their march to it from the country, which has produced the impression that the Governor had made an indiscreet use of the power of defence with which he was intrusted. But this is not the fact. The concourse of which we have spoken forms no part of the charge which we now have against the United States. They were not kept in arms. Their services were not accepted. It was, indeed, with infinite difficulty, and infinite address on the part of the Governor, and with the most painful reluctance, and even tears of regret on theirs, that the generous impulse which had brought them together could be so far repressed as that they could be prevailed upon to return to their homes, and trust the defence and honor of the State to the troops which the Governor had already embodied. But they did return; the sense of duty and order, which forms a no less honorable part of their character than their ardor of patriotism, prevailing over every consideration of personal feeling.

The next direction which the Governor received from the Department of War, was the Secretary's letter, herewith, (No. 3,) of the 6th of September, announcing that the enemy had received a reinforcement at the mouth of Patuxent, that the united squadrons were descending the bay, that Richmond was one of their objects, and repeating again, the solemn injunction, *be prepared to meet the enemy*. Thus, in every instance, the Governor of Virginia is thrown by the General Government upon his own energies and own judgment, without any notification of the enemy's strength, or the quantum of resistance which it would be expedient for him to call into the field.

To meet the advance guard, as it may be called, of the same enemy, the President of the United States, acting with the advice of his council, had made a call in the month of June or July, unless we are misinformed, of fifteen thousand men. To meet the united squadrons at Baltimore, we are advised that from eighteen to twenty thousand

men were called to the defence of that place. To meet the same enemy, at the same crisis, the Governor of Virginia had never in the field more than between eleven and twelve thousand men.

We hand you, herewith, the several general orders calling out troops on the occasion of the first approach of the enemy within our Capes, as, also, after the fall of Washington, numbered 4, 5, and 6, and submit it with confidence to your judgment, whether these calls can be considered as indiscreet. Whether you take the standard of the call for Washington, or that for Baltimore; or consider the accessibility of Richmond, by the channels either of York or James rivers, and the consequent necessity of guarding, with equal strength, both those avenues of approach; of guarding them, too, with raw militia against veteran and highly disciplined troops, inured to victory; it seems very clear that those calls, if censurable at all, are rather censurable for their moderation than their excess.

To these documents, we will add only a letter from the Secretary of War, of the 21st September, written with a full knowledge of all our preparations, and when they were at the highest; in which letter, so far as he from censuring the magnitude of those preparations, that he is considered thereby as having approved and sanctioned them. If this construction be right, there will be no occasion, we trust, of giving you any further trouble on this branch of the claims of Virginia for re-imburement.

We are, sir, very respectfully, &c. &c.

WILLIAM WIRT,  
JOHN CHEW.

Hon. WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD, *Secretary of War.*

*Statement of the number and positions of the troops embodied by the Executive of Virginia, and actually in the field about the middle of September, 1814.*

Names of commanding officers.	Aggregate of cavalry.	Aggregate of artillery.	Aggregate of riflemen and infantry.	Total number.	Station.
Mag. Gen. John Pegram, -	-	76	1,254	1,330	The vicinity of Petersburg.
Same, -	-	-	365	365	Fort Powhatan.
Col. Thomas M. Randolph, -	-	160	413	573	Worronigh church.
Col. Moses Green, -	-	118	242	360	Charles city court-house.
Brig. Gen. John H. Cocke, -	-	177	2,237	2,414	Camp Carter.
Brig. Gen. Chamberlayne, -	-	-	919	919	Bottom's Bridge.
Brig. Gen. Breckenridge, -	-	-	1,760	1,760	Camp Mitchell.
Brig. Gen. Leftwick, -	-	103	1,831	1,934	Camp Mims.
Col. Ambler, -	-	-	392	392	City of Richmond.
Major Woodford, -	650	-	-	650	Some of these cavalry were on vidette duty, and the others were distributed among the several corps of the army.
	650	634	9,413	10,697	

It is difficult to ascertain the number of the troops on any given day previous to the 15th September. Many of them were discharged immediately upon their arrival, and before they were organised upon any regular plan, or reports could be received from them. This was particularly the case with the cavalry. Of this species of force it was found, that the Governor's proclamation, and the general orders of the 26th August, had brought into the field a larger proportion than was necessary; consequently, on the 12th of September, seventeen troops were discharged, of which eight were volunteers, and the residue draughts.

Captain Prosser's troop of cavalry was called into service on the 26th of August, and performed vidette duty between Richmond and Washington city until the 10th September, when it was discharged.

Colonel Boykin took the field on the 29th August, with about eight hundred men, and continued in service until the 13th September. He was stationed at Cabin point, on James river.

The foregoing statement and remarks relate to the measures adopted by the Executive of Virginia, for the defence of Richmond, Petersburg, and the shores of York and James river; together with such points of our maritime frontier as could be protected by that force; due regard being had to the safety of the metropolis.

The situation of the other exposed parts of Virginia will be seen by an examination of the letters from the commanding officers in those parts.

G. W. GOOCH,  
*Adjutant General, Virginia.*

No. 1.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 31st, 1814.*

SIR:

We have this moment received information, the correctness of which is not doubted, that the enemy evacuated Nottingham yesterday at 10 o'clock. The barges moved down about 4 o'clock; it is believed that they embarked from Benedict last evening and this morning. I give this notice for your information as early as possible, as it may have a bearing on your arrangements for the defence of your section of the country.

I have the honor to be your excellency's most obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

His Excellency J. BARBOUR, *Governor of Virginia, Richmond.*

No. 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 1, 1814.*

SIR:

The enemy have embarked on board their vessels on the Patuxent, and will, as I presume, in execution of their desolating system, proceed immediately to some other of our principal towns. *Richmond is known to be one on which they have fixed their attention.* Norfolk and Baltimore are others: against which they will move, in the first instance, will probably not be known, until they land their men in a marked direction towards it.

Be on your guard, prepared at every point, and in all circumstances, to repel the invaders.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

*The GOVERNOR of the State of Virginia, Richmond.*

A copy of the original.

G. W. GOOCH, *Adjutant General, Virginia.*

No. 3.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *September 6, 1814.*

SIR:

I am sorry to inform you that the enemy's squadron has passed our battery at the White House on the Potomac river. It was impossible to collect such a number of heavy pieces in the present state of affairs here as to prevent it.

The fleet which had descended the Patuxent, with the troops on board, lately employed against this city, and a reinforcement since received, which had paused at the mouth of that river, on account, as was supposed, of the detention of this squadron, descended the bay yesterday, either for the Potomac or some other object lower down the bay. As it doubtless will immediately know that the squadron has passed our battery, it may proceed to such other object; which must be, I presume, if it has one in the bay, either Norfolk or Richmond.

I hasten to give you this intelligence, that you may be prepared to meet the enemy, should they present themselves at either place.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA.

No. 4.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *September 19, 1814.*

SIR:

The enemy has passed down the bay, out of sight, below Annapolis. It may be presumed that they will attack either Richmond or Norfolk.

The force collected near Richmond is, I trust, fully adequate to its defence.

Norfolk, General Porter writes me, is not so well prepared. Cannot some additional force be thrown in to its aid? I fear the reinforcement from North Carolina will not arrive there in time.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 6, 1814.*

SIR:

For the expenditure attending the militia who have been called into the service of the United States, by this Department, or the commander of the military district No. 5, the United States are regularly chargeable.

For any advances made by the State of Virginia, for the support of such troops, reimbursement is, of course, due.

No call of the militia, except in the modes above stated, is obligatory on the United States. In the case under consideration, it is true, that the call made by the Executive of the State was notified to this Government, with a request that the militia might be taken into the service of the United States. This, however, does not remove the objection to the right in a State, at its discretion, to subject the United States to such expenses.

The President is aware, that the predatory incursions of the enemy, and the menace of a more serious attack on the principal cities along our seaboard, made an extra call of militia, in certain cases, necessary. Whether the troops which were called into service by the Executive of Virginia, for the defence of Richmond, are more than were necessary for the purpose, is a question which could not be immediately decided; it will be attended to as soon as circumstances will admit. In making the decision, regard must be had to just principles, taking into view similar claims of other States.

For the present, I am authorized to state that one hundred thousand dollars will be advanced to the Executive, on account of money paid by it, in support of the troops in the service of the United States, in the first instance; and the balance, on account of the other claims alluded to, which are hereafter to be adjusted.

On the proposition to take the militia, now assembled, for the defence of Richmond, into the service of the United States, I have to state, that it will be acceded to as to four thousand of these troops; provided, the Executive of the State should be of opinion, that they may be, in the present less menacing posture of the enemy, spared from their present service, to be employed between this and Baltimore, in lieu of a like number lately called from the State for that purpose.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JAS. MONROE.

The Hon. CHARLES EVERETT.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 149.

[2d SESSION.]

## RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 13, 1816.\*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 13, 1816.*

SIR:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, dated the 16th of April last, requesting the Secretary of War "to report, at an early day of the next session of Congress, a system for the organization and discipline of the militia, best calculated, in his opinion, to promote the efficiency of that force when called into the public service," I have the honor to submit the enclosed plan.

With sentiments of great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. GRAHAM,

*Acting Secretary of War.*HON. HENRY CLAY, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

*A plan for classing and arming of the militia, and for calling them forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and to repeal the laws heretofore passed for those purposes.*

That the militia of the United States shall be classed by the proper authority of the several States and Territories, in the following manner:

Those between eighteen and twenty-one years of age shall be called the minor class; those between the age of twenty-one and thirty-one years, shall be called the junior class; and those over thirty-one, and under forty-five years of age, shall be called the senior class of militia.

\* See No. 152.

That the militia of the minor class shall be liable to be called into the service of the United States, within the State or Territory to which they belong, for a term not exceeding — months.

The militia of the senior class shall be liable to be called into the service of the United States, within the State or Territory to which they belong, and in the adjoining States and Territories, for a term not exceeding — months.

The militia of the junior class shall be liable to be called into the service of the United States, for the performance of any duty requireable of the militia under the constitution of the United States, for a term not exceeding — months.

That when any portion of the militia of the junior class shall be called into the service of the United States, for a term exceeding — months, they shall, by the United States, be armed, equipped, and clothed, in the same manner as the regular troops.

That the militia of the minor and junior classes of each division shall be annually assembled, at not more than two cantonments within the same, at such time and place, and for such periods, as shall be designated by the proper authority of the several States and Territories; during which time, they shall be trained under the authority of the States, agreeably to the system, discipline, and police, which is or may be adopted for the government of the army. And officers of experience shall be detailed by the Executives of the several States and Territories, who shall, at the times and places appointed, organize the militia so assembled into companies, battalions, regiments, and corps; and command the same accordingly during their encampment: *Provided*, That it shall be the duty of all commissioned officers, under thirty-one years of age, who may not be detailed for command, punctually to attend such encampment of their division, and act in any capacity of staff or non-commissioned officer which shall be assigned them: *Provided, also*, That the militia of the said minor and junior classes, belonging to the cavalry, shall attend, and be organized and instructed as infantry.

That whilst the militia are so assembled, they shall be subsisted and equipped at the expense of the United States, provided they shall be called out and embodied by the several States for a period not less than — weeks.

That the militia shall be organized by the Legislatures of the several States and Territories, into divisions, brigades, regiments, and corps; and that the organization of the regiments of infantry, riflemen, and cavalry, shall be the same as is now prescribed for the organization of the infantry of the United States. A brigade shall be composed of four regiments of infantry, one regiment of riflemen, one battalion of artillery, (to be organized as the corps of artillery of the regular army is now organized,) and of as many troops of cavalry as the Executives of the several States and Territories may authorize, not exceeding —. And the privates of the rifle regiment, and of the light companies of each regiment of infantry, shall be composed of men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-one years. Two brigades shall form a division.

That there shall be erected in each State and Territory, by the United States, one or more arsenal or depôt, for arms, equipments, tents, and equipage, from which supplies shall be furnished, upon requisitions of the Executives of States or Territories, made upon the War Department, from which all orders for the delivery of supplies must be given; and the arms and equipments so delivered shall be charged to the States or Territories, under the provisions of the act of April 23, 1808, for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia: *Provided*, That, in lieu of the appropriation under that act, there shall be applied, annually, under the direction of the President of the United States, the sum of — dollars.

That such tents and camp equipage as may be delivered to the militia shall be received for at the depôts by officers designated for that purpose by the Executives of the several States and Territories, and charged to them: *Provided*, That credit shall be given for all such as may be returned without other damage than the usual injury of service.

That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or, in the opinion of the President, shall be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be his duty to call forth such numbers of the militia as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion.

That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof be obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested by law in the marshals, it shall be the duty of the President to call forth such portion of the militia as may, in his opinion, be necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed.

That whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the President, to call forth the militia for the purposes aforesaid, it shall be his duty forthwith, by proclamation, to command such insurgents to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes, within a time to be limited in the proclamation.

That in case of an insurrection in any State or Territory against the Government thereof, it shall be the duty of the President, on the application of the Legislature of such State or Territory, or of the Executive of such State or Territory when the Legislature thereof cannot conveniently be convened, to call forth such number of the militia of any State or Territory as may, in his opinion, be sufficient to suppress such insurrection.

That whenever, from any of the occurrences herein mentioned, it shall become the duty of the President to call forth the militia, he may require the Governor or Commander-in-chief of the militia in any State or Territory, or such officer of the militia as he may judge expedient, to execute his orders, so far as may be applicable to their respective commands.

That whenever any part of the militia shall be called into the service of the United States, their organization shall be the same as may at the time be provided by law for the organization of the army of the United States, except when called out by companies, corps, regiments, or brigades, when they shall preserve their local organization.

That the militia employed in the service of the United States shall be subject to the rules and articles of war which are or shall be provided for the government of the army of the United States.

That every officer, or non-commissioned officer, who shall fail to obey the orders of the President, or the orders of a superior officer of the militia, which may be issued in virtue of such orders, in any of the cases before recited for calling forth the militia, shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding — months' pay, nor less than — months' pay, which he would be entitled to receive if he were in the actual service of the United States; and shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any commission in the service of the United States for life, or such term of years as shall be determined and adjudged by a court martial.

That every officer, non-commissioned officer, musician, and private of the militia, who shall be detached, as aforesaid, and shall disobey the orders of the President, or of any superior officer, for the purposes of carrying into effect the objects herein contemplated, shall be liable to be tried by a court martial, and receive such punishment as is pointed out by the martial law for similar offences; and, moreover, the non-commissioned officer, musician, and private, detached, as aforesaid, or shall be accepted as substitutes, as hereinafter mentioned, who shall refuse or neglect to march and join his corps, when ordered to do so by his superior officer in the detachment, shall be considered as a deserter from the service of the United States, and shall be dealt with accordingly: *Provided, nevertheless*, That any non-commissioned officer, musician, and private of the militia, who shall be detached for the service of the United States, as aforesaid, shall have a right to furnish an able-bodied man belonging to the militia as a substitute.

That regimental chaplains in the militia, who have been or shall be called into the service of the United States, shall receive the same monthly pay and rations as a captain of infantry, with the addition of forage for one horse; and, whenever called forth into the service of the United States, division quartermasters shall be entitled to the pay, emoluments, and allowance of a deputy quartermaster general; brigade quartermasters to the pay, emoluments, and allowances of an assistant deputy quartermaster general; and regimental quartermasters to the pay and emoluments of a lieutenant of infantry, and sixteen dollars per month in addition thereto, and forage for one horse; division inspectors shall be entitled to the pay, emoluments, and allowances of a lieutenant colonel of infantry; brigade majors to the pay, emoluments, and allowances of a major of infantry, aids-de-camp to major generals to the pay, emoluments, and allowances of a major of cavalry; and aids-de-camp to brigadier generals to the pay, emoluments, and allowances of a captain of cavalry.

That the expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by marching the militia of any State or Territory of the United States to their places of rendezvous, in pursuance of a requisition of the President, or which shall have been, or may be incurred, in cases of calls made by the authority of any State or Territory which shall have been or may be approved by him, shall be adjusted and paid in like manner as the expenses incurred after their arrival at such place of rendezvous, on the requisition of the President: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be considered as authorizing any species of expenditure previous to arriving at the place of rendezvous, which is not provided by existing laws to be paid for after their arrival at such place of rendezvous.

That, in all cases, when a brigade of militia shall be called into the service of the United States, it shall be the duty of the brigade major of such brigade to inspect and muster the same, and sign the muster rolls. If less than a brigade of militia be called into the service of the United States, then it shall be the duty of a brigade major of the division, wherein such militia may rendezvous, to inspect and muster the same, and sign the muster rolls; two musters to be made in the manner aforesaid; one on the assembling, and the other on the discharge of such militia. If it should so happen that there be no brigade major in the brigade, where such militia shall be called out, or in the division where they shall rendezvous, the commanding officer may direct any officer, under the rank of lieutenant colonel, to inspect and muster the militia so called forth.

That no writ, or civil process, issuing from any court of the United States, shall be served upon any militia-man, or levied upon his property, while performing militia duty in the service of the United States; nor shall any judgment be entered in the said courts, in any of the cases aforesaid.

All offences committed by the officers, non-commissioned officers, privates, or musicians of the militia, subsequent to their detachment for the service of the United States, or orders to march for that service agreeably herewith, and before their assembling at the appointed place of rendezvous, shall be tried by courts martial, to be composed of militia officers only, of the State or Territory to which such delinquents shall belong, not in the actual service of the United States. All offences committed by the officers, non-commissioned officers, privates, or musicians of the militia, whilst in the actual service of the United States, shall be tried by courts martial composed by militia officers in the service of the United States: *Provided*, that offences committed whilst in the service of the United States may be tried and punished, although the term of service of the delinquent may have expired, and the court martial, for the trial of such offences, shall be composed of militia officers, without regard to their having been in the service of the United States.

That if any delinquent, directed to be summoned to appear before a court martial, for neglect or refusal to obey the orders of the President, shall be absent when any non-commissioned officer shall call to summon him, a copy of the summons, or written notice thereof, signed by him, and left with some person of suitable age and discretion, at the usual place of abode of such delinquent, at least ten days previous to the day of appearance, shall be held and taken to be a sufficient summons of such delinquent; and in case of the non-appearance of such delinquent, the court martial may proceed on his trial in the same manner as if he had appeared and pleaded not guilty to the charge exhibited against him.

That it shall be the duty of the President of any court martial for the trial of militia, if required, and upon his being duly satisfied that such testimony is material to the trial, to issue his precept directed to any person to be summoned as a witness, commanding his or her attendance at such court, to testify for or against the person to be tried, as the case may be; and any witness having been duly summoned, and failing to appear, without a reasonable excuse, shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding fifty dollars, to be sued for and recovered in the name of the United States, by bill, plaint, or information, in any court of competent jurisdiction. And if any witness, when called upon for that purpose, shall refuse to testify, or shall behave with contempt to the court; or if any other person shall use any menacing words, signs, or gestures, in presence thereof, or shall cause any riot or disorder therein, it shall be lawful for such court to punish every such offender by imprisonment, for a term not exceeding one month, at the discretion of the court.

That, for the purpose of carrying into execution the sentence, judgment, or order, of any such court martial, for any of the offences specified in the last clause of the preceding article, it shall be lawful for the court to issue an order to any commissioned officer of militia, not below the rank of captain, commanding him to carry the same into effect by military force, whose duty it shall be to obey the same, and execute the order accordingly.

That on the trial of delinquents, for offences not capital, by any such court martial, the deposition of witnesses, taken before a justice of the peace, or other person authorized to take affidavits to be read in court of record in the State or Territory where the same shall be taken, may be read in evidence, provided the prosecutor and person accused are present at taking the same, or are duly notified thereof. And further, that the returns of captains, or other commanding officers of companies, of delinquents draughted, or ordered into the service of the United States, who shall have refused or neglected to enter the same, sworn to as aforesaid, shall be competent evidence of the facts therein contained.

That if any person shall willingly swear false before any such court martial, or in any affidavit, or deposition, taken as aforesaid, he or she shall be adjudged to be guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury, and shall be indicted, tried, and punished, accordingly, by any court of competent jurisdiction, in the State or Territory where such offence shall be committed.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 150.

[2d SESSION.]

## INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF GENERAL HARRISON WHILE COMMANDING THE NORTHWESTERN ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 31, 1816.

The House of Representatives having, on the 30th of April, last, "Ordered, That the Committee on Public Expenditure be discharged from a further consideration of the letter and documents of General William Henry Harrison; that the same, together with the communications and documents presented to the committee on the same subject, be referred to the Secretary of War; and that he be instructed to report thereon to this House at their next session;" the acting Secretary of War has the honor to report:

That General Harrison, in his letter of the 20th of December, 1815, has solicited "an inquiry into the expenditure of public money within the eighth military district whilst under his command; and particularly whatever relates to the supplies or provisions by the special commissaries of the United States, and under the contract of Messrs Orr and Greely;" and he particularly requests that the inquiry may embrace the following points:—"Whether any supplies were ever demanded by me of the contractors, Orr and Greely, which were not called for by the state of the army, and warranted by the conditions of their contract? Whether any injustice was done to said Orr and Greely, by any order given by me to the purchasing of special commissaries of the army? Whether there is reason to believe that any sentiments of hostility existed in my mind towards the said contractors, and which operated injuriously to their interests, either by forcing them to do what was unnecessary, or withholding from them



any thing that they had a right to claim? Whether there is any reason to believe that any connexion (other than that which the relations of our commissions necessarily produced) existed between myself and any of the staff officers of the army? And, generally, whatever relates to the expenditure of public money for the support of the Northwestern army, as far as I may have been concerned."

From the documents referred to this Department, and from those which were in its possession, it appears that, on the 10th of March, 1813, a contract was entered into between the Secretary of War and Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, for the supply of provisions from the 1st day of June, 1813, to the 1st of June, 1814, for the army in the eighth military district, and in Canada; a copy of which (marked A.) is among the documents accompanying this report. Previously to the day on which Orr and Greely's contract was to take effect, large quantities of provisions had been purchased by the commissaries, under the order of General Harrison, and also by Mr. Denny, a contractor at Pittsburgh, under the order of Mr. Eustis, then Secretary of War. These provisions were procured for the supply of the army then in the eighth military district, and for that intended for the campaign for the recovery of Detroit, and for the invasion of Upper Canada. On the 6th of January, 1813, General Armstrong was advised, by Major General Harrison, of these particulars.

In the month of May, B. G. Orr Esq., one of the contractors, reported himself to General Harrison, who addressed to him a letter, in the words following:

HEAD QUARTERS, FRANKLINTON, *May 19, 1813.*

SIR:

You will be pleased to provide for the issuing of provisions at such places within the settlements as Brigadier Generals M<sup>r</sup> Arthur and Cass, and Major Bartlett, the Deputy Quartermaster General, may require. I can give no direction with regard to the forwarding of provisions to the frontiers, or the lakes; nor information as to the delivery of those which the Government have accumulated there, until I receive further information from the Secretary of War. But the posts of Cleveland and Lower Sandusky having been exclusively furnished by the late contractor, (Mr. Porter,) it will be necessary that you make immediate arrangements for issuing at both these places by the 1st of June. Provision should be made at Cleveland for at least eight hundred daily issues, and at Lower Sandusky for four hundred."

I am, respectfully, your humble servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

BENJAMIN G. ORR, Esq. *Contractor to the eighth military district.*

In the month of June a copy of the contract, with instructions, was received by Major General Harrison, from which instructions the following is an extract:

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to General Harrison, dated*

MAY 31, 1813.

Herewith enclosed you will receive a copy of the contract for supplying the troops in the State of Ohio. You are authorized to fill up the blank attached to the copy, and to appoint agents to deliver over to Messrs. Orr and Greely such provisions now in deposit as you may deem proper to issue, according to the agreement, taking their duplicate receipts for the same; one of which must be transmitted to the accountant of this Department, and one to the Superintendent General of military supplies, that Orr and Greely may be held accountable for the provisions so received.

On the receipt of these instructions, Major General Harrison addressed a letter to B. G. Orr, Esq. in the following words:

HEAD QUARTERS, FRANKLINTON, *June 20, 1813.*

SIR:

I am directed, by the Secretary of War, to complete the arrangements with you for turning over to you all the provisions which have been purchased on the public account.

It is necessary, therefore, that you should immediately meet me at Lower Sandusky, in order that the business may be finished as soon as possible. I have directed that no issues of provisions be made, on your account, at any of the posts where the public have them. There is, I imagine, full as much provisions on hand, the property of the United States, as will be wanted for the campaign, some fresh beef excepted.

I am, &c.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

BENJAMIN G. ORR, Esq. *Contractor to the eighth military district.*

In consequence of this letter, a meeting appears to have taken place, on the 22d June, between Mr. Orr and General Harrison at Franklinton, when a proposition was made in writing by Mr. Orr, relative to the terms on which the contractors would receive the public provisions. The precise nature of this proposition is not known, as no copy of Mr. Orr's letter has been furnished to this Department. It appears, however, that an answer was given by General Harrison in the following words:

HEAD QUARTERS, FRANKLINTON, *June 22, 1813.*

SIR:

Your letter of this date is now before me; the proposition contained in it cannot be acceded to. The only arrangement which I think myself authorized to make, is that of delivering over to you all the public provisions, of every description, which have been purchased for the army, and taking your receipt for it, in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of War's instructions. I must observe, also, that most of the provisions are placed in situations where it was never intended they should be used; nor can I say how far the United States will be bound to pay for the transportation of it. This question will remain for the determination of the Secretary of War. I have also to inform you that a contract exists, and is now in operation, for transporting the provisions which are at Norton and Upper Sandusky to Lower Sandusky. The public teams are also engaged in this business. Should it be determined that the contractors are to pay the expense of transportation, all that is transported after this day will of course be charged to them. I cannot give you a correct statement of the provisions we have on hand; it is, however, sufficient to serve the whole of the troops to be employed within this district, and in the operations against Detroit and Malden, at least, until the first of December next.

I am, very respectfully, your humble servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

B. G. ORR, Esq. *of the house of Orr and Greely, Contractors.*

Major General Harrison and the contractor not agreeing as to the manner in which "the blanks, attached to the contract, should be filled up," the question seems to have been referred to the Secretary of War, as appears from the following extract of a letter from General Harrison to the Secretary of War:

*Extract of a letter from General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

FRANKLINTON, *June 24, 1813.*

Mr. Orr, the contractor, declines taking the public provisions until he can see you, for which purpose he sets out this morning for Washington. He complains of the want of funds, and asserts that he has purchased, or left money

to purchase, a considerable quantity of provisions at Cleveland: this he ought not to have done, at least not to a greater amount than for the temporary supply of Cleveland and Lower Sandusky, as he knew of the immense supplies we had on hand.

Subsequent to this period there does not appear to have been any orders given by the Secretary of War to General Harrison, in relation to the turning over the public provisions to the contractors; nor was the additional agreement attached to the contract ever executed. And, on the 4th of August, Mr. Orr addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, in the following words:

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1813.

SIR:

You will do me the justice to recollect, how repeatedly and urgently I have advised the purchase of the provisions now at Cleveland and its neighborhood, to guard against the possibility that General Harrison may not be entirely correct as to the time to which those on hand of the last year's purchases may serve. On your assurances, whilst treating for the contract in which I am concerned, that the subsistence of the army by land carriage from the interior of Ohio, was abandoned, I shall fully rely; and shall consider your refusal to furnish the means of buying the provisions now to be had on the lake, and General Harrison's letter of the 22d June, as notices to the contractors not to attempt to secure them. Of this letter I subjoin a copy; and relying, confidently, on the *unerring wisdom* and *foresight* of the General, will take it for granted, that the supplies therein spoken of, as sufficient for the whole of the army within our district, at least until December next, will, when added to those we have been called on to supply, and are now issuing, secure the army from want until the month of April next.

The waters leading into the Ohio and lake Erie are so low in the fall, and so obstructed by ice in the winter, as to be wholly un navigable; hence, if the provisions in the Connecticut reserve are suffered to escape, April will be the earliest period that can be relied on for supply by water; and hence, too, the dangerous consequences that may result from an erroneous estimate of the stock on hand, either in quantity or condition, and from a want at a season which can be relieved by no other means than the ruinous, if not impracticable, one of land carriage.

I write this letter with no view to extort money from you; on that point I am answered. But solely to apprise you of the exoneration the contractors will think themselves authorized to claim, from all the consequences that may ensue, from an ill-judged and misinformed dependence on the stores on hand; and from a renewal of the scenes of last fall and winter, on the same theatre, and on the same account.

I am, &c.

B. G. ORR.

Honorable JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Secretary of War.*

The acting Secretary of War has entered into these minute details, as he considers that the difference of opinion between the commanding general and the contractors, in relation to the turning over of the public provisions, led to consequences which have a material bearing on the inquiry requested by him.

1st. The continuing the commissariat for the preservation and issue of the public provisions, and the consequent exercise of the discretion of the commanding general as to the time, place, and manner of issuing these provisions.

2d. The commanding general exercising this discretion as to the issues of the public provisions, the contractors were, necessarily, limited in *their* issues to the times and places at which they were specially required to issue; and, it may be added, that they claimed an exemption from any responsibility, for a failure on either part, to comply with the requisitions which might be made upon them, in consequence of the happening of certain contingencies over which they had no control, as specified in the letter addressed by Mr. Orr, on the 4th of August, 1813, to the Secretary of War.

To these consequences may be traced, nearly, if not all, the complaints made by the contractors, for injuries sustained by them, in consequence of the interference of the commanding general with their contract, as specifically stated in the affidavit of Mr. Orr, marked B, one of the documents referred by the House of Representatives to this Department.

To meet the inquiry proposed by General Harrison, "whether any injury was done to the contractors by any order given by him to the purchasing or special commissaries of the army?" it will be necessary to decide—

1st. Was the conduct of General Harrison, in relation to the turning over of the public provisions to the contractors, in the month of June, 1813, correct or not?

2d. If correct, did he exercise a sound discretion, (with a view as well to the interests of the United States as to the rights of the contractor,) in relation to the measures which were taken by him for the issue and supply of provisions, by the issuing and the purchasing commissaries, pending the contract of Orr and Greely?

On these subjects, the acting Secretary of War forbears to offer an opinion; considering it more proper to submit, in detail, the facts herein stated; and to refer to the affidavit of Mr. Orr, and to the statement of General Harrison, dated the 20th of December, 1815, marked C; which, he conceives, will enable the House satisfactorily to decide upon them.

The other points on which Major General Harrison has requested an inquiry, are—

1st. Whether any supplies were ever demanded of the contractors, "Orr and Greely, which were not called for by the state of the army, and warranted by the conditions of their contract?"

It does not appear from the evidence contained in the documents referred to this Department, that any such supplies were ever demanded of the contractors by Major General Harrison; nor is it understood that any such allegation has been made by the contractors.

2d. "Whether there is reason to believe, that any sentiment of hostility existed in his mind towards the said contractors, and which operated injuriously to their interests; either by forcing them to do what was unnecessary, or withholding from them any thing which they had a right to claim?"

An inquiry into the motives of individuals is always a delicate one, and rarely productive of satisfactory results. It is, however, believed, that other and more legitimate motives than those arising from sentiments of personal hostility to the contractors, may be justly assigned for the conduct of the commanding general, in all those cases where the contractors allege that that conduct has produced effects prejudicial to their interest.

3d. "Whether there is any reason to believe that any connexion, (other than that which the relation of their commissions necessarily produced,) existed between him and any of the staff officers of the army?"

No imputation of this kind has been made by the contractors: Mr. Orr disavows any such; and the documents referred to this Department afford no evidence that could justify it. On the contrary, it appears, from the deposition of James Findlay and Jacob Burnet, (marked D) that the situation of General Harrison, in relation to his pecuniary affairs, was worse when he returned from than when he entered into the service.

4th. "Whatever relates to the expenditure of public money for the support of the northwestern army, as far as he may have been concerned."

The statements marked E F G will exhibit the sums which have been paid by the War Department, on account of purchases made by the commissaries, as well for supplies furnished by the contractors, for the support of the northwestern army, from the period General Harrison took the command of it in September, 1812, until the 1st of June, 1814, amounting to one million one hundred and sixty thousand dollars. No part of this sum has been advanced to General Harrison.

All which is respectfully submitted.

GEO. GRAHAM,  
*Acting Secretary of War.*

## A.

*Articles of agreement made on the 10th day of March, Anno Domini 1813, between John Armstrong, Secretary of War of the United States of America, of the one part, and Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, of the City of Washington, of the other part.*

This agreement witnesseth, that the said John Armstrong, for and on behalf of the United States of America, and the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, and administrators, have mutually covenanted and agreed, and by these presents do mutually covenant and agree, to and with each other, as follows, viz:

*First,* That the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators, shall supply and issue all the rations, to consist of the articles hereinafter specified, that shall be required of them for the use of the United States, at all and every place or places where troops are or may be stationed, marched, or recruited within the limits of the State of Ohio and the Michigan territory, and the Canada shore of lake Erie and the upper lakes, thirty days' notice being given of the post or place where rations may be wanted, or the number of troops to be furnished on their march, from the 1st day of June, 1813, to the 31st of May, 1804, both days inclusive, at the following prices, that is to say: at any place where rations shall be issued within the State of Ohio, south of the Indian boundary line, and a line drawn from the eastern extremity thereof, to Georgetown, on the Ohio river, at seventeen cents per ration. At all places north of said Indian boundary line in said State, and in the Michigan territory, not specially provided for hereafter, and at Forts Wayne, Chicago, and Michilimackinac, at twenty-five cents per ration. At all other places on lake Erie, from the western boundary line of Pennsylvania, to Cleveland, including Cleveland, at eighteen cents per ration. At all places between Cleveland and Detroit, including Detroit, Lower Sandusky, foot of the rapids, river Raisin, Brownstown, and on the Canada shore of lake Erie and Detroit river, at twenty cents per ration: provided the United States have command of said lake; and if lake Erie is commanded by the enemy, the price of the ration at the above-mentioned places between Cleveland and Detroit, and on the Canada shore, shall be twenty-five cents per ration. Where the price of the ration is seventeen cents, the prices of the component parts of the same shall be, for bread or flour, six cents five mills; meat, six cents; liquor, three cents five mills; small parts, one cent. Where the price of the ration is eighteen cents, the prices of the component parts of the same, shall be, for bread or flour, seven cents; meat, six cents; liquor, four cents; small parts, one cent. Where the price of the ration is twenty cents, the prices of the component parts of the same, shall be, for bread or flour, seven cents five mills; meat, seven cents; liquor, four cents five mills; small parts, one cent. Where the price of the ration is twenty-five cents, the prices of the component parts of the same, shall be, for bread or flour, ten cents; meat, eight cents five mills; liquor, five cents five mills; small parts, one cent. The prices of the component parts of the small parts of the ration shall be sixteen cents per pound for candles; ten cents per pound for soap; four cents five mills per quart for vinegar; and nine cents per quart for salt.

*Second,* That the ration to be furnished and delivered by virtue of this contract, shall consist of the following articles, viz: one pound and a quarter of beef, or three quarters of a pound of salted pork; eighteen ounces of bread or flour; one gill of rum, whiskey, or brandy; and at the rate of two quarts of salt, four quarts of vinegar, four pounds of soap, and one pound and a half of candles, to every one hundred rations.

It is understood that it shall be in the option of the General, or officer commanding an army or a great military district, in all cases not otherwise provided for by this contract, to direct when, and how often, fresh or salted meat shall be issued, by general orders, to be promulgated a reasonable time before the issue is to commence; that the contractor shall always issue flour two days in every week, and the option of bread or flour for the remainder of the week be with the contractor.

*Third,* That supplies shall be furnished by the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators, at the fortified places and military posts that are or may be established in the limits aforesaid, upon the requisition of the commandant of the army, or a post, in such quantities as shall not exceed what is sufficient for the troops to be there stationed, for the space of three months in advance, in good and wholesome provisions, consisting of due proportions of all the articles forming the ration.

It is understood that if the contractor shall be required to deposit provisions at one place or post, and shall afterwards be required to move them, to be delivered at another place or post, the expenses of transportation to such other place or post shall be borne by the United States. It is also understood that all supplies are to be originally delivered at the posts where they may be required, without expense to the United States.

*Fourth,* That whenever and as often as the provisions stipulated to be furnished under this contract shall, in the opinion of the commanding officer of the post or place where they are offered to be issued, be unsound, unfit for use, or of an unmerchantable quality, a survey shall be held thereon, by two disinterested persons, one to be chosen by the commanding officer, and the other by the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, or their agent, and in case of disagreement, a third person to be chosen by mutual consent, who shall have power to condemn such part of the provisions as to them may appear unfit for use. But if the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, or their agent, shall fail or neglect to appoint a person to inspect the said provisions, after reasonable notice in writing, it shall be permitted to the said commanding officer to appoint such persons as he may think proper, to inspect the provisions, under oath, with power to condemn as aforesaid. And all provisions condemned by such survey, or inspection, may be destroyed by the commanding officer.

*Fifth,* That the commanding general, or person appointed by him, at each post or place, in case of absolute failure, or deficiency in the quantity of provisions contracted to be delivered and issued, shall have power to supply the deficiency by purchase, at the risk and on account of the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators.

*Sixth,* That all losses sustained by the depredations of an enemy, or by means of the troops of the United States, in articles intended to compose rations, to be issued under this contract, being the property of the contractor, as well as in other property necessarily used in transporting the same, shall be paid for at the contract price of the rations, or the component parts, and at an appraised value of the other articles, on the deposition of one or more creditable characters, and the certificate of a commissioned officer, when the same can be obtained, ascertaining the circumstances of the loss, and the amount of the articles for which compensation is claimed.

*Seventh,* That escorts and guards for the safety of the provisions, and for the protecting of the cattle against an enemy, shall be furnished whenever, in the opinion of the commanding officer of the army, or of any post, to whom application may be made, the same can be done without prejudice to the service, and that the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators, shall not be answerable for any deficiency of supplies, at any of the said posts or places, if it shall appear, upon satisfactory proof, that such deficiency was occasioned by the want of proper escorts and guards.

*Eighth,* That at all stationary posts, proper storehouses shall be provided on behalf of the public, for the reception and safekeeping of the provisions deposited from time to time at such posts, respectively; and the contractor shall suffer no loss for want of such stores.

*Ninth,* That the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, his heirs, executors, or administrators, shall render their accounts to the accountant of the Department of War, for settlement, at least once in every three months, agreeably to such form as by the said accountant may be established and made known to them.

*Tenth,* That all such advances of money as may be made to the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators, for and on account of the supplies to be furnished pursuant to this contract, and all such sums of money as the commanding officer of the troops or recruits that are or may be within the limits aforesaid may cause to be disbursed, in order to procure supplies, in consequence of any failure on the part of the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators, in complying with the requisitions herein contained, shall be duly accounted for by them by way of set-off against the amount of such supplies, and the surplus, if any, repaid to the United States, immediately after the expiration of the term of this contract, together with an interest at the rate of six per centum per annum, from the time of such expiration until the same shall be actually repaid. And that, if any balance shall, on any settlement of the accounts of the said Benjamin G. Orr and

Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators be found to be due to them, for or on account of the rations which shall be supplied, pursuant to this agreement, the same shall immediately be paid. And that no unreasonable or unnecessary delay, on the part of the officers of the United States, shall be given to the settlement of the accounts of the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, their heirs, executors, or administrators. *Provided*, however, that no member of congress shall be admitted to any share or part of this contract, or agreement, or to any benefit to arise therefrom.

In witness whereof, the said Secretary of War, for and on behalf of the United States, hath hereunto subscribed his name, and affixed the seal of the War Office of the United States; and the said Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely have hereto set their hands and seal the day and year first above written.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.  
BENJAMIN G. ORR. [L. s.]  
AARON GREELY. [L. s.]

Signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of

DANIEL PARKER.  
GEORGE BOYD.

B.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, *Washington County*, ss:

Benjamin Grayson Orr, of the firm of Orr and Greely, of the city of Washington, and contractor for supplying provisions to the northwestern army, being duly sworn upon the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, saith, that understanding, some time in the winter of 1812-13, that the contract for the supply of the northwestern army had not been given to any one, that himself and Aaron Greely made proposals to the Secretary of War to undertake that duty, that these proposals were accepted of, and that on the 10th day of March following an agreement was signed, sealed, and delivered by the Secretary and themselves, and bond, under the penalty of fifty thousand dollars, with ample security, given for their performance.

In answer to that branch of the first interrogatory by the committee, propounded in the words, "to what extent general officers have interfered prejudicial to the public interest or the rights of individuals," it may be difficult to answer, and necessarily must, in degree, be founded on opinion and a multitude of minute and indescribable circumstances; however, I proceed to the duty with a firm resolution to attempt no discolouration or concealment of facts, and no intrusion of matter in my opinion irrelevant to the subject.

It is my opinion that Major General William Harrison has interfered prejudicially to the public interest, and injuriously to individual rights, ever since he assumed the command of the northwestern army, and I found that opinion on the coincidence and agreement of every officer of the army and private citizen of the Western country who had an opportunity of knowing the facts, and with whom I had an opportunity of conversing. I now speak of the supplies purchased and transported, before my contract commenced, by the agents of Government other than the contractors, but the accounts of the War Department, and information that may be derived from Judge Porter, will enable the committee to ascertain the correctness or incorrectness of this opinion. One evil consequent upon this mode of supply, that has and still jeopardizes the public interest, and in no small degree has and still affects the rights of the present contractors, is apparent and undeniable. I mean the uncertainty in which General Harrison was placed at any given time of the last year of the real amount of these purchases, and of the real occasions there, were for new. For instance, on the 6th day of January, 1813, he informs the Secretary of War, by an official letter, that "provisions have been purchased, and are now in progress towards the rapids of Sandusky, for ten thousand men for one year."

On the 22d of June he says, in a letter to me, "I cannot give you a correct statement of the provisions we have on hand; it is, however, sufficient to serve the whole of the troops to be employed within this district, and in the operations against Detroit and Malden at least until the first of December next."

Again, on the 24th of June, in an official letter to the Secretary of War, he tells him that "Mr. Orr, the contractor, asserts that he has purchased, or left money to purchase, a considerable quantity of provisions at Cleveland; this he ought not to have done, at least not to a greater amount than for the temporary supply of Cleveland and Lower Sandusky, as he knew of the immense supplies we had on our hands."

With this information, then, from so high and responsible a character as the commander-in-chief, is it to be wondered at that the Secretary refused adequate supplies of money to the contractors for the exigent circumstances in which they were placed, and that, superadded to a refusal, he destroyed their credit by protesting their drafts?

To exemplify my meaning more clearly, I will state that, on the 19th day of May, at Franklinton, in Ohio, General Harrison made a requisition upon the contractors to supply throughout the settlements of that State all recruiting marching parties, the Quartermaster's Department, and the posts of Lower Sandusky and Cleveland immediately, an amount of rations which in their opinion would amount to twenty-five thousand dollars per month, and they having received in advance from the War Department only ten thousand, drew bills of exchange, to enable them to comply with this requisition, on the Secretary for this amount. These bills were protested, and the contractors had to sustain all the loss and all the discredit flowing from it. On calling on General Armstrong for his reasons for protesting their drafts, they were shown General Harrison's letter of the 24th June, speaking of his *immense* supplies. This I consider as one instance resulting from purchases by irresponsible commissaries that affected the rights of individuals directly, and led to effects injurious to the public interest.

Contemporaneous with these events was another, which arising, as I believe, from the same cause, certainly affected the rights of individuals. By reference to letter C it will be found that General Harrison, on the 19th of May, required the contractors to provide immediately, to issue at Lower Sandusky on the 1st of June, the commencement of their contract year, four hundred rations daily, which was faithfully attended to: they laid in provisions, procured the conveniences for issuing, bargained with agents to attend to the business, and left the post in perfect assurance that every thing was and would continue well. But in this just expectation they were disappointed, for on the 7th of July their provisions were thrown into the common, their agents deprived of all privileges, except that of calling on the contractors for their wages, their conveniences for issuing taken possession of by the commissary, and the contractors' rights and authority wholly suspended. The reason General Harrison assigned for this measure will be found in his letter to me of the 23d of June, and the contractors have to regret the loss of some hundreds of dollars, independent of the violation of their rights, inherent from the agreement, because General Harrison did not know, or was not explicit enough to let them know, that they were only temporarily charged with the duty of supplying that post.

About the time of the preceding events General Armstrong desired that the whole of the public provisions should be delivered to the contractors, and I received General Harrison's letter of the 20th of June on that subject, and repaired to head quarters on the 21st. In this interview General Harrison contended that I must pay the transportation from the then places of deposit to those intended for their consumption; that unless I assented to such his proposition, he would not deliver them to me, and that if I did the contractors should be charged with all such expenses from that evening. I protested against such charges as quite unusual and ruinous to the contractors, and proposed to take them on the customary terms, and to leave it to the accounting officers of the Department and myself to settle on those terms, but this he declined; accordingly I was compelled to forego the advantage of receiving the deposit, which has invariably accrued to all contractors in all other districts, rather than plunge myself and my securities in inevitable ruin. For instance, a barrel of flour is received by the contractors at the contract price of thirteen dollars and five cents, the commission he would get for assuming the risk of its spoiling, its wasting, or loss by ordinary means, would be one dollar sixty-two and a half cents, yet, superadded to this risk, the General contended that I must agree to pay six dollars from Norton, and three and a half from Upper to Lower Sandusky, on every barrel which Mr. Mukn (under contract) was engaged to carry, and which the United States' teams should, after the evening of the conversation we had on the subject, transport. This decision of the General has inflicted great injuries on the contractors, and given occasion for the employment of a number of agents or commissioners, on

account and in pay of the United States, that cannot but have produced the worst effects on the public interest. By this decision one important consideration was lost to the Government, and that was a correct knowledge, at a favorable season, of the quantity, quality, and situation of the provisions on hand, in order that, correctly knowing what would be wanted, a seasonable and sufficient supply might have been provided; and this knowledge would have certainly been obtained had General Harrison proceeded to execute the ordinary and facile duty of delivering to the contractors the stores on hand agreeable to General Armstrong's instructions, or agreeable to the customary and equitable rule by which all other depositories in all other districts had been delivered over. This decision of General Harrison was the more injurious to the contractors, as under it all the posts, or all but one, were kept from them when the price of the ration was twenty-five and twenty cents, whilst those of seventeen and eighteen cents, consisting almost entirely of recruiting rendezvous, were given in change to them. It is not for me to say how much the loss sustained by damaged provisions, by the pay and subsistence of the host of agents, bullock drivers, butchers, horsemen, commissaries, and the delinquency of some, no doubt, of each description, added to the inevitable waste and leakage in all large issues of provisions, amounted to more than the per centage agreed to be allowed the contractors—that information may be derived with more precision probably from the accountant's office.

I will resume the subject of my statement, in which I had progressed as far as the latter end of June, and state to the committee that I found the Secretary of War in July averse to making any advances for the purchase of provisions: he confided in General Harrison's assurances that his supplies were immense, and no doubt suspected that the contractors, in their solicitude to purchase more, were influenced rather by selfish considerations than a desire to promote the public good. It was under this impression, probably, that he protested sixteen thousand dollars more of their drafts, and refused to give money to lay in stores for the future. In this state of things, persuaded that General Harrison was mistaken on this subject, I addressed to the Secretary a letter on the 4th of August, of which I give you a copy, marked H, No. 12, to shield the contractors from the consequences of want when that could not be relieved by any means but that of the ruinous one of land carriage, over extensive wildernesses and impracticable roads. Having done this, and gotten of the Secretary ten thousand dollars for the ordinary expenses of the month of August, I set out again for the army, and on the 22d of that month sent an express with General Harrison's requisition of the 18th, requiring two hundred thousand rations to be provided at convenient points on the lake shore, for the use of the army on its arrival in Canada. On the 1st of September I received another requisition for one hundred thousand rations more, to be sent to the mouth of Sandusky by the 10th of that month, both of which were promptly complied with, and the latter in the space of eight days from its reception, although the distance it had to be transported was one hundred miles. This done, I set out for head quarters at Seneca, and thence to Chillicothe, to get money to pay for the provisions bought for these occasions whilst at head quarters. I imparted to General Harrison the object of my journey to Chillicothe, and unknown to me, and contrary to truth, he wrote to the Secretary of War that the chief part of the provisions which I had on hand, to comply with his requisitions, had been "purchased with the money which he received for bills he drew on the War Department previously to his going to the seat of Government the last time." The fact is that none of them were paid for at the time of his writing that paragraph, nor until I had obtained money from the bank of Chillicothe, and had returned and disbursed it. What General Harrison's object in thus intermeddling was I do not certainly know, but whether it was sinister or laudable, he missed of his aim, as the Secretary disregarded his information and paid the bills.

It was on this visit to head quarters, that I heard of Mr. Piatt's employment to purchase provisions for the main body of the army. Before this, he had confined his interferences (or rather they had been confined by General Harrison) to the posts north of the Indian boundary line, on the waters of the Miami of the Ohio, and of the lake, under the plea that the General had authority to buy bread, to consume with his remaining meat, and meat, to consume with his remaining bread; under which, they successfully manœuvred to keep the contractors estranged from those the most profitable posts in their district, and to confine their attention to the recruiting and marching parties through the settled parts of the State.

I asked General Harrison if it was true that he had authorized Mr. Piatt thus to interfere with the contractors in their business, in violation, as I thought, of their agreement with the Secretary of War? He avowed he had; and contended that he had a right to have purchased as much of the exhausted parts of rations as would be consumed with those unexhausted; that, as the public stores had not been delivered to the contractors, it behooved him to make the whole of the component parts of rations expire together. I complained that this interference rendered our contract null, defeated the intentions of Government, and produced a competition in the market that had raised the article of beef from twenty to forty per cent. higher than it had been previously purchased for.

These interferences I consider as infractions of the agreement of the United States, and operating to the great injury of the contractors, as well as to themselves. For instance, large quantities of the beef bought by Mr. Piatt was killed at Portage mouth, and carried to Put-in-bay, in September last, spoiled on its passage, or before it could be consumed after its arrival there, and thrown into the lake. But, previous to that, of the number first purchased, I have heard many were lost before they reached Portage; and, afterwards, in driving three hundred and fifty-one head to Detroit, all were lost but one hundred and thirty-one. A thorough investigation into this business will, probably, like many others, nay, indeed, all others of a like character, never take place; but I am well persuaded that whatever rations or parts of rations that have been so supplied have been an additional expense of from fifty to one hundred per cent. on the contract price—an unnecessary expense to the Government, as the contractors were ready and desirous to execute any of the General's commands.

The letter from General Harrison, at Amherstburg, on the 28th September, and my answer of the same date, marked G & H, are the next and last correspondence that has passed between General Harrison and the contractors, and affords the first indication of the General's consent that we should issue provisions to the army. I know not that he had received any instructions from the Secretary of War to authorize him anew, but believe that he had received none since his letter in May, on that subject. Assuming this as a fact, which can be easily ascertained, it occurred to me, that, if the General had authority to deliver the provisions of the public, then he had the same authority long before, and his not doing it was an exercise of power contrary to the Secretary's will, and contrary to his instructions. This privation, therefore, I consider as injurious to the contractors, and prejudicial to the public interest.

I will now pass over the contention between the General and myself, on the subject of transporting the provisions deposited by his order along the United States' side of lake Erie, and of his interference to prevent Commodore Elliot from sending them up to Detroit in the public vessels; and proceed to refer the committee to General Cass's letter of the 29th of October; my answers of the 4th and 6th of November; my letter to Captain Elliot of the 11th; General Cass's two letters of the 5th, and my answer of the 16th of the same month; marked respectively, No. 16 J, No. 17 K, No. 18 L, No. 19 M, No. 20 N, No. 21 O, No. 22 P. This correspondence requires no comment from me; it is in itself sufficiently intelligible. The question now is, who is to pay for, or rather to be charged with, the purchase money of the articles I did not undertake to buy? and that, I presume, is a matter of adjustment between the accountant and myself. But what will come with propriety within the scope of your inquiries, is, an injury I believe I sustained, under the authority of General Cass, at Detroit.

In the month of November, the provisions in the hands of the contractors at that place, which had arrived there partly from Portage, Fort Meigs, and Sandusky, belonging to the public, and partly from the places of deposit on the southern side of lake Erie, so often referred to, became so much exhausted that he could not issue complete rations; at which time, other provisions arriving belonging to the public, General Cass ordered the commissary to commence issuing, and turned the contractors' agents out of doors.

This circumstance, if the contractor had failed of any duty, or in executing any requisition which had been made on him, he would have been the first to have acquiesced in; but no such was, or could be, made against him; no requisition had been made on him to deliver one ration at Detroit; yet, in violation of the contract, he was used as before related, and suffered this privation for more than a month, with his agents on expenses, walking through the streets, and nothing to do.

But the most important effects of this employment of commissaries, this uncertainty of the stock on hand all summer, or this improvidence of the General in not calling for timely supplies at seasons when they could be made, or of all these causes combined, are now pressing with the greatest severity on the contractors, as well as on the army. The Secretary of War came to the conclusion, on his return from the northward, to put a stop to the drawing bills by one or the other—the contractor or commissariat must be protested; and, after ascertaining the sentiments of the President on the subject, the contractors' bills were protested to the amount of sixty thousand five hundred dollars. The consequence is, that, throughout the whole district, disappointment has been sustained, distrust has taken place of confidence, confusion of order and regularity. The sub-contractors for the supply of the recruiting rendezvous withhold their abstracts, and refuse to supply longer; and General Harrison, apprised of this circumstance, calling on the general contractors for large supplies, even at places he has always before refused to let them issue at.

A further consequence of these causes is, the distresses of the army at Detroit, Malden, and Sandwich; all the fall they have been fed with bread made of sour and musty flour, and now are reduced to half rations for a month; just before the date of this affidavit, the troops were ordered by Colonel Butler on half rations of bread, and one and a half rations of meat. This state of things is, to be sure, extremely bad, but they are daily growing worse, and a disbandment of the army, as well as great public and private loss, must soon be the consequence, unless an immediate remedy is provided and supplied.

I state, then, that General Harrison misstated the amount of his provisions on hand in January, 1813, and in June following; that this overrating, and the tenor of his letters to the Secretary on my subject, induced the Secretary to protest the contractor's drafts, and injure his credit.

I state that he withheld from the contractors the public provisions, notwithstanding General Armstrong's instructions, and, under this plea, that all the posts north of the Indian boundary line were kept from them; that he employed Mr. Piatt to purchase large quantities of provision for the use of the main army, without calling on the contractors to supply it; and that the issuing to the main army was never allowed to them till the 29th of September; that it was taken from them again by General Cass, on the 16th of November, and not restored till the 21st of December. That, notwithstanding the tenor of General Cass's letter to me of the 5th of November, when he made the requisition for five hundred thousand rations, I have been represented to the Government as having failed to comply with my duty, and that bills have been drawn to pay for these purchases at extravagant prices, advising that their amounts be charged to the contractors. I state, then, that these bills coming in so fast, and to so great an amount, with their accompanying representations, have produced the protest of the contractors' bills to a great amount, and has thrown the whole district into confusion, and endangered the supply of every military post in it.

I state further, that the contractors have received of the Government	- - -	\$129,022
And have rendered abstracts for about	- - -	140,000
That they have made other issues, for which abstracts have not come in, for	- - -	100,000
That the provisions in deposite, under General Harrison's requisition, amount to	- - -	20,000
		<u>\$260,000</u>

And that their provisions on hand at the different posts—equal, in amount, those received from Government.

BENJ. G. ORR.

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1814.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Personally appeared before me, Daniel Rapine, one of the Justices of the Peace in and for the District of Columbia, on the 21st day of March, in the year 1814, the within named Benjamin G. Orr, and, being duly sworn upon the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, did depose and say, that the foregoing statement is just and true, according to the best of his knowledge and belief.

DAN. RAPINE.

C.

Statement of General Harrison.

CINCINNATI, December 20, 1815.

In a letter which I had the honor to receive from Mr. Fisk, who was the chairman of a committee appointed, in the spring of 1814, to inquire into the complaints of improper interferences with the contractors by the commanding generals, and which letter was dated August 3d, 1814, he says, that he "had formed an unfavorable opinion of me, from some statements which had been made to the committee, supported by documents, chiefly my own letters, substantiating the following facts, viz: that, in a letter addressed by me to the contractor, Mr. Orr, about the 24th of June, 1813, I informed him that I had provisions enough on hand for fourteen thousand men for one year, that, about the 24th of August of the same year, I made a large requisition upon him for supplies, which, in consequence of the former letter, he was unable to furnish, and that I had also caused large purchases to be made by the commissaries of the army after the said 24th of June, and that, notwithstanding all this, the army wanted provisions at Malden, and on the expedition to the Moravian towns." Never was there a more artful combination of truth and falsehood than this statement contains. The army did not want provisions at Malden; it remained at that place but one night. The troops had drawn provisions for that and the following day, and there were at least eighty thousand rations on board the vessels, at the wharfs, at the distance only of one hundred yards from the encampment. I should indeed but illy have deserved the situation which I occupied if I had invaded an enemy's country without a single day's provision for my troops. Could I, for a moment, have preserved the confidence of a single man in the army under such circumstances? What would have been the feelings of the volunteers, and their venerable and patriotic leader? Would not the latter have denounced me immediately to the Government as entirely incompetent to the command? And yet I do know that, notwithstanding the army did want provisions when operating on the Thames, so entirely evident was this want beyond any exertions of mine to prevent, that Governor Shelby, who was intimately acquainted with all my plans, and with the whole course of my conduct, has continued to speak of me, and to write of me, in a manner far (I must acknowledge) beyond either my merits or pretensions. His letters to the President will prove this. I shall advance nothing in this statement without adducing evidence in support of it, although the statement which I shall make will be so consistent that I trust it would, of itself, have carried conviction to the minds of the committee. I ask them, therefore, to refer to my official account of the operations at Detroit, and upon the Thames, in which it is stated, that the vessels which had been sent back from Malden for provisions had been driven to the lower end of the lake, by a storm, and that they had not arrived at that time, nor, indeed, did they arrive until after I had sailed for Buffalo. Upon what, then, could the army, the prisoners, the Indians, with whom I was treating, and the inhabitants of Detroit, a part of whom I was obliged to supply, subsist from the 27th of September to the 12th or 15th of October, but upon the provisions which were taken over with the troops? I acknowledge that they were not well supplied, but the issues could not have been less than seven thousand rations per diem. From the following statement it will appear that the contractors, and not me, were to blame for the deficiency of provisions, and that if I had relied entirely upon them the army would have starved. I cannot find, in any of my letters to the contractors, that I ever said I had provisions for fourteen thousand men for one year. In the letter of the 20th of June, the paragraph in relation to this subject stands thus: "there is, I imagine, full as much provisions on hand, the property of the United States, as will be wanted for the campaign, *some fresh beef excepted.*"

In the letter of the 22d of June, I state, that "there will be quite provisions enough for all the troops that are to be employed at least until the 1st of December." The difference between the statements is, however, not at all

material to the argument, since I broadly acknowledge that I not only directed the contractor to procure no provisions for the campaign, but complained to the Secretary of War that he had made considerable purchases at Cleveland. By referring to a map of the State of Ohio, the movements of the northwestern army on the three lines of operation leading from the first to the second military base, may be traced as follows, viz: the right line ascending the Sciota river from Delaware, and descending Sandusky river to Upper and then to Lower Sandusky. The left taking the direction of that branch of the Miami of the Ohio which interlocks with the Miami of the lake, crossed the Portage between them, and descended the latter river to Fort Meigs. The centre line pursued the route of General Hull from Urbana by Forts Manary, M<sup>r</sup>Arthur, and Finlay, to Fort Meigs. I shall advance nothing in this statement but what is supported by an original document sent with it, or which will be confirmed by the persons to whom I shall refer, and who are within reach of the committee. For the quantity of provisions on hand at the date of my letter to Mr Orr, 24th of June, see original returns of the commissaries, marked No. 1. I have no return by me of the quantity of provisions on hand at Fort Meigs in June, 1813, but the deposition of Captain Oliver, the commissary accompanying this, will furnish it. My estimate is eight hundred barrels of flour and a much larger quantity of meat. If this estimate is correct, we have on the left and centre lines, and at Fort Meigs, which terminated them, flour equal to nine hundred and forty thousand rations, and half that number of rations of salted meat. The above provisions were purchased by my order; those on the left wing, amounting to nineteen hundred thousand rations, were purchased under a particular order from the Secretary of War. These facts can be ascertained by reference to the War Office and Colonel Morrison, and the honorable Mr. Creighton. Admitting that of this quantity there had been consumed, on the 24th of June, 1813, four hundred thousand rations, which is a large allowance, there will remain for this line, one million five hundred thousand of all the component parts of the ration, meat excepted, for a considerable quantity of the meat procured for this line had been driven to Fort Meigs in the preceding winter, and there salted.

From these facts it will be admitted that, on the 22d of June, 1813, I was authorized to say we had provisions enough on hand for the campaign. But by what sad reverses were these bright prospects so blasted that it became necessary to purchase more provisions, and in August to call upon the contractors for a large supply? From the affidavit of Mr. Piatt, and from the personal evidence which he will give to the committee, it will be seen that it is not true that provisions were purchased by the commissaries of the army after the month of June, and before the month of September, excepting some beef cattle, to no great amount, to make the other component parts of the rations on hand complete rations. The call upon the contractor was rendered necessary from the following circumstances: The provisions on the left line were brought from the Miami country, and deposited at St. Mary's on the river of that name, and at Amanda, on the Anglaize, (called on the map Tawa town,) and boats were prepared at each of those places to take them to fort Meigs. The greater part of the boats were ready upon the arrival of General Clay's brigade of Kentucky militia in the latter end of April, and by that officer very properly taken to convey his troops to the relief of fort Meigs, then besieged by the enemy. Part of the flour was, however, taken down as far as fort Winchester, and there left, that the troops might be unincumbered with it in their approach to the enemy. After the siege of fort Meigs was raised, orders were given to provide other boats at St. Mary's and Amanda, (those which had descended could not be taken back,) and when I wrote to the contractors, on the 22d of June, I had still strong hopes that, by the usual recurrence of a fresh at that season, the provisions might be brought down. In this hope I was, however, disappointed. Mr. Piatt knows better than I do how much of it reached fort Meigs. My own belief is, that a very few barrels of that which was deposited at fort Winchester arrived, and that in a damaged state. Very early in the spring, a large deposit of flour had been made at fort Meigs; to that place, also, large droves of hogs and beeves were driven from Urbana and Franklinton. The preservation of this provision engaged my early and particular attention. The flour was put under cover before the sick were sheltered in any other way than by tents; barrels were ordered to be prepared for the pork and beef; but, as it was necessary to salt it before these could be made ready, the meat was put in large vats which were deemed safe, as ship carpenters were employed to make and calk them. Notwithstanding all my personal care and attention, however, a great part of the flour as well as the meat spoiled. During the siege of fort Meigs the covering of the flour was destroyed by the enemy's shot, and a great number of the barrels shattered, and the whole exposed to the continued rains which fell for several weeks. Apprised of this circumstance, I directed that it should be overhauled, sifted, and repacked, and as much as possible baked into biscuit. This business was in full operation when the enemy made their second appearance, and caused it to be suspended. Upon the final report of the state of the provisions at fort Meigs in August, I found that a considerable quantity of the flour had been destroyed. A great deal of the salted meat was also spoiled, supposed to be occasioned by the shot from the enemy's batteries causing the reservoirs to leak. The garrison, too, had been obliged to use the salt meat contrary to my intention, as the communication was intercepted, and the fresh beef could not be taken to them. The supplies upon the right wing had also suffered very materially. The flour was principally purchased in the neighborhood of Chilicothe, from whence it was taken in wagons to Franklinton, Delaware; from those places to Norton; from Norton to Upper Sandusky, and from that to Lower Sandusky. From these repeated changes of the carriages, from the frequent loading and unloading, and from the excessive badness of the roads, the barrels were much broken, and the militia officers, who commanded at the several depots, were not as attentive as they ought to have been in the construction of sheds to keep them from the weather. From these causes the greater part of the flour was much injured, although it was all examined, and the sound part separated from that which was damaged and repacked; the loss was very considerable. The consumption upon this wing was also unexpectedly increased to an enormous amount from the number of the Ohio militia which turned out to repel the second invasion of the enemy, and from the unnecessary retention of two thousand of them at Upper Sandusky, after the enemy had retired. On the 18th of August I had ascertained that there would be a deficiency of salted provisions in the public depots, and as I knew that the contractors had a quantity of that article at Cleveland, which they never had been required to purchase, I addressed a letter to their agent, requiring of them two hundred thousand rations of salt meat for the consumption of the troops *when in Canada*. I did not at that time suppose that the flour would be wanted; but as it would have been unjust to have obliged the contractors to furnish the salted meat, which was then scarce, and upon which they would probably lose, I gave them the option of furnishing the other parts of the ration or not, as they pleased. See the original draught of my letter, (No. 2,) and Mr. Greely's answer, (No. 3,) enclosing the return of provisions on hand at Cleveland, by which it will appear that they had at that time upwards of three-fourths of the whole quantity demanded. It is true that Mr. Orr (see his letter, No. 4,) contradicts the statement of his partner, Mr. Greely; but the reason of his doing so was soon explained. Upon his arrival at head quarters, about the 7th of September, he stated to me that the Secretary of War would not pay his draughts unless they were sanctioned by me upon an estimate of the cost of provisions which I might require of him. I agreed to authorize his drawing, upon his submitting an estimate. His letter and estimate, (No. 5,) will show that he wished the Government to advance the whole cost of the three hundred thousand\* rations which had been required of him, although he had on hand the greater part of the amount purchased with funds that had been placed in his hands when he took the contract. I refused to sanction his drawing for more than a reasonable advance upon the provisions which were then to be purchased. The whole affair was explained to the Secretary of War in a letter of the 8th of September. This refusal of mine to suffer Orr to draw for sixty thousand dollars to purchase one hundred and thirty-five thousand rations, (which was the quantity wanted to make up the three hundred thousand which were required,) gave the first shock to the good understanding which had subsisted between us, and my taking him severely to task, when the army was crossing the lake, for not providing vessels to transport his provisions, entirely destroyed it.

From the foregoing statement it will, I trust, be acknowledged that, in June, 1813, I was authorized to say that there was sufficiency of provisions in the public stores for the contemplated campaign, and that there was nothing unjust towards the contractors, or injurious to the public interests, in the demand of three hundred thousand rations in the latter end of August, since I knew that the *greater part was on hand*. I acknowledge that, at the time I

\*On the 29th of August, I had, in consequence of Mr. Greely's letter, increased the demand from two to three hundred thousand rations. (See my letter, No. 6.)

gave the order, I thought it probable that all the salted meat required could not be procured, and certainly I should not have blamed the contractors for not performing impossibilities. The troops did not suffer because this provision was not purchased, but they were stinted in their supplies at Detroit, because the contractors did not (as they might have done) procure the means of transporting their provisions across the lake. The demand for the three hundred thousand rations was made to render "security more sure;" a maxim that should be constantly in the mind of every general when providing for the subsistence of his army in a wilderness, or in an exhausted country. How many in other respects well-planned enterprises have failed from neglecting it. The great King of Prussia, who, above all other generals, was famous for ascertaining the subsistence of his army, failed in an attempt upon Olmutz, in the seven years' war, because for once he trusted to a single resource. Had he succeeded in this attempt, he might, in a few weeks after, have dictated the terms of peace to the Empress Queen in her capital. But, without recurring to remote examples, our own annals furnish a fatal instance of the neglect of this maxim. General Wilkinson says that he was unable to take Montreal in the fall of 1813, because he was not joined by the corps under General Hampton; and the latter general asserts that he could not form the desired junction for want of provisions.

I have never heard that the retention of the provisions, purchased by the agents of the United States in the hands of their commissaries after the commencement of Mr. Orr's contract, formed a part of his complaints against me. If such should be the case, however, Colonel Morrison will give the committee the most satisfactory information upon the subject. It was in pursuance of his advice that I prescribed the terms upon which the provisions should be delivered, and which were refused by Mr. Orr.

Mr. Orr has asserted that he cleared one hundred thousand dollars by the contract, and that, but for me, he would have made three hundred thousand. [See the depositions of Captain Reed, late assistant deputy quartermaster general and three other gentlemen, marked No. 6.] I know of no act of mine that could have operated so injuriously to the interests of the contractors, unless in the two instances in which their entire failure to supply the troops was corrected by purchases made by the officers of the United States. Upon my return into the district, in January, 1814, Captain Oliver, the commissary, waited on me to inform me that he was then employed, under an order from Brigadier General Cass, in purchasing provisions for the troops at Detroit, who were almost in a starving situation in consequence of the neglect of the contractors to comply with General Cass's requisitions. I approved of the order which had been given by General Cass, and his successor, in the command of Detroit, Colonel Butler, and directed Captain Oliver to continue his exertions to execute them. (See the deposition of Captain Oliver, No. 7.) I had scarcely disposed of this affair, when I was alarmed by the intelligence received from Major General Gano, of the Ohio militia, to whom was entrusted the defence of Lower Sandusky and Put-in-bay, at the latter of which lay the prize ships taken from the enemy, that the troops at those places were supplied with provisions from hand to mouth, there being scarcely a barrel of flour in store, and that his utmost exertions to procure a supply from the contractors had been unavailing. (See the deposition of General Gano, No. 8.) The matter was so urgent that no time was to be lost. Captain Oliver was, therefore, instructed to make a contract for the delivery of forty thousand rations, at Lower Sandusky, with the utmost possible despatch, to make the best bargain he could for the interests of the contractors, but to give a price which would insure the delivery of the provisions. What less could have been done in the two cases here mentioned? Should I have countermanded the orders given by General Cass and Colonel Butler, by the execution of which alone the important posts of Detroit and Malden could be preserved, or should I have permitted the enemy to retake the ships in harbor, at Put-in-bay, which would have enabled them again to contend for the superiority on the lakes, for fear that I should deprive Mr. Orr of the opportunity of making three hundred thousand dollars instead of one hundred thousand?

In order to gain credit to his complaints of persecution from me, it was conceived to be necessary by Mr. Orr and his friends to assign some motive for it, and they have chosen to account for it by supposing a partiality, on my part, towards Mr. John H. Piatt, the Deputy Commissary General. As this officer was allowed a certain per centum upon his expenditures, his emolument, consequently, increased by every order to purchase provisions. The contractors were made to fail, in order that business might be thrown in Piatt's hands; and I believe that it has been more than insinuated that we divided the spoil. By referring to Mr. Piatt's deposition, No. 9, it will be seen, and the fact can be verified by his accounts which have been passed at the War Office, that after the commencement of Orr's contract, Piatt never received an order from me to purchase any provisions, but in a single instance, and that was some beef cattle for the purpose of making the flour and other component parts of the rations in the hands of the United States commissaries complete rations. The order for the purchases to remedy the failure of the contractors at Detroit and Malden, in the winter of 1813-14, was given when I was out of the district, first by General Cass, and afterwards by Colonel Butler, that for the supply of Sandusky and the Bass islands was committed to Captain Oliver. To give color to my supposed subserviency to the interests of Mr. Piatt, it has, I understand, been asserted that I drew him from obscurity to place him in the lucrative office which he filled. This story is just as false as the inference that is drawn from it. I was a perfect stranger to Mr. Piatt when I found him upon the frontiers of this State acting as purchasing commissary under an appointment from General Hull. I continued him in opposition to the claims of a friend of eighteen years' standing, because I was informed that he had given great satisfaction to Hull's army by his zeal and industry. (See certificates of Generals Taylor, Findlay, and Colonel Jesup, marked No. 10.) With Mr. Piatt I never had any connexion, but in the relation of commanding general and commissary, in my life. If examined upon oath by the committee he will testify that all the pecuniary transactions which ever passed between us were my renting a house from him in Cincinnati for my family, for which he charged me more than the preceding tenant had paid; his purchasing two yoke of oxen from my farm after I had left the army, and a book account of fifty dollars, principally for articles furnished my family in my absence. In a case of this kind, where even the suspicion of improper conduct would be nearly as fatal to my character as a conviction of guilt, all delicacy should be laid aside and the affair examined to the bottom. It is, therefore, my earnest wish that Colonel Morrison, Mr. Piatt, and such other officers as served under me, who are within reach of the committee, may be required to testify not only as to the facts, but to declare their opinion and the general impressions existing in the army. It would be very difficult to exhibit positive proof of the corruption of a commanding general, but there are a thousand circumstances which might come to the knowledge of those about him which would be quite as convincing as the most authentic document. I do not indeed think it would be wrong to make all public officers account for any sudden increase of wealth. To show that this has not been my case, I have procured the deposition of General Findlay and Mr. Burnett, to show that I left the army poorer than when I entered it, and that I have since been obliged to have recourse to loans to put my farm in a situation to support my family. The high characters of these gentlemen will be vouched for by all the Ohio delegation.

I have no claim to push the investigation I have solicited further than is necessary to my own defence, but if with a view to a better understanding of the operations which may be necessary in a future war, the House of Representatives should determine to give greater scope to the inquiry, the result will, I am sure, prove the correctness of the places which were adopted for the support of the Northwestern army, and that the actual cost of the supplies will bear a favorable comparison with that of any other army which preceded it in the same tract, or with those which, in the late war, were employed in other sections of the country. I do not consider myself, however, responsible for the amount of money which may have been expended by the army under my command, excepting as to its faithful application, so far as that depended on me. I am, indeed, ignorant of the amount. All that my duty required me to know, was, that it was as little as possible, to give security to the measures which I was directed to pursue. My opinion may differ from many, with regard to the quantum of supplies necessary to produce that security, and I may perhaps be blamed for having ordered them to be provided on a scale unnecessarily large. It cannot, however, be by those who are acquainted with the country which was the scene of our operations, or who will recollect that the army under General St. Clair was in a starving condition when it was defeated, and that of General Wayne, after a preparation of two and a half years, was scarcely able, upon very reduced allowance, to reach the point of its destination.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON,  
*Late Major General in the United States army.*



## No. 1.

*Report of provisions remaining at different posts on the centre and left wing of the northwestern army, (the purchases of John H. Piatt, Deputy Purchasing Commissary,) on the 24th day of June, 1813.*

Names of posts.	Bbbs. Flour.	Bbbs. Biscuit.	Bbbs. Whiskey.	Bbbs. Salt.	Bbbs. Pork.	Pounds Bacon.	Boxes Soap.	Boxes Candles.	
Fort Winchester,	1,209	-	247	119	13	20,000	10	18	Part of the flour damaged, being sunk in the river after leaving Amanda and St. Mary's, and for the want of proper care after it arrived at Fort Winchester.
Fort Jennings, -	26	-	3½	15	-	600	-	1	Good order.
Amanda, -	400	20	69	45	-	110,000	14	23	Do.
St. Mary's, -	106	83	9	½	-	8,000	3	6	Do.
Loramies, -	1,590	-	153	-	15	-	5	5	Do.
Greenville, -	-	90	-	-	-	18,360	-	-	Do.
Piqua, -	332	-	28	6	-	1,200	8	4	Do.
Dayton, -	163	-	25	3	-	4,000	6	4	Do.
Fort Findlay, -	60	-	30	50	-	500	28	-	Do.
Fort M <sup>c</sup> Arthur, -	536	-	43	14	-	-	21	12	Do.
	4,422	193	607½	252½	28	162,660	95	73	Total amount.

At all the abovementioned posts I have appointed issuing commissaries, agreeably to your excellency's order, at thirty dollars per month, who will take every necessary care, until your excellency may think proper to give the provisions into the hands of the contractors.

JOHN H. PIATT.

DEAR SIR:

CINCINNATI, June 30, 1813.

Having made the necessary arrangements, I returned to this place on the 28th, and shall take every possible care to have the provisions in my charge taken care of, and issued in the proper manner. I have now ready two hundred and twenty-five beeves, taken up at Manary's block-house, which shall be forwarded whenever your excellency thinks proper to give the order. Your family are in good health.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN H. PIATT.

His Excellency Major General WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

## No. 2.

HEAD QUARTERS, SENEGA TOWN, August 18, 1813.

SIR:

As you have reported yourself to me as the authorized agent of the contractor, I must request that you take immediate measures for having two hundred thousand rations of salted pork or bacon prepared at Cleveland, Sandusky, or some other place on the lake, to be used when the army shall arrive on the Canada shore. Should you think proper to supply the other component parts, and make the two hundred thousand complete rations, you are at liberty to do so. You have the flour at Cleveland, and as it will not be wanted there, it can be used for the above purpose; however, the pork must be procured at any rate.

I am, very respectfully, your humble servant,

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

MAJOR PETER G. VOORHIES, *Agent for Orr and Greely.*

## No. 3.

CAMP HARRISON, CLEVELAND, August 25, 1813.

SIR:

I have taken the liberty to send you enclosed a correct statement of the component parts of rations at this time ready to be delivered in good order along the lake coast, on the navigable waters within this district; the principal part of which are at this place. All the component parts of the rations can be delivered almost exclusively at this post immediately; except the salted pork, which will fall short of the two hundred thousand rations about thirty thousand; this deficiency is not in the country, neither can it be procured in time at this season of the year. If you should think it proper to take salted beef in lieu of this deficiency, I have the barrels and salt on hand, and can deliver to you five hundred barrels prime beef, in good order, and warranted to keep good until the first of May next. Ten days' notice will be sufficient. I have contracted for ten thousand pounds of bacon: the time in which it was to be delivered has expired since the 20th instant. I expect it every day, and am confident it will be here in time.

I have a number of bakers employed in baking biscuit, of which I can immediately furnish you with fifty thousand rations, warranted to keep good for one year. Colonel Orr's long stay in the city of Washington prevented my returning here before you left this to attend to your orders.

I experience a very serious difficulty for the want of stores for the provisions. Was Mr. Duncan Reed, the acting Deputy Quartermaster, more attentive to his business a few boards might be procured to cover those provisions which are now lying exposed to the storms on the lake shore, and the evil in a great degree be remedied. The regiment of Pennsylvania militia, under the command of Colonel Rees Hill, amounting to about six hundred and fifty men, will arrive here on Sunday next. I shall ever endeavor at all times to obey you and comply with your requisitions, and exert myself for the good of the public service.

q

I am, with pleasure, respectfully your obedient humble servant,

AARON GREELY.

His Excellency WILLIAM H. HARRISON,  
*Major General commanding the Northwestern Army.*

*Return of provision now deposited at different places on the shore of Lake Erie, for the use of the northwestern army, by Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, contractors. August 25, 1813.*

PORK.		FLOUR.		WHISKEY.		SOAP.		CANDLES.		VINEGAR.		SALT.		Where deposited.
Bbbs	Rations.	Bbbs	Rations.	Galls.	Rations.	Lbs.	Rations.	Lbs.	Rations.	Galls.	Rations.	Bbbs	Rations.	
513	136,458	761	132,920	1,933	61,856	2,000	50,000	350	23,333	1,100	110,000	65	520,000	Cleveland. Huron. Grand River. Vermilion.
7	1,862	97	16,878	66	2,112	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	80,000	
18	4,788	80	13,972	3,000	96,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
6	1,596	25	4,366	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
544	144,704	963	168,136	4,999	159,968	2,000	50,000	350	23,333	1,100	110,000	75	600,000	

ORR AND GREELY,  
*Contractors for the Northwestern army.*

No. 4.

CLEVELAND, August 29, 1813.

SIR:

Major Voorhies's solicitude induced him to go from this place to the different settlements in the reserve, in quest of salted provisions, to comply with your requisition for two hundred thousand rations, but almost entirely without success; there is none to be bought of any account, and that dispersed, in every direction, in small quantities of one, two, and three barrels at a place. What aggravates this state of the case is, that I have found, upon examination to-day with Major Voorhies, that Mr. Greely's report to you of the 25th is very erroneous. Instead of five hundred and thirteen barrels of pork, which he states are in store at this place, we find only three hundred and seven; nor do I believe it will be practicable to obtain, in any short time, a quantity which will increase this amount to more than four hundred barrels. Mr. Greely, I observe, has written you also that he can furnish, upon ten days' notice, beef for the alleged deficiency, which he will warrant to keep till May next. It is my opinion, and Major Voorhies', that at this season beef could not be saved, and at any rate, as they are yet to be procured, they could not be brought here at so short a notice. In short, in no respect can I see that any dependence should be placed in his report; and a fear that you may be misled induces me to write so plainly. Whatever you wish to be done, that can be done, you may rely shall be assiduously attended to; but I cannot suffer you to be beguiled into a confidence that will certainly be deceptive.

Major Voorhies will probably leave this on the 31st, with Colonel Hill's regiment of Pennsylvania militia, with as much of the pork as the boats can carry; by him, I shall write you more fully, who likewise will be able to give you explicit and detailed accounts of the reasonable calculations that may be founded on supplies from this quarter.

He will go with the capacity, the integrity, and the disposition, to render every service in the present emergency that any one can possess; and in the execution of your commands, every assistance in my power shall be given him.

Great delay at the War Office, and a severe bilious fever, has detained me longer from the district than I expected. Major Voorhies will explain fully. Meanwhile,

I have the honor to be, with great esteem, sir, your most obedient servant,

BENJAMIN G. ORR.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON.

No. 5.

SENECA TOWNS, September 7, 1813.

SIR:

When in Washington lately, on the subject of the protested drafts of the contractors, I urged to the Secretary of War the necessity of devising some means to prevent the recurrence of events so fatal to their credit, and possibly injurious to the public interest. Unable to ascertain what the wants of the army you command might be, and unwilling to give to any one the power of drawing ad libitum on the public treasury, he told me I must submit to you an estimate of the cost of each requisition that might be made on me, for which, when approved of by you as reasonable, I might draw, without danger of protest. For this purpose, I now enclose you a view of what I suppose the current issues to recruiting and marching parties through the State of Ohio, for the present month, will amount to, as well as the recent requisition for three hundred thousand rations, for the proposed invasion of the enemies' country. I hope you will find it satisfactory; and that, notwithstanding the want of instruction from the Secretary on the subject, as it does not increase your responsibility, you will not decline this the Secretary's own arrangement.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

BENJAMIN G. ORR.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON.

*The Contractors' estimate.*

I suppose the current issues to recruiting and marching parties throughout the State of Ohio will, for the month of September, amount to	\$5,000
Three hundred thousand rations recently required for the army, in its operations against the enemy, I suppose will cost	\$55,000
	<u>\$60,000</u>

SENECA TOWNS, September 7, 1813.

The above estimate, amounting to sixty thousand dollars, is respectfully submitted to the consideration of General Harrison.

BENJAMIN G. ORR,  
*one of the contractors for the 8th military district.*

No. 6.

HAMILTON COUNTY, State of Ohio, ss:

Personally appeared before me, John Mahard, Justice of the Peace in and for said county, James Reed, who, being sworn agreeable to law, deposeth and sayeth, that, some time in the month of May, 1814, he, the deponent, was in company with Benjamin G. Orr, then army contractor within the 8th military district. This deponent, being in conversation with the said Benjamin, asked the said Benjamin if he, the said Benjamin, would clear any amount by the contract for supplying the army? The said Benjamin informed this deponent that he, the said Benjamin, would clear one hundred thousand dollars, and probably something rising of that sum; and if it had not been for General

Harrison, he, the said Benjamin, would have cleared three hundred thousand dollars; and, further this deponent sayeth that Mr. John Ragues, (agent for the said Benjamin,) informed this deponent that the said Benjamin would clear by the contract between eighty and one hundred thousand dollars, and further this deponent sayeth not.

Sworn and subscribed before me, this 29th day of July, 1815.

JAMES REED.

JOHN MAHARD, J. P.

STATE OF OHIO, *Cuyahoga County*, ss:

Personally appeared Aikin Sexton before me, Horace Perry, a Justice of the Peace for said county, and being duly sworn, upon his oath saith, that some time in the month of May, 1814, he, the deponent, heard Benjamin G. Orr, contractor for the northwestern army, say, that he, the said Benjamin, had made by said contract one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and that he should have made three hundred thousand dollars if it had not been for the conduct of General Harrison, and that the above observations of the said Benjamin were made, in a public company where the deponent was present, and further this deponent saith not.

Sworn and subscribed before me this 11th day of September, 1815,

AIKIN SEXTON.

HORACE PERRY, *Justice of Peace.*

STATE OF OHIO, *Geauga County*, ss:

Personally appeared Eli Bond, Esquire, before me, Solomon Kingsbury, a Justice of Peace in and for said county, and being sworn agreeable to law, deposeeth and saith, that he, the deponent, was, in the year 1813, agent for Benjamin G. Orr and Aaron Greely, then army contractors within the eighth military district, that he, the deponent, heard the said Benjamin G. Orr repeatedly say, that he, the said Benjamin, had made, or would make, by the said contract one hundred thousand dollars and upwards, and if it had not been for the conduct of General Harrison, he, the said Benjamin, would have made three hundred thousand dollars, and further this deponent saith not.

Sworn and subscribed before me, this 16th day of October, 1815.

ELI BOND.

SOLOMON KINGSBURY, *Justice of Peace.*

STATE OF OHIO, *Geauga County*, ss:

Personally appeared Elisha Norton, Esquire, before me, Solomon Kingsbury, a Justice of the Peace in and for said county, and being duly sworn, upon his oath saith, that, some time in the spring of 1814, he, the deponent, heard Benjamin G. Orr, contractor for the northwestern army within the eighth military district, say, that he, the said Benjamin, had made or would make by said contract one hundred thousand dollars and upwards, and that he should have made three hundred thousand dollars if it had not been for the conduct of General Harrison, and further this deponent saith not.

Sworn and subscribed before me, this 16th day of October, 1815,

ELISHA NORTON.

SOLOMON KINGSBURY, *Justice of Peace.*

No. 7.

I was appointed special commissary by Major General W. H. Harrison in August, 1813, and served in that capacity during his command of the district. I never thought General Harrison disposed to oppress the contractors, without the interest of the service imperiously demanded it. Mr. Benjamin G. Orr, one of the contractors, complained of injuries done him by General Harrison; I knew of none.

The flour part of sixty thousand rations deposited at Lower Sandusky, in February and March, 1814, on account of the contractors, by order of General Harrison, was necessary for the maintenance of Put-in-bay, Portage, and Lower Sandusky.

General Harrison never had any private interest in the disbursement of the public funds that passed through my hands, nor did any thing ever come to my knowledge to induce a belief that he had any concern or interest in the expenditures of any of the staff officers.

The following was the quantity of flour on hand at Fort Meigs on the 7th of May, 1813; (first siege of the British.)

United States,	474½ barrels
Mr. Spencer Ball, in store,	325
	799½
	147,911 rations.

Mr. Ball's flour in store, afterwards used by the United States troops, was part of a contract with Mr. Buford, deputy commissary.

The investment of Fort Meigs, April and May, 1813, by the British, made it necessary to stop all provisions destined for that post during such a state of things, in consequence of which about three thousand barrels of flour, with other components, were deposited at Fort Winchester on 2d, 3d, and 4th of May, 1813. Nearly all the boats that had conveyed those provisions to Winchester were taken by General Clay, for the transport of his troops from thence to Meigs, leaving the provisions behind without the means of transportation. And in the first place, leaving head St. Mary's navigation and Amanda on the Anglaize with much less provisions than the vessels were first designed to carry, owing to General Clay's troops descending the St. Mary's and Anglaize on board the same crafts.

WILLIAM OLIVER, *late Special Commissary 8th.*

Sworn to and subscribed before me, at Cincinnati, the 21st December, 1815.

JOHN MAHARD, *Justice of Peace.*

No. 8.

THE STATE OF OHIO, *Hamilton County, Corporation of Cincinnati*, ss:

Be it remembered, that, on the 6th day of January, A. D. 1816, John S. Gano, Major General of the first division, personally appeared before me, William Corry, mayor of the town of Cincinnati, who being duly sworn, did depose and say, that he commanded the forts and military posts on the northern frontier of State of Ohio, and Put-in-bay island, in the winter of 1813 and 1814, and on receiving returns of the quantity of provision at the different posts, it was found that the provision would fall very short of supplying the troops stationed and passing; and in consequence thereof, he ordered the contractors to furnish more provision. And from information received from the contractors' agent and others, he found that no certain calculation could be made on receiving provision from them; and some of the posts then were very short of provision; consequently, the situation of the posts was reported to General Harrison after his return to the district, urging the necessity of a supply of provisions to such posts, which this deponent considered of very great importance, as the letters from him, this deponent, will more fully show, and further he saith not.

JOHN S. GANO.

Sworn and subscribed before me, the 6th day of January, Anno Domini 1816.

In testimony whereof, I have hereto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said corporation the day and year above written.

WILLIAM CORRY, *Mayor.*

HEAD QUARTERS, O. M. LOWER SANDUSKY, *January 17, 1814.*

DEAR GENERAL:

The disagreeable news from below occasions me to have great anxiety for the vessels at Put-in-bay. I proceeded a few days ago to Portage, in order to cross to see their situation; the ice prevented my going by water and was not sufficient to bear. I have, however, been relieved by a visit from Lieutenant Champlain, and Doctor Eastman of the navy, who came up the night before last and returned yesterday; they came over on the ice, though it was very thin in places. The Lieutenant informs me he has ten seamen and forty soldiers, and has his vessels and guns so prepared, that, in case of an attack, he can bring about forty to bear from on board and a small block-house, on the rocky point of land near the vessels. I shall, by his request, and my own opinion of the necessity of the measure, send a reinforcement of about thirty of the regulars from Seneca, as soon as the ice is sufficiently strong to bear them. At the fort at Portage I have one hundred militia, which may render them some assistance if necessary: my troops are very much scattered, and I believe every post is in a tolerable state of defence. The troops have had immense fatigue since they have been out, they are now more healthy, and appear in better spirits since two months' pay has come on, though nothing will induce them to continue longer than their term of service, which expires on the last of next month. Majors Vance and Meek arrived three days ago from Detroit, and have an exalted opinion of the vigilance and arrangements of Colonel Butler; the officers Captains Holmes and Hill, commanding Malden and Sandwiche, have put themselves in the best possible state of defence. A detachment under the command of Major Smiley has gone up the river Thames. The militia at Detroit are discontented, a number sick, some dead, &c. I have been hawk and buzzard as to supplies—the commissary and contractor—and I fear that with all the exertions that can be made some of the posts must suffer; at Meigs no flour, and two or three other posts in nearly the same situation. I called on the contractors and urged the necessity of immediate supplies, but I cannot rely on their promises. The want of forage has nearly destroyed all the transport on this line; I have urged Captain Gardner to supply the agent of that department, at this place, with funds for that purpose, but to no effect. I have been lately very unwell, but have recovered, except a lame ankle. As it is uncertain where this will meet you, I shall not give a detailed account until I know where you are, and will then write more fully, and send you a report of the troops under my command.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN S. GANO.

P. S. Six o'clock, P. M. An express from Erie have just arrived here, a naval officer with a letter from General Cass, and a request from Captain Elliot for a reinforcement for Put-in-bay of two hundred men; I have ordered Lieutenant McFarland from Seneca with all his effective regulars, about thirty able to march being all the disposable force I have, except a small command at Portage erecting a fortification there, from which I will detach a part, though the whole cannot make more than a third of the number required. From information there is not the least doubt but an attempt will be made to take or destroy the vessels; it is the opinion of Lieutenant Packet and General Cass also. Will it not be proper to send on some regular troops or militia from the interior without delay?

JOHN S. GANO.

His Excellency WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

HEAD QUARTERS, O. M. LOWER SANDUSKY, *January 25, 1814.*

DEAR GENERAL:

Yours of the 16th inst. I received this day, and directed my brigade major to make the enclosed report, by which you will see the situation of the troops under my command. I have issued orders as per enclosed copies. The difficulty in forwarding provisions, owing to the impossibility of transportation by land, has been, and is, severely felt; the troops at Meigs have been obliged to take flour from Winchester themselves, there being no other means of transport, and are now but scantily supplied; I have urged the contractors on this head, but have received nothing but fair promises, until my patience is entirely exhausted, and I have directed Mr. Oliver to supply. A man from Put-in-bay left here this morning. He informs me the detachment I sent on had not been able to cross, but are waiting at the point of the peninsula, and will cross as soon as possible; I have ordered Major Crooks with some militia to cross; which will make the force there as follows: sailors twenty-two, Atkins' command forty-two, all now there; McFarland with twenty-eight regulars on the march, and Crooks with Captain Howel's company, say forty, which is one hundred and thirty-two, and I have one company at the fort at Portage. I fear the provisions at the island are not sufficient to support them until the ice will break up to afford water transportation to them; and at Portage they depend on this place for flour, which is scarce; they have, however, meat enough there. Thus, you see, as before I observed to you, we have been between hawk and buzzard—the contractor and commissary. I am informed the detachment that returned to Detroit from the Thames did not succeed in getting the quantity of provision expected. I am also informed, by some officers from Buffalo, that the British were preparing a secret expedition; their destination unknown. I am happy to inform you every exertion has been made at Detroit, Sandwiche, and Malden, to defend those places to the last extremity; and the commanding officer, since General Cass left there, deserves great credit. Neither of those places will be given up without some fighting; the officers commanding each are in high spirits, and have great confidence in their ability to defend their posts. Some artillery officers have passed on to Detroit, and I am of opinion that some active regular officers are wanting there, as many have left it. The militia have been very much reduced there, as you will see. I must inform you I have lost a number of my militia, out of the few I had here. I buried at this place fifteen or sixteen, which is as great a proportion as they have lost at Detroit; and one other small part of a company has buried seven. I have never mentioned this part of the subject before, as I thought it best to keep it close. I am informed some Canadians attempted to cross from Long Point to Put-in-bay, but found the ice insufficient, and returned; their object not known. I assure you I have and will continue to use every exertion for the good of the service; I have had the arms, &c. that the Kentuckians threw away at Portage collected, and the principal part brought to this place, and the cattle and some horses have been taken and converted to public use. There is plenty of ammunition at Fort Meigs, but it is scarce on this line. I sent for powder to Meigs, but our means of transportation was such that we only received two hundred pounds half cannon; but I am informed there is a large quantity on board the vessels fixed and unfixed, and six thousand five hundred stand of arms, some field carriages, &c. which I have ordered to be brought over as soon as the ice will permit; the roads are so very bad it has been impracticable. I am well satisfied I have not been ordered to Detroit, and particularly as General Cass appeared to be opposed to it; and I have had an immense trouble in regulating my different posts, and quieting the murmurs of my militia. They are very good; but not such as I used to take the field with when we were first acquainted in the former Indian wars. I have ordered to be transmitted to the Secretary of War the sentence of two general court martials, as I (by the articles of war) am not authorized to approve of the sentence, and have it carried into effect. If those powers are delegated to you, sir, please to inform me by the bearer. Mr. Sallion, who has been stationed at Fort Meigs in the commissary's line, can give you much information on many points that I cannot at present. General Cass, by my request, ordered Colonel Paul to inspect the militia at this post, Portage, Meigs, Findlay, Upper Sandusky, and McArthur, and Captain Moore on the other line, which is completed by this time.

I have the honor to be, with great respect and esteem, your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN S. GANO.

P. S. You will see a great diminution of my force, many being sick and absent, and I having discharged two companies by your order to escort the prisoners, &c. My first report was two thousand one hundred and thirty-four, and the amount ordered to Detroit was near six hundred. You see now the number of effectives there are amazingly reduced.

His Excellency WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

LOWER SANDUSKY, *January 27, 1814.*

DEAR GENERAL:

Captain Payne has called on me to sanction his drawing funds for his department; I have thought proper to refer him to you; I am informed a good supply of corn may be had near a mill forty miles from this. Will it not be advisable to have three or four hundred of meal forwarded on to the army? The flour the contractor's agent promised, should have been here ten days ago, but has not arrived, and owing to the disappointment we are reduced in that article at this [post to nineteen barrels Seneca, seventeen Portage. I sent four barrels there yesterday; at Meigs they are very short, at Winchester they have two or three hundred barrels, but short of meat. I must confess I have been completely deceived and disappointed by them, they having stated it was on the road. I gave them notice 24th December, to have three months' rations at different posts for the number of men specified. Captain Payne knows the situation; you will please give him such directions as you think proper, on this subject; he certainly exerted himself much to my satisfaction, in forwarding provisions and clothing to Detroit: you know him. If he could get leave to settle his accounts it may be best. Excuse this suggestion. If you had not arrived in your district, I was determined to have sent in every direction and purchased provisions at all events for the troops in service, and those that were to relieve them, but I am happy the arrangement has fallen into your hands, for I think *I would hang half of the quartermasters and all the contractors, if I was to remain in service much longer;* and I am astonished how you have managed with them to effect the objects you have, for there appears no system or regularity with any of them. I have ordered one company more to this place from Findlay, and a sergeant, two corporals, and twelve men from Upper Sandusky to that post, which is all the force I can order here from this and the centre line. This day's report is eighty sick, at Meigs. I am happy to inform you the troops at Detroit are recovering, for you see we can afford them but little aid. If a successful attempt is made at Put-in-bay, (which God forbid, and I think impossible,) we may have a visit from them. We will endeavor to give a good account, for my men are in high spirits, and I have added much to the strength of this place; we are not well supplied with ammunition, but have sent for some from the shipping and Franklinton.

I am, with great respect, your humble servant,

JOHN S. GANO.

His Excellency WILLIAM H. HARRISON, *Cincinnati.*LOWER SANDUSKY, *February 10, 1814.*

DEAR GENERAL:

The day before yesterday I returned from Fort Meigs, after making some necessary arrangements there. I have one additional company of men at Portage, who have orders to cross, as soon as the ice will admit, which will fill the complement required. They marched from Fort Findlay; the man who floated off on a cake of ice is safe. It wafed him to the ice fast to the island a—singular escape. I believe the vessel safe, but will be ready to afford all the protection in my power. I have been obliged to discharge some men who had certificates of having served a month last summer a year. The men are all anxious to be relieved; they have had a busy tour, and I would be glad to have those at the island relieved before, or by the time their term of service expires; and if those on this line could be mustered at Upper Sandusky, if you approve, can deposit their arms there, and those of Detroit and Meigs at Winchester or St. Mary's. I will await your orders on this subject, and if I remain alone will keep this post until relieved or ordered away, though I feel anxious to see my family, and particularly on account of the indisposition of a part of it.

I have ordered the arms from this to Franklinton that want repair, and if you advise tents and camp kettles, axes, &c., could be sent in by return wagons. There has been no possible way of removing the six or seven thousand stand of arms, &c. &c. from the vessels. My brigade major has not been able to return, and I think there has been a kind interposition of Providence in the protection of the vessels. This winter, provision has been extremely scanty; we have been reduced to half a barrel flour here, but I ordered from Seneca three barrels, and purchased or borrowed two or three for the company. At Portage, and at Fort Meigs, they were four days without, though twenty-four barrels arrived there the night before I left there, and more expected. Mr. Oliver informs me, supplies will shortly be on to this place; you must have received the news from Detroit as late as this, therefore I will not communicate. Please present my compliments to your good lady and family, and believe me to be, with much esteem,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN S. GANO.

His Excellency MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON.

No. 9.

STATE OF OHIO, *Hamilton county, ss:*

Be it remembered, that, on the 30th day of October, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, at Cincinnati, in the county of Hamilton, John H. Piatt came personally before me, one of the Justices assigned to keep the peace within and for the county of Hamilton, and, being duly sworn, deposed and saith, that, he was acting as purchasing commissary, under an appointment made by General Hull, which was afterwards confirmed by the Secretary of War, a short time after General Harrison took the command of the eighth military district. This deponent declares, that he is not in any degree related to General Harrison by blood, marriage, or otherwise; that they never have at any time been connected in business of any kind, nor have they been jointly concerned in any purchase, sale, or contract, of any description whatever, to the amount of five hundred dollars. This deponent purchased three thousand five hundred hogs, which were delivered at Detroit, at five dollars per hundred, and put into the possession of the contractor's agent; this deponent delivered about eleven hundred barrels of flour at St. Mary's, at ten dollars per barrel, and about the same quantity at Urbana at from eight dollars to eight dollars and fifty cents per barrel; he also purchased beef at different times, by the order of General Harrison, for the use of the army, and, in every instance, the beef purchased by him was delivered at a price below that allowed the contractor by the United States. This deponent states further, that, nearly all the purchases of pork and flour, made by him during the continuance of the contract of Orr and Greely, were made on the requisitions of General Cass and Colonel Butler, in the absence of General Harrison, but were afterwards sanctioned by him. This deponent states further, that, in every instance in which he made a purchase of provisions for the use of the army during the continuance of Colonel Orr's contract, such purchases had been rendered absolutely necessary to save the troops from suffering, and that he did not, in any instance, purchase, or deliver, provisions at any place or post at which the contractors had furnished a sufficient supply, and he avers that all the provisions purchased by him were delivered at such prices as put it in the power of the contractors to make a handsome profit on issuing them to the troops. The pork furnished by this deponent was delivered to the contractor's agent at Detroit, at five dollars per hundred, to be averaged on foot, at which post the contractor was allowed seven cents for each ration of pork, of three quarters of a pound; the flour purchased by this deponent at Urbana was delivered at not more than four and a half cents per pound, when the contract price of each ration of flour (the ration being one pound two ounces,) was six cents and five mills; and this deponent further states, that he has been informed by his agent Mr. Hugh Glenn, and by Captain Oliver, that the requisition for the post at Detroit was made, in the first instance, on the contractors, who refused to comply with it, which will appear from General Cass's and Colonel Butler's requisitions on him. This deponent further states, that, General Harrison's order to him was to issue the provisions then in the commissaries' stores, at the places where such provisions were on hand, but that in all other cases the provisions must be furnished by the contractors.

JOHN H. PIATT.

Sworn and subscribed to before me,

GRIFFIN YEATMAN, *J. P.*

CINCINNATI, OHIO, *November 20, 1815.*

SIR:

John H. Piatt, of Cincinnati, was employed, during the campaign of 1812, first as contractor, and afterwards as commissary to the army commanded by Brigadier General Hull; and in those situations, his conduct was such as to give general satisfaction to the army.

We are, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

JAMES TAYLOR,  
JAMES FINDLAY.

TH. P. JESUP, *Colonel United States Army.*

MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON.

CINCINNATI, *December 29, 1815.*

DEAR SIR:

From Mr. Burnet and other very respectable characters who have lately returned from the Eastern States, I have learned that the industry and motives of a few enemies have produced an impression so general and unfavorable to my reputation, that it becomes a duty to my family, my character, and even my country, to endeavor to remove it. There was no means of accomplishing this which appeared so proper as that of an investigation by the House of Representatives. I have accordingly solicited one by a letter addressed to their Speaker, which is herewith enclosed: it is also accompanied by a statement which I have prepared, with a number of documents to support it. The letter having been presented, you will oblige either to put the statement and documents also in possession of the House, or deliver them to the Committee that may be appointed, as you may judge proper. I cannot believe that there will be any hesitation to grant my request; but if there should, I hope you will be prepared to support my claims. Mr. Bassett, who is my near relation, Mr. Pleasants, and Mr. Nelson of Virginia, will all of them readily yield you their aid, as would Mr. Clay himself if he should have an opportunity of speaking. I will thank you to make known my wishes to these gentlemen. I think it is probable that you may be one of the committee: if you are, I must repeat in this private letter what I have said in that to the Speaker, that I wished the investigation to take the greatest possible scope, and that no sense of delicacy towards me should prevent the asking the officers who may be summoned before the committee any questions which will probe the subject of the investigation to the bottom; and if I have a friend on the committee, he will take that course without the least apprehension that any thing will come to light which would cause him to blush for me. Others have served the country more successfully, but none with more zeal and fidelity than I have done. I claim no reward, I could be contented with obscurity; but I cannot rest under unmerited obloquy. I see that my old opponent [Proctor] has been severely reprimanded by the Prince Regent. My fate has been more hard than his. He had (I presume) a fair trial, I have been condemned unheard. His crime was the loss of an army and a province; mine of having incurred (in what way I know not) the hatred of a minister, and forcing a contractor to do his duty.

I have selected you as the medium of giving the enclosed papers their destination as well from the high opinion I entertain of your character as your being the Representative of my district. The trouble you may give yourself on this occasion will be gratefully remembered by dear sir, your friend and humble servant,

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

HONORABLE JOHN McLEAN, Esq.

HAMILTON COUNTY, ss:

Before me the subscriber, one of the Justices of the Peace in and for the county of Hamilton, came personally James Findlay and Jacob Burnet, who, on oath, depose and say, they are intimately acquainted with Major General William Henry Harrison, and that, during the time he commanded the northwestern army, they had some agency in the management of his private pecuniary concerns, and know that he borrowed money to defray the ordinary expenses of his family. They further state, that, since his resignation, he has increased the loans that were made during the war, for the purpose of improving and stocking his farm at North Bend, which loans he has not refunded to the present day. And these deponents state further, that the said General William H. Harrison is jointly interested with them in fifteen thousand dollars of the stock of the Miami Exporting Company, which is all the stock owned by him in that bank, which amount of stock was purchased with money received from the sale of land situate in the Miami, purchased and owned jointly by him and these deponents prior to the commencement of the late war. These deponents know that the General is, and for many years past has been, possessed of a large and very valuable real estate; but which has not been sufficiently productive to defray his ordinary expenses, in consequence of which he has been under the necessity of having recourse to loans, as above stated. These deponents know, that he proposed, since he left the service, to sell his bank stock for the purpose of raising money to enlarge the improvements on his farm, which was prevented by an offer from the bank to extend his accommodations. These deponents being intimately acquainted with the property, business and circumstances, of General Harrison, are convinced, that he did not add to the value of his estate during the war, and that he left the army more embarrassed than he was when he entered it. The conviction produced on our minds, by a long, intimate, and confidential acquaintance with the General, requires us to declare, on this occasion, that, in point of honor and integrity, he is not excelled by any person in the circle of our acquaintance, and that we believe he would rather sacrifice his fortune than add to it by an act dishonest or dishonorable.

JAMES FINDLAY,  
JAS. BURNET.

Sworn and subscribed to, this twentieth day of January, 1816, by James Findlay, one of the deponents, before me,  
ANDREW MARK, *J. P.*

STATE OF OHIO, ROSS COUNTY, *Mayor's Office, Chillicothe*, ss:

I, Levin Belt, Mayor of the town of Chillicothe aforesaid, do hereby certify, that the foregoing deposition was sworn to and subscribed before me, by Jacob Burnet, one of the members from Hamilton County, of our present Legislature, now in session in this place.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of my office this twenty-sixth day of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixteen.

LEVIN BELT, *Mayor.*

## E.

*Statement, showing the amount expended in the purchase of provisions, for the supply of the army in the eighth military district, in pursuance of instructions from General William H. Harrison, between the 1st of June, 1813, and 1st June, 1814, particularizing those purchased to supply failures on the part of the contractors, Orr and Greely.*

<b>JOHN H. PIATT.</b>		
This amount allowed him for sundry expenditures for provisions in the Commissary's Department, between the 1st June, 1813, and 1st June, 1814, in virtue of instructions from General Harrison, - - - - -	\$13,618 37	
This amount allowed him for the purchase of one thousand four hundred and ninety-one beef cattle, between the 28th August, 1813, and the 12th November, 1813, as per accompanying abstract, marked R, - - - - -	29,547 03	
This amount charged by him for expenditures by him in the purchase of provisions to supply a failure on the part of the contractors, between the 26th of January, 1814, and the 26th April, 1814, in pursuance of instructions from Lieutenant Colonel Butler, of the 3d January, 1814, and of General Harrison, of the 17th January, 1814, and noted in accompanying statement, marked O and G, - - - - -	54,092 97	97,258 37
<b>WILLIAM OLIVER.</b>		
This amount charged by him for sundry expenditures for provisions in the Commissary's Department, between the 1st June, 1813, and 1st June, 1814, - - - - -	18,946 87	
This amount charged by him in the purchase of provisions, and expenses incident thereto, to supply failures on the part of the contractors, between the 29th January and 31st May, 1814, by virtue of authority in him vested by General Harrison, and noted in accompanying statement, marked O and G, - - - - -	40,095 72	59,042 59
<b>GEORGE WALLACE.</b>		
This amount allowed him for provisions furnished by him to Ohio militia at Cleveland, to supply a failure of the contractors, and charged to them by warrant, No. 1,302, in accompanying statement, marked O and G, - - - - -		3,624 36
<b>PIATT &amp; WALLACE.</b>		
This amount allowed them for provisions furnished to supply a failure on the part of the contractors, by virtue of instructions from General Harrison, under date of 7th February, 1814, but, in the opinion of the accountant of the Department of War, not properly chargeable to them, - - - - -		22,128 94
		\$182,054 26

## F.

*Statement showing the amount expended in the purchase of provisions for the supply of the army in the eighth military district, in pursuance of instructions from General Wm. H. Harrison, from the time he took the command until the 1st of June, 1813; also, the amount of provisions deposited, under his directions, by Ebenezer Denny, within the said period, and admitted to the credit of said E. Denny, in the adjustment of his accounts.*

<b>JOHN H. PIATT.</b>		
This amount charged by him for expenditures in the purchase of provisions, in pursuance of instructions from General Wm. H. Harrison, from the time he took the command of the army of the eighth military district, to the 1st of June, 1813, - - - - -		\$291,630 86
<b>J. C. BARTLET.</b>		
This amount allowed him for expenditures as aforesaid, - - - - -		56,972 91
<b>THOMAS BUFORD.</b>		
This amount allowed him for expenditures as aforesaid, - - - - -		59,729 96
<b>SPENGER BALL.</b>		
This amount allowed him in payment of flour furnished by him, under a special contract for the supply of the northwestern army, in April and May, 1813, - - - - -		17,860 00
<b>EBENEZER DENNY.</b>		
This amount allowed him for furnishing provisions, in pursuance of letters, to him directed, from the Secretary of War, under dates of 1st and 26th September, 1812, and deposited as directed by General Harrison, for the use of the northwestern army; admitted to the credit of said Denny, agreeably to a decision of the Secretary of War, under date of 11th January, 1814, - - - - -		261,625 26
		\$687,818 99

Statement showing the sums advanced Orr and Greely, army contractors, under their contracts, bearing date the 10th March, 1813, to supply, from the 1st June, 1813, to the 31st May, 1814, also the cost of provisions purchased to supply failures on the part of the said contractors, and the amount of public provisions turned over to them by public agents.

Time of payment.	How paid.		For what account paid.	Amount.
1813.		No.		
April 10,	By warrant,	607	In payment of their draft, dated March 23, 1813,	10,000 00
June 1,	Do.	823	Advanced them on account,	3,500 00
July 7,	Do.	1,020	Do. do.	8,000 00
" 22,	Do.	1,091	Do. do.	15,000 00
August 4,	Do.	1,193	Do. do.	10,000 00
Sept. 10,	Do.	1,355	In payment of their draft, dated August 29, 1813,	3,000 00
Oct. 6,	Do.	1,476	Do. of their (protested) draft, dated September 15, 1813,	25,000 00
Nov. 3,	Do.	1,584	In payment of their draft dated October 8, 1813,	5,000 00
1814.				
Nov. 11,	Do.	1,639	Do. do. October 2, 1813,	4,522 00
March 4,	Do.	413	Do. do. January 23, 1814,	4,500 00
" 8,	Do.	437	In payment of two drafts, dated January 22, 1814, by Lt. col. A. Butler, for whiskey purchased on account of the contractors,	9,138 25
April 12,	Do.	708	Advanced them on account,	7,000 00
" 13,	Do.	712	Do. do.	4,257 70
" 20,	Do.	751	Do. do.	60,000 00
June 2,	Do.	888	In payment of their draft, dated May 14, 1814,	10,581 07
July 22,	Do.	1,182	Do. do. June 27, 1814,	2,184 61
August 10,	Do.	1,302	In payment of provisions furnished by George Wallace, to Ohio militia, at Cleveland, to supply a failure of the contractors from the 26th March, to the 31st May,	3,624 36
1815.				
Feb. 28,	Do.	2,187	Advanced them on account,	4,508 81
August 22,	Do.	2,839	Do. do.	5,000 00
Dec. 29,	Do.	3,387	In payment of their draft, dated December 8, 1815,	1,511 55
1816.				
Dec. 30,	Do.	3,402	Do. do. December 13, 1815,	5,000 00
January 4,	Do.	3,440	Advanced them on account,	10,000 90
" 10,	Do.	3,517	In payment of their order in favor of Moses Rixby,	6,412 40
" 13,	Do.	3,571	Do. draft, dated January 13, 1816,	1,286 47
" 30,	Do.	3,695	Do. do. December 31, 1815,	1,851 30
" "	Do.	3,701	Do. do. January 26, 1816,	9,595 43
Feb. 19,	Do.	3,794	Do. do. January 24, 1816,	2,321 10
" 21,	Do.	3,813	Do. do. February 20, 1816,	908 32
" 22,	Do.	3,820	Do. do. January 24, 1816,	1,086 16
" 27,	Do.	3,845	Do. do. February 26, 1816,	139 05
March 13,	Do.	3,954	Do. do. March 13, 1816,	419 40
" 26,	Do.	4,037	Advanced them on account,	10,000 00
<i>Quartermaster's Department.</i>				
1813.			This sum advanced Orr and Greely, by John C. Payne, assistant deputy quartermaster general October 9, 1813,	1,000 00
Oct. 9,				
1814.			This sum expended by James McClosky, Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General, in the purchase of whisky, pork, and beef, on account of the contractors, by order of Colonel Croghan, in April and May, 1814,	5,860 60
April & May,				6,860 60
<i>Commissary's Department.</i>				
			This amount charged by John H. Piatt, for expenditures by him in the purchase of provisions, to supply the failure of the contractors, between the 26th January, and 26th April, 1814, in pursuance of General Harrison's order of the 17th January, 1814, and of Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Butler's, dated 3d January, 1814, and which are included in the statement exhibiting the whole expenditure of said J. H. Piatt,	54,092 97
			This amount charged by William Oliver, for expenditures by him in the purchase of provisions, to supply the failure of the contractors, between the 29th January, and 31st May, 1814, by virtue of instructions from General Harrison; and which are included in the statement exhibiting the whole expenditures of the said William Oliver,	40,095 72
			This amount, for public provisions turned over to Orr and Greely, as per abstract marked B, and which constitute a part of the amount in the statements exhibiting the whole expenditures of J. H. Piatt and W. Oliver,	50,889 15
<i>Piatt and Wallace.</i>				\$442,286 42
			This amount allowed Piatt and Wallace, for provisions furnished the northwestern army under a special contract with William Oliver, commissary, in pursuance of General Harrison's instructions of 7th February, 1814, to supply a failure of Orr and Greely; but considered by the accountant of the Department of War not properly chargeable to them,	22,128 94



## G.

*General Abstract of Provisions, &c. transferred to Orr & Greely, Contractors.*

Time when received.	Places where received.	Rations meat.	Rations flour.	Rations whiskey.	Quarts Salt.	Pounds soap.	Pounds candles	Pounds tallow & grease.	Pounds candle-wick.	
October, 1813, - -	River Thames	35,000	5,401							
January, 1814, - -	Seneca,	4,778	3,926	5,032	3,380	512	1,434	-	28	
Oct. 30 to Dec. 5, 1813,	Detroit,	68,032	129,193	31,488	30,244	681	1,274	1,788	123	
Mar. 20 to Ap. 30, 1814,	Detroit,	41,920	170,971	218,328	9,755					
December, 1813, - -	Amherstburgh	2,634	7,886	8,388	255	-	304			
December, 1813, - -	Sandwich,	"	1,035	"	72					
Dec. 1813, and May, 1814	L. Sandusky,	7,435	24,054	27,552	5,442	53	519	1,009		
January, 1814, - -	Fort Gano,	2,399	"	"	1,512	-	125	91		
March and May, 1814,	Fort Meigs,	9,461	29,390	25,688	1,271	1,018	948	1,584		
		171,659	371,856	316,476	53,941	2,264	4,604	4,472	151	61,217 65

Deduct this sum, being an allowance of 12½ per cent. for wastage, and one cent per ration for issuing, and 696 rations for brine,

10,328 50

*Dolls.* 50,889 15

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 151.

[2d SESSION.]

## NUMERICAL FORCE OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 13, 1817.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 14, 1817.*

SIR:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 11th instant, requesting the Secretary of War to communicate to the House the number of officers and privates composing the whole military establishment in the actual service of the United States, particularizing the strength of each corps and regiment, I have the honor to communicate the accompanying general return of the army of the United States, by corps and regiments.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

GEORGE GRAHAM,  
*Acting Secretary of War.*

HON. HENRY CLAY, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

General Return of the Army of the United States, by Regiments and Corps.

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.	Major Generals.	Brigadier Generals.	Aids-de-Camp.	Adjutant and Inspector Generals.	Adjutant Generals.	Inspector Generals.	Quartermaster Generals.	Assistant Adjutant Generals.	Assistant Inspector Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster General.	Assist. Dep. Quartermaster-General.	Topographical Engineers.	Assistant Topographical Engineers.	Paymaster General.	Judge Advocates.	Chaplains.	Hospital Surgeons.	Hospital Surgeons' Mates.	Post Surgeons.	Apothecary General.	Assist. Apothecaries.	Commissary General of Purchases.	Dep. Com. General of Purchases.	Assistant Commissaries of Issues.	Store-keepers.
General Staff,	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	10
General staff of the north division,	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	3	-	-	3	2	4	8	13	-	1	-	1	-	2
General staff of the south division,	1	2	-	-	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	3	-	-	3	2	4	6	10	-	1	-	1	2	3
Total,	2	4	-	1	2	2	2	4	4	2	4	6	-	1	6	4	8	14	23	1	2	1	2	5	13

GENERAL RETURN—Continued.

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Third Lieutenants.	Cadets.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Principal Musicians.	Master Mechanics.	Mechanics.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Artificers.	Laborers.	Privates.	Total commissioned.	Total, non-commissioned and privates.	Aggregate.	REMARKS.
General staff,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	4	On duty at the several arsenals and laboratories.
General staff of the north divis.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	60	60	Distr. in garris. on the coast of New England, north district.
General staff of the south divis.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	49	49	Div. betw. the north and sou. divis. garr. perm't fortifications.
Corps of engineers,	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	19	19	At Mobile, New Orleans, and Baton Rouge, south division.
Ordnance department,	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	10	7	-	-	-	-	15	192	-	-	20	58	186	-	41	477	518	Greenbush, Sackett's Harbor, and fort Niagara, north division.
Regiment of light artillery,	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	38	36	20	-	-	509	38	664	702	Michilim., Green Bay, Chicago, and fort Wayne, north divis.
Corps of artillery,	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	32	32	64	27	-	-	18	-	-	-	135	157	110	-	-	2,037	171	2,457	2,523	Forts Hawkins & Gaines, & on Apalachicola river, south divis.
First regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	9	9	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	37	37	18	-	-	430	38	525	563	At and in the vicinity of Detroit, north division.
Second regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	10	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	38	39	30	-	-	595	39	746	785	Forts Montgomery, Crawford, & Jackson, Alab. riv., south divis.
Third regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	9	9	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	40	37	29	-	-	514	38	624	662	At and in the vicinity of Plattsburg, north division.
Fourth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	10	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	37	34	20	-	-	478	39	573	612	Forts Montgomey, Crawford, & Jackson, Alab. riv., south divis.
Fifth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	10	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	42	37	32	-	-	481	39	596	635	At and in the vicinity of Detroit, north division.
Sixth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	9	9	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	36	27	25	-	-	384	38	476	514	At and in the vicinity of Plattsburg, north division.
Seventh regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	9	9	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	36	32	16	-	-	618	38	705	743	Forts Montgomery, Crawford, & Jackson, Alab. riv., south divis.
Eighth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	9	9	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	36	34	22	-	-	602	38	697	735	Natchitoches, and on the Mississippi river, south division.
Rifle regiment,	1	1	1	-	-	1	2	10	10	10	10	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	38	37	20	-	-	661	37	758	795	Prairie du Chien, and neighboring posts.
Total,	12	16	18	9	9	18	10	19	148	148	172	34	7	9	28	14	15	192	513	507	342	142	186	7,309	736	9,298	10,024	

14th Congress.]

No. 152.

[2d Session.

## RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 17, 1817.

Mr. HARRISON made the following report:

The committee of the House of Representatives, to whom was referred so much of the President's message as relates to the re-organization and classification of the militia, and the report of the acting Secretary of War of the 13th ultimo, report herewith a bill for that purpose.

The organization of regiments, brigades, and divisions, has been adopted by the committee in opposition to very high authority, because it is the one which has heretofore been used in all the States, and because it appeared better suited to the tactics of the present day, than the more complex system of the legion recommended by General Knox in his report of 1790.

The mode of classification contained in the bill has been frequently recommended in the reports of committees of the House, and in those of the Department of War. The effects of this plan will be felt only when the militia are called into the service of the United States, and will not affect the constitution of the corps as it now exists, for the ordinary duties of muster and discipline. The advantages of a system that will bring into the same corps, for the duties of the field, men of the same age and vigor, and throw the burden of military duty upon that class of citizens who would be enabled to perform it with fewer personal sacrifices, were the motives to its adoption.

The junior or middle class will be composed of men who have small families, or those who have none, who are in the full enjoyment of bodily strength and activity, and whose minds will be more easily excited to military ardor and the love of glory, than those of a more advanced period of life.

In the performance of the duty assigned them, the committee progressed thus far without difficulty; but they considered their task as barely commenced. An organization, however perfect, is but a single step towards the desirable object; the great difficulty to be encountered is the *application* of a system of discipline, or military instruction to a great population scattered over an immense territory.

The accomplishment of this object at once is evidently not within the power of the Government. To instruct the present militia of the country to any useful extent, would require a larger portion of their time than they can possibly spare from the duty of providing for their families, unless they are liberally paid; to pay them, would absorb all the resources of the nation. The alternative appears to be, to direct the efforts of the Government to instruct such a portion of the militia as their means will allow, and which would produce the most beneficial result upon the whole mass, leaving to the effects of another system, the gradual introduction of those military acquirements which, in a republican Government, it is so essential for every citizen to possess.

Acting upon this principle, and believing that the instruction which it is in the power of the Government to give would be more usefully bestowed upon the whole of the officers and sergeants of the militia, than upon any particular class, the sections of the bill which relate to this part of the subject have been adopted by the committee. They have also considered it to be proper to annex some estimate of the annual expense of the system they recommend.

Although it may be considered that, by presenting a bill for the "organization and classification" of the militia, and the exposition of their motives which accompany it, the committee have performed the task assigned them by The resolution under which they acted, they have, nevertheless, believed it to be their duty to submit some further views, the result of their deliberations upon this important subject.

This course may be more excusable, as the committee have no hesitation in acknowledging that the plan embraced by the bill is a mere expedient, a choice of difficulties; a system which, although it will place the militia on a much better footing than they have before stood yet it is not likely to produce that great desideratum, that indispensable requisite, in a Government constituted like ours, the diffusion of a military spirit and military information throughout the great mass of the people.

The part of the subject which still remains to be discussed, will be best understood by dividing it into two distinct propositions.

1st. Is it desirable that the whole male population of the United States, of the proper age, should be trained to the use of arms, so as to supersede, under any circumstances, the necessity of a standing army. 2dly. Is it practicable?

The solicitude which has been manifested by the great men, who have successively filled the office of Chief Magistrate of the United States, for the adoption of a system of military discipline for the militia, which would produce the effect contemplated by the first proposition, sufficiently manifests their sense of its importance. The subject was often and warmly recommended by the father of his country; and, at an early period of his administration, a plan for the purpose was proposed by the Secretary of War; and, being corrected agreeably to his suggestions, was submitted to the national Legislature. It is believed that objections to the expense, and supposed difficulty of executing this plan, and not to its object, was the cause of its being rejected. Is the opinion, which prevailed at that period, that an energetic national militia was to be regarded as the capital security of a free republic, less apparent at the present? Has any thing since occurred, either in the history of our own, or of any other country, to show that a standing "army, forming a distinct class in the community," is the proper defence of a Government constituted like ours? Do the events of the late war show that discipline is not necessary for the militia? or does the present aspect of the political world afford so much security as to justify the indifference which prevails in providing an effectual national defence?

It is impossible that any American can recur to many of the events, and particularly to the concluding scenes, of the late war, without feeling that elevation of mind, which a recollection of his country's glory is calculated to produce. There are, however, others, and not a few, that are eminently calculated to show that an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure can be distinctly traced to the want of discipline in the militia. The glorious success which, in several instances, crowned their efforts, was the result of uncommon valor, or of valor united with the advantage of a position suited to their peculiar character. The greater part of the American militia, accustomed from their early youth to the use of fire-arms, are, doubtless, more formidable than any other troops in the world in the defence of a line or rampart. Victories in the field are gained by other qualities; by those disciplined evolutions which give harmony and concert to numerous bodies of men, and enable whole armies to move with the activity and address of single combatants. Let our militia be instructed, and America would be equal to a contest with the rest of the world united. The improvements which have been made in the art of war, since the commencement of the French revolution, give greater advantages to invading and disciplined armies, acting against those of a contrary character, than they before possessed. This arises from their increased activity, produced by the great multiplication of their light troops; the celerity of movement given to the artillery, and, above all, to the improvements in the staff, placing the subsistence of large armies upon a footing of security, beyond what was formerly supposed to be possible. An improvement in tactics, which gives advantages to the professed soldier who fights for conquest, over the citizen who bears arms only in the defence of his country, is, perhaps, to be regretted, and no alternative is left to the latter but to perfect himself in the same arts and discipline. It is believed that there is no instance on record of a republic, whose citizens had been trained to the use of arms, having been conquered by a nation possessing a different form of government. Small republics have been overthrown by those which were more

powerful; as Saguntum, destroyed by Carthage, and Numantia, by Rome. But it has been observed of those governments, that "their walls and towers became their funeral piles, leaving nothing to their conquerors but their ashes."

The committee cannot conceive that any aspect, however pacific it may be, which the Governments of Europe may for the present have assumed towards this country, should be used as an argument to procrastinate, even for a day, any measure calculated to render their future hostility abortive. It cannot be believed that any real friendship can exist in the breast of the sovereigns of that continent for a Government which has been founded upon principles so opposite to theirs, and which, by the happiness it diffuses, affords an eternal satire and reproach upon their conduct. Whatever security there may be derived from their policy, none can certainly be expected from their forbearance; whenever, from a change of circumstances, they may think it proper to change their policy. The liberties of America must then be preserved, as they were won by the arms, the discipline, and the valor of her freeborn sons.

But the defence of our country against a foreign enemy does not constitute the only (perhaps not the chief) motive of military improvements to the extent contemplated by the proposition we are considering. The safety of a republic depends as much upon the equality in the use of arms amongst its citizens, as upon the equality of rights. Nothing can be more dangerous in such a Government than to have a knowledge of the military art confined to a part of the people: for sooner or later that part will govern.

The effects of discipline possessed by a few, to control numbers without, is to be seen in all the despotic Governments of modern, as well as ancient times.

In general, however, the subjects of those despotic Governments, which preserve their authority by standing armies, are not allowed the use of arms; but the use of arms is not alone sufficient. A striking example of this is to be found in one of the Grecian republics: The Spartans were enabled, by the force of discipline alone, to keep in subjection for ages the Helots and other ancient inhabitants of Laconia. These men were not only allowed the use of arms, but upon almost every occasion formed the greater part of the Lacedemonian army: nor were they deficient in bravery. But they were not permitted to learn that admirable discipline which distinguished the opolites or heavy armed infantry of Sparta.

Another important consideration, urging the diffusion of a military spirit amongst our citizens, is the counterpoise it will afford to that inordinate desire of wealth which seems to have pervaded the whole nation, bringing with it habits of luxury, manners, and principles highly unfavorable to our republican institutions.

The first effect of this state of society is the substitution of a standing army for a national militia. Upon this subject the committee beg leave to make a quotation from the report of General Knox, corrected by President Washington. "It is," says the patriotic Secretary, "the introduction of vice and corruption of manners into the mass of the people that renders a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised, and avarice, indolence, and effeminacy of manners predominate, and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate the minds of the youth in the paths of virtue and honor, that a standing army is formed and riveted forever." So true is the principle here contended for, that it is believed, that there is no instance in history of a nation losing its liberties where the military spirit of the people did not decline in the same proportion that the corruption of manners advanced. Nor was any free Government ever overturned by an internal convulsion, until the destruction of that spirit had been first produced in the body of the people. It was not until the amusements of the theatre, the baths, and the public gardens, had superseded the exercises of the Campus Martius, that a Roman army dared to revolt against its country, and with the power of the sword to substitute, for its free institutions, the arbitrary will of a dictator. Eighty years before the successful usurpation of Cæsar, the revolt of an army could have produced no such consequence. But the habits of the people had been changed. No longer in every Roman citizen was to be found a trained and practised soldier; the higher tactics were cultivated, indeed, with zeal and success by a martial nobility. No period had been more prolific of great generals. At none, had the discipline of the legions been so perfect, but they were no longer filled by citizens taking their routine of service. The military had become a distinct profession, composed of men who, in the habits of war and pillage, had forgotten the sacred obligations attached to their character as citizens, and who were ever as ready, upon the suggestion of their leader, to turn their arms against their country as the enemy whom they were raised to oppose.

As in every age, then, and in every country, the same causes will produce the same effects, the palladium of American liberty must be the diffusion of military discipline and a military spirit through the whole body of the people.

But secondly, is the object attainable? That it is not attainable by any of the systems which have heretofore been in use in the United States is very evident from the little success which has attended them. The late war repeatedly exhibited the melancholy fact, of large corps of militia going to the field of battle without understanding a single elementary principle, and without being able to perform a single evolution. Yet militia laws exist and have existed in all the States since the war of the revolution, which set apart, with great precision, a number of days in each year for the purpose of training and discipline. But from this plan no good fruit has ever been produced. It was an error, indeed, common to all the militia systems in use in the United States, that the periods for training were too short and too distant from each other to produce much benefit. To remedy this defect, five camps of discipline have been recommended. One of the reasons which governed the committee in rejecting that part of the Secretary of War's recommendation, has been explained above. But if that objection could be overcome, the committee are far from thinking that the object could at all be accomplished in that way. There is another more formidable obstacle to success; more formidable, because it arises from the nature of our Government and the constitution of the human character. The sentiments and habits of a free country necessarily produce amongst the citizens a superior restlessness under restraint than is to be met with in the subjects of a monarchy. This spirit frequently manifests itself even in a career of military services, where the high interests involved, and in which they largely partake, and the evident necessity of discipline might be supposed able to correct it. There can scarcely be a restraint more vexatious and disgusting to a grown man, than the initiatory lessons of the military art. Military discipline consists in the observances of a number of minute particulars, which, to the novice in arms, have no apparent object; but which form the links of a beautiful and connected system. It is believed that to this cause is to be attributed the little progress which has been made in training the militia of these United States. Nor is there much prospect that any change of system could, with regard to the present militia, produce the result at which we aim.

In searching for landmarks to guide us to our object, it will be in vain that we direct our attention to the modern nations of Europe. From them we can borrow nothing to aid our purpose. Governments formed upon artificial distinctions in society, which estimate their security by the inability of their subjects to resist oppression, can furnish a free people with no guides in organizing a system of defence which shall be purely national. We are, however, not without resource.

The ancient republics, from which we have drawn many of the choicest maxims upon which to found our civil institutions, will furnish also a most perfect model for our system of national defence. The whole secret of ancient military glory—the foundation of that wonderful combination of military skill and exalted valor, which enabled the petty republic of Athens to resist the mighty torrent of Persian invasion, which formed the walls of Sparta, and conducted the Roman legions (influenced, indeed, by unhalloved motives,) to the conquest of the world, will be found in the military education of their youth. The victories of Marathon and Platea, of Cyncephele and Pydna, were the practical results of the exercises of the Campus Martius and Gymnasia. It is on a foundation of this kind, and of this kind only, that an energetic national militia can be established.

"An examination into the employments and obligations of individuals comprising the society," says General Knox, "will evince the impossibility of diffusing an adequate knowledge of the art of war by any other means than a course of discipline during the period of nonage. The time necessary to acquire this important knowledge cannot be afforded at any other period of life with so little injury to the public or private interests." Nothing is more true than what is here advanced; and yet it is most singular that the amiable and patriotic Secretary should have founded his plan upon a course of instruction, to commence within the limits of nonage, indeed, but at so advanced a period of

it, that all the objections which could be made to disciplining the militia at a more advanced age will apply equally to it, with the addition of others which are more cogent, and which are supposed to be inherent in the system itself. Of his advanced corps, composed of the youth of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age, those of eighteen and nineteen are to be drawn out for thirty days in each year, and those of twenty for ten days, to be instructed in camps of discipline.

It has been strongly urged against this plan, that the separation of the youth, at that critical age, from the superintending vigilance of their parents and guardians, would be a very dangerous step; and that the loss of time from the pursuit of their professions and occupations would prove to them a most serious evil.

Whatever force there may be in these objections, the committee are fully persuaded that the improvement to be derived from the execution of this plan would not compensate for the expense and loss of time it would occasion. The perfection of discipline, as it regards the soldier, is the grace, the precision, and address with which he performs certain evolutions. To arrive at this perfection, long continued practice is essential.

And since it must be evident that the time necessary for this purpose cannot be taken from the avocations of our citizens after they have arrived at the age of manhood, the only alternative is to devise a system of military instruction, which shall be engrained on, and form a part of, the ordinary education of our youth.

The organization of a system thus extensive in its operations must necessarily be a work of some time and difficulty. The want of statistical information will prevent the committee from submitting to the House at this time more than the outline of their plan. It is embraced in the following propositions:

As the important advantages of the military part of the education of youth will accrue to the community, and not to the individuals who acquire it, it is proper that the whole expense of the establishment should be borne by the public treasury.

That, to comport with the equality which is the basis of our constitution, the organization of the establishment should be such as to extend, without exception, to every individual of the proper age.

That, to secure this, the contemplated military instruction should not be given in distant schools established for that purpose, but that it should form a branch of education in every school within the United States.

That a corps of military institutions should be formed to attend to the gymnastic and elementary part of education in every school in the United States, whilst the more scientific part of the art of war shall be communicated by professors of tactics, to be established in all the higher seminaries.

The committee are fully aware that the establishment of an institution which, from its nature, is calculated to produce an important change in the manners and habits of the nation, will be received with caution and distrust by a people jealous of their liberties, and who boast of a Government which executes its powers with the least possible sacrifice of individual rights. An encroachment upon individual rights forms no part of their system. It is not a conscription, which withdraws from an anxious parent a son, for whose morals he fears more than for his life. It is not a Persian or Turkish mandate to educate the youth within the purlieu of a corrupt court; but a system as purely republican in practice as in principle.

The means are furnished by the Government, and the American youth are called upon to qualify themselves, under the immediate inspection of their parents, or of tutors chosen by their parents, for the sacred task of defending the liberties of their country.

Although the system of General Knox widely differs from that which has been recommended by the committee, his opinion of the effects to be produced by it is conceived to be more peculiarly applicable to the latter. "If the United States," says he, "possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution for the military instruction of the youth, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its extensive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country, reverence and obedience to its laws, courage and elevation of mind, openness and liberality of character, accompanied by a just spirit of honor. In addition to which, their bodies will acquire a robustness greatly conducive to their personal happiness; while habit, with its silent, but efficacious operations, will durably cement the system."

That the House may possess all the information necessary to act upon this important subject, the committee respectfully recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War be required to prepare, and lay before this House, at the next session of Congress, a plan for the military instruction of all the youth in the United States, in the way which is best calculated for the purpose, with as little injury as possible to the ordinary course of education.

*Estimates of the expenses of training the officers and sergeants of the militia of the United States. These estimates are made on a supposed number of one hundred thousand men, divided equally, as nearly as may be, into twenty-five brigades.*

1. Estimate upon the supposition that the officers and sergeants receive full pay without rations, or an allowance for rations or forage, except to the sergeants for whom rations might be necessary.

Each brigade containing, according to estimate, four thousand men, will be composed of four regiments or forty companies.

There would then be the following field and staff officers who should attend the training:

1 Brigadier, full pay, \$104,	-	-	-	-	-	\$104 00
1 Brigade inspector, with the pay of major,	-	-	-	-	-	50 00
4 Colonels, at \$75,	-	-	-	-	-	300 00
4 Lieutenant colonels, at \$60,	-	-	-	-	-	240 00
4 Majors, at \$50,	-	-	-	-	-	200 00
40 Captains, at \$40	-	-	-	-	-	1,600 00
40 Lieutenants, at \$30,	-	-	-	-	-	1,200 00
40 2d Lieutenants, at \$25,	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 00
160 Sergeants, at \$8 pay, and \$6 for rations,	-	-	-	-	-	2,240 00
Amount of expenses of one brigade,	-	-	-	-	-	\$6,994 00
The adjutant to be taken from the line.						
			Brigades,			25
Expense of training officers for one month, at full pay, of twenty-five brigades, or one hundred thousand men,						\$173,850 00

And, estimating the whole United States' militia at a million, then the total expense of training the officers of the whole militia would be some hundred thousand dollars less than two millions.

The following estimate is made on the supposition of the officers receiving only half pay. The estimate proceeds, however, upon a supposition that no officer is to receive less than thirty dollars per month, and the sergeants full pay and rations.

## 2. Estimate for one hundred thousand men.

1 Brigadier, half pay,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$52 00
1 Brigade inspector,	-	-	-	-	-	-	30 00
4 Colonels, half pay,	-	-	-	-	-	-	150 00
4 Lieutenant colonels, half pay,	-	-	-	-	-	-	120 00
4 Majors, \$30,	-	-	-	-	-	-	120 00
120 Captains and lieutenants, at \$30,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,600 00
160 Sergeants, pay and rations,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,240 00
For officers of one brigade,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$6,312 00
For 25 brigades,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$157,800 00
And for 1,000,000,	-	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$1,578,000 00</u>

At thirty dollars per month, except sergeants; and, leaving them on full pay and rations, then the amount would be varied, as will appear by the third estimate, viz:

134 Officers, in a brigade of 4,000 men, at \$30,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$4,020 00
160 Sergeants, on full pay and rations,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,240 00
One brigade,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$6,260 00
For 100,000, making twenty-five brigades,	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$156,500 00
And for 1,000,000,	-	-	-	-	-	-	<u>\$1,565,000 00</u>

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 153.

[2d Session.]

## MILITIA CLAIMS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 23, 1817.

JANUARY 23, 1817.

I transmit to the Senate a report of the acting Secretary of War, in compliance with their resolution of the 8th instant.

JAMES MADISON.

JANUARY 21, 1817.

The acting Secretary of War, to whom has been referred the resolution of the Senate of the 8th of this month, requesting that the President cause to be laid before the Senate, the amount of money paid by the Government of the United States for the services of militia during the late war, stating the amount to each respective State, and distinguishing, as far as possible, what has been paid for militia called into service by the authority of the Executive of the United States; and that paid for such calls made by authority of a State; and in what cases States have been reimbursed which have made advances for their militia, specifying the State in each case, as before," has the honor to report:

That from the year 1812 to the year 1816, no separate appropriations for militia services having been made by Congress, no distinct accounts consequently have been kept of the amount paid for the services of militia, called into service during the late war, by the authority of the Executive of the United States, or of the amount paid for the services of such as were called into service by authority of a State, and recognized and paid and subsisted by the United States.

The report called for on this subject cannot be made, until all the accounts for military expenditures shall have been settled; nor will it then be practicable to ascertain fully the distinct expenditures in certain cases, as where articles have been used indiscriminately by troops of different descriptions, assembled or acting together. With respect to the pay of the militia, the distinct amount thereof may be ascertained, on an investigation of all the paymaster's accounts, a task which cannot be accomplished during the present session. The very heavy disbursements, on account of the expenses of the militia so called into service, have been made from the following appropriations for the military establishment, viz: "Pay of the army volunteers and militia," "subsistence of the army, volunteers and militia," "quartermaster's department," "medical and hospital department," and "contingencies." In the year 1816, an appropriation for one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars was made on account of militia, which sum has been applied to the reimbursement, in part, of the claims of certain States that had made advances for the support of their militia in the service of the United States, and the statement marked A, which accompanies this report, exhibits the amount expended, the sums reimbursed, and the balances claimed by those States respectively. All which is respectfully submitted.

GEORGE GRAHAM,  
Acting Secretary of War.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

## A.

*Statement of claims exhibited by the following States for Militia services, viz:*

STATES.	Gross amount of claims of each State to whom advances have been made on account of such claims.	Amount advanced by the United States on account of the claims of the several States.	Balance claimed by the several States to whom money has been advanced on account.
New Hampshire, - - - - -	64,552 20	40,000 00	24,552 20
Rhode Island, - - - - -	55,787 7	21,917 67	33,869 40
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	268,556 82	175,000 00	93,556 82
Virginia, - - - - -	1,769,123 99	1,050,000 00	719,123 99
North Carolina, - - - - -	37,479 33	30,000 00	7,479 33
	\$2,195,499 41	\$1,316,917 67	\$878,581 74

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTANT'S OFFICE, January 13, 1817.

PETER HAGNER.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 154.

[2d SESSION.

INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF GENERAL HARRISON WHILE COMMANDING THE NORTHWESTERN ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 23, 1817.

Mr. RICHARD M. JOHNSON made the following report:

The select committee, to whom was referred the letter and documents from the acting Secretary of War on the subject of General Harrison's letter, [See No. 150,] ask leave to report:

That they have investigated the facts involved in this inquiry, by the examination of documents, and a great number of the most respectable witnesses personally acquainted with the transactions upon which the inquiry originated; and the committee are unanimously of opinion that General Harrison stands above suspicion, as to his having had any pecuniary or improper connexion with the officers of the commissariat for the supply of the northwestern army; that he did not wantonly or improperly interfere with the rights of contractors; and that he was in his measures governed by a proper zeal and devotion to the public interest. The committee ask leave to be discharged from the further consideration of the subject; and, as the papers refer in part to the conduct and transactions of the contractors of the northwestern army, whose accounts are unsettled, and only incidentally involved in this inquiry, that the papers be transmitted to the Department of War.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 155.

[2d SESSION.

BREVET RANK.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 28, 1817.

Mr. LOWNDES made the following report:

The Committee of Ways and Means, in examining the estimates for the military service for the year 1817, have had their attention drawn to the charge produced by brevet commissions, not more by its amount than its uncertainty. It is stated that this charge is continually fluctuating by the removal of brevet officers to or from posts which before were commanded by officers without brevets. The committee will not be expected to discuss the military question, Whether the number and grade of officers in our service be adequate to the number of troops which they are required to command? But, if they are adequate, it should seem that brevet officers cannot be assigned "to separate posts, districts, or detachments, unless officers whose lineal rank qualifies them for such posts are unemployed." Such would be the fact, if the terms which have been referred to were considered as conveying any definite limitation. The committee, however, believe that, in their construction, they have not been so considered. The effect has substantially been, that the proportion of the higher officers to the whole force of the army has been greater than was intended by the act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States. As the committee suppose that this effect was not intended to be produced by the act which authorized the President to confer brevet rank, (the value of which as a testimony of public approbation was not expected to result from additional pay, which, indeed, was not made its permanent appendage,) they have directed their chairman to report a bill repealing the provision which entitles officers breveted under the act of the 6th July, 1812, to additional pay or emoluments. By an act passed in 1802, the commanding officer of each separate post may be allowed such additional rations as the President may direct. This provision, which is probably necessary to enable an inferior officer to bear the increased expenses which the command of a post cannot fail in his case to produce, does not seem to the committee to be justly applicable to an officer of superior rank. They submit a clause upon this subject in the bill which they report.

14th CONGRESS.]

No. 156.

[2d SESSION.]

## MILITIA CLAIMS OF MARYLAND.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 24, 1817.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 24, 1817.*

SIR:

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate, dated the 22d instant, "requesting the acting Secretary of War to lay before the Senate the probable amount of the claim of the State of Maryland, for militia services during the late war, and such information as he may be in possession of; on that subject," I have the honor to state, that no specific account of the expenses incurred by the State of Maryland for militia services during the late war has been rendered. The enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. John L. Kerr, who is the agent appointed by the State of Maryland to adjust her claim against the United States, exhibits the general information in the possession of this Department on the subject.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

GEORGE GRAHAM.

HON. JOHN GAILLARD, *President of the Senate.*UNION HOTEL, GEORGETOWN, *February 22, 1817.*

SIR:

In the conversations, which I have had the honor to hold with you, on the subject of the claims of the State of Maryland, for a reimbursement of expenditures, incurred by calling out her militia, to resist the repeated incursions, and to meet the attacks of the common enemy, (sudden and grievous as they were to her citizens) I explained to you the cause of my inability to lay before you, at this time, an exact specification of the various heads of advances made for this object by the authority of our State, always in full assurance that they must be ultimately indemnified. I beg leave, sir, to repeat to you that the late period of the enactment by our Legislature, at their late session, of a law for the purpose of causing these claims to be formally presented for liquidation, rendered it impracticable to bring with me at once such precise statements and vouchers, as may be requisite for their final adjustment. I hoped, however, that no difficulty would arise in the way of my obtaining, at this time, from the authority of the President, through your Department, a recognition of such general principles as would embrace the entire demand of Maryland, and afford to me a proper basis, on which I might soon prepare a satisfactory account. In our last conference on this subject, I distinctly understood from you, that all expenses incurred by an individual State, in calling out the militia for the purpose of repelling an invasion, or a menace of attack from the enemy, would be reimbursed where there had been either a previous requisition or subsequent approbation of such calls by the Government of the United States; but you declined to concede another principle, about which I was chiefly anxious, and in which the State of Maryland is most concerned, that, where the militia has been called forth by State authority to repel an invasion or threatened invasion of the enemy, in those emergencies which were constantly occurring during the late war, and which the laws of such State recognized as fit occasions for arraying its military force, the Government of the United States, being bound by the constitution to provide for the common defence, and to protect each State against invasion, will ratify the measure and assume the expenses incurred. Under the sanction of the first two principles, to the full extent of which, I understand, there are, in your Department, precedents of claims of States, already liquidated or assumed, a part of those of Maryland will be, in a short time, arranged and presented for settlement, and on the last ground I have stated, I flatter myself, that when I shall be prepared to produce explicit evidence of the actual services rendered by our militia, and of the nature of the emergencies under which they were called out, a just and fair interpretation of the constitution and existing laws will enable you to assume the residue of our demand.

Exposed as Maryland, by its peculiar geographical situation, will always be to the ravages of war, in any contest with an enemy having a naval superiority, she must, necessarily, as in the late war with Great Britain, become an involuntary creditor of the United States, whose Government is bound by the principles of the federal compact, to protect her: and in those distressing emergencies which will admit of no delay to obtain a previous assurance of reimbursement of her expenditures, she must promptly put forth her energies and resources for her own protection, and, consequently, for the general defence; and she must liberally confide in the justice and sound policy of the General Government, to indemnify her, in all cases, for such indispensable advances for the common security. To anticipate a refusal on the part of the General Government, as to the exigencies of the late war, to adopt such a liberal construction of its powers and duties, as will fulfil the just expectations of the people of Maryland, would be to impute to it a system of policy, which seems to me as incompatible with the future safety of our common country as its good faith.

It is not my intention, sir, to enter at this time into any further discussion of the grounds on which the claims confided to me by the Government of Maryland, for adjustment with that of the United States, may be supported either on constitutional principles, or by the authority of precedents, already established in the assumption or liquidation of similar claims of other States, inasmuch as I am not yet prepared to lay before you the required specification of all the different heads of expenditure, which compose this mass of claim, and to support them by the proper vouchers, and because I entertain the strongest hope that, when they shall be fully explained and understood they will receive, without difficulty, the sanction of the President.

A principal motive for now addressing you this note, is to place in your Department, a mere evidence of the present demand of the State of Maryland on the Government of the United States for expenses incurred for the pay and subsistence of militia, called out at different periods of the late war with Great Britain, and other charges incident to such calls, in order to enable you to answer an inquiry, which I have reason to hope will be made by the Committee of Finance in the Senate, who, I understand, are about to close the appropriations for the present year: therefore, reserving the right of hereafter presenting any additional claims, which may exist, I beg leave to state the amount of the present demand, as estimated to the first of December 1816, at the sum of two hundred and sixty-five thousand three hundred and forty-seven dollars and forty-four cents.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN LEEDS KERR.

The Hon. GEORGE GRAHAM, *acting Secretary of War.*



15th CONGRESS.]

No. 157.

[1st SESSION.

## DAMAGES FOR ENLISTING A MINOR.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 12, 1817.

Mr. WILLIAMS made the following report:

The Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the petition and documents of Alexander Worster, of the State of Massachusetts, have had the same under consideration, and submit to the house the following report:

That on the 31st day of January, A. D. 1815, the petitioner, acting as captain in the service of the United States, enlisted one Noah Hasty, who, at the time, represented himself to be more than twenty-one years of age, and was verily believed by the petitioner. Afterwards the said Hasty was discharged by writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that he was under age, and enlisted without the consent of his father. And after this again, the father commenced suit against the petitioner for retaining his son, and at a supreme judicial court holden for the county of York, in the State aforesaid, recovered judgment against him for the sum of sixty dollars damage, and fifty-five dollars and twenty-seven cents costs of suit, which he has been obliged to pay, with other large sums, in defence of said suit.

The petitioner further states, that, as an officer of the United States, he could not discharge said soldier till satisfied of his minority, and that this did not appear while he retained him. He therefore asks indemnification from Congress.

The eleventh section of the act of 1802, fixing the military peace establishment, provides, "That no person under twenty-one years of age shall be enlisted by any officer, or held in the service of the United States, without the consent of his parent, guardian, or master, first had and obtained; and if any officer shall enlist any person contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, for every such offence he shall forfeit and pay the amount of the bounty and clothing which the person so recruited may have received from the public; to be deducted out of the pay and emoluments of such officer."

Such is the law by which it is presumed the petitioner should have been governed. The committee then are of the opinion, that the losses of which he complains, and for which he asks remuneration, are the inevitable consequences of his own wrong, and against which he ought to have used the necessary precaution; that it appears to them unreasonable for the Government to interpose; that they are not apprized of any similar case in which relief has been extended, and that to do so in this would be unprecedented and improper. They therefore recommend to the House the following resolution:

*Resolved,* That the prayer of the petitioner ought not to be granted.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 158.

[1st SESSION.

## STRENGTH OF THE ARMY, AND ITS DISPOSITION.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 22, 1817.

DECEMBER 22, 1817.

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 11th of this month, requesting to be informed of the present strength of the army of the United States, its distribution among the several military posts which it is designed to protect, and its competency to preserve and defend the fortifications amongst which it is distributed, and to aid in constructing such other military works, if any, as it may be deemed proper to erect, for the more effectual security of the United States, and of the territories thereof, I now transmit a report from the Secretary of War, which contains the information desired.

JAMES MONROE.

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives requesting the President of the United States "to cause to be laid before the House of Representatives a return of the present strength of the army of the United States, with the distribution thereof among the several military posts which it is designed to protect, together with any information which he may be able to afford respecting the competency of such force to preserve and defend the fortifications amongst which it is distributed, and to aid in constructing and to defend such other military works, if any, as it may be in the contemplation of the Government to erect, for the more effectual security of the United States, and of the several territories thereof," the Secretary of War has the honor to make a return of the present strength of the army of the United States, with the distribution thereof among the several military posts.

The military establishment, as it now stands, is sufficiently extensive to keep the fortifications in a state of preservation, but is wholly inadequate to defend them against a regular attack by a force of sufficient strength and skill. To garrison the forts on the maritime frontier alone would require, according to the best information and estimates of this Department, more than thrice our present number to repel the assaults of such a force. The portion of the army stationed in the neighborhood of fortifications now erecting is employed to aid in constructing them; but only an inconsiderable number has yet been so engaged, owing to its dispersed situation. Though not immediately comprehended in the resolution of the House, it is but justice to the army to observe that it has been employed to a considerable extent the last year in the construction of roads, arsenals, and other public works connected with the defence of the country.

The existing fortifications are thought to be wholly insufficient in the event of a future war. As the declaration of war is the act of the whole community, justice, honor, and humanity require that every portion of the country should, as far as possible, be protected against its ravages. This is among the most sacred duties of the Government; and, impressed with its importance, a board of the most skilful officers in our service has been constituted to examine the whole line of our frontier, and to determine on the position and extent of works that may be necessary to the defence of the country. This great work is not yet completed; and, in its present state, it is impossible to speak with any precision as to the extent to which our fortifications ought to be carried. The soldiers will be able to render important aid in constructing the works that may be determined on; but, from the composition of the army, they can only come in aid of regular and professed workmen.

J. C. CALHOUN.



Distribution of the army of the United States, showing the strength of posts and garrisons.

DIVISION OF THE NORTH—MAJOR GENERAL JACOB BROWN.

Department.	Fortification, cantonment, or post.	Commanding officer.	Corps.	Aggregate strength.	
Department No. 2. Colonel Miller, 5th Infantry, brevet Brigadier General,	Fort George, Castine, Maine,	Captain Leonard,	Light artillery,	60	
	Fort Preble, Portland, Maine,	Captain Crane, brevet Major,	Corps of artillery,	118	
	Fort Constitution, Portsmouth, N. H.	Captain Walback, brevet Lieut. Colonel,	Do.	236	
	Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Massachusetts,	Captain Harris, brevet Lieut. Colonel,	Light artillery,	76	
	Fort Independence, Boston, Massachusetts,	Major Eustis, brevet Lieutenant Colonel,	Do.	290	
	Fort Warren, Boston, Massachusetts,	Captain Brooks, brevet Major,	Do.	51	
	Fort Wolcott, Newport, Rhode Island,	Captain Towson, brevet Lieut. Colonel,	Do.	65	
	Fort Adams, Newport, Rhode Island,	Captain Eastman,	Do.	53	
	Fort Trumbull, New London, Connecticut,	Captain McDowell,	Do.	73	
	Arsenal, Charlestown, Massachusetts,	Captain Talcott,	Ordnance,	49	
Department No. 3. Brigadier General Scott, brevet Major General,	Fort Columbus, New York,	Major Hindman, brevet Colonel,	Corps of artillery,	194	
	Fort Lewis, New York,	Captain Sweet, brevet Major,	Do.	78	
	Fort Wood, New York,	Captain Romayne,	Do.	74	
	Arsenal, New York,	Captain Tyler,	Ordnance,	21	
	Fort Mifflin, near Philadelphia,	Captain T. Biddle, brevet Major,	Corps of artillery,	108	
Department No. 4. Col. Porter, Light Artillery, brevet Brigadier General,	Fort McHenry, Baltimore,	Captain Hall,	Do.	105	
	Fort Severn, Annapolis,	Captain Reed,	Do.	88	
	Fort Washington, on the Potomac,	Captain Jones, brevet Lieutenant Colonel,	Do.	187	
	Arsenal, Frankfort, Pennsylvania,	Captain Rees,	Ordnance,	33	
	Arsenal, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania,	Major Wooley,	Do.	35	
	Arsenal, near Baltimore,	1st Lieutenant Baden,	Do.	31	
	Cantonment near Plattsburg, New York,	Colonel Atkinson,	6th regiment infantry,	428	
	Fort Pike, Sackett's Harbor, New York,	Captain Hieleman,	Corps of artillery,	101	
	Cantonment, Sackett's Harbor, New York,	Colonel Brady,	2d regiment infantry,	460	
	Cantonment, Greenbush, New York,	Captain Smith, brevet Major,	Do.	71	
Department No. 1. Brigadier General Scott, brevet Major General,	Fort Niagara, New York,	Lieutenant Colonel Pinkney,	Do.	87	
	Do.	Captain Gates,	Corps of artillery,	92	
	Arsenal near Troy, New York,	Major Dalaby,	Ordnance,	30	
	Arsenal, Rome, New York,	1st Lieutenant Welch, brevet Captain,	Do.	17	
	Fort Shelby, Detroit, Michigan,	2d Lieutenant Mellon,	Corps of artillery,	65	
	Cantonment, Detroit, Michigan,	Lieutenant Colonel Smith,	5th regiment infantry,	249	
	Grosse Isle, Detroit river, opposite Malden,	Captain Foster,	Do.	55	
	Fort Wayne, head of the river Miami of the Lake,	Captain Vose, brevet Major,	Do.	56	
	Fort Gratiot, outlet of lake Huron,	Major McNeil, brevet Colonel,	Do.	49	
	Michilimackinac,	Captain Pierce,	Corps of artillery,	77	
Department No. 5. Brigadier General Macomb, brevet Major General,	Do.	Captain Greene,	3d regiment infantry,	98	
	Fort Howard, Green Bay,	Major Taylor,	Do.	224	
	Fort Dearborn, Chicago,	Captain Baker, brevet Major,	Do.	93	
	Fort Harrison, Indiana,	Captain Chunn, brevet Major,	Do.	76	
	Arsenal, Detroit,	3d Lieutenant Howard,	Ordnance,	2	
			Total,	4,355	

DISTRIBUTION—Continued.

DIVISION OF THE SOUTH—MAJOR GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON.

Department.	Fortification, cantonment, or post.	Commanding officer.	Corps.	Aggregate strength.
Department No. 6. Brigadier General Gaines, brevet Major General,	Fort Nelson, Norfolk, Virginia, . . . . .	Captain Yeaton, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	64
	Fort Norfolk, Norfolk, Virginia, . . . . .	Captain Lomax, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	50
	Craney Island, Norfolk, Virginia, . . . . .	Captain E. A. Allen, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	43
	Fort Johnston, Smithville, North Carolina, . . . . .	Captain Wilson, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	67
	Arsenal, Richmond, Virginia, . . . . .	Captain Hayden, . . . . .	Ordnance, . . . . .	34
	Arsenal, Washington City, . . . . .	1st Lieutenant Nelson, brevet Captain, . . . . .	Ordnance, . . . . .	42
Department No. 7.	Fort Moultrie, Charleston, South Carolina, . . . . .	Major Bankhead, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	74
	Fort Johnson, Charleston, South Carolina, . . . . .			
	Tybee Barracks, Savannah, Georgia, . . . . .	None, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	-
	Encampment, Point Petre, Georgia, . . . . .	Captain Payne, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	83
	Fort Scott, Point Petre, Georgia, . . . . .	Captain Donoho, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	42
	Arsenal, Charleston, South Carolina, . . . . .	Captain Margart, . . . . .	Ordnance, . . . . .	1
	Cantonment, Montpelier, 9 ms. from Ft. Montgomery, . . . . .	Captain Cutler, brevet Major, . . . . .	4th regiment infantry, . . . . .	350
	Fort Montgomery, on the Alabama river, . . . . .	Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle, . . . . .	7th regiment infantry, . . . . .	421
	Fort Crawford, 45 miles from Fort Montgomery, . . . . .	Captain Vashon, . . . . .	7th regiment infantry, . . . . .	97
	Fort Charlotte, Mobile, . . . . .	1st Lieutenant T. I. Beal, brevet Captain, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	52
Fort Bowyer, Mobile Point, . . . . .	2d Lieutenant R. Beal, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	28	
Fort St. Philip, Plaquemines, . . . . .	Captain Humphreys, brevet Major, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	79	
Petite Coquille, outlet of lake Pontchartrain, . . . . .	Captain W. O. Allen, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	69	
Department No. 8. Brigadier General Ripley, brevet Major General,	New Orleans, Louisiana, . . . . .	Captain Peychaud, . . . . .	1st regiment infantry, . . . . .	63
	Natchitoches, Louisiana, . . . . .	Lieutenant Colonel Trimble, . . . . .	1st and 8th reg'ts infantry, . . . . .	182
	Covington, Louisiana, . . . . .	Captain Miles, . . . . .	1st regiment infantry, . . . . .	124
	Passa Christiana, . . . . .	Captain Murray, . . . . .	Corps of artillery, . . . . .	51
	Passa Christiana, . . . . .	Colonel Nicholas, . . . . .	1st and 8th reg'ts infantry, . . . . .	281
	Baton Rouge, . . . . .	Major Whartenby, . . . . .	1st regiment infantry, . . . . .	217
	Fort Hampton, Mississippi, . . . . .	Captain Willis, . . . . .	8th regiment infantry, . . . . .	67
	Arsenal, New Orleans, . . . . .	3d Lieutenant Symington, . . . . .	Ordnance, . . . . .	3
	Fort Osage, Missouri river, . . . . .	Captain Dorman, . . . . .	8th regiment infantry, . . . . .	49
	Fort Clark, Illinois river, . . . . .	1st Lieutenant Humphreys, . . . . .	8th regiment infantry, . . . . .	30
	Belle Fontaine, Missouri Territory, . . . . .	Captain O. Fallen, . . . . .	Rifle regiment, . . . . .	159
	Fort Edwards, Illinois Territory, . . . . .	Captain Ramsey, . . . . .	Rifle regiment, . . . . .	64
Department No. 9. Colonel Smith, Rifle Regiment, brevet Brigadier General,	Fort Armstrong, Rock Island, . . . . .	Major Morgan, . . . . .	Rifle regiment, . . . . .	132
	Fort Crawford, Prairie du Chien, . . . . .	Lieutenant Colonel Chambers, . . . . .	Rifle regiment, . . . . .	218
	Arsenal, Newport, Kentucky, . . . . .	Captain Richardson, . . . . .	Ordnance, . . . . .	22
	Arsenal, Belle Fontaine, . . . . .	Captain Magee, . . . . .	Ordnance, . . . . .	3
			Total, . . . . .	3,261

Note.—Although more than 3,000 men have been recruited during the present year, the number has not equalled the discharges, as the term of all the war soldiers enlisted previous to 1813 has expired. The difference of the returns by regiments and corps, and the returns by posts and garrisons, may be accounted for by the former including all officers and privates, whether present or absent. Since the date of the above returns, the 4th and 7th regiments of infantry, and several companies of artillery, have been temporarily assigned to the frontiers of Georgia.

D. PARKER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 159.

[1st SESSION.

## LIST OF BREVET OFFICERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 29, 1817.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 23, 1817.

SIR:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, directing the Secretary of War to "report a list of all the officers who held brevet rank in the army of the United States, at the close of the late war, noting their respective lineal rank at the time at which their brevet rank was conferred on them, together with a list of all the officers of the present army who now hold a brevet higher than their lineal rank, and of these, the number and grade of all such officers as actually receive, in virtue of their brevet rank, greater pay or emolument than they would be otherwise entitled to by law." I have the honor to transmit a list of the officers who held brevet rank in the army of the United States at the close of the late war, marked A; and a list of all the officers of the present army of the United States, who now hold brevets higher than their lineal rank, marked B; and a list of the officers who were commanding departments and posts, and exercising their brevet rank, respectively, at the last returns, marked C.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

To the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives, U. S.

A.

*A list of officers who held brevet rank in the army of the United States at the close of the late war.*

Names.	Lineal rank.	Brevet rank.	Names.	Lineal rank.	Brevet rank.
A. Macomb,	Brig. General.	Maj. General.	Wm. O. Butler,	Captain.	Major.
E. P. Gaines,	do.	do.	J. B. Murdoch,	do.	do.
W. Scott,	do.	do.	John M. Davis,	do.	do.
E. W. Ripley,	do.	do.	M. Marston,	do.	do.
Moses Porter,	Colonel.	Brig. General.	T. L. Butler,	do.	do.
J. G. Swift,	do.	do.	B. Watson,	do.	do.
James Miller,	do.	do.	George McGlassin,	do.	do.
C. Freeman,	Lt. Col.	Colonel.	Thomas Harrison,	do.	do.
John R. Fenwick,	do.	do.	D. Ketchum,	do.	do.
George E. Mitchell,	do.	do.	H. Chotard,	do.	do.
T. Aspinwall,	do.	do.	B. Birdsall,	do.	do.
Z. Pike,	Major.	Lt. colonel.	S. Vail,	do.	do.
Abr. Eustis,	do.	do.	W. Laval,	do.	do.
George Bonford,	do.	do.	G. C. Allen,	do.	do.
William McRee,	do.	Colonel.	L. Austin,	do.	do.
J. V. Ball,	do.	Lt. colonel.	E. Montgomery,	do.	do.
George Armistead,	do.	do.	G. D. Smith,	do.	do.
Thomas S. Jesup,	do.	Colonel.	J. Read,	do.	do.
J. E. Wool,	do.	Lt. colonel.	Wm. J. Worth,	do.	do.
J. Hindman,	do.	do.	Richard Zantzinger,	1st Lieutenant.	Captain.
H. Perre,	do.	do.	D. Frazer,	do.	Major.
H. Leavenworth,	do.	Colonel.	E. De Russey,	do.	Captain.
R. Butler,	do.	Lt. colonel.	John Mountfort,	do.	do.
J. McNeal,	do.	Colonel.	Chester Root,	do.	do.
W. H. Overton,	do.	Lt. colonel.	Harold Smyth,	do.	do.
T. Chambers,	do.	do.	David Riddle,	do.	Major.
W. Piatt,	do.	do.	John P. Livingston,	do.	Captain.
D. Appling,	do.	do.	Benj. F. Larned,	do.	do.
Wm. Lawrence,	do.	do.	David B. Douglas,	do.	do.
George M. Brooke,	do.	Colonel.	Samuel Spotts,	do.	do.
R. H. McPherson,	do.	Lt. colonel.	William Gibbs,	do.	do.
J. Whistler,	Captain.	Major.	N. S. Clark,	do.	do.
H. McCall,	do.	do.	Charles J. Nourse,	do.	do.
John B. Walback,	do.	do.	Henry Whiting,	do.	do.
E. Humphrey,	do.	do.	Richard K. Call,	do.	do.
A. P. Hayne,	do.	do.	John W. Holding,	do.	do.
J. B. Crane,	do.	do.	Johnathan Kearsley,	do.	do.
Roger Jones,	do.	Lt. colonel.	Joseph Gleason,	do.	do.
J. H. Boyle,	do.	Major.	George Watts,	2d Lieutenant.	1st Lieutenant.
Alex. S. Brooks,	do.	do.	E. B. Randolph,	do.	do.
Nathan Towson,	do.	Lt. colonel.	John Watmaugh,	do.	do.
S. B. Archer,	do.	Major.	Joshua Brant,	do.	do.
Thomas Biddle,	do.	do.	George Trescot,	do.	do.
S. D. Harris,	do.	Lt. colonel.	J. J. Cromwell,	do.	do.
J. A. Burd,	do.	Major.	H. M. Campbell,	do.	Captain.
W. Youngs,	do.	do.	J. S. Schumck,	do.	1st Lieutenant.
J. Pentland,	do.	do.	R. M. Kirby,	do.	Captain.
R. Desha,	do.	do.	John P. Dieterich,	do.	1st Lieutenant.
J. T. Chunn,	do.	do.	H. C. Story,	do.	do.
J. G. Totten,	do.	Lt. colonel.	Richard H. Lee,	3d Lieutenant.	do.
C. Larrabee,	do.	Major.	P. O. Fling,	do.	do.
A. C. W. Fanning,	do.	do.	Charles Cisna,	do.	2d Lieutenant.
W. S. Foster,	do.	do.	Samuel Riddle,	do.	do.
S. Burbank,	do.	do.	Joseph Leach,	do.	do.
J. L. Baker,	do.	do.			

## B.

*A list of all the officers of the present army of the United States, who now hold brevets higher than their lineal rank.*

Names.	Lineal rank.	Brevet rank.	Names.	Lineal rank.	Brevet rank.
Alexander Macomb,	Brig. General.	Maj. General.	W. Youngs,	Captain.	Major.
E. P. Gaines,	do.	do.	J. T. Chunn,	do.	do.
Winfield Scott,	do.	do.	J. G. Totten,	do.	Lt. colonel.
E. W. Ripley,	do.	do.	T. Stockton,	do.	Major.
Moses Porter,	Colonel.	Brig. General.	C. Larrabee,	do.	do.
T. A. Smith,	do.	do.	A. C. W. Fanning,	do.	do.
Joseph G. Swift,	do.	do.	William S. Foster,	do.	do.
Daniel Bissell,	do.	do.	S. Burbank,	do.	do.
James Miller,	do.	do.	M. Marston,	do.	do.
John R. Fenwick,	Lt. Colonel.	Colonel.	Benjamin Watson,	do.	do.
George E. Mitchell,	do.	do.	G. McGlassin,	do.	do.
Thomas S. Jesup,	do.	do.	D. Ketchum,	do.	do.
Ab. Eustis,	Major.	Lt. colonel.	H. Chotard,	do.	do.
William McRee,	do.	Colonel.	Sylvanus Thayer,	do.	do.
George Armistead,	do.	Lt. colonel.	William Laval,	do.	do.
J. Hindman,	do.	Colonel.	Benjamin Birdsall,	do.	do.
Henry Leavenworth,	do.	do.	L. Austin,	do.	do.
J. McNeal,	do.	do.	E. Montgomery,	do.	do.
William Lawrence,	do.	Lt. colonel.	G. D. Smith,	do.	do.
George M. Brook,	do.	Colonel.	William J. Worth,	do.	do.
John B. Walback,	Captain.	Lt. colonel.	Daniel Riddle,	do.	do.
Moses Sweet,	do.	Major.	Joseph S. Nelson,	1st Lieutenant.	Captain.
E. Humphreys,	do.	do.	D. T. Welsh,	do.	do.
E. Cutler,	do.	do.	D. B. Douglass,	do.	do.
Peter Muhlenburg,	do.	do.	T. J. Beall,	do.	do.
J. Dinkins,	do.	do.	R. A. Zantzinger,	do.	do.
J. Dorman,	do.	do.	C. Root,	do.	do.
Daniel Baker,	do.	do.	J. Mountfort,	do.	do.
R. Gray,	do.	do.	Samuel Spotts,	do.	do.
J. B. Crane,	do.	do.	William Gibbs,	do.	do.
Roger Jones,	do.	Lt. colonel.	R. K. Call,	do.	do.
A. S. Brooks,	do.	Major.	G. Gooding,	do.	do.
Nathan Towson,	do.	Lt. colonel.	J. Gleason,	do.	do.
S. B. Archer,	do.	Major.	J. W. Holding,	do.	do.
Thomas Biddle,	do.	do.	B. F. Larned,	do.	do.
J. Sproul,	do.	do.	J. P. Livingston,	do.	do.
J. H. Vose,	do.	do.	T. P. McMahon,	2d Lieutenant.	1st Lieutenant.
William Bradford,	do.	do.	H. C. Story,	do.	do.
S. D. Harris,	do.	Lt. colonel.	J. Schmuck,	do.	do.
John A. Burd,	do.	Major.	E. Brimhall,	do.	do.
J. Selden,	do.	Lt. colonel.	J. S. Abeel,	do.	do.
Turner Croker,	do.	Major.	Richard H. Lee,	do.	do.
D. E. Twiggs,	do.	do.	J. B. Brant,	do.	do.

## C.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, December 23, 1817.

By the last returns received at this office, the following officers of the army were commanding departments and posts, and exercising their brevet rank respectively, viz:

Brigadier General Macomb, brevet major general, commanding department No. 5.  
 Brigadier General Gaines, brevet major general, commanding the eastern section of the south division.  
 Brigadier General Scott, brevet major general, commanding department No. 1 and 3.  
 Brigadier General Ripley, brevet major general, commanding department No. 8.  
 Colonel T. A. Smith, brevet brigadier general, commanding department No. 9.  
 Colonel Porter, brevet brigadier general, commanding department No. 4, and  
 Colonel Miller, brevet brigadier general, commanding department No. 2.  
 At Fort Preble, Portland, Maine, Captain Crane of artillery, brevet major.  
 Fort Constitution, Portsmouth, Captain Walback, do. do. lieutenant colonel.  
 Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Captain Harris, light artillery, do. lieutenant colonel.  
 Fort Independence, Boston, Major Eustis, do. lieutenant colonel.  
 Fort Warren, do. Captain Brooks, do. do. major.  
 Fort Willcot, Newport, R. Island, Captain Towson, do. do. lieutenant colonel.  
 Fort Columbus, New York, Captain Stockton, artillery, do. major.  
 Fort Mifflin, Philadelphia, Captain Biddle, do. do. major.  
 Fort Washington, Potomac, Captain Jones, do. do. lieutenant colonel.  
 Fort Gratiot, outlet of Lake Huron, Major McNeal, Jun. 5th infantry, brevet colonel.  
 Greenbush, near Albany, Captain Smith, 2d do. do. major.  
 Fort Harrison, Indiana, Captain Chunn, 3d do. do. major.  
 Chicago, Captain Baker, 3d do. do. major.  
 Harbor of New York, Major Hindman, artillery, do. colonel.  
 Fort Wayne, Ohio, Captain Vose, 5th infantry, do. major.  
 Fort Charlotte, Mobile, First Lieutenant Beall, artillery, do. captain.  
 Fort St. Philip, Louisiana, Captain Humphrey, do. do. major.  
 Cantonment, Mount Pelier, Captain Cutler, 4th infantry, do. major.  
 Arsenal at Greenleaf's Point, First Lieutenant Nelson, ordnance, do. captain.  
 Arsenal at Rome, First Lieutenant Welch, do. do. captain.

The stations of the above officers are liable to constant change; other officers not breveted, may succeed to those stations; and other brevet officers may also be called to separate commands; hence it is impossible to state accurately what officers of the army may be so commanding as to entitle them to pay according to their brevets, which are restricted by regulation as far as the laws and articles of war will justify. See pages 17, 35, and 52 of the Military Laws and Regulations.

In addition to the foregoing, the following officers of the corps of engineers, who held brevets higher than their lineal rank, are performing duties which entitle them to pay according to their brevets:

Colonel Joseph G. Swift, brevet brigadier general.  
 Captain J. G. Totten, brevet lieutenant colonel.  
 Captain S. Thayer, brevet major.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 160.

[1st Session.]

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 9, 1819.

Mr. HARRISON made the following report:

The committee, to whom was referred so much of the message of the President as relates to the militia, have had that subject under consideration, and beg leave to report:

That the constitution grants to Congress the following powers in relation to the militia, to wit: To provide for organizing the militia: for arming them, for disciplining them, for calling them into the service of the United States, for governing them therein, and for compensating them for their services; which powers the committee have considered separately.

1. The committee are of opinion, that, in organizing the militia, it would be a great improvement to divide them into two classes, with a view to train diligently, and to provide to arm immediately, the young men, and exempt the elderly men from that sacrifice of time which effective training would require; the organization of the militia might remain in all other respects nearly as heretofore established.

2. The constitution having made it the duty of Congress to provide for arming the militia, this power is not duly exercised by merely enacting that the militia shall arm themselves. A law to that effect, unsanctioned by penalties, will be disregarded, and if thus sanctioned, will be unjust, for it will operate as a capitation tax, which the opulent and the needy will pay equally, and which will not be borne by the States in the proportion fixed by the constitution. The committee do not approve of putting public arms into the hands of the militia, when not necessary. That mode would expose the arms to be lost and destroyed. They conceive that Congress should provide arsenals, from which the militia of every part of the United States could draw arms when necessary, which would be a sufficient exercise of the power to provide for arming the militia.

3. Congress having power to provide for governing the militia only when they are in the service of the United States, and the authority of training them belonging to the State Governments, the committee have not deemed it proper that Congress should prescribe the time to be devoted to training, or the manner in which that object will be best effected. It is the duty of the State Legislatures to enact the necessary laws for that purpose. The committee deem it a sufficient exercise of the power to provide for disciplining the militia, to direct the appointment of the necessary officers, to prescribe their duties, and to provide a system of discipline, comprehending the camp duties, instruction, field exercise, and field service of the militia.

4. The committee are of opinion, that the regulations for calling forth the militia may remain substantially as at present existing: That the President should, in all cases, address his orders immediately to some officer of the militia, and not to the Executive of any State. The Governor of a State is not a militia officer, bound to execute the orders of the President; he cannot be tried for disobedience of orders, and punished by the sentence of a court martial.

5. In providing for governing the militia in the service of the United States, it has appeared to your committee, that the senior class might be exempted from being marched out of the State to which they may belong: that the junior class, composed of ardent and vigorous men, the efficient force of the nation, should, when called into service, continue therein some time after having acquired the knowledge and habits of soldiers; that the officers should, by their own consent, be continued still longer in service, as military knowledge, principles, and habits, are most essential to the officers, who are the souls of an army. It has also appeared to your committee, that those principles would be best acquired by the officers of the militia, in serving with officers of the regular troops on court martial, for the trial of offenders either of the regular troops or militia.

6. The compensation to the militia for their services, consisting of pay and allowance for clothing, and of pensions in case of disability by wounds received in the service, the committee would allow to remain nearly as heretofore fixed by law.

The committee, acting according to the foregoing principles, report a bill to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, for calling them into the service of the United States, for governing them therein, and for compensating them for their services.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 161.

[1st Session.]

## PAY OF BREVET OFFICERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 12, 1818.

Mr. LOWNDES made the following report:

The committee, appointed on the part of the House of Representatives, to confer with a committee of the Senate, on the subject of the disagreeing votes of the two Houses, on the amendment of the Senate, to the bill making appropriations for the military service of the United States for the year 1818, have met the committee of the Senate, in pursuance of their appointment. They considered it right to offer to the committee of the Senate the following exposition of the views which they supposed the House of Representatives to have taken in disagreeing to the amendment of the Senate, in the hope that it might obviate or lessen the difficulties which separated the two Houses.

By the construction of the law of 1812, which the committee of the House of Representatives believed to be adopted by that House, the pay of a brevet commission is due only when the officer exercises a command to which his lineal rank would not entitle him. To such command under the President's general order of 1816 and 1817, he may be assigned, upon special and temporary occasions. It is believed, from the amendment proposed by the Senate, that their construction is not very different from this. The construction of the War Department, however, is very different. The Committee of the House of Representatives consider it wrong to explain or amend an act by which salaries or pay is regulated by the provisions of an appropriation law. But if it were right, the short debate which occurred in the House of Representatives, on the Senate's amendment, sufficiently proves that that amendment might change a little the ground of argument, but would not terminate the controversy.

As an amendment of the law of 1812, the provision proposed by the Senate, is, therefore, unsatisfactory, and to insist upon an appropriation previous to an amendment, is to insist either that the one body shall conform its appropriations, not to its own construction of existing laws, but to that of the other body, or that both shall adopt what both believe to be erroneous, the construction of the Executive Government.

The committee of the House of Representatives believe, that respect for the rights of both Houses requires that the act of 1812 should be amended, by defining, more precisely, the contingencies in which pay shall be due, or if this be impracticable, by authorizing it in all cases, or in none. The bill which passed the House of Representatives, at its last session, may explain the amendment which it then preferred, but it now insists only that the amending law should first determine to whom pay is due, before an appropriation should be made for its payment.

The committee of the House of Representatives consider it necessary, to fair and free legislation, that appropriations, in regard to the propriety or the extent of which, the two Houses find, after deliberation, that they still differ, should be separated from those which both consider as necessary to the public service. If either branch of the Legislature determine that it will not make the great mass of necessary appropriations, while there remains one unprovided for, which it considers to be proper, it throws upon the other branch the necessity of concurring in an appropriation which it may believe that neither the law nor the public interest requires, or of endangering all the appropriations of the Government. The committee of the House of Representatives hope that the appropriations which both Houses deem necessary will be made, and that the appropriation for brevet officers which the Senate suggests will be left to be provided for when an amendment to the act of 1812 shall determine what that appropriation ought to be.

The committee of the Senate, in answer to these observations, supported their amendment by arguments, which they have since reduced to writing, and which the committee of the House of Representatives are thus enabled to report more accurately than they could otherwise have done.

The conferees, on the part of the Senate, admitted that doubts might exist, as to the proper construction of the act of 1812, allowing pay to brevet officers, and that it might be found expedient to remove such doubts by an explanatory law defining more precisely the contingencies in which such pay should be allowed, but as according to the construction given that law by the House of Representatives as stated by their conferees, which accords substantially with that contained in the Senate's amendment; expenditures to a certain extent would be legally authorized under it, and must be supposed to have taken place and to continue to take place, until the law shall be altered. The conferees of the Senate were of opinion that an appropriation sufficient to cover such probable expenditure ought now to be made, without waiting for the passage of such explanatory law. They did not think such law should be made to have a retrospective operation so as to affect expenditures legally incurred before its passage; nor could they perceive how the passage of such a law could be deemed necessary to determine the propriety of making an appropriation to meet an expenditure which it could not regulate. They admitted that generally it would not be the most correct course to amend a law establishing salaries or authorizing an expenditure by a provision in a general appropriation law, though they believed there was no constitutional or legal objection to such a course; but they stated further: 1st. That the Senate's amendment was not designed as an alteration of the law of 1812, but only expressing the construction of that law which appeared to the Senate the correct one, and restricting the sum appropriated to the discharge of expenditures incurred pursuant to such construction, which it is presumed may be done on the same principle that other specific appropriations are made applicable to the objects designated, and to no others. 2d. If the objection be to the words in the Senate's amendment, which restrict the application of the sum appropriated to services performed by brevet officers when acting in their brevet rank, the conferees of the Senate would agree to strike out these words and have the sum appropriated applicable to services performed by such officers generally agreeably to the terms of the estimates. Though the conferees of the Senate were willing to admit that generally, it would not be advisable to embarrass a measure embracing the mass of appropriations deemed necessary, by insisting on one of a doubtful nature, they did not consider the argument as in any degree affecting the present case, the appropriation insisted on by them not being doubtful in its nature; because, according to any fair construction that can be given the law of 1812, and adopting that preferred by the House of Representatives, some expenditure is authorized, and must be presumed to take place under it, before an explanatory law can be passed; and an appropriation to meet such expenditure did not appear to them of a doubtful nature, and on such alone they insisted. It appeared also to the conferees of the Senate, that the construction given the law for several years by the Government, and acquiesced in by Congress, allowing brevet officers such pay as is now asked gave those officers reasonable ground to expect a continuance thereof so long as the law continued in force, and as the expenditure now proposed to be provided for did not arise out of any new construction of the law, and had at least in part already accrued, they considered it the duty of the two Houses to provide for it in the general appropriation law, and not leave it to be provided for in an act which may or may not pass; and they could see no ground for postponing the appropriation now insisted on by them that would not equally apply to any other asked for to meet an expenditure already incurred under any law that it might be suggested required amendment.

The conferees of the Senate stated explicitly, they would not insist on making, at this time, any appropriation, with a view of covering an expenditure which should accrue subsequent to the period at which an explanatory law relating to the matter in question, could be supposed to pass, and which might, therefore, be either authorized or controlled by such law; and though the sum requisite to meet the expenditure that must accrue under the existing law, before it can be altered, could not be exactly ascertained, it might be estimated with nearly the same accuracy that sums for other objects are; and therefore its uncertainty appeared to them to form no solid objections to the measure.

For the purpose, therefore, of providing for such expenditure alone as must, in any event, take place, and leaving the two Houses to act in regard to the subject in future as each should consider correct, without being considered in any manner compromised by the appropriation that might now be made; and anxious to reconcile, as far as practicable, the views entertained by both Houses on this subject, by making those of the House of Representatives, as far as, in their opinion, a due regard to correct legislation, and the duty they owe the Senate, would authorize, the conferees of the Senate proposed, if the conferees of the House of Representatives would agree thereto, to modify the Senate's amendment, so as to read as follows:

For additional pay, rations, and forage, to officers having brevet commissions, when commanding separate posts, districts, or detachments, requiring them to act in their brevet rank, during the months of January, February and March, of the present year, nine thousand dollars.

The committee of the House of Representatives did not consider this modification as in any material degree lessening the objections to the Senate's amendment. They should prolong their report unreasonably, if they were to repeat the answers which were given to the arguments of the committee of the Senate. In one respect they seem to have been misunderstood. The committee of the Senate consider them as admitting, that, under a just construction of the law of 1812, some expenditure must be presumed to take place, and to require an appropriation in this year. But they have made no such admission. In the army of the United States there is notoriously a number of officers in every high grade disproportionately great, when compared with the number of men whom they command, and if brevet officers are entitled to additional pay only when they command posts requiring them to act in their brevet rank, (and such is the construction of the Senate,) it may be reasonably presumed, that, while peace continues, there will no where be found that deficiency of lineal rank which will require brevet officers so to act.

As the conferees of the Senate thought the objection urged by those of the House of Representatives to the course pursued by the Senate, that it made the passage of the large number of appropriations, in which both Houses concur, depend upon that of one, in respect to which they differ, an objection inapplicable to the subject, the committees were obliged to separate, without agreeing on the subject of the Senate's amendment. The committee of the House of Representatives regret that such has been the result, and have only to hope, that if they have mistaken or misapplied the principles which ought to regulate the conduct of the two Houses, on the subject of appropriation bills, that their errors may be corrected by the wisdom of the House.



15th CONGRESS.]

No. 162.

[1st Session.]

## ARMS DELIVERED TO THE SEVERAL STATES—MILITIA FORCE—AND THE NUMBER OF ARMS MADE AND REPAIRED AT THE PUBLIC ARMORIES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 24, 1818.

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1818.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate, requesting me to cause to be laid before them, "a statement of all the arms and accoutrements which have been manufactured at the different armories of the United States, with the cost of each stand; and the number delivered to each State respectively, under the act for arming the whole body of the militia," I now transmit a report from the Secretary of War, with the documents marked A, B, and C, which, together with a report to him from the Ordnance Department, contains the information required.

JAMES MONROE.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, February 21, 1818.

The Secretary of War, to whom was referred a resolution of the Senate of the 2d instant, "requesting the President of the United States to cause to be laid before the Senate, a statement of all the arms and accoutrements which have been manufactured at the different armories of the United States, with the cost of each stand; and the number delivered to each State respectively, under the act for arming the whole body of the militia," has the honor to transmit statements marked A, B, and C, accompanied by a letter from the Ordnance Department.

Respectfully submitted,

J. C. CALHOUN.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1818.

SIR:

In answer to the call of the honorable the Senate of the United States, of the 2d February, 1818, as communicated from the War Department, for "a return of the arms and military stores furnished to the respective States, under the provisions of the law of 1803," I have the honor, in obedience to your directions, to submit the following report:

An account was made out in the Department of War, from the vouchers transmitted to this office, and that of the late Superintendent General of military supplies, of the whole number of arms which appeared to have been delivered under the law of 1803, amounting, as per statement accompanying this report, and marked A, to \$62,606.

Taking that account as a basis, an apportionment was made of the number, or part thereof, which each State was entitled to, according to its effective militia; the respective numbers of which will appear in the statement marked B, and annexed thereto.

The document, marked A, will also exhibit wherein some States have received more and others less than their respective proportions of arms.

The apportionment and adjustment thus made was considered, by the Department of War, as bringing them up to the 1st January, 1816; and the final settlement, and future arrangement for deliveries, were referred to the Department of Ordnance.

In obedience to that reference, circular letters were addressed on the 18th September, 1816, and 15th April, 1817, to the Executive authorities of the several States, by the Department of Ordnance, announcing that it would take measures for a general settlement of the accounts of arms (in whatever way delivered) between them and the United States; that it would be prepared to make further deliveries where they should be due; and that where balances appeared against any particular State, the amount would be included in the next quota which should be assigned to it. Intimation was also given that where artillery should be preferred, in lieu of arms, this Department would furnish it accordingly.

The officers of the Ordnance Department have, since those communications, attended to the service which devolved upon them, as far as has been found practicable, as will more fully appear under the head of "REMARKS," which are attached to the statement marked A.

Considerable embarrassment and delay occurred in the performance of that service, from the difficulty of obtaining regular and correct vouchers for the deliveries of arms, as directed by the law of 1803, in distinction from those delivered to the militia whilst in the service of the United States, during the late war: a difficulty, perhaps, unavoidable, from the extensive scenes of military operations, and the consequent loose or incorrect manner in which accounts of the deliveries of arms and other munitions of war were made and recorded.

It will be perceived, from the exhibit marked B, that the returns of the effective militia in the respective States is very deficient, some of them being of a very remote date. Partial returns have been received for 1816, and 1817, at the office of the Adjutant and Inspector General of the United States Army, but it will be necessary, and it is respectfully recommended, that measures be taken for obtaining more complete returns to that office, agreeably to laws of 8th May, 1792, and 2d March, 1803, before another apportionment of arms be assigned to the respective States.

This Department is continuing its exertions to effect a settlement up to the 1st January, 1816, as speedily as possible; greater delay has been hitherto experienced than was originally anticipated.

I have the honor also to enclose a statement of the number and species of arms manufactured and repaired at the national armories, since their first establishment, which you will perceive from the exhibit marked C, and also called for by the honorable Senate.

With much respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Lieut. Col. of Ordnance.*Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

## A.

Statement of small arms to which the several States and Territories are entitled according to the last returns of the militia; the number received by the Executive authorities, with the deficit and overplus of the respective proportions.

States and Territories.	Proportion of 62,606 muskets, according to returns.	Received by the Executives.	Less than the proportion.	More.	Settlements have been made with the following States.	Remarks.
New Hampshire, - - -	2,136	1,400	736	-	N. Hampshire,	Settlement effected with the State of New Hampshire, up to the 1st January, 1816, and a balance of 736 stands of arms delivered to the said State agreeably to the foregoing apportionment.
Massachusetts, - - -	5,935	3,100	2,835	-	Massachusetts,	Settlement is also made with the State of Massachusetts, up to the 1st January, 1816, and a balance of 2,835 stands of arms was delivered to that State conformably to the foregoing apportionment.
Vermont, - - - - -	1,738	2,500	-	762	Vermont,	Settlement was made with the State of Vermont, and it was ascertained that the said State had received 762 stands of arms more than its quota, up to the 1st January, 1816.
Rhode Island, - - -	708	2,000	-	1,292	-	It is expected a settlement will speedily be effected with the State of Rhode Island.
Connecticut, - - -	1,571	2,000	-	429	-	No report from the Executive of this State.
New York, - - - - -	8,153	16,012	-	7,859	New York,	Settlement effected with the State of New York, up to the 1st January, 1816, and said State had received 1,359 stands of arms more than its apportionment.
New Jersey, - - - -	3,171	3,155	16	-	-	In a train of settlement.
Pennsylvania, - - -	8,529	4,258	4,271	-	-	An officer of this department has been directed and instructed to make as speedy a settlement of arms with the State of Pennsylvania as the nature of the business will permit.
Delaware, - - - - -	639	1,650	-	1,011	-	No report from the Executive of the State of Maryland, of arms delivered that State.
Maryland, - - - - -	2,762	4,000	-	1,238	-	Difficulties have occurred in settling the account with Virginia; but the Executive has been informed that in the interval arms, if required, will be furnished by the Department of Ordnance.
Virginia, - - - - -	7,195	3,244	3,949	-	-	A settlement, it is expected, has ere this been made with North Carolina.
North Carolina, - - -	3,708	2,180	1,528	-	-	It is also presumed a settlement has been effected with the State of South Carolina.
South Carolina, - - -	2,763	2,000	763	-	-	A division of artillery is preparing for the State of Georgia, to be charged to its general account.
Georgia, - - - - -	2,358	3,000	-	642	-	The State of Kentucky has received 1,200 stand of arms since the foregoing apportionment was struck.
Kentucky, - - - - -	4,266	1,500	2,766	-	-	A number of military stores has been delivered to the State of Kentucky since the foregoing apportionment, but no final settlement of arms has been effected.
Tennessee, - - - - -	2,504	1,500	1,004	-	-	No report from the Executive of this State.
Ohio, - - - - -	3,155	3,000	155	-	-	In a train of settlement.
Louisiana, (no return of militia,) -	-	3,250	-	3,250	-	No report from the Executive of Louisiana.
District of Columbia, - - - - -	192	2,200	-	2,008	-	
Mississippi territory, - - - - -	454	-	454	-	-	No report from the Mississippi territory.
Indiana territory, - - - - -	430	-	430	-	-	No report from the Indiana territory.
Illinois territory, (no ret. of militia,) -	-	657	-	657	-	No report from the Illinois territory.
Missouri territory, - - - - -	241	-	241	-	-	It is expected a settlement will be effected with this territory shortly.
Michigan territory, (no ret. of mil.,) -	-	-	-	-	-	No report from the Executive of this territory.

It is necessary to observe, that the several States have received arms, and military stores generally, previous to the 1st January, 1816, the receipts for which do not express under what law delivered. Where a State has received more than its proportion under the law of 1808, it is intended to carry the balance to the quota which may be assigned to it subsequent to the 1st January, 1816.

## B.

Statement of the Militia of the United States, taken from the latest returns of States and Territories, and upon which was predicated the apportionment of arms to the different States, under the law of April, 1808, a statement of which accompanies this return.

States and Territories.	Date of return.	Aggregate.	States and Territories.	Date of return.	Aggregate.
New Hampshire, - - -	1813	24,902	Georgia, - - - - -	1815	27,480
Massachusetts, - - -	1815	69,175	Kentucky, - - - - -	1815	49,719
Vermont, - - - - -	1809	20,259	Tennessee, - - - - -	1812	29,193
Rhode Island, - - -	1814	8,255	Ohio, - - - - -	1814	36,771
Connecticut, - - - -	1815	18,309	Louisiana, (no return.)		
New York, - - - - -	1814	95,026	District of Columbia, - - -	1812	2,252
New Jersey, - - - -	1815	36,966	Mississippi territory, - - -	1812	5,291
Pennsylvania, - - -	1812	99,414	Indiana territory, - - -	1814	5,010
Delaware, - - - - -	1813	7,448	Illinois territory, (no return.)		
Maryland, - - - - -	1811	32,189	Missouri territory, - - -	1814	2,812
Virginia, - - - - -	1815	83,847	Michigan territory, (no return.)		
North Carolina, - - -	1815	43,217			
South Carolina, - - -	1815	32,202			
					729,737

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, February 19, 1818.

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Leut. Col. of Ordnance.*

## C.

A statement of the number and species of arms manufactured, and the number and species of arms repaired at the national armories; and also of the moneys expended at those works, exhibiting a view of the whole, from the period of their first establishment, and according to the accounts received and on record in the Department of Ordnance. January, 1818.

## ARMORY, HARPER'S FERRY, VIRGINIA.

YEARS.	Muskets made.	Muskets repaired.	Rifles made.	Pistols made.	Total amount expended, including purchases, build-ings, repairs, &c.
1798 and 1800, - - -	-	-	-	-	\$59,908 32
1801, - - - - -	293	-	-	-	27,201 81
1802, - - - - -	1,472	-	-	-	29,334 33
1803, - - - - -	1,048	-	-	-	28,697 58
1804, - - - - -	161	-	780	-	31,313 71
1805, - - - - -	-	-	1,716	-	31,262 17
1806, - - - - -	136	-	1,381	-	41,908 80
1807, - - - - -	50	-	146	2,892	40,631 28
1808, - - - - -	3,051	-	-	1,208	104,952 63
1809, - - - - -	7,348	-	-	-	158,835 13
1810, - - - - -	9,400	691	-	-	145,042 30
1811, - - - - -	10,000	1,392	-	-	139,707 59
1812, - - - - -	10,200	2,113	-	-	161,772 01
1813, - - - - -	9,000	612	-	-	183,663 93
1814, - - - - -	10,400	548	1,600	-	144,010 81
1815, - - - - -	5,239	-	1,469	-	125,335 82
1816, - - - - -	6,416	23	2,052	-	227,286 87
1817, - - - - -	8,513	-	2,726	-	177,533 00
Total, - - - - -	82,727	5,379	11,870	4,100	\$1,858,398 09

## REMARKS.

The amount expended at this armory in 1817, is - - - - - \$177,533  
Muskets manufactured, - - - - - 8,513  
Rifles manufactured, 2,726, equal in labor to - - - - - 3,770

Total number of muskets, - - - - - 12,283

In order to ascertain the precise cost of each musket, the following deduction should be made:

Probable amount of expenditures for repairing mill-dam, laborers employed thereat, &c. - - - - - 2,500

Actual expenditure, - - - - - \$175,033

From the above deduction being made, it would result that the actual cost of muskets at this armory, will be \$14 25 each.

Stock and tools, and unfinished work on hand, estimated at - - - - - \$256,000

## ARMORY, SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS.

YEARS.	Muskets manu- factured.	Muskets repaired.	Carbines manu- factured.	Total amount of ex- penditures, includ- ing purchases, buildings, repairs, &c.
1795,	245	-	-	\$4,495 5
1796,	838	-	-	15,392 25
1797,	1,028	-	-	18,863 80
1798,	1,044	-	-	19,157 40
1799,	4,595	-	-	84,299 23
1800,	4,863	-	-	64,924 94
1801,	3,205	-	-	50,328 94
1802,	4,358	-	-	30,142 55
1803,	4,775	-	-	32,459 74
1804,	3,566	-	-	43,312 64
1805,	3,535	-	-	45,937 25
1806,	2,018	-	-	42,674 01
1807,	5,692	-	-	55,304 64
1808,	5,870	-	-	103,174 71
1809,	7,070	1,086	600	122,469 31
1810,	9,700	1,406	602	131,556 47
1811,	12,020	-	-	114,151 26
1812,	10,140	-	-	139,340 07
1813,	6,920	11,105	-	104,958 48
1814,	9,585	5,475	-	102,632 64
1815,	7,279	21,145	-	151,456 37
1816,	7,199	5,129	-	155,951 65
1817,	13,015	454	-	187,138 08
Total,	128,559	45,800	1,202	\$1,820,122 08

## REMARKS.

The actual expenditure in the manufacture of arms at this armory, in 1817,	-	-	\$187,138 08
In order to ascertain the precise cost of each musket, the following deductions should be made:			
For muskets which have been repaired at the armory in 1817,	-	\$2,000 00	
For inspection of contract arms, by officers of the armory, and by orders of the Ordnance Department, in 1817,	-	-	1,236 68
For making arm-chests,	-	-	1,392 00
For manufacturing screw-drivers,	-	-	1,040 00
For purchases of additional ground and buildings, in 1817,	-	-	4,975 00
			<u>10,643 68</u>
Actual expenditure,	-	-	<u>\$176,494 40</u>

From the above deductions being made, it would result that the actual cost of muskets at this armory will be \$13 56 each.

The stock on hand, and parts of work done at this armory, is valued at \$111,545 56

## GENERAL REMARK.

It may, in addition, be remarked, generally, that though the within sums appear to have been expended in the manufacture of arms, making their apparent cost at the rates stated, there were other expenditures at both armories (such as transportation of arms to and from the armory, with other incidental expenses,) which have not yet been reported, and which would render the actual cost of the arms still lower. The value of the public buildings, grounds on which they are erected, and the adjacent lands, belonging to the national armories, may be estimated to be at least one hundred thousand dollars each.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, February 12, 1818.

G. BOMFORD, Lieut. Col. of Ordnance.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 163.

[1st SESSION.]

## WAR WITH THE SEMINOLE INDIANS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 25, 1818.

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1818.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I now lay before Congress all the information in the possession of the Executive respecting the war with the Seminoles, and the measures which it has been thought proper to adopt for the safety of our fellow-citizens on the frontier exposed to their ravages. The enclosed documents show that the hostilities of this tribe were unprovoked, the offspring of a spirit long cherished and often manifested towards the United States; and that, in the present instance, it was extending itself to other tribes, and daily assuming a more serious aspect. As soon as the nature and object of this combination were perceived, the Major General commanding the southern division of the troops of the United States was ordered to the theatre of action, charged with the management of the war, and vested with

the powers necessary to give it effect. The season of the year being unfavorable to active operations, and the recesses of the country affording shelter to these savages, in case of retreat, may prevent a prompt termination of the war, but it may be fairly presumed that it will not be long before this tribe and its associates receive the punishment which they have provoked and justly merited.

As almost the whole of this tribe inhabits the country within the limits of Florida, Spain was bound, by the treaty of 1795, to restrain them from committing hostilities against the United States. We have seen with regret that her Government has altogether failed to fulfil this obligation, nor are we aware that it has made any effort to that effect. When we consider her utter inability to check, even in the slightest degree, the movements of this tribe, by her very small and incompetent force in Florida, we are not disposed to ascribe the failure to any other cause. The inability, however, of Spain to maintain her authority over the territory and Indians within her limits, and in consequence to fulfil the treaty, ought not to expose the United States to other and greater injuries. When the authority of Spain ceases to exist there, the United States have a right to pursue their enemy, on a principle of self-defence. In this instance, the right is more complete and obvious, because we shall perform only what Spain was bound to have performed herself. To the high obligations and privileges of this great and sacred right of self-defence will the movement of our troops be strictly confined. Orders have been given to the General in command not to enter Florida, unless it be in the pursuit of the enemy, and, in that case, to respect the Spanish authority wherever it is maintained; and he will be instructed to withdraw his forces from the province as soon as he shall have reduced that tribe to order, and secure our fellow-citizens in that quarter, by satisfactory arrangements, against its unprovoked and savage hostilities in future.

JAMES MONROE.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 164.

[2d SESSION.

DEFEAT OF THE SEMINOLE INDIANS—CAPTURE OF SPANISH POSTS IN FLORIDA—AND  
THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRISTER.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS, BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH HIS OPENING MESSAGE OF THE 17TH  
OF NOVEMBER, 1818.

*Extract of a letter from R. Sands, commanding Fort Gaines, to the officer of Fort Hawkins, dated*

FEBRUARY 2, 1817.

When the colonel, with the troops, left Fort Scott, he gave the buildings in charge of one of the Perrymans, from whom I have just received a letter, handed me by his brother, who arrived here after I had commenced writing this.

Perryman states in his letter that the Red Sticks, (or hostiles,) after we had left the fort, came in companies, and carried off every thing we had left with him, and what he had purchased of Butler, burnt three houses, and threatened, if he did not leave the place, to burn it over his head. He got what few articles he could, with his family, in a canoe, and came to his brother's, who informs me that there is at present about three hundred Indians embodied at the Forks, and others constantly joining them. He does not know their intentions, but understood a party was going out to steal horses, &c.

This morning, (3d,) one of the settlers waited on me to advise in what manner to act, as eight or ten Indians had been at his house, and ordered him off; telling him that in six days they would come back, and, if he was not gone, they would drive him away.

*Extract of a letter from the Governor of Georgia to General Gaines, dated*

MILLEDGEVILLE, February 5, 1817.

You, no doubt, have already been informed that the notorious Woodbine has recently made his appearance again at the mouth of the Appalachicola, and that he has an agent now among the Seminole Indians and negroes in that quarter, stirring them up to acts of hostility against this country; and that Woodbine himself has gone, in an armed vessel, to some part of the West Indies for supplies. Connected with this fact is another, which may serve as an intimation of the future conduct of these people, when once in possession of the supplies which it is said they expect on the return of Woodbine. About ten or twelve days ago, a small party of those Indians entered the frontier of Wayne county, and stole two horses and some cattle. They were pursued by some of the inhabitants, who peaceably demanded a restoration of the stolen property; and, instead of a compliance on the part of the Indians, they immediately fired upon the whites, who retired without returning a shot. One of the whites was mortally wounded.

*Copy of a letter from General Gaines to the Governor of Georgia, dated*

MILLEDGEVILLE, February 5, 1817.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of this date.

The facts which you have been pleased to communicate, in relation to the late hostile conduct of the Seminole Indians, must and shall receive my immediate and particular attention. I am not authorized to change the destination of the 4th infantry, but, should I receive no authority to recall a part of that corps, I shall order one or two companies of artillery (to do duty as infantry) from Charleston to the southern frontier of this State, with instructions to check Indian hostilities, and at the same time to remove from Indian land such intruders as may remain, after being duly notified to remove.

*Extract of a letter from George Perryman to Lieutenant Sands, dated*

FEBRUARY 24, 1817.

The charge given me by Colonel Clinch and yourself, and other officers of the United States, induces me to believe there is a confidence placed in me which I ought not to deceive. I therefore think it my duty, as well as my inclination, to give you the following information:

There was a friend of mine not long since in the Fowltown, on Flint, and he saw many horses, cattle, and hogs, that had come immediately from the State of Georgia, and they are bringing them away continually. They speak

in the most contemptuous manner of the Americans, and threaten to have satisfaction for what has been done—meaning the destruction of the negro fort. There is another of my acquaintances returned immediately from the Seminole towns, and saw the negroes on parade there. He counted about six hundred that bore arms. They have chosen officers of every description, and endeavor to keep up a regular discipline, and are very strict in punishing violators of their military rules. There is said to be about the same number of Indians belonging to their party, and there are both negroes and Indians daily going to their standard. They say they are in complete fix for fighting, and wish an engagement with the Americans, or McIntosh's troops; they would let them know they had something more to do than they had at Appalichicola. They have chosen Bowlegs for their head, and nominated him King, and pay him all kind of monarchical respect, almost to idolatry, keeping a picket guard at the distance of five miles. They have a number of the likeliest American horses; but there are one or two chiefs who are not of the choir. Kenhijah, the Missioukey chief, is one that is an exception.

*Copy of a letter from Archibald Clarke, Intendant, St. Mary's, Georgia, to General Gaines, dated*

SIR:

FEBRUARY 26, 1817.

In consequence of a recent and most obnoxious act perpetrated by a party of Indians, (supposed to be of the Lower Creeks,) in this county, in the murder of an unfortunate white woman and her two infant children, by which the defenceless inhabitants on our frontier have been thrown into a distressing state of alarm, I avail myself of the earliest opportunity in giving information that may be relied on, under the fullest assurance that immediate measures will be adopted to guard and prevent a repetition of such cruel and barbarous acts.

On the 24th instant, the house of a Mr. Garret, residing in the upper part of this county, near the boundary of Wayne county, was attacked during his absence, near the middle of the day, by this party, consisting of about fifteen, who shot Mrs. Garret in two places, and then despatched her by stabbing and scalping. Her two children (one about three years, the other two months) were also murdered, and the eldest scalped. The house was then plundered of every article of value, and set on fire. A young man in this neighborhood, hearing the report of guns, went immediately towards the house, where he discovered the murdered family. The flames having only commenced, they were extinguished, and he spread the alarm. The workmen from my mills and a few others assembled to pursue; but, having but few arms, and not otherwise equipped, their pursuit proved fruitless. The Indians were tracked as far as the men dared venture. Their course was parallel with the western branch of Spanish creek, which induces the belief of their being Indians of the lower tribes.

On this open, extensive, and entirely unprotected frontier, the poor and innocent inhabitants have ever been exposed to these calamities. Representation after representation to the several Governors of this State, of cruel and unprovoked murders in this quarter by the Indians, have been made. A momentary disposition was manifested to afford relief; but a little time, however, would elapse before the alarm would subside, and the subject never more thought of, until again revived by an occurrence such as I have just related.

To you, sir, therefore, the inhabitants on the frontier, as well as others, through me, appeal for some protection. A small detachment of troops upon the head of the St. Mary's would answer a most valuable purpose, by at once checking the inroads of the savages, and preventing our abandoned and unprotected citizens from adventuring into the Indian country, and driving in herds of cattle.

*Copy of a letter from R. Arbuthnot to the officer commanding at Fort Gaines, dated*

SIR:

OKOLOKNE SOUND, March 3, 1817.

I am desired by Peter McQueen, an unfortunate Indian chief, who was some years since obliged to fly from the town of Tucky Bathe, on the Tallapoohatch river, to claim of your friendship the delivery of a negro man named Joe, (taken away from him since the peace,) whom he stated to be in Fort Gaines. When McQueen left Tucky Bathe, his property was considerable, both in negroes and cattle; of the former, ten grown negroes were taken by a half-breed man named Barney, nine of which, he learns, were sold, and one (a girl) is still in possession of said Barney. Twenty able negroes were taken by a chief named Colonel, or Auchi Hathe, who acts also as an interpreter; and as he never had possession of any of those persons' property, nor ever did them an injury to his knowledge, he claims, as a further proof of your friendship, that you will use your influence in procuring those negroes for him; and, should they be given up by the persons holding them, there is one faithful negro among them, named Charles, who will bring them to him at Okolokne river.

The American headmen and officers that were accustomed to live near him can testify to his civility and good fellowship with them, and there are none of them, he is convinced, that would not serve him if in their power. As he owes nothing, nor ever took any person's property, none have a right to retain him; and he hopes that, through your influence, those persons now holding his negroes will be induced to give them up.

While I am thus advocating the cause of an unfortunate individual, allow me to claim an extension of your philanthropy to all the Indians within your circle, by your representing to them the folly of their quarrels, and that they ought to live quietly and peaceably with each other.

The Lower Creeks seem to wish to live peaceably and quietly, and in good friendship with the others; but there are some designing and evil-minded persons, self-interested, who are endeavoring to create quarrels between the Upper and Lower Creek Indians, contrary to their interest, their happiness, and welfare. Such people belong to no nation, and ought not to be countenanced by any Government.

The head chiefs request I will inquire of you why American settlers are descending the Chatahoochee, driving the poor Indian from his habitation, and taking possession of his home and cultivated fields?

Without authority, I can claim nothing of you; but a humane and philanthropic spirit guiding me, I hope the same will influence you; and if such is really the case, and that the line marked out by the treaty between Great Britain and the United States respecting the *Indian nations* has been infringed upon by the subjects of the latter, that you will represent to them their improper conduct, and prevent its continuance.

I hold in my possession a letter received from the Governor of New Providence, addressed to him by His Britannic Majesty's chief secretary, informing him of the orders given to the British ambassador at Washington, to watch over the interests of the Indian nations, and see that their rights are faithfully attended to and protected, agreeably to the treaty of peace made between the British and Americans.

I am in hopes that ere this there is arrived at New Providence a person from Great Britain with authority to act as agent for the Indian nation; and, if so, it will devolve on him to see that the boundary lines, as marked out by the treaty, are not infringed upon.

I hope you will not think these observations, *made by desire of the chiefs*, any improper interference, and requesting the favor of an answer,

I am respectfully, &c.

P. S. McQueen states that the offspring of the negroes, when he left Tucky Bathe, were seven of those taken by Barney, and none of those taken by Auchi Hathe, and he supposes they have increased.

*Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Richard M. Sands, fourth infantry, commanding at Fort Gaines, Georgia, to Colonel William King, or officer commanding the fourth regiment of infantry, dated*

MARCH 15, 1817.

SIR:

I enclose, for your information, two letters which I received a few days since. Yesterday, William Perryman, accompanied by two of the lower chiefs, arrived here. He informs me that McQueen, the chief mentioned in one of the enclosed letters, is at present one of the heads of the hostiles; that they are anxious for war, and have lately murdered a woman and two children.

He likewise says that he expects the news in George Perryman's letter is true, for there are talks going through the towns that the English are to be at Okoloking river in three months.

I have sent an Indian runner to Okoloking, to ascertain what preparations the hostiles are making. I have the honor to be, &c.

*Extract of a letter from David B. Mitchell, Indian agent, to the Secretary of War, dated*

MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, March 30, 1817.

By yesterday's mail I received a letter from Mr. Timothy Barnard, who resides on Flint river, in the Indian country, a considerable distance below the agency, in which he observes: "I have been informed two days past, from below, where the Red Stick class reside, that a party has been down near St. Mary's, and murdered a woman and two children, and brought off some horses. I have heard for some time past that the Red Stick party have commenced their Red Stick dancings again, which is a proof that they mean to commence hostilities. Our forts, Crawford and Gaines, having been evacuated, I believe, has been the cause of this Red Stick class beginning again to commence hostilities. They think that our troops were afraid to continue there."

The murder of the woman and two children, spoken of by Mr. Barnard, had been previously communicated to me by the magistrates of Camden county; and I have no doubt but it was perpetrated in retaliation for the killing of an Indian about three or four weeks previous, on the Florida side of the St. Mary's river, by some worthless white men who reside on the frontiers of East Florida, and who live by plunder. They have, for some time past, been a perfect nuisance to the frontier of Georgia, in that quarter; and, although repeated complaints of their bad conduct have been made to the Governor of the province, yet, either from the want of ability or inclination, they have not been suppressed; but I believe that their impunity is attributable to the first, viz: inability on his part to apprehend and punish them.

The single fact of this murder being easily accounted for on the Indian principle of retaliation, I should dread no further bad consequences from it; but the other facts stated by Mr. Barnard can only be attributed to a settled plan of hostility on the part of the Indians, and that such a disposition has been encouraged by the removal of the troops from Camp Crawford. And I have the more reliance upon the intelligence as coming from Mr. Barnard, who has resided nearly fifty years in the Indian country, and is perfectly well acquainted with their habits and customs, and whose family connexion gives him the best and surest means of correct information.

As an additional inducement to this measure, I will further state that I have received information from other persons at and near Fort Gaines, that a British agent is now among these hostile Indians, and that he has been sending insolent messages to the friendly Indians and white men settled above the Spanish line. He is also charged with stimulating the Indians to their present hostile aspect; but, whether he is an acknowledged agent of any foreign Power, or a mere adventurer, I do not pretend to determine, but am disposed to believe him the latter. But be that as it may, and let the hostile disposition of the Indians proceed from what it may, a moderate regular force stationed at Camp Crawford, or any other suitable position in that quarter, will, I am confident, keep all quiet, and without it some serious mischief will result.

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated*

CAMP MONTGOMERY, M. T. April 3, 1817.

I received by the last mail a letter from Archibald Clarke, Esquire, intendant of the town of St. Mary's, by which it appears that another outrage of uncommon cruelty has recently been perpetrated by a party of Indians upon the Southern frontier, near the boundary of Wayne county. They have massacred a woman (Mrs. Garrett) and two of her children; the mother and eldest child were scalped, the house plundered and burnt.

MONTGOMERY, April 3, 1817.

SIR:

The enclosed letter contains some additional information upon the subject of my communication of this date. Most respectfully, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

FORT GAINES.

GENERAL GAINES:

I am requested by all the citizens to inform you of our situation, believing that no communication has been forwarded giving a detail of the information received, our distress, and the prospect of approaching destruction.

We are hourly told, by every source of information, by the friendly Indians, by letters from William Hambly and Edmund Doyle, who reside low down on the Appalachicola, that all the lower tribes of Indians are embodied, and are drying their meats to come on to the attack of this post. The British agent at Oakelockines Sound is giving presents to the Indians. We have among us Indians who have been down, and received powder, lead, tomahawks, knives, and a drum for each town, with the royal coat of arms painted on it. We have, at this time, at least five hundred Indians skulking in this neighborhood, within three or four miles of us, who will not act for themselves, and who are evidently waiting the signal to strike an effectual blow. They have stolen almost every horse belonging to the citizens. They have scared them from the fields which they have cleared, and have taken possession of their houses. They are now stealing horses, cattle, and hogs, from the Georgia lines, and have killed one or two families on the St. Tillas.

The citizens have all assembled near the fort, not able to return to the States, nor no prospect of making crops. The Indians have all returned to their towns below the line, and this post is unable to remove them. The troops are scarce of provisions, and no prospect of the early arrival of more.

Nothing but speedy relief, by troops, can quiet the people, or save this country from destruction.

Respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,

A. CULLOH.

*Copy of a letter from G. Leftwich, adjutant seventh infantry, to General Gaines, dated*

CAMP MONTGOMERY, M. T. July 28, 1817.

SIR:

Agreeably to your instructions of the 26th instant, I proceeded to the Burnt Corn Spring, near the place where the recent murder was committed by an Indian; and from the best information received, I have the honor to make the following report:

1. It does not appear that any misunderstanding existed between the Indians and the citizen killed, (Mr. Glass.)

2. It appears that the Indians made the first assault, and that without any provocation on the part of the citizens.

3. From the information received, it appears that Mr. Glass heard four or five guns fire some short distance from his house; he was under the impression that the Indians were doing some mischief, and went out for the purpose of ascertaining what the firing was at; he had proceeded but a short distance when he discovered an Indian woman, he went towards her and inquired if she knew who it was that was shooting; she made him no answer; he asked her several times and received no answer. She said something, and an Indian that was concealed in the bushes not more than fifteen steps from Mr. Glass, rose up and shot him through the body: he snapped his gun at the Indian, who immediately ran off: he then fired at the woman as she was running after the man, but does not know whether he killed her or not. His wound being very painful, he dropped his gun and shot-bag and attempted to return home; he had not proceeded more than three hundred yards when he fainted, and remained until found by a traveller. This was on Saturday, and he died Sunday morning, leaving a widow and eight children to lament his untimely death: he was a man who supported a good character in his neighborhood, though in limited circumstances. On the following day there was a cow found near the place where Mr. Glass was shot, with four balls shot through her.

4. There was only one Indian man seen by Mr. Glass; but from the circumstances of his hearing four guns, and the cow being found near that place with four balls shot through her, induces a belief that he had several companions with him, although they were not seen by Mr. Glass. From the report of the friendly Indians, it is believed they are fifty or sixty in number, and that they have returned to the camp on Pine Barren creek, occupied by them at the time they murdered Johnson and Wagasky, as a part of them were met by several persons near the Pine Barren spring a few days after the murder was committed.

Colonel Dale's party pursued them to their camp on the Sappalogas, but found it deserted apparently several days: they have several small fields of corn growing at the place. From the sign left, it is believed they have a number of horses, and some of the largest description. The Indian who acted as guide states they have at this time a negro boy and a horse belonging to Johnson and Magasky: it appears to be the prevailing opinion among the inhabitants, that they may be found on Pine Barren creek.

I have the honor to be, &c.

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated*

CAMP MONTGOMERY, M. T. August 25, 1817.

Having received several communications from persons settled upon the public land, within the tract acquired by the treaty at Fort Jackson, containing general accusations against the Indians; that they had killed cattle and hogs, and stolen corn, &c. from the inhabitants, and requesting the interposition of military authority, I have uniformly referred them to the civil magistrates, because I have in no instance during the present year heard of any thing like an *assemblage of force* among the Indians in this quarter of the territory. Nor could I see any reason why persons who had obtruded themselves upon the public land contrary to law, should be allowed military protection against the petty offences of which these people complained, especially as it did not appear that the civil authority had been opposed, nor even resorted to by the complainants.

The enclosure, marked A, contains a copy of my reply to the inhabitants of Murder Creek, and in this you will find the substance of my other replies, both written and verbal. Since the date of this reply, and, as I have reason to believe, some days after it reached the settlement of Murder Creek, a Mr. Glass, near that place, was killed by an Indian, who was said to be accompanied by three others.

On receiving this information, I immediately despatched a discreet officer, Lieutenant Leftwich, to ascertain the particulars of the outrage, with a view to send a party in pursuit of the offenders, in case they should not have been arrested by the civil authority.

A.

*To the Inhabitants of Murder Creek, Alabama Territory.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP MONTGOMERY, M. T. July 12, 1817.

GENTLEMEN:

I have received your communication of the 21st of last month, stating that the Indians residing upon the Con-aka had killed cattle and hogs belonging to the inhabitants of Murder Creek, and had broke into their houses, and taken from them some provisions, corn, &c.

In reply, I have to observe, that all Indians within the lately acquired territory are amenable to our laws, and may be prosecuted for the offences of which you complain, in the same manner as if they were white inhabitants.

The lands cultivated by friendly Indians within the ceded territory have been reserved and guaranteed to them by treaty; and by a late act of Congress, the agent of Indian affairs has been authorized to settle the respective claims to such reservations. Until this is effected, there exists no where any sort of authority to drive off such Indians settled upon the public land.

Governor Mitchell, the agent, will in a short time enter upon the examination and adjustment of those claims.

The disposition which you have manifested to abstain from\* "rash measures" towards those Indians, affords ground to hope that, viewing them as a part of the human family, possessing the right of residing among us, you will make allowance for their ignorance and their wants, which are calculated rather to awaken our commiseration, than to excite in us a spirit of hostility towards them.

That you may have peace and prosperity throughout your settlement, is the sincere wish of

Your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

*Extract of a letter from Major Twiggs to General Gaines, dated*

FORT SCOTT, September 17, 1817.

Your communication to the Indians on the east side of Flint river was read and explained to the principal chief of the Mickasukies, the 6th of this month. He promised to give an answer in ten days at furthest. I have detained the express until this time, in expectation of sending it on by him, but have been disappointed. I have not heard from them since. The interpreter informed me the principal warriors were absent when he was there, but what were present said they never heard of Indians being given up to be punished by the whites; that they had heard of their being sometimes killed by themselves, for offences committed, but seemed to think that giving them up was out of the question; but

\* The inhabitants promised not to resort to "rash measures."



said they would have a meeting, and would answer the letter in a few days. As they have not done so, I think but one construction can be put on their conduct. The young seemed to dislike the communication very much; and when Gregory was about leaving the town, he offered his hand to an Indian, who held out his with a knife in it, and refused to shake hands with him. He staid so short a time among them, that it was impossible for him to give much information respecting them. Captain Donoho has returned; he has been sick in Hartford, which was the cause of his delay. On his return, the Indians were very rude to him, and frequently threatened his guide, and once caught hold of the captain's bridle in a threatening manner.

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated*

CAMP MONTGOMERY, M. T. October 1, 1817.

I have the honor to lay before you a copy of a letter which I have received from the chiefs of ten of the Seminole towns, in reply to my demand for the delivery of the murderers of our citizens.

By this communication it appears, that, instead of a compliance with my demand, the chiefs have set up a claim against us for the lives of three Indians, for whom they allege they have not yet taken satisfaction. They charge us with having killed ten of their warriors, and, claiming a balance of three to be due them, they admit, by necessary implication, that they have killed seven of our citizens.

They acknowledge the murder of a woman (Mrs. Garret) and her two children. But the chiefs attempt to justify this act, upon the ground that the warriors who committed the outrage had just before lost some friends; had entered our settlements to take satisfaction; found at the house of Garret a kettle belonging to the Indians that had been killed, and, from this circumstance, supposed the murder had been committed by the "husband of the woman;" they therefore killed her and her two children!

By a letter from Major Twiggs, the commandant of Fort Scott, I learn that he had been warned, some weeks past, by the principal chiefs of the Fowltown, (fifteen miles above the fort, and twenty above the national boundary,) not to cut another stick on the east side of Flint river; adding, that the land was his, and he was directed by the powers above to protect and defend it, and should do so; and it would be seen that talking could not frighten him. Major Twiggs adds, he had not seen the chief, nor any of his people, since he made this threat. The major states, in another letter, that this town had been detected in stealing one hundred head of cattle, in one drove, all of which they had killed.

*From Major Twiggs to General Gaines, dated*

FORT SCOTT, September 18, 1817.

Since I started the express this morning, the Indians have delivered the enclosed letter to me.

I have the honor to be, &c.

*To the commanding officer at Fort Hawkins.*

SEPTEMBER, the 11th day, 1817.

DEAR SIR:

Since the last war, after you sent word we must quit the war, we, the red people, have come over on this side. The white people have carried all the red people's cattle off. After the war, I sent to all my people to let white people alone, and stay on this side of the river; and they did so; but the white people still continue to carry off their cattle. Barnard's son was here, and I inquired of him what was to be done; and he said we must go to the head man of the white people, and complain. I did so, and there was no white head man, and there was no law in this case. The whites first begun, and there is nothing said about that, but great complaint made about what the Indians do. This is now three years, since the white people killed three Indians. Since that, they have killed three other Indians, and taken their horses, and what they had; and this summer they killed three more; and very lately they killed one more. We sent word to the white people, that these murders were done, and the answer was, that they were people that were outlaws, and we ought to go and kill them. The white people killed our people first; the Indians then took satisfaction. There are yet three men that the red people have never taken satisfaction for. You have wrote that there were houses burnt; but we know of no such thing being done; the truth, in such cases, ought to be told; but this appears otherwise. On that side of the river, the white people have killed five Indians; but there is nothing said about that; and all that the Indians have done is brought up. All the mischief the white people have done ought to be told to their head man. When there is any thing done you write to us; but never write to your head man what the white people do. When the red people send talks, or write, they always send the truth. You have sent to us for your horses, and we sent all that we could find; but there were some dead; it appears that all the mischief is laid on this town; but all the mischief that has been done by this town, is two horses; one of them is dead, and the other was sent back. The cattle that we are accused of taking, were cattle that the white people took from us; our young men went and brought them back, with the same marks and brands. There were some of our young men out hunting, and they were killed; others went to take satisfaction, and the kettle of one of the men that was killed was found in the house where the woman and two children were killed; and they supposed it had been her husband who had killed the Indians, and took their satisfaction there. We are accused of killing up Americans, and so on; but since the word was sent to us that peace was made, we stay steady at home, and meddle with no person. You have sent to us respecting the black people on the Suwany river; we have nothing to do with them. They were put there by the English, and to them you ought to apply for any thing about them. We do not wish our country desolated by an army passing through it, for the concern of other people. The Indians have slaves there also, a great many of them. When we have an opportunity, we shall apply to the English for them; but we cannot get them now.

This is what we have to say at present.

Sir, I conclude by subscribing myself your humble servant, &c.

N. B. There are ten towns have read this letter, and this is the answer.

*Extract of a letter from George Graham, acting Secretary of War, to Brevet Major General Edmund P. Gaines, Fort Hawkins, Georgia, dated*

OCTOBER 30, 1817.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, covering a copy of the reply which was made, by ten of the Seminole towns, to the demand made by you on them for the surrender of the murderers of some of our citizens.

These papers have been submitted to the President, and I am instructed by him to inform you that he approves of the movement of the troops from Fort Montgomery to Fort Scott; the appearance of this additional force, he flatters himself, will at least have the effect of restraining the Seminoles from committing further depredations, and perhaps of inducing them to make reparation for the murders which they have committed. Should they, however,

persevere in their refusal to make such reparation, it is the wish of the President that you should not, on that account, pass the line, and make an attack upon them within the limits of Florida, until you shall have received instructions from this department.

You are authorized to remove the Indians still remaining on the lands ceded by the treaty made by General Jackson with the Creeks; and, in doing so, it may be proper to retain some of them as hostages until reparation may have been made for the depredations which have been committed. On this subject, however, as well as to the manner of removing them, you will exercise your discretion. McIntosh, and the other chiefs of the Creek nation, who were here some time since, expressed then, decidedly, their unwillingness to permit any of the hostile Indians to return to their nation.

P. S. The authority to remove the Indians will, of course, not extend to those Indians and their families who have claims to reservations of lands under the treaty.

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War.*

CHATAHOOCHEE, November 9, 1817.

From various reports from the Seminole Indians I can only learn that they are determined to deliver up none of their offenders; nor will they restore stolen property, except one town, the Mickasukees, the chief of which professes to be friendly. By the enclosed letter from Major Twiggs it appears they are determined to attack us as soon as we cross Flint river; and that they have two thousand seven hundred warriors. Although I feel little faith in their threats, and believe their numbers to be overrated, yet I deem it proper to be provided with additional force. I have, therefore, requested of his excellency the Governor of Georgia a regiment of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, which, he has informed me, are held in readiness to march.

*Extract of a letter from General Edmund P. Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FORT GAINES, GEORGIA, November 9, 1817.

Previous to my leaving the Coroka I ascertained that the accounts I had received respecting the Seminole Indians being at Pensacola were incorrect, and that the number of Indians of different tribes there did not exceed what had been usual at this season of the year. This statement was soon after confirmed by Mr. Denson, and the interpreter Cornels. The latter, however, states that he had seen and conversed with the hostile party of Uchu warriors, part of whom killed Johnston, and Magasky, and Mr. Glass. They now consist of about thirty warriors, or thirty-five. They were, a few days past, at the mouth of Yellow Water; had several stolen horses which they offered for sale, and declared their determination to be always hostile towards our citizens.

From Major Twiggs I learn that he has received information, upon which he places reliance, that the Indians have recently had a meeting at the Mickasukee town, of near two thousand seven hundred warriors, when it was determined they would attack us, as soon as we should cross the Flint river. Although I put little faith in these threats, and believe their numbers to be overrated, yet I deem it proper, keeping an eye to the safe side, to be provided with additional force; and have, therefore, desired the Governor of Georgia to send me the regiment of infantry and squadron of cavalry, held in readiness for that purpose: for, in a war with savages, I think little should be hazarded; as every little advantage which we suffer them to acquire tends to add, in an extraordinary degree, to their strength and confidence.

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson.*

FORT SCOTT, GEORGIA, November 21, 1817.

The first brigade arrived at this place on the 19th instant. I had previously sent an Indian runner to notify the first town chief, E-me-he-maut-by, of my arrival, and with a view to ascertain whether his hostile temper had abated, requested him to visit me. He replied, that he had already said to the commanding officer here all he had to say, and he would not come.

He had warned Major Twiggs not to cross or cut a stick of wood on the east side of Flint river, alleging that the land was his; that he was directed, by the Powers above and below, to protect and defend it, and should do so. This being the talk referred to, and his town having continued to be hostile ever since the last war, having participated, as the friendly Indians assert, in the predatory war carried on for some time past against the Georgia frontier, I yesterday detached two hundred and fifty men (supposed to be about the strength of the town) under the command of Major Twiggs, with orders to bring me the chief and warriors; and in the event of resistance to treat them as enemies.

The detachment arrived at the town early this morning, and were instantly fired upon, but without effect. The fire was briskly returned by the detachment, and the Indians put to flight, with the loss of four warriors slain; and, as there is reason to believe, many were wounded.

It is with deep regret I have to add that a woman was accidentally shot, with some warriors, in the act of forcing their way through our line formed for the purpose of arresting their flight. The unfortunate woman had a blanket fastened round her (as many of the warriors had) which, amidst the smoke in which they were enveloped, rendered it impossible, as I am assured by the officers present, to distinguish her from the warriors.

Among the articles found in the house of the chief, was a British uniform coat (scarlet) with a pair of gold epaulettes, and a certificate signed by a British captain of marines, "Robert White, in the absence of Colonel Nicholls," stating that the chief had always been a true and faithful friend to the British.

The reports of friendly Indians concur in estimating the number of hostile warriors, including the Red Sticks and Seminoles, at more than two thousand, besides the blacks, amounting to near four hundred men, and increasing by runaways from Georgia. They have been promised, as several Indians inform me, assistance from the British at New Providence. This promise, though made by Woodbine, is relied on by most of the Seminole Indians. I have not a doubt but they will sue for peace, as soon as they find their hopes of British aid to be without foundation.

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War.*

FORT SCOTT, GEORGIA, November 26, 1817.

With a view to ascertain the strength of the hostile Indians in the vicinity of Fowltown, and to reconnoitre the adjacent country, I, a few days past, detached Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle, with three hundred officers and men. The colonel reports that the Indians had placed themselves in a swamp out of which about sixty warriors made their appearance near the town, and, with the war-whoop, commenced a brisk fire upon our troops, which they returned in a spirited manner. The fire continued but fifteen or twenty minutes, when the Indians were silenced, and retired into the swamp, with a loss, which the colonel estimates at six or eight killed, and a greater number wounded. We had one man killed, and two wounded.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 2, 1817.*

SIR:

Your letter of the 9th ult. advising of the call on the Governor of Georgia to assemble the auxiliary force, which had been previously required by you, at Fort Hawkins, on the 25th ultimo, has been received.

It is hoped that the letter addressed to you from this Department, on the 30th of October, will have been received, and that you will confine your operations to the objects stated in that communication, and to such a disposition of the regular force under your command as will deter the Seminole Indians from making further depredations on the frontiers of Georgia.

The state of our negotiations with Spain, and the temper manifested by the principal European Powers, make it impolitic, in the opinion of the President, to move a force at this time, into the Spanish possessions, for the mere purpose of chastising the Seminoles for depredations which have heretofore been committed by them.

I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

GEO. GRAHAM.

Major General EDMUND P. GAINES.

*General Gaines to the Secretary of War.*HEAD-QUARTERS, FORT SCOTT, GEORGIA, *December 2, 1817.*

SIR:

I had the honor to receive, on the 26th ultimo, your communication of the 30th October. I am very happy to find that the President approves of my movement. But I much regret that his just expectations, as to the effect there was reason to believe would be produced on the minds of the Indians, by this movement, have not been realised. I am now quite convinced that the hostility of these Indians is, and has long since been, of so deep a character, as to leave no ground to calculate upon tranquillity, or the future security of our frontier settlements, until the towns south and east of this place shall receive a signal proof of our ability and willingness to retaliate for every outrage. It is now my painful duty to report an affair of a more serious and decisive nature than has heretofore occurred, and which leaves no doubt of the necessity of an immediate application of force and active measures on our part. A large party of Seminole Indians, on the 30th ultimo, formed in ambuscade, upon the Appalachicola river, a mile below the junction of the Flint and Chatahoochee, attacked one of our boats, ascending the river near the shore, and killed, wounded, and took, the greater part of the detachment, consisting of forty men, commanded by Lieutenant R. W. Scott of the 7th infantry. There were also on board, killed or taken, seven women, the wives of soldiers. Six men of the detachment only escaped, four of whom were wounded. They report that the strength of the current, at the point of attack, had obliged the lieutenant to keep his boat near the shore; that the Indians had formed along the bank of the river, and were not discovered until their fire commenced; in the first volley of which Lieutenant Scott and his most valuable men fell. The lieutenant and his party had been sent from this place, some days before, to assist Major Muhlenburg in ascending the river with three vessels laden with military stores, brought from Montgomery and Mobile. The major, instead of retaining the party to assist him, as I had advised, (see the enclosure No. 1,) retained only about twenty men; and, in their place, put a like number of sick, with the women, and some regimental clothing. The boat thus laden was detached alone for this place. It is due to Major Muhlenburg to observe, that, at the time he detached the boat, I have reason to believe, he was not apprised of any recent hostilities having taken place in this quarter. It appears, however, from Lieutenant Scott's letter, received about the hour he was attacked, (enclosure No. 2,) that he had been warned of the danger. Upon the receipt of this letter, I had two boats filled up with covers, and with port-holes for defence; and detached Captain Clinch, with an officer and forty men, with an order to secure the movement of Lieutenant Scott, and then to assist Major Muhlenburg; this detachment embarked late in the evening of the 30th, and must have passed the scene of action below at night, and some hours after the affair terminated. I have not yet heard from Captain Clinch; I shall immediately strengthen the detachment under Major Muhlenburg with another boat secured against the enemy's fire. He will, therefore, move up with safety, keeping near the middle of the river; I shall, moreover, take a position, with my principal force, at the junction of the rivers, near the line; and shall attack any force that may attempt to intercept our vessels and supplies below; as I feel persuaded the order of the President, prohibiting an attack upon the Indians, below the line, has reference only to the past, and not to the present or future outrages, such as the one just now perpetrated, and such as shall place our troops strictly within the pale of natural law, when self defence is sanctioned by the privilege of self preservation. The wounded men who made their escape concur in the opinion, that they had seen upwards of five hundred hostile Indian warriors at different places, below the point of attack; of the force engaged, they differ in opinion, but all agree that the number was very considerable, extending about one hundred and fifty yards along the shore, in the edge of a swamp or thick woods. I am assured by the friendly chief, that the hostile warriors of every town upon the Chatahoochee prepared canoes and pushed off down the river to join the Seminoles, as soon as the account of my movement from the Alabama reached them.

The Indians, now remaining upon the Chatahoochee, I have reason to believe, are well disposed. One of the new settlers, however, has recently been killed; but it has been clearly proved that the murderer had belonged to the hostile party. The friendly chiefs in the neighborhood, when apprised of the murder, assembled a party and sent in pursuit of the offender; and followed him to Flint river, on the route to Mickasukee, whither he escaped. Orrishajo, and several other friendly chiefs, have offered me their services, with their warriors, to go against the Seminoles. I have promised to give them notice of the time that may be fixed for my departure, and then to accept their services. The enclosure (No. 3) contains the substance of what I have said to the chiefs who have visited me, several of whom reside south of the Spanish line and west of the Appalachicola river. It was expected by the chiefs, that I should communicate to them my views and wishes. I felt authorized to say but little, and I deemed it necessary, in what I should say, to endeavor to counteract the erroneous impressions by which they have been misled by pretended British agents. I hope the President will see, in what I have said, nothing to disapprove. I feel persuaded a report of the various talks, which I received from the chiefs, would show the propriety of what I have said to them; such a report I have not a moment's time now to make. The Indians are, at this moment, firing at our camp from the opposite line of the river.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD P. GAINES,  
*Major General by Brevet Commanding.*To the Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR,  
*Washington City.*

No. 1.

*General Gaines to Major Muhlenburg.*FORT SCOTT, *November, 1817.*

SIR:

The waters having risen sufficiently high to enable you to ascend the river with all the vessels, I wish you to do so, though it should take longer than I had anticipated. You can avail yourself of the aid of Lieutenant Scott's detachment to expedite your movements hither. Keep your vessels near to each other; and should you meet with any insuperable obstacle, endeavor to apprise me thereof, and you shall have additional relief. Wishing to see you soon with your fleet,

I remain, with great regard, your obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES.

To MAJOR MUHLENBURG,  
*Commanding the United States' troops ascending the Appalachicola.*

SPANISH BLUFF, *November 28, 1817.*

SIR:

Enclosed you will receive Major Muhlenburg's communication, which he directs me to forward to you by express from this place. Mr. Hambly informs me that Indians are assembling at the junction of the river, where they intend to make a stand against those vessels coming up the river; should this be the case, I am not able to make a stand against them. My command does not exceed forty men, and one half sick, and without arms. I leave this immediately.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. W. SCOTT,  
*Lieut. 7th Infantry, commanding Detachment.*

NOTE.—The bearer of this is entitled to three dollars on delivering this letter. The Indians have a report here that the Indians have beaten the white people.

CHIEFS AND WARRIORS:

The President of the United States has been informed of the murders and thefts committed by the hostile Indians in this part of the country. He has authorized General Jackson to arrest the offenders, and cause justice to be done. The Indians have been required to deliver up the murderers of our citizens, and the stolen property, but they refused to deliver either; they have had a council at Mickasukee, in which they have determined upon war; they have been at war against helpless women and children, let them now calculate upon fighting men. We have long known that we had enemies east of this river: we likewise know we have some friends; but they are so mixed together we cannot always distinguish the one from the other. The President, wishing to do justice to his red friends and children, has given orders for the bad to be separated from the good. Those who have taken up arms against him, and such as have listened to the bad talks of the people beyond the sea, must go to Mickasukee Suwany, where we wish to find them together. But all those who were our friends in the war will sit still at their homes in peace; we will pay them for what corn and meat they have to sell to us; we will be their friends, and when they are hungry we will give them meat. The hostile party pretend to calculate upon help from the British! they may as well look for soldiers from the moon to help them. Their warriors were beaten, and driven from our country by American troops. The English are not able to help themselves: how, then, should they help the old "Red Sticks," whom they have ruined by pretended friendship?

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT SCOTT, GEORGIA, *December 4, 1817.*

I would much more willingly devote my time and humble faculties in the delightful occupation of bringing over savage man to the walks of civil life, where this is practicable without force, than to contribute to the destruction of any one of the human race; but every effort in the work of civilization, to be effectual, must accord with the immutable principles of justice. The savage must be taught and compelled to do that which is right, and to abstain from doing that which is wrong. The poisonous cup of barbarism cannot be taken from the lips of the savage by the mild voice of reason alone; the strong mandate of justice must be resorted to and enforced.

After all that the wisdom and philanthropy of our country and Government, aided by millions of money, have yet been able to effect, it is a melancholy truth, that in no Indian nation within my knowledge, (the Chickasaws excepted,) has the scalping knife been laid aside for any considerable length of time, until their every hope of using it with impunity had been defeated.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 9, 1817.*

SIR:

Your letter, bearing date the 21st ultimo, advising of the arrival of the first brigade at Fort Scott on the 19th ultimo, and of the subsequent attack with the Indians at Fowltown, has been received. Although the necessity of this attack, and the consequent effusion of blood, is exceedingly to be regretted, yet it is hoped that the prompt measures which were taken by you on your arrival at Fort Scott, and the display of such an efficient force in that quarter, will induce the Indians to abstain from further depredations, and sue for peace.

Referring to the letters addressed to you from this Department on the 30th of October and 2d of December, as manifesting the views of the President, I have to request that you conform to the instructions therein given. Should the Indians, however, assemble in force on the Spanish side of the line, and persevere in committing hostilities within the limits of the United States, you will, in that event, exercise a sound discretion as to the propriety of crossing the line for the purpose of attacking them, and breaking up their town.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEO. GRAHAM.

Major General EDMUND P. GAINES.

*Extract of a letter from David B. Mitchell, Indian agent, to George Graham, acting Secretary of War, dated*

CREEK AGENCY, *December 14, 1817.*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 31st of October, and 3d November last. Before the receipt of those letters, a meeting of the principal chiefs had been called by the Little Prince, at the town of Thla-cotch-cau, on the Chatahochee river, near Fort Mitchell, at which I attended; the object of which was to take into consideration the state of the nation, and particularly the measures which it would be proper for them to take in relation to those Indians residing between Fort Gaines and the Spanish line; and also the conduct they should pursue with regard to the war with the Seminoles. They unanimously expressed much regret that hostilities should have commenced between the troops under General Gaines and the Fowltown Indians, who reside within our boundary; because these Indians, although they did not unite with the friendly ones during the late war, neither did they join the Red Sticks, and had recently expressed a great desire to become decidedly friendly. They were, however, perfectly willing that their warriors should join General Gaines against the Seminoles.

I stated to them that it was not the desire of the President to go to war with the Seminoles, if he could honorably avoid it; and, at the present moment, he would not consent to their going against the Seminoles within the Spanish territory, under authority of the United States; that they must wait, therefore, until I gave them the order to march. At the same time, I advised them to send a confidential and trusty chief down to the Indians living between Fort Gaines and the Spanish line, and desired them immediately to remove above the line of Jackson's treaty; and that the same chief should then proceed directly to the Mickasukee town, the head quarters of the Seminoles and Red Sticks of the late war, and propose to them certain terms of peace, and a junction of their force to go against the negro camp. The objects which this chief was instructed to hold out to those Indians as attainable, by adopting this course, were various, and of sufficient importance, in the view of those making the proposition, to induce a belief that they would be favorably received; in which event, I should proceed to Fort Scott to adjust their differences. This course of proceeding was immediately adopted, and the head man of the Osuchies,

Hopoi-Haijo, set out on the same day, charged with the mission. To afford time to ascertain the result of this plan, and that I might be able to communicate with the War Department, another meeting was assigned for the 11th of next month, at this place, when all the friendly warriors, with McIntosh at their head, will attend to receive their final orders. But, on my return to this place, I fortunately fell in with General Gaines, on his way to Fort Hawkins, from whom I learned the fatal disaster which had befallen a detachment of his troops, under Lieutenant Scott, on the 30th of last month; the particulars of which he informed me he had communicated, which renders a detail from me unnecessary.

In speaking with General Gaines upon the subject of the road from Fort Hawkins to Fort Stoddert, he informed me that it was not this road to which he referred in his communication to the War Department, but ninety miles of new road, which he had made between Fort Montgomery and Fort Scott, and by which he recently marched the troops from the former to the latter post. As soon as I receive the five thousand dollars which you have ordered to be remitted to me, I shall endeavor to lay it out to the very best advantage in repairing the bridges and roads; and General Gaines has assured me that, as soon as the troops can be spared, a detachment shall be ordered to assist.

*Copy of a letter from Major General E. P. Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FORT HAWKINS, GEORGIA, December 15, 1817.

SIR:

I arrived at this place the day before yesterday morning. In the afternoon of the same day, I reviewed the detachment of Georgia militia, under the command of Brigadier General Glasscock. They look well, and are ready to march; but the inattention on the part of the contractor's agent to the requisitions for a supply of rations will, I apprehend, according to custom, delay the movement of the militia until some part of the frontier settlements suffer by the Indians, who, I have no doubt, will detach considerable parties for this purpose as soon as they find themselves unable to succeed in any attempt against the regular troops at Fort Scott; and I think it cannot be long before they are convinced of this. But, although I consider the regular troops secure in the positions they occupy, yet I am satisfied their numbers will not warrant their being detached, or leaving their places of defence, except to a very small extent.

I have just now received Mr. Graham's letter of the 2d instant.

The views of the President, so far as may depend on me, shall be scrupulously observed. I should instantly discharge the Georgia militia, were I not strongly impressed with a belief that such a step would hazard the safety of the frontier settlements. The Seminole Indians, however strange and absurd it may appear to those who understand little of their real character and extreme ignorance, entertain a notion that they cannot be beaten by our troops. They confidently assert that we never have beaten them, or any of their people, except when we have been assisted by "red people." This will appear the less extraordinary when it is recollected that they have little or no means of knowing the strength and resources of our country; they have not travelled through it; they read neither books nor newspapers; nor have they opportunities of conversing with persons able to inform them. I feel warranted, from all I know of these savages, in saying that they do not believe we can beat them. This error of theirs has led them, from time to time, for many years past, to massacre our frontier citizens, often the unoffending and helpless mother and babes. I felt myself fully authorized to adopt the only measures which long experience has proved to be adequate to put a stop to these outrages. I was pleased with the prospect of being instrumental in effecting an object of so much importance to our exposed frontier settlements, and which I felt, and still feel, persuaded would, in the end, benefit the Indians. The steps I have taken are known to the Department of War. You can more readily conceive than I can describe the mortification and disappointment I have experienced in being compelled to suspend or abandon my measures at a moment when the loss of Lieutenant Scott and his party had given the enemy an occasion of triumph, and a certain prospect of increasing his strength, by enlisting against us all who had before wavered or hesitated. Permit me, then, to repeat my request that I may be permitted to return.

There is little ground to apprehend that we shall find it necessary to follow the Indians far beyond the national boundary. They are now to be found in very considerable parties on our side of the line.

I have not a doubt of the necessity of sending to Flint river, by way of Hartford, the detachment of militia under General Glasscock. My endeavors to put the detachment in motion will delay my own movement until the 17th instant, at which time I shall resume my march to Point Petre.

An opinion prevails among the well informed of this part of the country (who have, by some means unknown to me, been advised of our intention to take Amelia Island) that our troops there will meet with no opposition. Should this be the case, I shall return to Fort Scott without delay.

I have the honor, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General Commanding.*

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from Major General Andrew Jackson to George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, December 16, 1817.

I am in hopes that this check to the savages may incline them to peace. Should it not, and their hostility continue, the protection of our citizens will require that the wolf be struck in his den; for, rest assured, if ever the Indians find out that the territorial boundary of Spain is to be a sanctuary, their murders will be multiplied to a degree that our citizens on the southern frontier cannot bear. Spain is bound by treaties to keep the Indians, within her territory, at peace with us; having failed to do this, necessity will justify the measure, after giving her due notice, to follow the marauders and punish them in their retreat. The war hatchet having been raised, unless the Indians sue for peace, your frontier cannot be protected without entering their country; from long experience, this result has been fully established.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 16, 1817.

SIR:

On the receipt of this letter, should the Seminole Indians still refuse to make reparation for their outrages and depredations on the citizens of the United States, it is the wish of the President that you consider yourself at liberty to march across the Florida line and to attack them within its limits, should it be found necessary, unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish post. In the last event, you will immediately notify this Department.

I have the honor to be, &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

General EDMUND P. GAINES, *Fort Scott, Georgia.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 26, 1817.

SIR:

Your letters of November the 26th, and of the 2d and 3d instant, were received by this morning's mail. The fate of the detachment under Lieutenant Scott is much to be regretted; but, under all the circumstances, no blame can attach to yourself or the officers immediately concerned. When the order of the 12th November was given,

directing you to repair to Amelia Island, it was hoped that the Seminoles would have been brought to their reason without an actual use of force, and that their hostility would not assume so serious an aspect. It is now a subject of much regret, that the service in that quarter has been deprived of your well known skill and vigilance.

Before this will reach you, it is hoped that the views of the President in relation to the settlement on Amelia Island will have been effected. Should that be the case, it is his wish that you should immediately repair to Fort Scott, and resume the command till General Jackson's arrival, to whom orders have this day been sent to command there; or, if you should think the force under your command sufficient, and other circumstances will admit, to penetrate through Florida, and co-operate in the attack on the Seminoles. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the topography of the country between Amelia and their towns, to say whether it is practicable, or what would be the best route; but it is not improbable that some advantage might be taken of the St. John's river, to effect the object. Should it be practicable, it is probable efficient aid might be given to the attack on them, as the attention of their warriors must be wholly directed towards Fort Scott. Should you think it practicable and advisable to co-operate, with the force under your command, you will leave a sufficient number at Amelia Island to retain the possession of that place.

I have the honor to be, &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

Brevet Major General EDMUND P. GAINES.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 26, 1817.

SIR:

You will repair, with as little delay as practicable, to Fort Scott, and assume the immediate command of the forces in that section of the southern division.

The increasing display of hostile intentions, by the Seminole Indians, may render it necessary to concentrate all the contiguous and disposable force of your division upon that quarter. The regular force now there is about eight hundred strong, and one thousand militia of the State of Georgia are called into service. General Gaines estimates the strength of the Indians at two thousand seven hundred. Should you be of opinion that your numbers are too small to beat the enemy, you will call on the Executives of adjacent States for such an additional militia force as you may deem requisite.

General Gaines had been ordered, early in last month, to repair to Amelia Island. It is presumed that he has, therefore, relinquished the command at Fort Scott. Subsequent orders have been given to General Gaines, (copies of which will be furnished you,) advising him that you would be directed to take command, and directing him to reassume, should he deem the public interest to require it, the command at Fort Scott, until you should arrive there. If, however, the General should have progressed to Florida before these subsequent orders may have reached him, he was instructed to penetrate to the Seminole towns through the Floridas, provided the strength of his command at Amelia would justify his engaging in offensive operations.

With this view, you may be prepared to concentrate your forces, and to adopt the necessary measures to terminate a conflict which it has been the desire of the President, from considerations of humanity, to avoid, but which is now made necessary by their settled hostilities.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

Major General ANDREW JACKSON, *commanding Southern Division.*

*Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARTFORD, GEORGIA, January 9, 1818.

SIR:

I had the honor to receive, on my way to this place, the 5th instant, by express, from Fort Hawkins, your very acceptable letters of the 9th and 16th of last month.

The instructions they contain shall be regarded with the attention which their importance demands.

I received by the same express several reports, up to the 21st December, from Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle and Major Muhlenburg, copies of which I enclose herewith, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

By these reports it appears that the principal force of the enemy (between eight hundred and twelve hundred) has been assembled on the Appalachicola, with a view to cut off our supplies ordered up that river, and that the detachment with the vessels has suffered severe annoyance and some loss.

I do not apprehend that we shall lose a vessel, or that any serious consequences to the troops at Fort Scott will result from the delay and difficulty of obtaining supplies by that channel. The supply of flour is more than sufficient for the present month, and there is likewise a considerable supply of corn at the fort, and beef cattle in the neighborhood. Of salted pork there can be but little until the arrival in the river of thirty thousand rations, and with every other requisite supply ordered in the early part of last month from Mobile, and which may be brought up the river in the covered ball-proof boats which have been prepared for the purpose. But to guard against every untoward obstacle in that quarter, I have ordered supplies from this place and Fort Hawkins, part of which are now on the way, and will be deposited at a work now constructing by the detachment under General Glasscock, on Flint river, at the Chetaw village, sixty miles above Fort Scott, whence the supplies will be taken in ball-proof boats; and I have strong ground to believe they will be at Fort Scott by the 24th of the present month, at which time I calculate upon being able to concentrate my force, and shall lose no time in attempting a decisive blow, which I trust will terminate the war.

I have received information that a party of Indians entered the settlement near Traders' Hill, a few days past, killed a woman, and took off some three or four negroes. I had previously ordered a detachment of artillery from Amelia Island, with two companies of militia taken from General Floyd's division, to take post at Traders' Hill, for the defence of that settlement. I have reason to believe the artillery arrived at the Hill about the time the murder was committed, and the militia soon after, and that the Indians were pursued.

The residue of militia taken from General Floyd's division (five companies) are ordered to this place to reinforce General Glasscock's command, excepting one company, which will be posted near the big bend of Oakmulgee.

The detachment under General Glasscock, delayed by rainy weather, bad roads, and want of punctuality in the contractor's department, may not be able to form a junction with the United States' troops in time to put an end to the war before their term of service expires, which will be early in next month. I have therefore requested of his excellency the Governor of this State an additional force, to assemble at this place the 1st of next month, to consist of four battalions of infantry and four companies of riflemen, for three months, which I hope will meet your approbation.

No. 1.

FORT SCOTT, December 20, 1817.

SIR:

Since the day of your departure I have not received the least information, except by Indians, from Fort Gaines, and I have no information whatever of the Georgia militia or McIntosh's Indians.

You will herewith receive a copy of Brevet Major Muhlenburg's letter to me, of the 16th instant, which will apprise you of his situation. The armed boat I sent down yesterday, under the command of Captain Blackstone, with a supply of fifteen days' provisions for the men on board the vessel, and some materials to better secure them

from the fire of the enemy. I had the boat so altered as to make her convenient to carry forward an anchor, by which means the vessels will be enabled to progress slowly, and I think will reach this in eight or ten days, unassisted by the wind; they are about thirty miles below.

I shall do every thing the force under my command will permit, without hazarding too much, to draw the attention of the enemy from the vessels, whose force, from the best information I have been able to obtain, is between eight hundred and twelve hundred Indians and negroes, and increasing daily. On the 13th instant, Hambly and Doyle were made prisoners by this party, and, I presume, killed, and their property of every description taken possession of. The chief, William Perryman, who had gone down with a party to protect Hambly and Doyle, was killed, and his men forced to join the opposite party. All the Indians on the Chattahoochee, below Fort Gaines, who are not disposed to go to war, I fear will be compelled to remove above for security.

The present war with these Indians will require a much greater force than was contemplated to bring it to a speedy and favorable conclusion. Capechinnico, or the principal chief of the Mickasukee town, is in command of all the hostile Indians.

I have a large keel boat on the stocks, and should I not be deceived, will have her in a condition for service in twenty days, at farthest; she will transport from three to four hundred barrels, and will be constructed to navigate the Appalachicola river with safety and despatch.

In consequence of the situation of our vessels, and the difficulty of supplying Fort Hughes, I have thought it best to recall the command. During the time Captain McIntosh commanded that post, he was surrounded by a large force, and his arrangements were such as to do him much credit; he did the enemy some injury, and had no men killed or wounded.

There is but about twenty days' rations of meat on hand at this post. I have sent the contractor's agent to Fort Gaines to forward beef, and if he should be disappointed there, have directed him to proceed further.

I am, sir, &c. &c. &c.

M. ARBUCKLE, *Lieutenant Colonel Commanding.*

Major General GAINES.

No. 2.

FORT SCOTT, *December 21, 1817.*

SIR:

Since closing my letter, the keel-boat arrived from the vessels below with some wounded.

Major Muhlenburg states, it is impossible for the vessels to get up, the shore being lined on both sides of the river with Indians and negroes, who keep up a constant fire on them. He has determined, if the boat does not return to him this evening, to drop down and try to get to the bay. The boat will leave this under the command of Major Twigg at 12 o'clock to day, and will reach them by sundown, provided it is not interrupted in its descent.

I shall endeavor to keep up an intercourse with them (by means of the keel-boat) until we can get the ammunition from on board, and, in the last extremity, they will be compelled to drop down to the bay; in doing which, I am apprehensive they will suffer severely.

You have, herewith, a copy of Brevet Major Muhlenburg's letter of the 19th inst. He appears dissatisfied that more has not been done for his relief; in this nothing shall be omitted that the force here can effect.

Should I attempt to march against the enemy with all the force here, with the intention of removing him from the river, I am confident I should not succeed, and, at least, would sustain a very considerable loss.

Men and means of every description are greatly wanting here, and should any misfortune happen to the vessels we have not half a supply of ammunition, and not a single stand of spare arms.

I have not heard a word from you since your departure.

I am, sir, &c. &c.

M. ARBUCKLE, *Lieutenant Colonel Commanding.*

Major General E. P. GAINES.

No. 3.

NEAR THE OCHESEE TOWN, ON THE APPALACHICOLA RIVER,

*Tuesday evening, December 16, 1817.*

SIR:

On Monday morning the transports were attacked by the Indians from both sides of the river, with a heavy fire of small arms. We returned their fire; the firing has continued ever since. We have lost two killed and thirteen wounded, most of them severely; whether we have injured them any, I am unable to say. We are now compelled to remain here, as it is impossible for us to carry out a warp, as a man cannot show himself above the bulwark without being fired on. I can assure you that our present situation is not the most pleasant, not knowing how soon, or whether, we are to receive succor from above.

The wounded are in but a bad situation, owing to the vessels being much crowded, and it is impossible to make them any ways comfortable on board. Not having any other means to communicate to you, I am compelled to despatch the keel-boat under the command of Captain Clinch, with instructions to make the best of his way to Fort Scott.

I hope to hear from you soon with instructions how I am to proceed in my present situation.

With respect, &c.

P. MUHLENBURG, *Brevet Major.*

P. S. We have but a few days' provision on hand; the men have been on half allowance for some time.

No. 4.

NEW OCHESEE TOWN, *December 19, 1817.*

SIR:

Yours by Captain Blackston was received at 12 o'clock this morning, and was in hopes that you would have been able to afford some relief to the command, as our situation demanded that something should have been done immediately. That we are not able to progress is evident, as we have the enemy on both sides of the river, and, therefore, impracticable to carry out a warp. Had we not heard from you by the keel-boat this morning, it was decided that we should have attempted to return to the bay this evening. I shall now despatch the keel-boat under the command of Lieutenant Gray, and try to retain our present position until the night of the 21st.

In case we should not hear from you, or be reinforced by land, we shall make the attempt to reach the bay. For further particulars, I refer you to Lieutenant Gray.

With respect, &c.

P. MUHLENBURG, *Major.*

Lieut. Colonel ARBUCKLE.

*Extract of a letter to Brevet Major General Edmund P. Gaines, dated*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 16, 1818.*

The honor of the United States requires that the war with the Seminoles should be terminated speedily, and with exemplary punishment, for hostilities so unprovoked. Orders were issued soon after my arrival here, directing the war to be carried on within the limits of Florida, should it be necessary to its speedy and effectual termination. The orders, I presume, have been received.

As soon as it was known that you had repaired to Amelia Island, in obedience to orders, and it being uncertain how long you might be detained there, the state of things at Fort Scott made it necessary to order General Jackson to take command there. From his known promptitude, it is presumable that his arrival may be soon expected; and, in the mean time, full confidence is placed in your well established military talents. I hope the junction of the militia will enable you to carry on offensive operations, and to restrain the enemy from depredations on the frontier.

J. C. CALHOUN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARTFORD, GEORGIA, *January 23, 1818.*

SIR:

I have received this day from Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle reports of the state of his command, up to the 18th of the present month, and from Brigadier General Glasscock up to yesterday's date, copies of which I have the honor to enclose herewith, No. 1 to 6.

By these communications you will perceive that, whatever has been or can be said of the desire of the Seminole Indians to lay down their arms and make peace, there is in reality no prospect of peace without beating them into a conviction of the danger and evil effects of a war with us; and I feel persuaded that a peace made with them at this time would be followed by scenes of more daring outrage than those which our frontier settlements have heretofore suffered.

I have learned from an officer lately at Fort Hawkins, that there is in the post-office at that place a letter from the Department of War to Major General Jackson. The hope of seeing him, and ascertaining his views upon the subject of our operations in this quarter, and to provide for supplying the additional detachment of militia ordered to this place, I have delayed my movement to Fort Scott until I see or hear from the General, or from the Department of War.

I have, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

No. 1.

FORT GAINES, *December 23, 1817.*

SIR:

I received yours by Mr. Laycock last evening, expressing a wish to hear from this post. This is the third attempt that I have made to give you news from here; this same man was made prisoner on his way to your post, and a second time compelled to return back.

You are anxious to know of the movements of the militia and Indians. I will give you what I have heard on that subject: it was brought from Fort Mitchell by an Indian on express; he received it from Sam Sells, direct from Fort Hawkins; he states that the militia were to leave the Agency on last Thursday; no word of them here yet. He stated that there was considerable confusion amongst them about marching, and that some had refused to march; and that the agent had told the Indians that General Gaines had no business to go to the Indian towns and fire on them in the night; that he had acted like the Indians themselves in doing so. McIntosh had come as far as Fort Mitchell on his way, and the agent has sent him home, and told him to meet him at the Agency, for a talk, in thirty days, eighteen of which yet remains; and that he should not move until the General Government should give the order. This I expect is the case; for they have sent Onis Horyo a talk that he was doing wrong to be in service in this country till the agent should give him orders. He further states that the agent has sent a talk to Seminole to the chiefs to meet him and he would make peace for them, and the white people should have no satisfaction for what was done. This is the news here as it respects the Indians. I am induced to believe that they are not coming; nothing new here since you heard from this post. After all that I have said to the citizens, they are going from the fort to their houses. General Gaines directed me to send you the census of the people at this post. A few days since there were two hundred and eighty-five persons in the fort, sixty of which have left it. The General directed me to have a large corn-house built for the reception of the people's corn; I have done so, but they have no disposition to do so. I am constantly advising the people to secure their provisions, but they will not take advice till it will be too late. So soon as they are done with the schooner, I shall expect a visit in this neighborhood. Six — will be sufficient to destroy all the corn in this part of the country, as it all remains at the people's houses without any protection.

An Indian report here says that Mr. Arbuthnot's son is with the Indians, giving them instructions, and that it was his doings that Doyle and Hambly were taken; they state that he is with Kenhija, and that his orders were to take them to him. The chiefs below here sent word to those above that they have heard that they were in the white people's service, and that they will pay them a visit after a little, and reward them for their conduct. Finding that those above are not coming down soon, they are considerably alarmed for fear they will fall on them.

ROBERT IRVIN.

Colonel ARBUCKLE, *commanding Fort Scott.*

No. 2.

FORT SCOTT, *December 27, 1817.*

SIR:

Enclosed you will receive a copy of a letter I received yesterday from Captain Irvin. Can the information given by the Indian expresses be true?

The armed boat returned from the vessel in the Appalachicola river yesterday; and, although they have not progressed much, I was greatly gratified to be informed that no men had been killed or wounded on board of them, except those I informed you of in my communications of the 20th and 21st instant.

I consider the situation of those vessels much more safe than when I wrote to you last, and have little doubt I shall have them here in ten days from this time, or, if not, I can unload them with safety below, and have them returned to the bay.

I have had no information respecting the Georgia militia, or McIntosh and his Indians, except what is contained in the enclosed.

I have not heard of provisions being on the way from Fort Hawkins, nor have I received a line from you since your departure from this post.

I am, &c.

M. ARBUCKLE, *Lieut. Col. Com.*

Major General E. P. GAINES, *St. Mary's, Georgia.*

No. 3.

FORT MITCHELL, *December 30, 1817.*

MY FRIEND:

The messenger which was sent to the Mackasookies has returned with an answer to our talk. The Mackasookies say it was not them that began the war; they were sitting down in peace, and the white people came on them in the night and fired on them. The Mackasookies are all sitting in their town and doing no mischief, and waiting to see if the white people will make peace with them. The people that shot at the boat, and killed all the white people, were the old Red Sticks from the Upper town—those that turned hostile last war. The man that was sent to the Mackasookies (Hopie Haija) with a peace-talk met the Mackasookies at the half-way ground, coming with a peace-talk to us.



Mr. Hambly and Mr. Doyle were taken prisoners; Hopoie Haija saw them; Tustenogee Chepen has gone to release them, and carry them to the fort at St. Marks. I have sent you this little talk now; our meeting that you appointed will soon be, and then every thing will be made straight.

The Chehaws have received two letters from the army, and they had nobody to read them, and they do not know the contents, and wish the army could be stopped until our meeting is over.

TUSTENOGEE HOPOIE,  
HOPOIE HAJA.

No. 4.

CAMP CUMMING, January 10, 1818.

Sir:

Yours of the 8th is just received, and I am extremely gratified to hear of your arrival at Hartford, as I already feel considerably relieved. The many difficulties which have occurred since you left us, from contractors, together with the want of experience, I can assure you, has caused me to feel the responsibility attached to my command; but, with your instructions, I flatter myself I shall now be able to get on.

We are now encamped about four miles from Fort Blackshear, on a very beautiful and commanding spot, with a considerable creek on each side, about four miles distant, neither of which can be crossed with wagons. A bridge was erected on the one in our rear, but it is entirely gone; so soon as the one in our front falls sufficiently, it will be bridged. I have thought it advisable to have the roads repaired, which will be done immediately.

Upolicha, a confidential Indian, has just arrived with a talk from Conard, the purport of which is as follows: He states, that since the principal chiefs left home for the Agency, the whole of the property of one of them was taken off by some of the Fowltown Indians, and that Conard is considerably alarmed for his own property. He has advised us to be on our guard, particularly so far as it relates to the soldiers strolling from the camp, which, for fear of danger, will be attended to. We have not now on hand ten bushels of corn. Brockman is of opinion that it will be dangerous to go again to the Chehaw, in consequence of which I have, at his particular request, sent him with this express. I must refer you to him for further information as to the corn and provisions to be procured in the nation.

I am almost fearful, when I recollect for a moment, that the time of service for which this detachment has been called on, will expire before your object can be accomplished, as the officers, with a few exceptions, are governed by the men, and not the men by the officers. I am in hopes, however, that should your object not be accomplished by the first of next month, I shall be able to render you an essential service, by volunteers from my command, should it be deemed necessary. I will, however, have a personal interview with you on the subject, on your arrival at our camp.

Not having calculated on moving from this place for six or seven days, for want of provisions, &c. I gave a furlough to Captain Melvin; should you deem it necessary for us to move before that time, I would be glad that he would return.

I am yours, with respect and esteem,

THOMAS GLASSCOCK, *Brig. General Commanding D. G. M. U. S. S.*

Major General E. P. GAINES.

No. 5.

CEDAR CREEK, 5 O'CLOCK, January 22, 1818.

Sir:

I was ordered this evening by General Glasscock to take five men, and proceed immediately to meet Captain Leigh, who was packed from Hartford with provisions. I proceeded accordingly, and met him about two miles on the east side of this creek, and Captain Leigh, five men and myself, proceeded on to Blackshear's works, in considerable haste; when we reached the creek, we made a halt to fix on a pack, which was likely to fall, before we crossed. During this stay, Captain Leigh and a private of Captain Avery's company, by the name of Samuel Loftis, started to cross. I called to the captain, and observed that he was probably going into danger; he replied not. As my party and self had crossed not more than half an hour before, I proceeded, and accompanied by this man Loftis, they had not gotten entirely across the creek, when they were fired on by a party of Indians, the number I suppose to be twenty or thirty, from the report of their guns, and both shot dead on the spot; I immediately rode back and ordered the provisions, together with Cornet Isaac Brown's command, consisting of twenty men, to a corner of General Blackshear's old works, on the east side of the creek, where we took shelter in a small breastwork, determined to secure the provisions if possible: this was the only alternative, as they were planted on the swamp, which was at least one hundred yards across, and I not having more than twenty-seven men under my command with guns. When we completed our works, Captain Snotter and Mr. John Bridges proceeded down the creek, in order to make their way across to the army, that General Glasscock might be informed of the murder, and we reinforced: that reinforcement has just reached our works, commanded by Major Joseph Morgan. I, with Captain Donnelly's company, will proceed with the provisions to the army, and Major Morgan will pursue the trail.

I hope, sir, as this was written by a torch, that you will excuse, or correct, any mistake.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

FRANKLIN E. HEARD, *Brigade Major.*

No. 6.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARTFORD, GEORGIA, January 26, 1818.

Sir:

In obedience to your order to me of the 2d instant, I proceeded to Savannah, when, to my great mortification, I found the draught little further advanced than when the order first issued from the Executive Department. In a conference with Lieutenant Colonel Marshall, I learned that the draught has been made, but that a number of desertions had since taken place, which, with forty-seven determined exempt from duty, have reduced the quota one-half, and that he knows of no steps that can be adopted, without a flagrant violation of the civil law, to cause their attendance at the general rendezvous, if they refused to go, which they do, almost unanimously. The draught from the 35th regiment have progressed further in their preparations for the service, though I was informed by Lieutenant Colonel Harrison that it would be some days before they could leave their homes, as an inquiry into exemption; and a second draught, would be necessary to fill their ranks.

On my leaving Savannah, Colonel Marshall assured me, that as soon as a second draft had been effected, and the necessary arrangements made for their movements, he would address to me a report to that effect, at Fort Hawkins, which has not been received, and I am left to conclude that the arrangements referred to have not been carried into effect. Captain Russell reported to me that he was prepared to furnish the transportation necessary for their movements, if it should be required.

I have the honor, &c.

CLINTON WRIGHT, *Major United States Army.*

General E. P. GAINES.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARTFORD, GEORGIA, *January 30, 1818.*

SIR:

I had the honor to receive yesterday your letters of the 26th December, and 16th of the present month, the first having followed me from Amelia Island.

I have, for some months past, endeavored to inform myself of the topography of the country between the Appalachicola and St. John's; but have received only the apparently imperfect accounts of some half-blooded blacks, and Indians, as to the western part of that tract of country. The eastern part is well known to many of the inhabitants of this State, with whom I have conversed. From Amelia Island to the Lochway, the country is, for the most part, what is here called pine barren, nearly level, intersected with creeks and ponds, bordered in many places with rich hammock land, which increases in quantity and quality as you approach the Lochway towns. From thence to St. Marks and Appalachicola, the hammock land is found in very considerable bodies; much the largest portion of the country, however, is poor, sandy, pine barren. The hammock lands afford great quantities of live oak, some cedar, and other valuable timber. There are several large swamps on the route between the Lochway and St. Marks, which, during a season of rainy weather, are impracticable, without the aid of boats; but the country being generally open, will admit of good roads, when the weather is moderately dry. I have not a doubt but the army may march with considerable facility, from the Appalachicola to St. John's, or Amelia Island, with the aid of a few vessels, to send provisions, &c. from Fort Scott, down the river, and thence coastwise to the mouth of the Suwanny river, 130 miles east of the Appalachicola, and about 140 miles west, southwest from Amelia Island. The last mentioned distance may be marched in eight days, without wagons or baggage, the troops carrying their own provisions in their haversacks. A movement from Amelia Island, by the way of St. John's and Lochway, as you have suggested, would, I think, produce the desired effect, in co-operation with the troops from Fort Scott; upon this subject, I shall confer with the commander-in-chief of the division.

By a letter from Major Bankhead, dated the 17th of this month, I learn that two thousand Spanish troops are reported to have arrived at St. Augustin. Although little reliance can be placed in the report received by Major Bankhead, yet whether it be true or not, I am satisfied his command (220 men) is quite too small to admit of any detachment, other than that at Trader's Hill. There should, indeed, be not less than this number stationed at and in the immediate vicinity of the Hill, and a much greater number upon the frontier between that point and this. By a letter from W. Harris, Esq. of Telfair, I am informed that a party of Indians killed a Mr. Daniel Dikes, and his family, a few days past, on the St. Tilla, about forty miles from the town of Jackson, Telfair courthouse. I immediately detached a troop of cavalry in pursuit of the Indians, and at the same time sent out a detachment of infantry to reconnoitre the country, and secure the intermediate frontier from a similar outrage.

Accompanying this I enclose a monthly return of the detachment of Georgia militia under Brigadier General Glasscock, which was not received until this day; I had confidently believed that the proper returns of this detachment had been duly forwarded by Major Nicks, who mustered and inspected the same, to the Adjutant and Inspector General's office.

With extreme regret I have to state that the expected co-operation on the part of that detachment has entirely failed. An attempt to obtain volunteers to continue in service until the arrival of the detachment from Major General Floyd's division, produced but forty men. The enclosed report of Major Wright, assistant adjutant general, contains a discouraging picture of that detachment. It cannot be expected at this place before the 10th of next month, nor is it probable that more than two hundred and fifty or three hundred out of the five hundred called for, can be got into service.

The enclosed papers, No. 1 to 4, contain copies of my last correspondence with the contractor's agent.

The acting quartermaster, Lieutenant Keiser, has purchased the greater part of the provisions issued during the present month, and is now engaged in the purchase of thirty thousand rations, the greater part of which is now on the way to Fort Scott, by the way of Flint river. To pay for these supplies, I have been under the necessity of borrowing ten thousand dollars from the Governor of Georgia, upon a promise to replace the amount in three months from the 23d instant. I had taken the liberty to send to Augusta a draft upon the Department of War for fifteen thousand dollars, but could not obtain money on the draft without suffering a discount of 2½ per cent. which was totally inadmissible.

The fifteen thousand dollars, forwarded by your order, being required to pay the expense of transportation, for which this sum will be insufficient, I have to request that you will be pleased to order the sum of ten thousand dollars, on account of the supply of rations to be forwarded to his excellency Governor Rabun, to replace that sum advanced by him.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

The Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

No. 1.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARTFORD, GEORGIA, *January 12, 1818.*

SIR:

I have received your report, in which you state that you have some rations "on the way," but you do not state where, or in what quantities, they are to be found. Let me be informed upon this subject without delay.

Having been informed by Brigadier General Glasscock that he has not been regularly supplied with rations by you; that he had advanced you two thousand dollars to purchase pork for the detachment of Georgia militia under his command, (which I directed you to forward to this place for that detachment,) I learn that you have not complied with my requisition or order. Should this apparent neglect remain longer unexplained, your continuance as contractor's agent, or as sutler, within the limits of my command, will be no longer tolerated.

Your most obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES, *Maj. Gen. Commanding.*

Captain O. W. CALLIS, *Contractor's Agent, Fort Hawkins.*

No. 2.

SIR:

HARTFORD, *January 24, 1818.*

Your communication of the 12th is received. To the several subjects therein referred, and to others, I have the honor to reply as follows:

The rations reported to have been on hand were at Fort Hawkins, Creek Agency, Fort Mitchell, and Fort Gaines; estimated, at Fort Hawkins, say ten or fifteen thousand rations of pork and beef, and of flour four or five thousand rations; at the Agency, nine thousand rations of flour, with a considerable quantity of the smaller parts; at Fort Mitchell, ten thousand rations of flour, with a very small quantity of vinegar; and at Fort Gaines, say six or seven thousand rations of flour.

The two thousand dollars received of General Glasscock I did not understand were to be applied exclusively to the purchase of pork. My disbursements in the purchase of provision have considerably exceeded that sum since the receipt of it, which was on the 10th of December last. Of this fact I shall be able to convince the general, by a reference to my books, and other vouchers on that subject. It is true that the balance of pork left at Fort Hawkins was not forwarded to this place in compliance with your orders; this non-compliance proceeded from no disposition to evade or treat with indifference the orders of the general, but for want of immediate means of transporting it. In short, allow me to assure you, sir, that if I have, or if I may disobey your orders, it is alone ascribable to the want of the means for compliance. With regard to the flour refused at Fort Hawkins, afterwards transported to and sold

at this place to the troops, by Mr. Lavake, I report that it was never the property of the contractor; that it was inspected and refused as his; that it was transported and sold by him, without the knowledge or consent of the contractor or his agent.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. W. CALLIS, *Contractor's Agent.*

Major Gen. E. P. GAINES, *Commanding, &c.*

No. 3.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARTFORD, GEORGIA, *January 19, 1818.*

The army contractor is hereby required to provide for the daily issue of two thousand complete rations to United States' troops and militia, at the new fort now building on Flint river, near the Chehaw village, and to have in store at that fort, by the 20th day of next month, (February,) sixty thousand complete rations; the meat part of which to consist of good pickled pork or bacon.

E. P. GAINES, *Maj. Gen. Commanding.*

BENJAMIN G. ORR, *Esq.*

*Army Contractor, or his Agent, Fort Hawkins.*

No. 4.

HARTFORD, *January 24, 1818.*

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your requisition, under date of the 19th, and to report that the contractor cannot comply with it in full; but that there is engaged to the contract to have been delivered at Fort Hawkins, on the 20th of this month, seventy thousand rations of pork, which, together with the provisions the money I have, or may have, will procure, shall be furnished the troops.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. W. CALLIS, *Contractor's Agent.*

Major General GAINES.

SIR:

FORT SCOTT, *January 12, 1818.*

On the 16th instant I had the honor to inform you of the arrival of the vessels in charge of Brevet Major Muhlenburg, and to enclose to you the resignation of 1st Lieutenant Sharp, of the corps of artillery, the acceptance of which I recommended, on account of his intemperate habits. Since that period, Lieutenant Johnson, of the same corps, has tendered his resignation, which is herewith enclosed. I would also recommend that his wish to leave the service should be gratified, as his conduct in a skirmish with the Indians some time since was not such as to evidence his being well qualified for the profession of arms.

I have permitted him and Lieutenant Sharp to be absent until the acceptance of their resignations may be published, unless otherwise ordered; and herewith enclosed is a copy of Lieutenant Sharp's letter of resignation.

On the 4th instant I crossed the Flint river, about fourteen miles above this post, and proceeded to Fowltown, which had been deserted. I burnt it, and on the next day arrived at Allapulgas, a small town about fourteen miles southeast of this post. It had also been abandoned, and the cattle and stock of every kind removed, as had been the case at Fowltown. I am informed they have gone to or beyond the Okolokne river, there to place their women and property in greater security, and better prepare themselves for war. They continue to have considerable intercourse with the Indians at Chatahoochee, many of whom were with them, and assisted in the destruction of Lieutenant Scott and his party, and in the attack on our vessels ascending the river, under the command of Brevet Major Mullenburg. You have herewith a copy of a letter from Mr. Irvin, commanding at Fort Gaines. I cannot believe the information it contains, yet I have been informed, a few days since, that the Indians on the Chatahoochee, below Fort Gaines, have received information from the agent of the Creek nation that they are to use their pleasure in joining us, as we are the aggressors. But few of them require great inducement to act in the war, but most if on our side; and should the war with the Lower Creeks terminate on the terms represented by Mr. Irvin, it will be risking but little to say the peace will be of short duration. The force of this place is much too small to advance against the enemy, and I have not received the least information of the Georgia militia or McIntosh's Indians, except what is contained in Mr. Irvin's letter, or a line from General Gaines since his departure.

I have but about two days' rations of meat, and something upwards of thirty days' rations of flour on hand, and without advice of additional supplies being on the way; and should Captain Birch, who is now at Fort Gaines with a command of one hundred and twenty men, for the purpose of obtaining beef, not succeed, and the contractor's agents persist in neglecting their duty much longer, the consequences must be greatly disastrous to the troops and the inhabitants of the Chatahoochee.

I have sent Captain Cummings to the bay, for the purpose of obtaining information should any vessel arrive there with provision, and will do all in my power to maintain my position; yet I do greatly fear my best exertions to do so will fail. I detached a sergeant and four mounted men, on express, to Fort Hawkins, on the 21st ultimo, and have not since heard of them. I shall write to the Creek agent by the present opportunity, and enclose to him a copy of Mr. Irvin's letter.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. ARBUCKLE,

*Lieut. Col. 7th Inf. commanding.*

Major General ANDREW JACKSON,

*Commanding Southern Division, Nashville, Tennessee.*

N. B. Since writing the above, I have received a letter from General Gaines, dated on the 20th ultimo, at Hartford. The contractor's agent in that quarter, I am informed, has failed, and the militia are now about thirty miles above this, badly supplied with provision. Captain Birch has informed me that he will be able to obtain thirty or forty head of beef cattle at Fort Gaines; he will be compelled to take them, as the people refuse to sell.

M. A.

FORT SCOTT, *January 13, 1818.*

SIR:

I received your letter of the 20th ultimo, yesterday, after writing to Major General Jackson; a copy of my letter to him is enclosed, which will exhibit to you the state of things in this quarter.

I have heard nothing more of Colonel Brearly or the militia, except that they were within twenty-five miles of the Flint river on the 4th instant. Brockman wrote to me on that date, and informed me that he was engaged procuring provisions for the militia, the contractor having failed to supply. This, with the information you gave on that subject, has induced me to contract with Mr. McCulloh to deliver fifteen thousand rations of meat at this post, in twenty days from this time, at twelve and a half cents per ration. Should he fulfil his agreement, and Captain Birch succeed in procuring thirty or forty head of beef cattle, I think that supply will last the troops until provisions are received from New Orleans. Our horses have a distemper among them, which I fear will destroy a great number of them.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. ARBUCKLE, *Lieutenant Colonel Commanding.*

Major General E. P. GAINES, *Commanding E. S. D. S. St Mary's, Georgia.*

FORT SCOTT, *January 18, 1818.*

SIR:

I have received information this evening, which I have no doubt may be relied on, that the whole or the greater portion of the hostile Indians are to have a meeting somewhere near the mouth of Flint river, on the 21st instant, for the purpose of concerting measures for the destruction of the inhabitants on the Chatahouchee, and the reduction of this post. In the latter object they expect to succeed, owing to our want of supplies; and their calculations are not without a reasonable prospect of success, should not uncommon exertions be made to supply us from your quarter, as this command has been without meat at this time for five or six days, and have barely a hope of receiving a temporary supply, by a command sent to Fort Gaines for the purpose of collecting a few beef cattle.

I have heard from the bay this evening; one vessel has arrived there with clothing and military stores, having on board very little, if any, more provisions than will be required by the command on board of her, and without certain information of other vessels being on the way.

I have to request you will let me hear from you without loss of time, and that you will inform me of a prospect of supplies from your quarter.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. ARBUCKLE, *Lieutenant Colonel Commanding.*

Brigadier General GLASSCOCK, *Chehaw town, Flint river.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *August 14, 1818.*

SIR:

The President having determined to restore St. Marks and Pensacola, with the Barancas, to the Spanish authority, I am directed to issue orders to carry this determination into effect. You will, accordingly, give the necessary orders to the commandant at Pensacola to surrender that place, with the Barancas, to any Spanish officer properly authorized to receive them. Authority from the Governor General at the Havannah, or the Spanish minister, Don Onis, is considered sufficient; or, in case the Governor, late in possession of West Florida, Don Jose Masot, should himself appear to receive possession, it will be restored to him on his own authority. St. Marks will be restored to the late Spanish commandant, should he appear to receive it, or to any officer having similar authority, as in the case of Pensacola; provided he is accompanied with a sufficient force to garrison it, so as to prevent the post from being seized by the hostile Indians. Its situation in the midst of the hostile Indians renders this precaution necessary. You, who have an accurate knowledge of the strength of the Indians, and of the post, will be able to give precise instructions on this point. It is sufficient that the Spanish force be so considerable as will probably prevent any attempt by the Indians to occupy it.

Public property will be restored in the condition, as far as practicable, in which it was taken possession of. On evacuating these posts, you will make such arrangements as will be the best calculated to hold the Indians, still remaining hostile, in check, and to cover our frontier. To effect these objects, it is thought that it will not be necessary to take post to the west of the Appalachicola, within the Florida line, as the Indians in that quarter are said to be very inconsiderable. You will, accordingly, station the troops which may be thought to be necessary for the protection of that portion of the frontier on our side of the line, unless your impression should be decidedly different from that I have stated; in which event, you will take post at any point which you may judge proper within the country possessed by the Indians. On the east of the Appalachicola you may station the troops on either side of the line, as you may judge proper. Fort Gadsden, besides admitting of great facility for supplies, appears to be a very commanding position, and ought not to be evacuated. Should you think so, you will retain it, and garrison it with a sufficient force.

I trust you will be able to make such a distribution of your command as to afford, with vigilance, effectual protection to the frontier, without resorting to the militia. It is of great importance, if the militia can be dispensed with, not to call them into actual service, as it is harassing to them and exhausting to the treasury. Protection is the first object, and the second is protection by the regular force.

I have, &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

Brevet Major General E. P. GAINES, *Fort Hawkins, Georgia.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *August 19, 1818.*

SIR:

I send the enclosed extract from the letter of the Secretary of State to the Spanish minister, in relation to St. Marks and Pensacola. My instructions to you, of the 14th instant, contained the substance of this extract; and my object in communicating it now, is, that you may be in possession of the precise ideas communicated to the Spanish minister, in case any difficulty should occur.

I have, &c.

General E. P. GAINES.

J. C. CALHOUN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, *January 20, 1818.*

SIR:

In a communication to you of the 12th instant, I acknowledged the receipt of your order of the 26th ultimo, and advised you of the appeal I had made to the patriotism of the West Tennesseans. On yesterday, the officers who had so gallantly headed the Tennessee mounted volunteers during the Creek campaigns, met me at this place, and gave every assurance of their ability to assemble two regiments of mounted gun-men by the 31st instant, at any designated point within the western part of this State. I have ordered them to rendezvous at Fayetteville, and as many as may appear on the 31st instant, or the 1st of February, to be mustered and received into service for six months (if not sooner discharged) by my inspector general. The contractor has instructions to issue to these troops twenty days' rations, and every measure has been adopted to facilitate their march, via Fort Jackson, by the most practicable route, to Fort Scott. These troops will be well supplied as far as Fort Jackson, and there the necessary provisions may be obtained and packed to answer their immediate wants, until they are intercepted by supplies from below. Major Fanning has been despatched to Fort Hawkins to purchase and forward on these supplies to the most convenient point of interception. I have advanced to him two thousand dollars, with authority to draw on the quartermaster general for any additional sums wanted, and imposed upon him the temporary duties of deputy quartermaster general. I am compelled to this arrangement from an impression that there can be no officer of the quartermaster's department in the vicinity of Fort Hawkins, and Colonel Gibson could not possibly reach that neighborhood to effect the objects wished.

My inspector general, Colonel Hayne, (no brigadier general having volunteered his services,) is charged with conducting the march of the two regiments of Tennessee volunteers to the southern frontier.

From the contents of Colonel Arbuttle's and Major Muhlenburg's letters, copies of which are herewith enclosed, you will readily perceive that the former must remain inactive, and that the latter is in a dangerous situation. Every information from our southern frontier justifies the decisive measures I have taken, and urges the prompt movement of the volunteers called into service. I trust you will view the subject in the same light, and that my arrangements may meet with your entire approbation.

The troops now assembled on our southern boundary, reinforced with the Tennessee volunteers called into service, will enable me to inflict speedy and merited chastisement on the deluded Seminoles. I remain here to facilitate every arrangement for the prompt movement of the Tennessee detachment, but will leave this on the 22d inst. for Fort Scott, via Fort Hawkins.

From Colonel Arbuckle's letter I am advised of the departure of General Gaines from Fort Scott; and the newspapers communicate the information of the Georgia contingency being commanded by a brigadier general. As he must consequently be the commanding officer of the forces in the neighborhood of Fort Scott, I have this day directed instructions to him by no means to precipitate himself into a general engagement with the Seminoles, but at all hazards to relieve, if possible, Major Muhlenburg from his present situation, and cover his ascent up the Appalachian river. I have further advised him of my movements, and directed that he should remain on the defensive, collect all the necessary supplies, and have every preparation made for an active campaign as soon as reinforced by the Tennesseans.

General Gaines has been notified of this order. I have no later advices from him than that of the 2d of December, informing me of the catastrophe of Lieutenant Scott and party.

Your letter, enclosing your general order of the 29th ultimo, has been received. Like yourself, I have no other feelings to gratify than those connected with the public good, and it gives me pleasure to find that we coincide in those opinions calculated to produce it. Responsibility now rests where it should, on the officer issuing the orders; and the principle acknowledged is calculated to insure that subordination so necessary to the harmonious movement of every part of the military machine.

It would afford me much pleasure to communicate with you on all military points which my experience may enable me to elucidate.

With respect, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

HON. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a letter from J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, to Major General Andrew Jackson, dated*

JANUARY 29, 1818.

Your letters of the 12th and 13th instant are received. The measures you have taken to bring an efficient force into the field are appreciated; and a confident hope is entertained that a speedy and successful termination of the Indian war will follow your exertions.

*Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Andrew Jackson, dated*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, February 6, 1818.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo, and to acquaint you with the entire approbation of the President of all the measures which you have adopted to terminate the rupture with the Indians. The honor of our arms, as well as the interest of our country requires, that it should be as speedily terminated as practicable; and the confidence reposed in your skill and promptitude assures us that peace will be restored on such conditions as will make it honorable and permanent.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Andrew Jackson to the Secretary of War, dated*

FORT HAWKINS, February 10, 1818.

I reached this place last evening, when I learned, by sundry communications received from Brevet Major General Gaines, that the Georgia militia, under General Glasscock, had all returned home, leaving the frontier in a very exposed situation. The regular troops at Fort Scott have been out of provisions, but the means adopted by Major General Gaines to remedy that evil, induces a strong presumption that they are by this time supplied; which, with the stores ordered by me from New Orleans, will, I trust, afford us an ample supply for the campaign.

The contractor having failed, General Gaines has, by my order, directed the quartermaster to purchase provisions, in which he has succeeded so far as to procure one thousand one hundred hogs, and a sufficiency of bread stuff; this will march the troops to and from the seat of war.

I am without any official advice as to the preparation and march of the late requisition from the State of Georgia.

*Extract of a letter from General Andrew Jackson to the Secretary of War, dated*

HARTFORD, GEORGIA, February 14, 1818.

I arrived at this place on the evening of the 12th, and here met with General Gaines. From a letter received from the Governor of Georgia, advising of the movement of the militia from the several counties to the designated point of rendezvous, as well as the punctuality with which the troops have assembled here under General Gaines's requisition, has induced a hope that I shall be enabled to make a prompt and speedy march for the relief of Fort Scott.

I enclose you a copy of a letter from Colonel B. G. Orr to Captain Callis, contractor's agent at Fort Hawkins. From the sum with which he states to have furnished his agents in this country, you can judge how far efficient means have been adopted to insure the necessary supplies to the troops heretofore in service, as well as those summoned to the field under the late requisition. The mode of provisioning an army by contract is not adapted to the prompt and efficient movement of troops. It may answer in time of profound peace, where a failure or delay cannot produce any serious ill consequences; but where active operations are necessary, and success dependent on prompt and quick movements, there is no dependence to be placed on the contractor. His views are purely mercenary; and where the supplies will not insure him a profit, he hesitates not on a failure, never regarding how far it may defeat the best devised plans of the commander-in-chief. Experience has confirmed me in this opinion, and the recent failure has prompted me again to express it.

The plan which has been adopted to procure the necessary supplies for the army, to transport them to Fort Scott, and the quantity otherwise ordered to that point, will, I hope, relieve me from any embarrassment on that account, until a decisive blow has been struck upon the enemy. I have been so frequently embarrassed from the failures of contractors, that I cannot but express a hope that some other more efficient and certain mode of supplying our army may be adopted: such a plan as will render those charged with the execution of so important a trust responsible to military authority, and exposed to severe and merited chastisements, whenever defaulters, at the discretion of a court martial.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,  
FORT EARLY, February 26, 1818.

SIR:

In my last from Hartford, Georgia, of the 14th instant, I expressed a hope that the plans adopted to procure supplies for the detachment from Georgia to transport them to Fort Scott, together with the quantity ordered to that point, would relieve me from many embarrassments on that account, until a decisive blow could be struck upon the enemy.

The Georgia detachment marched from their encampment, near Hartford, on the 19th instant, and on that night General Gaines received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle, commanding at Fort Scott, containing such intelligence of his intention to abandon that post, in the event of not receiving supplies in a short given time, as induced him (General Gaines) to set out that night, and, if possible, by reaching the place in time to prevent such a disastrous movement.

The General has, as he communicated to me, ordered a large supply of provisions to the Creek agency to be transported in boats to Fort Scott and this place, which would serve until that ordered from Mobile (by himself) should arrive; and under that order did calculate on meeting two boats loaded with flour, on his reaching this place, but was deceived, having arrived here on the night of the 20th, which he left on the evening of the 21st, in a small boat with twelve men. On the night of the 22d I received, by express, a letter directed to General Gaines, and dated the 19th instant, from Captain Melvin of the 4th infantry, who had been charged by General Gaines to build the boats at the Agency, and have the provisions transported thence, stating that two boats would be finished in two days which would transport upwards of one hundred barrels of flour each; these I had strongly calculated on, but they have not arrived. The excessive rains have rendered the roads so bad that I ordered the troops, on their march here, to take their baggage on the wagon horses, and abandon the wagons; this facilitated their march to this place, which they reached to-day; and eleven hundred men are now here without a barrel of flour or bushel of corn. We have pork on foot; and to-morrow I shall proceed for Fort Scott, and endeavor to procure from the Indians a supply of corn that will aid in subsisting the detachment until we reach that place. How those failures have happened under the superintendence of regular officers I cannot imagine, but blame must rest somewhere, and it shall be strictly investigated as soon as circumstances will permit.

The waters are unusually high, and the ground so rotten that it is with much difficulty even pack-horses can pass. Every stream we are compelled either to bridge or swim.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, Major General Commanding.

HON. JOHN C. CALHOUN, Secretary of War.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, FORT GADSDEN,  
(East bank of the Appalachian river, formerly Negro Fort.)

March 25, 1818.

SIR:

At seven o'clock, P. M. on the 9th instant, I reached Fort Scott, with the brigade of Georgia militia nine hundred bayonets strong, and some of the friendly Creeks who had joined me on my march a few days before, where finding but one quart of corn per man, and a few poor cattle, which, added to the live pork I brought along, would give us three days' rations of meat, determined me at once to use this small supply to the best advantage. Accordingly, having been advised by Col. Gibson, quartermaster general, that he would sail from New Orleans on the 12th of February with supplies, and being also advised that two sloops with provisions were in the bay, and an officer had been despatched from Fort Scott in a large keel-boat to bring up a part of their loading, and deeming that the preservation of these supplies would be to preserve the army, and enable me to prosecute the campaign, I assumed the command on the morning of the 10th; ordered the live stock slaughtered, and issued to the troops with one quart of corn to each man, and the line of march to be taken up at twelve meridian. Having to cross the Flint river, which was very high, combined with some neglect in returning the boats during a very dark night, I was unable to move from the opposite bank until nine o'clock, on the morning of the 11th, when I took up my line of march down the east bank of the river for this place, touching the river as often as practicable, looking for the provision boats which were ascending, and which I was fortunate enough to meet on the 13th, when I ordered an extra ration to the troops, they not having received a full one of meal or flour since their arrival at Fort Early.

On that day my patrols captured three prisoners, and found some hidden corn. On the morning of the 14th I ordered the boat down the river to this place, whilst I descended by land, and reached here, without interruption, on the 16th. The eligibility of this spot as a depot determined me, and I immediately directed my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, of the engineer corps, to furnish a plan for, and superintend the erection of, a fortification. His talents and indefatigable zeal, displayed in the execution of this order, induced me to name it Fort Gadsden, to which he is justly entitled. On my arrival here I immediately despatched the boat to the bay for the balance of the provisions known to be there, and to ascertain whether the flotilla, in charge of Colonel Gibson, had reached there, and which returned on the 19th with the displeasing intelligence that nothing had been heard from the flotilla from New Orleans, since it was seen passing Fort Bowyer. I immediately put the troops on half rations, and pushed the completion of the fort for the protection of the provisions, in the event of their arrival, intending to march forthwith to the heart of the enemy, and endeavor to subsist upon him. In the mean time, I despatched Major Fanning, of the corps of artillery, to take another look into the bay, whose return, on the morning of the 23d, brought the information that Colonel Gibson, with one gunboat and three transports, and others in sight, were in the bay. On the same night I received other information that no more had arrived. I am, therefore, apprehensive that some of the smaller vessels have been lost, as one gunboat went to pieces, and another, when last spoken, had one foot of water in her hold; all the vessels had been spoken after a gale that dispersed them. A north and north-west wind has prevailed for six days, but has fortunately changed this morning. I am now awaiting a boat from the bay (which is expected to-day) to complete eight days' rations for my troops, upon which I mean to march. From information received from Pensacola and New Orleans I have no doubt but that St. Marks is in possession of the Indians. The Governor of Pensacola informed Captain Call, of the 1st infantry, (now here,) that the Indians had demanded arms, ammunition, and provisions, or the possession of the garrison of St. Marks of the commandant, and that he presumed possession would be given from inability to defend it. The Spanish Government is bound by treaty to keep her Indians at peace with us. They have acknowledged their incompetency to do this, and are consequently bound, by the law of nations, to yield us all facilities to reduce them. Under this consideration, should I be able, I shall take possession of the garrison as a depot for my supplies, should it be found in the hands of the Spaniards, they having supplied the Indians; but if in the hands of the enemy I will possess it, for the benefit of the United States, as a necessary position for me to hold, to give peace and security to this frontier, and put a final end to Indian warfare in the South.

Finding it very difficult to supply Fort Crawford on the Canecub by land I have ordered the supplies for that garrison by water, and written to the Governor of Pensacola that, if he interrupts them during the present Indian war, I shall view it as aiding our enemy, and treat it as an act of hostility; and stated to him the propriety, under existing circumstances, of his affording all facilities to put down their own as well as our enemies, and that our Governments, while negotiating, can take the subject under consideration, but, in the mean time, our provisions must pass to Fort Crawford by water without interruption.

In mine of the 14th February, from Hartford, I informed you of the means adopted to procure supplies, and in my last of the 26th, from Fort Early, I informed you of their situation. To those communications I beg leave to refer you. I have only to add that I left Fort Early for Fort Scott, and subsisted my troops on ground peas, corn,

and pork, that I could occasionally procure from the Indians, with some pork I had on foot, the whole subsistence for man and horse not costing five hundred dollars. Of all the supplies purchased for the relief of Fort Scott, and the support of the Georgia militia, not one pound was received until I passed Fort Scott. I said in my last that blame rested somewhere. The cause of those failures will, in due time, be a subject of investigation, and Colonel Brearly has been arrested on the application of General Gaines.

By some strange fatality, unaccountable to me, the Tennessee volunteers have not yet joined me; they promptly left their homes, and through the inclement weather reached Fort Mitchell, where I had ordered them supplies, and where Colonel Hayne, who led them, met my instructions to pass by Fort Gaines, where he would get a supply of corn that would enable him to reach Fort Scott; but the idea of starvation had stalked abroad, a panic appears to have spread itself every where, and he was told that they were starving at Fort Gaines and Fort Scott, and he was induced to pass into Georgia for supplies. His men and officers, as reported to me, were willing to risk the worst of consequences on what they had to join me; however, they have been marched from their supplies to a country stripped of them, when every consideration should have induced his advisers to have urged him on to secure the supplies in the bay, and preserve themselves and Fort Scott from starvation. I have a hope they will join me before I reach St. Marks, or the Mekasuky towns; this would be desirable, as the troops ordered from New Orleans, to protect the supplies, have not reached the bay, and leaving garrisons at Forts Scott and Gadsden weakens my force much; the whole effective strength of the regulars being but three hundred and sixty privates.

In mine of the 26th ult., from Fort Early, I stated that despatches received by General Gaines on the 19th instant, from the commanding officer at Fort Scott, induced him to set out that night for Fort Scott to prevent its abandonment, &c. In his passage down the Flint he was shipwrecked, by which he lost his assistant adjutant general, Major C. Wright, and two soldiers, (drowned.) The general reached me six days after, nearly exhausted by hunger and cold, having lost his baggage and clothing, and being compelled to wander in the woods four and a half days without any thing to subsist on, or any clothing except a pair of pantaloons. I am happy to have it in my power to say that he is now with me, at the head of his brigade, in good health.

The great scarcity of subaltern officers, in the 4th and 7th regiments of infantry, has induced me to appoint several young men, present, as second lieutenants in the regiments, who, from personal knowledge, and good recommendations, I have no doubt, will prove themselves worthy, and, I trust, will meet with the approbation of the President. A list of their names, and the regiments to which they are attached, will be furnished the adjutant and inspector general, by my adjutant general.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

P. S. Since writing the above I have the pleasure to inform you that the boat from the bay has arrived with provisions; also Colonel Gibson and Captain McKeever of the navy. I shall move to-morrow, having made the necessary arrangements with Captain McKeever for his co-operation in transporting my supplies around to the bay of St. Marks, from which place I shall do myself the honor of communicating with you. Should our enemy attempt to escape with his supplies and booty to the small islands, and from thence carry on a predatory warfare, the assistance of the navy will prevent his escape.

General McIntosh, commanding the friendly Creeks, who had been ordered to reconnoitre the right bank of the Appalachicola, reported to me on the 19th that he had captured, without the fire of a gun, one hundred and eighty women and children and fifty-three warriors of the Red Ground chief's party, with their cattle and supplies; the chief and thirty warriors making their escape or horseback. Ten of the warriors, attempting to escape after they had surrendered, were killed by the general.

A. J.

The Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

COOSADA, NEAR FORT JACKSON, *March 27, 1818.*

SIR:

Having arranged the affairs of the territory, as far as was practicable, I left St. Stephens, the 14th instant, with the intention of proceeding to Georgia for my family. At the town of Claiborne, the next day, intelligence reached me that, on the night of the 13th, a party of Indians had attacked a house on the Federal road, about sixty-five miles distant from that place, and murdered eight persons. I immediately ordered a detachment of mounted militia into service, and proceeded with them to the place. At the same time, apprehending the murderers might attempt to escape to Florida, the asylum for our enemies, I transmitted a communication, by express, to the commanding officer at Fort Crawford, notifying him of my arrangements, and desiring a force to be sent from the fort, in two detachments, along certain routes, to the place of rendezvous. The express was also instructed to overtake me. I accordingly received information from Major Young, that my request had been executed. The detachments were marched with a promptitude honorable to the major; and, I trust, they will be enabled, with the aid of the militia, to arrest the progress of the hostile party.

Understanding that the inhabitants, in this quarter, considered themselves in much danger, I issued the necessary orders for the disposition of the troops, and proceeded hither. I have since been correctly informed, that the morning I left the place of rendezvous, five men, riding on the road in that neighborhood, were fired on by the Indians; three killed and one wounded; in this state of things it is indispensable to the safety of the country, that troops should be stationed at several points; and I have taken measures, as far as I can, for that object. I have also issued an order, that all Indians who are hunting in our woods depart forthwith to their nation. It has become necessary to their safety, and to the repose of the inhabitants. We cannot distinguish the hostile from the friendly party; and such is the state of alarm, that the sight of an Indian creates among the women and children the most frightful apprehensions. I have sent a letter to the Big warrior, requesting him to call his people home, and assuring him that my order is dictated by the most friendly motives.

Is it not probable, that when the Seminoles are pressed by General Jackson, in the neighborhood of Appalachicola, they will retreat to our frontiers, and take revenge on our defenceless inhabitants? I look for it; and am without the means of resistance. There are not more than one hundred regulars at Fort Crawford; and two-thirds of the militia of the territory are not yet organized. Nor can I organize them, and appoint the officers, until the country is laid off into proper beats. So soon as the Legislature arranged the counties, I issued the necessary instructions on that subject; but owing to high waters, and the want of bridges, it is impossible to have them executed at present. There is not, moreover, nor has there been, one dollar in our treasury. You will readily perceive my embarrassments, and I earnestly entreat you to place funds at my disposal for the protection of the people; and, if practicable, to order a much larger number of regular troops to our frontiers.

I shall make this my head-quarters for some weeks.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

WM. W. BIBB.

Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, CAMP, NEAR ST. MARKS, *April 8, 1818.*

SIR:

I wrote you from Fort Gadsden, communicating the embarrassments under which I had labored, previous to my arrival at that post, and my determination, being then in a situation to commence active operations, to penetrate immediately into the centre of the Seminole towns. My army marched on the 26th ultimo; and, on the 1st of April, was reinforced by the friendly Creek warriors, under General McIntosh, and a detachment of Tennessee volunteers, commanded by Colonel Elliott. On the same day, a mile and a half in advance of the Mekasukian vil-

lages, a small party of hostile Indians were discovered judiciously located on a point of land projecting into an extensive marshy pond; the position designated, as since understood, for the concentrating of the negro and Indian forces to give us battle. They sustained, for a short period, a spirited attack from my advanced spy companies; but fled and dispersed in every direction, upon coming in contact with my flank columns, and discovering a movement to encircle them. The pursuit was continued through the Mekasukian towns, until night compelled me to encamp my army. The next day detachments were sent out, in every direction, to reconnoitre the country, secure all supplies found, and reduce to ashes the villages. The duty was executed to my satisfaction; nearly three hundred houses were consumed, and the greatest abundance of corn, cattle, &c., brought in. Every indication of a hostile spirit was found in the habitations of their chiefs. In the council houses of Kenhagees town, the King of the Mekasukians, more than fifty fresh scalps were found; and, in the centre of the public square, the old Red Stick's standard, a red pole, was erected, crowned with the scalps, recognized by the hair, as torn from the heads of the unfortunate companions of Scott. As I had reason to believe that a portion of the hostile Indians had fled to St. Marks, I directed my march towards that fortress. As advised, I found that the Indians and negroes combined had demanded a surrender of that work; the Spanish garrison was too weak to defend it, and there were circumstances reported producing a strong conviction in my mind, that, if not instigated by the Spanish authorities, the Indians had received the means of carrying on the war from that quarter; foreign agents, who have been long practising their intrigues and villainies in this country, had free access into the fort; St. Marks was necessary, as a depot, to ensure success to my operations. These considerations determined me to occupy it with an American force. An inventory of Spanish property, munitions of war, &c., has been taken and receipted for; personal rights and private property have been respected; and the commandant and garrison furnished with transportation to Pensacola. My correspondence with the Spanish commandants, the evidences under which I acted, and a detailed account of my operations, will be furnished you as early as practicable. Success depends upon the rapidity of my movements; to-morrow I shall march for the Suwaney river, the destroying of the establishments on which will, in my opinion, put a final close to this savage war.

Captain McKeever of the navy, cruising at my request on this coast, has been fortunate enough to secure Francis, or Hillis Hago, the great prophet, and Hornattlemed, an old Red Stick chief. They visited his vessel under an impression they were English; from whom, as they stated, supplies of munitions of war, &c., under late promises, were expected. Arbuthnot, a Scotchman, and suspected as an instigator of this savage war, was found in St. Marks; he is in confinement, until evidences of his guilt can be collected.

I am your most obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

CAMP, 14 MILES FROM ST. MARKS, ON MARCH TO SUWANEE. *April 9, 1818.*

From evidences furnished me by a Mr. Hambly, there is little room to doubt but that one of the chiefs, found slain on the field, in advance of the Mekasukian villages, was Kenhagee. Francis, or Hillis Hago, and Hornattlemed, the prime instigators of this war, have been hung. The latter commanded the party who so inhumanly sacrificed Scott and his companions. Colonel Dyer, with the remainder of the Tennessee volunteers, is in the neighborhood, and will unite with me to-morrow.

AT MANACKS, *April 15, 1818.*

DEAR SIR:

Since I last wrote to you I have received intelligence which makes it necessary for me to return to St. Stephens. I learn that the Indians who committed the late murders in this neighborhood were seen a few days since at Pensacola. My situation is extremely unpleasant. I am without funds for the protection of the territory, and totally ignorant of the views of the Government with respect to Florida. A friendly and intelligent Indian has informed me that the hostile party, by whom we have been annoyed, are two miles south of the Florida line, on a creek called Yellow Water, from whence they make incursions upon us. And yet I have received no intimation from the Executive of the United States which authorizes me to send troops into the Spanish territory. What orders have been issued to General Jackson on that subject I know not; nor indeed am I acquainted in any degree with the arrangements on the part of the United States for prosecuting the present war.

I should be glad to ascertain the views of the Government. We have no mails at present, and I send this letter to Georgia by travellers whom I have met this evening on my route to St. Stephens.

WILLIAM. W. BIBB.

HON. JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,

BOWLEG'S TOWN, SUWANEE RIVER, *April 20, 1818.*

SIR:

My last communication, dated Camp, before St. Marks, April 8, and those to which it referred, advised you of my movements and operations up to that date; and, as I then advised you, I marched from that place on the morning of the 9th. On the evening of the 10th I was joined by the rear of the Tennessee volunteers, also by the Indians, under General McIntosh, whom I had left at Mickasuky to scour the country around that place. Although the weather has been dry and pleasant, and the waters had subsided in a great degree, our march might be said to have been through water, which kept the infantry wet to the middle, and the depth of the swamps, added to the want of forage, occasioned the horses to give out daily in great numbers.

On the morning of the 12th, near Econfinnah, or Natural Bridge, a party of Indians were discovered on the margin of a swamp, and attacked by General McIntosh, and about fifty Tennessee volunteers, who routed them, killing thirty-seven warriors, and capturing six men and ninety-seven women and children; also recapturing a white woman who had been taken at the massacre of Scott. The friendly Indians also took some horses, and about five hundred head of cattle from the enemy, who proved to be McQueen's party. Upon the application of an old woman of the prisoners, I agreed that if McQueen was tied and carried to the commandant of St. Marks, her people should be received in peace, carried to the upper tribes of the Creek nation, and there provisioned until they could raise their own crops. She appeared much pleased with these terms, and I set her at liberty, with written instructions to the commandant of St. Marks to that effect. Having received no further intelligence from McQueen, I am induced to believe the old woman has complied with her part of the obligation.

From St. Marks I marched with eight days' rations, those that joined me having but five: this was done under the expectation of reaching this place in that time, founded on the report of my faithful Indian guide, which I should have accomplished but for the poverty of my horses, and the continued sheets of water through which we had to pass. On the morning of the 15th, my scouts overtook a small party of Indians, killing one man, and capturing the residue, consisting of one man, and one woman, and two children; and on that evening I encamped, as my guide supposed, within twelve miles of Suwaney. I marched very early on the 16th, under the hope of being able to encompass and attack the Indian and negro towns by one o'clock, P. M., but, much to my regret, at three o'clock, and after marching sixteen miles, we reached a remarkable pond, which my guide recollected, and reported to be distant six miles from the object of my march: here I should have halted for the night, had not six mounted Indians, (supposed to be spies,) who were discovered, have effected their escape; this determined me to attempt, by a forced movement, to prevent the removal of their effects, and, if possible, themselves, from crossing the river; for my



rations being out, it was all important to secure their supplies for the subsistence of my troops. Accordingly my lines of attack were instantly formed and put in motion; and, about sunset, my left flank column, composed of the 2d regiment of Tennessee volunteers, commanded by Colonel Williamson, and a part of the friendly Indians under Colonel Kanard, having approached the left flank of the centre town and commenced their attack, caused me to quicken the pace of the centre, composed of the regulars, Georgia militia, and my volunteer Kentucky and Tennessee guards, in order to press the enemy in his centre, whilst the right column, composed of the 1st regiment of Tennessee volunteers, under Colonel Dyer, and a part of the friendly Indians, headed by General McIntosh, who had preceded me, were endeavoring to turn his left and cut off his retreat to the river. They, however, having been previously informed of our force, by a precipitate retreat, soon crossed the river, where it is believed Colonel Kanard, with his Indians, did him considerable injury. Nine negroes and two Indians were found dead, and two negro men made prisoners. On the 17th, foraging parties were sent out, who found a considerable quantity of corn and some cattle. On the 18th, having obtained some small craft, I ordered General Gaines across the river with a strong detachment, and two days' provision, to pursue the enemy; the precipitancy of their flight was soon discovered by the great quantity of goods, corn, &c. strewed through the swamps, and convinced General Gaines that pursuit was in vain; nine Indians and five negro prisoners were taken by our Indians. The evidence of the haste with which the enemy had fled induced the General to confine his reconnaissance to search for cattle and horses; both of which were much wanted by the army. About thirty head of cattle were procured, but, from the reports accompanying General Gaines's, which, in due time, will be forwarded to you, and the disobedience of his orders by the Indians, not one pound was brought into camp.

As soon as time will permit, I shall forward you a detailed account of the various little affairs with the enemy, accompanied with reports of the commanding officers of detachments; suffice it for the present to add that every officer and soldier under my command, when danger appeared, showed a steady firmness, which convinced me that, in the event of a stubborn conflict, they would have realized the best hopes of their country and General.

I believe I may say that the destruction of this place, with the possession of St. Marks, having on the night of the 18th captured the late Lieutenant Ambrister, of the British marine corps, and, as represented by Arbuthnot, successor to Woodbine, will end the Indian war for the present; and should it be renewed, the position taken, which ought to be held, will enable a small party to put it down promptly.

I shall order, or take myself, a reconnaissance west of the Appalachicola, at Pensacola point, where, I am informed, there are a few Red Sticks assembled, who are fed and supplied by the Governor of Pensacola. My health being impaired, as soon as this duty is performed, the positions taken, well garrisoned, and security given to the southern frontier, (if the Government have not active employ for me,) I shall return to Nashville to regain my health. The health of the troops is much impaired, and I have ordered the Georgia troops to Hartford to be mustered, paid, and discharged, the General having communicated his wishes, and that of his troops, to be ordered directly there, and reporting that they have plenty of corn and beef to subsist them to that point. I have written to the Governor of Georgia to obtain from the State the necessary funds to pay General Glasscock's brigade when discharged, and that the Government will promptly refund it. I am compelled to this mode to have them promptly paid, Mr. Hogan, the paymaster of the 7th infantry, (for whom I received from Mr. Brent an enclosure said to contain fifty thousand dollars,) not having reached me.

From the information received from Ambrister, and a Mr. Cook, who was captured with him, that A. Arbuthnot's schooner was at the mouth of this river preparing to sail for the bay of Tamper, my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, volunteered his services with a small detachment to descend the river and capture her. The importance of this vessel to transport my sick to St. Marks, as well as to destroy the means used by the enemy, induced me to grant his request. He sailed yesterday, and I expected to have heard from him this morning. I only await his report to take up the line of march on my return to St. Marks. The Georgia brigade, by whom I send this, being about to march, compels me to close it without the report of Lieutenant Gadsden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

The Honorable JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,  
FORT ST. MARKS, *April 20, 1818.*

SIR:

I wrote you from Bowlegstown on the 20th instant. On the night of the same day, I received the expected despatch from my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, communicating the success of his expedition, and on the next day, as soon as the sick of my army were despatched down the Suwaney river, to be conveyed in the captured schooner to St. Marks, I took up the line of march for that fort. I arrived at this place last evening, performing a march of one hundred and seven miles in less than five days. Lieutenant Gadsden had reached it a few hours before me. He communicates having found among the papers of Arbuthnot, Ambrister, and Cook, letters, memorials, &c. all pointing out the instigators of this savage war, and, in some measure, involving the British Government in the agency. These will be forwarded you in a detailed report I purpose communicating to you as early as practicable.

The old woman spoken of in my last communication to you, who had promised to use her influence in having McQueen captured and delivered up, has not been heard of. From signs discovered on the opposite shore of the St. Marks river, I am induced to believe that that Indian party is still in this neighborhood. A detachment will be sent out to reconnoitre the country, to receive them as friends, if disposed to surrender, or inflict merited chastisement, if still hostile.

I shall leave this in two or three days for Fort Gadsden, and after making all necessary arrangements for the security of the positions occupied, and detaching a force to scour the country west of the Appalachicola, I shall proceed direct for Nashville. My presence in this country can be no longer necessary. The Indian forces have been divided and scattered, and cut off from all communication with those unprincipled agents of foreign nations who have deluded them to their ruin; they have not the power, if the will remain, of again annoying our frontier.

I remain, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,  
FORT GADSDEN, *May 5, 1818.*

SIR:

I returned to this post with my army on the evening of the 2d instant, and embrace an early opportunity of furnishing you a detailed report of my operations to the east of the Appalachicola river.

In the several communications addressed to you from Hartford, Fort Scott, and this place, I have stated the condition of the army, on my assuming the immediate command. The embarrassments occasioned from the want of provisions; the privations of my troops on their march from the frontiers of Georgia; and the circumstances which compelled me to move directly down the Appalachicola river, to meet with and protect the expected supplies from Orleans; these were received on the 25th March, and on the next day I was prepared for active operations. For a detailed account of my movements from that period to this day, you are respectfully referred to the report prepared by my adjutant general, accompanied with Captain Hugh Young's topographical sketch of the route and distance performed. This has been principally a war of movements; the enemy, cut off from their strong holds, or deceived in the promised foreign aid, have uniformly avoided a general engagement. Their resistance has generally been

feeble, and, in the partial rencounters into which they seem to have been involuntarily forced, the regulars, volunteers, and militia under my command realized my expectations; every privation, fatigue, and exposure, was encountered with the spirit of soldiers, and danger was met with a degree of fortitude calculated to strengthen the confidence I had reposed in them.

On the commencement of my operations, I was strongly impressed with the belief that this Indian war had been excited by some unprincipled foreign or private agents. The outlaws of the old Red Stick party had been severely convinced, and the Seminoles were too weak in numbers to believe that they could possibly alone maintain a war with even partial success against the United States. Firmly convinced, therefore, that succor had been promised from some quarter, or that they had been deluded into a belief that America dare not violate the neutrality of Spain by penetrating to their towns, I early determined to ascertain these facts, and so direct my movements as to undeceive the Indians. After the destruction of the Mekasukean villages, I marched direct for St. Marks. The correspondence between myself and the Spanish commandant, in which I demanded the occupancy of that fortress with an American garrison, accompanies this. It had been reported to me, direct from the Governor of Pensacola, that the Indians and negroes unfriendly to the United States had demanded of the commandant of St. Marks a supply of ammunition, munitions of war, &c. threatening, in the event of a non-compliance, to take possession of the fort. The Spanish commandant acknowledged the defenceless state of his fortress, and his inability to defend it, and the Governor of Pensacola expressed similar apprehensions. The Spanish agents throughout the Floridas had uniformly disavowed having any connexion with the Indians, and acknowledged the obligations of His Catholic Majesty, under existing treaties, to restrain their outrages against the citizens of the United States.

Indeed, they declared that the Seminole Indians were viewed as alike hostile to the Spanish Government, and that the will remained, though the power was wanting, to inflict merited chastisement on this lawless tribe. It was, therefore, to be supposed that the American army, impelled by the immutable laws of self-defence, to penetrate the territories of His Catholic Majesty, to fight his battles, and even to relieve from a cruel bondage some of his own subjects, would have been received as allies, hailed as deliverers, and every facility afforded to them to terminate speedily and successfully this savage war. Fort St. Marks could not be maintained by the Spanish force garrisoning it. The Indians and negroes viewed it as an asylum if driven from their towns, and were preparing to occupy it in this event. It was necessary to anticipate their movements, independent of the position being deemed essential as a depot, on which the success of my future operations measurably depended. In the spirit of friendship, therefore, I demanded its surrender to the army of the United States, until the close of the Seminole war. The Spanish commandant required time to reflect; it was granted, and a negotiation ensued, and an effort made to protract it to an unwarrantable length. In the conversations between my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, and the Spanish commandant, circumstances transpired convicting him of a disposition to favor the Indians, and of having taken an active part in aiding and abetting them in this war. I hesitated, therefore, no longer, and as I could not be received in friendship, I entered the fort by violence. Two light companies of the 7th regiment infantry, and one of the 4th, under the command of Major Twigg, was ordered to advance, lower the Spanish colors, and hoist the star-spangled banner on the ramparts of Fort St. Marks. The order was executed promptly, and no resistance attempted on the part of the Spanish garrison.

The duplicity of the Spanish commandant in professing friendship towards the United States, while he was actually aiding and supplying her savage enemies, throwing open the gates of his garrison to their free access, appropriating the King's stores to their use, issuing ammunition and munitions of war to them, and knowingly purchasing of them property plundered from the citizens of the United States, is clearly evinced by the documents accompanying my correspondence.

In Fort St. Marks, as an inmate in the family of the Spanish commandant, an Englishman by the name of Arbuthnot was found, unable satisfactorily to explain the objects of his visiting this country, and there being a combination of circumstances to justify a suspicion that his views were not honest, he was ordered in close confinement. The capture of his schooner near the mouth of Suwaney river by my aid-de camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, and the papers found on board, unveiled his corrupt transactions, as well as those of Captain Ambrister, late of the British colonial marine corps, taken as a prisoner near Bowlegs town. These individuals were tried under my orders by a special court of select officers, legally convicted as excitors of this savage and negro war, legally condemned, and most justly punished for their iniquities. The proceedings of the court martial in this case, with the volume of testimony justifying their condemnation, present scenes of wickedness, corruption, and barbarity, at which the heart sickens, and which in this enlightened age, it ought not scarcely to be believed that a christian nation would have participated; and yet the British Government is involved in the agency. If Arbuthnot and Ambrister are not convicted as the authorized agents of Great Britain, there is no room to doubt but that that Government had a knowledge of their assumed character, and was well advised of the measures which they had adopted to excite the negroes and Indians in East Florida to war against the United States. I hope the execution of these two unprincipled villains will prove an awful example to the world, and convince the Government of Great Britain, as well as her subjects, that certain, though slow retribution awaits those unchristian wretches who, by false promises, delude and excite an Indian tribe to all the horrid deeds of savage war.

Previous to my leaving Fort Gadsden, I had occasion to address a communication to the Governor of Pensacola, on the subject of permitting supplies to pass up the Escambia river to Fort Crawford. This letter, with another from St. Marks on the subject of some United States clothing, shipped in a vessel in the employ of the Spanish Government, to that port, I now enclose, with his reply. The Governor of Pensacola's refusal of my demand cannot but be viewed as evincing an hostile feeling on his part, particularly in connexion with some circumstances reported to me from the most unquestionable authority. It has been stated that the Indians at war with the United States have free access into Pensacola; that they are kept advised, from that quarter, of all our movements; that they are supplied from thence with ammunition and munitions of war; and that they are now collecting in a large body, to the amount of four or five hundred warriors, in that city; that inroads from thence have been lately made on the Alabama; in one of which, eighteen settlers fell by the tomahawk. These statements compel me to make a movement to the west of the Appalachicola, and should they prove correct, Pensacola must be occupied with an American force, the Governor treated according to his deserts, or as policy may dictate. I shall leave strong garrisons in Forts St. Marks, Gadsden, and Scott, and in Pensacola, should it become necessary to possess it. It becomes my duty to state it as my confirmed opinion, that, so long as Spain has not the power or will to enforce the treaties by which she is solemnly bound to preserve the Indians within her territory at peace with the United States, no security can be given to our southern frontier, without occupying a cordon of posts along the sea-shore. The moment the American army retires from Florida, the war hatchet will be again raised, and the same scenes of indiscriminate massacre with which our frontier settlers have been visited will be repeated. So long as the Indians within the territory of Spain are exposed to the delusions of false prophets, and poison of foreign intrigue; so long as they can receive ammunition, munitions of war, &c. from pretended traders, and Spanish commandants, it will be impossible to restrain their outrages; the burning of towns, the destroying of their stock and provisions, will produce but temporary embarrassments. Re-supplied by Spanish authorities, they may concentrate and disperse at will, and keep up a lasting predatory warfare against the frontiers of the United States, as expensive to our Government as harassing to our troops. The savages, therefore, must be made dependent on us, and cannot be kept at peace without being persuaded of the certainty of chastisement being inflicted on the commission of the first offence.

I trust, therefore, that the measures which have been pursued will meet with the approbation of the President of the United States. They have been adopted in pursuance of your instructions, and under a firm conviction that they alone were calculated to ensure "peace and security to the southern frontier of Georgia."

The army will move on the 7th from hence, crossing the Appalachicola river at the Ochesee bluff, about forty miles above this.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

The Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
FORT GADSDEN, APPALACHICOLA RIVER, *May 3, 1818.*

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the army under the immediate command of Major General Andrew Jackson took up the line of march on the 26th day of March last, with eight days' rations, and lay in advance of this post about six miles on the 29th, at Okolokoe river, when nineteen canoes were made, and the principal part of the army crossed by eight o'clock, P. M., the residue next morning; when the march was again resumed at eleven o'clock, A. M. On this evening Brevet Major Twiggs of the 7th infantry was detached with one company and about two hundred warriors, with orders to advance on an Indian village called Tallahassie, and surprise it at day-break. On his near approach, he despatched a party to ascertain its situation, who reported it evacuated some days before. On the morning of the 31st he entered the village, having previously sent out parties to reconnoitre. Two of the enemy were made prisoners, one of whom made his escape from the Indians before he was brought into camp. The army passed the village about twelve o'clock, and encamped near Mickasuky, when intelligence was received of the approach of a detachment of mounted volunteers from Tennessee, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott, near four hundred strong. On the morning of the 1st of April the army formed and halted until their arrival, when they were ordered to form the advance of each flank, with Captains Russell and Evans's companies, as spies, with Captain John Gordon. The army now advanced within a mile and a half of Kinghajah's town, when a number of Indians were discovered herding cattle on the margin of a large pond. The general ordered the right and left columns to advance, with a view of cutting off their retreat, and at the same time instructed the advance light company, under Major Muhlenburg, the guard, under Major Nicks, together with the small companies composing his life guard, under Captains Dunlap and Crittenden, to advance in support of the spies, in the event of a general engagement. The spy companies commenced the attack, and a brisk running fire was kept up on both sides for some minutes, when the enemy divided, the spy companies pursuing those on the right; and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott having turned their flank, became generally engaged, and bore them over to the left column, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, within half gunshot of each other, when they were assailed by both flanks, and would all have fallen, had not the volunteers taken up the impression, from the similarity of dress, that some of the friendly warriors had reached in pursuit of the enemy, which occasioned the firing to cease for a short time, when a number made good their retreat into the swamp. Captain Crittenden's company, being on horseback, was unable to reach the head of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott's column, when they dismounted, and operated against the enemy. Major Muhlenburg's company, the advance guard, and Captain Dunlap's company, being on foot, were not able to reach the scene of action in time. The right column of Georgia militia, on nearing the pond, filed round it; and Colonel King, with his regiment, was ordered to advance through it, to support the column of horse, should it be found necessary; which was executed by the colonel with great promptness. The conduct of the officers and soldiers engaged on this occasion was, in every respect, praiseworthy; our loss, one man of Captain Andrews's company killed, and four of Captain Evans's company of Tennessee volunteers wounded. The reports give fourteen killed and several wounded of the enemy, and four women prisoners, from whom we learned that three hundred warriors had advanced from the town to aid those engaged, and, on seeing the advance of an army, fled precipitately. The army now advanced upon the town, which was found deserted by the enemy; and, on reaching the square, discovered a red pole planted at the council-house, on which were suspended about fifty fresh scalps, taken from the heads of extreme age down to the tender infant of both sexes, and, in an adjacent house, near three hundred men, which bore the appearance of having been the barbarous trophies of settled hostility for three or four years past.

The army continued the pursuit to a large pond of water, which is eight miles in length, varying in width from six hundred to four thousand yards, and from two to five feet deep, through which the army passed, when the approach of night induced the commanding general to draw off his troops. On the succeeding morning, Brevet Major General E. P. Gaines, with a large command, was ordered to pass the lake or pond, and attack the other towns, but which he found abandoned by the enemy. The red pole was again found planted in the square of Fowltown, barbarously decorated with human scalps of both sexes, taken within the last six months from the heads of our unfortunate citizens. General McIntosh, who was with General Gaines, routed a small party of savages near Fowltown, killed one negro, and took three prisoners, on one of whom was found the coat of James Champion, of Captain Cummings's company, (4th regiment of infantry,) who was killed by the Indians on board of one of our boats descending the river to the relief of Major Muhlenburg. This coat, with nearly all Captain Cummings's company's clothing, was lost on board of Lieutenant Scott's boat, when he and his party were massacred, on the 30th of November last. The pocket-book of Mr. Thomas Leigh, who was murdered at Cedar creek on the 21st of January last, was found in Kinghajah's town, containing several letters addressed to the deceased, and one to General Glasscock. About one thousand head of cattle fell into our hands, many of which were recognised by the Georgia militia as the brands and marks of their citizens. Near three thousand bushels of corn were found, with other articles useful to the army. Upwards of three hundred houses were consumed, leaving a tract of fertile country in ruin, where these wretches might have lived in plenty, but for the infernal machinations of *foreign traders*, if not *agents*. The army remained at this point until the morning of the 5th, when the march was resumed for St. Marks, before which it arrived on the evening of the 6th, and, after communicating with the commanding officer, took possession of that fortress on the following morning. Captain McKeever, of the navy, having sailed for St. Marks with some vessels containing supplies for the army, was fortunate enough to entice on board his vessel, in the river, Francis, or Hillishajo, and Homathlamicco, hostile chiefs of the Creek nation, and whose settled hostility has been severely felt by our citizens. The commanding general had them brought on shore, and ordered them to be hung, as an example to deter others from exciting these deluded wretches to future scenes of butchery. A man of the name of A. Arbuthnot was also taken on the arrival of the army, and placed in close confinement.

The troops having again received eight days' rations, and a garrison detached for Fort St. Marks, the army marched on the 9th of April, destined for Suwanee. On the morning of the 12th, the officer of the day reported that the sentinels had heard the lowing of cattle and barking of dogs during the night; from which the general was induced to send a runner to General McIntosh, who was encamped a short distance in rear of the army, with instructions to have the country below examined. In the mean time, the army moved slowly in advance. General McIntosh despatched Major Kanard with a party, who returned to him a runner reporting the discovery of a hostile party too strong for his little band of warriors. McIntosh moved against them with his whole force. A small detachment of different companies of the Tennessee volunteers, under Colonels Dyer and Williamson, (they having joined the army on the evening of the 10th,) were left at our encampment to search for horses, and, on hearing the report of Major Kanard, formed themselves into a company under Captain Bell, who was with them, and moved to attack the enemy, whom they found near a large swamp endeavoring to move off. A spirited engagement ensued, which resulted in the death of thirty-seven, and six men and ninety-eight women and children prisoners; and our loss three killed and four wounded of the friendly Indians. The only woman out of seven whose life was spared at the massacre of Lieutenant Scott was here recaptured by Major Kanard. General McIntosh individually killed three of the enemy and captured one. The little band of Tennessee volunteers acted on this occasion as becomes their character. At the commencement of the action the army was halted, and a runner despatched to inform General McIntosh that any aid he might deem necessary would be afforded, and that the army would remain until his arrival, which was not until we encamped for the night. The enemy abandoned a number of horses, hogs, corn, and about six hundred head of cattle.

The army moved on the morning of the 13th, and on the succeeding day our spies surprised a camp consisting of two men, a woman, and two children. One of the men was killed; the other, with a small boy, slightly wounded; and the woman, unfortunately, not being distinguished in the swamp, received a wound of which she died. At three o'clock, P. M. on the 16th, the army arrived at a large pond within six miles of Bowlegs town, on Suwanee river, where a few Indians well mounted discovered our advance. An attempt was made to overtake them, but the enfeebled state of our horses rendered it impracticable. Under these circumstances, the general deemed it advisable

to make the town by a forced march, not allowing the enemy time to cross the river and destroy their supplies. The manner of attack having been previously arranged, the army moved rapidly, until arriving near the large — which flanks the towns, when the troops changed position, conformably to previous orders, and moved forward. The left flank, composed of Colonel Williamson's regiment of Tennessee volunteers, at the head of which was a force of Indian warriors under Major (now Colonel) Kanard, soon came in contact, and warmly engaged the Indians and negroes; whilst the right flank, composed of Colonel Dyer's regiment of Tennessee volunteers, with a like force of warriors under General McIntosh, advanced near the river, to prevent the enemy from crossing. The centre advanced in excellent order, and under the expectation of having to combat with the strength of these towns and the fugitives from Mickasuky; but, on reaching Bowlegs town, found it abandoned. The left flank, from the nature of the ground they had to traverse, and Colonel Kanard not adhering entirely to the route designated, drove the Indians and negroes (about three hundred) into the river, before the right flank could occupy the desired position. The reports give eleven killed and three prisoners on the field, and it is believed many were killed and drowned in swimming the river, it being nearly three hundred yards wide. Colonel Kanard had thirteen wounded, but one dangerously. About twenty-seven hundred bushels of corn were obtained in the towns and neighboring swamps, near ninety head of cattle, and a number of horses. Our sentinels, on the night of the 17th, took prisoners two white men (Ambrister and Cook) and one negro, who had just returned from Arbuthnot's vessel at the mouth of Suwany; from the latter we obtained a letter written by A. Arbuthnot to his son, in which he enumerates the army of the United States under the general's command, and requires him to inform his friend Bowlegs that resistance would be fruitless against such an overwhelming force, and to make over the river with all despatch; admonishing his son, at the same time, to remove and secrete every thing which could be moved. From Cook we learned that this letter was read to the negroes and Indians, when they immediately commenced crossing their families, and had just finished as we entered their towns. Upwards of three hundred houses were here consumed, the most of which were well built and somewhat regular, extending near three miles up the river. On the morning of the 18th General Gaines was ordered, with a select command, and a number of warriors under General McIntosh, to cross the Suwany river in pursuit of the enemy; but found, on advancing about six miles, that they had dispersed in every direction, from the numerous trails, and too far advanced to overtake them, his command being short of supplies. A detachment of the warriors, having advanced some distance, fell in with a small party of the enemy, killed three warriors, took some women and children and five negroes. On the same morning, Lieutenant James Gadsden, aide-de-camp to the commanding general, descended the Suwany river to its mouth, with Captain Dunlap's and a few of Captain Crittenden's companies of the life-guard, and a small detachment of regulars, and captured, without difficulty, the schooner of A. Arbuthnot, which had brought supplies of powder and lead to the Indians and negroes settled at Suwany. This vessel afforded the means of transporting our sick back to St. Marks. On the evening of the 20th, General Glasscock was ordered, at his request, to march his brigade by Mickasuky to Hartford, in Georgia, and Captain Bell ordered to muster them out of service; and the army moved about three-quarters of a mile preparatory to its return. On the 24th General McIntosh was ordered to proceed direct to Fort Scott, on Flint river, and an order furnished him to the commanding officer to muster his warriors out of service.

The army reached Fort St. Marks on the 25th, having marched twenty-eight miles on that day, and we were agreeably surprised in finding Lieutenant Gadsden had arrived safely that evening from the mouth of Suwany. On the 26th a special court was ordered for the trial of A. Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister; which court, on the documents and evidence adduced, sentenced the first to be hung, and the latter to be shot. They were accordingly executed on the morning of the 29th. The army moved and encamped four miles from St. Marks on the evening of the 28th, and arrived at Fort Gadsden on the 2d instant; the general having previously detached a garrison of two hundred men, under the command of Brevet Major Fanning, to occupy Fort St. Marks. I have only to add, that this army has borne hardships and privations to a great extent, in a manner becoming soldiers and citizens of a nation proud of their liberties. The assistant topographical engineer will furnish a topographical report of the country through which the army operated; and I refer you to the enclosed sketches for information of our order of movement, and have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General.*

Brig. Gen. DANIEL PARKER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, FORT GADSDEN, *March 25, 1818.*

SIR:

I have ordered a supply of provisions to be sent from New Orleans, via Pensacola, to Fort Crawford, on the Canecho. This route has been adopted as the most speedy one of provisioning one of my garrisons which must be maintained during the present conflict against our mutual enemies, the Seminole Indians, and I cannot but express a hope that no attempt will be made to interrupt the free passage of my transports to that post. I am not disposed to enter into any controversy with you on the rights which our Government may claim to the free navigation of such water-courses as head within her limits, but flow through the territory of His Catholic Majesty, preferring to leave these subjects to be settled by those legally authorized; but as it is necessary for me to make use of the Escambia river in passing up provisions to the garrison at Fort Crawford, I wish it to be distinctly understood, that any attempt to interrupt the passage of transports cannot be viewed in any other light than as a hostile act on your part. I will not permit myself for a moment to believe that you would commit an act so contrary to the interest of the King your master. His Catholic Majesty, as well as the Government of the United States, are alike interested in chastising a savage foe, who have too long warred with impunity against his subjects as well as the citizens of this republic, and I feel persuaded that every aid which you can give, to promote this object, will be cheerfully tendered.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

DON JOSE MASOT, *Governor of Pensacola.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, BEFORE ST. MARKS, *April 6, 1818.*

SIR:

To chastise a savage foe, who, combined with a lawless band of negro brigands, have for some time past been carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war against the citizens of the United States, has compelled the President to direct me to march my army into Florida. I have penetrated to the Mekasuky towns, and reduced them to ashes. In these towns I found many indications of a hostile spirit. On a red pole in the centre of the council-houses of Kenhagas town, more than fifty fresh scalps, of all ages, from the infant to the aged matron, were found suspended. In addition to this, upwards of three hundred old scalps were found in the dwellings of the different chiefs settled on the Mekasuky pond. Those barbarians who escaped death have fled. From information communicated by the Governor of Pensacola to two of my captains, Gordon and Call, I was induced to believe they had fled to St. Marks for protection. The Governor stated that the Indians and negroes had demanded of you large supplies of munitions of war, with a threat, in the event of a refusal, of taking possession of your fortress. He further expressed an apprehension that, from your defenceless state, they were already in possession of St. Marks. The wife of Chenubby, a noted chief, now a prisoner in my camp, informed me that the hostile Indians and negroes obtained their supply of ammunition from St. Marks. To prevent the recurrence of so gross a violation of neutrality, and to exclude our savage enemies from so strong a hold as St. Marks, I deem it expedient to garrison that fortress with American troops, until the close of the present war. This measure is justifiable on the immutable principle of self defence, and cannot but be satisfactory, under existing circumstances, to His Catholic Majesty, the King of Spain. Under existing treaties between our two Governments, the King of Spain is bound to preserve in peace with the

citizens of the United States not only his own subjects but all Indian tribes residing within his territory. When called upon to fulfil that part of the treaty in relation to a savage tribe who have long depredated with impunity on the American frontier, incompetency is alleged, with an acknowledgment that the same tribe have acted in open hostility to the laws, and invaded the rights, of His Catholic Majesty. As a mutual enemy, therefore, it is expected that every facility will be afforded by the agents of the King of Spain to chastise these lawless and inhuman savages. In this light is the possession of St. Marks, by the American forces, to be viewed. I come not as the enemy, but as the friend, of Spain. Spanish rights and property will be respected. The property and rights of Spanish subjects will be guaranteed them. An inventory of all public property, munitions of war, &c. shall be made out and certified by an officer appointed by each of us, and a receipt given for the same, to be accounted for to His Catholic Majesty by the United States. The subject of my possession of the garrison of St. Marks will be referred to our respective Governments, for amicable adjustment. Some armed vessels of the United States are in the bay of St. Marks, with whom I wish to communicate; you will, I trust, furnish me with a small vessel to convey a letter, as well as some sick and wounded that are with me. As our mutual savage enemies are concentrating their forces near or on the Suwaney, an early and prompt answer is requested to this letter, with an English translation, as neither myself nor staff are acquainted with the Spanish.

This will be handed to you by aid-de-camp Lieutenant James Gadsden, by whom an answer is expected.  
I have, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *St. Marks.*

ST. MARKS, OFF APPALACHIE, *April 7, 1818.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR:

Being made to understand, although with the greatest difficulty, the contents of the letter with which your excellency honored me yesterday evening, delivered to me by your aid-de-camp, James Gadsden, I will declare to your excellency the satisfaction the knowledge of the result of your expedition against Meksuky has afforded me. That such would be the event could not be doubted on considering the superior talents and skillful conduct of your excellency, and to these must be attributed the success, on which I tender you my most cordial congratulation.

My chief, the Governor of Pensacola, had, in truth, reason to mention to your captains, Gordon and Call, what your excellency states to me, and to entertain fears for the fate of this fort, menaced by Indians and negroes for some months past, and particularly since they have been disappointed in their expectations of obtaining powder and balls, which they have so repeatedly solicited, and to which they thought themselves entitled, from the practice which subsisted of supplying them annually therewith. This proves how entirely unfounded is the assertion of the wife of the chief Chenubby, that the Indians have been supplied with munitions in this fort since I was advised and I determined to maintain the most perfect neutrality. No one can better remove from your excellency's mind any unfavorable opinion you may have formed on this subject than the bearer, William Hambly, as he has, at various times, interpreted to me the solicitations of the several Indian chiefs in my neighborhood; and he can also inform you of the advice I always gave them, to avoid the destruction which has overtaken them, and which I foresaw from the beginning.

This being realized, and there being now no motive to fear any insult to the fort from these barbarians and the negroes, I beg permission of your excellency to call your attention to the difficulty I should involve myself in with my Government, if I were presently to assent to what your excellency proposes to me, to garrison this fort with the troops of the United States, without first receiving its orders. Such I will solicit immediately an opportunity offers, and I do not for a moment doubt that they will be given to me; so zealous is my Government to comply with the stipulations between her and the United States. In the interim, I hope your excellency will desist from your intention, and be firmly persuaded of the good faith and harmony which will reign between this garrison and whatever troops you may think fit to leave in this vicinity, who may assist me in the defence of this fort on any unforeseen event.

The sick your excellency sent in are lodged in the royal hospital, and I have afforded them every aid which circumstances admit. I hope your excellency will give me other opportunities of evincing the desire I have to satisfy you.

I trust your excellency will pardon my not answering you as soon as requested, for reasons which have been given you by your aid-de-camp. I do not accompany this with an English translation, as your excellency desires, because there is no one in the fort capable thereof; but the before named William Hambly proposes to translate it to your excellency in the best manner he can.

May our Lord preserve your excellency many years. Such is my prayer.

Most excellent sir, I kiss your excellency's hands, and am your most obedient and devoted servant,

FRANCISCO CASO Y LUENGO.

The Most Excellent ANDREW JACKSON,

*General in chief of the troops of the United States before St. Marks.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, CAMP, NEAR ST. MARKS, *April 7, 1818.*

SIR:

I refer you to my communications of yesterday for the motives which have compelled me to occupy the fort of St. Marks. I again repeat that I have entered the territory of Spain as a friend, to chastise a mutual enemy of both nations, and whom His Catholic Majesty was bound, under the most sacred of treaties, to have punished himself. Peculiar circumstances, however, have prevented, and it was therefore expected that every facility would have been given to the American arms to have ensured success to their operations. The occupation of St. Marks is essential to the accomplishment of my campaign, and is peculiarly so at this period, when evidence is derived from every source of the designs of the negroes and Indians against that fortress. They are now concentrating with the intention of taking possession of St. Marks the moment my army moves from its vicinity, the dislodging them from which will cost me more American blood than I am disposed should be shed. Success to my operations requires despatch; you will excuse me, therefore, in refusing your request that a suspension should be granted until a permit is obtained from your Government, and on insisting that Fort St. Marks should be immediately occupied by American troops.

Major Fanning, my inspector general, and Lieutenant Simmons, of the ordnance department, are appointed to act, with one or two officers nominated on your part, to take an inventory of and inspect all public property in the fort of St. Marks, for which receipts will be given in the name of the American Government. Any disposition which you would wish made with the private property of yourself, officers, and soldiers, or any other arrangements gratifying to yourself, will be settled by my aid-de-camps, Lieutenants Gadsden and Glassel.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

DON FRANCISCO CASO LUENGO, *Commanding Fort St. Marks.*

[TRANSLATION.]

APPALACHIE, *April 7, 1818.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR:

I should insist on what I stated to your excellency in my letter of this morning, as to the necessity of awaiting orders from the Governor of Pensacola for the delivery of this fort under my command, were I not, in addition to what your excellency says in your answer, threatened by your aid-de-camp and the other officers appointed to negotiate on the subject, and had not so large a body of troops entered, without awaiting my permission, and taken possession of all the stores and posts, lowering the Spanish flag, and hoisting the American.

So manifest a violation of the territory of His Catholic Majesty obliges me to complain of it, and to protest against it; and I accordingly do protest against it, and beg of your excellency to provide me, as speedily as possible, the vessels necessary to transport me to Pensacola, together with the troops and those persons who are in the royal employ, and also to give orders that, in the interim, the private property and effects of every Spanish individual here be respected. With respect to the public property of His Catholic Majesty, I have nominated the subaltern officer of this detachment and commissary of the fort to make, with the three officers whom you name to me, an inventory thereof.

I repeat to your excellency my respects, and prayers to God to preserve your life many years.

Most excellent sir, I kiss your excellency's hands.

Your most obedient and devoted servant,

FRANCISCO CASO Y LUENGO.

The Most Excellent ANDREW JACKSON,

*General of the troops of the U. S. before St. Marks.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, CAMP, NEAR ST. MARKS, *April 7, 1818.*

SIR:

I have received your protest against my proceedings. The occupancy of Fort St. Marks by my troops, previous to your assenting to the measure, became necessary from the difficulties thrown in the way of an amicable adjustment, notwithstanding my assurances that every arrangement should be made to your satisfaction, and expressing a wish that my movements against our common enemy should not be retarded by a tedious negotiation. I again repeat what has been reiterated to you through my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, that your personal rights and private property shall be respected; that your situation shall be made as comfortable as practicable while compelled to remain in Fort St. Marks; and that transports shall be furnished, as soon as they can be obtained, to convey yourself, family, and command to Pensacola. I daily expect some vessels from the bay of Appalachiecola; as soon as they arrive, the most suitable shall be selected for said purpose.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*DON FRANCISCO CASO Y LUENGO, *Governor of St. Marks.*

[TRANSLATION.]

PENSACOLA, *April 16, 1818.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR:

Your excellency's letter of the 25th of the last month has been delivered to me, and also that of the 26th, in answer to mine of the 16th of February last. I have the honor to advise your excellency of the receipt of both, and to answer the former.

In the month of May, of the last year, from a spirit of conciliation, I permitted a cargo of provisions, which the schooner *Mobiterra* had brought from New Orleans to this place, to pass up the Escambia to Fort Crawford. Influenced by the same sentiments, I made a similar concession to Captain Call, assenting to the transporting of the cargo brought by the schooner *Italiana*, in January last, to the said destination; and, more lately, in continuance of the same amicable and conciliatory spirit, I consented that Lieutenant Eddy, of the garrison of the before named fort, (commissioned by its commander, Major Young, for the purpose,) should procure sixty barrels of provisions in this place; and the cargo of the schooner *Italiana* (which is, or ought to be, deposited here) not being yet exported, I do not think the further introduction of provisions, which your excellency asks at present, necessary; but, nevertheless, as I infer from your excellency's letter that these provisions are already on their passage, in pursuance of the sufferance hitherto accorded, and observing the restrictions and course established, that is, to consign them to a Spanish commercial house, who will take care to forward them, and pay the royal duties of import and export, I will allow the same destination to be given to them as to the former, provided that the Government of the United States shall not set up, or derive any right, either now or hereafter, from these purely gratuitous concessions, as I make them from the obligation of existing circumstances, which do not admit of supplying the garrison of the before named Fort Crawford by any other way.

In accordance with the declaration of your excellency, when you add that it is not your intention to enter into a discussion with me in relation to the right which the United States may claim to the free navigation of the Escambia, so neither is it mine to discuss this subject with your excellency, as well because it does not fall within my duties, as that, being a subordinate officer, I am bound to obey the superior on whom I depend, it being my duty, until I receive instructions to the contrary, to be governed on this head by the treaties existing between the United States and Spain; and in the last of amity, limits, and navigation, I do not see the before named river mentioned, but the sovereignty of the King my master over all the territories, rivers, coasts, ports, and harbors lying south of 31° north, solemnly and explicitly recognised by the United States; and, if extraordinary existing circumstances should require any further temporary concessions, not explained in the said treaty, I request your excellency to have the goodness to apply, in future, for the obtaining of them to the proper authority, as I, for my part, possess no power whatever in relation thereto.

May God preserve your excellency many years.

JOSE MASOT.

His Excellency ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General, &c.*HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, FORT ST. MARKS, *April 27, 1818.*

SIR:

After I left this port for St. Juan, to disperse and destroy the mutual enemy of Spain and the United States, a small schooner, with men and supplies, arrived from Pensacola, and was taken possession of and detained by my officer left in command. This vessel has been liberated with all her effects, excepting some clothing of the United States unaccompanied with any invoice, and which has been detained, as supposed to be a part of that taken on board the boats within the territory of this republic, in which Lieutenant Scott, of the United States' army, with his command, were so inhumanly massacred.

I regret being compelled to state to you, that, from the papers and other proofs taken at St. Juan's; the quantity of American cattle found at St. Marks, and purchased by me from the commissary of the post; and the intercourse

kept up between this post and the hostile Indians, there is too much ground to believe that the Indians have been encouraged, aided, and abetted by the officers of Spain in this cruel war against the United States. Proof positive exists that the Indians were supplied with ammunition by the late commandant of St. Marks. The United States clothing being found on board of a vessel in the employ of the Government of Spain, sailing from Pensacola direct for this port, compels me to call on you for a statement in what manner you came possessed of said clothing. The good understanding that so happily exists between His Catholic Majesty and the United States formed a just ground to believe that his agents would have discountenanced this cruel and savage war against the citizens of this republic. Spain, too weak to comply with her treaties with the United States, or chastise her own savage subjects, waging war against a friendly nation, it was scarcely to be believed that her officers would have been detected in aiding and abetting the enemy, assisting with the intelligence of our movements, and purchasing the property depredated of us. America, just to her treaties, and anxious to maintain peace with the world, cannot and will not permit such a savage war to be carried on in disguise any longer. Asylums have been granted to the persons and property of an Indian foe, (fugitives from the territory of the United States;) facilities, deemed by me necessary to terminate a war which, under existing treaties, should have been maintained by Spain; for feeding my troops; and liberating the subjects of Spain imprisoned by the Indians; have all been denied by the officers of His Catholic Majesty. All these facts prove the unjust conduct of Spanish agents in Florida. It cannot be longer tolerated, and although a republic fond of peace, the United States know her rights and at the expense of war will maintain them.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

DON JOSE MASOT, *Governor of Pensacola.*

[TRANSLATIONS.]

No. 2.

*Copy of a note of the Commandant of West Florida to Major Young, at the encampment, banks of the Escambia.*

PENSACOLA, *April 27, 1818.*

SIR:

Your note of the 27th, dated encampment on the Escambia and Fort Crawford, accompanying the proclamation which you were pleased to enclose, were delivered to me at three o'clock this afternoon by an artificer, a man of color, whose speedy return not allowing me at present to answer them in detail, I shall merely state, that the small number of peaceful Indians who were in this place and its vicinity retired on the 26th, at the dawn of which day several of them, both women and children, were killed by the troops of the United States. As it is not my purpose to investigate the motives of this act, or of the violation resulting from it, I shall only say that, in compliance with my duty, I shall give an account of the whole proceeding to my superior; and, in the mean time, I hope you will allow no further hostilities to be committed on this territory, on any pretence whatever. If the Indians should give any further cause of complaint, I trust you will inform me of it, that they may receive due punishment, should that depend on my authority. If there are any Indians still remaining within this territory, I will have them sought for and informed of your letter, and advise you of the result. I can assure you, both under my hand and on my word, that the information, as stated in your letter, of the aggressions committed by the Indians is the first I have had of them, for at the time I agreed to the return of the escort referred to, I had no knowledge of any others than those who were concerned in the attack on Lieutenant Eddy. I repeat to you the assurance that my wishes and efforts are wholly directed to preserve the peace happily subsisting between our Governments. In a full confidence in your favorable sentiments, I beg leave to offer you my respectful salutations.

God preserve you many years.

JOSE MASOT.

*To Major W. Young, Commanding the American troops on the Escambia.*

*Copy of a note from Jose Masot to Major W. Young.*

PENSACOLA, *April 30, 1818.*

SIR:

In consequence of the request expressed in your letter of the 27th instant, I assembled the chiefs of the Upper Creeks at the villages of Colome, Canaan, Cowale, and Forsatche, and communicated to them the contents of your letter. They all replied that they had for a long time been very miserable and wretched, without shelter or home, that by the counsel of a good friend they had at length found one, that they had listened attentively to it, and accepted with gratitude the offers you had made them. These Indians are about eighty-seven in number, including women and children. They agreed to divide themselves into three parties, and set out on their march, as soon as I received your answer, which they thought it would be prudent for them to keep; and that when you were informed of their resolution, you would give the necessary orders for their safe progress, and avoiding any rencounter with the Choctaws, who, if not seasonably apprized of the circumstances, might attack them, in which case the pacific arrangements, in which we both take so strong an interest, would be entirely defeated. Opahi-hola, an Aliliamon chief, on account of his advanced age, and infirmities, will, for the present, remain here with his family. I have given orders for his relief, and pledge myself for his good behaviour. You will always find me disposed, sir, to promote any measure conducive to the mutual interests of our two countries, which may, at the same time, be in conformity with existing treaties. I offer you the renewed assurances of my respect, and I pray God to preserve you.

JOSE MASOT.

*To Major WHITE YOUNG.*

PENSACOLA, *May 2, 1818.*

True copies of the letter and documents deposited in the archives of this command.

In the absence of the Secretary, (by indisposition.)

BUENAVENTURA DUBIEUIL.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, FORT MONTGOMERY, *June 2, 1818.*

SIR:

The Seminole war having terminated, I deem it politic and advisable to send to Washington John Blunt and his Indian comrades, who have acted as pilots to me during the late campaign. John Blunt is a Tuckabatchee Indian, has long been friendly to the United States, and in consequence of his opposition to the Red Stick party during the Creek war has drawn down upon himself their vengeance during the late contest. His settlement being in an exposed situation on the Appalachian river, he was early attacked by the Seminoles, his property destroyed, and his family rifled from him; alone he escaped and fled to Fort Scott, where, joining the American standard, he has proved himself a most zealous friend and faithful pilot to this period. In justice to him I am bound to state, that to his correct knowledge of the country and zealous attachment to the cause in which we were engaged, am I measurably indebted for the success of the present campaign.

Mr. Hambly accompanies John Blunt. Mr. H. is a Spanish subject by birth, and has long been a resident as a trader on the Appalachicola river. In consequence of his attachment to the American cause, and his active exertions to check the hostile feelings of those Indians disposed to war against the United States, he drew down upon himself and family their vengeance. He was forcibly taken from his house at an early period of the war, his property, goods, and negroes taken from him, and he violently transported from Mickasuky, Suwany, and St. Marks, until finally relieved by Captain McKeever of the American Navy; since which period he has been attached to my army as Indian interpreter. You will find him an honest and faithful friend to our Government, and valuable for the information which he can afford of Spanish policy and intrigue. He is well acquainted with all the transactions of foreign agents in this country, of their practices, &c. and how far encouraged by the Spanish authority, &c.

With respect, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

The Honorable JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, FORT MONTGOMERY, June 2, 1818.

SIR:

In a communication to you of the 5th of May, I detailed at length the operations of my army up to that period. Leaving a strong garrison of regulars in Fort Scott and Gadsden, I resumed my march with a small detachment of the 4th regiment of infantry, one company of artillery, and the effectives of the Tennessee volunteers, the whole not exceeding twelve hundred men, to fulfil my intentions, communicated to you, of scouring the country west of the Appalachicola river. On the 10th of May, my army crossed that river at the Ochesee village, and, after a fatiguing, tedious, and circuitous march of twelve days, misled by the ignorance of our pilots, and exposed to the severest privations, we finally reached and effected a passage over the Escambia. On my march, on the 23d May, a protest from the Governor of Pensacola was delivered me by a Spanish officer, remonstrating, in warm terms, against my proceedings, and ordering me and my forces instantly to quit the territory of His Catholic Majesty, with a threat to apply force in the event of a non-compliance. This was so open an indication of a hostile feeling on his part, after having been early and well advised of the object of my operations, that I hesitated no longer on the measures to be adopted. I marched for and entered Pensacola, with only the show of resistance, on the 21st of May. The Governor had previously fled to Fort Carlos de Barancas, where it was said he resolved upon a most desperate resistance. A correspondence ensued between us, accompanying this, marked A, detailing my motives for wishing and demanding that Pensacola and its dependencies be occupied with an American garrison. The package, marked B, are documents substantiating the charges, in part, against the conduct of the Spanish Governor having knowingly and willingly admitted the savages, avowedly hostile to the United States, within the town of Pensacola. The peaceable surrender of the fort at the Barancas was denied; I marched for and invested it on the evening of the 25th of May; and, on the same night, pushed reconnoitring parties under its very guns. On the morning of the 26th, a military reconnaissance was taken; and, on the same night, a lodgement was made, under a fire from the Spanish garrison, by Captain Gadsden, of the engineers, aided by Captains Call and Young, on a commanding position, within three hundred and eighty-five yards of the Spanish works, and a nine-pounder mounted; a howitzer battery was simultaneously established on the capital of, and within seven hundred and fifty yards of, the fort. At day-light, on the 27th, the Spanish garrison opened their artillery on our batteries; a parley was sounded, a flag sent in, and the surrender of Fort Carlos de Barancas again demanded: the favorable positions obtained were pointed out, and the inutilty of resistance urged. Anxious to avoid an open contest, and to save the effusion of blood, the same terms previously offered were again tendered. These were rejected, and offensive operations recommenced. A spirited and well directed fire was kept up the greater part of the morning, and, at intervals, during the afternoon. In the evening a flag was sent from the Spanish commandant, offering to capitulate, and a suspension of hostilities was granted until 8 o'clock the next day, when the enclosed article of capitulation, marked C, was signed and agreed to. The terms are more favorable than a conquered enemy would have merited, but, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, my object obtained, there was no motive for wounding the feelings of those whose military pride or honor had prompted to the resistance made. The articles, with but one condition, amounted, to the complete cession, to the United States, of that portion of the Floridas hitherto under the Government of Don Jose Masot.

The arrangements which I have made to secure Pensacola and its dependencies are contained in the general orders, &c., marked D. I deemed it most advisable to retain, for the present, the same Government to which the people had been accustomed, until such time as the Executive of the United States may order otherwise. It was necessary, however, to establish revenue laws of the United States, to check the smuggling which has been carried on successfully in this quarter for many years past; and, to admit the American merchant to an equal participation in a trade which would have been denied under the partial operation of the Spanish commercial code. Captain Gadsden was appointed by me collector, and he has organized and left the department in the charge of officers in whom the greatest confidence may be reposed.

Though the Seminole Indians have been scattered, and literally so driven and reduced as no longer to be viewed as a formidable enemy, yet as there are still many small marauding parties supposed to be concealed in the swamps of the Perdido, Choctawhatchy, and Chaponly, who might make occasional and sudden inroads on our frontier settlers, massacring women and children, I have deemed it advisable to call into service, for six months, if not sooner discharged, two companies of volunteer rangers, under Captains McGirt and Boyles, with instructions to scour the country between the Mobile and Appalachicola rivers, exterminating every hostile party, who dare resist and will not surrender and remove with their families, above the thirty-first degree of latitude.

The Seminole war may now be considered at a close; tranquillity again restored to the southern frontier of the United States; and as long as a cordon of military posts is maintained along the Gulf of Mexico America has nothing to apprehend from either foreign or Indian hostilities. Indeed, sir, to attempt to fortify or protect an imaginary line, or to suppose that a frontier, on the 31st degree of latitude, in a wilderness, can be secured by a cordon of military posts, whilst the Spanish authorities were not maintained in the Floridas, and that the country lay open to the use and excitement of any enemy, is visionary in the extreme. On the immutable principle, therefore, of self defence, authorized by the law of nature and of nations, have I bottomed all my operations; on the fact that the Spanish officers had aided and abetted the Indian enemy, and thereby became a party in hostilities against us, do I justify my occupying the Spanish fortresses. Spain had disregarded the treaties existing with the American Government, or had not power to enforce them. The Indian tribes within her territory, and which she was bound to keep at peace, had visited our citizens with all the horrors of savage war. Negro brigands were establishing themselves, when and where they pleased, and foreign agents were openly and knowingly practising their intrigues in this neutral territory. The immutable principles of self defence justified, therefore, the occupancy of the Floridas, and the same principle will warrant the American Government in holding it until such time as Spain can guarantee, by an adequate military force, the maintaining her authority within the colony.

A topographical sketch of the country, from the Appalachicola to Pensacola Bay, accompanies this. Captain Young will prepare, as soon as practicable, a topographical memoir of that part of the Floridas on which my army has operated, with a map of the country. Captain Gadsden is instructed to prepare a report on the necessary defences of the country, as far as the military reconnaissances will permit, accompanied with plans of the existing works, what additions and improvements are necessary, and what new works should, in his opinion, be erected to give permanent security to this important territorial addition to our republic. As soon as the report is prepared, Captain Gadsden will receive orders to repair to Washington city, with some other documents which I may wish to confide to his charge.



At the close of a campaign, which has terminated so honorably and happily, it gives me pleasure to express my approbation generally of the officers and soldiers of every species of corps which I have had the honor to command. The patience with which they endured fatigue, and submitted to privations, and the determination with which they encountered and vanquished every difficulty, is the strongest indication of the existence of that patriotic feeling which no circumstances can change, and that irresistible ardor, in the defence of their country, which will prove their strength and bulwark under any exposure. I should do violence to my feelings, if I did not particularly notice the exertions of my quartermaster general, Colonel George Gibson; who, under the most embarrassing of circumstances, relieved the necessities of my army, and to whose exertions I was indebted for the supplies received. His zeal and integrity in this campaign, as well as in the uniform discharge of his duties, since his connexion with my staff, merits the approbation and gratitude of his country.

With respect, yours, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON,  
Major General Commanding.

The Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

[TRANSLATION.]

MOST EXCELLENT SIR:

PENSACOLA, *May 18, 1818.*

On the 10th instant I received your excellency's letter of the 27th of April last, informing me that some articles of the clothing used by the troops of the United States, and supposed to be part of those taken in the boat in which Lieutenant Scott and his escort were so inhumanly murdered, were found in a small schooner despatched from this port for that of Appalachie with provisions.

Your excellency inquires of me in what manner these articles came into my possession; and you further state that you feel yourself obliged to inform me that the documents and the proofs found in St. Juan, the detention of American cattle, found in St. Marks, and the correspondence carried on between this post and the hostile Indians, are sufficient to create a belief that they were armed and incited to this cruel war against the United States by the Spanish officers.

Your excellency adds that there exists positive proofs that the Indians were supplied with munitions by the last commander of St. Marks; and you conclude by saying that an asylum has been granted here to the persons and property of the Indians, who are enemies to the United States, and fugitives from the American territory; and that these proceedings, and the refusing to allow the passage of provisions for your troops, prove the unjust conduct of the Spanish agents in the Floridas.

I shall answer the charges alleged in their proper order, with candor, and without evasion or reservation.

The first complaint made by your excellency is relative to the articles of clothing found on board the schooner Maria, and which have been detained on the supposition that they are the property of the United States.

Part of these articles, as is proved by copy of No. 1, were purchased at New Orleans in the month of May, last year; part came from the Havannah; and part were purchased in this place. All this is established. The charge is, of course, done away, and your excellency's question is satisfactorily answered.

The succeeding one is more serious, and relates to the course observed of late by the Governor of St. Marks.

I immediately required of him an account of his conduct, and he made me the communication found in copy No. 2. However, as your excellency affirms that you possess positive proofs of the misconduct of this officer, I must, as a necessary consequence, entreat you to submit them to me, that, the fact being established, I may inflict on him deserved punishment. I assure your excellency, with the sincerity natural to me, that he has acted in entire opposition to his instructions; and that, if your excellency will transmit the proofs I request, he shall be brought before a council of war, and punished with all the severity his transgressions deserve; but your excellency will be just enough to allow that the Spanish Government cannot be responsible for the misconduct of its agents, when it neither upholds them therein, nor suffers their mal-practices, being ascertained, to pass unpunished.

The last complaints of your excellency have a personal and direct application to myself, and are relative to the asylum granted to the persons and property of the fugitive Indians, and to the passage of provisions up the Escambia. It is easy for me to remove these charges, and I think your excellency will be satisfied with a short and true relation of facts.

With respect to the Indians, your excellency has been assuredly misinformed, as, although it is true that some remained here, the greater part of them were women and children, who procured a subsistence by furnishing the inhabitants with wood, fish, and other trifling objects, and were here before the present war with the Seminoles. Others, now and then, assembled on account of the war, but in very small numbers; as, when I had them collected, in compliance with the proposition made by Major Young, they, altogether, amounted to eighty-seven, and, assuredly, these few unarmed and miserable men were not hostile to the United States. The continual passing of American citizens from the frontier to this people, who travelled alone and unarmed among them, without being, at any time, insulted or molested in their persons or property, is a proof of this.

With respect to the passage of provisions up the Escambia, I have not hitherto prevented it, but, on the contrary, have facilitated it so far as I was able, and my limited powers have permitted, even to the compromising of myself; for, being only a subordinate officer, I could not consent to it, as it is unauthorized, but I took the responsibility on myself, in consideration of existing circumstances, and so I stated to your excellency in my letter of the 15th of last month, which I wrote to you by Major Perrault, and to which I refer you in support of my assertion. Now, that the free commerce of this people with those of the interior is declared admissible by higher authority, there will, in future, be no difficulty in allowing the merchants to transport from hence to Fort Crawford, and other forts on the frontier, as well by water as by land, whatever provisions and effects they may need or desire; by which means these posts will readily be provisioned, and your excellency will be satisfied.

I think I have answered your excellency's letter satisfactorily, and in a manner which can leave no doubt of the sincerity of my intentions, and which evinces my desire to contribute, so far as depends on me, to the good understanding existing between our respective Governments.

God preserve your excellency many years.

JOSE MASOT.

His Excellency ANDREW JACKSON,  
Major General of the Army of the United States.

[TRANSLATIONS.]

No. 1.

PENSACOLA, *May 18, 1818.*

Being informed of what, amongst other subjects, Major General Andrew Jackson, of the United States' troops, states to you in his letter of the 27th of April last, and communicated to me in yours of the 13th instant, in which you direct me to explain to you of what description the articles were, referred to by the said General, and by whom the coats worn by the men belonging to the Grey and Brown companies, (de pardos y morenos) from the Havana, under my command, were sold or brought to this place, they being the same uniform as that worn by the troops of the United States, I have to inform you, in reply, that the articles of clothing shipped on board the schooner Maria, for the supply of a detachment from the aforesaid companies at Appalachie, and detained by General Jackson, consisted of fifteen four point woollen blankets, brought here in His Majesty's Hermaphrodite brig El Amirante, which arrived at this port on the 2d of January last; twenty-five pairs of French shoes, bought here of Don Henrique Granpré, as is shown by voucher No. 1, annexed; fifteen common black hats, bought of Don Henrique Michelet, as is proved by voucher No. 2; and twenty shirts of Crea linen, and the same number of pantaloons, received by the above named Hermaphrodite armed brig, with the exception of three or four of the latter articles, which were made in North America for the use of their troops, and came into my possession in the manner I shall

explain to you. All which clothing I requested you, in mine of the 7th of April last, to report to the Department of Royal Finance, that they might be regularly entered in the clearance, on account, and at the risk, of the same. By voucher No. 3, annexed, you will perceive that, on the 1st and 6th of May, and 29th of July last, there were shipped to me, from New Orleans, by Don Pedro Dalhaste y Claveria, merchant and citizen of the United States, one hundred and thirty-one coats of the uniform altered there, as is stated in his letter of advice; also twenty-eight pairs of shoes; one hundred and eighteen shirts; seventy-six pairs of pantaloons; two hundred and thirty-six woollen waistcoats, without sleeves; twenty Russia jackets; two hundred and fifty-three leathern caps, for the use of the Chasseurs; and a quantity of leathern gaiters and stocks; which articles were purchased from the military storekeeper at New Orleans, and brought here in the schooners Maria and Jalouse, under the charge of their masters, Bartelome Alberty and Jose Medina, who included them in the manifests they presented to the custom house here, and the duties on them were paid, as appears from the estimate of them, made by the Department on the 19 h of May and the 11th of August last. It follows, from this statement, that the conjecture formed by General Jackson, that the articles of clothing detained by him were part of those taken from the escort of Lieutenant Scott at the time he was killed, within the territory of the republic, is deprived of all foundation, as the unfortunate fate of that officer and his escort happened on the Appalachicola in December last; and the articles of clothing alluded to were purchased in New Orleans in May and July of the same year, as is proved by the letters of advice and invoices comprised in voucher No. 3, to which I have referred. God preserve you many years.

BENIGNO GARCIA CALDERON.

To Don JOSE MASOT.

No. 1.

I hereby certify that, on the 10th of February last, I sold to Captain Don Benigno Garcia Calderon, commanding the Grey and Brown companies from Havana, two hundred and eighteen pairs of French shoes, iron shod, for the use of the men belonging to the said companies; and, at the request of the said officer, I give him the present certificate, at Pensacola, this 18th day of May, 1818.

HENRIQUE DE GRANPRE.

No. 2.

I hereby certify that, on the 12th of February, last I sold to Captain Don Benigno Garcia Calderon, commanding the Grey and Brown companies from the Havana, nine dozen round black hats for the use of the men belonging to the said companies; and, at the request of the said officer, I give him the present certificate, at Pensacola, this 18th day of May, 1818.

HENRIQUE MICHELET.

No. 3.

NEW ORLEANS, April 30, 1817.

Annexed you have an account of cost and charges of fifty-four shirts and twenty-eight pairs of shoes, for amount whereof you are debited, in account, fifty-three dollars. Although I had no orders from you for the shirts, I was induced to purchase them by the low price, and the probability of your employing them to advantage. In the sack which contains them, you will find a uniform coat, altered here, and which can be obtained of the storekeeper at twelve rials. I think this would answer. There are about a hundred and twenty of them. I am offered by the same storekeeper fifty field tents, nearly new, at three dollars, and a parcel of strong leathern caps, such as are worn by the Chasseurs, and which he will sell at less than two rials; of these there are about two hundred. The storekeeper having made me a second offer of the coats, I proposed to take them in barter for coffee, at eighteen and a half. At ten rials, I am persuaded it would be a good bargain, and would afford an opportunity of putting off the coffee, the low quality of which makes it a dull sale. The only quality asked for, and which sells with great difficulty at twenty dollars, is the very superior green coffee. I enclose the account of the cost and charges of the said coats, which you will receive by the schooner Maria, and whose amount is charged to your debit, in account current, viz: \$176 13.

Account of cost and charges of the following articles, shipped on board the schooner Maria, Captain Elberty, bound to Pensacola, on account and at the risk of, and to be delivered to, Don Benigno Garcia Calderon.

C.—No. 1. One sack, containing twenty-eight pairs of shoes, at six rials,	-	-	-	\$21 00
No. 2. One sack, containing fifty-four shirts, at four rials,	-	-	-	27 00
One coat,	-	-	-	1 50
Sacks, sewing, and transportation,	-	-	-	1 00
				<hr/>
				50 50
Commission, at five per cent.	-	-	-	2 50
				<hr/>
Amount to the debit of Don B. G. Calderon,	-	-	-	\$53 00

PEDRO DALHASTE Y CLAVERIA.

To Don BENIGNO GARCIA CALDERON, *Pensacola*.

Account of cost and charges of ten sacks, containing one hundred and thirty-one coats, shipped on board the schooner Maria, Captain Granpre, on account and at the risk of Don Benigno Garcia Calderon, at Pensacola, and to be delivered to him there, viz:

C.—No 3 to 12. Ten sacks, containing one hundred and thirty-one coats, at 10 rials,	-	-	-	\$163 75
Sacks, sewing, and transportation,	-	-	-	4 00
				<hr/>
				167 75
Commission, at five per cent.	-	-	-	8 33
				<hr/>
Amount to the debit of Don B. G. Calderon,	-	-	-	\$176 13

PEDRO DALHASTE Y CLAVERIA.

NEW ORLEANS, May 29, 1817.

NEW ORLEANS, July 29, 1817.

On the receipt of yours, the caps were already agreed for with some other articles of clothing, amounting, as per invoice annexed, to \$317 16½, and which is charged to you in account. I have suspended the purchase of the hats, which ran at from eight to ten dollars, until further orders. Account of cost and charges of the following articles, shipped in two hogsheds, three barrels, two cases, and one sack, on board the schooner Jalouse, Jose Medina, master, bound to Pensacola, on account and at the risk of Don Benigno Garcia Calderon, and to be delivered to him on his order, viz:

Twenty-five pairs of cotton pantaloons, at fifty rials,	-	-	-	\$12 50
Two hundred and thirty six flannel waistcoats, at three hundred and seventy-two rials,	-	-	-	88 50
Two hundred and fifty-three caps, at eighteen and three-fourths rials,	-	-	-	47 43½
A parcel of leather gaiters and coyars,	-	-	-	15 00
Twenty Russia vests or jackets,	-	-	-	-
Fifty-one pairs of pantaloons,	} 106 pieces at \$1 each,	-	-	106 00
Thirty-five cotton shirts,		-	-	-

Twenty-nine cotton shirts, at seventy-five rials, - - - - -	21 37½
Cooperage and transportation, - - - - -	3 50
	302 06½
Commission, at five per cent. - - - - -	15 10
Amount to the debit of Don B. G. Calderon, - - - - -	\$317 16½

PEDRO DALHASTE Y CLAVERIA.

To DON BENIGNO GARCIA CALDERON, *Pensacola*.

We, the undersigned, merchants of this place, hereby certify that the foregoing copies of paragraphs of letters of advice and of invoices are perfectly conformable to the originals exhibited to us by Captain Don Benigno Garcia Calderon, commanding the Grey and Brown companies from Havana; and that the signatures thereto subscribed are in the genuine hand-writing of Don Pedro Dalhaste y Claveria, a citizen of the United States and merchant at New Orleans. In testimony whereof we give the present certificate at the desire and request of the aforesaid Captain Calderon, at Pensacola, this 18th day of May, 1818.

HENRIQUE MICHELET,  
VINCENTE DE ORDOZGOITTI,  
VINCENTE BATLOUQUE.

No. 2.

PENSACOLA, *May 14, 1818.*

Instructed, by your letter of yesterday, of the points treated of by Major General Jackson in his letter of the 27th ultimo, and on which he founds his positive assertions, that the Indians not only received succors at Appalachie, but that they were excited to commit their outrages against them, [the United States,] were advised of his movements, &c. I have, in answer, to express the astonishment this affair has caused me, and which has solely arisen from the imposture employed, by some malicious person, to asperse the parties criminated by the letter of the said General. His excellency states, that, from the papers and other proofs taken at St. John's, the detention of American cattle found at St. Marks, and purchased of the commissary there, and the intercourse carried on between that place and the hostile Indians, it is evident that they were inspired and excited to this cruel war by the Spaniards. To this I have to reply, that it has never come to my knowledge that any person belonging to the fort had any intercourse, directly or indirectly, with St. John's; and although I wrote two letters to Mr. Arbuthnot, an English merchant, one of them was merely to thank him for the three copies [exemplares] he sent me from thence or Savannah, and for the information he gave me of the intention of the insurgents at Amelia Island, and of Captain Woodbine, who I informed you by express was one of the two chiefs hung on the day I left Appalachie, or on the preceding one; and the other was to request him to come or send as speedily as possible for the effects which, at the request of the Indian chiefs, and to avoid increasing their suspicions, I permitted to be deposited in the fort on the departure of O'Kelagne, who had them in charge; and although by this step I ran some risk, from the state of excitement of both parties, it was one which does not appear to me to give any just ground for suspicion. Nor does the finding of American cattle, which his excellency states he purchased at St. Marks, afford greater cause of suspicion, as it is notorious that, from the time of its establishment, its supplies were obtained from the droves of cattle brought there for sale by the Indians; and that they had many is shown from those found in Mickasukey and its vicinity. Purchases were only occasionally made, because we considered ourselves sufficiently supplied for some months; and if the cattle were stolen from the Americans, the sellers took good care to conceal that fact, and were all of them known to have droves, and were in the habit of bringing them for sale; and very seldom was it that the American commandant or magistrate, within whose district these excesses were committed, was known to complain of them to the commandant at St. Marks, and send him the marks of the cattle, that it might be seen from whence they came, and the purchase of them be avoided. Nor does the intercourse between the fort and the Indians, complained of by General Jackson, afford any better evidence of what he asserts, that from this it is inferable that they were inspired and excited to this cruel war by the Spaniards. Such intercourse and good understanding were at all times recommended by the Government, and never more necessary than in the circumstances in which we were placed in the fort; and on this, amongst other reasons, General Jackson, in his first letter, founded his demand that it should be occupied by his troops, and added, that on this account such a course could not fail to be approved by his Catholic Majesty. In the same letter he stated to me, that he had been informed by an Indian woman, a prisoner, that the Indians and negroes had received large supplies of munitions from the fort. I thought I had convinced him of the contrary in my answer, in which I represented to him that no one could better remove from his mind any unfavorable impressions on this point, than the bearer of it, Mr. William Hamby, who, during his stay here, repeatedly interpreted to me the anxiety of the chiefs to obtain such supplies; and that he could also inform him, that I uniformly counselled them to avoid the destruction which has overtaken them, and which I foresaw from the first. But as it appears he is not yet satisfied, and persists in his charge, a reference to the returns of the public storekeeper will show that, from the month of May last, and prior to the receipt of your orders, there had been issued to some chiefs and head men, and that merely from motives of policy, only three pounds of powder, three pounds of balls, and fourteen flints; and the interpreter belonging to the fort, Juan Sandoval, and his son Francisco, through whom I communicated with the Indians, can also testify to the truth of this statement, whose evidence I request of you to have taken, in refutation of General Jackson's charge against me. He cannot but know that, a short time before the Negro Fort on the Appalachie was blown up, all the chiefs of the tribes in its immediate vicinity went there and supplied themselves with powder and ball left for them by the English; and that at Mickasukey, and the houses in the neighborhood, there was a great quantity. Having thus obtained so large a supply of the kind of powder and ball they most esteemed, what value could they set on ours, which they in fact view with such indifference and contempt, that only those hunters, of whom now and then one comes to the fort to supply us with venison, geese, &c. will use it; and although, as I stated in my communication to you, some was repeatedly requested of me by the chief Kinache, for the purpose of showing, by the refusal of it, that the American interest prevailed in the fort, he did not obtain it; in consequence of which we were considered as American partisans to the last, were reproached with it, and had even to put up with some impertinences from them. I shall, however, in strict adherence to truth, and because the circumstance may have given rise to these suspicions, state that the chief Petisacho, who was hung, received, among other things, at the fort, from Mr. Arbuthnot, an English merchant, when he came from Savannah to request aid against the negroes from him on account of their molestation, a small barrel of powder, which might contain from twenty to twenty-five pounds, and which was kept with the other effects brought from O'Kelagne's, and which he had in charge. What he did with it I know not, but I well know that the chief occasioned me much fear and anxiety, by being so near the fort with four or five hundred Indians of his party. I never had an idea that he employed it against the Americans, but supposed that they used it in the purchase of peltry for the said Arbuthnot, which was his avowed object, and in which he was engaged on the arrival of the Americans. The idea that the officers at St. Marks lent themselves to aid and excite the Indians, by giving them information of the movements of the Americans, is highly ridiculous; for how, or from whence, could their movements be better known at the fort than from the Indians themselves? Thither they passed, and from thence repassed, incessantly, and their reports were so various that they deserved very little attention; as a proof of which, nothing certain was known of the operations of the Americans until the different columns of their troops appeared. At the mouth of the Pinar, although their three vessels were at anchor there for three or four days previous, they kept English colors flying until the day before the arrival of the army. My different communications to you are pledged that I took no part in the contest between the Americans and the Indians; nevertheless, my

mistrust of the latter evinced to which I gave a preference. How, then, is it possible to believe that I gave them the aid of which General Jackson complains, or how can such aid be reconciled with the tenor of my letters and the steps I took to liberate Messrs. Edmund Doyle and William Hambly, by which I exposed myself and my garrison to the vengeance of the Indians? Or, lastly, with the fact of my having ransomed, at a most critical moment, an American soldier, whom they declared to me they would otherwise put to death? I leave it to the most impartial to decide, if these be not proofs of the existence, at St. Marks, of a bias in favor of the American interest; and of this, I am persuaded, General Jackson will be convinced on deliberately reflecting on the subject. I shall not deny that I have observed towards those barbarians a policy which had the appearance of a warm friendship, and by which I have incurred considerable expenses. If, however, all the circumstances attendant on my situation be duly weighed, it will be seen that all this was necessary to restrain them from doing what they had at one time premeditated, on the pretext I have just alluded to, and on others suggested to them by some persons who had gone from hence to those parts of the country. Although I have, as I conceive, given satisfaction on all the points embraced by Major General Jackson in his letter, I beg leave to request that, for fuller evidence of what I allege, you will be pleased to give orders for having the testimony taken of the interpreter and his son, of the subaltern Don Miguel Ordóñez, of Don Anastasio Montes de Oca, the military storekeeper, and of surgeon Don Diego de Barrias, as these persons have some knowledge of the subject in question.

God preserve you many years.

To Don Jose Masot.

FRANCISCO CASO Y LUNENGO.

PENSACOLA, *May 23, 1818.*

It having come to my knowledge that you have passed the frontiers with the troops under your command, and that you are within the territory of this province of West Florida, which is subject to my government, I solemnly protest against this procedure as an offence against my sovereign, exhorting you, and requiring of you, in his name, to retire from it; as if you do not, and continue your aggressions, I shall repel force by force.

The consequence in this case will, doubtless, be the effusion of blood, and also an interruption of the harmony which has hitherto reigned between our respective nations; but, as the repeller of an insult has never been deemed the aggressor, you will be responsible, both to God and man, for all the fatal consequences which may result.

God preserve you many years.

JOSE MASOT.

*The Commander of the American Troops.*

A copy of this protest was addressed to General Andrew Jackson, and sent by a Spanish officer, meeting the American army, shortly after it had passed the Escambia river.

J. GADSDEN, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, PENSACOLA, *May 24, 1818.*

SIR:

The enclosed communication was forwarded to you by my aid-de-camp, Captain Gadsden, last evening; not finding you, however, in Pensacola, its delivery was delayed.

I have entered Pensacola to provision my troops. I have only to add, that an immediate compliance with my demand is expected. Resistance on your part would be a needless sacrifice of men.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

Don Jose Masot, *Governor of Pensacola, at Fort St. Charles, Barancas.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, (*on the line of march,*) *May 23, 1818.*

SIR:

The Southern frontier of the United States has, for more than twelve months, been exposed to all the horrors of a cruel and savage war. A party of outlaws and refugees from the Creek nation, negroes who have fled from their masters, citizens of the United States, and sought an asylum in Florida, and the Seminole Indians, inhabiting the territory of Spain, all uniting, have raised the tomahawk, and, in the character of savage warfare, have neither regarded sex nor age; helpless women have been massacred, and the cradle crimsoned with the blood of innocence. The United States, true to their own engagements, and confiding in the faith of Spain to enforce existing treaties, never entertained a doubt but that these atrocities would early attract the attention of the Spanish Government, and that speedy and effectual measures would have been adopted for their suppression. Under this persuasion, a cordon of military posts was established to give immediate protection to such of our frontier settlers as were peculiarly exposed, and strict injunctions issued to the American officers to respect the territory of Spain, and not to attempt operations within its limits. These instructions were most scrupulously observed; and, notwithstanding the inactivity of the American troops had encouraged the Indians to the most daring and outrageous acts of violence against our citizens, the Government of the United States was still disposed to respect the territory of Spain, and confide in the ability of the Spanish Government to execute existing treaties, until advised through you that, with every disposition, the Spanish authorities had not the power of controlling the Indians in Florida; that their acts of late were viewed as equally hostile to the interests of Spain as those of the United States; that Spanish subjects were not exempted from the evils of which we complained, and that the negro establishment on the Appalachicola, and St. Juan rivers, were founded by British agents, contrary to the will of Spain. Those representations determined the President of the United States to adopt effectual measures to restore tranquillity to the Southern frontier of the American republic; and, pursuant to his orders, justifiable by the immutable laws of self-defence, I have penetrated into Florida, reduced to ashes the Seminole villages, destroyed their magazines of provisions, beaten their warriors whenever they hazarded a contest, dispersed some, and expelled others across the river.

In the course of my operations, it became necessary to visit the Spanish fortress of St. Marks. Entering the territory of Spain to fight her battles, to relieve from bondage her subjects, and to chastise an Indian tribe whom she acknowledged, under existing treaties, she was bound to preserve at peace with the United States, I had every reason to expect that the American army would have been received as friends, and every facility afforded to insure success to operations so interesting to both Governments.

My expectations have not been realized. It had been reported to me, direct from you, that Fort St. Marks had been threatened by the Indians and negroes, and you expressed serious apprehensions, from the weakness of the garrison, and defenceless state of the works, for its safety. From other sources to be relied on, the same information had been furnished me. It became necessary, therefore, to anticipate the movements of the enemy, and amicably to get possession of a work, the dislodging the enemy from which might cost me much precious blood.

On entering St. Marks, evidence of the duplicity and unfriendly feelings of the commandant evinced itself. I found that the gates of his fort had been thrown open to the avowed savage enemies of the United States. That councils of war had been permitted to be held within his own quarters by the chiefs and warriors. That the Spanish store-houses had been appropriated to the use, and were then filled with goods belonging to the hostile party. That cattle, knowingly plundered from the citizens of the United States, had been contracted for and purchased by the officers of the garrison, from the Spanish thieves. That foreign agents had free access within the walls of St. Marks, and a Mr. Arbuthnot, condemned and executed as the instigator of this war, an inmate in the commandant's family.

From this fort was information afforded the enemy, of the strength and movements of my army, by the said Arbutnot, the date of departure of express noted by the Spanish commissary, and ammunition, munitions of war, and all necessary supplies furnished.

On my return from my operations east, your letter was received, positively refusing to permit (unless exorbitant duties were paid) any provisions passing up to the American fort on the Escambia. Connected with this strong indication of an unfriendly disposition on your part, I have, learnt from the most unquestionable authority, that the city of Pensacola has, for some months past, been entirely under the control of the Indians; that free ingress and egress is permitted to the avowed savage enemy of the United States; that supplies of ammunition, munitions of war, and provisions, have been received by them from thence; that on the 15th of April last, there was no less than five hundred Indians in Pensacola, many of them known to be hostile to the United States, and who had but lately escaped my pursuit. The late massacre of eighteen individuals on the Federal road was committed by Indians, direct from their return to Pensacola, who were received by you and transported across the bay, to elude the pursuit of the American troops. The Americans returning, the savages were permitted to return. An Indian, wounded in pursuit by a party, for having killed a citizen of the United States, was openly, in the sight of many Americans, received by you, and every comfort administered. Such practices, if authorised by the King, would justify me in open hostilities. Disposed, however, to believe that it was one of the unauthorised acts of agents, I deem it politic and necessary to occupy Pensacola and the Barancas with an American garrison, until the Spanish Government can be advised of the circumstance, and have force sufficient to maintain, and agents disposed to enforce, existing treaties.

This is the third time that the American troops have been compelled to visit Pensacola from the same causes. Twice had the enemy been expelled, and the place left in quiet possession of those who had permitted the irregular occupancy. This time it must be held until Spain has the power or will to maintain her neutrality.

This is justifiable on the immutable principles of self-defence. The Government of the United States is bound to protect her citizens; but weak would be all its efforts, and ineffectual the best advised measures, if the Floridas are to be free to every enemy, and on the pretext of policy or necessity, Spanish fortresses are to be opened to their use, and every aid and comfort afforded. I have been explicit, to preclude the necessity of a tedious negotiation. My resolution is fixed, and I have strength enough to enforce it. My army now occupies the old fort St. Michael, commanding Pensacola. If the town and the Barancas are peaceably surrendered, an inventory of all the property, ammunition, arms, &c. shall be taken by officers appointed by both parties, and the amount receipted for by me, to be accounted for by the American government. The property of Spanish subjects shall be respected; their religion and laws guaranteed to them; the civil Government permitted to remain as now established, subject to the control of the military authority of the United States; the ingress and egress open to all individuals; commerce free to the subjects of Spain as usual; and the military furnished with transportation to Cuba.

If the peaceable surrender be refused, I shall enter Pensacola by violence, and assume the Government until the transaction can be amicably adjusted by the two Governments. The military in this case must be treated as prisoners of war.

The proof supporting the accusation against your official station will justify this procedure.

In reply to your communication of the 22d instant, I have only to observe, that the clothing detained will be a subject for future friendly settlement.

How far the Indians, permitted to remain in the neighborhood of Pensacola, were friendly disposed to the citizens of the United States, is tested by the late massacre committed by them on the Alabama.

The Red Ground chiefs, Muldecoxy and Holmes, avowedly hostile to the United States, were but lately seen in Pensacola, and a body of Indians desecrated a few days in the vicinity of the Barancas, in presence of several Spanish officers.

By a reference to my communications of the 25th of March, you will see how far I have been the aggressor in the measure protested against. You are there distinctly advised of the objects of my operations, and that every attempt on your part to succor the Indians, or prevent the passage of my provisions in the Escambia, would be viewed in no other light than as hostile acts on your part.

You have done both, and exposed my troops to the severest privations, by the detention occasioned by the exaction of duties on my provisions and vessels in Pensacola. You have therefore been the aggressor, and the blood which may be shed by a useless resistance on your part to my demand will rest on your head. Before God and man you will be responsible.

This will be handed to you by my aid-de-camp, Captain Gadsden, by whom an answer is expected.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

DON JOSE MASOT, *Governor of Pensacola.*

[TRANSLATION.]

FORTRESS OF ST. CHARLES OF BARANCAS, *May 24, 1818.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR:

I received, at ten o'clock this morning, the two communications of your excellency of the 23d and of this day. As I have, in mine of the 18th instant, satisfactorily answered all the charges your excellency alleges in the former, I shall only add, with respect to the Indians, that I notice your excellency is greatly misinformed, as the circumstances to which you refer are, for the most part, unfounded; in proof of which, I will state that the only two Indians I have found since the peace negotiated by me, and the delivery of the eighty-seven to Major Young, are two who are in the prison, with three women and children. I ought to inform you that, long before the movements of your excellency, I had given orders at Appalachie that the Seminole Indians should not be succored, and even had placards posted up in Pensacola for the same purpose; passing over without notice only some unfortunate beings who, from time immemorial, had furnished the people with wood, as I have stated.

Your excellency lays to my charge the blood which may be shed by my refusal to deliver up the province, as your excellency requests; which I shall never do, nor can I, without covering myself with dishonor at the close of my life and of my long military career. I am firmly persuaded your excellency would, in my case, do the same, as you would not venture to stain the honorable laurels with which you are adorned. No nation, whatever may be its motives, can violate the territory of another, especially when no demands have previously been made of its Government. Your excellency has violated the Spanish territory in Appalachie, by taking possession of that fort, and pulling down its flag, when you could have adopted more conciliatory measures, which would more and more have cemented and strengthened the good understanding subsisting between our respective Governments.

On the 21st of the present month, by your excellency's order, Don Pedro Philibert and other inhabitants remained prisoners in their houses, on their parole of honor. To-day, at eleven o'clock, before Captain Gadsden arrived at Pensacola, your excellency's army entered, and made prisoners on parole Don Pedro de Alba, the interpreter, (who translated your before named communications, and who is the bearer of these,) and, I believe, all the military, and, of course, broke up the seven posts [puntos] stationed with the same number of officers and two chiefs for the maintenance of the tranquillity of the place.

These facts being incontrovertible, I ask, who but your excellency will be responsible for the blood that may be shed, as you declare, in your letter, that you are about to take possession of Pensacola and Barancas? I protest before God and man that my conduct is blameless, and that my ardent desires are, as they ever have been, to contribute to the peace and tranquillity of our respective nations; for, besides the sincerity of my intentions, I have in view the message of the President to the Congress of the United States on the 25th of March last, and its tenor assured me that no aggressions were to be expected from the troops of the said States. Such, however, this province has, unfortunately, suffered from the operations of your excellency in Appalachie and Pensacola.

I expect from the generosity of your excellency, first, that you will set the officers and troops which garrisoned Pensacola at liberty; and that, after supplying your army with provisions, you will shortly evacuate the territory of this province, and not carry on a partial war against West Florida at a time when our nations are in profound peace.

Lieutenant Colonel Don Lui Piemas, temporary commandant of Pensacola, is duly authorized to exercise my functions, and to receive the communications of your excellency, which he will faithfully remit to me, and to which I will give the promptest answers, to be transmitted to you through the bearer of this, the interpreter, Don Pedro de Alba. Finally, if, contrary to my hopes, your excellency should persist in your intention to occupy this fortress, which I am resolved to defend to the last extremity, I shall repel force by force; and he who resists aggressions can never be considered an aggressor.

God preserve your excellency many years.

JOSE MASOT.

His Excellency ANDREW JACKSON,

*Major General, commanding the army of the United States.*

HEAD QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, PENSACOLA, *May 25, 1818.*

SIR:

The accusations against you are founded on the most unquestionable evidence. I have the certificates of individuals who, on the 23d instant, at or near the little bayou, counted seventeen Indians in company of several Spanish officers.

I have only to repeat that the Barancas must be occupied by an American garrison, and again to tender you the terms offered, if amicably surrendered. Resistance would be a wanton sacrifice of blood, for which you and your garrison will have to atone. You cannot expect to defend yourself successfully, and the first shot from your fort must draw down upon you the vengeance of an irritated soldiery. I am well advised of your strength, and cannot but remark on the inconsistency of presuming yourself capable of resisting an army which has conquered the Indian tribes, too strong, agreeably to your own acknowledgment, to be controlled by you. If the force which you are now disposed wantonly to sacrifice had been wielded against the Seminoles, the American troops had never entered the Floridas.

I applaud your feeling as a soldier in wishing to defend your post; but when resistance is ineffectual, and the opposing force overwhelming, the sacrifice of a few brave men is an act of wantonness, for which the commanding officer must be accountable to his God.

ANDREW JACKSON,

*Major General, commanding Division of the South.*

Don JOSE MASOT, *Commanding Barancas.*

[TRANSLATION.]

MOST EXCELLENT SIR:

PENSACOLA, *May 26, 1818.*

On the 24th of the present month, Captain Amelung, of the 1st United States' regiment, put into my hands your excellency's letter, dated at Washington, Mississippi Territory, on the 23d of April last; in which, after apprising me that your Government had given it in charge to you to inform me that the Fort of the Negroes, erected during the late war with Great Britain, near the junction of the Chatahoochee and Flint rivers, had been reinforced, and was now occupied by more than two hundred and fifty negroes, many of whom were seduced from the service of their masters, (who are citizens of the United States,) and that all of them are well armed, provisioned, and disciplined, you make many wise reflections with respect to the serious injuries which may result from tolerating such an establishment, not only to those in the immediate neighborhood of it, by destroying the peace of the nation, but likewise to the good understanding which happily exists between our respective Governments. You enter into an investigation to show what the Spanish authorities ought to do to put an end to an evil of so serious a nature, in a mode prescribed by those principles of good faith, which are the foundation of friendly neighborhood among nations. You distinctly state what this Government ought immediately to do; in failure of which, your Government will be obliged to do it, to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the United States; and you conclude by requesting me to state, in my answer to your letter, whether the said fort had been constructed by the Spanish Government, and whether the negroes who composed its garrison were deemed subjects of His Catholic Majesty; and, if the fort was not built by Spanish authority, to state by what authority and by whose order it was built.

In answer to your excellency, I will state (with the veracity which comports with the character of an honorable officer, in which class I rank myself,) that, having arrived at the place nearly at the close of the month of March preceding, and being informed of what your excellency has communicated to me, (with this difference, that the fort, instead of being where you placed it, is to be found on the eastern bank of the Appalachicola, at about fifteen miles from its mouth or entrance into the sea,) I lost no time in proposing to my Captain General the measures which appeared to me proper, as well for securing the inhabitants of the country under my command from the damage, loss, and injuries which they have suffered, and still suffer, from this establishment, as to prevent the American citizens and the friendly Indians of the neighborhood from continuing to experience them. I have hitherto received no answer; and, consequently, your excellency (who knows how limited are the powers of a subordinate officer) cannot be surprised that I should make known to you that, although my mode of thinking exactly corresponds with yours as to the dislodging of the negroes from the fort, the occupying it with Spanish troops, or destroying it, and delivering the negroes who may be collected to their lawful owners, I shall not be able to act until I receive the orders of my Captain General, and the assistance necessary to enable me to undertake the enterprise with a moral certainty of accomplishing the end. I am persuaded that the determination of the said chief cannot be long delayed, and, should it authorize me to act, your excellency may rest assured and persuaded that I will not lose an instant in adopting, on my part, the most efficacious measures for cutting up by the root an evil which is felt to the full extent stated in your letter by the inhabitants of this province, who are subjects of my sovereign, and whose prosperity and tranquillity it is my duty to preserve and protect.

With this explanation, your beforenamed letter may be considered fully answered, as it gives you to understand that, thinking as your excellency thinks with respect to the necessity of destroying the negroes, the fort of Appalachicola, occupied by them, was not constructed by order of the Spanish Government; and that the negroes, although in part belonging to inhabitants of this province, and, as rational beings, may be subjects of the King my master, are deemed by me insurgents or rebels against the authority not only of His Catholic Majesty, but also of the proprietors from whose service they have withdrawn themselves; some seduced by the English Colonel Edward Nicholls, Major Woodbine, and their agents; and others from their inclination to run off. But as your excellency manifests a particular desire that, in case the fort was not erected by Spanish authority, I should state by whose order it was erected, I have no difficulty in satisfying your curiosity, by informing you that I have understood, ever since my arrival at this place, that the said fort, and another near the confluence of the Chatahoochee and Flint rivers, (which, it appears, no longer exists,) were built by the orders of the beforenamed Colonel Nicholls. I will not assure you he did it under authority from his Government; but I can say he proceeded to place artillery, munitions, and provisions in it, by the arrangement of Vice Admiral Malcolm; and that when Colonel Nicholls and the troops of his detachment, after the conclusion of the expedition against Louisiana, withdrew from that point, he left orders with the negroes totally contrary to the incontestable right of sovereignty which the King my master exercises from the line of the thirty-first degree of north latitude to the south. My predecessors in the Government have given an account of all these actions to the authorities on whom they depended, that the satisfaction which the violation required might be demanded by those on whom this duty devolves.

I think I have answered your excellency's letter satisfactorily, and in terms which cannot leave a doubt of the sincerity of my intentions in favor of the common cause of the American and Spanish inhabitants, and that my present inaction does not proceed from a want of inclination.

I likewise flatter myself that, until my Captain General decides, no steps will be taken by the Government of the United States, or by your excellency, which may be prejudicial to the sovereignty of the King my master in the dis-

trict of Appalachicola, which is a dependency of this Government. And, finally, I conclude by assuring your excellency that it will afford me particular satisfaction to have opportunities of evincing my desire not only to contribute, so far as depends on me, to the cementing of the good understanding which subsists between our respective Governments, but also to prove to your excellency the high opinion I entertain of your virtues and military talents. God preserve your excellency many years.

His Excellency A. JACKSON.

MAURICIO DE ZUNIGA.

FORT GADSDEN, *May 2, 1818.*

SIR:

We beg leave to submit to you the following statement of facts: On the 13th December, 1817, we were violently torn from our settlements on the Appalachicola river by a number of Indians headed by Chenubby, a chief from the Fowltown tribe, carried to Mickasuky, and delivered to Kenhajah, King of the Mickasukians. Kenhajah carried us to the negro towns on Suwaney, and thence to the Spanish fort St. Marks, to the commandant of which he delivered us as prisoners captured under the orders of a Mr. Arbuthnot, reported to us as a British agent. At St. Marks we were treated as prisoners, and not permitted to wander beyond the walls of the garrison.

Whilst at that port the ingress and egress of the Indians, hostile to the United States, was unrestrained, and several councils were held, at one of which Kenhajah, King of the *Mickasukians*, Francis or Hillis Hago, Hamathlemeco, the chief of Autesses, and the chief of the Kolemies, all of the old Red Stick party; and Jack Mealy, chief of the Ochevas, were present. When it was reported that the chiefs, and that warriors were entering Fort St. Marks for the purpose of holding a council, Hambly represented to the commandant the impropriety of permitting such proceedings within the walls of a Spanish fortress, the officer of which was bound to preserve and enforce the treaties existing between the King of Spain and the United States; he replied to Hambly with some degree of warmth, observing that it was not in his power to prevent it. On the Indians coming into the fort, at their request, we were confined. The council was held in the commandant's quarters, he, the commandant, was present, but strictly forbade the intrusion of any of the officers of the garrison.

The Indians were in the habit of driving to Fort St. Marks, and disposing of cattle to the commandant and other Spanish officers. While at that port three or four droves were brought in acknowledged by the Indians to have been stolen from the citizens of the United States, and purchased by the Spanish officers.

We were present at most of these contracts, and Hambly often referred to as an interpreter between the purchaser and seller.

Chenubby, a Fowltown Indian, once applied to Hambly to mention to the commandant that he was about visiting the frontiers of Georgia on a plundering expedition, and wished to know whether he would purchase the cattle brought in. A contract was entered into, and Chenubby, some time after, brought in and disposed of eleven head of cattle to the Spanish commandant of Fort St. Marks. These same cattle were those purchased by you from the commandant as his private property.

WM. HAMBLY.  
EDM'D DOYLE.

FORT GADSDEN, *May 3, 1818.*

SIR:

In conversation with the commandant at Fort St. Marks, on the subject of having that work occupied by an American garrison, I had occasion to notice the aid and comfort that the hostile party of Indians had received as reported from him; that they had free access within the walls of his fort, and that it was well known no small supplies of ammunition had been received from that quarter.

In reply he stated that his conduct had been governed by policy, the defenceless state of his work, and the weakness of his garrison compelled him to conciliate the friendship of the Indians, to supply their wants, to grant what he had not the power to deny, and to throw open, with apparent willingness, the gates of his fortress, lest they should be forced by violence.

That he had been repeatedly threatened by Indians and negroes, and that his security depended upon exhibiting an external friendship. After Fort St. Marks was occupied by the American troops a black man and Spanish soldier was reported to me as having been arrested clad in the American uniform, recognised as part of the clothing of the fourth and seventh regiments, captured in the boat commanded by Lieutenant Scott, in ascending the Appalachicola river.

In explanation the Spanish commandant observed, that his soldiers and the Seminole Indians were in the habit of trading with each other, and that this negro, with others of his garrison, had received his permission to purchase some clothing reported to have been brought in by the Indians.

Respectfully, &c.

JAMES GADSDEN, *Aid-de-camp.*

Major General A. JACKSON,  
*Commanding Southern Division U. S. Army.*

I certify that, on the 23d of May, being in the Bayou which enters Pensacola Bay, one and a half miles from the town, I saw at the ferry, on the road to Barancas, a number of Indians, I think about seventeen, in company with four Spanish officers. The officers were carried over, and the boat returned to ferry over the Indians. I saw one boat-load landed on the side next the Barancas. The Indians concealed themselves in the bushes on discovering us.

RICHARD BRICKHAM.

Witness: T. Cross, *Lieutenant of Infantry.*

I certify that I was in the boat with Brickham at the place and time mentioned in the above certificate; that I saw several Indians in company with four Spanish officers. The officers were ferried over with one Indian. I did not see the Indians ferried over; they concealed themselves on discovering us.

JOHN BONNER, his  $\times$  mark.

Witness: T. Cross, *Lieutenant of Infantry.*

Witness to both certificates: WM. S. FULTON,  
*Private Secretary to Commanding General.*

We certify that, being in Fort St. Charles, Barancas, on the 28th of May, 1818, in the afternoon, soon after the American troops took possession of the work, and as the Spanish troops were marching out, we saw an Indian carried out by some of the Spanish soldiers; he was laid on the back to be put on board a boat; he was wounded in the leg or thigh, and had every appearance of having been engaged in the defence of the fort.

WM. RUSSELL, *Captain of Spies.*

JAS. L. BELL, *Captain of 1st Reg. T. V. M. G. M.*

Witness: WM. S. FULTON,  
*Private Secretary to Commanding General.*

We, the undersigned, do hereby certify that, at the capture of Fort St. Marks, East Florida, by Major General Andrew Jackson, on the 7th April, 1818, there were some cattle purchased on account of the United States, and turned over to us, which we are of an opinion had been driven from the frontiers of Georgia, (a part of them at

least) and we were strengthened in our opinion by a number of officers and men from Georgia offering to swear to a number of them as the property of their neighbors and friends.

Given under our hands, at Fort Gadsden, this 3d of May, 1818.

JACOB R. BROOKS, *Act. Cont. Agent, U. S. Army.*  
PETER CÔNE, *Assistant Commissary.*

We, the undersigned officers and men of the Georgia militia, in the service of the United States, do hereby certify that we were at Fort St. Marks, East Florida, at the time of its capture by Major General A. Jackson, on the 7th April, 1818, and saw some cattle that were purchased on account of the United States, from the Spanish authorities, which we were ready to swear to as the property of our friends and neighbors in Georgia.

Given under our hands, at Fort Gadsden, this 3d of May, 1818.

ANDREW F. FRAZER, *Captain.*  
DANIEL F. SULLIVAN, *G. M. S.*

SIR:

FORT GADSDEN, *May 3, 1818.*

After the occupancy of Fort St. Marks with American troops, on the 7th of April last, it became my duty to take charge of some goods found in one of the public stores.

These goods were pointed out by the Spanish commandant, who, through Mr. Hambly as interpreter, separated several of the articles claimed as his own private property, and designated others as the property of Francis or Hillis Hajo, and Arbuthnot, a British agent or trader: an inventory of these were taken, and deposited with the American officer left in command at Fort St. Marks.

With respect, &c.

D. E. TWIGGS, *Brevet Major 7th Infantry.*

I certify that I acted as interpreter in the transaction above alluded to, and two separate parcels of goods were designated by the Spanish commandant of St. Marks as belonging to Hillis Hajo and Arbuthnot.

WM. HAMBLY.

FORT MONTGOMERY, *June 2, 1818.*

I certify that between the 5th and 17th of May, 1818, whilst at Fort Gadsden on the Appalachian river, I was informed by a Mr. Larua and Benneto Gassea, both citizens of, and at that time direct from, Pensacola, that, at the time of their departure thence, there were five hundred Indians in and about Pensacola; and I further certify that, on my arrival at Pensacola on the 23d of May, I was informed by Mr. Skeets, and other citizens of that place, that, on the 22d, which was the day before my arrival, Holmes, a noted Redstick, with his party, had left Pensacola to proceed to the Choctawhatchy for safety, having been for several days previous in town.

All which I certify on honor.

WM. HAMBLY.

Witness: Wm. S. FULTON, *Private Secretary of the Commanding General.*

I do hereby certify that, during my long residence on the river Appalachian, my knowledge of the Indian language, and my intimate acquaintance with the different chiefs, gave me many opportunities of knowing, through them, the advices given them from time to time by the Governors of West Florida, hostile to the United States. In the year 1812 or 1813, I saw a letter from the Governor of Pensacola to the late chief of the Seminoles, Thomas Perryman, advising him to collect his forces and join his upper town brethren, whom he said had come to a determination to rise in arms and shake off the American yoke; he would supply them in arms and ammunition, and he said he was sure that in less than a month their fathers and protectors, the Spaniards, would have a sufficient army in the field to aid and protect them. Not long after I saw this letter, a large party of Indians went down to Pensacola, where they received a large supply of ammunition and some arms; it was but shortly after this, when they attacked and destroyed the garrison of Fort Mims; this was the commencement of the first Indian war; on the 13th of December last, when on my plantation on the Appalachian, I was made a prisoner of by a party of Seminole Indians, and was taken up to the Ochesee Bluff in company with Mr. Doyle, who was made a prisoner of with me. They kept us there three days, during which time they were busily engaged with some transports, which were then ascending the river to Fort Scott; from thence they took us to the Mickasukee, where the Indians informed me that they had been told by the commandant of St. Marks that war was declared between Spain and the United States. From this place we were carried to the Suwaney, when Kenhagee, principal chief of the Seminoles, told me that we had been taken and robbed by order of Arbuthnot, and brought there to be tried by him. Shortly after we reached this, Arbuthnot arrived from Providence, when we were tried and sentenced by said Arbuthnot to be tortured. This sentence was not put in execution by the friendly interference of Mr Cook, clerk to Arbuthnot, and the negro chief Nero. We were then conducted back to the Mickasukee, then Kenhagee went down to the Fort of St. Marks to consult the commandant if he would take us as prisoners, to keep at his order. They held a council among the neighboring chiefs, and on the fifth day he returned and ordered us to be conducted down next morning. We arrived at St. Marks on the 12th of February at night. The Spanish officers received us kindly, but the commandant did not forget to remind us that we were still prisoners, and marked out that night the limits of our prison they rigidly kept during the time of our stay. Next morning the first thing that presented itself to my view, was my saddle horse, which had been taken from me by the Indians; he was in the possession of the commissary. I mentioned it to the commandant, but he said that he bought him of an Indian, and he could do nothing in it. A few days after, in the course of conversation, I mentioned it to the Spanish Doctor; he assured me that two-thirds of the property taken from us by the Indians had been bought by the commissary and others in the fort; the plundered property taken from Georgia, was every day luckily bought by the commandant and others; I knew one instance of an Indian making an engagement with the commandant for cattle, that he was then going to plunder, and in fourteen or fifteen days brought them in and sold them. On our first arrival at St. Marks we had, by help of a friendly Indian, conveyed intelligence to our friends in Pensacola of our situation, and they sent us on a small vessel to effect our escape. At her arrival, the commandant said to us that he had no objection to our getting out of the power of the Indians, but that he should first demand a written obligation that we should never return to that country, nor hold communication directly or indirectly with the United States Government, or any of her officers; this being settled, we left St. Marks in the night of the 28th March, and joined Captain McKeever in his gunboats in the bay of Appalachian; on the 30th returned with him to St. Marks, where we joined General Jackson on the 6th of April.

Given under my hand this 24th of July.

WM. HAMBLY.

PROVINCE OF WEST FLORIDA, TOWN OF PENSACOLA, *September 18, 1818.*

In pursuance with an order to me directed by Colonel William King, civil and military Governor of said province, (a copy whereof is hereto annexed,) I caused to appear before me, at the quarters of Captain Hugh Young, of the army of the United States, in this town, the following persons, viz: Manuel Gonzales, Dr. Brosnahan, William Cooper, J. Dauphin, — Skatee, Felippa Prieto, Joachim Barrelas, P. Alba, Jun. Jose Bonefi, (Marian) and Charles Lesseau, to answer, on oath, such interrogatories, not tending to criminate themselves, as might be propounded to them by Captain Young, relating to the intercourse which took place between the late Spanish authorities of this province, and the hostile Indians, during the recent war with the United States.

Joachim Barrelas, being duly sworn, declares, that he has frequently seen parties of Indians in the town of Pensacola since the month of November, 1817; says that parties of Indians have been provisioned by the late authorities at this place, on several occasions; has frequently heard, and believed that the Indians were in the habit of bringing into this place, horses, cattle, &c. for the purpose of selling them and other plunder; says he was at Barancas at



the time that General Jackson came to Pensacola, in May last; deponent acted there as commissary, and knows that several Indians went from town down to Barancas, with the Spanish forces, and took refuge in the fort; that at the same time several small parties were encamped about the Barancas; that, upon the arrival of General Jackson before the Barancas, Tapaulca and family were also in the fort; deponent has seen said chief several times in Pensacola, and believes him to be either a Creek or Seminole Indian; that while deponent was at Barancas, and subsequently to the said month of November, 1817, he saw an Indian named Lunæ, an express from St. Marks, cross over from Santa Rosa Island, to Barancas, with despatches for the Governor here; says that since the said month of November, 1817, Governor Masot, being himself at Barancas, did order this deponent to give rations to several parties of Indians then there, of at least from thirty to forty strong, men, women and children.

JOACHIM BARRELAS.

George Skeate, being duly sworn, declares, that he has constantly resided in the town of Pensacola since November, 1817, since which, he has repeatedly seen at different times in said town, from thirty to forty Indians; has not seen any ammunition given to the Indians within the period above alluded to; has heard, and believes, that horses, cattle, &c. were brought into this place by the Indians and sold, which deponent, however, did not see. Deponent believes that the late Governor Masot was well acquainted with the several murders that were committed on the neighboring American frontier; knows of no supplies furnished by order of the Spanish Government, since about the month of March, 1817, when a supply of knives, a few blankets, and some copper kettles, were furnished and delivered to a party of Indians, for the purpose, as was then said, of acting against the insurgents who were expected; that the said party of Indians shortly after disappeared, and nothing more was heard of them. Deponent saw, on the day that Major Young attacked a party of Indians in the neighborhood of this town, a number of Indians whom he believes were sent, (or went themselves,) across the bay in a boat belonging to Don Antonio Modina, Captain of the port.

GEORGE SKEATE.

Mr. Charles Le Jeune, being duly sworn, declares, that he has resided in Pensacola since November, 1817, since which he has frequently seen in this town, or its vicinity, parties of upwards of a hundred Indians encamped; that these parties were armed with rifles, or with the arms that were furnished them by the English; that although he cannot state that those parties had received ammunition from the Spanish Government here, he nevertheless can, and does state that the said parties were provisioned from the King's stores, by Prieto, King's storekeeper; that previous to November, 1817, the Government was regularly in the habit of giving out ammunition to the Indians, from a store which was expressly for that purpose here; that on the day that Major Young attacked the Indians near this town, there was a considerable number encamped near the water side in town, who, upon hearing the report of the fire-arms, crossed the bay in their own boats, and in other larger boats belonging to others.

CHARLES LE JEUNE.

William Cooper, being duly sworn, declares, that he has resided in Pensacola since November, 1817, during which period he has frequently seen in town and its vicinity, several parties of Indians—saw one in particular with some sheet lead, and has heard that the Indians had introduced some clothes into town that looked like American manufacture; states, also, that Tapaulca was *Red Stick* chief, and had been frequently about Pensacola, for several years past.

WILLIAM COOPER.

PENSACOLA, September 19, 1818.

I certify that the foregoing depositions were sworn to and subscribed before me on this day.

M. MCKENSEY, SEN.

Justice of the Peace in and for town of Pensacola, West Florida.

JOHN DUFFY, being duly sworn, declares as follows:

Question. Have you resided in and about Pensacola since November, 1817?

Answer. I have.

Question. Have you seen in said town, or its vicinity, within or since that period, any Indians?

Answer. I have.

Question. How many did you see at any particular time?

Answer. About the latter end of last spring I saw in town from fifty to sixty Indians, but few of them were armed; because they were prohibited from coming into town armed. I suppose their arms were left in their camps in the neighborhood.

Question. How did these Indians subsist themselves, and how did they procure ammunition?

Answer. Probably from Government here; of this, however, I am not certain.

Question. Did you see any horses, cattle, or other plunder, brought into this place by the Indians?

Answer. No.

Question. How many Indians were in Pensacola, and its neighborhood, at the time that Major Young attacked a party near this town?

Answer. Of all descriptions, viz: men, women, and children, there must have been a considerable number; not less probably than one hundred and fifty or sixty.

Question. When Major Young attacked the party near town, how did those in town find means to escape across the bay?

Answer. I have understood, and believe that they were set across by order of the Governor.

SANTIAGO PAUPHIN.

A true copy:

R. H. CALL, *A. L. C.*

JOSEPH BONEFI, being duly sworn, declares as follows, viz:

Question. Have you lived in Pensacola since November, 1817?

Answer. I have.

Question. Have you not between that period and the approach of the American forces, under Major General Jackson, repeatedly seen divers parties of hostile Indians in this town or its neighborhood?

Answer. I have. Indeed, between the said month of November and the time that the hostile party surrendered to Major Young, there were more or less in town; sometimes in numbers considerable, sometimes fewer.

Question. How, or by whom, were those Indians subsisted, and from whom, or by what means, did they procure ammunition and other warlike stores or weapons?

Answer. I have understood, and do believe, that they were fed by the Government here; as to ammunition, &c. I cannot state how they procured supplies, except it might have been from the stores about town.

Question. Have you seen or been informed of any horses, cattle, or other plunder, having been brought in here by the Indians within the time above alluded to?

Answer. No.

JOSEPH BONEFI.

PENSACOLA.

Both depositions sworn to and subscribed before me, September 19, 1818.

M. MCKENSEY, SEN.

Justice of the Peace in and for Pensacola, West Florida.

A true copy:  
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R. H. CALL, *A. L. C.*

STAFF, CORPS, AND REGIMENTS.	PRESENT, FIT FOR DUTY.																				Total.	Aggregate.						
	Adjutant General.	Quartermaster General.	Aid-de-camps.	Assistant Adjutant Generals.	Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General.	Assistant Topographical Engineer.	Hospital Surgeon.	Secretary to Major General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Judge Advocates.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Forage Masters.	Assistant Forage Masters.	Captains.	Subalterns.			Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster's Sergeants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.
4th battalion artillery,	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	1	3	5	3	35	47	52
4th regiment infantry,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	4	1	1	12	13	7	93	127	137
1st and 2d regiment Tennessee volunteers,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	4	3	2	1	2	4	-	1	-	17	54	4	2	59	57	11	610	743	837
Kentucky and Tennessee volunteer Life Guards,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	4	3	-	44	51	55
	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	3	4	5	5	2	1	3	4	-	1	22	63	5	4	78	78	21	782	979	1,092

Lieutenants Ripley and Cross, of the 8th department, joined at Pensacola, and marched with the army, not included in the above report. The companies of Life Guards, with a detachment of Tennessee volunteers, in all one hundred men, formed a guard for the protection of Pensacola. The sick of the different corps, amounting to thirty-six men, were detached, leaving an aggregate of nine hundred and fifty-six to operate against the fortress of Barancas.

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General.*

## [TRANSLATION.]

*Proposals which the civil and military commandant of the Province of West Florida makes to His Excellency Andrew Jackson, General-in-chief of the American army, before the Fort San Carlos de Barancas.*

- 1st. The fort of Barancas will be delivered to the troops of the United States, under the following conditions:  
[Approved, with the exceptions made following each article, and possession given at one o'clock past morning this day.]
- 2d. The garrison of the fort of Barancas will march out, to be transported to the Havana, on the day and hour which shall be agreed upon, with all the honors of war; drums beating; with arms and baggage. Those employed in the Royal Finance, and others attached to this department, shall also be transported to the same port.  
[A roster to be furnished of all the military and civil officers of the garrison of Fort Barancas; the troops to march out as expressed in this article; their arms to be stacked at the foot of the glacis, and left in possession of the American army until the day of embarkation, when they will be restored.]
- 3d. The commandant of the province, the officers of his staff of the artillery and engineers, the officers and troops, shall carry with them their arms and personal effects, and shall also have the liberty of disposing of their property of every kind, with perfect security to the purchasers.  
[All titles for property legally derived from the Crown of Spain will be respected.]
- 4th. The garrison shall be embarked on account of the United States; every person of the military class, or of the Royal Finance, shall receive, during the passage, such rations as are allowed to every grade by the regulations of Spain.  
[Approved, so far as relates to the transportation of the garrison, and the Spanish rations allowed, provided they do not exceed the American ration, in which case the American ration only will be allowed.]
- 5th. A competent number of vessels shall be furnished for embarking the personal effects, papers, and other property belonging to the commandant, officers, and others in the Royal employ, and particularly the papers of the secretary's office of the Government, which are in Pensacola; those of the Department of the Royal Finance, and of the civil and military employ. These papers shall not be subjected to any inspection or recognisance, under the pledge of their containing nothing foreign to the functions of the said persons.  
[Approved. An estimate of the necessary transportation to be furnished, agreeably to established usage.]
- 6th. The sick, wounded, and all those who are now, or may fall sick previous to the embarkation of the troops for the Havana, shall be maintained by the Government of the United States until cured, and shall have the same privileges as the rest of the garrison; those who are in a situation shall be embarked at the same time with it, and all shall be under the care of, and attended by, the surgeon and other individuals of the Spanish military hospital.  
[Approved.]
- 7th. The garrison of Pensacola, and the prisoners, as also those in the employ of the Royal Finance, shall enjoy the same privileges as the garrison of Barancas, and shall likewise be transported to the Havana, uniting the former to the latter, and all shall remain in the quarters they occupied in Pensacola until the moment of embarkation for the port of Havana.  
[Approved. An estimate of the necessary transportation to be furnished, and included in the estimate, for the garrison of Fort Barancas.]
- 8th. During their stay the United States will furnish to the King's storekeeper, under documents from the Royal officers, such articles of provisions as may be deficient or not in the King's stores, to complete the rations of the troops dependants; those in the King's employ, and their respective families, according to the allowance made by the regulations of Spain; the reimbursement thereof remaining subject to the decision of the Governments of Spain and the United States.  
[An inventory of the provisions in possession of the Spanish commissary to be forthwith furnished. The rations allowed subject to the limitation in the fourth article.]
- 9th. The provisions actually existing in the King's stores of Pensacola and Barancas shall be transported to the former, in order that they may serve for the said supply of rations.  
[Approved.]
- 10th. An inventory, and a duplicate thereof, shall be made by the military storekeeper, and such officer of artillery as the commandant of this corps may name, and such other as may be appointed by the general of the troops of the United States, of the artillery, powder, military stores, and other effects belonging to this department, in Pensacola, and Barancas.  
[Approved. Major Peters, of the artillery, appointed on the part of the American Government.]
- 11th. Persons and property shall be respected; concessions and sales of land made by the competent authorities shall be valid and guaranteed by the American Government at whatever time they may have been made, and until the date hereof.  
[All titles legally derived from the Crown of Spain, prior to this date, guaranteed and respected.]
- 12th. The commandant of engineers shall name an officer, who, with another whom the General of the American army may appoint, shall make an inventory, and a duplicate thereof, of the number and state of the royal edifices, in the same manner as is stated for the department of artillery.  
[Approved, and Lieutenant Sands of the artillery appointed on the part of the American Government.]
- 13th. The military officers, and those in the service of all and the several departments, may embark with them their wives, children, and servants; in which number are to be included the families of those of the said classes who may be absent. Those who have property to dispose of, or affairs to settle, may remain the time necessary for these purposes. The American authority shall afford them every protection during their stay, and they shall enjoy the same privileges as the rest of the garrison, and be transported to the Havana on account of the United States.  
[Inadmissible, so far as it regards transportation being allowed to the families of those officers not present, and servants not attending upon the persons of the officers and their families. Those individuals disposed to remain in Florida will be respected, and protected in all civil and personal rights; and, if not embracing the transportation allowed at the present period, they must furnish their own at a future period.]
- 14th. The storekeeper general shall form an inventory of the small vessels and craft, and of the other effects under his charge, in the same way as stated for the department of artillery.  
[Approved, and Lieut. Parkhurst, quartermaster of artillery, appointed on behalf of the American Government.]
- 15th. The officers and troops of this garrison, with their equipage, shall be transported to Pensacola, where they shall remain, as already stated, until embarked for the Havana.  
[Approved.]
- 17th. The Alabama chief, with his family, now in this fort, and who has been reported to Major Young, shall be included in this capitulation, and transported to the Havana.  
[Approved. His name to be entered in an article, and the Spanish Government guarantying that he never returns to the Floridas.]

18. The Catholic religion shall be maintained, with its ministers, and free exercise.  
[A free toleration to all religions guaranteed.]

19th. This capitulation is made under the confidence that the general of the American troops will comply with his offer of returning integral this province, in the state in which he receives it, as explained in his official letters.

[Approved, and the restoration made under the conditions expressed in General Jackson's communication to the Governor of Pensacola, the 23d of May.]

20th. If any doubt should arise as to the meaning of the articles of this capitulation, they shall be construed in the manner most favorable to the Spanish garrison.

[The above articles to be interpreted agreeably to their literal and expressed meaning.]

21st. The present capitulation shall be signed and exchanged by the general of the American army and the commandant of this province; as soon as possible, and, at latest, by five o'clock in the afternoon; each party respectively being in possession of an original.

[Approved.]

FORT OF SAN CARLOS DE BARANCAS, *May 28, 1818.*—7 o'clock in the morning.

JOSE MASOT.

CAMP NEAR FORT BARANCAS, *May 28, 1818.*

ANDREW JACKSON,  
*Major General Commanding.*

*Additional articles, which are to have the same force as the primary, and which extend to the fulfilment of what has been agreed upon.*

1st. The name required of the Alabama chief is Opayhola. The commandant of this province engages, in the name of his Government, that the said chief shall never return to the Floridas.

[Approved.]

2d. If any vessels of war of His Catholic Majesty, destined for this port, should arrive with a supply of provisions or money, they shall be freely admitted, as well as Spanish merchant vessels.

SAN CARLOS DE BARANCAS, *May 28, 1818.*—5 o'clock in the afternoon.

JOSE MASOT.

CAMP, NEAR FORT BARANCAS, *May 28, 1818.*

ANDREW JACKSON,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, BARANCAS, *May 29, 1818.*

FELLOW SOLDIERS:

You were called into the field to punish savages and negroes, who had, in a sanguinary manner, used the tomahawk and scalping-knife upon our helpless citizens upon the frontier. You have pursued them to Mickasukey, St. Marks, Suwaney, and lastly to this place, through an unexplored wilderness, encountering immense difficulties and privations, which you met with the spirit of American soldiers, without a murmur.

Your general anticipated a close of the campaign on his return to Fort Gadsden, and hailed the hour with feelings of gratitude to Heaven, at the prospect of relieving you from your labors, by placing you in quarters, and returning you to your homes; but how great was the disappointment, when he heard of the recent murders committed on the Alabama, by a party of the enemy from Pensacola, where they were furnished with provisions and ammunition by a friendly Power. Under this state of things, you were marched here, encountering difficulties which you alone can properly appreciate, meeting on the way the protest of the Governor of West Florida, threatening to employ force if we did not immediately evacuate the country. This new and unexpected enemy was soon taught to feel the impotence of his threats. You entered Pensacola without resistance, and the strong fortress of the Barancas could hold out but one day against your determined courage. Your general cannot help admiring the spirit and military zeal manifested, when it was signified that a resort to storming would be necessary; and would do injustice to his feelings, did he not particularly notice the judgment displayed by his aid-de-camp, Captain Gadsden of the engineers, in the selection of the positions for the batteries, and the gallantry of his second aid, Captain McCall, and Captain Young of the topographical engineers, in aiding him to erect the works, under the fire of heavy batteries within four hundred yards, as well as the skill and gallantry of Captain Peters, Lieutenants Minton and Spencer, in the direction and management of the nine pounder, and that of Lieutenants Sands and Scallon, charged with the management of the howitzer. Captain McKeever, of the navy, merits, as he has on several occasions, his warmest thanks for his zealous co-operation and activity in landing two of his guns, (should an additional battering train have been necessary,) and gallantly offering to lay his vessel before the water battery, in the event of storming the upper works; his officers and crew deserve his confidence.

\*The general assigns to Colonel King the government of Pensacola and its dependencies, and that part of the 7th department lying west of the Appalachicola and Chatahoochee rivers, until otherwise ordered by General Gaines.

The colonel will take measures to have the volunteers now at Pensacola relieved, preparatory to their return march. The Tennessee volunteers will be rationed for five days, and will forthwith move for Fort Montgomery, where they will receive further orders.

The general, in taking leave of Colonel King and his command, tenders to the officers and soldiers an affectionate farewell.

By order:

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, *May 29, 1818.*

Major General Andrew Jackson has found it necessary to take possession of Pensacola; he has not been prompted to this measure from a wish to extend the territorial limits of the United States, or from any unfriendly feeling on the part of the American republic to the Spanish Government. The Seminole Indians, inhabiting the territories of Spain, have, for more than two years past, visited our frontier settlements with all the horrors of savage massacre; helpless women have been butchered, and the cradle stained with the blood of innocence. These atrocities, it was expected, would have early attracted the attention of the Spanish Government, and, faithful to existing treaties, speedy measures adopted for their suppression. That, so far from being able to control, the Spanish authorities were often compelled, from policy or necessity, to issue munitions of war to these savages: thus enabling, if not exciting, them to raise the tomahawk against us. The immutable laws of self-defence, therefore, compelled the American Government to take possession of such parts of the Floridas in which the Spanish authority could not be maintained. Pensacola was found in that situation, and will be held until Spain can furnish military strength suffi-

cient to enforce existing treaties. Spanish subjects will be respected; Spanish laws will govern in all cases affecting property and person; a free toleration to all religions guaranteed, and trade alike to all nations.

Colonel King will assume the command of Pensacola, as military and civil Governor. The Spanish laws, so far as they affect personal rights and property, will be enforced. Colonel King will take possession of the archives of the province, and appoint some confidential individual to preserve them. It is all important that the record of titles and property should be carefully secured. He will cause an inquiry to be made into all the landed property belonging to the King of Spain, and hold possession of it. The claims to property, within the range of gunshot of Fort St. Charles de Barancas, will be scrupulously examined into; and, should this prove valid, a rent allowed, but possession in nowise given. This property is necessary for the United States, and under its laws may be held, and an equivalent paid. The revenue laws of the United States will be established, and Captain Gadsden appointed to act as collector; with full power to nominate such sub-officers as, in his opinion, will be necessary to the faithful discharge of the trust reposed in him. He will apply to the Governor of Pensacola for military aid in all cases where it may be necessary to correct attempts at an illicit trade.

ANDREW JACKSON,

*Major General, commanding the Division of the South.*

*Minutes of the proceedings of a special court, organized agreeably to the following order, viz:*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, FORT ST. MARKS, April 26, 1818.

GENERAL ORDER.

"The following detail will compose a special court, to convene at this post, at the hour of twelve o'clock M. for the purpose of investigating the charges exhibited against A. Arbuthnot, Robert Christy Ambrister, and such others who are similarly situated, as may be brought before it:

The court will record all the documents and testimony in the several cases; and their opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners; and what punishment, if any, should be inflicted.

DETAIL.

Major General E. P. GAINES, *President.*

*Members.*

Colonel King, 4th infantry,  
Colonel Williams, Tennessee volunteers,  
Lieutenant Col. Gibson, Tennessee volunteers,  
Major Muhlenburg, 4th infantry,  
Major Montgomery, 7th infantry,  
Captain Vashon, 7th infantry,

Colonel Dyer, Tennessee volunteers,  
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay, corps of artillery,  
Lieut. Col. Elliott, Tennessee volunteers,  
Major Fanning, corps of artillery,  
Major Minton, Georgia militia,  
Captain Cuttenden, Kentucky volunteers.

Lieutenant J. M. Glassell, 4th infantry, *Recorder.*

An orderly will be detailed from General Gaines's brigade; and the court will sit without regard to hours.

By order of MAJOR GENERAL JACKSON:

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General.*

FORT ST. MARKS, April 26, 1818.

The court convened pursuant to the foregoing order; when, being duly sworn in the presence of the prisoner, and he being asked if he had any objection to any member thereof, and replying in the negative, the following charges and specifications were read, viz:

Charges vs. A. Arbuthnot, now in custody, and who says he is a British subject.

CHARGE 1st. Exciting and stirring up the Creek Indians to war against the United States and her citizens; he, A. Arbuthnot, being a subject of Great Britain, with whom the United States are at peace.

*Specification.* That the said A. Arbuthnot, between the months of May and July, or some time in June, 1817, wrote a letter to the Little Prince, exhorting and advising him not to comply with the treaty of Fort Jackson, stating that the citizens of the United States were infringing on the treaty of Ghent, as he believed, without the knowledge of the Chief Magistrate of the United States; and advising the Upper and the Lower Creeks to unite and be friendly; stating that William Hambly was the cause of their disputes; also advising the Little Prince to write to the Governor of New Providence, who would write to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, through whom the United States would be called to a compliance with the treaty of Ghent; and advising them not to give up their lands under the treaty of Fort Jackson, for that the American citizens would be compelled to give up to them all their lands under the treaty of Ghent.

CHARGE 2d. Acting as a spy, and aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, supplying them with the means of war.

*Specification 1st.* In writing a letter from St. Marks fort, dated the 2d of April, 1818, to his son John, at Suwany, (marked A,) detailing the advance of the army under General Jackson, stating their force, probable movements and intentions, to be communicated to Bowleggs, the chief of the Suwany towns, for his Government.

*Specification 2d.* In writing the letters, marked B (without date) and C, with enclosures January 27, 1818; and D, called "a Note of Indian Talks;" and E, without date, applying to the British Government, through Governor Cameron, for munitions of war, and assistance for our enemies, making false representations; and, also, applying to Mr. Bagot, British ambassador, for his interference, with a statement, on the back of one of the letters, of munitions of war for the enemy.

CHARGE 3d. Exciting the Indians to murder and destroy William Hambly and Edmund Doyle, and causing their arrest, with a view to their condemnation to death; and the seizure of their property, on account of their active and zealous exertions to maintain peace between Spain and the United States and the Indians, they being citizens of the Spanish Government.

*Specification 1st.* In writing the letters, marked F, dated 26th August, 1817; G, dated 13th May, 1817; and H, threatening them with death; alleging against them false and infamous charges, and using every means in his power to procure their arrest; all which writings and sayings excited, and had a tendency to excite, the negroes and Indians to acts of hostility with the United States.

By order of the court:

J. M. GLASSELL, *Recorder.*

To which charges and specifications the prisoner pleaded *not guilty.*

The prisoner having made application for counsel, it was granted him; when the court proceeded to the examination of the evidence.

JOHN WINSLETT, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated that, some time before last July, the Little Prince received a letter, signed by Mr. Arbuthnot, advising the upper part of the nation to unite with the

lower chiefs in amity; and stating that the best mode for them to repossess themselves of their lands would be to write to him, Arbuthnot, and he would send on their complaints to the Governor of Providence, whence it would be forwarded to His Britannic Majesty, and he would have the terms of the treaty of Ghent attended to: he, moreover, stated his belief that the encroachments on the Indian lands were unknown to the President of the United States; the witness also identified the signature of the letter of the prisoner to his son, (marked A,) referred to in the first specification to the second charge, and heretofore noted as being the same with that sent to the Little Prince.

The witness, on being further interrogated, stated the language of the letter alluded to to be, that the British Government, on application, would cause to be restored to them their lands they held in 1811, agreeably to the terms of the treaty of Ghent.

Question by the prisoner. Who is the Little Prince, or is he known by any other name?

Answer. He is known by the name of Tustenukke Hopin, and is the second chief of the nation.

Question by the prisoner. Where is the letter you allude to, or in whose possession?

Answer. It was left in the possession of the Little Prince when I last saw it.

Question by the prisoner. Has this Little Prince no other name than what you state?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question by the prisoner. Do you swear that the letter alluded to was addressed to the Little Prince?

Answer. I do not. It was presented me by the Little Prince to read and interpret for him, which I did.

Question by the prisoner. Are you certain that the letter stated that the Chief Magistrate of the United States could have had no knowledge of settlements made on Indian lands, or injuries committed?

Answer. The letter stated that to be the belief of the writer.

JOHN LEWIS PHENIX, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated, with regard to the first specification of the second charge, that, being at Suwany, in the towns about the 6th or 7th of April, he was awakened early in the morning by Mr. Ambrister's receiving, by the hands of a negro, who got it from an Indian, a letter from St. Marks, at that time stated by Ambrister to be from the prisoner.

Question by the prisoner. Did you see that letter, or hear it read?

Answer. I did see the paper, but did not hear it read.

Question by the prisoner. Did you state that the letter was received by an Indian express?

Answer. So the black man that delivered it said.

A question being raised by a member of the court as to their jurisdiction on the third charge and its specifications, the doors were closed, and, after mature deliberation, they decided that this court are incompetent to take cognizance of the offences alleged in that charge and specifications.

PETER B. COOK, a former clerk to the prisoner, and a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated, that, about December or January last, the prisoner had a large quantity of powder and lead brought to Suwany in his vessel, which he sold to the Indians and negroes; that, subsequent to that time, which he cannot recollect, Ambrister brought for the prisoner, in his (the prisoner's) vessel, nine kegs of powder and a large quantity of lead, which were taken possession of by the negroes; the witness also identified the following letters referred to in the foregoing charges and specifications, marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, as being the prisoner's hand-writing; also the power of attorney, No. 1, granted by the Indians to A. Arbuthnot.

A.

*From A. Arbuthnot to his son, John Arbuthnot.*

FORT ST. MARKS, April 2, 1818, 9 o'clock in the morning.

DEAR JOHN:

As I am ill able to write a long letter, it is necessary to be brief. Before my arrival here, the commandant had received an express from the Governor of Pensacola, informing him of a large embarkation of troops, &c., under the immediate command of General Jackson; and the boat that brought the despatch reckoned eighteen sail of vessels off Appalachicola. By a deserter that was brought here by the Indians, the commandant was informed that three thousand men, under the orders of General Jackson, one thousand foot and one thousand six hundred horse, under General Gaines, five hundred under another general, were at Prospect Bluff, where they are rebuilding the burnt fort; that one thousand Indians, of different nations, were at Spanish Bluff, building another fort, under the direction of American officers; that, so soon as these forts were built, they intended to march—they have commenced. Yesterday morning advice was received that they had appeared near ——— and taken two of the sons of McQueen and an Indian. Late in the afternoon three schooners came to anchor at the mouth of the river; and this morning the American flag is seen flying on the largest. I am blocked here; no Indians will come with me; and I am now suffering from the fatigue of coming here alone.

The main drift of the Americans is to destroy the black population of Suwany. Tell my friend Bowleck that it is throwing away his people to attempt to resist such a powerful force as will be down on Sahwahnee; and, as the troops advance by land, so will the vessels by sea. Endeavor to get all the goods over the river in a place of security, as also the skins of all sorts; the corn must be left to its fate. So soon as the Sahwahnee is destroyed, I expect the Americans will be satisfied and retire: this is only my opinion; but I think it is conformable to the demand made by General Gaines of King Hatchy some months since. In fact, do all you can to save all you can; save the books particularly. It is probable the commandant will receive some communication from the vessels to-day; when he will know more certainly what are their motives in coming off the fort. I think it is only to shut the passage to the Indians. Twenty canoes went down the river yesterday, and were forced to return. The road between this and the Mickasukey is said to be stopped. Hillisajo and Himatklo Mico were here last night to hear what vessels; they will remove all their cattle and effects across St. Marks river this morning, and perhaps wait near thereto for the event.

I have been as brief as I can, to give you the substance of what appears facts that cannot be doubted. To enter into details, in the present moment, is useless. If the schooner is returned, get all the goods on board of her, and let her start off for Mounater creek, in the bottom of Cedar Key bay. You will there only have the skins to hide away. But no delay must take place, as the vessels will no doubt follow the land army; and, perhaps, even now, some have gone round. I pray your strictest attention; for the more that is saved will be, eventually, more to your interest.

Let the bearer have as much calico as will make him two shirts, for his trouble; he has promised to deliver this in three, but I give him four days.

I am yours affectionately,

A. ARBUTHNOT.

B.

*From A. Arbuthnot to Charles Cameron, Governor of Bahamas.*

SIR:

Being empowered by the chiefs of the Lower Creek nation to represent the state of their nation to your excellency, that you may be pleased to forward the same for the information of His Majesty's Government, to whom alone they look for protection against the aggressions and encroachments of the Americans, I beg leave to submit to your excellency the enclosed representations, humbly praying that your excellency will be pleased to take an early opportunity of forwarding the same to Great Britain.

I am also instructed by Bowleck, chief of the Sahwahnee, to make the demand herein enclosed; he never having had any share of the presents distributed at Prospect Bluff, though he rendered equally essential services as

any of the other chiefs to the British cause, while at war with America; and was at New Orleans with a part of his warriors. His frontiers being more exposed to the predatory incursions of the back Georgians, who enter his territory and drive off his cattle, he is obliged to have large parties out to watch their motions and prevent their plundering; and, being now deficient of ammunition, he prays your excellency will grant his small demand.

Humbly submitting the same, I have the honor to be, your excellency's most humble servant,

A. A.

*The humble representations of the chiefs of the Creek nation to his excellency Governor Cameron.*

First, We beg leave to represent that Edmund Doyle and William Hambly, lately clerks at Prospect Bluff to Messrs. Forbes & Co., and who still reside on the Appalachicola river, we consider as the principal cause of our present troubles and uneasiness. Hambly was the instrumental cause of the fort at Prospect Bluff being destroyed by the Americans, by which we lost the supplies intended for our future wars. Since then both these men have kept emissaries among us, tending to harass and disturb our repose, and that of our brethren of the Middle and Upper nation; they spread among us reports that the Cowetas, aided by the Americans, are descending to drive us off our lands; they equally propagate false.

C.

*From A. Arbuthnot to Benjamin Moodie, Esquire, enclosing letters to Charles Bagot, Esquire, British Minister at Washington.*

SAHWAHNEE, IN THE CREEK NATION, January 27, 1818.

SIR:

The enclosed, containing matter of serious moment, and demanding the immediate attention of his excellency the British ambassador, I trust he will for this time forgive the trifling expense of postage, which I have endeavored to prevent as much as possible by compressing *much matter* in one sheet of paper. Should you, sir, be put to any trouble or expense by *this trouble* I give you, by being made acquainted with the same, I will instruct Bam, Dunshee, & Co. to order payment of the same.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

A. ARBUTHNOT.

*From A. Arbuthnot to the Honorable Charles Bagot.*

SIR:

It is with pain I again obtrude myself upon your excellency's notice; but the pressing solicitations of the chiefs of the Creek nation, and the deplorable situation in which they are placed by the wanton aggressions of the Americans, I trust your excellency will take as a sufficient apology for the present intrusion.

In August last, the head chief of the Seminole Indians received a letter from General Gaines, of which I have taken the liberty of annexing your excellency the contents as delivered me by the chief's head English interpreter, with King Hatchy's reply thereto.

This letter appears to have been intended to sound the disposition of the chief, and ascertain the force necessary to overrun the nation; for, from then, until the actual attack was made on Fowltown, the same general, with General Jackson, seem to have been collecting troops and settling in various quarters.

If your excellency desires to have further information respecting the situation of this country and its inhabitants, I can, from time to time, inform your excellency of such facts and circumstances as are stated to me by chiefs of known veracity, or which may come under my own observation; and your excellency's order, addressed to me at New Providence, will either find me there, or be forwarded me to this country.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, your excellency's most obedient servant,

A. A.

The following memorandum was on the back of the foregoing letter:

King Hatchy, 1,000; Boleck, 1,500; Oso Hatjo Choctawhachy, 500; Himashy Miso Chattchichy, 500; at present with Hillisajo —; at present under arms, 1,000 and more; and attacking those Americans who have made inroads on their territory.

A quantity of gunpowder, lead, muskets, and flints, sufficient to arm one thousand or two thousand men.

Muskets, 1,000; arms smaller, if possible.

10,000 flints, a proportion of rifle put up separate.

50 casks gunpowder, a proportion for rifle.

2,000 knives, six to nine inch blade, good quality.

1,000 tomahawks.

100 pounds vermilion.

2,000 pounds lead, independent of ball for musket.

KING HATCHY,  
BOLECK.

*From General Gaines to the Seminole chief.*

Your Seminoles are very bad people; I don't say whom. You have murdered many of my people, and stolen my cattle and many good horses, that cost me money; and many good houses that cost me money you have burnt for me; and now, that you see my writing, you'll think I have spoken right. I know it is so; you know it is so; for now you may say I will go upon you at random; but just give me the murderers, and I will show them my law; and, when that is finished and past, if you will come about any of my people, you will see your friends; and, if you see me, you will see your friend. But there is something out in the sea—a bird with a forked tongue—whip him back before he lands, for he will be the ruin of you yet. Perhaps you do not understand who or what I mean—I mean the name of Englishman.

I tell you this, that if you do not give me up the murderers who murdered my people, I say I have got good strong warriors, with scalping-knives and tomahawks. You harbor a great many of my black people among you at Sahwahnee. If you give me leave to go by you against them, I shall not hurt any thing belonging to you.

GENERAL GAINES.

To the SEMINOLE CHIEF.

*From King Hatchy to General Gaines, in answer to the foregoing.*

You charge me with killing your people, stealing your cattle, and burning your houses; it is I that have cause to complain of the Americans. While one American has been justly killed, while in the act of stealing cattle, more than four Indians while hunting have been murdered by these lawless freebooters. I harbor no negroes. When the Englishmen were at war with America, some took shelter among them; and it is for you white people to settle those things among yourselves, and not trouble us with what we know nothing about. I shall use force to stop any armed Americans from passing my towns or my lands.

KING HATCHY.

To General E. P. GAINES.

## D.

## NOTE OF INDIAN TALKS.

In August, Capp had a letter from General Gaines, in substance as annexed, No. 1; and returned the answer, as by No. 2: nothing further was said on either side. The end of October, a party of Americans from a fort on Flint river surrounded Fowltown during the night, and began burning it. The Indians then in it fled to the swamp, and in their flight had three persons killed by fire from the Americans: they rallied their people, and forced the Americans to retire some distance, but not before they had two more persons killed. The Americans built a blockhouse or fort where they had fallen back to, and immediately sent to the fort up the country for assistance, stating the Indians were the aggressors; and also settled with Inhemocklo for the loss his people had suffered; at the same time sending a talk to King Hatchy, by a head man, Apiny, that he would put things in such a train as to prevent further encroachments, and get those Americans to leave the fort. But no sooner was the good talk given, and before the bearer of it returned home, than hundreds of Americans came pouring down on the Indians, roused them to a sense of their own danger, they flew to arms, and have been compelled to support them ever since. It is not alone from the country, but by vessels entering Appalachicola river with troops, and settlers are pouring into the Indian territory, and, if permitted to continue, will soon overrun the whole of the Indian lands. From the talk sent King Hatchy, by Governor Mitchell, I am in hopes that those aggressions of the Americans on the Indian territory are not countenanced by the American Government, but originate with men devoid of principle, who set laws and instructions at defiance, and stick at no cruelty and oppression to obtain their ends. Against such oppressions the American Government must use not only all their influence, but, if necessary, force, or their names will be handed down to posterity as a nation more cruel and savage to the unfortunate aborigines of this country, than ever were the Spaniards in more dark ages to the nations of South America.

The English Government, as the special protectors of the Indian nations, and on whom alone they rely for assistance, ought to step forward and save those unfortunate people from ruin. And as you, sir, are appointed to watch over their interests, it is my duty as an Englishman, and the only one in this part of the Indian nation, to instruct you of the talks the chiefs bring me for your information; and I sincerely trust, sir, you will use the powers you are vested with for the service and protection of those unfortunate people, who look up to you as their saviour. I have written General Mitchell, who I hear is an excellent man, and, as he acts as Indian agent, I hope his influence will stop the torrent of innovators, and give peace and quietness to the Creek nation.

I pray your excellency will pardon this intrusion, which nothing but the urgency of the case would have induced me to make.

I have the honor to be, your excellency's most obedient servant,

A. A.

## E.

*From Cappichimicco and Bowleck to Governor Cameron.*

It is with pain we are again obliged to obtrude ourselves on your excellency's notice, in consequence of the cruel war we have been forced into by the irruptions of the Americans into the heart of our lands. It will be first necessary to state to your excellency, that one head chief, Kihijah, received a letter from General Gaines in August last; a copy of which is enclosed, with the answer returned thereto. This letter only appears to have been a prelude to plans determined on by the said general and General Jackson to bring on troops and settlers to drive us from our lands, and take possession of them; for, in the end of October, a party of Americans surrounded Fowltown during the night, and in the morning began setting fire to it, making the unfortunate inhabitants fly to the swamp, and who in their flight had three persons killed by the fire of the Americans. Our Indians rallying, drove the Americans from the town, but in their exertions had two more of their people killed. The Americans retired some distance, and built a fort or blockhouse to protect themselves, until the assistance they had sent for to the fort up the country should arrive. A letter falling into the hands of General Mitchell, the Indian agent, which states the Indians to have been the aggressors, he suspected its truth, and, on inquiry, found it was the reverse; in consequence, he made satisfaction to Inhinoothlo, the chief of Fowltown, and his people, for the injuries they had sustained: at the same time, he desired a talk to be sent to our head chief, stating his wish to see all the Indians friends, and that in twenty days he would send and get the Americans to retire from the forts. But this has had no effect on the lawless invaders of our soil; for before the bearer of our talks could return home, he met hundreds of Americans descending on us. They have also settlers and troops which come from Mobile, and go up the Appalachicola river. Thus, seeing no end to those inroads, necessity compels us to have recourse to arms; and our brethren are now fighting for the lands they inherited from their fathers, for their families and friends.

But what will our exertions do without assistance? Our sinews of war are almost spent; and harassed as we have been for years, we have not been able to lay by the means for our extraordinary wants; and to whom can we look up to for protection and support, but to those friends who have at all former times held forth their hands to uphold us, and who have sworn in their late treaty with the Americans to see our just rights and privileges respected and protected from insult and aggression? We now call on your excellency, as the representative of our good father, King George, to send us such aid in ammunition as we are absolutely in want of; and, as our brother chief, Hillisajo, was informed, when in England, that when ammunition was wanted to enable us to protect our just rights, that your excellency would supply us with what was necessary. We have applied to the Spanish officer at the fort of St. Marks, but his small supply prevented his being able to assist us, and we have only on your excellency to depend. We likewise pray your excellency would be pleased to send an officer or person to lead us right, and to apportion the supply you may be pleased to send us agreeably to our proper wants.

In praying your excellency will lend an ear to our demand, and despatch it without delay, we remain your excellency's faithful and most obedient friends and servants,

CAPPICHIMICCO,  
BOLECK,

*For ourselves and all the other chiefs of the Lower Creek nation.*

To His Excellency Governor CAMERON.

## F.

*Letter from A. Arbuthnot to Colonel Edward Nicholl.*

NASSAU, N. P. August 26, 1817.

SIR:

Especially authorized by the chiefs of the Creek nation; whose names I affix to the present, I am desired to address you, that you may lay their complaint before His Majesty's Government. They desire it to be made known that they have implicitly followed your advice in living friendly with the Americans who were their neighbors, and nowise attempted to molest them, though they have seen the Americans encroach on their territory, burning their towns, and making fields where their houses stood. Rather than make resistance they have retired lower in the peninsula. The town of Eahallaway, on the Chatahoochee, where Olismicco was chief, is one instance of the encroachments of the Americans. This town is situated under the guns of Fort Gaines; and Micco was desired to submit to the Americans or his town would be blown to atoms. Rather than do so, he retired, and



is now living in the lower nation, and his fields, and even where the town stood, is ploughed up by the Americans. They complain of the English Government neglecting them, after having drawn them into a war with America; that you, sir, have not kept your promise of sending people to reside among them; and that if they have not some person or persons resident in the nation to watch over their interest, they will soon be driven to the extremity of the peninsula. You left Mr. Hambly to watch over the interest of the Creek nation; but you had hardly left the nation when he turned traitor, and was led by Forbes to take the part of the Americans. His letter to me, of which I annex you a copy, will show you what length he could go if he had the means. It is Hambly and Doyle who give the Indians all the trouble they experience. They send their emissaries among the Lower Creeks, and make them believe the Cowhetas, aided by the Americans, are coming to destroy them. Thus both are put in fear, and their fields are neglected, and hunting is not thought of. I have endeavored to do away this fear, by writing the chief of the Cowheta towns that they ought to live on friendly terms with their brethren of the lower nation, whose wishes were to be on good terms with them, and not to listen to any bad talks, but to chase those that give them from among them. My letter was answered from them rather favorably; and I hope the talk that was sent to the Big Warrior last June will heal the difference between them. Hillisajo arrived in my schooner at Ocklocknee Sound last June, and was well received by all the chiefs and others who came to welcome him home. In consequence of his arrival a talk was held, the substance of which put on paper for them; and it was sent, with a pipe of peace, to the other nations. Hillisajo wished to return to Nassau with me, but I prevailed on him to stay in the nation, and keep them at peace. I regret, sir, to notice this poor man's affairs, though, by his desire, it appeared that he arrived at Nassau a short time after I had left it in January, and Captain W. being here, took charge of him, his goods and money, prevailing on the Governor to let him stay with him until he went down to the nation, which it was his intention to do. Of the money received of Governor Cameron, he had only given him eighty dollars, by Captain W. a barrel of sugar, a bag of coffee, and a small keg of rum. And the interpreter, Thugart, informed that when Hillisajo asked for an account, Captain W. refused it, saying it would be useless to a man who could not read. He also misses two cases; one of which contains, he thinks, crockery. I have made inquiry of His Majesty's ordnance storekeeper, and he informs me the whole were delivered to Captain W.; they are, therefore, lost to Hillisajo.

I am desired to return Hillisajo's warmest acknowledgments for the very handsome manner you treated him in England, and he begs his prayer may be laid at the foot of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. I left him and all his family well on the 20th June. Old Cappichimico desires me to send his best respects, and requests that you will send out some people to live among them, and all the land they took from Forbes shall be theirs; at all events, they must have an agent among them to see that the Americans adhere to the treaty, and permit them to live unmolested on their own lands. This agent should be authorized by His Majesty's Government, or he will not be attended to by the Americans. In the gazettes of Georgia the Americans report the Seminole Indians are continually committing murders on their borders, and making incursions into the State. These are fabrications tending to irritate the American Government against the poor Indians: for, during the time I was in the nation, there was only one American killed, and he with two others were in the act of driving off cattle belonging to Bowlegs, chief of Suwany; whereas, three men and a boy were killed last June, by a party of American cattle stealers, while in their hunting camps; the boy they scalped, and one of Bowleg's head men was killed in St. John's river, in July. The backwood Georgians, and those resident on the borders of the Indian nation, are continually entering it, and driving off cattle. They have, in some instances, made settlements, and particularly on the Choctahatchy river, where a considerable number have descended.

By the treaty with Great Britain, the Americans were to give up to the Indians all the lands that may have been taken from them during the war, and place them on the same footing they were in 1811. It appears they have not done so; that Fort Gaines, on the Chatahochee, and Camp Crawford, on the Flint river, are both on Indian territory that was not in possession of America in 1811. They are fearful that, before any aid is given by the English Government, they will no longer be in possession of any territory. I wrote last January to his excellency the honorable Charles Bagot, respecting the encroachments of the Americans, as I was informed, by the copy of a letter from the right honorable Earl Bathurst, handed me by his excellency Governor Cameron, that His Majesty's ambassador had received orders to watch over the interests of the Indians. Since my return here I have received of Mr. Moodie, of Charleston, an extract of a letter from the honorable Charles Bagot, that the expense of postage is so considerable, any further communications of the same nature must be sent him by private hands. Now, sir, as no person goes from this direct to Washington, how am I to be able to comply with his desire? Thus he will be kept ignorant of the situation of the poor Indians, and the encroachments daily made on their lands by the American settlers, while he may be told by the American Government that no encroachments have been made, and that the forts they still hold are necessary to check the unruly Seminoles. Thus the person appointed to watch over the interest of the Indians having no other means of information than from the parties interested in their destruction, and seeing, from time to time, in the American gazettes, accounts of cruel murders, &c. &c. committed by the Indians on the frontier settlements of the United States, he apprehends the Indians merit all the Americans do to them.

But let His Majesty's Government appoint an agent, with full powers to correspond with His Majesty's ambassador at Washington, and his eyes will then be opened as to the motives of that influence, American individuals as well as the Government, in vilifying the Indians.

The power given me, and the instructions, were to memorialize His Majesty's Government, as well as the Governor General at Havana; but if you will be pleased to lay this letter before His Majesty's Secretary of State, it will save the necessity of the first; and I fear that a memorial to the Governor General would be of no use.

Referring you to the answer, I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. ARBUTHNOT.

To Lieutenant Colonel EDWARD NICHOLS.

G.

*From A. Arbuthnot to William Hambly.*

OCKLOCKNEE SOUND, May 3, 1817.

SIR:

On my return home, this day, I received a letter signed by you, and dated 23d March. As you therein take the liberty of advising me, *as you say*, by order of the chiefs of the Creek nation, I am glad of, and shall embrace this opening you gave me, and reply to you at some length; and, sir, let me premise that, when you lived at Prospect Bluff, a clerk to Messrs. Forbes & Co., you did not consider Cappichimico, McQueen, or any other of the chiefs of the lower nation, as outlaws, nor have they ever been considered as such by the English Government, who are the especial protectors of the Indian nation; and it ill becomes Mr. Hambly to call Cappichimico an outlaw, that man who has ever been his friend, and by his authority has prolonged his life. Yes, sir, the young chiefs and warriors of the Creek nation, considering you as the chief cause of their troubles, would have long ere this had possession of you, and perhaps with your life made you pay the forfeit for the injuries heaped on them, had not that man, who has been your friend from your early youth, stepped in as your protector. Yes, this is the man who Mr. Hambly presumes to call an outlaw. A pardoned villain, when going to the gallows, would bless the hand that saved his life; but Mr. Hambly blazes his saviour.

As Mr. Hambly's generous friend is the principal cause of my being in this country, as an honest man I shall endeavor to fulfil my promise to him and the other chiefs. The guilty alone have fear; an honest and upright man dreads no danger, fears no evil, as he commits no ill; and your arm of justice ought to be applied where it would rightly fall on the heads of the really guilty. Your mean and vile insinuations, that have been the cause of thefts and murders, come ill from him who has been the cause of the murder of hundreds. Though your usage was made villainous at the fort, yet your revenge was too savage and sanguinary. If your conduct, sir, to the Indians were

guided by as pure motives as mine, you would endeavor to influence them, and respect each other as brothers, and live in harmony and friendship, cultivating their lands in summer, and taking their diversions of hunting in winter, respecting their neighbors, and making yourselves respected by them. If thus, sir, you would act, (and by your knowledge of their language you have much more in your power than any other man,) you would then be the true friend of the Indians. Were I an instigator of thefts and murder, would I hold the language I have done to the chiefs and others who have called on me? Ask the Lieutenant commanding at Fort Gaines, if my letter to him breathed the strains of murder? Ask Opy Hatchy, or Dany, his interpreter, if the recommendatory note I sent him by order of Apiny, could be written by an instigator of murder? Ask Apiny himself if my language to him was that of a murderer? Ask Mappalitchy, a chief residing among the Americans on Oakmulgee, if my language and advice to him favored that of a murderer? All those, and every Indian who has heard my talks, will contradict your vile assertions.

But Mappalitchy has given me a clue by which I can unravel from whence the aspersions come, not from Apiny, Hatchy, or any of the chiefs of the upper towns, but from him who endeavors to lead them to mischief and quarrels with each other.

Did not the chiefs hear my note read with respect, and perfectly according to my sentiments of being all as brethren uniting with the bonds of friendship and love? Did not they agree to smoke the pipe of peace with their brethren of the lower nation, and live in future as brothers? What made some of them alter their minds afterwards? The interference of a humane man, who counsels them to write me, demanding my removal from a band of outlaws, and which letter is signed "William Hambly."

I shall only make one more observation, and that will show from whence I came, and whether I came among the Indians as a revenger or as the friend of peace and harmony.

In the spring of 1816, Mr. Hambly sent Governor Cameron a letter containing talks of the chiefs of the Indian nations; they are forwarded to England, and his excellency handed me, on my leaving Providence, an answer thereto from the right honorable Earl Bathurst, one of His Majesty's chief Secretaries of State, that I might make the same known to the chiefs on my arrival in the nation. What will Governor Cameron think of the man who, in 1816, could write against the encroachments of the Americans on the Indian nation, and, in the spring of 1817, call the chiefs of that nation, for whom he more especially wrote, outlaws. Mr. Hambly may sell his services to America; but no man can expatriate himself from that allegiance due to his native country; and a Government may call on a friendly nation to give up a subject that has seriously wronged her. I recommend Mr. Hambly to be content with the *douceur* he may have received, and permit the unlettered Indian to live quietly and peaceably on his native land.

I shall send a copy of this letter, with the one from you, to be read by the chiefs of this nation, and shall, at the same time, take an opportunity of expressing myself more fully than I did in the note sent by Apiny.

Wishing you a speedy recantation of your errors, and a return to your former way of thinking,

I am your obedient servant,

A. ARBUTHNOT.

#### H.

##### *Letter from A. Arbuthnot to the Governor of Havana.*

The chiefs of the Creek nation, whose names are hereunto annexed, beg leave to approach your excellency, and represent their complaints. Long imposed on by the persons keeping stores in this country in charging us exorbitant prices for their goods, while they only allow us a very trifling one for our peltry, we have found it necessary to look out for a person that will deal fairly with us, and we wish to establish a store for him on Appalachicola river. We have made application to the commander of St. Marks, and he referred us to your excellency. It is not alone the imposition that has been practised upon us, that has made us presume to address your excellency; we have complaints of a more serious nature against the persons employed by the only house that has been established among us, that of Mr. Forbes.

In the first place, some years back, under false pretences, they attempted to rob us of a very large portion of our best lands; and we the more readily acceded to it, from the faithful promise given us that they would get English people to settle it, and live among us, but, far from doing this, Mr. Forbes attempted to sell it to the American Government, and settle it with Americans. Thus finding ourselves deceived and imposed on, we withdrew our grant about three years since, which, from the stipulations contained therein not being fulfilled on the part of Mr. Forbes, we conceived we had a right to do. Secondly, Mr. Doyle and Mr. Hambly, the two persons left in the nation to carry on Mr. Forbes's business, have, for more than two years, been endeavoring to influence us to join the Americans; and, finding that fair means would not secure us from our attachments to our ancient friends the English, they have recently had recourse to threats of bringing the Americans down upon us; and that people only want a pretext to attack us, which the said Doyle and Hambly attempt to give them, by spreading false reports of our murdering the Americans, stealing their cattle, and preparing for war against them, while, in fact, it is the Americans who murder our red brethren, steal our cattle by hundreds at a time, and are daily encroaching on our lands, and maintaining the settlers in their ill-gotten possessions by armed force.

On the Choctahatchy river there are a large body of Americans forming settlements, and more are daily joining them. As this river is far within that line marked out by your excellency's Government and the Americans, some years since, (though that line was unknown to us until very lately, and we never gave our sanction, nor, in fact, knew of any sale of our lands made to the Americans,) we trust your excellency will give order to displace them from within the line, and send them back to their own country. Our delaying to address your excellency to represent the forementioned grievances has been owing to the want of a person to attend to our talks, and put them in writing for us. The commander of the fort at St. Marks has heard all of our talks and complaints. He approves of what we have done and what we are doing; and it is by his recommendation we have thus presumed to address your excellency.

We have the honor to be your excellency's most obedient and very humble servant,

A. ARBUTHNOT.

To His Excellency the GOVERNOR GENERAL, &c. &c.

#### No. 1.

##### *Power of attorney from the Indian chiefs to A. Arbuthnot.*

Know all men by these presents, that we, chiefs of the Creek nation, whose names are affixed to this power, having full faith and confidence in Alexander Arbuthnot, of New Providence, who, knowing all our talks, is fully acquainted with our intentions and wishes, do hereby, by these presents, constitute and appoint him, the said Alexander Arbuthnot, our attorney and agent, with full power and authority to act for us, and in our names, in all affairs relating to our nation, and also to write such letters and papers as to him may appear necessary and proper for our benefit and that of the Creek nation.

Given at Ocklocknee Sound, in the Creek nation, this seventeenth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen.

- |                                   |                                  |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1 Cappachimicco, his × mark.      | 7 Inhimatchluchy, his × mark.    |
| 2 Inhemothlo, his × mark.         | 8 Laboe Inhamatchlo, his × mark. |
| 3 Charle Tustonoky, his × mark.   | 9 Hourathee Micho, his × mark.   |
| 4 Otus Mico, his × mark.          | 10 Hillisajo, his × mark.        |
| 4 Ochacone Tustonoky, his × mark. | 11 Tamuches Haho, his × mark.    |
| 6 Imatchlucle, his × mark.        | 12 Oportlimico, his × mark.      |

Witness: PETER SHUGERT, *Interpreter.*

*Certified explanation of names and towns to which the foregoing chiefs belong, agreeably to the numbers set opposite thereto.*

1. Kinhigee, chief of Mickasuky.
2. Inhemothlo, chief of Fowltown.
3. Charle Tustonoky, second chief of Oakmulgee Town.
4. Chief on the Conholoway, below Fort Gaines.
5. Oponey, chief of the Oakmulgee Towns.
6. Chief of the Atlapalgas.
7. Chief of Pallatchacoley.
8. Chief of the Chehaws.
9. Chief of the Red Sticks.
10. Francis, (the prophet.)
11. Peter McQueen, chief of the Tallahasses, (an old Red Stick.)
12. A Red Stick, created chief by the lower towns.

Question by the court. Have you, at any time within the last twelve months, heard any conversation between the prisoner and the chief called Bowlegs, relating to the war between the United States and the Seminoles?

Answer. I heard the prisoner tell Bowlegs that he had sent letters to the Prince Regent, and expected soon to have an answer. Some time afterwards, some of the negroes doubted his carrying those letters, when the prisoner stated that he had, but the distance being great, it would take some time to receive an answer.

By the court. State to the court when and where you first saw the letter signed "A. Arbuthnot," dated April 2, 1818, referred to in the first specification of the second charge.

Answer. About the 6th of April, a black man, who said he had received it from an Indian, gave it to Mr. Ambrister, whom I saw reading it.

Question by the court. Do you know by what means that letter was conveyed to Suwany?

Answer. I understood by an Indian who was sent from Fort St. Marks.

Question by the court. Who paid the Indian for carrying the letter referred to in the last interrogatory?

Answer. I do not know.

Question by the court. What steps were taken by the negroes and Indians on the receipt of the letter?

Answer. They first believed the bearer to be an enemy, and confined him; but, learning the contrary, began to prepare for the enemy, and the removal of their families and effects across the river. The Indians lived on the opposite side.

Question by the court. Did the Indians and negroes act together in the performance of military duty?

Answer. No; but they always said they would fight together.

Question by the court. Did not Nero command the blacks, and did not Bowlegs own Nero; and was not the latter under the immediate command of Bowlegs?

Answer. Nero commanded the blacks, and was owned and commanded by Bowlegs; but there were some negro captains who obeyed none but Nero.

Question by the court. What vessel brought to Suwany the ammunition which you said was sold by the prisoner to the Indians and negroes?

Answer. The schooner Chance, now lying at this wharf. She is a foretopsail vessel, belonging to the prisoner.

The witness also identified the manuscript of the prisoner on the following documents, viz: No. 1, granting him full power to act in all cases for the Indians, as recorded before; and also a letter, without signature, to the Governor of St. Augustine, numbered 2; and further, a letter, without date, to Mr. Mitchel, the Indian agent, numbered 3; an unsigned petition of the chiefs of the Lower Creek nation to Governor Cameron, praying his aid in men and munitions of war, numbered 4: all of which the witness stated to be in the hand-writing of the prisoner.

#### No. 2.

*[Supposed to be from Bowlegs to the Governor of St. Augustine.]*

SIR:

I had the honor of receiving your letter of September, but the impossibility of finding a person to write an answer to the same is the cause of this apparent neglect.

I shall be very happy to keep up a good understanding and correspondence with you, and hope you will, when occasion offers, advise me of such things as may be of service to myself and people. My warriors and others that go to St. Augustine, return with false reports, tending to harass and distress my people, and preventing them from attending to their usual avocations. At one time, the Americans and Upper Indians, supported by a force of about three thousand men, were running lines far within the Indian territory; at another time, are collecting a force at Fort Mitchel, in the forks of Flint and Chatahoochee rivers, to fall on the towns below.

Now, sir, we know of no reason the Americans can have to attack us, an inoffensive and unoffending people. We have none of their slaves. We have taken none of their property since the Americans made peace with our good father, King George. We have followed the orders of his officer that was with us, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Nichols, and in no wise molested the Americans, though we daily see them encroaching on our territory, stealing our cattle, and murdering and carrying off our people. That same officer also told us, we, as allies to the great King, our father, were included in the treaty of peace between our good father and the Americans; and that the latter were to give up all the territory that had been taken from us before and during the war. Yet, so far from complying with the ninth article of that treaty, they are daily making encroachments on our land, getting persons, who are not known to the chiefs, and, without any power or authority, to grant and sign over lands to them. Thus they deceive the world, and make our very friends believe we are in league with them.

The principal chiefs of the nation, with the head warrior, assembled at my town on the 8th instant, and came to the resolution of informing the British minister at Washington of the conduct of the Americans and the officers of their Government towards us. It has been done accordingly, and copies sent to England.

We demand of the King, our father, to fix some of his people among us, who may inform him, from time to time, of what is passing, and see the Americans do not extend themselves on our lands.

The Spanish subjects in the Floridas are too much in the interests of the Americans to be our friends. For the Governors, I shall always entertain the greatest regard; but for the people, they do not act so as to merit any esteem and protection. You desire I would chase those marauders who steal my cattle. My people have lately driven some Americans from Lahheway, and I have no doubt the Americans will lay hold of this as a pretext to make war on us, as they have before done, in stating we harbor their runaway slaves.

To His Excellency Don JOSE COFINGER, Governor of St. Augustine.

#### No. 3.

SIR:

King Hatchy, the head chief of the Lower Creek nation, has called on me to request I would represent to you the cruel and oppressive conduct of the American people living on the borders of the Indian nation, and which he was in hopes, from a talk you were pleased to send him some weeks since, would have been put a stop to, and peace restored between the Indians and American people. But, far from any stop being put to their inroads and encroachments, they are pouring in by hundreds at a time, not only from the land side, but ascending the Appalachian

in vessel loads. Thus, the Indians have been compelled to take up arms to defend their homes from a set of lawless invaders.

Your known philanthropy and good will to the Indians induces the head chiefs to hope that you will lose no time in using your influence to put a stop to those invasions of their lands, and order that those who have already presumed to seize our fields may retire therefrom.

The Indians have seized two persons they think have been greatly instrumental in bringing the Americans upon them, and they are now in their possession as prisoners. It is even reported they have made sales of Indian lands without the knowledge, consent, or approbation of the chiefs of the nation; and from their long residence in the nation, and the great influence the one of those people formerly enjoyed among the chiefs as their chief, there is some reason to believe he has been guilty of improper conduct to the Indian nation.

Gen. MITCHELL, *Agent for Indian Affairs.*

No. 4.

*Petition of the chiefs of the Lower Creek nation to Governor Cameron.*

We, the undersigned, are deputed by the chiefs of the Creek nation to wait on your excellency, and lay before you their heavy complaints.

To the English we have always looked up as friends, as protectors, and on them we now call to aid us in repelling the approaches of the Americans, who, regardless of treaties, are daily seizing our lands and robbing our people. They have already built seven forts on our land; they are making roads and running lines into the very heart of our country; and, without the interference of the English, we shall soon be driven from the land we inherited from our forefathers.

The Americans tell us the English will regard us no more, and we had better submit to them; but we cannot submit to their shackles, and will rather die in defence of our country.

When peace was made between the English and Americans, we were told by Lieutenant Colonel Nichols that the Americans were to give up our lands they had taken from us, and we were desired to live quietly and peaceably, in nowise molesting the Americans. We have strictly followed those orders, but the Americans have not complied with the treaty. Colonel Nichols left Mr. Hambly in charge of the fort at Prospect Bluff, with orders to hear us if any cause of complaints, and represent the same to the British Government; but he turned traitor and brought the Americans down on the fort, which was blown up, and many of our red brethren destroyed in it. The ammunition stores intended for our use were either destroyed or taken off by the Americans. We have sent several messengers to inform your excellency of these proceedings of the Americans, but they have never returned to us with an answer. Three of our red brethren have lately been killed by the Americans while hunting on our lands, and they threaten to attack the towns of Mickasuky and Sahwahnee, the only two large towns left us in the Creek nation; and without aid from your excellency, we cannot repel their attack.

We are therefore deputed to demand of your excellency the assistance of troops and ammunition, that we may be able effectually to repel the attack of the Americans, and prevent their further encroachments; and, if we return without assistance, the Americans, who have their spies among us, will the more quickly come upon us.

We most humbly pray your excellency will send such a force as will be respected and make us respectable.

[*The following endorsed on the foregoing.*]

CHARLES CAMERON, Esq., *Governor, Commander-in-chief, &c.*

I beg leave to represent to your excellency the necessity of my again returning to the Indian nation with the deputies from the chiefs; and, as my trouble and expense can only be defrayed by permission to take goods to dispose of among them, I pray your excellency will be pleased to grant me such a letter or license as will prevent me from being captured, in case of meeting any Spanish cruiser on the coast of Florida.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning, at 7 o'clock.

FORT ST. MARKS, *April 27, 1818.*

The court convened pursuant to adjournment. Present:

Major General E. P. Gaines, *President.*

*Members.*

Colonel King,  
Colonel Williams,  
Lieutenant Colonel Gibson,  
Major Muhlenburg,  
Major Montgomery,  
Captain Vashon,

Colonel Dyer,  
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay,  
Lieutenant Colonel Elliott,  
Major Fanning,  
Major Minton,  
Captain Crittenden.

Lieutenant J. M. Glassell, *Recorder.*

When the further examination of the witness, PETER B. COOK, took place, viz:

Question by the prisoner. How long have you been acquainted with the settlements on the Sahwahnee?

Answer. Between six and seven months.

Question by the prisoner. For what term of years did you engage to live with the prisoner?

Answer. For no stated period; I was taken by the year.

Question by the prisoner. Were you not discharged by the prisoner from his employ?

Answer. He told me he had no further use for me after I had written the letters to Providence.

Question. Where did you stay after you were discharged?

Answer. I stayed in a small house belonging to a boy called St. John, under the protection of Nero.

Question. What was the subject matter of the letters you wrote to Providence?

Answer. After being refused by the prisoner a small venture to Providence, I wrote to my friends for the means to trade by myself.

Question by the prisoner. Do you believe the prisoner had knowledge of the venture being on board the schooner?

Answer. I do not believe he did; it was small, and in my trunk.

Question by the prisoner. Do you know that Ambrister was the agent of the prisoner?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you think that the powder and lead shipped would more than supply the Indian and negro hunters?

Answer. I did not see the powder and lead myself, but was told by Bowlegs that he had a great quantity; he had them keeping to fight with.

Question. Did the Indians reside on the east side of the river?

Answer. They d.d.

Question. You were asked if the negroes and Indians, when the letter marked A was communicated, did not take up arms. Had they received information of the defeat of the Indians at Mickasuky prior to that time?

Answer. It was afterwards, I believe, they received the information.

Question. Did not Bowlegs keep other powder than that got from the prisoner?

Answer. He had some he got from the bluff, which was nearly done; he said his hunters were always bothering him about powder.

Question. Did you state that, at the time Ambrister ascended the river, there was no other vessel at the mouth of the river?

Answer. There was none other there; there was one had sailed.

Question. There is a letter A spoken of; how do you know that the son of the prisoner had that letter in his possession?

Answer. I saw him with it, which he dropped, and a boy called John picked it up and gave it to me.

Question. You stated that the Indians and negroes doubted the fidelity of the prisoner in sending letters to the Prince Regent; do you think the prisoner would have been punished by them had he not complied with their wishes?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Do you believe the prisoner was compelled to write the Indian communications?

Answer. He was not compelled.

WILLIAM HAMBLY, a witness for the prosecution, being duly sworn, and commencing a statement of what he heard the chiefs say, and the prisoner objecting to hearsay evidence of that kind, the court was cleared in order to take the question; when they decided that the prisoner's objection was not valid. The witness was therefore recalled, and stated that, fifteen or twenty days after the prisoner arrived at Ocklocknee, the Seminole Indians began to steal horses from the United States' settlements, and committed murders on the Satilla river, which, he was informed by them, was at the instigation of the prisoner. The chiefs of the Little Villages, in witness's neighborhood, then desired him to write a few lines to the prisoner, stating those reports, and that he did not know that those Indians he was exciting had long been outlawed, and cautioned him against such proceedings, or he might be involved in their ruin. This the witness did; when the prisoner wrote him a long and insulting letter, which was lost, upbraiding the witness for calling those Indians outlaws, and accusing him of exciting the Indians to cruel war. The witness was told by chiefs and Indians, who had seen the prisoner, that he advised them to go to war with the United States, if they did not surrender them the lands which had been taken from them, and that the British Government would support them in it.

The Indians that took the witness and a certain Mr. Doyle prisoners, which happened on the 13th of December last, told them it was by the prisoner's order; and, on their arrival at the Mickasuky, (as prisoners,) King Hijah and all his chiefs told them it was by the prisoner's orders they were taken and robbed. On their arrival at Suwany, they were told by the Indian and negro chiefs, who sate in council over them, that the prisoner had advised he should be given up to five or six Choctaw Indians, who were saved from the negro fort, who would revenge themselves for the loss of their friends at that place. On their return from Suwany, the chief King, Hijah, told them that he had got the prisoner to write several letters for him; one to the Governor of Providence, one to the British minister at Washington, one to the Secretary of State in London, and one to the American agent for Indian affairs, protesting against the proceedings of the commanding officer at Fort Scott. While the witness was at Suwany, the Indian chiefs told him that the prisoner had arrived at that place with ten kegs of powder on board his vessel; and, whilst in Fort St. Marks, some time in March, Hillis Hajo, or Francis, brought an order from the prisoner to the commandant for two kegs of powder, with other articles, which were in his possession.

Question by the court. Were any murders or depredations committed on the white settlements by the Indians previous to the prisoner's arrival at Ocklocknee?

Answer. None, except one murder at Fort Gaines, which was before or about the time of the prisoner's arrival.

Question. How long have you resided among the Indians? State to the court whether you are acquainted with the Indian language, and how long since you learned it?

Answer. I have resided among them fourteen years, and have understood their language twelve years.

Question. Do you believe the Seminoles would have commenced the business of murder and depredation on the white settlements had it not been at the instigation of the prisoner, and a promise, on his part, of British protection?

Answer. I do not believe they would without they had been assured of British protection.

Question by the court. What was the light in which the prisoner was viewed by the hostile Seminoles? Was it that of an authorized agent of the British Government?

Answer. The different chiefs always represented him to me as such. The witness recognised the letter marked G, and signed A. Arbuthnot, as being a copy of the one alluded to in his testimony as lost.

Question by the prisoner. Are you acquainted with the prisoner's hand-writing?

Answer. I have seen it, but cannot say I am acquainted with it.

Question. Is that which you have just seen, and say is the copy of the one you lost, the prisoner's hand-writing?

Answer. It looks to be his hand-writing, but I cannot say positively.

Question. Was the prisoner considered as the agent of the Seminoles at the time those murders were committed?

Answer. I had not seen the prisoner at that time. The Indian chiefs told me that the prisoner had reported himself to them as an English agent.

Question. Where did you understand the prisoner to be when you were taken prisoner?

Answer. The Indians told us that he had gone over to Providence, but was expected back by the time we should arrive at Suwany.

Question. Did you not request King Hijah to prevail upon the prisoner to give you a passage in his schooner to Providence?

Answer. Yes, but was told that the prisoner refused it; stating that, if we were forced upon him, he would blind-fold us, and make us walk overboard.

Question. What were the reasons given by King Hijah for the prisoner's not granting your request?

Answer. King Hijah stated that the prisoner was fearful of meeting with an American vessel, where we should be taken out, and he thereby lose his schooner.

EDMUND DOYLE, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, was questioned as follows:

Question by the Judge Advocate. Do you know any thing that would lead to substantiate the charges against the prisoner now before you?

Answer. I know nothing but from common report.

WILLIAM FULTON, an evidence in the present prosecution, being duly sworn, testified to the copy of the letter from A. Arbuthnot to General Mitchel, agent for Indian affairs, dated Suwany, January 19, 1818, and marked No. 6, as acknowledged by the prisoner to be the same in substance as one written by himself at that time. An extract from the letter was then read.

#### No. 6.

*Extract from a letter written by A. Arbuthnot to General Mitchell, American agent for the Creek nation of Indians, dated*

SAHWAHNEE, January 19, 1818.

In taking this liberty of addressing you, sir, in behalf of the unfortunate Indians, believe me I have no wish but to see an end put to a war, which, if persisted in, I foresee must eventually be their ruin; and as they were not the aggressors, if, in the height of their rage, they commit any excesses, that you will overlook them as the just ebullitions of an indignant spirit against an invading foe.

I have the honor, &c.

A. ARBUTHNOT.

By order of King Hijah and Bowlegs, acting for themselves and the other Chiefs.

Question by the prisoner. Where did the prisoner acknowledge the letter just read to be a copy of the one written by himself?

Answer. In the encampment before this place, about the 6th or 7th instant.

Question by the prisoner. Was not the acknowledgment when he was a prisoner?

Answer. It was.

Question by the prisoner. Did you hear a gentleman say to the prisoner, whilst in custody, that those who recommended the scalping-knife and tomahawk should feel their keenest edge?

Answer. I did hear a gentleman say that those who excited the Indians to the murder of the unoffending should feel the keenest edge of the scalping-knife; but, as well as I recollect, that observation was not made until after the repeated acknowledgments of the prisoner of having written the letter.

Question by the court. Was not the confession of the prisoner to this letter made voluntarily, and without any constraint whatever?

Answer. I conceive it was.

The evidence on the part of the prosecution being closed, the prisoner required Robert C. Ambrister as one of his witnesses, against whom criminal charges had been filed, and who was in custody on account thereof; to which the Judge Advocate objecting, the court was cleared to take its sense; when it was decided that Robert C. Ambrister, now in custody for similar offences with the prisoner, cannot be examined as evidence before this court.

JOHN LEWIS PHENIX, a previous witness, now on the part of the prisoner, being again sworn, was questioned as follows, viz:

Question by the prisoner. Was there any other vessel at the mouth of the Suwany river when Ambrister seized your schooner?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What vessel was it? Was it not the vessel which Ambrister came in?

Answer. It was a sloop, and I understood Ambrister came in her.

Question. Did Ambrister ever mention to you who recommended him to seize the prisoner's schooner, or who assisted him in stimulating the negroes to do so?

Answer. No; I understood he came on board of his own accord.

Question by the court. Have you, since you commanded the prisoner's vessel, ever brought any arms to that part of the country?

Answer. No; I brought a quantity of lead and ten kegs of powder in the last trip.

JOHN WINSLET, a former witness on the part of the prosecution, being recalled on behalf of the prisoner, was questioned as follows, viz:

Question by the prisoner. Are you not of opinion that the letter which you say was written by the prisoner to the Little Prince is now in the possession of the Little Prince?

Answer. After reading it, I returned to him, and believe it to be still in his possession, as Indians seldom destroy papers of that kind.

The prisoner requesting some time to make up his defence, he was given until to-morrow evening, at four o'clock.

FORT ST. MARK'S, April 28th, four o'clock, P. M.

The Recorder having read over the proceedings of the court with closed doors, the prisoner was recalled into court, and made the defence, marked K, and attached to these proceedings. The doors were then closed, and, after most mature deliberation on the evidence adduced, the court find the prisoner, Alexander Arbuthnot, guilty of the first specification to the first charge, and guilty of the first charge; guilty of the first and second specifications of the second charge, and guilty of the second charge, leaving out the words "acting as a spy;" they therefore do, on the most mature reflections, sentence the prisoner, Alexander Arbuthnot, to be *suspended by the neck until he is dead*; two-thirds of the court concurring.

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Major General by brevet, President of the Court.  
S. M. GLASSELL, Recorder.

#### DEFENCE. (K.)

##### *May it please this Honorable Court:*

The prisoner arraigned before you is sensible of the indulgence granted by this honorable court in the examination of the case now before them. It is not the wish of the prisoner, in making his defence, to tire the patience of the court by a minute reference to the voluminous documents and papers, or to recapitulate the whole of the testimony which has come before the honorable court in the course of this investigation. Nor is it the intention of the prisoner to waste the invaluable time of this court by appeals to their feelings or sympathy, though I am persuaded that sympathy no where more abundant than in a generous American breast. My only appeal is to the sound and impartial judgment of this honorable court, the purity and uprightness of their hearts, that they will dispassionately and patiently weigh the evidence they have before them, apply the law, and on these, and these alone, pronounce their judgment.

If this honorable court please, I shall now proceed to examine the law and evidence that is relied on by this honorable court in support of the first charge and specification. Winslet, a witness on the part of the prosecution, says, the Little Prince showed him a letter written in June last, signed A. Arbuthnot, requesting his friendship with the lower nation of Indians; the same witness stated that he believed the letter to be now in the possession of the Little Prince. Here, may it please this honorable court, I would call their attention to the law relating to evidence; first presuming that the rules of evidence are the same, whether in civil or military tribunals.—*Macomb*, 99.

This point being conceded, the next inquiry is, what are the rules of evidence with respect to the admission of letters, or papers of private correspondence, in a court of criminal jurisdiction? May it please this honorable court, must you not produce the original letters and papers, if they are not lost or mislaid, so that they cannot be obtained; and, in case they are lost, proof must be made of the hand-writing being the same as that of the original before they can be received as evidence?—(*Macomb on Courts Martial; Peake's Evidence; Gilbert's Laus of Evidence.*) No instance can be cited where a copy of a letter was read as evidence when the original could be obtained, much less the giving in evidence the contents of such letter from bare recollection. The only proof that this honorable court has of the existence of such a letter being in the hands of any person, or its contents being known, is the vagrant memory of a vagrant individual. Make this a rule of evidence, and, I ask you, when would implication, construction, and invention stop? whose property, whose reputation, and whose life would be safe? Here I would beg leave to mention a remark made by the president of this court in the course of this investigation, which was, that notwithstanding the letter was proved by the witness to be in the possession of the Little Prince, this court could not notice that circumstance, because there was no means by which it could be obtained. I would ask the honorable court what means they have adopted, or what exertions have they made, to procure this letter? If the honorable court please, I shall here close the defence on the first charge and specification, believing that they are neither supported by law nor evidence.

May it please the honorable court, I will now come to the second charge, and first specification of that charge. In support of this charge and specification, the evidence is a letter written to my son. If the court please, this letter was written in consequence of the situation of my property at Sawhnee, and the large debts that were due me from Bowlegs and his people. Nothing, I believe, of an inflammatory nature can be found on reading the document marked A, authorizing the opinion that I was prompting the Indians to war. On the contrary, if the honorable court will examine the document marked A, they will see that I wished to lull their fears, by informing them that it was the negroes, and not the Indians, the Americans were principally moving against. If the honorable court please, I will make a few remarks on the second specification, and here close my defence. In proof of this charge, the court have

before them the evidence of Hambly, Cook, and sundry letters purporting to be written by myself to different individuals. May it please the court, what does Cook prove? Why, that I had ten kegs of powder at Sahwahnee. Let me appeal to the experience of this court, if they think that this quantity of powder would supply one thousand Indians, and an equal number of blacks, more than two months for hunting? As to the letters named in this specification, may it please the court, the rules of evidence laid down in the first part of this defence will apply with equal force in the present case. It remains now, may it please the court, to say something as to Hambly's testimony; and, may it please this honorable court, the rule laid down in this case as to hearsay evidence will be found without a precedent. A strong case was stated by an intelligent member of this court, on the examination of this part of the evidence; that is, would you receive as testimony what a third person had said, who, if present, you would reject as incompetent? Apply this principle to the present case; could an Indian be examined on oath in our courts of judicature? If, then, the testimony of savages is inadmissible, Hambly proves nothing.

Here, may it please this honorable court, I close my reply to the charges and specifications preferred against me; being fully persuaded that, should there be cause of censure, my judges will, in the language of the law, lean to the side of mercy.

*Continuation of the minutes of the proceedings of a special court, whereof Major General Gaines is President, convened by order of the 26th of April, 1818.*

FORT ST. MARKS, April 27, 1818.

The court proceeded to the trial of Robert C. Ambrister, a British subject, who, being asked if he had any objections to any one of the members of the court, and replying in the negative, was arraigned on the following charges and specifications, viz:

*Charges against Robert C. Ambrister, now in custody, who says he is a British subject.*

CHARGE 1st. Aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, supplying them with means of war, he being a subject of Great Britain, at peace with the United States, and lately an officer in the British colonial marines.

*Specification 1st.* That the said Robert C. Ambrister did give intelligence of the movements and operations of the American army between the 1st and 20th of March, 1818, and did excite them (the negroes and Indians) to war against the army of the United States, by sending their warriors to meet and fight the American army, whose Government was at peace and friendship with the United States and all her citizens.

CHARGE 2d. Leading and commanding the Lower Creeks in carrying on a war against the United States.

*Specification 1st.* That the said Robert C. Ambrister, a subject of Great Britain, which Government was in peace and amity with the United States and all her citizens, did, between the 1st of February, and 20th of March, 1818, levy war against the United States, by assuming command of the Indians, in hostility and open war with the United States, and ordering a party of them to meet the army of the United States, and give them battle, as will appear by his letters to Governor Cameron, of New Providence, dated 20th March, 1818, which are marked A, B, C, and D, and the testimony of Mr. Peter B. Cook, and Captain Lewis of the schooner Chance.

By order of the court,

J. M. GLASSELL, Recorder.

To which charges and specifications pleaded as follows, viz:

To the 1st charge and specification, *not guilty*.

To the 2d charge and specification, *guilty*, and *justification*.

The court adjourned until to-morrow morning at seven o'clock.

FORT ST. MARKS, April 28, 1818.

The court met pursuant to the adjournment. Present:

Major General Gaines, *President*.

*Members.*

Colonel King,  
Colonel Williams,  
Lieutenant Colonel Gibson,  
Major Muhlenburg,  
Major Montgomery,  
Captain Vashon,

Colonel Dyer,  
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay,  
Lieutenant Colonel Elliott,  
Major Fanning,  
Major Minton,  
Captain Crittenden.

Lieutenant J. M. Glassell, *Recorder*.

The Recorder then read to the court the following order, viz:

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

GENERAL ORDER.

(NEAR ST. MARKS,) April 28, 1818.

Captain Allison, of the 7th infantry, is detailed to form a supernumerary member of the special court now sitting at Fort St. Marks.

By order,

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General*.

Pursuant to the above order, the supernumerary member took his seat.

JOHN LEWIS PHENIX, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated, that about the 5th or 6th of April, 1818, his vessel and himself having been captured by the prisoner, and he brought to Suwany as a prisoner, there was an alarm among the negroes and Indians, created by learning some news from Mickasuky, at which time the prisoner appeared active in sending orders, and sending a detachment to meet the American army. The witness also stated, that the prisoner appeared to be a person vested with authority among the negro leaders, and give orders for their preparation for war, procuring ammunition, &c., and that the leaders came to him for orders; the prisoner furnished them with powder and lead, and recommended to them the making of ball, &c. very quickly. The witness also stated, that the prisoner occasionally dressed in uniform, with his sword; and that on the first alarm, which he understood was from Mickasuky by a negro woman, he put on the uniform.

The witness further stated, that some time about the 20th March, 1818, the prisoner, with an armed body of negroes, (twenty-four in number,) came on board his vessel, and ordered him to pilot them to Fort St. Marks, which he stated he intended to capture before the Americans could get there, threatening to hang the witness if he did not obey.

Question by the court. Did you ever understand by whose authority, and for what purpose, the accused came into the country?

Answer. I have frequently heard him say he came to attend to Mr. Woodbine's business at the bay of Tamper.

Question by the prisoner. Did I not tell you, when I came on board the schooner Chance, I wished you to pilot me to Saint Marks, as I was informed that two Americans, by the names of Hambly and Doyle, were confined there, and I wished to have them relieved from their confinement?

Answer. You stated you wanted to get Hambly and Doyle from St. Marks. I do not know what were your intentions in so doing.

Question. Did I not tell you that I expected the Indians would fire upon me when arriving at Saint Marks?

Answer. You did not. You stated that you intended to take the fort in the night by surprise.

Question. Did you see me give ammunition to the negroes and Indians? if so, how much, and at what time?

Answer. I saw you give powder and lead to the negroes when you came on board, and advised them to make balls; and I saw you give liquor and paint to the Indians.

Question. Have you not often heard me say, between the 1st and 20th of April, that I would not have any thing to do with the negroes and Indians in exciting them to war with the United States?

Answer. About the 15th of April I heard you say you would not have any thing to do with the negroes and Indians; I heard nothing about exciting them to war.

Question. Can you read writing?

Answer. Not English writing.

Question. Did you not hear me say, when arriving at Suwany, that I wished to be off immediately for Providence?

Answer. I did not. After the alarm, you said you wished to be off for Tamper.

Question. Did you not say to the accused you wished to visit Mr. Arbuthnot, at his store, on Suwany, and get provisions yourself?

Answer. I did not. I stated I wanted provisions.

Question. Did I send or command any Indians to go and fight the Americans?

Answer. I did not exactly know that you sent them; the Indians and negroes were crowding before your door, and you were dividing the paint, &c. among them; and I understood a party was going to march.

Question. Did I not give up the schooner in charge to you as captain?

Answer. After our return from Suwany town, you directed me to take charge of her to go to Tamper.

JOHN J. ARBUTHNOT, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated, that some time about the 23d of March, the prisoner came with a body of negroes, partly armed, to his father's store on Suwany river, and told the witness that he had come to do justice to the country by taking the goods and distributing them among the negroes and Indians, which the witness saw the prisoner do; and that the prisoner stated to him that he had come to the country on Woodbine's business to see the negroes righted. The witness has further known the prisoner to give orders to the negroes; and that, at his suggestion, a party was sent from Suwany to meet the Americans to give them battle, which party returned on meeting the Mickasuky Indians in their flight. The witness also testified to the following letter, marked A, and referred to in the specification of the 2d charge as the writing of the prisoner.

A.

*Robert C. Ambrister to Governor Cameron.*

SAHWAHNEE, (NEAR ST. MARK'S FORT,) March 20, 1818.

SIR:

I am requested particularly by all our Indian chiefs, to acquaint your excellency that the Americans have commenced hostilities with them two years ago, and have advanced some considerable distance in their country, and are now making daily progress. They say they sent a number of letters to your excellency by Mr. Arbuthnot, but have never received one answer, which makes them believe that he never delivered them, and will oblige them much if you will let them know whether he did or not. The purport of the letters was begging your excellency to be kind enough to send them down some gunpowder, muskets, balls, lead, cannon, &c., as they are now completely out of those articles; the Americans may march through the whole territory in one month, and, without arms, &c., they must surrender. Hillis Hajo, or Francis, the Indian chief, the one that was in England, tells me to let your excellency know, that the Prince Regent told him that, whenever he wanted ammunition, your excellency would supply him with as much as he wanted. They beg me to press upon your excellency's mind to send the above mentioned articles down by the vessel that brings this to you, as she will sail for this place immediately, and let the Prince Regent know of their situation. Any letters that your excellency may send down be good enough to direct to me, as they have great dependence in my writing. Any news that your excellency may have respecting them and America, you will be doing a great favor to let me know, that I may send among them.

There is now a very large body of Americans and Indians, who I expect will attack us every day, and God only knows how it will be decided; but I must only say this will be the last effort with us. There has been a body of Indians gone to meet them, and I have sent another party. I hope your excellency will be pleased to grant the favor they request. I have nothing further to add,

But am, sir, with due respect, your obedient humble servant,

ROBERT C. AMBRISTER.

Question by the prisoner. Did you hear me say that I came on Woodbine's business?

Answer. I did.

Question by the prisoner. Were not the negroes alluded to at Arbuthnot's store before I arrived?

Answer. No. You came with them.

PETER B. COOK, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated, that he never heard the prisoner give any orders to negroes or Indians; that the prisoner distributed Arbuthnot's goods, and also paint, to the negroes and Indians; also that some powder was brought from the vessel to Suwany by the prisoner, and distributed among the negroes by Nero. Some time in March the prisoner took Arbuthnot's schooner, and, with an armed party of negroes (twenty-four in number) set out for St. Marks, for the purpose of taking Arbuthnot's goods at that place, and stated that he would compel the commandant to deliver them up. On hearing of the approach of the American army, the prisoner told the negroes it was useless to run: for, if they ran any further, they would be driven into the sea. The prisoner told the witness that he had been a lieutenant in the British army, under Colonel Nichols. The prisoner was sent by Woodbine to Tamper to see about those negroes he had left there. The prisoner told the witness that he had written a letter to Governor Cameron for ammunition for the Indians some time in March; and also told the witness that he had a commission in the patriot army, under McGregor, and that he had expected a captaincy. The witness testified that the following letters, marked A, B, C, and D, and referred to in the specification to the 2d charge, were in the hand-writing of the prisoner, and one marked E.

NOTE.—The letter marked A, is copied in a previous part of these proceedings.

B.

*From Robert C. Ambrister to Major Edward Nichols.*

SUWANY, NEAR RIVER APPALACHICOLA.

DEAR SIR:

Francis and all the Indian chiefs have requested me particularly to acquaint you that the Americans have commenced hostilities with them these two years past, and are making daily progress in their territory, and say they



will proceed; that you are the only friend they have in that part of the world, and hope that you will exert yourself in their behalf, and ask for as much assistance as can be had; that the Americans are at the forks of the river Appalachicola; they have written a number of times to England and Providence, but have never received one answer; they expect the man never delivered the letters, but they have full hopes in my writing; they request you would make the Prince Regent acquainted with their deplorable situation; the Americans have been very cruel since they commenced, and I hope you will lose not a single moment in forwarding their views; they say they will be extremely happy to see you out; nothing would give them greater pleasure than to see you out at this present time. If they should not see you, to send them out all news and directions, that they may be guided by it. There are about three hundred blacks at this place, and a few of our bluff people; they beg me to say they depend on your promises and expect you are on the way out; they have stuck to the *cause*, and will always believe in the faith of you, and any directions you may give. Send to me at this place and I will do what I can.

And remain, my dear sir, most truly yours,

ROBERT C. AMBRISTER.

N. B. Francis says you must bring the horses when you come out, that you promised, and that his house has been burnt down and burnt his uniform clothes.

C.

R. A.

*From Robert C. Ambrister to Governör Cameron.*

MARCH 20, 1818.

SIR:

I am requested particularly by the Indian chiefs to acquaint your excellency that the Americans have commenced hostilities with them a long time since, and have advanced some distance in their territory, and are still continuing to advance; that they, the chiefs of Florida, have sent repeatedly to your excellency, and have never received one answer; they suspect Mr. Arbuthnot has never delivered the papers to your excellency; they wish me to state to you that they are completely out of ammunition, muskets, &c. begging your excellency will be pleased to send them the articles above mentioned with a few cannon, as the Americans build their boats so strong that their rifle balls cannot penetrate their sides. The captain of the vessel, who will come down again, I have given orders to make your excellency acquainted what time the vessel will sail for this place. Your excellency will, I hope, be good enough to make the Prince Regent acquainted with their situation, and ask for assistance, which they have pressed me very hard to press on your excellency's mind, and likewise to send them down what news may be respecting them and the country, which will be a great satisfaction to them.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

ROBERT C. AMBRISTER.

N. B. They beg your excellency will be as expeditious as possible, that your excellency is the only dependence they have, and whom the Prince Regent told them would give them every assistance that laid in your power.

R. C. A.

D.

*From Robert C. Ambrister to Governor Cameron.*

SUWANY, NEAR FORT ST. MARKS, *March 20, 1818.*

SIR:

I am requested by Francis and all the Indian chiefs to acquaint your excellency that they are at war with the Americans, and have been some time back; that they are in great distress for want of ammunition, balls, arms, &c. and have wrote by Mr. Arbuthnot several times, but they suppose he never delivers them to your excellency. You will oblige them much to let them know whether he did or not.

I expect the Americans and Indians will attack us daily; I have sent a party of men to oppose them; they beg of me to press on your excellency's mind to lay the situation of the country before the Prince Regent and ask for assistance. All news respecting them, your excellency will do a favor to let us know by the first opportunity, that I may make them acquainted; I have given directions to the captain to let your excellency know when the vessel will sail for this place. I hope your excellency will be pleased to send them the ammunition; I expect if they do not procure some very shortly, that the Americans will march through the country.

I have nothing further to add.

I am, dear sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ROBERT C. AMBRISTER.

E.

*From Robert C. Ambrister to Peter B. Cook.*

MOUTH OF THE RIVER, TUESDAY, 3 o'clock.

DEAR COOK:

The boat arrived here about three o'clock on Thursday; the wind has been ahead ever since I have been down; the rudder of the vessel is in a bad condition, but I will manage to have it done to-night; the wind, I am in hopes, will be fair in the morning, when I will get under weigh and make all possible despatch. I will make old Lewis pilot me safe. If those Indians don't conduct themselves straight, I would use rigorous means with them; beware of Mr. Jerry; I found him on board when I came; keep a good look out. I have sent two kegs of powder, and one bar of lead.

Yours, &c.

R. C. A.

Question by the prisoner. Did you not frequently hear me say that I would have nothing to do with the Indians in exciting them to war with the United States?

Answer. I do not recollect.

Question by the prisoner. Are you acquainted with Lewis Phenix, and have you not heard him express ill-will against me in consequence of my wishing him to pilot me to St. Marks?

Answer. I never did.

Question. Do you know of my sending troops at any time to fight against the United States, and have I not been constantly with you, so that you would have had an opportunity of knowing if there had been any sent by me?

Answer. I have not; they might have been sent without my knowledge.

JACOB HARMON, a witness on the part of the prosecution, being duly sworn, stated that, sometime in the latter end of March, or first of April, the prisoner took possession of the schooner *Chance*, with an armed party of negroes, and stated his intentions of taking St. Marks on his way thither going ashore; he learned from some Indians that Arbuthnot had gone on to St. Marks, which induced him to return. The witness also stated that, while the prisonee was on board, he had complete command of the negroes who considered him as their captain. The prisoner took the cargo of the vessel up towards Suwany, which consisted of, with other articles, nine kegs of powder, and five hundred pounds of lead.

The evidence on both sides being closed, the prisoner was allowed until five o'clock this evening to make his defence.

The time allowed the prisoner for the preparation of his defence having expired he was brought before the court, and made the defence marked M, which is attached to these proceedings.

The court was then cleared, and the proceedings read over by the Recorder, when, after due deliberation on the testimony brought forward, the court find the prisoner, Robert C. Ambrister, guilty of so much of the specification to the first charge as follows: viz. "and did excite them to war with the United States by sending their warriors to meet and fight the American army, he being a subject of Great Britain, which Government was at peace and friendship with the United States and all her citizens." But not guilty of the other part of the specification; guilty of the first charge; guilty of the specification of the second charge, and guilty of the second charge; and do therefore sentence the prisoner, Robert C. Ambrister, to *suffer death by being shot*, two-thirds of the court concurring therein.

One of the members of the court requesting a reconsideration of his vote on the sentence, the sense of the court was taken thereon, and deciding in the affirmative, when the vote was again taken, and the court sentence the prisoner to receive fifty stripes on his bare back, and be confined with a ball and chain to hard labor for twelve calendar months.

The court adjourned *sine die*.

EDMUND P. GAINES,  
Major General, by brevet, President of the Court.  
J. M. GLASSELL, Recorder.

DEFENCE M.

FORT ST. MARKS, April 28, 1818.

The United States of America vs. Robert Christy Ambrister.

Who being arraigned before a special court-martial upon the following charges, to wit:

1st. Aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy; supplying them with the means of war; he being a subject of Great Britain at peace with the United States, and lately an officer in the British colonial marines.

CHARGE 2d. Sending and commanding the Lower Creek Indians in carrying on war against the United States.

To the first charge the prisoner at the bar pleaded not guilty, and as to the second charge he pleaded guilty, and justification. The prisoner at the bar feels grateful to this honorable court for their goodness in giving him a sufficient time to deliberate, and arrange his defence on the above charges. The prisoner at the bar here avails himself of the opportunity of stating to this court that, inasmuch as the testimony, which was introduced in this case, was very explicit, and went to every point the prisoner could wish, he has nothing further to offer in his defence, but puts himself upon the mercy of the honorable court.

ROBERT C. AMBRISTER.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Camp four miles north of St. MARKS, April 29, 1818.

GENERAL ORDERS.

At a special court-martial, commenced on the 26th instant at St. Marks, and continued until the night of the 28th, of which Brevet Major General E. P. Gaines is President, was tried A. Arbuthnot on the following charges and specifications, viz:

CHARGE 1st. Exciting and stirring up the Creek Indians to war against the United States and her citizens; he, A. Arbuthnot, being a subject of Great Britain, with whom the United States are at peace.

CHARGE 2d. Acting as a spy, aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, and supplying them with the means of war.

CHARGE 3d. Exciting the Indians to murder and destroy William Hambly and Edmund Doyle, confiscate their property, and causing their arrest with a view to their condemnation to death, and the seizure of their property, they being citizens of Spain, on account of their active and zealous exertions to maintain peace between Spain, the United States, and the Indians.

To which charges the prisoner pleaded not guilty. The court, after mature deliberation on the evidence adduced, find the prisoner, A. Arbuthnot, guilty of the first charge, and guilty of the second charge, leaving out the words "acting as a spy;" and, after mature reflection, sentence him, A. Arbuthnot, to be suspended by the neck until he is *dead*.

Was also tried Robert C. Ambrister, on the following charges, viz:

CHARGE 1st. Aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, and supplying them with the means of war, he being a subject of Great Britain, (who are at peace with the United States,) and late an officer in the British colonial marines.

CHARGE 2d. Leading and commanding the Lower Creek Indians in carrying on a war against the United States.

To which charges the prisoner pleaded as follows: viz. To the first charge not guilty; to the second charge guilty, and justification.

The court, on examination of evidence, and on mature deliberation, find the prisoner, Robert C. Ambrister, guilty of the first and second charges, and do therefore sentence him to suffer death by being *shot*. The members requesting a reconsideration of the vote on this sentence, and it being had, they sentence the prisoner to receive fifty stripes on his bare back, and be confined with a ball and chain to hard labor for twelve calendar months.

The Commanding General approves the finding and sentence of the court in the case of A. Arbuthnot, and approves the finding and first sentence of the court in the case of Robert C. Ambrister, and disapproves the reconsideration of the sentence of the honorable court in this case. It appears from the evidence and pleading of the prisoner that he did lead and command, within the territory of Spain, (being a subject of Great Britain,) the Indians in war against the United States, those nations being at peace. It is an established principle of the laws of nations that any individual of a nation making war against the citizens of another nation, they being at peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and pirate; this is the case of Robert C. Ambrister, clearly shown by the evidence adduced.

The Commanding General orders that Brevet Major A. C. W. Fanning, of the corps of artillery, will have, between the hours of eight and nine o'clock, A. M., A. Arbuthnot suspended by the neck, with a rope, until he is *dead*, and Robert C. Ambrister to be shot to *death*, agreeably to the sentence of the court.

John James Arbuthnot will be furnished with a passage to Pensacola by the first vessel.

The special court, of which Brevet Major General E. P. Gaines is President, is dissolved.

By order of Major General Jackson.

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General*.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, September 23, 1818.

A true copy from the original papers on file in this office.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, August 14, 1818.

SIR:

I enclose for your information a copy of the orders to General Gaines, growing out of the late decision of the President, relative to St. Marks and Pensacola. [See letter to General Gaines of August 14, 1818.]

I was directed by the President to wait the reply of the Spanish minister to Mr. Adams's letter to him, which, not being received until the day before yesterday, has caused so great a delay as to render it necessary to send the orders direct to General Gaines, without passing them through you.

I have, &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

Major General ANDREW JACKSON, *Nashville, Tennessee.*

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *January 12, 1819.*

Mr. THOMAS M. NELSON, from the Committee on Military Affairs, consisting of Messrs. R. M. JOHNSON, REED, T. M. NELSON, HUNTINGTON, GAGE, STEWART of North Carolina, and PETER, to whom was referred that part of the President's message of the 17th of November, 1818, which relates to the proceedings of the court-martial in the trial of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, and to the conduct of the war against the Seminole Indians, reported:

That, after a perusal of the various documents submitted to Congress on the subject of the Seminole war, they find much difficulty in separating the responsibility of the commanding officer to his Government from the obligations of the United States to Spain; but as the occupation and capture of Pensacola and St. Marks are subjects of negotiation and correspondence at this time between the two Governments, and as the Committee on Foreign Relations will probably find this part of the President's message more immediately connected with their branch of the subject, your committee will confine themselves, in this report, to the trial and execution of Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister.

On the 26th of April, 1818, a general order was issued at head-quarters, Fort St. Marks, by Major General Jackson, signed by Colonel Robert Butler, Adjutant General, detailing "a special court-martial, to meet at twelve o'clock, A. M. for the purpose of investigating charges exhibited against A. Arbuthnot, Robert C. Ambrister, and such others, who are similarly situated, as may be brought before it."

Your committee do not deem it necessary to attach to their report the proceedings of that court, as every member of the house has been furnished with several copies, to which reference can be made.

Your committee can find no law of the United States authorizing a trial before a military court for offences such as are alleged against Arbuthnot and Ambrister, (except so much of the second charge as charges Arbuthnot with "acting as a spy," of which part of the charge the court found him "not guilty,") nor, in the opinion of your committee, does any usage authorize, or exigency appear from the documents accompanying the report of the trial, which can justify the assumption and exercise of power by the court-martial and the commanding general on this occasion. It is admitted, as a maxim of the law of nations, that "where the war is with a savage nation, which observes no rules, and never gives quarter, we may punish them in the persons of any of their people whom we may take, (these belonging to the number of the guilty,) and endeavor, by this rigorous proceeding, to force them to respect the laws of humanity; but wherever severity is not absolutely necessary, clemency becomes a duty."

In vain has your committee sought, among the documents on the subject of the Seminole war, for a shadow of necessity for the death of the persons arraigned before the court. The war was at an end, to all intents and purposes! The enemy's strong holds had been destroyed; many of them killed or taken prisoners, and the remainder, a feeble band, dispersed and scattered in every direction. The Spanish posts of St. Marks, which it was supposed had (and no doubt justly) protected them, was also in our possession, and so entirely was the war considered to be terminated that the Georgia militia, under General Glasscock, had returned to their homes. Then where was the absolute necessity which alone could warrant a departure from the exercise of that clemency of which the United States has heretofore so justly boasted?

Your committee find in the general order of the 29th of April, in which General Jackson orders the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, this remarkable reason, intended as a justification of the executions, principally of Ambrister, but applying both to Arbuthnot and Ambrister. "It is an established principle of the law of nations, that any individual of a nation, making war against the citizens of another nation, they being at peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a pirate." It may be asked by what system of interpretation the offences charged could be considered as piracies, which imply in common acceptation offences upon the high seas, of which the court could not assume cognizance, and it is equally difficult to understand the propriety of the application of the term "outlaw" to the offenders—a term which applies only to the relations of individuals with their own Governments? It will not be pretended that Lafayette, who volunteered his services in the cause of America, in the war which established our independence, forfeited his allegiance, became an outlaw, and subjected himself to an ignominious death, had he fallen into the hands of the English!

Or can it be believed that our voice would be heard in justification of Spain, if she were to execute such of our countrymen as she may make prisoners while fighting in the armies of the South American patriots? And if these cases should not be considered of such a nature as to warrant a resort to so severe a measure, while they occurred with a people in a state of revolution, and considered by the parent countries to be in a state of rebellion; much less could these men (Arbuthnot and Ambrister) be considered liable to it, who were acting with a power acknowledged and treated as sovereign and independent by us.

Your committee beg leave to call your attention particularly to the case of R. C. Ambrister, who, after having been subjected to a trial before a court which had no cognizance or jurisdiction over the offences charged against him, was shot by order of the commanding general, contrary to the forms and usages of the army, and without regard to the finding of that court, which had been instituted as a guide for himself. Your committee must here, in justice to their own feelings, express their extreme regret that it has become their duty to disapprove the conduct of one who has, on a former occasion, so eminently contributed to the honor and defence of the nation, as has Major General Jackson; but, the more elevated the station, the more exalted the character of the individual, the more necessary is it, by a seasonable yet temperate expression of public opinion, through the constitutional organ, to prevent the recurrence of incidents at variance with the principles of our Government and laws.

Nor can your committee forbear including in their strictures the court-martial who sat on the trial of Arbuthnot and Ambrister. A court-martial is a tribunal erected with limited jurisdiction, having for its guidance the same rules of evidence which govern courts of law; and yet Arbuthnot is refused by the court-martial, before whom he was on trial for his life, the benefit of the testimony of Ambrister, who had not been put upon his trial at that time, and whose evidence would have been received by any court of law, as legal, if not credible. Many other exceptions might be made to the evidence recorded in these proceedings, particularly to the question put to the witness Hambly, viz: "Do you believe the Seminoles would have commenced the business of murder and depredation on the white settlements, had it not been at the instigation of the prisoner, (Arbuthnot,) and a promise, on his part, of British protection?" Answer: I do not believe they would, without they had been assured of British protection." A leading question is expressly forbidden to be used by a court-martial by Macomb on martial law, and of which the court must have been apprised, as it is a work common in the army, and usually referred to by every court-martial when in session; and the question was calculated to elicit an expression of opinion and belief from the witness, rather than a statement of facts, upon which alone could the court act. Hearsay evidence in a case of life and death, your committee will venture to assert, was never before received against the accused in any court of this country; and yet, on the face of the record of the proceedings of the court-martial, hearsay testimony is admitted, which had been received from an Indian, who, if present, would not have been allowed to give evidence himself.

After mature deliberation, your committee beg leave to submit the following resolution:

*Resolved,* That the House of Representatives of the United States disapproves the proceedings in the trial and execution of Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister.

## REPORT OF THE MINORITY.

Mr. R. M. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred so much of the President's message as relates to the Seminole war, and the proceedings in the trial of Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister, in behalf of the minority of said committee, made the following counter-report:

That General Jackson, in a short, though sanguinary, war with the Creek nation of Indians, brought them to terms of peace, and, in the summer of 1814, a treaty was concluded with them, wherein they ceded to the United States a territory embracing several millions of acres of land. The effect of this cession was the cutting off the Indian establishments between the settlements of the United States in Georgia and Alabama and the Spanish territory. This object being obtained, future peace and safety to our citizens in that quarter were confidently anticipated; but, contrary to these just expectations, it was discovered that a hostile disposition was still entertained by the Seminole tribe of that nation, aided by fugitive negroes, and instigated by foreign incendiaries. It having been represented to the Government that murders had been committed upon our defenceless citizens, General Gaines was ordered, in the summer of 1817, with a considerable force, to take a station in that section for their protection. Gen. Gaines was directed to keep within the territorial limits of the United States, and abstain from every attempt to cross the Florida line; but to demand of the Indians the perpetrators of the crimes thus committed, in order that punishment might be inflicted upon the guilty, without involving the innocent, and without a general rupture with these deluded savages. The fact of such murders having been ascertained, attended with aggravating circumstances of rapine and cruelty, General Gaines, in conformity with his orders, made the demand. The savages, through the deceptive representations of foreign incendiaries, were led to believe that the strength of the United States was not sufficient to subdue them; or, if their own forces were incompetent to sustain the conflict, they would receive assistance from the British. These promises, made by these unauthorized agents, were predicated upon a pretence that the United States had bound themselves, by the treaty of Ghent, to restore the lands which the Indians had ceded previously to that treaty at Fort Jackson, and that the British Government would enforce its observance. Under this influence, they not only refused to deliver the murderers, but repeated their massacres whenever opportunity offered; and, to evade the arm of justice, took refuge across the line in Florida. In this state of affairs, in November, 1817, Lieutenant Scott, of the United States' army under General Gaines, with forty-seven persons, men, women, and children, in a boat, on the Appalachian river, about a mile below the junction of the Flint and the Chatahochee, was surprised by an ambuscade of Indians, fired upon, and the whole detachment killed and taken by the Indians, except six men, who escaped by flight, one of whom was wounded. Those who were taken alive on this occasion were wantonly murdered by the ferocious savages, who took the little children, and dashed out their brains against the side of the boat, and butchered all the helpless females except one, who was afterwards retaken. General Gaines was not yet authorized to cross into Florida to enforce a compliance with his demand for the delivery of the murderers; while the Indians were collecting in large numbers upon the line, which they seemed to think a perfect safeguard, and from which they continued their predatory incursions, as opportunity permitted. A letter from the Secretary of War of the 9th December, 1817, authorized General Gaines, in case this state of things should continue, and it should become impossible by any other means to prevent their depredations, to exercise a sound discretion as to crossing the Florida line, to break up their establishments; and, on the 16th of the same month, the Secretary of War, by letter directed to General Gaines, fully authorized him to cross the line, and attack the Indians within the Spanish territory, should they still refuse to make reparation for depredations already committed, unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish fort; in which case, he was directed to notify the Department.

Intelligence being received by the War Department of the massacre of Lieutenant Scott and his companions, General Jackson was directed, by letter of the 26th December, 1817, to repair to Fort Scott, and take command of the forces in that quarter, with authority, in case he should deem it necessary, to call upon the Executives of the adjacent States for such additional force as he should think requisite; in which he was referred to the previous orders given to General Gaines, and directed to concentrate his forces, and adopt the measures necessary to terminate a conflict which had been avoided from considerations of humanity, but which had now become indispensable, from the settled hostility of the savage enemy. In January following, the Secretary of War, in a letter to Gen. Gaines, says, "The honor of the United States requires that the war with the Seminoles should be terminated speedily, and with exemplary punishment for hostilities so unprovoked." Under these orders, and in this critical state of affairs, General Jackson, with that zeal and promptness which have ever marked his career, repaired to the post assigned, and assumed the command. The necessity of crossing the line into Florida was no longer a subject of doubt. A large force of Indians and negroes was making that territory their refuge, and the Spanish authority was either too weak or too indifferent to restrain them; and, to comply with orders given him from the Department of War, he penetrated immediately into the Seminole towns, driving the enemy before him, and reduced them to ashes. In the council-house of the King of the Meksukians more than fifty fresh scalps, and in an adjacent house upwards of three hundred old scalps of all ages and sexes were found; and in the centre of the public square a red pole was erected, crowned with scalps, known by the hair to have been the companions of Lieutenant Scott.

To inflict merited chastisement upon these barbarians, and to prevent a repetition of these massacres, by bringing the war to a speedy and successful termination, he pursued his march to St. Marks, when he found, in corroboration of previous information, that the Indians and negroes had demanded the surrender of that post to them, and that the Spanish garrison, according to the commandant's own concession, was too weak to support it. Here he ascertained that the enemy had been supplied with the means of carrying on the war from the commandant of the post; that foreign incendiaries, instigating the savages, had free communication with the fort for carrying on their intrigues; councils of war were permitted by the commandant to be held by the chiefs and warriors within his own quarters; the Spanish storehouses were appropriated to the use of the hostile party, and actually filled with goods belonging to them; munitions of war were furnished them, and property known to have been plundered from our citizens purchased from them by the commandant, while he still professed friendship to the United States. General Jackson, therefore, had no hesitation to demand of the commandant of St. Marks the surrender of that post, that it might be garrisoned with an American force; and when the Spanish officer hesitated to deliver it, he entered the fort by force, though without bloodshed, the enemy having fled, and the garrison being too weak to make opposition. Convinced of the necessity of rapid movements, in order to the ultimate success of the expedition, he immediately marched his forces to Suwany, seized upon the stores of the enemy, and burnt their villages.

Having thus far effected his object, General Jackson considered the war at an end. St. Marks being garrisoned by an American force, the Indian towns at Meksuky and Suwany being destroyed, the two Indian chiefs who had been the prime movers and leaders of the savages, one of whom had commanded the party that murdered Lieutenant Scott and his companions, and the two principal foreign instigators (Arbuthnot and Ambrister) being taken and executed, General Jackson ordered the Georgia militia to be discharged, and was preparing himself to return to Tennessee; but he soon learned that the Indians and negroes were collecting in companies west of the Appalachian, which would render it necessary for him to send a detachment to scour the country in that quarter. While preparing for this object, he learned that the Indians were admitted by the Governor into Pensacola, and enjoyed free access to that town; that they were collecting in large numbers, five hundred being in Pensacola on the 15th of April, many of whom were known to be hostile, and had just escaped from the pursuit of our troops; that the enemy were furnished with ammunition and supplies, and received intelligence of the movements of our forces from that place; that a number of them had sallied out, and murdered eighteen of our citizens, settlers upon the Alabama, and were immediately received by the Governor, and by him transported across the bay, that they might evade the pursuit. These facts being ascertained by General Jackson from unquestionable authority, he immediately took up his line of march towards Pensacola, at the head of a detachment of about twelve hundred men, for the purpose of counteracting the views of the enemy, and to execute his orders from the War Department, by terminating the war speedily, and with exemplary punishment for hostilities so unprovoked. On the 10th of May he crossed the Appalachian, at the Ocheese village, with the view of scouring the country west of that river; and on the 23d of the same month he received a communication from the Governor of West Florida, protesting against his entrance into that province,

commanding him to retire from it, and declaring that he would repel force by force provided he should not obey. This communication, together with the evident indications of hostility in the Governor, who had been well advised of the object of General Jackson's operations, determined the measures which he pursued. Accordingly, he marched directly to Pensacola, and, with but the shadow of opposition, took possession of that place the following day, the Governor having fled to Fort Carlos de Barancas; which post, after a feeble resistance, was also surrendered to General Jackson on the 28th; by which the Indians and fugitive negroes were effectually deprived of all possible means of continuing their depredations, or screening themselves from the arm of justice. Thus gloriously terminated the Seminole war; a war reluctantly entered into, but urged by dire necessity, to protect from the tomahawk and scalping knife of the most ruthless savages our peaceful frontier settlers, who, from decrepitude to helpless infancy, for more than two years, had been exposed to their cruelties; a war in which our citizen soldiers, with their usual fortitude and valor, under their persevering and determined commander, endured long and difficult marches, submitted to painful privations, subdued a brave and merciless enemy, without suffering one defeat, or betraying a solitary mark of dismay, to tarnish the lustre of their country's glory. A variety of circumstances convinced General Jackson that the savages had commenced this war, and persisted in their barbarities, under the influence of some foreign incendiaries, more criminal than the uncivilized natives. Alexander Arbuthnot, who avowed himself a British subject, and resided among the savages as an Indian trader, was taken at St. Marks, to which place he had withdrawn as danger approached, and was living as an inmate in the family of the commandant. It appearing that he had been a zealous advocate for the pretended rights of the savages, and in this respect the successor of the notorious Colonel Nichols, of the British colonial marines, in the late war with Great Britain; that he had repeatedly written in their behalf to the Spanish Governor of St. Augustine, the Governor of the Bahamas, the British minister in the United States, and to Colonel Nichols, endeavoring to procure aid from both those Governments against the United States; that he had repeatedly advised the Indians not to comply with the treaty of Fort Jackson, assuring them that the lands ceded to the United States by them in 1814 were to be restored by virtue of the treaty of peace with Great Britain; General Jackson ordered him to be tried by a court-martial, consisting of thirteen respectable officers, with Major General Gaines president. The court was directed to decide upon the fact of his guilt or innocence, and, if guilty, what punishment should be inflicted. Upon satisfactory testimony, he was convicted of exciting and stirring up the hostile Creeks to war against the United States and her citizens, and of aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, supplying them with the means of war, and by the court sentenced to be hung. Robert C. Ambrister, late a lieutenant of the British marine corps, and with the hostile Creeks and fugitive negroes the successor of Woodbine of notorious memory, was taken near the mouth of Suwaney river, and it being well known that he had been a leader and commander of the hostile Indians and fugitive slaves, General Jackson also ordered him to be tried by the same court martial. Upon satisfactory evidence, he was convicted of having aided and comforted the enemy, supplying them with the means of war, by giving them intelligence of the movements and operations of the army of the United States, and by sending the Indians and negroes to meet and fight against them; and upon his own confession, as well as the clearest evidence, of having led and commanded the Lower Creeks in carrying on the war against the United States; and by the court sentenced to be shot. One of the members of the court requesting a reconsideration of the sentence, it was agreed to; and, on a revision, the court sentenced him to receive fifty stripes on his bare back, and be confined with a ball and chain to hard labor for twelve calendar months. General Jackson approved the sentence in the case of Arbuthnot, and in the case of Ambrister he disapproved the reconsideration, and confirmed the first sentence. They were both executed accordingly. In relation to these transactions, questions of the first magnitude present themselves, which the committee have deemed it their duty to investigate. Was General Jackson justifiable, after marching his army across the line into the territory of Spain, in taking possession, by force of arms, of the Spanish posts St. Marks and Pensacola? Had he the right to punish Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister?

From the facts submitted, it is perfectly evident that the Spanish authorities in Florida did not retain that neutral character which was necessary to render its territory sacred; but, by their own acts, either of hostility or imbecility, they made that territory the seat of war. Independent of the solemn obligations of treaty, whereby Spain engaged to keep the Indians within her territory at peace with the United States, no principle is more firmly established by the laws of nations than this—that a nation at war has a right to pursue the hostile army into the territory of a neutral nation, and to make that territory the seat of war, when either the weakness or partiality of the neutral nation shall suffer the belligerent army retreating into its territory there to rally, collect strength, and provide supplies, to enable them to renew the conflict, and especially when munitions of war have been supplied, either by the citizens or authorities of the neutral nation.

But in the consideration of this subject, it should never be forgotten that Spain was bound, by the solemn stipulations of treaty with the United States, herself to have fought these battles; or, if too weak to have done so, at least to have made common cause with the United States against these lawless tribes of savages. The United States have never recognised the Indians within their territorial limits as nations *absolutely* independent; hence it has ever been considered the duty of the Executive, when they have been guilty of murders and depredations upon our citizens, either in plundering parties, or in the more formidable aspect of Indian armies, to order against them the military force of the country, or call into service the militia, as the case may require, to check their barbarities and to punish their crimes.

In accordance with this principle the Executive has ever acted since the commencement of the present Government. Repeated and bloody depredations upon our southern frontier, in which peaceful husbandmen, defenceless women, and innocent children, were made the victims of savage ferocity, not only rendered it necessary to put into operation the military force of the nation, but the sheltering of the Indians beyond the limits of the United States, gave occasion for the orders to General Jackson to pursue them beyond these limits. If Spain regards the Indians in the same light, it was a duty no less incumbent upon her by the laws of nations than by treaty to have repressed their lawless depredations; and, in her agents failing to do so, if through neglect, they made themselves parties in the war, or, if through weakness, they forfeited the *right* of sovereignty in that territory where they failed to *maintain it*. But if Spain regards the Indians as communities *absolutely* independent, then the territory, by right of occupancy, belonged to the Indians, and not to Spain, and the invasion was of the enemy's territory. Had the commandant of the Spanish post of St. Marks done his duty, in withholding from the enemy supplies, and in denying them a refuge within the reach of his own fort, the necessity of interrupting his garrison would not have existed; nor is it presumed that any attempt would have been made by General Jackson to possess himself of that post. And it is also presumed that his orders to respect the Spanish posts were predicated upon this supposed state of things. But, as the object of the entrance into Florida was the reduction of the Indian force, to bring the Seminole war to a speedy and successful termination, which was exhausting the blood and treasure of the nation, it was a duty which he owed to his country to effect that object. Any result short of this would have only increased the evils which it was his duty to correct; and this could not be effected while Spanish fortifications were appropriated to their defence, and yet regarded sacred by him. To have retired with his forces, under such a combination of circumstances which would have confirmed the erroneous impression entertained by the Indians and by the Spanish authorities of the sacred character of their places of refuge and succor to our ferocious enemies, would have perpetuated the war, and given it the character of permanency, which the honor of the United States required should be speedily concluded, and with the most exemplary punishment. The commandant at St. Marks himself acknowledged that his command was at the mercy of the Indians and negroes; he ought, therefore, to have hailed the approach of General Jackson, with his American forces, as a deliverer, and to have co-operated with him in the common cause, when he was assured that the object was a military occupation for the express purpose of putting an end to the Seminole war, and not for conquest. But the facts present this subject yet in a much stronger light to the committee. The Indians received not only shelter, but comforts and munitions, and all the facilities for carrying on the war, which a Spanish army could have received from that post. Did this conduct on the part of the Spanish commandant result from a hostile disposition? If so, he became a party in the war. Or, was it the effect of imbecility, as his professions of great friendship would imply? If so, the act of garrisoning St. Marks with an American

force bears no character of hostility to Spain, but was warranted by the laws of nations, by the treaty with Spain, and by the first law of nature—self-protection. Had the Governor of West Florida maintained the neutral character which was confidently expected, and which it was his duty to have done, the Seminole war had here ended, and our flag would not have been unfurled in that territory; the Indian establishments at Mekasuky and Suwaney broken up; their villages burnt; their supplies cut off; St. Marks occupied by our troops; their power in East Florida entirely annihilated.

In the firm conviction that the war was ended, General Jackson had ordered the Georgia militia to be disbanded, and was upon the point of returning himself with the Tennessee and Kentucky volunteers, when he learnt that the object of the campaign was not yet entirely accomplished.

The vanquished enemy, crossing into West Florida, where the authorities of Spain proved as imbecile as in the Eastern province, renewed their depredations, by their incursions into the adjoining territory of the United States, and committing murders upon our frontier settlers. Every circumstance, which not only justified the act, but which rendered it an imperious duty for him to enter the Spanish territory of East Florida, was equally applicable to the act of his crossing the Appalachicola to break down the power of the enemy in West Florida. But the conduct of the Governor, taken in connexion with the circumstances which induced the entrance into Pensacola, rendered its occupancy by General Jackson if possible yet more palpably necessary than that of St. Marks. Well apprised of General Jackson's object, that he had not entered the Floridas in hostility to Spain, but to do that which Spain was bound to do, both by treaty and by the laws of nations, to give security to our own citizens within our own territory by destroying the power of the savage foes, the Governor of Pensacola, in equal violation of the laws of neutrality and of humanity, succored those enemies, supplied them with munitions of war, sheltered and conveyed from the hand of justice those of them who were returning from the bloody fray, and when General Jackson was executing the righteous mandates of an injured and indignant nation upon them, the Governor commanded him to depart from the territory, threatening to oppose force to force should he not comply. Thus circumstanced, what should General Jackson have done? Should he have been induced, by the unprovoked and gasconading menaces of a foreign Governor, to retrace his steps? Or, should he have remained stationary until he could have despatched a messenger to the seat of the Executive for instructions how to act? This would have ill become an American general whose movements were sanctioned by the sacred laws of nature and of nations, and by the solemn stipulations of the foreign prince, as well as by the authority of his own Government.

Should he have left it in quiet possession of a savage foe? This would have defeated the whole object of the war? There was but one course, in the opinion of the committee, which he could pursue consistently with the honor of the nation and the safety of its frontier citizens. The Governor of West Florida, by his own act, had become a party with the savages in this war; or had, at least by his imbecility, forfeited the right of sovereignty within the territory; and the occupancy of the Spanish posts in that province by General Jackson was, in the opinion of the committee, a sacred duty which he owed to himself, to his army, to the Government, and to his country. While this nation scrupulously regards the dictates of justice in her intercourse with all nations, civilized and savage, it is a duty which she owes to her own character and to the safety of her citizens to assert her rights and avenge her wrongs. In relation to these movements, it appears to your committee that the Executive has sanctioned the act of General Jackson in the occupancy of those posts, by requiring that condition which the laws of nations and the treaty with Spain justify, in order to the restoration of St. Marks; and if Pensacola is not held subject to the same conditions, this does not imply a relinquishment of the right, but should be regarded as the evidence of an amicable disposition towards Spain.

The committee now enter upon the other point, that of the trial and execution of the foreign instigators, Arbuthnot and Ambrister. A subject of more delicacy and tenderness, as it involves the lives and liberties of individuals, yet of equal magnitude, and, in the opinion of the committee, of equal clearness. In ancient times, when barbarism more generally prevailed, and even polished nations seemed unconscious of the ties of humanity, which ought ever to bind the whole family of mankind in tenderness and affection, the practice obtained, of putting to death the soldiers, and even the citizens, of a vanquished enemy by the sword, and even by the public execution; or of holding prisoners of war in slavery for life, and entailing bondage on their posterity. But the progress of civilization, aided by the benign influence of christianity, has in modern days produced a radical change highly honorable to the civilized world.

In consequence of this principle, it follows that, although when one nation enters into war with another nation, all the citizens of the one nation may be considered, in some respects, as enemies to all the citizens of the other; yet they have not a right, in all cases when they meet, to act in hostility to each other; because women and children, and all others who are exempted from bearing arms, and those employed in rural and other peaceful occupations, are not the proper objects of hostility. Nor is it admissible to take the lives of those who fall into the power of their enemies after they have surrendered; because such act is now unauthorized by the laws of nations, and ever has been a violation of the laws of humanity. So, when armies meet in the field of battle, the soldier who lays down his arms, and asks for quarter, is entitled to his life; and the same with garrisons and whole armies, if they offer to capitulate, in cases of great extremity, it is an established principle of the laws of nations, universally acknowledged where civilization prevails, that their lives cannot be justly taken, unless their gross violation of the rules of civilized warfare render it necessary to inflict death as a punishment for their crimes. But death, in such cases, is never the righteous fate of unsuccessful war. Much less are peaceable citizens, unarmed, pursuing their lawful avocations, subject to death, or any other acts of hostility calculated to injure them, either in their persons or effects, because such citizens do not offer injury. But, from this general principle and universal practice among christian nations, another principle arises as universally acknowledged, and equally consonant to the laws of nature and nations, that when a nation, either savage or civilized, departs from these rules, and grossly violates the laws of nations and of humanity, retaliation or reprisals are always justifiable, often useful, and sometimes essentially necessary, to teach the offenders to respect the laws of humanity, and to save the effusion of blood.

In such cases, where the guilty persons can be taken and identified, the punishment ought to fall exclusively upon them. Yet reprisals are not necessarily even confined to the persons of the guilty, but the laws of war justify the punishment of the offending nation in any of the persons of the enemy. This nation, ever regarding mercy as her delight, has heretofore abstained from the exercise of this power, though the principle was recognized in the case of Captain Asgill, in the revolutionary war, and by President Madison, in which it received the sanction of the Legislature, in the late war. When at war with savages, who respect no rule, and are governed by no laws, whose known mode of warfare is indiscriminate murder of all ages, sexes, and conditions, it is a well-established principle, that their crimes may be lawfully punished in the persons of any of their people; and the citizens or subjects of any civilized nation, by engaging in their warfare, either in personal hostility, or by instigating, aiding, and abetting them, thereby identifying themselves with the savages, belong to their nation during the continuance of such engagements, and are, by the true and acknowledged principles of the laws of nations, subject to the same treatment.

When reprisals shall be made by inflicting retaliatory punishment upon foreigners thus identified with the savages, it is justifiable upon the principle of *reprisals alone*, and not because they become outlaws and pirates, for the laws of nations justify the citizens or subjects of one nation in entering the service of another nation; and during such service, they are considered as parts of the nation which they serve, subject to the same treatment, in all respects, as if they were its natural citizens or subjects.

It was upon this principle that the Marquis de Lafayette, Barons Steuben and de Kalb, and General Kosciusko, entered the American service in the revolutionary war, which was never considered as a just occasion for war by Great Britain against France, Prussia, or Poland; nor yet as a cause for regarding them in the character of outlaws and pirates. But had these distinguished men fallen into the power of Great Britain, the laws of war would have entitled them to the same tenderness, and subjected them to the same conditions, as native Americans. The same principle is equally applicable to those who enter into the service of the savages.

The universal principle of savage warfare, elicited by their general practice, is that of the most cruel and aggravated murder, not only of their enemies taken in arms, but also of peaceful unarmed citizens, helpless females,

and tender infants. If instances have been known wherein they have spared the lives of persons falling into their power, these instances have been too few in number, compared with the massacres which they have committed, desolating whole settlements, and murdering whole garrisons, to give an opposite character to their general practice.

The desolation and ruin of the Wyoming settlement, in the revolutionary war, and the recent massacres at Fort Mimms and on the river Raisin, in perfect accordance with their general history from the commencement of our national existence, furnish sufficient demonstration of this fact.

Alexander Arbuthnot was taken as a resident among the savages, with whom he had identified himself, by acting as their agent, exciting them to war, aiding, abetting, and supplying them with the means of carrying it on. Robert C. Ambrister was taken in their actual service, as a leader and commander of their forces; by which, as well as by aiding, abetting, comforting, and supplying them, he was also identified with the savages. Agreeably to these principles of the laws of nations, the committee are fully of opinion that General Jackson, as commander of the army, had the right to exercise upon them the law of retaliation without the intervention of a court-martial. However cautiously this rule should be exercised, and desirable as mercy always is, whenever it can be exercised with safety, this god-like virtue has its bounds, beyond which its exercise would be a perversion of justice; and it is presumed that the repeated murders which had been committed upon our citizens, the many bloody trophies of their cruelties found at Mekasuky, and their persisting in hostility against the repeated warnings and threats which had been held out to them, bore conviction to the mind of General Jackson that the exercise of the law of retaliation had become necessary to the future safety of his fellow-citizens.

But he chose to submit the case to the investigation and decision of a court-martial, composed of distinguished officers, by whom Alexander Arbuthnot was condemned to be hung, which sentence was confirmed and executed. By the same tribunal, Robert C. Ambrister was, in the first instance, condemned to be shot, but, upon reconsideration, they changed the sentence to that of corporal punishment and confinement to hard labor. The reconsideration was disapproved by General Jackson, and the first sentence confirmed and executed. On this last point, the committee are of opinion that it would have been more correct for General Jackson, after submitting the case to a court-martial, not only to examine the facts as to his guilt, but to determine the punishment to be inflicted, to have acquiesced in their final and only legal decision as a court. But, even in this, the committee are satisfied that General Jackson did not transcend the power warranted by the laws of retaliation, the prisoner's own confession, and the evidence produced, going to establish the facts which justified its application. And though the principles of national law involved in this war would have authorized a more extensive sacrifice, even on the persons of the innocent, yet the committee deem it a matter of great felicitation that punishment fell upon the guilty alone, and that the object is effected with so limited an example of justice. Under this view of the whole subject, the committee can discover much which merits applause, and little that deserves censure; and, from the incalculable benefits resulting to the nation from the faithful and distinguished services of General Jackson, and the officers and men who served under his command, in terminating finally the Seminole war, they are entitled to the thanks of their country.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *February 24, 1819.*

Mr. LACOCK, from the committee, consisting of Messrs. Lacock, Eaton, Eppes, King, and Burrill, appointed in pursuance of the resolution of the Senate, of the 18th of December last, "That the message of the President, and documents relative to the Seminole war, be referred to a select committee, who shall have authority, if necessary, to send for persons and papers; that said committee inquire relative to the advance of the United States' troops into West Florida; whether the officers in command at Pensacola and St. Marks were amenable to, and under the control of Spain; and, particularly, what circumstances existed to authorize or justify the commanding general in taking possession of those posts," reported:

That they have, under the authority conferred on them, called for and examined persons and papers. The testimony obtained is herewith submitted. The committee, after the most mature and dispassionate examination of the subject, offer for the consideration of the Senate the following narrative of facts, and the opinions and deductions clearly arising from, and growing out of, the facts thus presented.

On the origin of the hostilities between the United States and the Seminole Indians, the committee ask leave to remark, that the different savage tribes living within and on the borders of the Floridas, denominated Seminole Indians, were principally fugitives from the more northern tribes resident within the limits of the United States. After the treaty of 1814 with the Creek Indians, a considerable addition was made to the number of those fugitives, as the Indians who were dissatisfied with the provisions of that treaty took refuge in the Floridas, cherishing, there can be little doubt, feelings of hostility to the United States. These feelings seem to have been strengthened by the influence of foreign emissaries who had taken up their residence among them; among whom, as the most conspicuous, were Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister. In this state of things, it appears that the Executive department of the Government deemed it necessary for the security of the frontier to establish a line of forts near the southern boundary of the United States, and to occupy those fortifications with portions of the regular forces, and by these means peace was maintained with the Indians until the spring or summer of 1817, when the regular forces were withdrawn from the posts on the Georgia frontier, and concentrated at Fort Montgomery, on the Alabama river, a considerable distance west of the Georgia line. But it seems that about this time a border warfare was commenced between the Seminole Indians and the frontier inhabitants of Georgia. It is difficult to determine with certainty who commenced those hostilities, or on whom the greatest injuries were inflicted; General Gaines, however, demanded a surrender of the Indians who had committed outrages on the frontier of Georgia. With this demand they refused to comply, alleging that the first and greatest aggressions had been made by the white men. In consequence of this refusal, General Gaines was authorized by the Secretary of War, at his discretion, to remove the Indians still remaining on the lands ceded to the United States by the treaty made with the Creeks in 1814. In so doing, he is told that it might be proper to retain some of them as hostages until reparation was made for the depredations committed by the Indians. In pursuance of this discretionary authority, General Gaines ordered a detachment of near three hundred men, under the command of Major Twiggs, to surround and take an Indian village called Fowltown, about fourteen miles from Fort Scott, and near the Florida line. This detachment arrived at Fowltown in the night, and the Indians, taking the alarm, and flying to an adjacent swamp, were fired on by the detachment, and one man and one woman killed. Two Indians were made prisoners. The detachment returned to Fort Scott. A day or two afterwards, as stated by Captain McIntosh, who was of the party, about the same number of troops paid a second visit to the same village (as he states) for the purpose of obtaining property. While loading their wagons with corn, and collecting horses and cattle, they were fired upon by the Indians, and a skirmish ensued, in which a small loss was sustained on both sides. It is stated by Captain Young, the topographical engineer, that this town contained about forty-five Indian warriors, besides women and children.

A few days after the affair of Fowltown, Lieutenant Scott, with a detachment of forty men, seven women, and some children, ascending the Appalachicola with clothing and supplies for the garrison at Fort Scott, when within a few miles of that place, was attacked by a party of Indians, himself and his whole party fell victims to their fury, except six men who made their escape, and one woman made prisoner.

From this time the war became more serious; the Indians in considerable numbers were embodied, and an open attack made on Fort Scott. General Gaines with about six hundred regular soldiers was confined to the garrison. In this state of things, information having been communicated to the War Department, General Jackson was ordered to take the field. He was advised of the regular and militia force, amounting to one thousand eight hundred men, provided for that service. And the estimated force, by General Gaines, of the enemy, said to be two thousand eight hundred strong, and directed, if he should consider the force provided insufficient to beat the enemy, to call on the Governor of the adjoining States for such portions of the militia as he might think requisite. On the receipt

of this order, General Jackson, instead of observing the orders of the Department of War, by calling on the Governor of Tennessee, then in Nashville, near the place of his residence, chose to appeal, to use his own expressions, to the patriotism of the West Tennesseans who had served under him in the last war. One thousand mounted gunmen, and two companies of what were called *life-guards*, with the utmost alacrity volunteered their services from the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and repaired to his standard. Officers were appointed to command this corps by the general himself, or by other persons acting under his authority. Thus organized they were mustered into the service of the United States.

About the time General Jackson was organizing this detachment of volunteers in the State of Tennessee, or perhaps previously thereto, General Gaines was likewise employed in raising forces among the Creek Indians. There was this difference in the two cases: General Jackson raised his army in disregard of positive orders; General Gaines, without orders, took upon himself the authority of raising an army of at least one thousand six hundred Creek Indians, appointing their officers, with a brigadier general at their head, and likewise mustering this force into the service of the United States.

While your committee feel a pleasure in applauding the zeal and promptness that have marked the military conduct of these general officers on many former occasions, they would feel themselves wanting in their duty to the Senate and the nation if they did not express their decided disapprobation of the conduct of the commanding generals in the steps they took to raise and organize the force employed on this occasion. There was no law in existence that authorized even the President of the United States to raise or accept of the services of volunteers. The law passed for that purpose had expired in the year 1815. The constitution of the United States gives to Congress exclusively the power of raising armies, and to the President and Senate the power of appointing the officers to command those armies when raised. The constitution likewise gives Congress power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, but reserves to the States respectively the appointment of the officers. In conformity with the last recited provision of the constitution, the Congress of the United States have passed laws authorizing the President, when the contingencies above alluded to should happen, to call on the Governors, or any militia officers of the respective States, for such portions of the militia as he might deem requisite for the occasion. And in strict observance of these laws was General Jackson ordered to call on the Governors of the States adjacent to the seat of war for the requisite militia force.

It is with regret that the committee are compelled to declare that they conceive General Jackson to have disregarded the positive orders of the Department of War, the constitution, and laws. That he has taken upon himself, not only the exercise of those powers delegated to Congress as the sole legislative authority of the nation, and to the President and Senate, as it relates to the appointments, but of the power which had been expressly reserved to the States in the appointment of the officers of the militia. A power the more valuable to the States, because, as they had surrendered to the General Government the revenue and physical force of the nation, they could only look to the officers of the militia as a security against the possible abuse of the delegated power. The committee find the melancholy fact before them, that military officers, even at this early stage of this republic, have, without the shadow of authority, raised an army of at least two thousand five hundred men, and mustered them into the service of the United States. Two hundred and thirty officers have been appointed, and their rank established from an Indian brigadier general down to the lowest subaltern of a company. To whom were those officers accountable for their conduct? Not to the President of the United States; for it will be found that it was not considered necessary even to furnish him with a list of their names; and not until the pay-rolls were made out, and payment demanded, were the persons known to the Department of War. And in this place it is proper to observe, that General Jackson seemed to consider those officers of his own creation competent to discharge all the functions of officers appointed by the authority of the General or State Governments; for we find five of them detailed afterwards to sit on a general court martial on a trial of life and death. Might not, on the same principles, General Jackson have tried, condemned, and executed any officer of the Georgia militia, by the sentence of a court-martial composed of officers created by him, and holding their assumed authority by the tenure of his will?

Your committee will dismiss this branch of the subject by observing, that, consistent with the character and genius of our Government, no officer, however high or exalted his station, can be justified for an infraction of the constitution. It is an offence against the sovereignty of the nation—this sovereignty vested in the great body of the people. The constitution is the written expression of their will, and above the control of all the public functionaries combined; and, when that instrument has been violated, the people alone have power to grant the indemnity for its infraction; and all that can be said in favor of the officer who transcends his constitutional powers, must be taken, not in justification of the act, but in mitigation of the enormity of the offence committed. With this view of the subject, which they conceive to be a correct one, the committee have in vain sought for an excuse for the commanding general. He has stated in his letter to the Secretary of War, assuming the power to judge for the national legislature, that a volunteer force of mounted gunmen would be the least expensive and the most efficient. His duty was to execute the orders of his superior officers, not to disobey them; to observe and enforce the laws, not violate them. Obedience and subordination are the first and highest duties of a soldier; and no one knew better the truth of, and the necessity for observing this maxim, than the officer in question. For the truth of this observation, we have his own declaration: in his letter to the Secretary of War of 20th of January, 1818, he says, "your letter, enclosing your general order of the 29th ultimo, has been received. Like yourself, I have no other feelings to gratify than those connected with the public good, and it gives me pleasure to find we coincide in those opinions calculated to produce it. Responsibility now rests where it should, on the officer issuing the order, and the principle acknowledged is calculated to insure that subordination so necessary to the harmonious movement of every part of the military machine." It is to be regretted that an officer who seemed to be so perfectly acquainted with what belonged to the duty of others, should have been so totally regardless or unconscious of his own. And while the committee are willing to admit that the volunteer forces called into service by General Jackson were more efficient and less expensive than the militia, had he confined himself to the usual proportion of officers, this they conceive should not be urged as an argument in favor of employing them, or plead in justification of the unlawful act; for, if these reasons be considered conclusive, and should be acquiesced in, they will be applied with increased force (fortified by this precedent) in all future wars. An army of regulars will be considered (as they really are) more efficient and less expensive than either the volunteers, if authorized by law, or the militia. And the officer at the head of such army (acting on the principles before stated, and encouraged by the acquiescence of the nation) may dispense with the militia altogether, and increase the regular army to any extent that folly or ambition may suggest; and all this under the plea of necessity. The committee can scarcely imagine a possible case that may occur in a future war, when the necessity will be less strong than in the present. This war was waged when the United States were at peace with all the world, except this miserable undisciplined banditti of "deluded Indians" and fugitive slaves, their whole strength when combined not exceeding one thousand men; opposed to whom, (previous to General Jackson's taking the command,) and under General Gaines, were a force of one thousand eight hundred regulars and militia, besides the one thousand five hundred friendly Indians illegally subsidized by the last mentioned general. What, then, in this state of the case, becomes of the plea of necessity? And if it be admitted in this case to justify or palliate an act of military usurpation, the committee would anxiously inquire where it is to be disallowed or denied? And here the committee, having pledged themselves faithfully to disclose facts, and impartially to draw conclusions, beg leave to remark, that the conduct of the commanding general in raising this volunteer corps was approbated by the War Department, as will appear by the letter of the Secretary, dated the 29th day of January, 1818. And it is but justice to the Department to state, that it was not until the officers that had assisted in thus officering and organizing this corps were examined by the committee, that they were apprised of the illegality of the measure; for there is nothing to be found in General Jackson's letters on this subject to the Secretary of War, of the 12th, 13th, and 20th of February, 1818, from which it can be fairly inferred that he had appointed a single officer; indeed, it would seem, from a fair interpretation of those letters, that the officers, at least, were of the regular militia of the States, and that the only departure from his orders by the general, was, his having called on the subordinate officers of the militia, instead of the Governor of the State of Tennessee, and his preference of



mounted men to infantry. And it will also appear, from the letters aforesaid, that had the Department of War disapproved of this conduct, and determined to countermand the orders of General Jackson in raising this force, no order to that effect could have reached him before he had arrived at the seat of war, and of course the army might have been disbanded in sight of the enemy, and the objects of the campaign thereby jeopardized, and perhaps defeated.

The committee will next take notice of the operations of the army in the Floridas; whether they were authorized to pursue the enemy; and, connected with this authority, it was enjoined on General Gaines, to whom the first order to this effect was given, that, in case the enemy took refuge under a Spanish garrison, not to attack them there, but to report the fact to the Secretary of War. And the observance of this order, the committee conceive, was equally obligatory on General Jackson, who succeeded to the command; at least it must have clearly evinced the will of the Secretary of War on that point, and how far this injunction was observed, will be found by what followed.

It appears that General Jackson advanced into Florida with a force of one thousand eight hundred men, composed of regulars, volunteers, and the Georgia militia, and afterwards, on the 1st day of April, was joined by General McIntosh and his brigade of one thousand five hundred Indians, who had been previously organized by General Gaines; opposed to whom, it appears from the report of Captain Young, topographical engineer, and other evidence, the whole forces of the fugitive Seminole Indians and runaway negroes, had they all been embodied, could not have exceeded nine hundred or one thousand men, and at no time did half that number present themselves to oppose his march; of course, little or no resistance was made.

The Mikasuky towns were first taken and destroyed; the army marched upon St. Marks, a feeble Spanish garrison, which was surrendered "without firing a gun," and then occupied as an American post; the Spanish commandant having, first by humble entreaties, and then by a timid protest, endeavored to avert the measure. Here Alexander Arbuthnot was found, taken prisoner, and put in confinement, for the purpose, as it was stated by General Jackson, "of collecting evidence to establish his guilt." And here also was taken two Indian chiefs, one of whom pretended to possess the spirit of prophecy: they were hung without trial, and with little ceremony.

This being done, and St. Marks garrisoned by American troops, the army pursued their march eastward to Suwaney river, on which they found a large Indian village, which was consumed, and the Indians and negroes were dispersed; after which the army returned to St. Marks, bringing with them Robert C. Ambrister, who had been taken prisoner on their march to Suwaney. During a halt of the army, for a few days, at St. Marks, a general court martial was called, Arbuthnot arraigned, found guilty, sentenced to suffer death, and hung. Ambrister was tried in like manner, found guilty, and sentenced to whipping and confinement. General Jackson annulled the sentence, and ordered him to be shot; and this order was executed.

It appears by the testimony, that the army had arrived at St. Marks, on their return from Suwaney, on the 25th of April; and, on the 26th, General Jackson writes to the Secretary of War, in the following manner:

"I shall leave this, in two or three days, for Fort Gadsden; and, after making all necessary arrangements for the security of the positions occupied, and detaching a force to scour the country west of the Appalachicola, I shall proceed direct to Nashville. My presence in this country can be no longer necessary. The Indian forces have been divided and scattered: cut off from all communications with those unprincipled agents of foreign nations, who have deluded them to their ruin, they have not the power, if the will remains, of annoying our frontier."

It appears, however, by the conduct of the commanding general, that he had at this time looked to different movements; for at the time of writing this letter, as will be seen by the testimony of Captain Call and Surgeon Bro-nough, he had despatched Lieutenant Sands to Mobile to forward on a train of artillery to a given point, to be ready to be made use of in reducing Pensacola and the Fort of Barancas, should that measure be thereafter thought proper. Having made these arrangements, the army marched to Fort Gadsden, on the Appalachicola river. There, as stated by General Jackson, and confirmed by the testimony of Colonel Butler, information was received by a private letter, written from a merchant at Pensacola to Mr. Doyle, and shown to General Jackson, that a number of Indians had recently visited Pensacola, and were committing depredations on the Spanish inhabitants of that place, and were receiving aid and comfort from the garrison. On the receipt of this intelligence, the resolution seems to have been taken to garrison that place with American troops. And after a march of about twenty days, having met his artillery, General Jackson, with about twelve hundred men, the rest having been discharged, appeared before Pensacola, the capital of the province. The place was taken, with scarcely the show of resistance; the Governor had escaped, and taken refuge in the fort of the Barancas. To which place, distant about six miles, the army marched; and the fortress was invested on the 25th of May; and a demand being made for its surrender, and refused, the attack on the fortress was made by land and water. And, after the bombardment and cannonading had been kept up for a part of two days, and some lives lost, the fortress was surrendered, and the garrison made prisoners of war, and the officers of the Government, civil and military, transported to the Havana, agreeably to the terms of the capitulation; which terms, General Jackson, in his letter of 20th June, 1818, declares "were more favorable than a conquered enemy would have merited." The civil and military Government of Spain thus annulled, General Jackson thought it necessary to abolish the revenue laws of Spain, and establish those of the United States, as more favorable to the commerce of the United States; and, for this purpose, Captain Gadsden was appointed collector, and by him, under the authority of General Jackson, that department of the new Government was organized.

The Spanish authorities being thus put down by the sword, both civil and military, and a new Government established for this newly-acquired territory; the powers of which, both civil and military, vested in military officers; and General Jackson having declared, in numerous communications to the Department of War, that the Seminole war was closed, and the object of the campaign at an end, he returned to his residence at Nashville, State of Tennessee. And here it would have given the committee sincere pleasure to have stated that the history of the campaign had closed; but facts, which it becomes now their duty to report, require that history to be continued. On the 7th of August, 1818, more than two months after his consummation of the conquest of West and part of East Florida, he issued an order to General Gaines, directing him to take possession of St. Augustine, a strong fortress, and the capital of East Florida. A copy of this order is subjoined to this report; and his reasons for this measure are stated at large in the order, and reiterated and enforced by his letter to the Secretary of War, dated the 10th of the same month; which reasons, fully and beyond the possibility of doubt, discover the motives of the commanding general in all his movements against Spain.

The tendency of these measures by the commanding general seems to have been to involve the nation in a war without her consent, and for reasons of his own, unconnected with his military functions. Your committee would be unwilling to attribute improper motives where those of a different character could be possibly inferred, more especially when it is to affect a character whose military fame is the pride and boast of the nation. But even such a character becomes more eminently dangerous when he exalts himself above the majesty of the laws, declares the public will, and becomes the arbiter between the United States and foreign nations. That these high and transcendent powers have been usurped, and exercised in the present case, is, it appears to the committee, incontrovertibly evident from the facts adduced.

The constitution declares, art. 1, sec. 8, "Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water." Surely it was never designed by this provision that a military officer should first make war, and leave it to Congress afterwards to declare it. This would involve an absurdity that it is unnecessary to expose. It is sufficient to say, that the Executive authority of the United States, and much less a subordinate officer, has no power to change the pacific relations of the nation. The President of the United States is bound constitutionally to preserve the peace of the country until Congress declares it in a state of war. He can only, while thus in a state of peace, use the military forces of the nation in three specified cases, that is, "to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, and repel invasion."—(See constitution, art. 1, section 8; also the act for calling forth the militia, passed 28th February, 1795.)

It will not be pretended that Spain had invaded the United States, or that Congress had declared war against that nation; and of course the relations of peace did exist between the two countries at the time General Jackson

took possession of the Spanish possessions in the Floridas. These facts being admitted, and they cannot be denied, the only question to decide, is, whether the military conduct of General Jackson was not war against Spain? And on this subject there can be no room to doubt. The capital of a Spanish province is taken by the sword, a fortress is invested and bombarded, lives are lost, and the place surrendered on capitulation, the terms of which are declared "more favorable than a conquered enemy merited;" military officers and men, as well as those in the civil departments of Government, are transported to the West Indies, and a new Government established for the conquered country. If all these acts of hostility combined do not constitute war, the committee confess themselves utterly at a loss for its definition; or, if the fact be denied, the consequence of such denial will be a proof that no war was made by the Seminole Indians on the United States, and of course that the invasion of Florida was an unauthorized act of aggression on the part of the United States. But the committee will pursue this subject a little further, and examine the reasons offered by the officer commanding for taking possession of, and occupying the Spanish fortresses, more especially Pensacola and the Barancas. Those reasons are to be found in his numerous reports to the War Department, and his letters to the Spanish officers who commanded in the different fortresses, and are these: that Spain had not observed her treaty stipulations with the United States, as it related to the Florida Indians, and whose peaceable conduct she was bound to guaranty to the United States; that she had furnished those Indians at war with the United States with arms, ammunition, and supplies necessary to carry on the war. Here the committee would observe that they are neither the advocates nor the apologists of Spain. There can be no doubt but she had, by the violation of her engagements, given the United States sufficient cause of war; but they defend the constitution, by saying that General Jackson had no power to declare nor make the war; that neither he, nor even the President of the United States, had any discretion or power to judge what was, or was not, cause of war; this the constitution had wisely lodged in Congress. The treaty with Spain still existed. It was made by the constitution the supreme law of the land; and had Spain violated, on her part, every article of that treaty, still the Executive of the United States, who is bound to see the laws "faithfully executed," must, in good faith towards Spain, have observed on our part that treaty, and the obligation of preserving the peace of the nation would have remained until the treaty should have been revoked or annulled by Congress. Furnishing the Indians with arms, ammunition, and supplies, were so many violations of treaty stipulations, and might have been considered good cause of war by Congress; but of this General Jackson was not the judge. His duty was pointed out; it was to subdue and punish the Seminole Indians who had made war upon us. For this purpose, he was ordered to pursue them into the territorial limits of Spain, and over a part of which territory those Indians had at least a qualified right of possession and property. Under these orders no act of aggression on the Spanish authorities could have been designed, nor can any such acts be justified. Spain, before she could become or be made a party to this war, must have merged her neutral character in that of the enemy, and clearly identified herself with the Seminole Indians, and by acts of open and undisguised hostility to General Jackson, have opposed him by physical, not moral force.

But the weakness of the Spanish authorities is urged in justification of this outrage upon our constitution. And is the weakness of an independent Power to disparage their neutral rights, or furnish pretences for a powerful neighbor to weaken them further by hostile aggressions? And is it thus we are to be furnished by an American officer with a justification of the dismemberment of Poland, the capture of the Danish fleet by Great Britain, and the subjugation of Europe by Bonaparte? And shall the United States be called upon to imitate the examples, or silently acquiesce, and thereby subscribe to doctrines, and approve measures, that are in direct opposition to the repeated and invariable declarations of the Government, given to this nation and the world, through the official medium of Presidential messages and the correspondence of all her public ministers, and sanctioned by all her public laws, on the subject of neutral rights? Will it not be said that we have changed our national policy? Shall we not be addressed in the following language by the nations of Europe?—"The time was when the United States was also weak; she had no navy; she had no army. In those days she was a strong advocate for neutral rights; anxious that free ships should make free goods; that the neutral flag of the republic should protect all sailing under it; ever protesting against, and complaining of, the violation of her neutral rights by the belligerents of Europe. But those times have passed away; the nation has tried her strength in battle, and found herself quite equal to the struggle; she has had time to strengthen her army, and increase her navy; her former weakness forgotten; her former precepts abandoned; and, 'feeling power and forgetting right,' she walks over a prostrate constitution, to conquer and subdue a miserable and feeble, though neutral, colony, whose very weakness (pleaded in excuse for the aggression) should have rather constituted an appeal to a generous people for protection."

In this unfavorable light, the committee have too much reason to fear, will the civilized world view this transaction; and, if sanctioned by the nation, they regret to say, there will be too much reason given thus to consider it.

But there are still other reasons disclosed, and facts developed, that discover the motives of the commanding officer more fully than those above stated. More than two months after this campaign had ended, and the Seminole war terminated, another expedition is planned, and the land and naval forces of the United States ordered to execute it, which is to reduce the fortress of St. Augustine, the capital of East Florida; the reasons offered for this measure are stated in his orders to General Gaines, dated Nashville, August 7, 1818, and are as follows:

"I have noted with attention Major Twigg's letter, marked No. 5. I contemplated that the agents of Spain, or the officers at Fort St. Augustine, would excite the Indians to hostility, and furnish them with the means of war. It will be necessary to obtain evidence substantiating this fact, and that the hostile Indians have been fed and furnished from the garrison of St. Augustine. This being obtained, should you deem your force sufficient, you will proceed to take and garrison Fort St. Augustine with American troops, and hold the garrison prisoners until you hear from the President of the United States; or transport them to Cuba, as, in your judgment, under existing circumstances, you may think best.

"Let it be remembered, that the proceedings carried on by me, or this order, is not on the ground that we are at war with Spain; it is on the ground of self-preservation, bottomed on the broad basis of the law of nature and of nations, and justified by giving peace and security to our frontiers; hence, the necessity of procuring evidence of the fact of the agents or officers of Spain having excited the Indians to continue the war against us, and that they have furnished them with the means of carrying on the war; this evidence being obtained, you will (if your force is sufficient) permit nothing to prevent you from reducing Fort St. Augustine, except a positive order from the Department of War.

"Orders, some time since, have been given to the officer of the ordnance commanding at Charleston, to have in readiness a complete battering train, the number and caliber of the guns pointed out. I have no doubt you will find them in readiness.

"I enclose you the report of Captain Henley of the naval force on that station; you will open a correspondence with the commandant A. J. Dallas, to ensure his co-operation, provided it should be required."

In this projected expedition, it was not thought necessary or expedient to consult the Executive branch of the Government: the order sent to General Gaines was peremptory, on the discovery being made that the Indians had been supplied with ammunition and provisions, and excited to war; the blow was to be struck, and nothing but an express order from the Secretary of War was to prevent it. Long before this period the commanding general had, by his letters to the Secretary of War, declared the Seminole war at an end; and, after which, not a single new act of hostility had been committed. Yet, in this state of peace, is a military officer directed to ascertain facts, and, on such facts being substantiated, to make war on the neutral colony of a nation in peace and amity with the United States; thus disregarding not only the legislative and executive authorities of the United States, but setting at naught the usages of all civilized nations, by making war without a previous and public declaration. Were this nation subject to the will of a military despot, and were there no constitutional barriers to the inordinate exercise of military ambition, more than this could scarcely have been expected. It is with pain the committee are constrained to make these observations; but, where the vital principles of the constitution have been violated, as they conceive, it would be criminal in them, under the instructions they have received from the Senate, and the duty they owe to the nation, to be silent; silence, on their part, would have been considered an acquiescence in those measures, and they fear this precedent and example might be pleaded and followed on future occasions.

If these things be admitted in the South, will they not be considered as authorized in the North? Are there not fortresses there to be won, and provinces to be conquered? and are there not Indians in that quarter likewise? and may not the officer in command find means to prove that those Indians have been, or hereafter may be, furnished by the British with arms and munitions of war? and, if so, may he not follow the example set in the South; and add something to his stock of military fame, by reducing the British fortresses of Canada, and unfurling the star-spangled banner of this nation on the walls of Quebec.

We hope better things of the distinguished officer at the head of our armies; and we had hoped better things of the hero of New Orleans; but we have been disappointed: and, if the conduct of the officer in the South be sanctioned and approved by the nation, we are free to declare that the reduction of Quebec (where Montgomery fell, unable to conquer,) would present a much stronger claim to public approbation.

It is necessary here to remark, that a copy of the orders issued by General Jackson to General Gaines, for the reduction of St. Augustine, was transmitted to the Secretary of War, and a countermarching order promptly despatched to General Gaines, which reached him before the military expedition, set on foot by General Jackson, had commenced. And thus was suddenly arrested a military scheme, (as unconstitutional as it was impolitic,) and which might, as stated by the Secretary of War, in his letter of the 8th day of September, 1818, have involved this nation in a war with all Europe.

In thus promptly prohibiting the unauthorized seizure, at the will of a commanding general, of the possessions of a neighboring nation, with whom the United States are at peace, the committee recognise that sacred regard to the rights of other nations, which ought never to be departed from by the Executive of a free country; and that vigilant attention to the conduct of the officers of the army, which is necessary to secure a due subordination of the military to the civil power.

They consider that, on this occasion, the Executive of the United States has, (by promptly restoring St. Marks and Pensacola, wrested from Spain in violation of instructions,) pursued the course that the constitution demanded; that all former precedents justified; and to which the public sentiment gave a decided approbation.

In reviewing the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, your committee cannot but consider it as an unnecessary act of severity on the part of the commanding general, and a departure from that mild and humane system towards prisoners, which, in all our conflicts with savage or civilized nations, has heretofore been considered not only honorable to the national character, but conformable to the dictates of sound policy. These prisoners were subjects of Great Britain, with whom the United States are at peace. Having left their country, and united their fate with savages, with whom the United States were at war, they forfeited their claim to the protection of their own Government, and subjected themselves to the same treatment which might, according to the practice and principles of the American Government, be extended towards those with whom they were associated. No process of reasoning can degrade them below the savages with whom they were connected. As prisoners of war, they were entitled to claim from the American Government that protection which the most savage of our foes have uniformly experienced when disarmed and in our power. Humanity shudders at the idea of a cold-blooded execution of prisoners disarmed and in the power of the conqueror. And although savages, who respect no laws, may, according to the strict principles of the law of nations, have their own system of cruelty inflicted on them by way of retaliation, it is believed that such a system would degrade and debase the civilized nation who could resort to it, and is not only repugnant to the mild principles of the Christian religion, but a violation of those great principles of moral rectitude which distinguish the American character. Retaliation in the United States has always been confined to specified acts of cruelty. It is not believed that any attempt has ever been made to retaliate for charges so general as those exhibited against Arbuthnot and Ambrister, viz: "inciting the Indians to war." During the revolutionary war only two cases occurred of persons seized for purposes of retaliation, neither of whom was executed. The case of Asgill, seized on account of the murder of Huddy; and Governor Hamilton, of Vincennes, for specific acts of cruelty also. Hamilton was confined for a short time with rigor, and afterwards released. During the late war, marked with some cases of cold-blooded massacre on the part of our enemy, particularly the one at the river Raisin, no such measure as retaliation was resorted to.

The principle assumed by the commanding general, that Arbuthnot and Ambrister, by uniting in war against the United States, while we were at peace with Great Britain, "became outlaws and pirates, and liable to suffer death," is not recognised in any code of national law. Nothing can be found in the history of civilized nations which recognises such a principle, except a decree of the Executive Directory of France, during their short career of folly and madness, which declares that "neutrals found on board enemies' ships should be considered and treated as pirates."

The committee forbear to make any further remarks on the violation of the usual and accustomed forms in the punishment and conviction of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, except that even despots, claiming to exercise absolute power, cannot with propriety violate their own rules.

Having detailed a court-martial for the purpose of trying the prisoners, the commanding general, by his own authority, set aside the sentence of the court, and substituted for that sentence his own arbitrary will. In trials involving the life of an individual, a strict adherence to form is, in ordinary cases, considered the best security against oppression and injustice.

A departure from these forms is calculated to inflict a wound on the national character, and tarnish the laurels so justly acquired by the commanding general by his former victories.

Such are the facts as they appear to the committee, and such are the views taken by them of the important subjects referred to their consideration; and, together with their report, they submit various depositions and documents; to which, and to the correspondence and documents relating to the Seminole war, communicated to the Senate by the President of the United States at the last and present session, they refer.

## No. 1.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, February 10, 1819.

Sir:

Agreeably to the request made in your letter of the 8th instant, I now transmit an extract of General Jackson's letter of the 10th of August last, and a copy of General Jackson's order to General Gaines, of the 7th of last August, in relation to St. Augustine; a copy of the order to General Gaines, of the 1st of September; and an extract of the answer to General Jackson's letter of the 10th of August, 1818; which comprehend all the information required by the committee.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

Hon. ABNER LACOCK, Chairman, &amp;c. Senate U. S.

## No. 2.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, January 12, 1818.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your order of the 26th ultimo, which reached me last night; its contents are duly noted, and will be promptly attended to.

I have received no late advices from General Gaines, although I have for some time expected the return of the express sent to him on the 24th of November last. Taking into view the strength of the Seminoles and their adherents, as reported to you by General Gaines, and the aggregate of his strength, regulars and militia, amounting to but one thousand eight hundred men, which cannot possibly afford a like number of effectives; considering, likewise, that the greater portion of his forces are draughted militia, from Georgia, who may apply for their discharge at the expiration of three months from the time they were first mustered, and who may be disposed to claim this

right, and abandon the campaign, about the time I could reach Fort Scott, I have deemed it both prudent and advisable to call from the west end of the State of Tennessee for one thousand volunteer mounted gun-men, to serve during the campaign. With this force, in conjunction with the regular troops, I can act promptly, and, with the smiles of Heaven, successfully, against any force that can be concentrated by the Seminoles and their auxiliaries. Viewing, however, the lives of our citizens as too precious to be risked in a contest with savages, with the odds of two to one, unless where real necessity demands the exposure, I have therefore written to the Governor of Georgia to continue in the field the one thousand men required by General Gaines.

The result of the appeal I have made to the patriotism of those brave men in West Tennessee, who have so often followed me to the field of danger, will be known by the 19th instant, and I hope to leave this for Fort Scott on the 22d. Of my movements, and success in raising the mounted volunteers, you shall be advised.

It may appear to the Government, on the first view, that mounted men are the most expensive; but when we consider the rapidity of their movements, the amount of quartermaster's expenditures for pack-horses, baggage-wagons, and other means of transport indispensable to foot-men, in this instance saved, mounted gun-men, as auxiliaries in such a campaign as the one contemplated, will be found to save both blood and treasure to the United States. The volunteers that have been invited to the field are of tried materials, and such as can be relied on in the day of danger and trial.

With respect, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

I feel myself much at a loss for correct topographical information of the country occupied by the Seminole Indians, and particularly of that portion which may possibly become the seat of war. Should there be any maps, plans, or charts, of the section of country alluded to, in the secret bureau of the War Department, you will oblige me by having a copy transmitted to Fort Scott as early as practicable.

A. J.

No. 3.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, *January 13, 1818.*

SIR:

Being advised that the assistant deputy quartermaster general of General Gaines's brigade has resigned, and being unadvised as to quartermaster's funds within the seventh department, I have to request that necessary funds be forwarded to Quartermaster General Gibson, at Fort Scott, whom I have ordered to meet me at that place without loss of time.

Should the one thousand volunteer mounted gun-men attend to my appeal to their patriotism, I shall send on a confidential agent to Georgia, to have the necessary supplies for them procured and forwarded by the quartermaster, if any there, to Fort Gaines; and, if none, by the agent sent, with instructions to draw on Quartermaster General Gibson for the amount of his purchases; this is done to facilitate the march of the volunteers called for. I need not observe, that, without quartermaster's funds, an army cannot be wielded either with promptitude or effect. Promptitude in the present campaign will be a great saving to the United States, both in character and purse.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your most obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

No. 5.

*Extract of a letter from Major General Jackson to Brevet Major General Gaines, dated*

NASHVILLE, *August 7, 1818.*

I am happy to find that the notorious Micco de Cozey is at length destroyed. The distress of the Indians for provisions I expected. Your providing for their wants meets my entire approbation; it will meet the entire approbation of the Government, as it corresponds with the usual humanity extended to the suffering Indians.

I have noted with attention Major Twigg's letter, marked No. 5. I contemplated that the agents of Spain, or the officers of Fort St. Augustine, would excite the Indians to hostility, and furnish them with the means of war. It will be necessary to obtain evidence substantiating this fact, and that the hostile Indians have been fed and furnished from the garrison of St. Augustine. This being obtained, should you deem your force sufficient, you will proceed to, take, and garrison, Fort St. Augustine with American troops, and hold the garrison prisoners until you hear from the President of the United States, or transport them to Cuba, as, in your judgment, under existing circumstances, you may think best.

Let it be remembered, that the proceedings carried on by me, or this order, are not on the ground that we are at war with Spain. It is on the ground of self-preservation, bottomed on the broad basis of the law of nature and of nations, and justified by giving peace and security to our frontier; hence the necessity of procuring evidence of the fact of the agents or officers of Spain having excited the Indians to continue the war against us, and that they have furnished them with the means of carrying on the war. This evidence being obtained, you will (if your force is sufficient) permit nothing to prevent you from reducing Fort St. Augustine, except a positive order from the Department of War.

Orders, some time since, have been given to the officer of the ordnance commanding at Charleston, to have in readiness a complete battering train, the number and caliber of the guns pointed out. I have no doubt you will find them in readiness.

I enclose you the report of Captain Henley of the naval force on that station. You will open a correspondence with Commandant A. G. Dallas, to ensure his co-operation, provided it should be required. I trust, before this reaches you, you will have destroyed the settlement collected at Suwany; this can easily be done by a *coup de main*, provided secrecy of your movements be observed, and great expedition of march used. Without expedition of movement, and great caution, you will be discovered, and the enemy will flee, or endeavor to ambuscade you; both of which ought to be guarded against.

Have a careful eye to your supplies on hand, that, before they are consumed, others may be ordered and reach you. Without necessary supplies, an army cannot operate with effect. The late scarcity ought to teach us a lesson on this head, never to be forgotten. I therefore expect that no scarcity will happen at any place, post, or garrison, intrusted to your care. I shall expect to hear from you shortly; and that you and your brigade may be successful in all your operations, and cover yourselves with glory, is my heartfelt wish.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

No. 6.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, *August 10, 1818.*

Captain Gadsden will likewise deliver you his report, made in pursuance of my order, accompanied with the plans of the fortifications thought necessary for the defence of the Floridas, in connexion with the line of defence on our southern frontier. This was done under the belief that Government will never jeopardize the safety of the Union, or the security of our frontier, by surrendering those posts, unless upon a sure guaranty, agreeably to the

stipulations of the articles of capitulation, that will insure permanent peace, tranquillity, and security to our southern frontier. It is believed that Spain can never furnish this guaranty. As long as there are Indians in Florida, and it possessed by Spain, they will be excited to war and the indiscriminate murder of our citizens, by foreign agents and Spanish officers. The conduct of Spain, for the last six years, fully proves this. It was under the belief that the Floridas would be held, that my orders to make the report were given to Captain Gadsden. To this I refer you; its perusal will show you how important it is, not only to the defence and security of the frontier, but to the whole United States. It points to our vulnerable points, and shows our country can and was intended to be invaded, during the last war, from this quarter; and that the attempt would have been made, had not the Creek Indians been subdued previous to the arrival of the British troops; and afterwards their attempt to gain possession of Mobile bay was frustrated by the repulse they met with at Fort Bowyer. If possession is given of the points now occupied by our troops, and a war ensues, an attempt will no doubt be made to penetrate our country by the Appalachian, and, by the aid of the Indians, to reach the Mississippi at or above the Chickasaw Bluffs. Should this be done with a formidable force, in our unprepared state, it is highly probable that the enemy might reach the banks of the Mississippi; occupying these posts will prevent the danger of such an occurrence; surrender them, and I would not, without a much stronger force, hold myself responsible for the safety of my division. But with those posts fortified as recommended, and with an effective force of five thousand men, I pledge my life upon defending the country, from St. Mary's to the Barrataire, against all the machinations and attacks of the *Holy Alliance* and combined Europe.

By Captain Gadsden you will receive some letters,\* lately enclosed to me, detailing the information that the Spaniards at Fort St. Augustine were again exciting the Indians to war against us, and a copy of my order to General Gaines upon this subject. It is what I expected, and proves the necessity and sound policy of not only holding the posts which we are now in possession of, but likewise of our possessing ourselves of Fort St. Augustine; this alone can ensure peace and security on our southern frontier.

It is alone by a just and a bold course of conduct that we can expect to obtain and ensure respect from Europe, and not by a timid, temporizing policy; the first commands admiration and esteem, the latter contempt. But from the composition of the present administration, I can never suppose that they will abandon rights, or assume a timid and temporizing course of policy. I therefore conclude that the posts will never be surrendered, unless upon the terms agreed on in the capitulation, and then it guaranteed that those terms will be punctually fulfilled; particularly when it is recollected that, unless this is done, our frontier will be exposed to all the scenes of blood and massacre heretofore experienced; and to regain them will cost us much blood and treasure, in the event of a war. The security of the Western States renders it necessary that they should be held; the voice of the people will demand it. But upon this, as well as every other subject, I refer you to Captain Gadsden.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

HON. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

No. 7.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *September 1, 1818.*

SIR:

General Jackson has transmitted to this Department a copy of his letter to you of the 7th ultimo. It is to be presumed that his orders in relation to St. Augustine were given before he was apprised of the decision of the President in relation to St. Marks and Pensacola; as the principle on which that decision was made would equally extend to the case of St. Augustine. You will, accordingly, not carry that part of General Jackson's order into execution, except to collect with care the evidence of such facts as go to prove any countenance or assistance from the Spanish authority in St. Augustine to the hostile Indians; and should you ascertain that they have afforded any, you will report the facts, properly supported by evidence, to this Department. You will also report the facts on which you ordered the issue of rations to the Indians, and the extent of the issue. I refer to the issue which is alluded to in General Jackson's letter to you of the 7th ultimo, as the Department has not yet received any information on the subject.

I have, &c.

General E. P. GAINES.

J. C. CALHOUN.

No. 8.

*Extract of a letter from J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, to Major General Andrew Jackson, dated*

SEPTEMBER 8, 1818.

I enclose a copy of my orders of the 14th ultimo to General Gaines for your information. I concur in the view which you have taken in relation to the importance of Florida to the effectual peace and security of our Southern frontier; and such, I believe, is the opinion of every member of the administration. In fact, the grounds assumed are very far from being feeble. St. Marks will be retained until Spain shall be ready to garrison it with a sufficient force; and Fort Gadsden, and any other position in East or West Florida, within the Indian country, which may be deemed eligible, will be retained so long as there is any danger; which, it is hoped, will afford the desired security. We ought, it is true, never to resort to timid measures to avoid war; but it appears to me that a certain degree of caution (not from the fear of the Holy Alliance) ought, at this time, to mark our policy. A war with Spain, were it to continue with her alone, and were there no great neutral Powers to avail themselves of the opportunity of embarrassing us, would be nothing; but such a war would not continue long without involving other parties, and it certainly would, in a few years, be an English war. In such a war I would not fear for the fate of our country; but, certainly, if it can be prudently and honorably avoided for the present, it ought to be. We want time—time to grow, to perfect our fortifications, to enlarge our navy, to replenish our depots, and to pay our debts. I speak to you frankly, knowing your zeal for our country, with whose glory yours is now identified. No one who has examined my political course will, I am sure, think that these opinions are influenced by timid councils.

[NOTE. The order of the 14th of August, referred to in the above extract, has been already communicated to Congress.]

No. 9.

FORT CRAWFORD, *May 19, 1818.*

DEAR SIR:

Proceeding to Georgia for the purpose of bringing my family to this territory, and desirous to provide for the safety of the inhabitants on the frontiers during my absence, I have sought an interview with the officer in command at this place. At Camp Montgomery I learned that you would probably reach this place in a few days, and indulged the hope of seeing you. An interview with you would have been to me a source of much pleasure, and I regret that my arrangements will not permit me to await your arrival.

The Indians commenced their murderous incursions on the frontier settlements in January last, when two men were killed in this neighborhood. No events occurred afterwards to excite apprehension until the 14th of March, when a house on the Federal Road, near Poplar Spring, was attacked, and eight persons killed. This intelligence reached me at Claiborne, from whence a detachment of mounted riflemen was immediately ordered to the place, for one month's service. A few days afterwards five men, while travelling the road, were fired at, and three killed; from whom fifteen hundred, or two thousand dollars were taken. The people, for the most part, were flying for safety in every direction, and all communication by mail, or otherwise, with Georgia, wholly suspended. The

\* These letters have been passed into the State Department, and cannot now be found.

Indians were known to be still in that quarter. In this state of things, three posts were established by my order, at which there are in the whole about one hundred men, who have instructions to scour the woods from day to day. A fortnight since they found a camp; but, on their approach, the enemy fled to a contiguous swamp, from whence they fired, and killed one man. The commanding officer informs me that he thinks the number of Indians now in the neighborhood considerable. I should have mentioned that, in April, a house, within fifteen or twenty miles of Claiborne, was attacked; the husband killed, and wife and two daughters wounded. Thirty dollars, a quantity of bacon, and every article which could be conveyed away, taken and carried to Pensacola, where, I believe, the murderers might still be found.

I yesterday learned that one Indian was killed, and another wounded, near the Poplar Spring. This detail of events, however, was probably unnecessary, as you will receive from Major Young every intelligence upon the subject. My principal object is to state that, in my efforts to protect the people over whom I preside, the territorial treasury being destitute of funds, has afforded me no supplies whatsoever, nor has it been in the power of the commanding officer here to render the aid which he has uniformly manifested the best disposition to afford. I am desirous that the troops should be considered as in the service of the United States, and the accounts adjusted when their term of service expires. One company rendezvoused at Poplar Spring, for three months' service, on the 10th of April, and a detachment of twenty-five at Sepulger lately, for the same term of service. The expenditures incurred have been considerable, and altogether beyond my means of paying. You will readily perceive how unpleasant has been my situation without the means of affording the protection necessary to keep the inhabitants at their homes. The regular force in this quarter has been insufficient for the defence of the country; the militia I have not had time to organize, and, above all, not a dollar in the treasury. My views of the necessity of forwarding men and money to this section of the country have been repeatedly stated to Colonel Trimble; but, I apprehend, it has not been in his power to meet them.

Having endeavored, in vain, with my limited resources, to arrest the enemy after their successive murders, and being satisfied that they sought refuge in Florida, I determined to raise a volunteer force, and order them to attack the hostile Indians without regard to our boundary. A part of the force is now under the command of Major Young, and Captain Stull is in possession of my order. Had I been furnished with funds, the enemy would have been driven from that retreat long before this time; persuaded as I am that it is the only effectual method of affording security to this territory.

I have this moment received intelligence which leaves no doubt of your approach to this quarter; and I shall now leave the territory perfectly satisfied that the people will not suffer by my absence. Mr. Henry Hitchcock is appointed Territorial Secretary and will act as Governor after I set out from Fort Jackson, which will be on the 26th or 27th of this month. I may, however, be detained a few days longer in arranging with the Big Warrior the reception of a party of Indians who have sued for peace, and delivered themselves to Major Young. This they did so soon as the Major convinced them, by a well timed and well executed expedition, that they would no longer be permitted to murder our citizens, and find refuge in the Spanish territory.

There are at this place forty volunteers, and the same number of militia at Camp Montgomery. Should you need any additional aid from the territory it would be promptly furnished, should you notify me at Fort Jackson before my departure.

I enclose to you letters I have received from the commanding officer of the militia near Poplar Spring, which will present to you the state of things in that quarter. Excuse this hasty scrawl, and accept the assurances of my regard and esteem.

WM. W. BIBB.

No. 10.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, CITY OF WASHINGTON, February 20, 1819.

SIR:

In answer to your letter of the 17th of the present month I have the honor to state:

1st. That "the numbers and grades of the officers who commanded the detachment of Indians employed under McIntosh, and the whole number of Indians," appear, from the accounts of the agent who paid them, to have been

1 Brigadier general.	4 Assistant commissaries.
2 Colonels.	28 Captains.
2 Lieutenant colonels.	28 First lieutenants.
2 Majors.	28 Second do.
1 Assistant adjutant general.	1,517 Rank and file (or other warriors.)

2d. That "the number and grades of the officers, who commanded the Tennessee and Kentucky volunteers," appear, from the rolls which mustered them into service, to have been

1 Assistant adjutant general.	2 Quartermasters, (regimental.)
1 Assistant inspector general.	2 Surgeons. (do.)
1 Assistant deputy quartermaster general.	4 Surgeon's mates, (do.)
1 Chaplain.	4 Sergeant majors, (do.)
1 Foragemaster.	4 Quartermaster sergeants.
1 Assistant foragemaster.	20 Captains.
1 Judge advocate.	20 First lieutenants.
2 Colonels.	18 Second lieutenants.
4 Lieutenant colonels.	11 Third lieutenants.
4 Majors.	17 Cornets.
4 Adjutants, (regimental.)	

Of whom one captain, and one first lieutenant, appear to have belonged to Kentucky; the others to Tennessee.

3d. That "the number and grades of the officers who commanded (or served with) the two companies of rangers," under Captains Boyle and McGirt, appear, from a communication of the paymaster of the 4th regiment of infantry, dated the 23d of September, 1818, to have been

2 Captains.	2 Second lieutenants.
2 First lieutenants.	1 Surgeon's mate.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

NATHANIEL FRYE, Jun. *Chief Clerk.*

The Hon. ABNER LACOCK, *Chairman of the Committee*  
on the subject of the Seminole war, in Senate of the U. S.

No. 11.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, CITY OF WASHINGTON, February 23, 1819.

SIR:

Your letter of yesterday's date is now before me; and, with reference to my note of the 20th instant, I have to state that "the whole number of men (rank and file) employed as volunteers from Tennessee and Kentucky" appears, from the muster-rolls, to have been one thousand one hundred and sixty-three; the number employed in Captain Boyle's and Captain McGirt's companies of rangers one hundred and forty.

With sentiments of much respect, I am, sir, your most obedient,

NATHL. FRYE, JUN. *Chief Clerk.*

To the Hon. ABNER LACOCK,  
*Chairman of the Committee on the subject of the Seminole war, in Senate of the U. S.*

No. 12.

WASHINGTON CITY, February 5, 1819.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the present date, enclosing a communication from the chairman of the committee of the Senate, requesting of you a copy of the letter addressed by Major White Young to Governor Masot, on the 27th April, 1818. Not having received a report from Major Young relative to the correspondence with Governor Masot, or his attack on the hostile Indians in the vicinity of Pensacola, the only information I possess on the subject is contained in the letter of Governor Bibb dated on the 19th of May, 1818, to which I beg leave to refer you.

On my return from Suwamy to St. Marks, I was informed (through the medium of Mr. Hambly) by the captain of a vessel direct from Pensacola, that a number of hostile Indians had assembled at that place. On interrogating the captain, he reluctantly stated that, at the time of his sailing, there were in Pensacola four hundred and fifty or five hundred Indians; that they had been fed and furnished with munitions of war, and were committing depredations on the persons and property of the citizens on the frontiers of Alabama, and also on the subjects of Spain. After receiving this information, I informed you, in my letter dated at St. Marks, on the 26th of April, that I should leave that place for Fort Gadsden in two or three days, and, after making all necessary arrangements for the security of the position occupied, and detaching a force to scour the country west of the Appalachicola, I should proceed direct to Nashville. I then ordered Captain Sands to Mobile, to prepare and hold in readiness a train of artillery, should circumstances arising out of facts disclosed render its use in the field necessary. On this occasion, as on all others, I thought it my duty to be prepared fully to execute my orders in putting an end to the conflict.

On my arrival at Fort Gadsden, my quartermaster general, Colonel George Gibson, who was charged with the defence of that post, handed me several letters, brought from Fort Montgomery by Major Hogan, from respectable citizens, confirming the report made by the captain of the schooner while at St. Marks, and detailing the murder of eighteen of our citizens on the Sepulger, and the destruction of a family near Fort Claiborne. Major Hogan also confirmed this information, and added that the citizens at Montgomery were fortifying themselves. Similar information was received from two gentlemen who arrived in a vessel laden with suttler's stores for the troops at Fort Gadsden, but whose names are not now recollected, and by the captains of the sloop Hector and barge Peacock, direct from Mobile. In addition to the foregoing, I was shown a letter (confidentially written) from a person of high respectability in Pensacola, detailing the facts as stated by the captain of the schooner at St. Marks.

This information, corroborated by so many persons, determined me to go in person to Pensacola; and I ordered Colonel Gibson forthwith to Mobile, with instructions to give every facility to Captain Sands in having the artillery secretly moved to Fort Montgomery, there to await my orders; and immediately organized a force sufficient for the execution of my orders under date of 26th December, 1817.

After crossing the Choctawhachy, I despatched an Indian guide with a soldier express to Fort Crawford, with orders to Colonel Gibson and Captain Sands, at Fort Montgomery, to move on the artillery, and form a junction with me after I crossed the Escambia river; which order was promptly executed. On my reaching the Escambia, I was met by Captain Boyle, express from Governor Bibb, with the letter of the 19th of May above mentioned, and, on reaching the west bank, received information that Holmes and his warriors were then in Pensacola, for which place I immediately marched. For my proceedings thereafter I refer you to my detailed report.

Should you wish information on any other points growing out of my military operations during that campaign, it will afford me much pleasure to give it to you.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON,  
Major General, commanding Southern Division.

The Hon. J. C. CALHOUN.

No. 13.

FORT COVINGTON, NEAR BALTIMORE, February 5, 1819.

SIR:

Yesterday I had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instant, on the subject of the late war with the Seminole Indians, and, in answer to your interrogatories, on all of which I am unable to give you the information required. I was, however, with the troops at Fort Scott, under the command of General Gaines, at the commencement of hostilities. I was never ordered with any detachment to remove the Indians from the lands of the United States. Brevet Major Twiggs, of the 7th regiment United States' infantry, commanded the first detachment that visited the Indian village called Fowltown, situated on the east side of Flint river, by the order of the general; the nature of his orders I know not, neither can I say who fired the first gun. I understood at the time, that, on the approach of our troops, the Indians fled from their houses to an adjacent swamp; they were fired on, and two warriors and, unfortunately, one woman were killed; there was one prisoner taken by the detachment; on its march to Fowltown, and who was afterwards confined as a prisoner at Fort Scott. This detachment brought, on their return, three or four Indian horses.

The second detachment that visited the village of Fowltown, was placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle, of the 7th infantry, who, on a near approach, detached me with a command to advance on the village by a different route from that which he took; my orders from him were to take prisoners, if possible, but if an attempt to escape was made, to fire; and to examine all the buildings for corn. We were, however, discovered when within two hundred yards, and the Indians took to flight, giving the war whoop, and firing alarm guns. Corn, cattle, and other provisions, I have no hesitation in saying, was the object of this visit. We had one or two wagons with the detachment, which were loading with corn from the cribs of the Indians, when an attack was commenced by them, in which we had one man killed; as the Indians fought in the edge of the swamp, their loss was not ascertained, otherwise than by their own acknowledgment, which was afterwards said to be five or six warriors killed. We brought off all the corn which we conveniently could, and, perhaps, fifteen or eighteen head of cattle, and a few horses. Previous to our return to Fort Scott, the detachment was halted on the Flint river, three miles from Fowltown, and twelve from Fort Scott, where they remained four or five days in building a small picket work, called Fort Hughes. The provisions thus taken was just sufficient for the support of the troops during their absence from Fort Scott.

The third and last visit paid the village by our troops, was during the absence of General Gaines, who was at Amelia Island. This detachment was also commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle, and, on our arrival, finding the place entirely abandoned by the Indians, it was destroyed by fire.

The horses taken by the detachment under Major Twiggs, as well as those taken by that under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Arbuckle, were considered of no value, but were ordered by the General to be turned into the quartermaster's hands. I afterwards saw some of them in his possession; others were claimed by the friendly Indians as their property, which were given up to them by the general's order. I believe, sir, that this is all the information which it is in my power to give on the subject that you have requested.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN N. McINTOSH, Captain 4th regt. U. S. Infantry.

The Hon. A. LACOCK.

No. 14.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, February 6, 1817.

SIR:

I understand that the 4th regiment of the United States' infantry, which, for some time past, has been stationed on the frontier of this State, near the junction of the Flint and Chatahoochee rivers, is ordered to Fort Mont-

gomery, on the waters of Mobile, and I have not heard of any other troops being ordered to supply their place. By this movement, not only the frontier of Georgia is left without defence, but the restless and dissatisfied part of the Creeks, who are concentrated within the Spanish line, and at no great distance from the post (Camp Crawford) lately occupied by the 4th regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Clinch, will be without any check, and, I have no doubt, will indulge their propensity for mischief, by acts of murder or rapine, upon defenceless travellers and frontier settlers. It is a fact well known to Lieutenant Colonel Clinch, and to every officer with him at Camp Crawford, that nothing has kept those Seminole Indians, who have been joined by the most inveterate of the hostile fellows from the upper towns in check, but the presence of the troops; and, if they are removed, some serious consequences are to be apprehended. Besides, it is very evident, that, by the removal of the troops from Camp Crawford and the neighboring country, that portion of the territory acquired by Jackson's treaty, as it is usually called, lying east of the Chatahoochee, and which, of course, falls to Georgia, will be abandoned to the Indians.

Against measures which, in my judgment, will produce these results, it is my duty, as chief magistrate of Georgia, to protest. I am very far, however, from believing that it is the intention of the President, with knowledge of the fact, to leave Georgia, as a frontier State, on the Indians, and the Spanish provinces of Florida, unprotected; and that if the removal of the troops, under Lieutenant Colonel Clinch has been by him deemed indispensable, he will order their place to be supplied by a competent force.

I have to request that the substance of this letter may be communicated to the President, and that his determination thereon may be transmitted to the Executive of Georgia, with as little delay as possible.

I am, sir, with high consideration and respect, your very obedient servant,

D. B. MITCHELL.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

No. 15.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, GEORGIA, MILLEDGEVILLE, *February 5, 1817.*

SIR:

Understanding that you are thus far on your way to Fort Montgomery, I avail myself of the present opportunity to communicate some facts, in the expectation that you will have it in your power, if your judgment approve, to adopt the measures I am about to propose.

You, no doubt, have already been informed that the notorious Woodbine has recently made his appearance again at the mouth of the Appalachicola, and that he has an agent now among the Seminole Indians and negroes in that quarter, stirring them up to acts of hostility against this country; and that Woodbine himself has gone in an armed vessel to some part of the West Indies for supplies. Connected with this fact is another, which may serve as an intimation of the future conduct of these people, when once in possession of the supplies, which, it is said, they expect on the return of Woodbine. About ten or twelve days ago, a small party of those Indians entered the frontier of Wayne county, and stole two horses and some cattle. They were pursued by some of the inhabitants, who peaceably demanded a restoration of the stolen property; and, instead of a compliance on the part of the Indians, they immediately fired upon the whites, who retired without returning a shot; one of the whites was mortally wounded.

Before this last circumstance came to my knowledge, I had addressed the acting Secretary of War, and desired the contents of my letter to be communicated to the President, in which I represented the evil consequences that were likely to result to Georgia, in particular, by the removal of the 4th regiment from camp Crawford, without their place was supplied by an adequate force from some other quarter; and requested the order for the removal of that regiment might be countermanded, or their place supplied. To this communication there has not yet been time to receive an answer. One object of my present address is to know if you cannot suspend the march of the 4th regiment until I can hear from the War Department, if you do not feel authorized or disposed to order them back to their former station at Camp Crawford. Another object of the present address grows out of the following fact: some of our people have gone over the Ockmulgee, and settled between that river and the line run under the late treaty with the Creeks, on or near Goose creek, of which the Indians complain. I have appointed an agent to go and order them off, and bring me the names of all such as refuse to move from the Indian land. I am doubtful, from the character of those intruders, that they will not remove without force is used to compel them; and it is doubtful whether I can legally apply that force, and the United States can. I have to request, if consistent with your duty, or the orders of the General Government, that you will order a detachment of troops to proceed to the spot, and remove those intruders. I am unwilling to give the Indians any just cause of complaint against us, and the more so, because I am determined, as long as I hold the station I now occupy, never to permit any aggression on their part to pass with impunity. I hold it a good rule, however, "to do as I would be done by," and am desirous of conforming to this rule in the present instance.

I am, sir, with high consideration and respect, your very obedient servant,

D. B. MITCHELL.

Major General EDMUND P. GAINES.

No. 16.

Having been summoned to attend a committee of the honorable the Senate of the United States, to give evidence touching the Seminole war, I did attend accordingly, and, after a verbal statement to, and examination by, the committee, the following questions were asked me, with a request that I would answer in writing:

First, as to "the origin of the Seminole war, and the Fowltown affair."

It is, no doubt, within the knowledge of the honorable the committee, that, during the late war with the British and Creeks, posts were established and occupied on the Appalachicola by British officers and agents, and a considerable force there organized for the purpose of annoying the southern frontier of the United States. It is also known that the hostile Indians of the Creek war, who had not embraced the terms of peace proposed by General Pinckney, and finally settled by the treaty of Fort Jackson, had taken shelter in the Floridas. From their resentment, and the motley crew collected by Nichols, much mischief was to be apprehended by the inhabitants on the frontier of Georgia; and the post of Fort Scott, situate in the fork of the Flint and Chatahoochee rivers, and near their junction, was established and occupied by a considerable force of United States' troops, for the protection of that frontier; and the same troops, with the aid of some naval force which ascended the Appalachicola, destroyed a fort about sixty miles below, built by Colonel Nichols, occupied and defended by negroes. The blowing up of this fort, with its negro garrison, (for, except a few Choctaw Indians, who were taken, it is believed that no other Indians were in the fort,) had a salutary influence in restraining the fugitives from the Creek war, and those under the influence of Nichols and his partisans. I say the fugitives from the Creek war and the partisans of Nichols, because it is well understood that the Seminoles took no part in the Creek war, unless the receipt of goods, &c. from Nichols or his sub-agents be considered as proof of this fact; but the truth is, they will receive presents from any party, without any intention of adopting his projects; and such, I have no doubt, was the case with the Seminoles upon this occasion. The troops occupying Fort Scott were, however, soon after removed, and the post abandoned, or so nearly so, that it was in the power of the Indians, at any time, to have destroyed it. Filling, at that time, the executive chair of Georgia, I addressed the then Secretary of War on the subject of the removal of the troops, pointing out some of the evils which were likely to result, and urging the necessity of the re-occupation of the post by a respectable force. To this communication an answer was received, by which I was informed that, although it was the intention of the Government to concentrate a respectable force further to the west, yet it never was contemplated to leave the frontier of Georgia exposed.

The peace of the frontier of Georgia has always been exposed and disturbed, more or less, by acts of violence, committed as well by the whites as the Indians; and a spirit of retaliation has mutually prevailed. These petty



acts of aggression were increased and multiplied by a set of lawless and abandoned characters, who had taken refuge on both sides of the St. Mary's river, living principally by plunder. I believe the first outrage committed on the frontier of Georgia, after the treaty of Fort Jackson, was by these banditti, who plundered a party of the Seminole Indians, on their way to Georgia for the purpose of trade, and killed one of them. This produced retaliation on the part of the Indians, and hence the killing of Mrs. Garrett and her child. The evidence of these plunderings and murders is on the files of the Executive of Georgia.

Early in March, 1817, I resigned the Government of Georgia, and accepted my present appointment; and, in July, of the same year, called a general meeting of the Creek nation, at Fort Hawkins. At this meeting I endeavored to impress upon the minds of the Indians the necessity, on their part, of preserving peace; that many of the people of the lower towns had been led astray by evil counsel; had received presents from the British agent, Colonel Nichols; and, although it was acknowledged that they had not taken an active part with the Red Sticks in the Creek war, yet their conduct had made them, in some measure, obnoxious to the friendly part of their own nation, and to the United States; and that it was the duty of the friendly chiefs to reclaim those people, and restrain the restless spirits among them, whose conduct might eventually, if not checked in time, bring them into much trouble, if not utter ruin; assuring them, at the same time, that the United States would punctually fulfil all their engagements with them, of which I had then given them substantial proof; and that all, except murderers, who should return to their duty, and renew their friendly relations with the nation, should receive protection and forgiveness.

I state these particulars on account of their connexion with what immediately follows: About the last of August of the same year, say something more than one month after the meeting at Fort Hawkins, I received a letter from Major Twigg, then at Fort Scott, dated the 4th of that month, written, as he says, at the request of the chiefs of three towns near that place, expressive of their willingness to agree to the talk delivered by me, in July, at Fort Hawkins. A copy of Major Twigg's letter, and the memorandum enclosed therein, is herewith exhibited. Of the three towns referred to, the Fowltown was one; but, before I had an opportunity of sending for those chiefs, or of taking any measures for meeting their proposition, General Gaines arrived with a detachment of troops from the west, sent for the chief of Fowltown, and for his contumacy in not immediately appearing before him, the town was attacked and destroyed by the troops of the United States, by order of General Gaines. This fact was, I conceive, the immediate cause of the Seminole war. The reasons assigned for the destruction of Fowltown, in addition to the contumacy of the chief, were, the refusal of the chiefs of the Seminoles to give up some murderers, and the hostile aspect which they had assumed. Of this demand and refusal I know nothing more than what has been published; but truth compels me to say, that, before the attack on Fowltown, aggressions of this kind were as frequent on the part of the whites as on the part of the Indians, the evidence of which can be furnished from the files of the Executive of Georgia, to which I have before referred.

The second question put by the committee is, "the organization of McIntosh's brigade, how and by whom done, with a roster of the field and other officers; with the notice thereof given to the War Department; what answer, if any, was received?"

At the meeting at Fort Hawkins, in July, 1817, Colonel Brearly, of the 7th infantry, attended, and stated to me that he was directed by General Gaines to apply for the assistance or services of General McIntosh and five or six hundred of his friendly warriors, in case he should go against the Seminoles. I immediately communicated the application to the chiefs in council, and received for answer that they would leave that business to McIntosh and myself. I then told McIntosh that he must hold himself and his warriors in readiness to join the United States' troops whenever ordered. This he readily agreed to. Whether I received a written communication from General Gaines upon this subject or not, I do not recollect; but I was told by some one that he had written to McIntosh for his assistance. However, before a call was made on the warriors to take the field, I received a letter from the then acting Secretary of War, communicating the fact to me that General Gaines was prohibited from crossing the Spanish line, without a special order from that Department. This I considered as notice, or rather as an order, to me not to permit the friendly warriors to cross the line under sanction of, or in the service of, the United States. This letter, I think, I received some time in November; and a meeting of the chiefs having been called by the Little Prince, to take into consideration the affair of Fowltown, I informed them of the determination of the Government in this particular, and desired them to remain quiet until they heard from me again. This meeting was held in December, at the Broken Arrow, on the Chatahochee; and, on my return to the Agency, I fell in with General Gaines, to whom I communicated the contents of the Acting Secretary's letter, and the course I had taken with the Indians. The General then informed me that he had received the order spoken of, but that, from the representations he had made, he did not doubt but that the prohibition to crossing the Spanish line would be removed. I had appointed another meeting with the Indians, to take place at the Agency, at the end of twenty-five days, expecting to hear from the War Department in the mean time; but, upon the subject of crossing the Spanish line, I received no immediate answer. A meeting was accordingly held at the Agency, which commenced on the 9th of January, 1818, at which Colonel Brearly attended; and, although he brought no communication in writing from General Gaines, yet he informed me that he knew the prohibition to crossing the Spanish line had been withdrawn, and that General Gaines had ordered him to muster as many of the friendly Indians into service as were willing to engage. Arrangements were immediately made, and a day assigned, for enrolling the friendly warriors, and Colonel Brearly attended at Fort Mitchell, for that purpose, and there mustered the greater part of them. Some companies were mustered into service at several other places, which were more convenient for the purpose, owing to the local situation of the Indians. The first organization was that of a regiment; but, on getting into the field, they were recognised by General Jackson as a brigade. All these proceedings were communicated to the War Department, from time to time, to some of which answers were received, and some not. The rolls made out on mustering the brigade out of service are in the office of the Paymaster General, or, at least, were sent to that office by me. The staff of the brigade consisted of one brigadier general, two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, two majors, one assistant adjutant general, four assistant commissaries of purchases, and one aid-de-camp, who was omitted in the muster roll. The force of the brigade about fifteen hundred strong.

The third question put by the committee, is, "The force of the hostile Seminole Indians."

From the best accounts I have been able to receive, from Indians and others, I have never estimated the number of the Seminoles at more than seven hundred warriors, and I doubt whether they have that number, exclusive of those towns on the Chatahochee who were considered hostile during that war. The negroes have been estimated at two hundred and fifty or three hundred effective. When McIntosh and his warriors were mustered at Fort Mitchell, he divided his force, and, with that part which he retained under his own command, he descended the Chatahochee on the western bank, and, on reaching the town called Red Ground, encountered their chief and warriors. In this affair he took fifty-three warriors, and one hundred and thirty women and children. The chief made his escape, with a few warriors. Colonel Lovett, with the rest of the warriors mustered at Fort Mitchell, descended the Chatahochee on the eastern bank, and, General McIntosh crossing the river below the fork, the two detachments united on their march to Mickasuky, where they all joined General Jackson. At Mickasuky the Indians had generally fled, and but few were found at the town. On the march to Suwanee, McIntosh, with his warriors, encountered about two hundred of the hostile party, under Peter McQueen, of whom he killed thirty-seven, and made six warriors and one hundred and six women and children prisoners. The next enemy they engaged were the negroes at Sauvannee, amounting to about two hundred and fifty, of whom eleven or twelve were killed, and three made prisoners. The Indians of this part of the country fled before the army, and here ended the Seminole campaign, as far as the Indians were concerned. I will here observe, that the Mickasuky Indians are not considered by the Creek nation as Seminoles. Those Indians under Bowlegs are the only ones considered by them as Seminoles, although, in speaking generally of the Seminoles, in relation to the Seminole war, I include all the Indians who had any share in that war.

Being asked what became of the prisoners taken by McIntosh, I answer, they were generally sent into the nation, and are now there.

D. B. MITCHELL.

## No. 2.

FORT SCOTT, August 4, 1817.

SIR:

Some of the chiefs of the lower towns on the Chatahoochee met at this place to-day. The chiefs of three towns were present, who had not been to Fort Hawkins at the time the stipend was delivered to them. They requested me to forward their names, and the names of their towns, to you, and to inform you that the talk given to the Indians at that place they would agree to.

With respect, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS, Major Commanding.

I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original, now in my possession, 22d February, 1819.

D. B. MITCHELL, Agent for Indian Affairs.

## No. 3.

Towns.	Chiefs.	
Con-chatee,	{	Wacksee Micco,
Choco-nuklee,		Capetan Micco,
Oche-see,		Tallessee Tustunnuggee,
		Cow Merchant,
		Tuskeenehau.
		Holoth Emauthlau.*

I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original memorandum enclosed to me in the foregoing letter, by Major Twigg, 22d February, 1819.

D. B. MITCHELL, Agent for Indian Affairs.

## No. 17.

ROBERT BUTLER, Adjutant General of the southern division of the army of the United States, being duly sworn, testifies, that, in the summer of 1817, Mr. John Donnelson, of the neighborhood of Nashville, went to Pensacola and purchased lots of land there, with the approbation of the Governor. That the deponent has heard that Mr. James Jackson, of Nashville, was concerned with him, and was the only person concerned. He also understood that Donnelson's first view in going to Pensacola was for the benefit of his health. That Mr. Donnelson is nephew of General Jackson's wife. That he does not know the amount of Donnelson's purchase. That he does not know, nor does he believe, that General Jackson had, or expected to have, any interest in said purchase; nor did he ever hear it suggested.

The deponent further saith, that there were two regiments of mounted gun-men, volunteers, raised by General Jackson in January, 1818. That General Jackson appointed the colonels, and most or all of the field officers. That Colonel Haynes appointed the platoon and staff officers. That there were also two companies of volunteers, called life guards, who appointed their own officers, and tendered their services to the General, by whom they were accepted. That, according to the best of the deponent's recollection, the Governor of Tennessee was at Nashville at the time the officers of the gun-men were appointed.

That General Jackson's first determination to go to Pensacola was made at Fort Gadsden, after his return from Suwamy, and was made in consequence of information that there were, on or about the 15th of April, five hundred hostile Indians at Pensacola, who received ammunition and provisions from the Governor; and, also, information of several murders having been committed on the Federal Road. That, on the march to Pensacola, General Jackson told the deponent, that if, on his arrival, he found the information true, he would demand the surrender of the place. That, at Fort Gadsden, General Jackson saw a letter, which deponent thinks was from Innerarity, one of the house of Forbes, Leslie, & Co. at Pensacola, to Doyle, a trader, then at Fort Gadsden, giving information as to the number of Indians at Pensacola. That the letter also stated, that the property of the people of Pensacola was every day depredated on by the Indians. That, when General Jackson formed the determination to go to Pensacola, he ordered Lieutenant Sands to Mobile, to prepare artillery, to meet him after he should have crossed the Escambia, on his march to Pensacola, which order was executed.

That, at the time the army attacked Mickasuky, there were not more than five hundred Indian warriors embodied; nor does the deponent believe there were, at any time during the war, more than five or six hundred embodied at any one place. That, from the nature of the subject, this statement must be conjectural. That the enemy's warriors were in general well armed. That deponent was told there were about thirteen hundred souls at Suwamy, of which two hundred and fifty or three hundred were fighting men. That our army had one man killed and four wounded, in actions with the Indians, during the campaign, and two killed at the Barancas.

Deponent further says, that General Jackson received, from a private source, a plan of the fortress of St. Augustine; and, as the deponent believes, it was sent to the General, at St. Marks, or Fort Gadsden, after his return from Suwamy.

That General Jackson had under his command, in Florida, about eighteen hundred militia, volunteers, and regulars, and fifteen hundred Indians under McIntosh. That these Indians were received into the service while General Gaines commanded, and were regularly mustered, in and out of service, by the United States' officers.

## No. 18.

Colonel GEORGE GIBSON, of the United States' army, being duly sworn, testifies and says, that he acted as quartermaster general in General Jackson's campaign against the Seminoles. That, on the 29th day of January, 1818, at New Orleans he received an order from General Jackson to procure, and bring to Fort Scott a supply of rations, ordnance, and quartermasters, and hospital stores. That he joined the General at Fort Gadsden, on the 25th of March. That the general then placed him in command of the post, with orders to send stores round to Fort St. Marks, which was done. That, in April, Major Hogan, paymaster, joined the army. He brought information of the murders committed in Alabama, and on the Sapulgas, a branch of the Conecub by the Indians. About the same time information was brought by the sloop Hector to Fort Gadsden, from Mobile, that a large number of Indians were in Pensacola. This was confirmed by Captain Rogers of the Peacock from Mobile. In consequence of this information, the deponent held the transportation in readiness, and sent thirty-three thousand rations to Fort Scott, believing, from the information he had, that the army would move to the West. On the arrival of General Jackson the deponent gave him the above-mentioned information, and a number of letters on the subject of the Indian war to the westward of the Appalachicola. That, on the 6th of May, the General ordered the deponent to Mobile, by water, with instructions to send artillery and ammunition to Fort Montgomery, and to be there ready himself to meet him with artillery, forage, and provisions. The general was to advise the deponent by express of the point at which he was to meet him. That the deponent accordingly received an express, and met the general twelve miles from Pensacola. The deponent further says, that he thinks it probable, that news of the assemblage of Indians at Pensacola reached General Jackson at or near St. Marks, by a schooner which went from Pensacola, and was sent by Innerarity, and was a trading schooner loaded with sutlers' stores. That she arrived at Fort Gadsden after leaving St. Marks between the 1st and 4th of May. That Lieutenant Sands was sent from St. Marks to Mobile for ammunition and artillery, as deponent understood and believes, and conducted it to an artillery officer. That the army entered Pensacola on the day after the deponent joined, viz: on the 23d of May.

That the deponent was at New Orleans at the time Captain Call was sent to Pensacola in February. That the schooner Italiana arrived in Pensacola in January with a load of provisions from the contractor which were landed at Pensacola, and the duties paid by Innerarity. That a few months before this the contractor had been refused

\* The chief of Fowltown.

permission to send provisions up the Escambia, and had been obliged to carry them by land from Fort Montgomery to Fort Crawford. That, in the opinion of the deponent, it was impracticable to supply Fort Crawford in the winter by land, and as that place was in a suffering condition for want of provisions, the attempt was renewed by water. That it is about sixty miles from Fort Montgomery to Fort Crawford. That Arbuthnot's schooner, as deponent understood, was given by him to Colonel Brady, who assisted him in his trial, and was sold, as he heard, for about three or four hundred dollars.

No. 19.

*Statement of Doctor Bronaugh.*

I was attached to General Jackson's staff during the whole Seminole campaign. At St. Marks the general received information, by a vessel from Pensacola, of a large number of Indians having collected there; where they were furnished with provisions, arms, and munitions of war. Believe that Captain Sands was sent from St. Marks for Mobile, in quest of a train of artillery, to have it at Fort Montgomery, subject to the general's orders. I understood from the general that he would have all his arrangements made and entered into, that every thing might be in complete readiness, provided he should ultimately come to the conclusion to visit Pensacola. I am impressed with the belief that an actual determination to occupy this place, and the Barancas, was never formed until the protest of Governor Masot was received on the line of march.

J. C. BRONAUGH, *U. S. Army.*

No. 20.

RICHARD K. CALL, Captain United States' 1st infantry, acting as an aid to General Jackson, being duly sworn, testifies and says, that, in the campaign against the Seminoles, he first joined General Jackson at Fort Gadsden, and afterwards, on the arrival of the Tennessee volunteers, he joined him again near St. Marks; that he understood that General Jackson determined upon going to Pensacola, on hearing that the Governor of that place had protested against the passage of supplies up the Escambia river, and in consequence of subsequent information relative to the assemblage of Indians at Pensacola; that the deponent had been at Pensacola by orders of Colonel Trimble, commanding at New Orleans; that he arrived there on the 21st of February, 1818, and remained there till the 26th; that his orders were to obtain a passage for supplies up the Escambia to Fort Crawford; that the Governor of Pensacola stated to the deponent, that he considered it unsafe for him to give the privilege asked for, as he was under great apprehensions, if he did so, the Indians would take possession of St. Marks, or give the Spaniards in that place great annoyance; that deponent made report of the above to Colonel Trimble, and also gave information of this protest or objection of the Governor to General Jackson; that, on the return of the army from Suwaney, Lieutenant Sands was sent from St. Marks to Mobile for cannon; that, at Fort Gadsden or St. Marks, deponent heard that General Jackson had a letter from Innerarity to Doyle or Hambly, informing that there were a number of hostile Indians at Pensacola; the number he thinks was said to be five hundred.

Deponent further says, that Arbuthnot's schooner was given by him to Colonel William Brady, who, as the deponent understood, defended him before the court-martial; that he does not know what became of the property on board of the schooner, consisting of skins and some wearing apparel, among which was Ambrister's uniform; that the property taken at Suwaney consisted principally of horses and cattle; that the army subsisted on the cattle, and that the other property was given to the friendly Indians; that the negroes taken were given to the Indians; that, as he understood, Colonel Arbuckle gave fifty dollars a head to the Indians for every negro delivered to him at Fort Gadsden, intending to deliver them to their owners when called for. Deponent further says, that General Starks, from Georgia, purchased some of the surrendered property.

No. 21.

*Statement of John H. Eaton.*

Some time in the fall of 1817, I proposed to Mr. James Jackson of Nashville, to join with me in the purchase of lots in Pensacola, and lands in and about there: he united with me; and six other gentlemen were afterwards associated. We employed John Donnelson (who became also concerned) to proceed to Pensacola and make the purchases, taking care not to extend them beyond sixteen thousand dollars. My inducement to making this adventure was, that I believed the country would ultimately belong to the United States, and I was impressed with the belief that it would be at no distant period; this, however, was a mere impression, and founded on information derived from no source except my own opinions.

I proposed asking a letter of introduction from General Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola, which the general gave; this was thought by us necessary from a knowledge that the Indians frequently interrupted American citizens while in that city; and this danger we believed would be avoided by having the protection of the Governor, which we supposed could and would be attained by introductory letters from respectable sources. I think it was sometime in November that Mr. Donnelson proceeded on his mission from Nashville, in company with a Mr. Gordon, who we employed to go with him.

The purchases were made, consisting of a number of unimproved lots in Pensacola, sixty acres of ground adjoining the town, on the lower side, and about two thousand acres on the bay two or three miles out. The deeds I have seen, and are now at Nashville, written in the Spanish language, made to Mr. Donnelson, and by him since conveyed to the eight gentlemen interested originally. Mr. Donnelson stated to me that his first purchase was refused to be acquiesced in by the Governor of Pensacola, alleging that American citizens should not buy lands there; his objection, however, was withdrawn afterwards, and Mr. Donnelson was permitted to go on and complete his purchases.

I aver that General Jackson is not, nor ever was, in any manner concerned with this company; nor was it entered into from any conversation, hint, or opinion ever given by General Jackson, but arose entirely from the circumstances first stated in this affidavit—the belief that the country would, ere long, belong to this Government; and that, if so, the speculation would prove a beneficial one.

The eight gentlemen concerned are as follows:

James Jackson, Sen.  
James Jackson, Jun.  
John H. Eaton,  
John C. McLemore,

John McCray,  
John Jackson,  
Thos. Childress,  
John Donnelson.

The above gentlemen bearing the same name are in nowise connected or related to General Jackson; the general, in fact, has no relatives; all his family having perished during the revolutionary war, in this country, as I have ever understood. Mr. Donnelson is nephew to Mrs. Jackson, the wife of General Jackson.

Question. Did you have any conversation with General Jackson before or after getting his orders to go to the Seminole war.

Answer. After getting his orders I did not; shortly after our association was formed I saw General Jackson, and named to him what had been done; and his remark was, that he had no doubt but that our project would turn out advantageously, or in words to this effect; but General Jackson's opinion rested on no better foundation than our own, a belief prevailing through the country at that time that the country was about to be ceded. Many purchases were made in Pensacola last fall, I have understood, founded, no doubt, on this general public impression.

Sworn to:

JNO. H. EATON.

No. 22.

*Colonel King to Major General Jackson.*

Sir:

PENSACOLA, October 15, 1818.

Captain Boyles returned to this place on the 13th, having been wounded in an affair with a party of hostile Indians near the Choctawhatchy.

He reports, that, on the 6th instant, he left his boats in Yellow Water, and, with a detachment of twenty-two men on foot, pursued a party of Indians whose track he had discovered. He overtook them on the 8th, about twenty-five in number, attacked and defeated them, killing four, wounding many, and making some prisoners. A large quantity of ammunition, and all their plunder, fell into his hands.

The following morning, just before day, the party defeated the day before, supposed to have been reinforced, attacked him in his camp; but he succeeded in repulsing them with loss, notwithstanding one half of his men fled at the first onset, and were never again brought into action. In this affair, the captain himself received a musket ball in his side, and had one of his men dangerously wounded; this, together with the want of provisions, compelled him to return to Pensacola, bringing with him sixteen prisoners. He reports to have made seven scalps during the expedition.

The rangers being very much fatigued, I shall permit them to rest a few days. I hope Captain Boyles will be sufficiently recovered to resume his command. I shall then once more order him to the Choctawhatchy, where he is of opinion a party is concealed, of from forty to fifty warriors, who have resolved never to surrender, confiding in the expected return of the Spaniards, when they are sure of protection and supplies, and will again commence their depredations on our settlements. This expedition, I flatter myself, of Captain Boyles's will disappoint and render them harmless, before the province is evacuated.

I cannot close this communication without again calling your attention to the meritorious conduct of Captain Boyles. In zeal, activity, and perseverance, he is surpassed by no partisan I have ever known.

W. KING, *Colonel 4th Regiment.*

Major General ANDREW JACKSON, *Commanding Division of the South.*

*Major Fanning, Commanding St. Marks, to Major General Gaines.*

FORT ST. MARKS, EAST FLORIDA, *November 27, 1818.*

SIR:

From an Indian family arrived here yesterday, from Tampa bay, I learn that the Seminoles have received from St. Augustine ten pack-horse loads of ammunition, and that it was distributed among them sixteen days ago. That an English trading vessel was at Tampa a month since. Some provisions and ammunition were procured from her by the enemy. That, ten days past, two English trading vessels were at Snake island, not far from the mouth of Sukaney river.

Thus, there can be but little doubt of the Seminoles being now well supplied with ammunition and provisions.

The Spaniards recommended to the enemy united and vigorous operations against us, telling them that they themselves were going to take St. Marks, which they expected to do without fighting, in the same manner it was taken from them. That from St. Marks they would go to Fort Gadsden, where they expected some little resistance, and finally to Pensacola.

These circumstances have put new life among the Sukaney Indians, but Kinbajah says he has heard such talks too long, and that he will collect his people and go back to his old situation, and be on friendly terms with the United States. The other Indians who left their towns and went to Sukaney, during our last campaign, are moving, or about to move, back again, and wish to have nothing further to do with the war.

There is too much appearance of truth in this relation, not to deserve attention; and, in conformity to the spirit of the general order of the 16th September, I shall not give up this post to the Spaniards, should they arrive, until I may be convinced of the falsehood of the report respecting their conduct, or until I may receive orders so to do from superior authority.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. C. W. FANNING, *Major U. S. Army, Commanding St. Marks.*

Major General E. P. GAINES,  
*Commanding 6th and 7th Military Departments, Fort Hawkins, or elsewhere.*

Certified: DANIEL E. BURCH, *Aid-de-camp.*

*Extract of a letter from General Andrew Jackson to the Secretary of War, dated*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, *November 28, 1818.*

I enclose you a copy of a letter from Colonel King, detailing a conflict between Captain Boyles, of the Rangers, and a detachment of hostile warriors. The conduct of the captain, in this affair, was meritorious, and I trust, ere this, he has recovered from his wound, and disappointed the hopes of the warriors of the Choctawhatchy. A short time since, every mail from the south reported the pleasing intelligence of the general submission of the Seminoles; the cause of the reassumption of hostilities is stated in the colonel's communication. The fact that the news of the restoration of Pensacola to Spain had revived their hopes, and again excited them to war, is an additional evidence of the propriety of my operations in the Floridas, and has confirmed me in my unalterable opinion, that the Seminole conflict could not have been terminated by any other means than those adopted. My only apprehensions are, that my operations were not sufficiently extensive to insure permanent tranquillity in the south. St. Augustine is still in possession of the Spaniards, and the whole peninsula is beyond the control of our garrisons. The situation of Florida, in relation to our country, is peculiar, and demands the early attention of our Government. Bordering almost on the Creek nation, and within the vicinity of the four southern tribes of Indians, her territory will always prove an asylum to the disaffected and restless savage, as well as to a more dangerous population, unless some energetic Government can be established to control or exclude these interlopers. The savages and negroes who have not submitted to our authority have fled east of the Suwaney river, and whether settled in the Atochaway plains, near St. Augustine, or more southwardly, we have yet to learn. Their force, no doubt, is too inconsiderable to create any serious disturbances with this country; but, if unmolested, they may acquire confidence with their strength, and prove a destructive enemy to our frontier settlers. They should be pursued before they recover from the panic of our last operations.

I submit to your consideration military operations for this spring, connected with the occupancy of the bay of Tampa. The plan proposed is to embark, from Fort Gadsden or Pensacola, five hundred regulars, for the bay of Tampa, together with a force, say one hundred and fifty or two hundred men, adequate to the maintaining of the work to be constructed at that point. Simultaneous with this movement, to push a force of five or six hundred men up to the St. John's, and occupy a position at or near the old Indian town Pecolota. This force, as soon as strongly fortified, to be actively employed in scouring the country as far west as Suwaney, forcing to, or receiving the submission of the hostile Indians, who will be sent into the interior of the Creek nation. The troops detached to the bay of Tampa having constructed a suitable work, having reconnoitered the neighboring country, and destroyed Woodbine's negro establishment, to march to the position occupied on the St. John's, deviating only where Indian villages or settlements (if there are any in the country) invite their attention. From the best information I can collect, the march from Tampa to the point proposed on the St. John's would not exceed seven days. Each man, from my own experience, can march with eight days' rations on his back, which, with due economy, will last twelve—time sufficient to perform the operation intended. The expense of the expedition would be trifling, as it is proposed that none but regulars should be employed, and the advantage to the nation incalculable, as finally crushing savage hostilities in the south, and affording active service to some of our regiments who have grown sluggish from the inactivity of garrison duties.

*Major General Gaines to Governor Coppinger.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, AMELIA ISLAND, December 28, 1818.

SIR:

I have received information that Augustus Santee, a sergeant of the United States' artillery, who had obtained from his commanding officer a temporary leave of absence, was a few days since fired on, arrested, and imprisoned, by a party of armed men at St. John's, headed by a person assuming the rank and character of a Spanish officer.

It is likewise reported, that two citizens of the United States were by the same party fired on, wounded, and imprisoned; and that the perpetrators of this outrage, with a view to shelter their conduct under the veil of Spanish authority, took the sergeant and citizen by force towards St. Augustine, whither it was understood they were to be carried, under a pretext that they would there be arraigned and tried as offenders.

Presuming that the information given me upon this subject is correct, I hasten to demand of you the immediate liberation of the sergeant and citizens thus arrested, wounded, and imprisoned, within your Government.

Major James M. Glassell, of the general staff of the army of the United States, is instructed to hand you this letter, and to take charge of, and order to this place, the persons confined; and, by this officer, I shall expect to receive from you a proper explanation, with the assurance that the perpetrators of this outrage will be punished as its enormity demands.

I have the honor to be, &c.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General by Brevet, Commanding.*

To His Excellency Governor COPPINGER, *St. Augustine.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, FERNANDINA, E. F. December 29, 1818.

SIR:

I have received information from several persons, lately from St. Augustine, that a party of armed men, headed by a person called Captain Miller, assuming the rank and authority of a Spanish officer, about the 23d instant, fired upon Augustus Santee, a sergeant of the United States' artillery, with two citizens of the State of Georgia. The sergeant had obtained a short leave of absence, to accompany his brother on a visit to St. John's. This brother and the other citizen are reported to have been badly wounded. The sergeant and one of his companions (the other being unable to travel) were seen on the 24th, marching under guard towards St. Augustine.

I have addressed a note to Governor Coppinger, demanding the immediate liberation of the sergeant and other persons confined; a copy is enclosed herewith, marked No. 1.

The Captain Miller above mentioned is reported to be a deserter from our service; he is, nevertheless, understood to be a captain of the Florida militia, and to have acted under the authority of the Spanish Government.

The sergeant was absent without my knowledge; the unfortunate citizens who were wounded are represented to be disorderly men, and are suspected of having gone to Florida with a design to arrest some fugitive offender who had escaped from prison in Georgia. This impression, however, appears to be founded only in vague rumor. Be this as it may, there is, notwithstanding, much ground to believe that the Spanish authorities only want the means to enable them to give us open and unequivocal proofs of their settled hostility, and intimate connexion with our red enemies. In support of this opinion, I enclose herewith, No. 2, a copy of a letter from Major Fanning, commanding St. Marks, received by the last mail. By this it appears, from Indian testimony, that the Spaniards at St. Augustine, with all their affected purity, have lately furnished hostile Indians, at the bay of Tampa, with ten horse-loads of ammunition, recommending to them united and vigorous operations against us. I shall hold myself in readiness to do what can be done with the limited means under my control, and shall strike at any force that may present itself.

Permit me to request, that an officer of the quartermaster general's department may be ordered to join me, with the sum of twenty thousand dollars, for defraying the expenses of that department; and that a battalion of infantry may be ordered to this place, in addition to my present command.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

The Honorable J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

[Mr. LACOCK communicated the following additional documents to the Senate, March 3, 1819.]

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1819.

On an examination before the Special Committee of the Senate, on the subject of the Seminole war, I was told by the honorable Mr. Burrell, one of the committee, that what he (Mr. Burrell) then took down of my testimony was a memorandum; and if used, that my deposition should be written out, and submitted to me for correction. The deposition was not submitted; but was sent at once to the printer, who, believing that several words were omitted, sent it to me for revision. I then waited on two of the committee, Mr. Lacock and Mr. Burrell, and obtained leave to strike out a part; but they would not permit me to make any additions. The parts struck out were not material. What I wished to add was the substance of an order, the following extract from which I beg leave to make a part of this deposition.

GEORGE GIBSON.

*Extract of an order to Colonel Gibson, dated*

CAMP, twenty-six miles east of St. Marks, 24th April, 1818.

General McIntosh and his warriors will be at Fort Scott, and will probably take much of the supplies ordered up, and as the Tennessee volunteers will pass from Gadsden to that point, he wishes you to despatch a boat with a further supply, and should the corn have arrived from New Orleans last ordered, you will forward a considerable quantity also to enable the volunteer's horses to reach Fort Hawkins.

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General.*

The order from which this extract is made, together with the order from which the following is extracted, were submitted through Mr. Eaton to the committee. I beg leave also to make the second extract a part of this deposition, to wit:

*Extract of another letter to Colonel Gibson, dated before*

St. Marks, April 9, 1818.

This is caused by one of those deluded wretches who have asked for peace, and it is granted them. Seventeen men, eighteen women, and thirty children, have surrendered; and they ask permission to pass by water to Fort Gadsden. This is granted them, and they will remain here until the runner returns by whom you will write to the commanding officer of St. Marks, Captain Vashon, under what badge you will know them.

ANDREW JACKSON.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, to wit:

On this 3d day of March, 1819, George Gibson personally appeared before the subscriber, a justice of the peace in and for the county aforesaid, and made oath, in due form of law, that the matters and things, as set forth in the annexed statement, are true as stated.

Sworn before

JOSEPH FORREST.

ROBERT BUTLER, adjutant general of the Southern division of the army of the United States, being duly sworn, testifies, that, in the summer or fall of 1817, Mr. John Donnelson, of the neighborhood of Nashville, went to Pensacola, and purchased lots of land there, with the approbation of the Government; that the deponent had heard that Mr. James Jackson, of Nashville, was concerned with him, and was the only person concerned; he also understood that Donnelson's first view in going to Pensacola was for the benefit of his health; that Mr. Donnelson is nephew of General Jackson's wife; that he does not know the amount of Donnelson's purchase; that he does not know, nor does he believe, that General Jackson had, or expected to have, any interest in said purchase, nor did he ever hear it even suggested.

The deponent further saith that, on the 10th January, 1818, General Jackson addressed a circular to the old volunteer officers, to raise volunteers for the Seminole campaign, in which the following clause is found: "The grade of the officers to be determined by themselves, or the platoon officers of the regiment. The officers raising companies to command." The deponent has heard that an election was held, and the rank of the field officers established in that way, and not appointed by General Jackson, as stated in the deponent's affidavit, before the committee of the Senate, as positive, when the deponent then stated it as matter of opinion only. Also, that the Governor of Tennessee was at Nashville, which appears, from reference to papers, was not the case. The deponent further states that General Jackson received information at St. Marks on his return from Suwaney; that there were about five hundred hostile Indians at Pensacola who received ammunition and provisions from the Governor. In consequence of which the general ordered Lieutenant Sands of the artillery to Mobile to hold two field pieces of field artillery in readiness for his orders. On the arrival of the army at Fort Gadsden the General received information of several murders having been committed on the Federal Road, and was shown a letter, said to be private, from a gentleman at Pensacola to Mr. Doyle, as the deponent believes, stating that a large number of Indians were in Pensacola, and depredating on the property of the citizens; this information determined the general to change his route for Tennessee by Pensacola, and orders were given to Colonel Gibson to proceed to Mobile, and afford Lieutenant Sands every facility in moving the artillery to Fort Montgomery to await the general's order, which was given, on nearing the Escambia, by express, requiring the artillery to form a junction with the army, after crossing that river, which was executed. The general remarked to the deponent, on march to Pensacola, that, if he found the information true on reaching that place, he would demand a surrender of it; and the deponent believes that the determination of the general to occupy Pensacola and Barancas was made on receiving the protest of the Governor, and learning that his provisions were stopped by him at the former place. That, at the time the army attacked Mickasuky, there were not more than five hundred Indian warriors embodied, nor does the deponent believe there were, at any time during the war, more than five or six hundred embodied at any one place; that, from the nature of the subject, this statement must be conjectural; that the enemy's warriors were in general well armed; that deponent was told there were about thirteen hundred souls at Suwaney, of which two hundred and fifty, or three hundred, were fighting men; that our army had one man killed, and four wounded, in actions with the Indians during the campaign, and two killed at the Barancas. Deponent further says, that General Jackson received from a private source a plan of the fortress of St. Augustine; and, as the deponent believes, it was sent to the general at St. Marks, or Fort Gadsden, after his return from Suwaney; that General Jackson had under his command in Florida, from recollection, about eighteen hundred regulars, volunteers and militia, and about fifteen hundred Indians under McIntosh; and that the Indians were received and mustered into the service of the United States, under the orders of Brevet Major General Gaines, and mustered out of service under orders of Major General Jackson, by a regular officer.

This deponent deems it due to himself to state that the deposition published with the report of the committee of the Senate, under his name, was not written by him, but was taken down by Mr. Burrell of that committee, and a promise given to the deponent that, when it was thrown into form, it would be submitted for correction and signature, which was not done, although the committee were twice informed, by one of its members, at the request of this deponent, that parts thereof were *not correct*, hence the deponent was not able to give the necessary correction which he would have done from an examination of papers, and necessary reflection.

ROBERT BUTLER.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, *to wit:*

On this 3d day of March, 1819, Robert Butler personally appeared before the undersigned, a justice of the peace in and for the county aforesaid, and made oath on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, that the matters and things, as set forth in the foregoing, are true as stated.

Sworn before

JOSEPH FORREST.

[On the 23d of February, 1820, Mr. Rufus King presented to the Senate the following memorial and documents:]

*Memorial of Andrew Jackson, Major General in the Army of the United States, and Commander of the Southern Division.*

*To the Honorable the Senate of the United States:*

On the 18th of December, 1818, your honorable body resolved "that the message of the President, and documents relative to the Seminole war, be referred to a select committee, who shall have authority, if necessary, to send for persons and papers; that said committee inquire relative to the advance of the United States' troops into West Florida; whether the officers in command at Pensacola and St. Marks were amenable to, and under the control of, Spain; and particularly what circumstances existed to authorize or justify the commanding general in taking possession of those posts."

In conformity with this resolution, a select committee of five persons of your honorable body was appointed, who, on the 24th of February, 1819, made a report.

The committee had ample time for a correct examination of the subject submitted to their consideration, and the means by which to have been fully satisfied of the innocence of your respondent; yet, in their report, he has been accused of crimes against the laws and constitution of his country. Upon a review of that document, your respondent is free to declare that both the narrative of facts, and the arguments deduced from them, are unsound and erroneous. The incorrect impressions with which the committee seem to have labored have, in the opinion of your memorialist, given to this subject a distorted aspect, and thrown around it a deceptive coloring.

With striking a deadly blow at the liberty of his country, and with acts of wanton usurpation, which, for their enormity, would vie with the most absolute despots—with the directory of France, during their short career of madness and folly—has your respondent been charged. These accusations have for their object the rendering your respondent obnoxious to his fellow-citizens. Still, he will not so far forget the duty he owes himself, and the respect due the Senate and the American people, as to indulge recrimination. It is not the means by which truth can be arrived at, or the cause of justice and impartiality promoted. But, to vindicate himself from reproach, to ward off unmerited imputations, and to stand in opposition to a report of a committee of your body, which casts the *severest* censure, is a right secured to him, because it is the right of every citizen.

With all the respect, therefore, that is due to an august branch of the Government, but with that frankness and sincerity which conscious innocence demands to assume, does he present himself. It is a duty which he owes to himself, to his office, to his family, nay, to his country, for which he has encountered privations, and whose interest has always been dear and paramount to all other considerations. In doing this, he will not depart from that respect which is proper to be observed; nor will he hesitate to believe but that the Senate, on an impartial examination of the facts, will come to conclusions different from what their committee have arrived at.

The manner in which the inquiry was conducted by the committee is believed to have been novel; a mass of testimony, tending seriously to affect the reputation of an individual, was collected; and, although it was proposed, yet

was an opportunity denied him, of appearing before them to offer any statement or explanation in his power, in relation to those subjects upon which doubts and difficulties might arise. He was deprived, by this refusal, of the privilege of confronting his accusers, and of interrogating and cross-examining witnesses summoned for his conviction. Such testimony only as the committee chose to select was heard, and, when published to the world, declared a language different from what the witnesses intended.

By refusing the accused an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, how easily may be indulged in rancorous invective, and occasions sought to vent malignant and implacable resentments. Your respondent does not pretend to assert that any thing of the kind occurred during the present investigation, but has barely adverted to it as forming a portion of the evil consequences which might arise from so informal a method of inquiry. To adopt such a course is to prostrate the rules of judicial proceedings, to violate every maxim of justice, and to trample down all the sacred guaranties of the constitution. He has been taught to believe that, agreeably to the provision of our *magna charta*, every individual was secure in his life, liberty, property, and reputation; and that he could not be tried before any constituted authority of the nation without being heard in his defence, permitted to introduce exculpatory evidence, to cross-examine and confront his accusers. This is one of the choicest fruits of our republican institutions, and is an essential preservative of liberty; it should be guarded with vestal vigilance, and for no purpose whatever subjected to violation by any branch or department of the Government. In its maintenance there is safety, but danger in departure.

The committee, whilst adverting to the origin of the Seminole war, have omitted to enumerate the Spanish and Indian aggressions on our rights, as a justification of the measures which were adopted in its prosecution. They have rather employed palliatives for the outrages of the enemy, and given an aggravated aspect to the measures which were adopted for the peace and security of our frontiers. Add to this the *manner* in which the testimony was collected, the misconception of facts and incorrect arguments contained in the report, the time at which it was published, and the style in which it was composed; and your respondent cannot forego the belief that it evinces an hostility to the Executive, and to the military officers under his command.

It is a subject of no small surprise that this spirit of opposition should have diffused itself, after the luminous arrangement of facts, with the conclusive reasoning and inferences arising from the laws of nations and the United States, by Mr. Secretary Adams, as well as the ample and satisfactory discussion in the House of Representatives, the great inquest of the nation. Moreover, Congress had made provision for a vigorous prosecution of the Seminole war in the spring of 1818, in conformity to the suggestion of the President in his message in the month of March, when he detailed to them every information in relation to that subject. The citizens of Georgia and Alabama had made repeated calls on the General Government for protection; and, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances touching the causes and progress of that war, Congress authorised the calling out an additional brigade of militia, and made liberal appropriations for the payment of the Georgia troops then in service. The President, too, who is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and who should be the proper judge to determine whether his orders be faithfully executed, had made the acts of his officers his own, not only by the express authority which he had conferred, but by subsequent adoption also.

With a large majority of the people of the United States the defensive measures adopted by the Government, as also the reasons by which they had been governed, were entirely satisfactory, in consequence of its being distinctly perceived that no other course could have been pursued which would have secured the indispensable purposes for which the Seminole war had been prosecuted. That those measures should be denounced as a violation of the laws and constitution, by those very persons who originally gave them their suffrages, is certainly calculated to excite the astonishment of every impartial observer.

Under such circumstances it was to have been anticipated that all controversy, relative to the agency of your respondent in giving rise to the war, would have been completely put to rest. It was confidently expected that he would have escaped the crimination of your committee; reproaches which, if sanctioned by your honorable body, are little inferior to cashiering; besides, no instance is to be found on record where a similar course was adopted in relation to any of the Indian wars in which the United States have been engaged.

After all the above circumstances had transpired, and it was supposed that the subject of the Seminole war had been finally disposed of in the House of Representatives, your committee took it up with avidity, prosecuted it with an assiduity that was unexampled, and almost adverted upon the conduct of the Executive, and his official agents, in a manner which is believed to be altogether strange and novel. By reiterations of mal-conduct they seem to have evinced a disposition to stamp upon the whole transaction, and those connected with it, infamy and disgrace.

Should the time ever arrive when a majority of any of the superior tribunals of the nation, influenced by party feelings, shall proceed to criminate a public officer, or effect his removal, in order to create a vacancy, or to gratify the ambition of a favorite partisan, then may private resentment, and the most angry passions, acquire an unbounded and dangerous control over their proceedings. Every sentiment of justice and humanity will be completely stifled, as well as all regard for the constitution and laws. The patriot will have ample cause to tremble for the honor of his country, and the perpetuity of her republican institutions. The venerable fabric of our liberties, which has been consecrated by the blood of our heroes, and the wisdom of our sages, will be imminently endangered, if not entirely buried in ruins.

That the charges preferred should have been published to the world, at a time to preclude all investigation, is a circumstance but little calculated to impart consolation, or to quiet the alarms of reputation assailed. No other sentiment can be indulged than that it was intended, by counteracting the decision of the House of Representatives previously made, to produce an unfavorable impression on the public mind, before any thing could be offered as an antidote to the impressions it was intended to disseminate. Twelve months have almost elapsed since the publication of the report; all investigation has been necessarily postponed, and hence has additional, unmerited injury been sustained. The effect has been to excite prejudice, and thereby prevent that impartial examination which is so essential to correct determination. Calumny has been aided, suspicion left free to act, and the means of exciting public odium amply afforded. Resting on the eternal principles of truth and justice, and claiming for himself the high prerogative secured by the constitution, this respondent asks to appear in his own vindication, and to submit the grounds of his defence, and the "*motives*" by which he has been actuated.

The first consideration which presents itself, is the authority under which your committee acted. Three propositions only are contained in the resolution of your honorable body, upon the second of which no report has been made, nor has your committee stated "what circumstances existed to authorize or justify the commanding general in taking possession of the Spanish posts." Instead of confining themselves within the pale of their powers, they have travelled over the whole ground occupied by the House of Representatives, in search of *new* subjects of inquiry not before touched on, or embraced within their powers.

So far as the committee have embraced within their investigation the original causes of the war; the withdrawal of the regular troops from the frontiers of Georgia; the employment of volunteers and friendly Indians; the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister; the order to take possession of St. Augustine, and the reasons and motives of your respondent in the conduct and management of the war, it is believed to be an act of supererogation, and a departure from sound practice. This objection is not made by your respondent upon the ground that he considers his conduct vulnerable, or from a wish to elude inquiry; but is barely mentioned as presumption of the strong disposition of your committee to affix censure upon his motives and actions.

Upon a careful examination of the *discretionary* orders which were directed to your respondent from the Department of War, there can be no question but that they authorized and justified every measure which was adopted during the Seminole war, and should, at once, have acquitted him of all censure and responsibility. He was ordered to engage in offensive operations; to bring the war with the Seminoles to a *speedy* and *successful* termination, with *exemplary punishment* for hostilities so unprovoked; and to establish a peace on such conditions as would make it honorable and permanent. He was, in effect, charged with the management of the war, and vested with the powers *necessary* to give it effect. No orders could have been more ample, as to the selection of means, as well as to their application.

The massacre of Mrs. Garret and children, and the butchery of Lieutenant Scott and comrades, your respondent is informed, were the events which induced the Government to order him to take command of the operating army, and to prosecute the war with vigor and effect. They had determined to abandon the cautious and defensive policy hitherto adopted, and to pursue a new system of operations against the enemy. The orders directed to your respondent and General Gaines, subsequent to those tragical events, were entirely different from former ones; inasmuch as they were peremptory as to carrying on operations in *Florida* against the Seminole Indians.

The first order to your respondent had no reference to those issued to General Gaines, save that of the same date with his own, which was directed to him at Amelia Island, requiring his co-operation in the attack upon the Seminoles. In no part of it was a reference to any previous order to your respondent, or to any other person, pointing out the most advisable means to be adopted, or limiting him in their choice or application. And even had the orders of General Gaines been obligatory, as the case which they contemplated never occurred, they must entirely have lost their force and effect. An order to perform a particular service, or to effect a specific object, without any limitation as to the means to be employed, leaves, it is conceived, an entire discretion with the officer as to their character and application—it then becomes a general power. It is also believed to be true that the limits of such an order cannot be transcended without an entire desertion of the object contemplated. The orders of your respondent completely superseded those directed to General Gaines; and if so, he must stand acquitted of the high charge of having been guilty of their violation. Yet, if any doubt could exist upon this subject, the subsequent approval of the measures and motives of your respondent, by the Executive of the United States, completely settles all controversy.

In the first page of the report an effort is made to induce a belief that the treaty of Fort Jackson was negotiated by your respondent, and that the hostilities of the Seminoles proceeded from its unjust and tyrannical demands. Upon this branch of the subject your respondent begs leave to remark that the General Government had some time previously settled the terms of capitulation, and your respondent, not as a commissioner or negotiator, but as the conqueror of the country, received their submission upon those terms—terms which demanded the surrender of their prophets, as well as the instigators of the war.

Those Indians, after being routed at Hoithlewallée, in April, 1814, fled to Pensacola, where they were protected, clothed, fed, and supplied with munitions of war, by the Spanish authorities. They never were parties to the treaty at Fort Jackson; and, however they might have been dissatisfied with its conditions, as demanded by the Government, their dissatisfaction and hostility were excited by Spanish agents and British emissaries resident among them; one of whom was the infamous Woodbine, who was then engaged in enlisting them in his service by the distribution of presents, and in disciplining them for war. These facts might have been ascertained by a reference to the correspondence between your respondent and the Governor of Pensacola, which were on file in the War Department.

Upon the subject of occupying the Spanish posts, your respondent thinks proper to observe, that he deemed it essentially necessary to the execution of his orders. It would have been impossible to have obtained a *speedy and effectual termination of the war*, so long as the commandants of those fortresses furnished the enemy with supplies and munitions of war, and aided, abetted, and encouraged them in their savage hostilities against our frontier settlements.

They had both become the rendezvous for embodying hostile negroes and Indians, and for giving them comfort and protection. According to the acknowledgments of her own commanding officers, the authority of Spain over Florida had ceased, and was to be considered as *derelict* to all intents and purposes. Your respondent did not believe himself under any obligation to respect an authority that did not exist; a sovereignty that was not asserted or exercised; reason nor law could require him to respect rights that were suffered to be usurped for the purpose of promoting a most cruel and sanguinary war against the citizens of the United States. These posts had been alternately substituted for the fort, on the Appalachicola, and thither the negroes and Indians had retreated for shelter and protection, after their defeats at Mickasuky. They constituted the laboratories of the war; and there were their materials collected and organized for active service. They were in reality Indian forts and storehouses, attempted to be protected by the Spanish flag; and had they been in the exclusive possession of our savage enemies, they could not have derived greater advantages, been more benefited, nor *we* more seriously injured.

Against such an enemy, what measures were to be adopted under orders that required a *speedy and effectual termination of the war*; and which were to give permanent peace and security to our southern frontier? They were not to be met and fought in the open plain, where a decisive blow might be given, and the contest ended; but were to be sought for in the fortresses of Spain, and in the swamps of a wilderness, where they might contend at leisure, and recede from the contest, the moment it became hazardous. Partial remedies to prevent such evils had already been adopted by the American Government. During the war of 1812, Spain had suffered Great Britain to violate her neutrality in Florida, to the injury and annoyance of the United States. In 1814, Pensacola was entered by United States' troops, and a lesson, it was hoped, enforced, that however this Government was disposed to cultivate peace, she could not preserve it by permitting Spain, regardless of existing treaties, to outrage her dearest rights. She was called upon to maintain her neutrality according to the injunctions of the law of nations, and the provisions of the treaty of 1795. She pleaded inability to comply, and the American Government forgave the injury. Peace was at length restored to the United States; yet still Spain, regardless of her obligations, permitted British agents to reside within the bosom of Florida, and to excite the Indians and negroes to pillage and to bloodshed. Remonstrance was again employed, but in vain. Inability was still the pretext, and the same tragical scenes, witnessed in 1814, were now repeated. The savages who had causelessly made war, and who were shedding the blood of our border settlers, being thus openly received and comforted by the Spanish authorities, were such acts of hostility, were so flagrant a violation of the good understanding existing between the United States and Spain, as, in the opinion of your respondent, *wholly to merge the neutral character*. And your respondent considers, that he would have been guilty of a dereliction of duty, had he drawn up his troops by way of cordon, and remained on the Georgia frontier, receiving the reports of Indian robberies and massacres, only that he might transmit them to the Secretary of War; for he could have done no more.

Both of those fortresses were clearly identified as "associates" in the war, and were both equally under the control of the negroes and Indians. Ambrister had appeared before St. Marks with four or five hundred under his command; and an equal number had been seen about Pensacola, the most of whom were equipped for war by Governor Masot. In both instances, the strength of the enemy was amply sufficient for a forcible occupation of the posts. Moreover, the Governor of Pensacola had refused the passage of provisions up the Escambia, destined for our starving troops at Fort Crawford. An United States' schooner, called the *Amelia*, had been detained at that place until the town was taken, when were obtained from her provisions for the troops. Another provision vessel, ordered into the Perdido, had been captured by boats sent from the Barancas, and placed under the guns of the fort, but fortunately made her escape under cover of the darkness of the night.

In this state of things, had your respondent been compelled to suspend operations, and to wait for additional orders from the War Department, the object of anticipating the enemy would have been entirely defeated. He would have been compelled to retrograde to the interior, for the want of supplies, leaving many points of the frontier exposed to the ruthless barbarities of exasperated savages. The militia force would have become inactive and discontented; their time would have expired before any thing effectual could have been done; and the campaign thus rendered completely abortive. If St. Marks was necessary to the defence of the frontier of Georgia, Pensacola was much more so for the peace and security of Alabama. In consequence, too, of its being located on the seaboard, it afforded much greater facilities to our enemies, for it commanded the navigation of the Escambia, up which had, necessarily, to pass, all the supplies for our forts erected on its tributary streams. The occupation of this post was not determined upon, until the reception of Governor Bibb's letter, at the Escambia, detailing many outrages, and communicating the intelligence that Holmes and his warriors were then in Pensacola; as also, the receipt of Governor Masot's protest, complaining of a violation of his neutrality, and ordering your respondent to retire from West Florida, accompanied with a *threat* to coerce him, if he did not comply. Lieutenant Sands



had been despatched from St. Marks, with orders to hold his artillery in readiness to meet future contingencies, should they occur; but he never was directed to convey it to a *given point*, until after your respondent reached the Choctawhatchy.

Nor were those proceedings considered *acts of war*, as represented by the committee. By advertising to the correspondence with the commandant of St. Marks, the Governor of Pensacola, and the Secretary of War, it may be distinctly seen, that your respondent entered the territory of Spain as a *friend*, to chastise an enemy of both nations, and to enforce those obligations and duties which the Spanish authorities had pleaded *inability* to perform; that all his operations were bottomed on the broad principle of self-defence, authorised by the law of nature and of nations. They were not directed against the Government of Spain, but against the fortresses which had become the strong holds, the rendezvous, of negroes and Indians, and whose neutrality was prostrated to the basest purposes. They were seized because they were Indian posts to all intents and purposes. Spain has disavowed the conduct of her official agents; and the American Government has declared that a war was not intended with that nation.

Although the Spanish authorities were guilty of many *open and undisguised acts of hostility*, yet the sovereignty of Spain over Florida was altogether ideal. Her commandants had repeatedly acknowledged that they were unable to restrain the savages, and that the Indian chiefs and British emissaries were proceeding contrary to their wishes, and in violation of their laws: hence were these fortresses occupied, as the only measure which could give a speedy and permanent peace to our bleeding frontiers. The Spanish Government did not consider it an act of war, nor did Mr. Pizarro or Don Onis complain of it as a measure of that description. The two Governments have acknowledged themselves at peace, and have since kept up a regular and friendly intercourse with each other in the shape of negotiation.

Neither were the garrisons made *prisoners of war*, or treated like *conquered enemies*, as is stated by your committee. The contrary will be made clearly apparent, by an examination of the conditions upon which the Spanish posts were occupied; to which your respondent begs leave to refer. Your committee acknowledge that the Spanish authorities in Florida were guilty of acts of war against the United States; but that her neutral character was not *wholly merged* in that of the enemy, in consequence of her employing *moral* and not *physical* force. If giving the negroes and Indians encouragement in their outrages, by the purchase of their plunder; furnishing them with aid and protection, supplies and munitions of war, did not *wholly merge* the neutrality of the Spanish authorities, and make them associates in the war, your respondent confesses that he is at a loss for a definition of terms. Agreeably to this idea, it would be improper to consider the population of a nation, with whom we were at war, as enemies, save those who were in the field; for it is only the latter who resort to "physical force." This distinction is entirely new, and is in contradiction to many of the most clear and long established principles of *good sense* and national law.

It is stated by your committee, that all authority at Pensacola was *put down by the sword*, and that a new Government was established, "the powers of which, both civil and military, were vested in military officers." Every one would be induced to understand, from this, that the terms of capitulation were arbitrarily and tyrannically imposed upon Governor Masot, when, in fact, they were proposed by himself, and the civil and military Government was dissolved at his own instance. The temporary Governor, Colonel King, was an officer of the United States' army; but civil officers were appointed to the different departments from amongst the citizens; and Mr. McKinsey, a citizen of Mobile, was placed at the head of the magistracy. All that was contemplated was to organize some kind of civil authority for the protection of the lives, liberty, and property, of the citizens, during the *temporary* occupancy of the fortress. The same Government to which the people had been accustomed was retained. It became absolutely necessary to establish the revenue laws of the United States, in order to check the smuggling which had been carried on successfully in this quarter for many years, as well as to admit the American merchant to an equal participation in trade, which would have been denied under the partial operations of the Spanish commercial code.

The executions of the Indian chiefs and British outlaws are justifiable on the ground of precedent and the laws of nations. One of the former was a prophet, who had employed his superstitious influence, and the promises of his transatlantic friends, to stimulate his deluded brethren to deeds of rapine and massacre. The other commanded in person the party who perpetrated the cold blooded butchery of Lieutenant Scott and his unfortunate companions. Both had been engaged in most of the robberies and murders committed, and were active instigators of the savage war which raged on our defenceless frontier.

Acting as chiefs of the negroes and Indians, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, by numerous acts of atrocity, had become identified with those monsters—*associates* in the war. They were the principal authors of the hostilities of the ferocious savages, who observed none of the rules of civilized warfare, who never gave quarter, and only took prisoners for the purpose of torturing! They were, without authority, principals in an unlawful war. Their mode of carrying it on was characterized by plunder, massacre, destruction, and revenge; and was in open violation of the laws of war and of nations. Great Britain would not interfere to prevent those miscreants from instigating the fugitive negroes and the Indians from burning, and pillaging, and scalping, the inhabitants of Georgia and Alabama; but she disowned them, and left them to their fate. The Spanish authorities would not, or could not, interfere, and the Indians regarded them as friends and associates. Both acted as chiefs of the motley banditti, giving them counsel and exciting them to war; and one of them actually led those black and red combatants to battle. They both officiated as Indian agents, in writing to Spanish Governors and British ministers, stating their grievances, and soliciting assistance; and sometimes as quartermasters, procuring supplies, and furnishing munitions of war.

Under these circumstances, it is believed that they merited death, whether they were placed upon an equality with the outlawed Red Sticks, or fugitive negroes, who were in a state of open rebellion. Indeed, their criminality was of a deeper dye than that of the Indian chiefs. They were the paymasters for human scalps; and, to discharge that high trust, had exiled themselves from their native land, plunged into the recesses of the wilderness, and groped their way to the Indian camp, for the express purpose of working upon the feelings of the ignorant and untutored savages, to instigate them to lay waste the abodes of industry and innocence, and stain our soil with the blood of slaughtered women and children! Enjoying the lights of education, yet devoted to this infamous employment, the active agents in a war which was marked in its progress by plunder and massacre! Should mercy have been extended to wretches who excited such a war, and who, within a short period, would have renewed the same tragical scenes? As associates of savages, who respected none of the laws of civilized warfare, they could not claim the benefit or protection of those laws, for they were not parties. They were as much outlaws to all its provisions, as a pirate on the ocean. Such wretches are more criminal than any painted Red Stick; and to pardon them would be treachery to mankind. If, in the ordinary course of justice, it has been deemed wise and politic to take the life of an offender for the murder of a single individual, both religion and humanity must recommend the infliction of the same penalty upon him who has been conspicuously instrumental in the murder of every age, sex, and condition. Although retaliation might have been employed upon the innocent, for such horrid crimes, yet, in these cases, it fell upon the guilty. Let it be borne in mind, that the Indian chiefs and British outlaws were the monsters *demanded* to be surrendered by the treaty of Fort Jackson, the *terms of which had been antecedently settled by the Government*, ratified by your honorable body, and carried into effect by the Congress of the United States; and let it also be recollected, that these were *the prophets and instigators of the war*, upon whom was ordered to be inflicted "exemplary punishment for hostilities so unprovoked."

The two British incendiaries were not executed upon the *general* charge alone of "exciting the Indians to war," as stated by your committee, but upon that and other *general* charges subjoined thereto, which they *omitted* to notice, but which may be seen by a reference to the proceedings of the court of inquiry on that occasion.

The case of Arbuthnot and Ambrister was not within the reach of any rules or articles of war. The rights and privileges here secured belonged only to our own countrymen; and, as the offences charged were committed by foreigners beyond our own territorial limits and jurisdiction, our municipal code contained nothing by which to test the offence. To it the principles of national law was alone applicable, which attached no penalty to their crimes

other than *death*. In organizing the court of inquiry, it was only intended (as in councils of war) that the opinion should operate directory, and as advice, not to become binding. In the second sentence pronounced by the special court upon Ambrister, there was a departure from the rules of that law upon which alone it was believed jurisdiction was had of the offence. Nor was it less a violation of the rules and articles of war; for those rules had denounced corporal punishment. The sentence, therefore, was void, because known to no law. Your respondent, therefore, conceived himself authorized to carry into execution the first sentence, because it awarded the only punishment that was legal to be inflicted; and because his lawless, guilty conduct entitled him to die. Besides, Ambrister was the most criminal. He had commanded, in person, a corps of negroes, with the view of anticipating your respondent in the occupation of St. Marks, and was actually taken in arms against the forces of the United States.

The general commanding, as in all such cases, possessed the right, by the law of nations, to retaliate and to punish; nor could the organizing of the court deprive him of the power. The court of inquiry derived its existence, and its whole authority, from the order for its organization; and no more could they exercise a power not delegated to them, than could a committee of your honorable body inquire into matters *not contained in the resolution which created them*. The order calls it a *special court*, and directs it to perform *special duties*. It only asks for *opinions*; and gives no right to carry those opinions into execution. It details a recorder, by which a court of inquiry is ever distinguished from courts martial; the latter having a judge advocate, without which no proceedings can be had, and no sentence pronounced.

Censure is endeavored to be attached, in consequence of the withdrawal of the regular troops from the posts on the Georgia frontier, and concentrating them at Fort Montgomery, on the Alabama river, a considerable distance west of the Georgia line. In the commission of this *military error* your respondent had no participation; it was done in pursuance of an order of Mr. Crawford, then Secretary of War; an order which he was bound to obey, although contrary to his own opinion.

Upon the subject of raising and organizing the volunteers of West Tennessee, which has called forth the severest animadversions, your respondent did not, as he conceives, "disregard the orders of the War Department, the constitution, and laws." His orders were, to call upon the Governors of the adjacent States for such additional military force as he might *deem necessary to beat the enemy*. The order was entirely discretionary, as no number or description of troops were mentioned. In the language of the Secretary of War's letter to Governor Bibb, your respondent was "vested with full powers to conduct the war in the manner he might judge best."

When his appeal was made to the citizens of West Tennessee, the frontier settlements were threatened on every side with danger and distress, as well as our troops at Fort Scott and on the Appalachicola. Major Muhlenberg was endeavoring to ascend that river with provisions, &c. and was arrested in his progress, and surrounded, by eight or twelve hundred Indians. Colonel Arbuckle, commandant at Fort Scott, was also about to abandon his post for want of supplies. The one thousand Georgia militia, who had been called out for sixty days, after advancing forty miles from Hartford, to the neighborhood of Fort Early, were returning home, leaving the command of Colonel Arbuckle, as also the Georgia frontier, in an exposed and perilous condition. Not only from the public journals, but from the communications of Colonel Arbuckle, had this intelligence been received. Under these circumstances, Major Fanning was despatched to Georgia, with a request that the Governor should continue those troops in the field for an additional period, or supply the deficiency, as early as practicable, by an equal number of volunteers.

As it was not known, at this time, whether the Governor of Tennessee was at Knoxville or in the Cherokee nation, your respondent made his appeal to his old and tried comrades in arms, desiring them to follow him to the field, in defence of their invaded country. In affording the desired relief, no time was to be lost. Delay was replete with danger; and defeat and disaster would have been the result, had the dilatory process of draughting been resorted to. The same day on which the appeal was made, the Governor of Tennessee was written to, and apprised of the attempt to obtain volunteers; and that one thousand draughted militia would be required, should the appeal not be promptly and successfully answered. In reply, the Governor gave his entire approbation to the measure, and co-operated in raising an additional company of mounted volunteers, which was commanded by Captain Dunlap, and which joined the army at Fort Gadsden.

All the volunteers were raised and organized under the laws of Tennessee, the officers of whom were elected by themselves, and *not appointed by your respondent*, as asserted by your committee. Although earnestly solicited to appoint them, he peremptorily refused. To the officers who had served him in the late Creek and British war, he stated, not only in his appeal, but also upon their meeting at Nashville, that they were to organize themselves in the manner they might think proper; that the grade of the officers was to be determined by themselves; and that those raising companies were to command them. The only agency of your respondent, in the whole transaction, was the appointment of Colonel Hayne, inspector general of the southern division, to superintend their organization, and lead them to Fort Scott, where he took the command. Every measure touching the raising and organizing this volunteer corps was regularly communicated to the Secretary of War, and received his unqualified approbation.

The committee admit, that the laws of Congress authorize the President to call on the Governors of the different States for such portions of the militia as he may deem requisite; but deny that there is any law in existence vesting him with authority to accept the services of volunteers. Here they have endeavored to make an impression on the nation, that volunteers are not militia; and that the circumstance of *volunteering* their services, in preference to being *draughted*, essentially and radically changes their character. There is certainly no position more unsound; as is clearly evinced by the fact, that most of the calls of the General Government have been met in this way, by the patriotic and gallant yeomanry of our country; until now, it has never been complained of.

When a requisition is made by the President on any State in the Union, for a quota of militia, it is sufficient if they are forthcoming; and it is believed that he has no authority, under the laws or constitution of the United States, to inquire into the mode in which they have been raised and organized. This is a question to be determined exclusively between the Governor of a State and its own citizens. It is one of the attributes of State sovereignty, guaranteed by the federal constitution, and with which the Executive and Congress cannot interfere. If an officer of the United States' army should be guilty of an infringement of this State prerogative, the complaint of its Governor or Legislature should be considered as the only basis to authorize an inquiry into his official conduct.

It is stated by your committee, that it was not found necessary to furnish the President with a list of the names of the militia officers; "and not until the *pay-rolls* were made out, and payment demanded, were the persons known to the Department of War." A majority of your committee were within reach of all the information necessary to the correction of *this error*. Colonel Hayne's communications to the Secretary of War were on file in that office; from which they might have been informed of the number and grade of the officers, as well as of every particular relative to the organization of the volunteers; together with the express and decided approbation of that Department of the Government. Appended to the report are the *pay-rolls*, filed in the office of the *Paymaster General*. Why they omitted to examine the *muster-roll* in the *War Office*, from which the *pay-roll* was transcribed, your respondent is at a loss to determine. Upon an examination of the *pay-rolls*, they should have known that, agreeably to the rules and articles of war, they must have been made out from the *muster-rolls*, which designate, by name, the number and grade of the officers mustered into service. The *muster-roll*, together with the *letters* of Colonel Hayne, would have satisfied the committee that the volunteers had been organized agreeably to the laws of Tennessee; and that it was a procedure over which the General Government could exercise no control.

By the rules and articles of war, "troops of all descriptions shall be mustered once in two months, for payment; *nor shall any payment be made, but upon muster-rolls, signed by the inspector general or his assistant*; or, in the absence of these, by some officer of the army of the United States, especially assigned to this duty by the general or other officer commanding the department in which the troops so mustered shall be."

Again, "the officers and soldiers of any troops, whether militia or others, *being mustered, and in the pay of the United States*, shall, at all times, and in all places, when joined or acting in conjunction with the regular forces of the United States, *be governed by the rules and articles of war*, and shall be subject to be tried by courts-martial, in like manner with the officers and soldiers of the regular forces, save only that such courts-martial shall be composed entirely of militia officers."

From these extracts it must appear evident, that no payment can be made, but upon *muster-rolls*, signed by the inspector general, &c.; and that, from the time they are made out and received at the War Office, the militia are considered in the service of the United States. Neither Congress nor the President have any authority to inquire how their officers have been appointed; whether they have been received as volunteers, or raised by the more tedious and vexatious method of draughting. Were the idea of your committee correct upon this subject, the people of the different States would be deprived of the invaluable privilege of selecting between these two modes of complying with the calls made upon them for the defence of our common country. The General Government had the services of those troops, which is all that can be required; and they have long since been mustered out of service, and paid from the public treasury.

The committee confess that the Secretary of War approbated the manner in which the Tennessee volunteers were raised and organized; but say, that "it is but justice to the Department to state, that it was not until the officers that had assisted in thus officering and organizing this corps were examined by the committee, that they were apprised of the illegality of the measure." Surely, the Secretary of War must have examined the communications of Colonel Hayne and your respondent, stating every particular touching the mode agreeably to which they were raised and organized, as also the *muster-rolls*, giving the grade and number of the officers by name; all of which were transmitted, and acknowledged to have been received, at an early period, at that office. He certainly could not have compromised himself so far, as to give his approbation to a measure before he was made acquainted with its nature and tendency.

Troops, of the same description of the Tennessee volunteers, were received and employed by the Government, on our northern frontier and southern borders, during the late struggle with England, and in the war with the Creek nation of Indians. They fought the battles of Talldega, Emuckfaw, the Horseshoe, and New Orleans, and protected Mobile from British visitation. Volunteers, similarly raised and organized, were commanded by Governors Shelby, Harrison, Edwards, and General Porter, of New York, during the same period. The field officers of the Georgia militia were appointed in the same manner on the west bank of the Oukmulgee; and one of the present Senators from Tennessee actually appointed the officers of his own regiment, which he raised without any authority, and which he commanded on an expedition against the Seminole Indians, in 1812. The most of these troops were paid off by the United States, received the approbation of the General Government, and the applause of the nation.

It is stated in the report of the committee to the Senate, that the "whole strength of this miserable, undisciplined banditti of deluded Indians and fugitive slaves, when combined, did not exceed one thousand men. Opposed to whom, *previous to General Jackson's taking command, and under General Gaines, were a force of one thousand eight hundred regulars and militia*, besides the one thousand five hundred friendly Indians illegally subsidized by the last mentioned general; what, then, in this case, becomes of the plea of necessity?" It is plainly to be inferred, then, that this motley horde of negroes and Indians were too inconsiderable to justify raising the volunteer force which was employed in reducing them to a state of submission.

It is well known to all those acquainted with the character of Indians, and their peculiar mode of warfare, that it is almost impossible to form a correct estimate of their aggregate force, until the termination of the war. In this case, General Gaines had computed them at two thousand eight hundred; and Arbuthnot, who officiated as a military chief of the savages, had represented them, in a communication to the British minister, Mr. Bagot, to be three thousand five hundred strong. This calculation was by no means extravagant, when it is considered that from eight to twelve hundred had been concentrated at a single point, when Lieutenant Scott and party were attacked, and that they were daily increasing in number. Whatever might have been their whole effective strength, at any period of the war, it could have been augmented by auxiliary bands in Florida; and it was certainly the duty of the commanding general to call out such additional force as should ensure success in every emergency. Furthermore, the greatest portion of the Georgia militia, then in the field, could be retained in service only for about three months. And it was expected that they would apply for discharges so soon as their time expired. Your respondent considered the lives of our citizens as too precious to be risked, in a contest with Indians, where there was an odds of two to one, unless dire necessity demanded the exposure. The consequence of an opposite policy was, that the decisive and rapid movement of our overwhelming numbers distracted and dispersed the enemy, compelled them to seek refuge in the Spanish fortresses, woods, and swamps; and they never were afforded an opportunity to display their whole force by concentration. The war was speedily and effectually terminated, and much blood and treasure saved to the nation.

With regard to the Indian and militia force, under the command of General Gaines, previous to the time your respondent assumed the command of the army, he has to remark, that, until a few days anterior to his arrival at Fort Scott, not a single Indian warrior had joined the standard of the United States; nor had the first requisition of Georgia militia ever united with the command of General Gaines; the latter had returned home, in consequence of which it became absolutely necessary, on the part of General Gaines, to make a second call on the Governor of that State, for the double purpose of defending the frontier and occupying Amelia Island.

A few of the friendly Indians joined your respondent before he reached Fort Scott, and a considerable number at that place, making, in the aggregate, about four or five hundred. The balance of the force under his command was not, at that time, more than nine hundred effectives; and he confidently affirms, that when he took up the line of march from Fort Gadsden, on the 25th of March, 1818, his whole command, fit for duty, consisted only of three hundred and sixty privates of the regulars, about eight hundred Georgia militia, and Major Lovet's detachment of friendly Creeks. McIntosh and his warriors were organized at Fort Mitchell, after the arrival of your respondent at Fort Hawkins, and never united with him until the 1st of April, about six miles in the rear of Mickasuky. All these facts were accessible to your committee, had they been disposed to examine the letters of your respondent on file in the Department of War. To this Department all his communications were made; and there they should have applied for correct information, if it had been wanted.

The next subject which has exposed your respondent to bitter reproach from the committee, is the order which was directed to General Gaines, to occupy St. Augustine. A letter from Major Twigg had conveyed the intelligence that our savage enemies had been fed and furnished from that garrison; and it was rendered highly probable, that, aided, abetted, and encouraged, by the commandant, they were recruiting and embodying at that place, with a view of renewing hostilities. A strong presumption was created, that this, like the other Spanish posts, had become a depot and rallying point for negroes and Indians, to which they had retreated for refuge and protection, after being driven from Negro Fort, St. Marks, and Pensacola.

The order given to General Gaines was entirely conditional and *prospective*; and had the facts reported been established, as directed, there would have existed the same incontrovertible reason for the occupancy of St. Augustine as of the other Spanish fortresses. The orders of your respondent had undergone no modification; and the measure would have been indispensably necessary to their execution, as well as to the peace and security of our frontiers. Besides, he had transmitted to the War Department regular information of his proceedings in Florida, with the reasons and motives by which he had been governed, from the 25th of March to the 7th of August, without a sentence of dissatisfaction ever having been expressed by the Government.

Your committee also report that, "long before this period, the commanding general had, by his letter to the Secretary of War, declared the Seminole war at an end; and, after which, not a single new act of hostility had been committed." It is true, after the defeat of the negroes and Indians at Mickasuky, the destruction of Suwaney, and the asylum of St. Marks had been wrested out of their occupation, that your respondent persuaded himself that the war was ended. But subsequent information proved this opinion to be erroneous. The letter of Governor Bibb, appended to the report to the Senate, as well as the deposition of Charles Baron, details sundry outrages committed subsequent to the date of your respondent's letter to the Secretary of War; and it is also known that *six men were murdered in the interior*, which it is believed was communicated by General Gaines to the War Department. The communications of General Gaines and Major Fanning, annexed to the report, also give a very different aspect to this question, and to which your respondent begs leave to refer your honorable body.

In the animadversions upon the motives of your respondent, he cannot withhold the opinion that there has been exhibited an unusual share of asperity, as also a want of charity and forbearance, which was not to have been anticipated from members of so august and enlightened a body as the Senate of the United States, deliberating upon a subject which they have represented to be of great national magnitude. Leaving the motives of the committee on this occasion to their own private review and examination, your respondent will barely observe that they have imperfectly recognised the maxim that innocence is always presumed until the contrary appears by proof. Why they should have inquired into the motives of your respondent at all he is at a loss to determine, as it was a matter entirely beyond their control and jurisdiction. The only subject of investigation was the legality of his official acts, as designated in the resolution of the Senate of the 18th of December.

Your respondent has no objection to this course, except as a pernicious precedent, and a violation of authority. He has no secrets, and will never shrink from a rigid and impartial examination into his official conduct. Had the committee adverted to the order to take possession of St. Augustine, as well as the communications of your respondent to the Secretary of War upon the subject of his military operations, they must have been satisfied that his motives were to promote the public good; to *obey his orders*, by carrying on a vigorous and efficient war against the savage enemies of the United States, by which the blood and treasure of the nation was to be economized; to establish a peace that would be honorable and permanent, and to give repose and security to our exposed and defenceless borders.

In this instance, as well as in some others, the report of the committee is contradicted by the evidence of its own documents. The depositions of Colonel Butler and Major Eaton (a member of the committee) conclusively prove that your respondent had no agency in speculating in Florida lands, which is in direct opposition to the inference drawn by your committee. No member of that committee can, for a moment, seriously and candidly harbor the opinion that your respondent would lead a gallant army into the field, jeopardize the lives of valuable citizens, risk the ruin of health and reputation, and "*violate the constitution*" of his country, for the purpose of speculating with security in Spanish lands. The "*motives of his own, unconnected with his military functions,*" were, a desire to end speedily a savage war, and to save the blood and treasure of the country; and not, as charged, to adventure his health and reputation, and the lives of brave men, in quest of titles to Florida lands. The imputation is unwarranted and unjust, and has its refutation in the very testimony which the committee have published. The dignity of his office, which, at every exposure, he has sought to maintain, never has been prostituted to the purposes of speculation in any way, and it never shall. Strange, then, that honorable men should make so foul an accusation without proof, nay, without even circumstances to support it.

Your respondent would beg leave, in this place, to remark upon the depositions annexed to the report. He ventures the opinion that such documents never before have been published to the world as evidence upon which to predicate a report. Eaton's and Mitchell's are the only depositions presented in legal form. To those two gentlemen regular interrogatories were proposed, to which they deliberately responded and affixed their signatures, as required by law; Doctor Bronaugh's deposition is signed, but not given under oath; Colonel Butler's, Colonel Gibson's, and Captain Call's are neither sworn to nor signed. The depositions of the last four gentlemen were published without their knowledge, although they had received a promise from the members of the committee who took down the testimony that it should be copied, and again submitted to them for correction and signature.

Until depositions are fully examined, amended, and signed by the witnesses, they cannot be considered good and complete evidence. This is a rule which, it is believed, is uniformly adhered to in all judicial tribunals; it never should be departed from on any occasion, as it is essentially necessary to an impartial administration of justice. Every opportunity should be given the witnesses to make a fair and full disclosure of the facts; to consider the force and effect of their expressions, as well as the import of every sentence. By an opposite procedure, irreparable injustice may be done, and the rights of a public agent sacrificed by those who should afford him security and protection.

There are several minor points touched upon by the committee, to which your respondent considers it unnecessary to give a particular reply, as they are of inconsiderable importance, and could not be noticed without swelling this memorial to an unwieldy size. He flatters himself they have been satisfactorily answered in the discussion of the other subjects out of which they have incidentally arisen. They will all, however, be more amply and minutely explained by an examination of the documents heretofore communicated to Congress relative to the Seminole war, to others on file in the War Office, and to those accompanying this memorial; to all of which your respondent respectfully refers your honorable body.

To conclude: your respondent has devoted his best services to the cause of his country, and to the perpetuation of her liberties. Her constitution and laws are objects of his sincere veneration, and every anxiety of his heart has been enlisted to promote the glory and happiness of his country. How far he has been instrumental, under the guidance of Providence, in effecting those desirable objects, he submits to the decision of his enlightened fellow-citizens. He does not pretend to be exempt from the errors common to human nature. Surrounded as he was by every privation and embarrassment, in all the hurry and bustle of war, it was next to impossible to attend particularly to every minor consideration. But, upon the great errors charged—a breach of his orders, a departure from the constitution, and a violation of the rights of humanity—he openly maintains his innocence, and denies that the charges are correctly made. He calls upon the Senate, by the high claims they prefer to magnanimity, to protect his reputation from the unmerited censure cast by their committee. He asks for justice, and nothing more; to extend it is due to your respondent, to the Senate, and to the nation.

ANDREW JACKSON,  
*Major General, commanding Southern Division.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 24, 1814.*

SIR:

Since the date of my last letter it has occurred to me that the proposed treaty with the Creeks should take a form altogether military, and be in the nature of a *capitulation*; in which case, the whole authority of making and concluding the terms will be in you, exclusively, as commanding general. In this transaction, should it take place, Colonel Hawkins, as agent, may be usefully employed.

I am, very respectfully, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General PINCKNEY.

True copy.

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

SIR:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 24, 1814.*

In the event of your acceptance of the appointment suggested by my letter of the 22d instant, I have to suggest the wish of the President that you should proceed, without delay, to Fort Jackson, and consummate the arrangements committed to Major General Pinckney, in relation to the hostile Creeks. A copy of the instructions given to General Pinckney is enclosed.

Major General JACKSON.

True copy.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 17, 1814.*

The policy dictated, as well by the unprovoked and ungrateful conduct of the hostile Creeks, as by a due regard to the future safety of the southwestern frontier, may be brought under the following heads, viz:

1st. An indemnification, (for expenses incurred by the United States, in prosecuting the war,) by such cession, or cessions of land, as may be deemed an equivalent for said expenses.

2d. A stipulation on their part that they will cease all intercourse with any Spanish post, garrison, or town; and that they will not admit among them any agent or trader who does not derive his authority or license from the United States.

3d. An acknowledgment of a right in the United States to open roads through their territory; and, also, to establish therein such military posts and trading houses as may be deemed necessary and proper; and

4th. A surrender of the prophets, or other instigators of the war, who will be held subject to the orders of the President.

With these outlines as your guide you are authorized, in conjunction with Colonel Hawkins, to open and conclude a treaty of peace with the hostile Creeks, as soon as they shall express a desire to put an end to the war.

I am, sir, very respectfully, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General PINCKNEY.

True copy.

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp*.

I, James Gadsden, a captain in the army of the United States, on oath, declare, that, during the whole period in which the transactions below detailed took place, I was an aid-de-camp to Major General Andrew Jackson, and that the following narrative contains a true statement of facts to my knowledge:

Early in January, 1818, General Jackson received orders from the War Department to repair to Fort Scott, assume the command of the army, and to bring the conflict with the Seminole Indians to a speedy termination. The Secretary of War stated the enemy's force to be two thousand seven hundred, or two thousand eight hundred strong, and gave authority to the General to call, from the neighboring States, such a force as would ensure the desired object. The regular brigade under General Gaines did not, according to the last reports, exceed six hundred men. He had called upon Georgia for not more than one thousand two hundred militia; and it was uncertain, at that period, whether the friendly Creek warriors would accept of the invitation tendered. Some additional force was therefore deemed necessary, and the speediest mode of raising it was a subject of solicitude to General Jackson. Governor McMinn, of Tennessee, was engaged about this period in carrying into effect a treaty with the Cherokee nation; and it was a matter of great uncertainty whether a letter would find him at his usual place of residence, near Knoxville, or not. He was not at the capital of the State; and his friends, in and about Nashville, were generally under the impression that he was still in the Cherokee nation. General Jackson determined therefore to make an appeal to his old companions in arms; many of whom held commissions in the militia of the State. His circular to these men, and his letter to the Governor, notifying him of what he had done, have been published.

I was present at the meeting of the field officers of the volunteers at Nashville, and heard no remarks of General Jackson, calculated to control or influence them in the selection of their officers. The only subject of anxiety with him appeared to be that the men should be raised by the 1st of February. He desired that the number should be completed; that the men should be satisfied with their officers; that they should rendezvous at Fayetteville; be mustered into service, and overtake their General on the frontiers of Georgia. Colonel Hayne, inspector general, was instructed to command the detachment on their march to Fort Scott. He received authority to appoint no other officers than those attached to his personal staff; a privilege enjoyed alike by regular and militia commanders. The Nashville company elected their own officers; and the Kentucky company was raised without even the knowledge of General Jackson. Their own feelings led them into the field upon the mere knowledge of the fact that the frontier was exposed to Indian aggressions.

I accompanied General Jackson through a part of Tennessee, previous to his departure south. In every village we passed through, much interest was taken in the approaching campaign; and the citizens were generally inquisitive as to the nature of the appeal to their patriotism. I was directed by General Jackson to explain its character; and, in every instance, expressed but one opinion, as derived from him; that one thousand men were wanted to put a speedy close to the Seminole war; that, in consequence of the confidence which the General had in his old comrades in arms, and the facility with which volunteers could be raised, he had made this appeal; that they must be satisfied with their commanders, and elect their own officers. On this subject I found many individuals exceedingly scrupulous. They were assured that no intention was entertained to impose commanders on them; that the men were wanted, and the general was well aware that, to be efficient, they must be contented with their officers.

General Jackson left Nashville with one company of Tennesseans. A company of Kentuckians overtook him in the Cherokee nation; and the Tennessee brigade had orders to join him, as soon as organized, on the frontiers of Georgia. From Hartford General Jackson moved with the Georgia brigade, and was reinforced, on his march to Fort Scott, by about six hundred friendly Creeks.

From Fort Gadsden, where the operations of the campaign may have been said to have commenced, the movement was made with a force of regulars, Georgians, and Indians, not exceeding two thousand men. The strength of the enemy was not known, at this time, to be less than that stated by the Secretary of War, two thousand seven hundred. A detachment of Tennesseans, and General McIntosh's warriors, overtook the army on the morning of the attack on the Micksuky villages; and all the troops called into service were not finally concentrated until the day after the movement from St. Marks towards the towns on Sahwannee river. The actual force of the enemy was never ascertained, until their final dispersion from the Sahwannee river. Rumor often magnified their strength beyond that stated by the Secretary of War.

The demand of the surrender of St. Marks was made in amity. General Jackson received intimation that the Indians and negroes, combined, wished to throw themselves into that work, as a dernier retreat; and the Governor of Pensacola had stated that the work and garrison were both too weak to resist their meditated attacks. I was entrusted with the communication to the Spanish commandant of St. Marks, and directed to urge the propriety of an *amicable* permit for the fort to be occupied by an American garrison, until the close of the war, on the ground that the Seminole Indians were enemies to both nations; and that every facility should be afforded the American arms in closing a war so injurious to both parties. In the course of the negotiation facts disclosed themselves developing the real character of the Spanish commandant, and, in a measure, implicating him as a party in the war. These facts were reported to the General; and, not until then, was the order issued for entering the fort by violence.

On the return of the army to Fort St. Marks, from the towns on the Sahwannee river, General Jackson expressed to me his determination to return to Nashville, conceiving that the war was closed. On the next day information was given, by the captain of a small schooner from Pensacola, that hostile Indians were lurking about that town; that they had frequently sought refuge to the west of the Appalachicola river, and were committing depredations on the road leading from Georgia to the Alabama. On this information General Jackson observed, that it would be necessary to leave strong garrisons in St. Marks, Forts Gadsden, and Scott, and send a party to scour the country west of the Appalachicola; but he still expressed his intention to return to Nashville. So well persuaded were the officers, generally, that all operations were over, that many of them sought leave of absence. An officer attached to General Jackson's staff, as volunteer aid-de-camp, left him at this place for New Orleans. Previous to his departure, he was told by General Jackson that his services would no longer be necessary, as he was determined to return to Nashville.

Lieutenant Sands was not sent to Mobile to forward on a train of artillery to a given point. This officer had commanded for many years in Mobile; and, being attached to the place, expressed a wish to visit it, with a view of being reinstated in the command, if possible. His request was granted, and he received an order, at the same time, to have a few pieces of ordnance in a condition for field service. Colonel Gibson received instructions, subsequently, from Fort Gadsden, to have the artillery, ammunition, provisions, &c. transported to Fort Montgomery.

On the return of the army to Fort Gadsden, General Jackson received a reply from the Governor of Pensacola, to his letter relative to provisions ascending the Escambia river. At the same time, letters were received by individuals, and further information from the captain of the schooner, that Pensacola was under the control of the Indians; that more than four hundred warriors were in its vicinity, preparing for the renewal of hostilities on the Alabama frontier. Major Hogan, who had recently arrived from Fort Montgomery, reported some murders lately committed by Indians direct from Pensacola, and who had returned with their plunder and scalps to that place. On the receipt of this information, General Jackson observed to me that he must himself command the troops destined to scour the country west of the Appalachicola. *He did not, at that time, intimate an intention of occupying Pensacola.* To give security to the frontiers of Alabama was his object; and that his operations must be governed by circumstances which might occur.

On the third or fourth day of March, an express was sent to Colonel Gibson, at Fort Montgomery, to endeavor to join the army with the artillery and provisions, at or near Durand's Bluff, the lower crossing place on the Escambia.

At this place a letter was received, by express, from Governor Bibb, detailing the murders which had been committed by hostile chiefs from Pensacola; and the next day after the army had crossed the Escambia, the protest of the Governor of Pensacola was received. The bearer was despatched with a note, promising a reply to the protest that night. The same day, I was sent to Pensacola, with a reply. The Governor had left his capital. The next day, the communication demanding the occupancy of Pensacola and its dependencies, until Spain should control, by an adequate military force, the Indians within Florida, was delivered to the Governor, at the Barancas; and, on his refusal to accede to the terms of that communication, the army took up its line of march for that place. The result is known.

The plan of St. Augustine was sent to General Jackson at my request, and is now in my possession. As an engineer attached to the Seminole army, it was my duty to be prepared for any events, by obtaining accurate knowledge of the country which might be the scene of operations. I did not request the plan of the proprietor, from any intimation from General Jackson that he intended or wished to visit that fortress.

JAMES GADSDEN.

True Copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

STATE OF LOUISIANA, *City and Parish of New Orleans:*

Be it known, that, on this 30th day of June, 1819, before me, John Lynd, notary public in and for said city and parish, duly commissioned, personally appeared James Gadsden, who, in my presence, signed his name to the foregoing instrument of writing, and, having been duly sworn, deposed that the contents thereof are true and correct. In faith whereof I grant these presents, under my signature and seal of office.

JOHN LYND, *Notary Public.*

Mr. Sebastiano Caro, a citizen of Pensacola, being sworn, states that, being in Mobile during the early part of the Seminole campaign, he knew nothing of the Indians being at that time in Pensacola; that, in the spring of 1814, about two hundred Indians were in Pensacola, and it was generally understood by the citizens, and believed by them, that those Indians procured ammunition and provisions from the public stores, for the purpose of carrying on their depredations on the American frontier; and that this proceeding was much commented on by the citizens, and generally condemned. Mr. Caro did not, himself, see ammunition and provisions issued to the Indians; but it was a thing of public notoriety.

SEBASTIAN CARO.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

Sworn and subscribed to before me, at Pensacola, September 7th, 1818,

H. YOUNG, *Captain Topographical Engineers.*

Jose S. Caro, a citizen of Pensacola, being sworn, states that, early in the present year, 1818, a party of hostile Indians were in Pensacola, their numbers not known, but probably fifty; that, on hearing of the approach of the American army under General Jackson, the Governor of Pensacola furnished those Indians with provisions and ammunition, and sent them in public boats across the bay. The deponent saw the rations issued, and the party embarked. The deponent further states, that, subsequent to this, he saw three parties of hostile Indians furnished with provisions, the ostensible object of which was, to enable those Indians to march to the interior, and give themselves up; but it was generally believed, that those Indians had no such intention. The deponent saw those Indians set out, and states that they had their arms.

JOSEPH ESTEEVEN CARO.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

Sworn and subscribed to before me, at Pensacola, September 10th, 1818,

H. YOUNG, *Captain Topographical Engineers.*

Charles Baron, a resident of Pensacola, being sworn, states that, about the latter end of April or beginning of May, 1818, a party of Indians, amounting to near one hundred, were in Pensacola, with a quantity of plunder, which, it was generally believed, was taken at the time Stokes's family were murdered on the Escambia. The Indians sold this plunder, openly, to the inhabitants of Pensacola; and the deponent could not learn that the Spanish authorities at Pensacola made any inquiries respecting it. The deponent further states, that, at several times in the present year, 1818, he saw parties of Indians furnished with provisions and ammunition, from the King's stores; but he does not recollect the dates of these transactions.

The deponent further states, that he has frequently heard Spanish officers at Pensacola justify the conduct of the Indians towards the United States, manifesting, in their conversation, a decided hostility towards the Americans.

CARLOS BARON.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

Sworn before me, at Pensacola, September 13th, 1818,

H. YOUNG, *Captain Topographical Engineers.*

Pierre Senac, being solemnly sworn, declares as follows: That he has resided in the town of Pensacola constantly since the month of November last past; that, since that time, and until the arrival of Major Young near this town, there were always considerable numbers of hostile Indians in or near the town; that, on many occasions within that period, he has seen from one hundred and fifty to two hundred Indians here; that their forces were

regularly provisioned from the King's store here; that he has seen large quantities of sheet lead in possession of the Indians, and considers it as greatly resembling the lead aprons of cannon; that the Government must have furnished the lead in question, as there were no other means here of getting such lead; and that the said lead was run off into balls, which the deponent saw.

That on the day that Major Young attacked a party of Indians near this town, there was then *in* town a considerable number more, who were set across the bay, in boats provided for that purpose, by the Spanish Governor.

Deponent further states, that, about the 1st of March last past, three considerable parties of hostile Indians, one party under the command of Leon Lesassier, another under the command of Arnaud Gilmar, (both lieutenants in His Catholic Majesty's service,) and the third commanded by an Indian chief, retired out of this town, and went down towards the neighborhood of Barancas, where provisions and ammunition were regularly supplied to them by the Spanish Government; that the said Indians were armed with guns, which they had received from the English during the late war; and that they remained encamped within from one to three leagues from Barancas for the space of nearly a month; that these Indians, besides being armed with guns, had also tomahawks, which deponent understood and believes were furnished by John Inerarity; and that, when the Government caused the said parties to be thus assembled and equipped, they were collected at Barancas, for the purpose, as deponent conceives, to elude the vigilance of such individuals in Pensacola as would not concur in such measures.

Deponent further states, that, since the said month of November last past, he has seen brought in here, by the Indians, a quantity of cottonade and women's clothing, brought, or said to have been brought, from the American frontier; that these things were publicly sold in this town, notwithstanding it was notoriously known here, that those articles and property had just been taken from those whom the Indians had killed on the American frontier.

PEDRO SENAC.

Attest: J. B. ROBINSON, *Interpreter.*

PENSACOLA.—Sworn to and subscribed, before me, this 19th day of September, 1818.

M. MCKINSEY, SEN.

*Justice of the Peace in and for the town of Pensacola, W. F.*

I, Isaac McKeever, a lieutenant in the navy of the United States, on oath declare, that the following narration contains a true statement of facts, to the best of my knowledge. I commanded the naval force which convoyed the store-ships, transports, &c. from New Orleans to Fort Gadsden, and from thence to the bay of St. Marks, during the Seminole war. I arrived in the said bay on the 1st of April, 1818, with British colors flying at my mast head; on the next day I was visited by a Spanish lieutenant, the second in command at Fort St. Marks. The lieutenant was inquisitive as to the character of my vessels and the nature of my visit, and wished to know whether I had any authority from the Captain General of Cuba for entering the territories of His Catholic Majesty. In reply, I asked him if he had seen my colors on entering the bay of St. Marks, and intimated that the nature of my visit could not be satisfactorily explained until the arrival of Captain Woodbine, at the same time intimating that it was of an illicit character, and that succor, aid, &c. to Hillishajo and his warriors, in their present distress, was intended. At the mention of this he expressed much satisfaction, stated that Captain Woodbine and the Spanish commandant of St. Marks were good friends, and voluntarily gave me every information as to the movements of General Jackson's force, and his strength; the situation of the hostile Indians he detailed at length, and stated, what rejoicing the reception of the long promised and expected succor would occasion. He stated that Hillishajo and the Spanish commandant were on intimate terms; that the former was then in the vicinity, and had lately been at the fort of St. Marks, when he had urged, with menaces, the commandant to send on board to ascertain to demonstration the character of the strangers; and, having satisfied himself, he would see Hillishajo that evening, after which we might expect a visit from the latter, who accordingly came on board the following morning. He likewise informed me that Arbutnot, a friend to the hostile Indians, and an acquaintance of Woodbine's, was in Fort St. Marks. On my expressing to him some apprehension of being blockaded by an American squadron reported to be on the coast, or of my retreat being cut off by Jackson, he replied, that the latter was impossible; that Jackson had but five pieces of artillery, and the impracticability of the swamp would prevent his assuming any position below me; but that I need apprehend no danger from any quarter; that, as allies, by anchoring under the guns of the fort, protection would be afforded me.

About this time we were informed by the Spanish officers and Indians, who came on board, that, on our arrival within the bay, the Indian camp demonstrated much joy at the approach of their expected supplies of munitions, &c.

I. MCKEEVER.

NEW ORLEANS, June 5, 1819.

Sworn this 5th June, 1819,

DOM. A. HALL, *Dist. Judge U. S. Lou. Dist.*

*The following statement is made by request:*

About the 1st of May, 1818, I was sent by the officer commanding at New Orleans, in charge of a public transport schooner, with provisions for the garrison at Fort Crawford, with orders to touch at Pensacola, and obtain permission of the Governor of that place to enter the bay of Pensacola and the Escambia river, through the Spanish territory, to my destination. I arrived at Pensacola on the 16th of May, and immediately reported the schooner, her cargo, and destination, to the Governor; notifying him, at the same time, of my wish to proceed without delay. On the 18th, the Governor informed me that he was not authorized to let the provisions proceed without the payment of a transit duty of two per cent., and required an invoice of the cargo to be rendered at the custom-house, in order that an estimate might be made of the duties imposed. I remonstrated with him against the payment of duties on public supplies, on board a public vessel, and designed for public service; and urged a free passage as an act of friendship only, which neighboring nations, at peace, were bound, in common justice, to extend to each other. All without avail. Fort Crawford being then short of provisions, I was forced by necessity to accept the passage on the terms offered; and, accordingly, entered the cargo at the custom-house, and paid the duties required into the royal treasury.

I inquired of the Governor whether transports, charged with public supplies, and destined for Fort Crawford, would thereafter be suffered to pass Pensacola free of the duties imposed in the present instance; and was informed that a categorical answer could not then be given to the inquiry, as the Captain General of Cuba had not yet given a decision on that point, and whatever he might resolve would be communicated.

When the transport came to anchor in the port of Pensacola, I discovered distinctly several groupes of Indians on the water's edge; and, aware of the impotency of the Spanish authority, I was apprehensive I should not be permitted to land in safety. Before I was ready to leave the vessel, however, the Governor's aid came on board, and, before we reached the shore, the Indians had mostly disappeared. I was afterwards informed that, at the time the transport came to anchor, there were upwards of a hundred in the town, who immediately retired to the neighboring woods, by order of the Governor. I was further informed, by a respectable citizen of Pensacola, that, a few days preceding my arrival, a considerable number of Indians, who had taken refuge in that place, had been transported, by the Governor's authority, to St. Rose island, on the opposite side of the bay.

The undersigned certifies, upon honor, to the correctness of the substance of the foregoing statement.

T. CROSS, *Captain U. S. Army.*

WASHINGTON CITY, February 1, 1820.

I was Quartermaster General of the South Division on the Seminole campaign. At Fort Gadsden I received orders to proceed to Mobile and Fort Montgomery, for the purpose of forwarding supplies to the army, then on its march west. From Mobile I sent the schooner Little Sally, Captain Pastes, loaded with provisions, to the Perdido river, with instructions to remain there until the approach of the army, or until further orders. Two days after we arrived at the Barancas, Captain Pastes joined, and informed us that his vessel had been taken by a Spanish launch near the mouth of Perdido, and brought under the guns of the Fort Barancas, and detained several days. This was confirmed by several Spanish officers after we took possession of the fort.

I certify, on my honor, to the truth of the above statement.

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1820.

GEORGE GIBSON,  
Late Quartermaster General of South Division.

SIR:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 27, 1818.

In the present state of hostilities between the Indians and the United States, your aid and co-operation may be required by the general commanding the United States' army in the South; you will therefore afford all the aid and support in your power, and keep up a correspondence for this purpose.

Despatch immediately two gunboats and two of the smaller vessels to Mobile, and to the Appalachicola, to protect the convoys of supplies, and to remove any obstructions to a free communication between the forts and forces of the United States. It will be your duty also to adopt such further measures as the circumstances of the case or the development of events may render necessary.

B. W. CROWNINSHIELD.

P. S. Commandant J. D. Henley is also ordered to send one of the small vessels of his squadron to the Appalachicola, which vessel will be subject to your order.

Com. D. T. PATTERSON, Com. Naval Station, New Orleans.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH,  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, FORT ST. MARKS, April 26, 1818.  
GENERAL ORDER.

The following detail will compose a *special court*, to convene at this post, at the hour of 12 o'clock, M. for the purpose of investigating the charges exhibited against A. Arbuthnot, Robert Christy Ambrister, and such others who are similarly situated, as may be brought before it. The court will record all the documents and testimony in the several cases, and their *opinion* as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and what punishment, if any, should be inflicted.

DETAIL.

Major General E. P. Gaines, *President.*

*Members.*

Colonel King, 4th infantry.  
Lieutenant Colonel Gibson, Tennessee volunteers.  
Major Montgomery, 7th infantry.  
Colonel Dyer, Tennessee volunteers.  
Lieutenant Colonel Elliott, Tennessee volunteers.  
Major Minton, Georgia militia.

Colonel Williamson, Tennessee volunteers.  
Major Muhlenburg, 4th infantry.  
Captain Vashon, 7th infantry.  
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay, corps of artillery.  
Major Fanning, corps of artillery.  
Captain Crittenden, Kentucky volunteers.

Lieutenant J. M. Glassell, 4th infantry, *Recorder.*

An orderly will be detailed from General Gaines's brigade, and the court will sit without regard to hours.  
By order of Major General Jackson.

ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant General.*

A true copy.

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

SIR:

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 2, 1816.

Your communication of the — ultimo, with its enclosures, have been received, and submitted to the President, as well as my letter of the 27th ultimo to you.

Since the date of that letter, information has been received directly from Spain, which gives additional force to the impressions entertained in relation to Colonel Jesup's communications. The improbability of the information given by that officer will not, in the opinion of the President, justify any arrangement which is calculated to produce public excitement.

A judicious disposition of the force under your command, with a view to meet an event of that nature, is all that is considered necessary at the present moment, except the transportation of the arms and munitions of war, to the menaced point of attack, which such a measure renders indispensable.

These dispositions you will carry into execution agreeably to the instructions contained in my letter of the 27th ultimo, with such modifications as the actual state of the posts, and a true regard to the public interest, may require.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient, and very humble servant,

WM. H. CRAWFORD.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding the Southern Division.*

A true copy from the original.

RICHARD I. EASTER, *A. D. C.*

*Extract of a letter from William H. Crawford, Secretary of War, to Major General Jackson, dated 27th September, 1816.*

The destruction of the Negro Fort, at the junction of the Appalachicola and Flint Rivers, may have removed the necessity of keeping up so large a force in that quarter. It must, however, be admitted, that every means of exciting those Indians to hostility will be resorted to in the event of a Spanish war. But even in that event, it is questionable whether we should keep so large a portion of our active force, pent up in a fort, acting on the defensive, when, in fact, there is nothing worth defending. The militia of Georgia would be competent to the chastisement of the hostile Indians in that quarter. If the danger becomes more threatening, all the posts, in the interior of the Indian country, may be occupied by the militia of that State, and Tennessee, so as to admit of the assemblage of the whole regular force, at the point immediately menaced. Your knowledge of the situation of the posts within your command will enable you to adopt the necessary measures to secure the object presented in this communication.



In withdrawing forces from posts now occupied, you will keep in view the preservation of the military stores which may have been deposited in them, which can only be done by transporting them with the troops, or by leaving a sufficient number of them for their protection, until the post can be manned by the militia, or troops brought from the northern division.

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, January 20, 1818.

SIR:

I have received your letter of the 18th ultimo, and have to regret the situation in which you are unfortunately placed. Every effort will be made, however, to relieve you. I shall leave this place for Fort Hawkins on the 22d, and two regiments of mounted volunteers will rendezvous at Fayetteville, Tennessee, on the 31st instant, and proceed, by forced marches, direct to our southern frontier.

The commanding officer of the Georgia militia has instructions, this day, not to invite a general engagement with the Indians, but, at all hazards, to aid you in relieving Major Muhlenburg.

ANDREW JACKSON,  
*Maj. Gen. Commanding Division of the South.*Col. ARBUCKLE, *Commanding at Fort Scott.*

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.**Extract of letter from Major General Jackson to Brevet Major General Gaines, dated*

HEAD-QUARTERS, NASHVILLE, August 17, 1818.

DEAR SIR:

I am happy to find that the notorious Mecedicoxy is at length destroyed. The distresses of the Indians for provisions I expected: your providing for their wants meets my entire approbation. It will meet the full approbation of the Government, as it corresponds with their usual humanity, always extended to the suffering Indian.

I have noted, with attention, Major Twigg's letter, marked No. 5. I contemplated that the agents of Spain, or the officers of Fort St. Augustine, would excite the Indians to hostility, and furnish them with the means. It will be necessary to obtain evidence substantiating this fact, and that the hostile Indians have been fed and furnished from the garrison of Fort St. Augustine; this being obtained, should you deem your force sufficient, you will proceed to, take, and garrison with American troops, Fort St. Augustine, and hold the garrison prisoners, until you hear from the President of the United States, or transport them to Cuba, as in your judgment, under existing circumstances, you may think best.

Let it be remembered, that the proceedings heretofore carried on by me, or this order, is not on the ground that we are at war with Spain; it is on the ground of self-defence, bottomed on the broad basis of the law of nature and of nations, and justified by giving peace and security to our frontier; hence, the necessity of procuring evidence of the fact of the agents or officers of Spain having excited the Indians to continue the war against us, and that they have furnished them with the means of carrying on the war; this evidence being obtained, you will (if your force is sufficient) permit nothing to prevent you from reducing Fort St. Augustine, except a positive order from the War Department.

Orders, some time since, have been given to the officers of the ordnance commanding at Charleston, to have in readiness a complete battering train, the number and caliber of the guns pointed out; I have no doubt but that you will find them in readiness. I enclose you the report of Captain Henley, of the naval force on that station; you will open a correspondence with Commandant A. J. Dallas, to ensure his co-operation, provided it should be required.

I trust, before this reaches you, you will have destroyed the settlement collected at Suwanee. This can easily be done by a *coup-de-main*, provided secrecy of your movement be observed, and great expedition of march used: without expedition of movement, and great secrecy is observed, you will be discovered, and the enemy will either flee, or endeavor to ambuscade you; both of which ought to be guarded against.

Have a careful eye to your supplies on hand, that before they are consumed others may be ordered, and reach you: without necessary supplies, an army cannot operate with effect. The late scarcity ought to teach us a lesson on this head never to be forgotten; I shall therefore expect that no scarcity will exist at any place, post, or garrison intrusted to your care.

I shall expect to hear from you shortly; and that you and your brigade may be successful in all your operations, and cover itself with glory, is my heartfelt wish; and, with this feeling,

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON, *Maj. Gen. Commanding.*

Brevet Maj. Gen. GAINES.

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.**Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Honorable W. Lowndes, Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, dated 13th April, 1818.*

The estimate formerly transmitted for the expense of calling out the militia, during the present year, was made for infantry; but as upwards of twelve hundred men of the present militia force in the field are mounted volunteers, an additional sum of ninety thousand dollars will be necessary to meet the increased expense.

A true copy from the records of this Department.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 21, 1819.

C. VANDEVENTER.

HEAD-QUARTERS, TENNESSEE VOLUNTEERS,  
SOUTH SIDE OF THE TENNESSEE RIVER, February 13, 1818.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit you the muster-rolls of the volunteer mounted gun-men, of West Tennessee; also, a consolidated morning report of the brigade. I have had much trouble in procuring these returns.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HAYNE, *Inspector General Commanding Brigade.*To Brigadier Gen. D. PARKER, *Adjutant and Ins. Gen. City of Washington.*

True copy, on file in my office:

A. P. HAYNE, *Inspector General United States' Army.*

SIR:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *March 7, 1818.*

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 9th, and three of the 15th instant. I have the pleasure of expressing to you my entire approbation of all the measures you have adopted to ensure a prompt movement of the patriotic volunteers confided to your command.

It is a subject of regret that there is no public arsenal in that section of the country, from which arms and equipments could be drawn. The course which you have taken to remedy the evil, I trust, will be effectual. So far as it may be practicable, let the arms be preserved and returned, after the campaign closes, to the owners. Where this cannot be done, let the account, properly vouched, be paid by the quartermaster's department.

The bills drawn on account of supplies of every kind will be paid when presented to this Department. Upwards of one hundred thousand dollars have been forwarded to the paymasters of the 4th and 7th regiments, for the payment of the militia, before they are discharged. General Jackson will adopt such measures as will be proper to secure this object. The desire of the President, that the disbursing officers of the regular forces should be charged with the expenditures of the campaign, is the only obstacle to appointing the gentlemen recommended by the officers of the Tennessee brigade. Every attention will be given to secure the object of their wishes.

I am well aware of the difficulties to be overcome to organize efficiently, and satisfactorily to the officers and men, a volunteer corps for the field. In the present instance, the pride and spirit of veterans, aided by patriotism, and directed by superior intelligence, have handsomely surmounted every obstacle. The alacrity with which the brave Tennesseans have again resumed their arms in defence of their country, is a sufficient earnest that their efforts will be successful, and that their efficiency, joined with the gallant exertions of other corps, will speedily terminate the conflict.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

To Colonel A. P. HAYNE, *Inspector General, commanding Tennessee brigade.*

True copy, taken from the original on file in my office,

A. P. HAYNE, *Inspector General U. S. Army.*

I, Richard K. Call, captain of the United States' army, and aid-de-camp to Major General Jackson, do swear, that, some time during the last session of Congress, I was summoned to appear before a committee of the Senate of the United States, to give evidence in relation to the occurrences of the Seminole campaign; that, after giving the statement, which appeared as one of the documents accompanying the report of the committee, (which statement was taken in writing by one of its members,) I was told by Mr. Lacock, chairman of the committee, that my testimony could not then be copied in order to receive my signature, but that, by the next morning at ten o'clock, it should be prepared; at which time I should have an opportunity of comparing it with the original, and of correcting any mistake which might arise in its being transcribed. I accordingly repaired, on the day appointed, to the Senate chamber, and was informed by Mr. Lacock, chairman, that the committee would not meet that day, and that my testimony was not yet copied. I again mentioned to him, that, from the number of mutilations and erasures which had been made in recording my evidence, if it was copied, I should expect the right of seeing it before it should be given to the public. He replied that he did not know that the committee would make any use whatever of my deposition; but if they should ultimately determine to introduce it as a document on which a report would be framed, it should be previously copied, submitted to my inspection, and receive my signature; none of which promises were complied with. After my interview with Mr. Lacock, I remained in Washington five or six days, to the best of my recollection, during which time I heard nothing from Mr. Lacock or my deposition; neither did I learn that my statement had been applied to any purpose until my return from Philadelphia to Baltimore, at which place I saw it attached to the report of the committee.

My deposition, however, though published without my having an opportunity of correcting errors which might arise in transcribing it, and in direct violation of Mr. Lacock's promise, is, according to my recollection, correct, with a trivial exception. It is, however, not without error; and this error will be found in the omission of the expression, *I believe*. When interrogated by the committee, in relation to the purpose for which Lieutenant Sands had been ordered to Mobile, my answer was, *I believe* he was ordered there for artillery; and not positive to the fact. I, moreover, observed to the committee, that I did not, at that time, belong to the personal staff of General Jackson; my duties were remote from his person; and, therefore, I was little acquainted with the views and opinions of the commanding general.

R. K. CALL.

Sworn to, this 30th day of July, 1819, before

W. TANNEHILL, *Justice of Peace, Davidson Co. Ten.*

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

NASHVILLE, *July 29, 1819.*

I, James C. Bronaugh, of the United States' army, and attached to the staff of Major General Andrew Jackson, do swear, that, during the last winter, whilst at the city of Washington, I was summoned to appear before the committee of the Senate, in pursuance of their resolution of the 18th December last, "that the message of the President and documents relative to the Seminole war be referred to a select committee, who shall have authority, if necessary, to send for persons and papers; that said committee inquire relative to the advance of the United States' troops into West Florida, whether the officers in command at Pensacola and St. Marks were amenable to, and under the control of, Spain; and particularly what circumstances existed to authorize or justify the commanding general in taking possession of those posts." That, when I appeared before said committee, I was questioned upon the subjects contained in my deposition, which is published in the documents accompanying their report of the 24th February, 1819; that the substance of my answers was taken down by Major John H. Eaton, a member of the committee; and that it was expressly declared to me by John Forsyth, another member, "that, if my testimony was used by the committee, I should have timely information, for the purpose of affording me an opportunity of correcting it." That this promise made me by Mr. Forsyth was violated; and that I never saw the deposition afterwards, until it was published in the documents accompanying the report.

JAMES C. BRONAUGH, *United States' army.*

Sworn to, and subscribed before me, this 24th day of July, 1819,

R. C. FOSTER, *J. P.*

True copy:

R. I. EASTER, *Aid-de-camp.*  
R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

NASHVILLE, *April 21, 1819.*

SIR:

In a conversation with Mr. Forsyth on the subject of the report of the committee of the Senate, I stated that the committee had misstated several facts in relation to the occurrences of the Seminole war. "First: That the Governor of Tennessee was in Nashville when you received your instructions to call for a portion of the militia of the State; and that you neglected to make any requisition upon him for the number for which you were authorized to call; informing him that he was not then in Nashville, and that you had written him immediately on receiving your

instructions. I further told him that you were prepared to prove that you had not appointed the officers to their respective commands, as alleged by the committee." To all which Mr. Forsyth replied, that it was much to be regretted that, in an investigation so important to the country and the character of the individual, evidence so closely connected with the matter in consideration had not been earlier before the committee.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICHARD I. EASTER.

Major General ANDREW JACKSON.

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

DUNLAPSVILLE, TENNESSEE, *March 30, 1819.*

SIR:

On the 22d day of February, 1819, Governor McMinn came to Kingston. Immediately on his arrival, I informed him of my intentions to raise a volunteer company, to join your army on its march to Fort Scott. The Governor went to John Laya's tavern, and made a public and animated appeal to the patriotism of the people of Kingston and its vicinity; and assured all those who would go with me, or go from any part of the State, that they went with his warmest wishes, as he felt anxious to facilitate every movement of the volunteers at so important a crisis. Governor McMinn pledged his faith and reputation, as Governor of the State of Tennessee, to those who went with me, that remuneration should be made for their services.

I am, with respect, yours, &c.

RICHARD G. DUNLAP.

General JACKSON.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, SOUTHERN DIVISION, NASHVILLE, *January 11, 1819.*

SIR:

I have just received orders from the President of the United States to repair to Fort Scott, Georgia, with instructions to call on the Governors of the neighboring States for such additional militia force as may be deemed necessary to co-operate with the disposable regular troops of the southern division, against the Seminoles.

I have this night addressed circulars to several of those brave officers who served with me during the Creek campaign, under a hope that a timely address to the patriotism of our citizens will enable me to effect, by voluntary enlistment, what would otherwise have to be done by draughts.

I have called for one thousand mounted men; and, should the appeal prove inefficacious, will embrace the earliest opportunity of making a requisition on you for a like number of draughted militia.

I have received your letter of the 4th instant, and am happy to hear of the ratification of the treaty with the Cherokee Indians.

Respectfully yours, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

Governor McMINN.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

[CIRCULAR.]

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE, *January 11, 1819.*

SIR:

The Seminole Indians have raised the war hatchet. They have stained our land with the blood of our citizens; their war spirit must be put down, and they taught to know that their safety depends upon the friendship and protection of the United States. To accomplish this, the aid of one regiment of mounted gun-men, of one thousand strong, completely armed and equipped, and to serve during the campaign, is asked from West Tennessee. Can you raise them, and be ready for the field, in ten days? If you can, your general, who led you to victory on the plains of Talledega, Emuckfau, and Tahopk, asks you to accompany him to the heart of the Seminole towns, and there aid in giving peace and safety to the southern frontier. An answer is expected in five days, and it is anticipated that the number required is now ready. This is a private appeal to the patriotism of West Tennessee, and is not to appear in a newspaper. If the regiment is raised and marched, all expenses for expresses shall be paid. By the return of the express you are expected to give your opinion of the probability of the result, that preparations may be made accordingly. Colonel R. H. Dyer, Colonel Gibson, Colonel Williamson, Colonel George Elliott, Major William Mitchell, Major John Smith, of Montgomery county, Colonel Martin, of Williamson, and Captain F. Ellis, of Dixon county, have alone been addressed on this subject. The grade of the officers to be determined by themselves or the platoon officers of the regiment. The officers raising companies to command them. Upon further reflection, it is requested that those officers named above, and all such as can raise a company, will meet me at this place on the 19th of the present month. Punctuality in this is much desired; and it is further requested, that all those officers who have served in the late war will be confidentially notified of the foregoing.

I have the honor to be, &c.

A. JACKSON, *Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

NASHVILLE, *January 19, 1818.*

SIR:

In my last I informed you of the late order received from the President of the United States, and of the appeal I had made to the patriotism of West Tennessee. This day the officers who heretofore commanded the volunteers met me, and report, that two regiments of mounted gun-men will rendezvous, on the 31st instant, at Fayetteville, prepared and equipped for a tour of six months. Thus you see, that my best hopes of Tennessee are realized. Had circumstances permitted, and time allowed, and the emergency demanded an appeal to the whole State, I have no doubt but five thousand men could have been raised. There appears no difficulty but the want of arms. With those two regiments, and the regulars, should the time of the Georgia troops have expired, I will be able to act promptly, and, I hope, with effect.

The last account from Fort Scott, on the 19th ultimo, left the regular force in an unpleasant situation. I set out on the 22d, in the morning.

I have the honor to be, yours, respectfully,

ANDREW JACKSON.

His Excellency Governor McMINN.

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

*Act of the Legislature of Tennessee, 1815. [See ch. cxviii. sec. 112.]*

*Be it enacted,* That, when it may be conceived that the public good eminently requires it, the Governor is hereby authorized to call out such parts of the cavalry of this State as he thinks proper; and, when so called out, they shall be considered, ruled, and regulated, as mounted gun-men, for the time he may so order them.

True copy: R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

*Extract of a letter from Governor McMinn, dated*

JUNE 20, 1818.

DEAR SIR:

I am happy to hear of your return, as also those brave men who volunteered their services with you.

I have never heard from you since you left the Lookout Mountain; but hope, from what I have learned from others, that you have silenced the disturbers of our peace. I am prodigiously pleased to hear of your leaving the post of St. Marks and Pensacola in possession of the Americans, out of which I trust in God they will never be taken.

JOS. McMINN.

General JACKSON.

True copy: R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

*Extracts of two letters from the Governor of Tennessee to Major General Andrew Jackson, dated*

MURFREESBOROUGH, April 6, 1819.

Your favor of the 3d instant is now before me, and with pleasure I make the following reply:

Your letter, dated Nashville, 11th January, 1818, reached me at Knoxville, seat of Government.

Your letters of the 11th and 19th January both reached me by due course of mail; the former advising of your having received instructions from the President of the United States to call on the Governors of the neighboring States for such militia force as you might deem necessary, to co-operate with the regular troops of the southern division against the Seminole Indians; but that you had made an appeal to the officers who had served with you in the Creek campaign, by which you expected that the necessity of calling on the State of Tennessee for one thousand draughted men would be superseded; which expectation must have been realized, by the advice contained in your letter of the 19th, above referred to; in which you state that the officers have given you assurances that they would furnish two regiments at the earliest notice. Your mode of raising those troops *met my entire approbation*; and I gave it my support in aiding Captain Dunlap in raising a company of mounted volunteers, at Southwest Point; which, I have since learned, joined your army at Fort Gadsden.

True extract: R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

SIR:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, February 5, 1819.

The enclosed is a copy of a letter from the chairman of the committee of the Senate, on the subject of the Seminole war.

Governor Bibb's letter to you of the 19th of May last is all the information now in the possession of this Department relative to the inquiry of the committee.

I will thank you to communicate, as early as practicable, whatever information you may possess on all the points of inquiry contained in the letter of the chairman, and not comprehended in the letter referred to.

I have, &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

Major General ANDREW JACKSON,  
*Commanding South Division, Washington City.*

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

Arthur P. Hayne, inspector general of the southern division of the army of the United States, and late commandant of the Tennessee volunteers, being duly sworn, testifies: That, in the month of January, 1818, Major General Andrew Jackson, of the United States' army, addressed circular letters to Colonels Dyer, Williamson, Elliott, Mitchell, Phillips, and others; and stated to them that the southwestern frontier was in danger, and that he had determined to make an appeal to the patriotism of the people of West Tennessee; that it was his wish to raise two regiments for that object. And deponent further testifies, that, on the arrival of the said field officers at Nashville, they, the said field officers, settled among themselves their own rank; and the deponent further declares, that the said field officers were not, in any way or manner, either directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, controlled, governed, or influenced by the said Major General A. Jackson; and the deponent further testifies, that the field officers determined, at their first meeting at Nashville, that individuals who first succeeded in bringing to the rendezvous full companies should rank as captains, and command their own men; and that the same principle should govern the election of subalterns. And the deponent further testifies, that he never received any authority from Major General Andrew Jackson, nor was he concerned himself, in any way or manner whatever, either directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, in any of the appointments of the officers of the Tennessee brigade, with the exception of those of his immediate staff, a privilege allowed to all commanding officers, either in regular or militia service. The deponent further testifies, that the muster-rolls of the Tennessee brigade were forwarded on to the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, at Washington City, on the 13th of February, 1818, from Ditto's landing, on the Tennessee river; that the said rolls reached Washington in safety, and in the ordinary course of mail.

A. P. HAYNE.

True copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

Sworn to and subscribed before the undersigned, judge of the first judicial district of the State of Louisiana, this 12th of June, 1819.

JOSHUA LEWIS.

Certified:

R. I. EASTER, *Aid-de-camp.*

DEAR GENERAL:

ELM GROVE, May 21, 1819.

I have just returned home from the western district, and have recently seen the report of the Senate of the United States relative to the Seminole war, wherein I find you charged, by a committee of that honorable body, of

organizing and appointing the officers to take the command of the volunteers from this State engaged in that war. Certainly that committee could not have received the proper information respecting this particular subject; and, believing that you, sir, have a wish that the facts should be stated in all questions wherein you are concerned, I have thought proper to make the following statement, which every field officer belonging to the two regiments, I have no doubt, will recollect to be facts.

In the month of January, 1818, you made an appeal to a number of those officers who had accompanied you in the Creek war, and to Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans, and named to them that there were one thousand men wanting, and that volunteer mounted men would be received; and requested that those officers would meet at Nashville, on the 19th January, 1818; at which time and place a number of officers met. After assuring you that the men could be raised with ease, it was proposed by myself, and some other officers then present, for you to name the officers to command those troops. This you refused, and said, "Agree among yourselves on your officers;" and then stated to the officers present that you would appoint Colonel A. P. Hayne to lead us on to Fort Scott, and, on our arrival at that point, you would then take the command yourself. We then left you, and withdrew to a room, where it was agreed that I should take the command of the first regiment, and Colonel Thomas Williamson should take the command of the second regiment, and that we should officer and organize them in the same way that the volunteer mounted gun-men were organized in 1814, when we marched to Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans; the other field officers were then agreed on, and our names reported to you, in writing, who would command the two regiments. You then named to the officers the law regulating the peace establishment, and how the regiments were officered under that law. It was then named to you by myself, together with several other officers, that, by experience, we had found that horsemen required more officers than footmen, on account of horsemen covering a much larger space. You then said, "Organize yourselves in a way that you may think proper; it will rest with the Government." A number of those officers you made the appeal to were commissioned by James Madison, Esq., then President of the United States, in 1812; and a part of them, under all privations, stuck to the service with you, without a murmur, during the war with Great Britain and the hostile Creek Indians.

I am, sir, with the greatest respect, your most obedient humble servant,

R. H. DYER,  
*Late Colonel 1st reg't Tenn. Vol. Mounted Gunmen.*

The facts stated in the above letter are known by the undersigned, who was present at the time alluded to, to be correct.

THOMAS WILLIAMSON,  
*Late Colonel 2d reg't Tenn. Vol. Mounted Gunmen.*

Sir:

MURFREESBOROUGH, September 23, 1819.

In answer to your note of this date, just received, I have to reply that I was of the volunteer corps raised in East Tennessee, in the latter part of the year 1812, by Colonel John Williams, and marched into East Florida in the same year, or in January in the year 1813, as well as I recollect. I was an officer in said corps, and held a commission signed by Colonel John Williams.

This volunteer corps was raised under the influence of Colonel John Williams, organized by him, and the officers commissioned by him. We marched into East Florida, and had an engagement with the Indians and negroes. This campaign was approved by the General Government, and the officers and men paid for their services.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL BUNCH.

Major General JACKSON.

A true copy:

R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

MAJOR GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON:

In answer to the interrogatories this day proposed by you to me, I declare I held no office or appointment whatever under Colonel John Williams, or any other person, in the Florida or Seminole campaign, commonly so called, set on foot and commanded by Colonel John Williams, in 1812.

I was one of the privates composing that service, and my services were wholly voluntary. I do not know that any commissions were made out in form for the officers; but I know that the officers were selected or named by Colonel John Williams, and I know that those selected by him served in the capacity for which they were selected. I know it, because I was consulted on that occasion; the selection having been made, as I believe, with a view, in part, to the feelings and the interest of the individuals composing the command. We had an engagement with Indians, and perhaps negroes; but I do not know that there were any negroes in the engagement. I received my pay from the General Government, and I believe all others did. I know of no authority given by the General Government to raise such company, nor have I ever understood that there was any; and I believe the same to have been wholly voluntary.

Given under my hand, this 22d of September, 1819.

A true copy:

P. M. MILLER.  
R. K. CALL, *Aid-de-camp.*

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 165.

[2d SESSION.]

THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, NOVEMBER 26, 1818.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 23, 1818.

Sir:

Conformably to a resolution of the Senate of the United States, of March 17, 1818, I have the honor to state, that in May last, a copy of the resolution was sent to the Adjutant General of the militia of each State and Territory, with a circular letter requiring reports to be made conformably thereto, on the 1st of October; and when the address of the Adjutant General was not known, the letters were sent to the Governors of States and Territories. Duplicates were immediately sent to such as had not reported, and I now have the honor to transmit a return, showing the organization and strength of the militia of States and Territories, as far as returns have been made, together with such militia laws as have been received by this Department.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE of the United States.

Report of the organization and strength of the militia of the several States and Territories.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	DIVISION AND BRIGADE STAFF.										INFANTRY, GRENADIERS, LIGHT INFANTRY, AND RIFLEMEN.																									
	Year of which the last return was made.	Number of divisions.	Number of brigades.	Major Generals.	Aids-de-camp.	Division Inspectors.	Division Quartermasters.	Brigadier Generals.	Aids-de-camp.	Brigadier Majors and Inspectors.	Brigade Quartermasters.	Number of regiments.	Number of companies of infantry.	Number of companies of grenadiers.	Number of companies of light infantry.	Number of companies of riflemen.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Chaplains.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum and Fife Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers, Fifers, and Buglers.	Privates.	Aggregate, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.
Massachusetts, -	1817	13	28	13	23	12	13	27	24	28	27	109	910	5	90	17	90	103	101	102	97	93	90	96	84	887	923	906	97	87	175	3,555	-	2,443	54,173	64,271
New Hampshire, -	1817	3	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	38	345	-	-	-	38	38	37	38	36	35	-	37	38	338	336	333	38	38	74	1,265	-	840	19,715	22,576
Rhode Island, -	1817	1	4	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	13	13	13	3	13	13	13	13	13	13	-	13	9	100	115	115	13	13	400	400	191	6,191	7,651	
Connecticut, -	1818	3	9	3	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	26	240	-	55	20	26	26	30	25	24	26	25	25	25	247	259	229	25	24	1,046	949	824	13,385	17,627	
New York, -	1818	11	56	11	22	11	11	56	56	56	56	189	-	-	-	189	189	189	189	189	189	49	173	139	1,418	1,389	1,347	186	186	306	5,867	4,944	4,230	83,339	104,986	
New Jersey, -	1818	4	13	4	8	3	3	13	13	13	10	46	371	-	-	24	41	86	44	43	82	-	42	39	395	408	310	32	-	47	1,373	911	457	28,288	32,598	
Pennsylvania, -	1818	16	32	16	32	-	-	31	64	-	-	105	1,050	-	31	63	103	103	139	39	79	52	-	81	55	1,173	1,046	950	59	56	157	2,317	1,876	1,324	103,795	116,248
Maryland, -	1818	4	21	4	8	4	4	18	14	21	10	124	813	3	67	97	-	105	219	119	105	97	1	107	107	819	749	623	76	50	93	3,291	1,829	694	63,775	73,475
Virginia, -	1817	7	17	7	14	7	7	17	17	17	-	88	875	-	-	-	65	54	71	60	44	47	-	36	17	791	729	630	38	13	74	2,304	1,346	1,122	40,612	48,155
North Carolina, -	1817	10	22	10	10	10	10	22	22	22	22	96	581	1	15	27	96	96	96	96	96	96	-	75	48	595	551	537	73	5	117	2,748	-	494	41,425	51,991
South Carolina, -	1818	5	21	5	8	3	4	21	17	19	17	72	722	-	4	44	64	-	142	69	62	69	26	63	46	698	682	680	57	56	116	2,520	2,051	959	51,205	60,527
Kentucky, -	1818	2	5	2	4	-	-	5	5	5	-	20	138	2	2	2	19	-	38	17	18	2	-	15	7	164	306	-	-	576	666	666	8	7,744	9,583	
Ohio, -	1818	2	5	2	4	-	-	5	5	5	-	20	138	2	2	2	19	-	38	17	18	2	-	15	7	164	306	-	-	576	666	666	8	7,744	9,583	
Louisiana, -	1818	2	5	2	4	-	-	5	5	5	-	20	138	2	2	2	19	-	38	17	18	2	-	15	7	164	306	-	-	576	666	666	8	7,744	9,583	
Illinois, -	1818	2	5	2	4	-	-	5	5	5	-	20	138	2	2	2	19	-	38	17	18	2	-	15	7	164	306	-	-	576	666	666	8	7,744	9,583	
Missouri Territory, -	1817	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	12	12	12	12	1	-	-	88	176	-	-	119	116	13	1,659	2,123	5,000	6,502

REPORT, &c.—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.		CAVALRY.																	Aggregate, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.				
		Year of which the last return was made.	Number of regiments or battalions.	Number of companies, or troops.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Chaplains.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.		Sergeants.	Corporals.	Trumpeters.	Privates.
Massachusetts,	-	1817	23	75	4	6	21	20	17	-	-	4	2	63	133	66	-	-	280	-	95	2,167	2,878
New Hampshire,	-	1817	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	64	33	-	-	132	-	64	1,753	2,079
Rhode Island,	-	1817	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	12	6	-	-	24	24	-	152	240
Connecticut,	-	1818	5	20	5	-	5	3	4	5	5	4	20	37	20	3	4	80	79	36	638	953	
New York,	-	1818	-	-	2	2	3	4	4	4	2	2	20	36	20	-	-	83	81	29	839	1,133	
New Jersey,	-	1818	5	35	5	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	35	65	30	-	-	113	77	35	1,351	1,721	
Pennsylvania,	-	1818	-	24	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	24	47	21	-	-	63	27	18	1,041	1,244	
Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia,	-	1818	4	103	-	4	8	4	4	4	4	4	93	169	77	-	-	333	235	34	6,574	7,562	
North Carolina,	-	1817	17	48	13	12	12	7	3	6	-	3	48	86	34	2	1	135	46	27	1,694	2,232	
South Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kentucky,	-	1817	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	538	633
Ohio,	-	1818	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	18	10	-	-	48	-	6	6	538	633
Louisiana,	-	1818	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	34	18	-	-	64	55	18	1,049	1,275	
Illinois,	-	1818	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	16	7	-	-	31	30	3	216	311	
Missouri Territory,	-	1817	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

REPORT, &c.—Continued.

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	ARTILLERY.																	Grand total.	REMARKS.						
	Year of which the last return was made.	Number of regiments or battalions.	Number of companies.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Paymasters.	Chaplains.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Mates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sergeant Majors.	Quartermaster Sergeants.	Drum and Fife Majors.			Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Privates.	Aggregate, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.	
Massachusetts, -	1817	25	72	5	5	21	22	20	-	6	4	65	133	-	-	-	-	274	-	186	2,946	3,687	70,836	Militia laws received.	
New Hampshire, -	1817	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	63	-	-	-	-	118	64	862	1,139	25,794	Ditto.		
Rhode Island, -	1817	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	14	7*	-	-	-	28	28	14	354	459	8,350	Ditto.	
Connecticut, -	1818	12	40	5	5	5	4	3	4	4	5	34	84	5	4	-	2	157	127	84	1,406	1,993	20,573	Ditto.	
New York, -	1818	-	-	6	6	5	5	6	6	5	-	117	218	7	-	-	-	510	505	363	4,580	6,417	112,536	Ditto.	
New Jersey, -	1818	1	21	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	21	43	-	-	-	-	73	57	29	644	850	35,169	Ditto.	
Pennsylvania, -	1818	-	7	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	7	14	-	-	-	-	27	23	-	443	524	118,016	Ditto.	
Maryland, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia, -	1818	4	60	-	4	8	4	4	4	4	4	56	68	-	-	-	-	220	193	64	4,058	4,721	85,758	Ditto.	
North Carolina, -	1817	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50,387	Ditto.	
South Carolina, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Ditto.
Kentucky, -	1817	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7	-	-	-	-	15	-	4	87	121	52,745	Ditto.	
Ohio, -	1818	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	-	-	-	-	8	8	2	111	136	61,938	Ditto.	
Louisiana, -	1818	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,894	Ditto.	
Illinois, -	1818	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,123	Ditto.	
Missouri Territory, -	1817	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,502	-	

NOTE.—The preceding imperfect, consolidated report of the organization and strength of the militia of the States and Territories, embraces all the returns which have been received, conformably to a resolution of the Senate of the United States of March 17, 1818; although some of the returns are dated 1817, they were reported by the Adjutant Generals, under the resolution, as the present strength and organization.

Letters have been received from the Adjutant Generals of South Carolina, Maryland, Mississippi, and Delaware, stating that it is not in their power to report the organization and strength of the militia of their States, conformably to the resolution. The Adjutant General of Virginia reports, that their militia laws are so distributed through the session-acts of Assembly, that a digest cannot readily be made. There are no reports from the other States or Territories.

D. PARKER, *Adjutant General.*



15th CONGRESS.]

No. 166.

[2d SESSION.]

## WESTERN ARMORY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 7, 1818.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 3, 1818.*

SIR:

In reply to so much of your letter of the 20th ultimo as requires my opinion "as to the expediency or necessity of the establishment of a national armory on the Western waters," I have the honor to enclose, for the consideration of the Military Committee, a report of the Ordnance Department, containing a statement of such facts as appear to be connected with the object of your inquiry.

Whether it would be expedient to establish an additional national armory will depend, in the first place, on the fact, whether those already established are sufficient to fabricate as many arms as the necessity of the country requires; and, if they are not sufficient, whether it would be more advisable to fabricate them by a national armory or by contract.

In presenting this view of the subject, it is assumed that the supply of arms ought to be manufactured within the country, and ought not to be imported.

By a reference to the report of the Ordnance Department, it will appear that the national armories can fabricate, annually, about twenty-five thousand. This number, it is conceived, is not sufficient, whether we regard the present supply, or the increased number which the growing population of the country requires.

Our principal reliance for defence is on the militia—a species of force which requires a much more ample supply than regular troops, as experience proves them to be much more wasteful of arms. At the commencement of the late war our supply amounted to two hundred thousand stands; and, though it continued less than three years, our stock, at its termination, was nearly exhausted.

It is believed that, as arms can be fabricated at least as cheap, and of a better quality, by a national armory, than by contract, it is the preferable mode.

If these observations are correct, it would appear expedient to establish an additional national armory, and that the "place of its location" ought to be on the Western waters. It is probable that arms can be fabricated in that portion of our country at least as cheap as at Harper's Ferry, or Springfield; and a very considerable expense would be annually saved in transportation. As to the particular "place of location," I am not in possession of such information as will enable me to give an opinion on the subject.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *Chairman of the Military Committee  
of the House of Representatives, U. S.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *December 2, 1818.*

SIR:

In answer to the inquiries of the Military Committee, made in their communication of the 20th ultimo, I have now the honor to state that the national armories at Springfield and Harper's Ferry are capable of fabricating, annually, about twenty-five thousand stands of arms, at an expense of three hundred and fifty to three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars. By contracting for some of the heavier parts of the work, it is judged the product at those establishments might be increased to thirty thousand stands a year, in which case the expense might amount to four hundred and twenty or four hundred and thirty thousand dollars. The arms manufactured by contract amount now to eight or ten thousand stands a year, and the price is, in general, fourteen dollars for the musket, exclusive of extra charges incurred in proving, inspecting, packing, and transporting the arms to the arsenals. It is calculated the demand for the Western country will embrace at least one-third of the whole supply required for the United States.

There are now deposited at Pittsburgh from twelve to fifteen thousand stands, viz: two thousand rifles, sent from Harper's Ferry in 1817, and eight thousand muskets sent from the same place in the present year. The residue consists principally of arms which have been in service and have undergone repairs.

The expense attending the transportation of arms from Harper's Ferry to Pittsburgh may be stated at about one dollar a stand.

About twenty thousand stands of arms remain at New Orleans; about four thousand at Newport, Kentucky; and about three thousand at Detroit. These are principally such as have been in the hands of troops, and have undergone, or are undergoing, repairs. The cost of fabricating muskets may be stated at about two-thirds in labor, and one-third in materials.

As the necessaries of life will be cheaper in the Western country than on the seaboard, it may be presumed the wages of workmen will eventually be lowest where they can be easiest subsisted.

Iron may be delivered on the Ohio, of a quality suitable for the manufacture of arms, at nearly the same price it will cost at Harper's Ferry. The other materials, with the exception of coals, will cost higher. The number of men employed at Springfield and Harper's Ferry varies from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and forty, or thereabouts, at each place. It is judged not proper to employ at one establishment more than about two hundred and fifty hands, because a degree of discipline and subordination is necessary to be maintained, and the difficulty of preserving regularity, and ensuring united exertion, increases with the increase of numbers.

The first cost of an armory in the Western country, on the scale of Springfield and Harper's Ferry, may be calculated at about two hundred thousand dollars for lands, command of water, buildings, and machinery. About three years will probably be required to bring a new establishment into successful operation, and the expense may be during that time sixty or seventy thousand dollars a year. Supposing it should be decided to establish an armory in the Western country on the scale of Springfield or Harper's Ferry, it would be advisable to employ, for a few years, at first, no more than about one hundred and fifty hands, or enough to ensure eight thousand stands of arms yearly; otherwise, some inconvenience might be sustained by the desertion of workmen from armories now in operation. The permanent annual expense on that scale may be from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty thousand dollars. The number of arms in the possession of the Government, at the commencement of the late war, is not distinctly known at this office. It is presumed to have been upwards of two hundred thousand stands. At the close of the campaign of 1814 the arsenals were nearly exhausted. The great extent of seacoast, and of inland frontier, to be protected, will render large distribution of arms to the militia indispensable in time of war; and it ought to be concluded, as well from past experience as the nature of the case, that our resources will sooner fail in that particular than in any other of our military supplies. The reason is, that so much time is required to put in operation an establishment for manufacturing arms on a large scale, that it will not be in the power of Government, on a sudden emergency, to increase very materially the supply.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

DECIUS WADSWORTH, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

The Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 167.

[2d SESSION.]

## ARREST OF CAPTAIN OBED WRIGHT, OF THE GEORGIA MILITIA, FOR BURNING THE CHEHAW VILLAGE, IN THE CREEK NATION.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 14, 1818.

*To the House of Representatives of the United States:*

DECEMBER 12, 1818.

In compliance with the resolution of the House of the 10th instant, I transmit a report of the Secretary of War, with copies of the correspondence between the Governor of Georgia and Major General Jackson, on the subject of the arrest of Captain Obed Wright.

JAMES MONROE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 12, 1818.*

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 10th instant, the Secretary of War has the honor to transmit to the President of the United States copies of the correspondence between the Governor of the State of Georgia and Major General Jackson, relative to the arrest of Captain Obed Wright, transmitted by them to this Department.

J. C. CALHOUN.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, GEORGIA, MILLEDGEVILLE, *June 1, 1818.*

SIR:

You will no doubt have been informed by General Jackson, ere this reaches you, of an unfortunate attack recently made by a detachment of Georgia militia, under the command of Captain Obed Wright, on a village in the Creek nation of Indians, situated on the west side of Flint river, generally known by the name of Chehaw.

In order to bring the circumstances of this transaction fully before you, I must beg leave to refer you to a copy of a letter written by myself to General Jackson, (herewith enclosed,) by which you will perceive, that soon after the army entered the nation, and passed Fort Early, the Indians in that neighborhood, especially from two towns situated on the east side of Flint river, generally denominated Hopaunees, and Philemees, from chiefs of that name, had recommenced their depredations on our frontier. After having waited a considerable time in expectation of receiving an answer from the general, but in vain; and being repeatedly and earnestly requested by the distressed inhabitants of that frontier to afford them protection against the inroads of the savages; and being fully satisfied by letters from respectable citizens from that quarter, that the murders and depredations committed were by Indians from the above-named towns, I took upon myself the responsibility of ordering a detachment into service for the special purpose of destroying them, having been convinced, by experience, that small detachments, stationed on the frontiers, were not sufficient to ensure protection to the inhabitants, as the Indians, acquainted with their situation, watched favorable opportunities for coming in on some unguarded point, committing murders, and returning with impunity. On the 24th of November last, I received a requisition from the War Department, requesting me to cause to be detailed, from Major General Floyd's division, five hundred men, for the special purpose of assisting in the reduction of Amelia island. Orders for this purpose were immediately given to Major General Floyd, who, viewing it, as I did, a case of emergency, drew the whole of the requisition from the first brigade of his division, under the impression that their services would be required on that occasion only. Before the organization of the troops could be completed, Amelia island fell into the hands of the regular force sent against it. General Floyd, notwithstanding, completed the organization, and, without consulting me at all, they were ordered to the frontier at different points. Some were ordered to Hartford to join the two regiments, which were then organizing to go against the Indians, agreeably to a request of General Gaines. Among these was Captain Wright's company from Savannah. At the time they marched, however, the captain, from ill health, was unable to accompany them, but shortly after followed on to Hartford, and assumed the command of a small detachment left there, although it since appears he had never been mustered into the service of the United States. Captain Wright having tendered his services to lead the expedition, and, from the circumstances above mentioned, believing I had the right to command him, they were accepted. I accordingly ordered two companies of cavalry from two adjacent counties, and two companies of infantry, which I had previously ordered to different posts on the frontier, to rendezvous at Hartford, and report themselves to Captain Wright, and also directed Captain Wright to call on Captain Bothwell, then in the service of the United States, stationed at Fort Early, for assistance, should it be necessary. The only reason I have to offer for calling on the troops in the service of the United States is, the danger to which the frontier was exposed, and the necessity for putting a stop to the incursions of the savages, which could only be done by the destruction of their towns, in order that the inhabitants might return to their homes, and prepare their farms for cultivation, the season for doing so having then commenced. The party, on their march learning that Hopaunee had left his own village, and had taken up his residence at the Chehaw town, took on themselves the responsibility of pursuing him there; and, having reached the town, commenced an attack on it; the result of which was, that several of the friendly Indians were killed. As the detachment was ordered into service by the State's authority, and as they had violated their orders by destroying a friendly town, I had ordered an investigation of the conduct of the commanding officer before a military tribunal; but I have since determined to stay all further proceedings until the pleasure of the President of the United States should be known on the subject. Captain Wright was arrested by order of General Jackson, but was released by the civil authority. I have since had him arrested, and shall keep him confined to await the President's decision. I have the honor to transmit a copy of General Jackson's letter to me, demanding forthwith the delivery of Captain Wright to the officers sent by him to arrest and confine him. It is a production as inflammatory and indecorous, as it is unbecoming a gentleman and a soldier. Enclosed you will also receive a copy of my letter to the general in reply.

Should it meet the approbation of the President, I would prefer that the case of Captain Wright be referred to the Circuit Court of the United States, which will be held in Savannah, in December next.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

WM. RABUN.

The Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War, Washington.*EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, GEORGIA, MILLEDGEVILLE, *March 21, 1818.*

SIR:

You have no doubt been apprized that, since your departure from Hartford with the Georgia militia, the Indians have been hovering on the frontier of Telfair county; that they have killed a Mr. Bush, and wounded his son, and, being pursued by the citizens of that county, have met them in hostile array, when an engagement took place, which lasted near an hour, in which our little detachment, consisting of only thirty-four men, lost seven killed and

a number badly wounded. This rencounter has excited considerable alarm on that frontier, and the inhabitants are, in many instances, flying from their homes, for the want of protection.

The object of this communication is to request that you will be so good as to station some troops near the Big Bend of the Ockmulgee, and at or near the most assailable points below that place. If it is not convenient for you to furnish the necessary force, you will please give directions for supplying such detachments as may, in that event, be ordered into the service, under the authority of the State, with rations, &c. I hope you will write me on this subject without delay, as great alarm has been produced by the hostile attitude which the enemy has assumed.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. RABUN.

Major General ANDREW JACKSON, *U. S. army, Creek nation.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, GEORGIA, MILLEDGEVILLE, June 1, 1818.

SIR:

I have lately had the honor to receive yours of the 7th ultimo, founded on a communication from General Glasscock, relative to an attack recently made on the Chehaw village. Had you, sir, or General Glasscock, been in possession of the facts which produced the affair, it is to be presumed, at least, that you would not have indulged in a strain so indecorous and unbecoming. I had, on the 21st of March last, stated the situation of our bleeding frontier to you, and requested you, in respectful terms, to detach a part of your overwhelming force for our protection, or that you would furnish supplies, and I would order out more troops; to which you have never yet deigned to reply. You state, in a very haughty tone, that "I, as Governor of a State, within your military division, have no right to give a military order whilst you are in the field." Wretched and contemptible, indeed, must be our situation, if that be the fact. When the liberties of the people of Georgia shall have been prostrated at the feet of military despotism, then, and not till then, will this imperious doctrine be tamely submitted to. You may rest assured, that, if the savages continue their depredations on our unprotected frontier, I shall think and act for myself in that respect.

You demand that Captain Wright be delivered in irons to your agent, Major Davis. If you, sir, are unacquainted with the fact, I beg leave to inform you, that Captain Wright was not under your command, for he had been appointed an officer in the Chatham county militia, which had been draughted for the special purpose of assisting General Gaines in reducing Amelia island. That object having been accomplished before our militia had taken the field, General Gaines, as soon as their organization was completed, assumed the right to order them to the frontier, without ever consulting the State authority on the subject. Captain Wright, at that time being in a state of debility, failed to march, and, of course, was not mustered into the service of the United States. He, however, followed on to Hartford, where, finding himself not likely to be received into the service of the United States, tendered his services to command the contemplated expedition, which were accordingly accepted. Having violated his orders by destroying the Chehaw village, instead of Hopaunees and Phlemmees towns, against which the expedition was directed, I had, previous to receiving your demand, ordered him to be arrested; but before he was apprehended agreeably to my orders, he was taken by your agent, and afterwards liberated by the civil authority. I have since had him arrested and confined, and shall communicate the whole transaction to the President of the United States, together with a copy of your letters.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WM. RABUN.

Major General ANDREW JACKSON, *United States' army.*

SIR:

FORT HAWKINS, GEORGIA, May 17, 1818.

I was ordered on the 6th instant from Fort Gadsden to Georgia; on the 8th instant, I was overtaken by an express from Major General A. Jackson, with the enclosed communications; I proceeded without delay to Hartford; Captain Wright was gone before I arrived. I now hasten to Milledgeville to deliver General Jackson's letter to the Governor of Georgia.

Captain Wright, I understand, has gone to Savannah, where I intend to pursue him; if he is taken, I will notify you immediately.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. DAVIS, *Assistant Inspector General.*

The Honorable J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

SIR:

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, May 7, 1818.

You will send, or deliver personally, as you may deem most advisable, the enclosed talk to Kanard, with instructions to explain the substance to the Chehaw warriors.

You will proceed thence to Hartford, in Georgia, and use your endeavors to arrest, and deliver over in irons to the military authority at Fort Hawkins, Captain Wright, of the Georgia militia, who has been guilty of the outrage against the women and superannuated men of the Chehaw village. Should Wright have left Hartford, you will call upon the Governor of Georgia to aid you in his arrest.

To enable you to execute the above, you are authorized to take in company with you the Tennesseans that went from hence lately for Fort Scott, and await, if you think it necessary, the arrival of the Georgians, now on march under Major Porter.

You will direct the officer commanding at Fort Hawkins to keep Captain Wright in close confinement until the will of the President be known.

The accompanying letters for the Secretary of War and the Governor of Georgia you will take charge of until you reach a post-office.

ANDREW JACKSON, *Major General commanding.*

Major Davis.

SIR:

Send, with the accompanying letter, to the Secretary of War, a copy of the talk to the Chehaw nation, the order to you, and the letter to the Governor of Georgia: they are left open for this purpose.

The copies of Glasscock's letters will accompany that to the Secretary of War and the letter to the Governor of Georgia.

Yours, &c.

J. GADSDEN, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEAD-QUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, May 7, 1818.

[On line of march, 7 miles from Fort Gadsden, 12 o'clock.]

SIR:

I halt my army to enclose you a communication which has this moment been received by express from General Glasscock. The outrage which has been committed upon the superannuated warriors, women, and children,

whose sons were then in the field in the service of the United States, merits the severest chastisement. The interference, too, of the Governor of Georgia with the duties imposed on me, claims the earliest attention of the President.

All the effects of my campaign may, by this one act, be destroyed, and the same scenes of massacre and murder, with which our frontier settlers have been visited, again repeated.

On my march from Hartford to Fort Scott, the necessities of my army were first relieved at the Chehaw village, and every act of friendship characterized the conduct of their old chiefs. The young warriors immediately entered, and were mustered into the service of the United States; and, under the command of Colonel Kanard, were esteemed one of the most efficient corps of friendly Indians. What must be their feelings, on returning to the vicinity of their homes, after the privations, fatigues, and dangers of a long march, in the service of the United States, to find their houses consumed, their families dispersed, and their old warriors and chiefs butcherously and inhumanly murdered, you must well know how to estimate.

I have written to Hartford to have Captain Wright arrested and ironed, until the will of the President of the United States is known; and I have requested of the Governor of Georgia to aid in the execution of this order, should Wright have left that place.

I shall send a talk to the Chehaws, explaining, as satisfactorily as possible, this most iniquitous proceeding.

Copies of the above are enclosed.

Yours respectfully,

ANDREW JACKSON.

The Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

SIR:

FORT EARLY, *April 30, 1818.*

I have the pleasure to inform you that my command has safely reached this place, having suffered some little for the want of meat. The gods have proved equally propitious to us, on our return as on our advance at Mickasuky. Some of my men were nearly out of corn, and, searching about some old houses that had not been consumed, to see if they could make any discovery, in entering one of them, to their great astonishment and surprise, they came across the man who was lost from Captain Watkin's company, on the 2d of April. It appears, from his statement, that he was taken with a kind of cramp, and was unable to move and became senseless. When he recovered, he became completely bewildered, and never could reach the camp; he therefore concluded it was prudent to secrete himself in some swamp, and, after wandering about some time, came across a parcel of corn, on which he subsisted until we found him: he was very much reduced, and apparently perfectly wild. On that night Gray struck a trail, pursued it about a mile and a half, came to a small hut, which fortunately contained fifty or sixty bushels of corn, some potatoes and peas, which enabled us to reach the Flint, opposite Chehaw village; when, arriving within thirty miles of the place, I sent on Major Robinson, with a detachment of twenty men, to procure beef. On his arriving there, the Indians had fled in every direction; the Chehaw town having been consumed about four days before, by a party of men consisting of two hundred and thirty, under a Captain Wright, now in command of Hartford.

It appears that, after he assumed the command of that place, he obtained the certificates of several men on the frontier, that the Chehaw Indians were engaged in a skirmish on the Big Bend. He immediately sent or went to the Governor, and received orders to destroy the towns of Philemnee and Opaunee. Two companies of cavalry were immediately ordered out and placed under his command, and on the 22d he reached this place. He ordered Captain Bothwell to furnish him with twenty-five or thirty men to accompany him, having been authorized to do so by the Governor. The order was complied with. Captain Bothwell told him that he could not accompany him, disapproved the plan, and informed Captain Wright that there could be no doubt of the friendship of the Indians in that quarter; and stated, that Opaunee had brought in a public horse that had been lost that day. This availed nothing; mock patriotism burned in their breasts; they crossed the river that night, and pushed for the town. When arrived there, an Indian was discovered grazing some cattle; he was made a prisoner. I am informed by Sergeant Jones, that the Indian immediately proposed to go with the interpreter, and bring any of the chiefs for the captain to talk with. It was not attended to. An advance was ordered, the cavalry rushed forward and commenced the massacre. Even after the firing and murder commenced, Major Howard, an old chief, who furnished you with corn, came out of his house with a white flag in front of the line. It was not respected. An order was given for a general fire, and nearly four hundred guns were discharged at him before one took effect. He fell, and was bayoneted; his son was also killed. These are the circumstances relative to the transaction. Seven men were killed, one woman, and two children. Since then three of my command, who were left at Fort Scott, obtained a furlough, and on their way one of them was shot, in endeavoring to obtain a canoe to cross the Flint. I have sent on an express to the officer commanding Fort Scott, apprizing him of the affair, and one to Adjutant Porter, to put him on his guard. On arriving opposite Chehaw, I sent a runner to get some of them in, and succeeded in doing so. They are at a loss to know the cause of the displeasure of the white people. Wolf has gone to the agent to have it inquired into. We obtained from them a sufficient quantity of beef to last us to Hartford, at which place I am informed there is a plentiful supply of provisions.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your friend and obedient servant,

THOMAS GLASSCOCK, *Brig. Gen. com'g Ga. militia, U. S. S.*

Major General ANDREW JACKSON.

ON MY MARCH TO THE WEST OF THE APPALACHICOLA, *May 7, 1818.*

FRIENDS AND BROTHERS:

I have this moment received, by express, the intelligence of the unwarrantable attack of a party of Georgians on the Chehaw village, burning it, and killing six men and one woman.

FRIENDS AND BROTHERS:

The above news fills my heart with regret, and my eyes with tears: when I passed through your village, you treated me with friendship, and furnished my army with all the supplies you could spare; and your old chiefs sent their young warriors with me to fight, and put down our common enemy. I promised you protection; I promised you the protection and fostering friendship of the United States, so long as you continued to hold your father, the President of the United States, by the hand of friendship.

FRIENDS AND BROTHERS:

I did not suppose there was any American so base as not to respect a flag, but I find I am mistaken. I find that Captain Wright of Georgia has not done it. I cannot bring your old men and women to life, but I have written to your father, the President of the United States, the whole circumstance of your case, and I have ordered Captain Wright to be arrested and put in irons, until your father, the President of the United States, makes known his will on this distressing subject.

FRIENDS AND BROTHERS:

Return to your village; there you shall be protected, and Captain Wright will be tried and punished for this daring outrage of the treaty and murder of your people; and you shall also be paid for your houses and other pro-

perty that have been destroyed; but you must not attempt to take satisfaction yourselves; this is contrary to the treaty, and you may rely on my friendship, and that of your father, the President of the United States.

I send you my friend, Major Davis, who is accompanied by a few of my people, and who is charged with the arrest and confinement of Captain Wright: treat them friendly; they are your friends; you must not permit your people to kill any of the whites; they will bring down on you destruction. Justice shall be done to you; you must remain in peace and friendship with the United States. The excuse that Captain Wright has made for this attack on your village is, that some of your people were concerned in some murders on the frontiers of Georgia; this will not excuse him. I have ordered Captain Wright, and all the officers concerned in this transaction, in confinement, if found at Hartford. If you send some of your people with Major Davis, you will see them put in irons. Let me hear from you at Fort Montgomery. I am your friend and brother.

ANDREW JACKSON,  
Major General, commanding division of the south.

To the CHIEFS AND WARRIORS of the Chehaw village.

ON MARCH TOWARDS PENSACOLA, 7 MILES ADVANCED OF

SIR:

FORT GADSDEN, May 7, 1818.

I have this moment received, by express, the letter of General Glasscock, a copy of which is enclosed, detailing the base, cowardly, and inhuman attack on the old women and men of the Chehaw village, whilst the warriors of that *village* were with me fighting the battles of our *country* against the common enemy, and at a time, too, when undoubted testimony had been obtained, and was in my possession, and also in possession of General Glasscock, of their innocence of the charge of killing Leigh and the other Georgian at Cedar creek.

That a Governor of a State should assume the right to make war against an Indian tribe, in perfect peace with, and under the protection of, the United States, is assuming a responsibility that I trust you will be able to excuse to the Government of the United States, to which you will have to answer; and through which I had so recently passed, promising the aged that remained at home my protection, and taking the warriors with me on the campaign, is as unwarrantable as strange. But it is still more strange that there could exist within the United States a cowardly monster, in human shape, that could violate the sanctity of a flag when borne by any person, but more particularly when in the hands of a superannuated Indian chief, worn down with age. Such base cowardice and murderous conduct as this transaction affords, has not its parallel in history, and should meet with its merited punishment.

You, sir, as Governor of a State within my military division, have no right to give a military order whilst I am in the field; and this being an open and violent infringement of the treaty with the Creek Indians, Captain Wright must be prosecuted and punished for this outrageous murder; and I have ordered him to be arrested and confined in irons until the pleasure of the President is known upon the subject. If he has left Hartford before my order reaches, I call upon you, as Governor of Georgia, to aid in carrying into effect my order for his arrest and confinement, which I trust will be afforded, and Captain Wright brought to condign punishment for this unprecedented murder. It is strange that this hero had not followed the trail of the murderers of your citizens; it would have led him to the Mickasuky, where we found the *bleeding scalps of your citizens*; but there might have been more danger in this than attacking a village containing a few superannuated women and men, and a few young women without arms or protectors.

This act will, to the last ages, fix a stain upon the character of Georgia.

I have the honor, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON, Major General commanding.

His Excellency WILLIAM RABUN, Governor of the State of Georgia.

SIR:

FORT HAWKINS, May 30, 1818.

In pursuance of my order from General Jackson, dated May 7, 1818, (which has heretofore been enclosed to you,) I came up with Captain Obed Wright, of the Georgia militia, in Dublin, on the 24th instant. I arrested him, and brought him on as far towards Fort Hawkins as Milledgeville, where the civil authority interfered and discharged him.

A copy of the proceedings is herewith enclosed, together with a copy of my letter to the Governor of Georgia, and Wright's arrest.

I have notified Major General Jackson of the circumstances.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. DAVIS, Assistant Inspector General.

The Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, Secretary of War.

CHAMBERS, May 28, 1818.

Present: their honors Robert Wynn, William Bevin, and James Fleming, *Justices*.

The court met for the purpose of hearing Obed Wright, who was brought up before them upon a writ of *habeas corpus*, which is as follows:

GEORGIA, }  
Baldwin county. } To any Justice of the Inferior Court.

The petition of Obed Wright sheweth: That he is detained in confinement by Major Davis, an officer in the United States' service, and he therefore prays the benefit of a *habeas corpus*, to inquire into the cause of his confinement and detention.

SEABORN JONES, Attorney for petitioner.

GEORGIA, Baldwin County:

It appears, from the petition of Obed Wright, that he is now kept in custody by you, and he having prayed a writ of *habeas corpus*, you are, therefore, hereby commanded, that you bring before me, at the court house of the county, by the hour of eleven o'clock of the forenoon of the day, the body of the said Obed Wright, by whatever title he may be known to you, together with the cause of his commitment and detention, that he may be dealt with according to law. Fail not, and have you then and there this writ.

Given under my hand and seal, the 28th of May, 1818.

WILLIAM BEVIN, J. I. C.

*Habeas corpus*, by the constitution of the United States, and of the State of Georgia.

To Major DAVIS, an officer in the United States' service.

MILLEDGEVILLE, May 28, 1818.

I have the said Obed Wright in court, together with the cause of his commitment and detention.

JOHN M. DAVIS,  
Assistant Inspector General U. S. army.

Major John M. Davis, assistant inspector general of the United States' army, in obedience to a writ of *habeas corpus*, this day served on him, having produced the body of said Obed Wright, mentioned in the *habeas corpus* before the court, together with the cause of his commitment and detention:

And the court, on consideration, deeming that no sufficient cause is shown for his detention: on motion, ordered, that he be discharged forthwith.

ROBERT WYNN.  
WILLIAM BEVIN.  
JAMES FLEMING.

GEORGIA, *Baldwin County*:

I, Thomas H. Kenan, clerk of the Inferior Court for said county, do hereby certify, the preceding pages contain a true copy of the proceedings of the trial of Obed Wright, in consequence of his confinement and detention.

Given under my hand and seal, this 28th day of May, 1818.

THOMAS H. KENAN, *Clerk Inf. Court.*

SIR:

MILLEDGEVILLE, *May 29, 1818.*

In pursuance of Major General Jackson's order to me of the 7th inst., a copy of which is herewith enclosed, I arrested Captain Obed Wright, of the Georgia militia, in Dublin, on the 24th inst., and brought him thus far, on my way to Fort Hawkins, when a writ of *habeas corpus* was served on me, by which Captain Wright has been released from confinement:

I do now hereby call on you to have Captain Wright delivered to me, that I may be able to keep him in confinement until the will of the President of the United States be known.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. DAVIS,  
*Assistant Inspector General U. S. army.*

His Excellency WM. RABUN, *Governor of Georgia.*

SIR:

DUBLIN, GEORGIA, *May 24, 1818.*

I am directed by Major General Jackson, commanding the division of the south, to arrest, you and conduct you to Fort Hawkins, where you are to remain until the pleasure of the President of the United States be known on your case.

You will, therefore, consider yourself in arrest, and proceed accordingly.

I am, respectfully, yours, &c.

JOHN M. DAVIS,  
*Assistant Inspector General U. S. army.*

Capt. OBED WRIGHT, *Georgia militia.*

[The following message was sent to the House of Representatives, January 4, 1819.]

*To the House of Representatives of the United States:*

DECEMBER 31, 1818.

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 24th instant, requesting me to lay before it "copies of the correspondence, if any, between the Department of War and the Governor of Georgia, in answer to the letter of the latter to the former, dated on the 1st of June of the present year, communicated to the House on the 12th instant; and also the correspondence, if any, between the Department of War and General Andrew Jackson, in answer to the letter of the latter, of the date of 7th May, 1818, also communicated to the House on the 12th instant," I transmit a report from the Secretary of War, with a copy of an extract of a letter from Major Vandeventer, chief clerk in the Department of War, in reply to General Jackson's letter of the 7th of May, 1818.

JAMES MONROE.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 30, 1818.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 24th instant, "requesting the President of the United States to cause to be laid before this House (if, in his opinion, the same should not be inconsistent with the public interest) copies of the correspondence, if any, between the Department of War and the Governor of Georgia, in answer to the letter of the latter to the former, dated on the 1st of June of the present year, communicated to this House on the 12th instant; and also the correspondence, if any, between the Department of War and General Andrew Jackson, in answer to the letter of the latter, of the date of the 7th May, 1818, also communicated to this House on the 12th instant," has the honor to transmit an extract of a letter written by Major Vandeventer, chief clerk in the Department of War, in reply to General Jackson's letter of the 7th of May, 1818, and to state that no letter was addressed by this Department to the Governor of Georgia, in answer to his letter of the 1st of June, 1818.

J. C. CALHOUN.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

*Extract of a letter from Major C. Vandeventer, chief clerk, to Major General Andrew Jackson, dated*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *June 2, 1818.*

Your letters of the 7th of April, (one without date,) from Fort Gadsden, and of the 26th of April, are received.

The President of the United States and the Secretary of War are out of town. The former will return about the 15th instant; the latter not before the middle of next month. So soon as the President returns, your despatches, together with your order to Major Davis commanding the arrest of Captain Wright, and a copy of your letter to the Governor of Georgia, in relation to the horrid and atrocious destruction of the Chehaw village, will be laid before him. In the mean time, I am advised to communicate the "opinion" that the trial of Captain Wright by court-martial is decidedly preferable to a civil prosecution in the federal court.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 168.

[2d SESSION.

## REDUCTION OF THE ARMY CONSIDERED.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 14, 1818.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 11, 1818.*

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives passed the 17th of April last, directing the Secretary of War "to report, at an early period of the next session of Congress, whether any, and, if any, what reduction may be made in the military peace establishment of the United States with safety to the public service; and whether any, and, if any, what change ought to be made in the ration established by law, and in the mode of issuing the same; and also report a system for the establishment of a commissariat for the army;" I have the honor to submit the following report:

In order to form a correct opinion on a subject involving so many particulars as the expense of our military establishment, it will be necessary to consider it under distinct and proper heads. To ascertain, then, "whether any, and, if any, what reductions may be made in the expenses of our military peace establishment," I propose to consider its number, organization, pay and emoluments, and administration. To the one or the other of these heads all of its expenses may be traced; and if they are greater than they ought to be, we must search for the cause in the improper extent of the establishment, the excessive number of officers in proportion to the men, the extravagance of the pay and emoluments, or the want of proper responsibility and economy in its administration.

Pursuing the subject in the order in which it has been stated, the first question which offers itself for consideration is, whether our military establishment can be reduced "with safety to the public service," or can its expenditures be with propriety reduced, by reducing the army itself. It is obvious that, viewed in the abstract, few questions present so wide a field for observation, or which are so well calculated to produce a great diversity of sentiment, as the one now proposed. Considered as an original question, it would involve in its discussion the political institutions of the country, its geographical position and character, the number and distance of our posts, and our relations with the Indian tribes and the principal European Powers. It is conceived, however, that a satisfactory view of it may be taken without discussing topics so extensive and indefinite.

The military establishments of 1802 and 1808 have been admitted, almost universally, to be sufficiently small. The latter, it is true, received an enlargement, from the uncertain state of our foreign relations at that time; but the former was established at a period of profound quiet, (the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration,) and was professedly reduced, with a view to economy, to the smallest number then supposed to be consistent with the public safety. Assuming these as a standard, and comparing the present establishment (taking into the comparison the increase of the country) with them, a satisfactory opinion may be formed on a subject which otherwise might admit so great a diversity of opinion.

Our military peace establishment is limited, by the act of 1815, passed at the termination of the late war, at ten thousand men. The corps of engineers and ordnance, by that and a subsequent act, were retained as they then existed; and the President was directed to constitute the establishment of such portions of artillery, infantry, and riflemen, as he might judge proper. The general orders of the 17th of May, 1815, fix the artillery at 3,200, the light artillery at 660, the infantry 5,440, and the rifle 660 privates and matrosses. Document A exhibits a statement of the military establishment, including the general staff, as at present organized; and B exhibits a similar view of those of 1802 and 1808; by a reference to which it will appear that our military establishments, at the respective periods, taken in the order of their dates, present an aggregate of 3,323, 9,996, and 12,656. It is obvious that the establishment of 1808, compared with the then wealth and population of the country, the number and extent of military posts, is larger in proportion than the present; but the unsettled state of our relations with France and England at that period renders the comparison not entirely just. Passing, then, that of 1808, let us compare the establishment of 1802 with the present. To form a correct comparison, it will be necessary to compare the capacity and necessities of the country then with those of the present time. Since that period our population has nearly doubled, and our wealth more than doubled. We have added Louisiana to our possessions, and with it a great extent of frontier, both maritime and inland. With the extension of our frontier, and the increase of our commercial cities, our military posts and fortifications have been greatly multiplied. Document marked C exhibits the number and positions of posts in the year 1802, and document D those of the present time; by a reference to which it will be seen that at the former period we had but twenty-seven posts, the most remote of which were, to the north, at Mackinaw, and to the south, at Fort Stoddert, on Mobile river; but now we have seventy-three, which occupy a line of frontier proportionally extended. On the lakes, the Mississippi, Missouri, Arkansas, and Red River, our posts are now, or will be shortly, extended, for the protection of our trade and the preservation of the peace of the frontiers, to Green Bay, the mouths of the St. Peter's and the Yellow Stone river, Bellepoint, and Natchitoches. Document marked E exhibits a statement of the extent of the line of our frontier, inland and maritime, with the distance of some of the more remote posts from the seat of Government, drawn up by Major Long, of the topographical engineers, from the most approved maps.

If, then, the military establishment of 1802 be assumed to be as small as was then consistent with the safety of the country, our present establishment, when we take into the comparison the prodigious increase of wealth, population, extent of territory, number and distance of military posts, cannot be pronounced extravagant; but, on the contrary, after a fair and full comparison, that of the former period must, in proportion to the necessities and capacity of the country, be admitted to be quite as large as the present; and on the assumption that the establishment of 1802 was as small as the public safety would then admit, a reduction of the expense of our present establishment cannot be made, with safety to the public service, by reducing the army. In coming to this conclusion, I have not overlooked the maxim that a large standing army is dangerous to the liberty of the country, and that our ultimate reliance for defence ought to be on the militia. Its most zealous advocate must, however, acknowledge that a standing army, to a limited extent, is necessary; and no good reason can be assigned why any should exist but which will equally prove that the present is not too large. To consider the present army as dangerous to our liberty partakes, it is conceived, more of timidity than wisdom. Not to insist on the character of the officers, who, as a body, are high-minded and honorable men, attached to the principles of freedom by education and reflection, what well-founded apprehension can there be from an establishment distributed on so extended a frontier, with many thousand miles intervening between the extreme points occupied? But the danger, it may be said, is not so much from its numbers as a spirit hostile to liberty, by which, it is supposed, all regular armies are actuated. This observation is probably true when applied to standing armies collected into large and powerful masses; but, dispersed as ours is over so vast a surface, the danger, I conceive, is of an opposite character—that both officers and soldiers will lose their military habits and feelings, by sliding gradually into those purely civil.

I proceed next to consider whether any reduction can be made, with propriety, by changing the organization, or by reducing the number of officers of the line or the staff in proportion to the men. It is obvious that, as the officers are much more expensive, in proportion to their numbers, than the soldiers, the pay of the army, in relation to its aggregate numbers, must be increased or diminished with the increase or diminution of the former. It is impossible to fix any absolute proportion between officers and men which will suit every country and every service; and the organization of different countries, and of different periods in the same country, has accordingly varied considerably. Our present organization, of which document marked A contains an exhibit, is probably as well or better adapted to the nature of our country and service than any other, as it seems to be the result of experience; for, by a reference to document marked B, it will be seen that it is nearly similar (with the exception of the general staff, in which the

present is more extensive,) to the organization of the military establishments of 1802 and 1808. It is believed that the proportion of officers of the line to the men will require no further observations.

The staff, as organized by the act of the last session, combines simplicity with efficiency, and is considered to be superior to that of the periods to which I have reference. In estimating the expenses of the army, and particularly that of the staff, the two most expensive branches of it (the engineer and ordnance departments) ought not fairly to be included. Their duties are connected with the permanent preparation and defence of the country, and have so little reference to the existing military establishment, that if the army were reduced to a single regiment, no reduction could safely be made in either of them. To form a correct estimate of the duties of the other branches of the staff, and, consequently, the number of officers required, we must take into consideration not only the number of troops, but, what is equally essential, the number of posts and extent of country which they occupy. Were our military establishment reduced one-half, it is obvious that, if the same posts continued to be occupied which now are, the same number of officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's, paymaster's, medical, and adjutant and inspector general's departments would be required.

To compare, then, as is sometimes done, our staff with those of European armies assembled in large bodies, is manifestly unfair. The act of the last session, it is believed, has made all the reduction which ought to be attempted. It has rendered the staff efficient, without making it expensive. Such a staff is not only indispensable to the efficiency of the army, but is also necessary to a proper economy in its disbursements; and should an attempt be made at retrenchment, by reducing the present number, it would, in its consequences, probably prove wasteful and extravagant.

In fact, no part of our military organization requires more attention in peace than the general staff. It is in every service invariably the last in attaining perfection; and, if neglected in peace, when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection. It is in peace that it should receive a perfect organization, and that the officers should be trained to method and punctuality; so that, at the commencement of a war, instead of creating anew, nothing more should be necessary than to give to it the necessary enlargement. In this country particularly the staff cannot be neglected with impunity. Difficult as its operations are in actual service every where, it has here to encounter great and peculiar impediments, from the extent of the country, the badness and frequently the want of roads, and the sudden and unexpected calls which are often made on the militia. If it could be shown that the staff, in its present extent, was not necessary in peace, it would, with the view taken, be unwise to lop off any of its branches which would be necessary in actual service. With a defective staff, we must carry on our military operations under great disadvantages, and be exposed, particularly at the commencement of a war, to great losses, embarrassments, and disasters.

As intimately connected with this part of the subject, it is proper to observe, that so many and such distant small posts as our service requires, not only add to the expense of the army, by rendering a more numerous staff necessary, but they increase the price of almost every article of supply, and the difficulty of enforcing a proper responsibility and economy. To an army thus situated, the expenses and losses resulting from transportation alone constitute a considerable sum. Under the best management our army must be more expensive, even were our supplies equally cheap, than European armies collected in large bodies, in the midst of populous and wealthy communities. These observations are not made to justify an improper management, or to divert the attention of the House from so important a subject as the expense of our military establishment. They, in fact, ought to have an opposite effect; for just in the same proportion that it is liable to be expensive ought the attention and effort of the Government be roused to confine its expenses within the most moderate limits which may be practicable.

The next question which presents itself for consideration is, can the expenses of our military establishment be reduced, without injury to the public service, by reducing the pay and emoluments of the officers and soldiers? There is no class in the community whose compensation has advanced less since the termination of the war of the revolution than that of the officers and soldiers of our army. While money has depreciated more rapidly than at any other period, and the price of all of the necessaries of life has advanced proportionably, their compensation has remained nearly stationary. The effects are severely felt by the subaltern officers. It requires the most rigid economy for them to subsist on their pay and emoluments. Documents marked F and G exhibit the pay and subsistence during the revolution, and as at present established; and document marked H exhibits the allowance of clothing, fuel, forage, transportation, quarters, waiters, stationary, and straw, at the termination of the revolutionary war, and in 1802, 1815, and 1818. By a reference to those documents, it will be seen that, under most of the heads, the variations of the different periods have been very small, and that, on a comparison of the whole, the pay of an officer is not near equal now, if allowance is made for the depreciation of money, to what it was during the revolution. I will abstain from further remarks, as it must be obvious, from these statements, that the expense of our military establishment cannot be materially reduced, without injury to the public service, by reducing the pay and emoluments of the officers and soldiers.

It only remains to consider, in relation to this part of the resolution of the House, whether the expense of our military establishment can be reduced by a proper attention to its administration, or by a more rigid enforcement of responsibility and economy. Our military establishment is doubtless susceptible of great improvement in its administration. The field is extensive, and the attention of the Government has not heretofore been so strongly directed towards it as its importance deserves. Here all savings are real gain, not only in a moneyed, but a moral and political point of view. An inefficient administration, without economy or responsibility, not only exhausts the public resources, but strongly tends to contaminate the moral and political principles of the officers who are charged with the disbursements of the army. To introduce, however, a high state of economy and responsibility in the management of a subject so extensive and complicated as our military establishment, is a task of great difficulty, and requires not only a perfect organization of the department charged with it, but a continued energetic and judicious enforcement of the laws and regulations established for its government. The organization is the proper sphere of legislation, as the application of the laws and regulations is that of administration. The former has done all, or nearly all, that can be done. It is believed that the organization of the War Department, as well as the general staff of the army, is not susceptible of much improvement. The act of the last session, regulating the staff, has not only made important savings in the expenses of the army, but has given both to the Department and the staff a much more efficient organization than they ever before had. Every department of the army charged with disbursements has now a proper head, who, under the laws and regulations, is responsible for its administration. The head of the Department is thus freed from detail, and has leisure to inspect and control the whole of the disbursements. Much time and reflection will be required to bring the system into complete operation, and to derive from it all the advantages which ought to be expected. The extent of the saving which may result from it can only be ascertained by time and experience; but, with an attentive and vigorous administration, it doubtless will be considerable. In war, it will be much more difficult to enforce economy and responsibility; but, with a system well organized, and with officers trained to method and punctuality, much of the waste and frauds, which would otherwise take place in war, will be prevented. In peace, there can be no insuperable difficulty in attaining a high degree of responsibility and economy. The mere moneyed responsibility, or that of purchases and disbursements, will be easily enforced. The public now sustain much greater losses in the waste and improper use of public property than in their moneyed transactions. In our military establishment, responsibility in the latter is well checked, and not badly enforced. The accounts are rendered with considerable punctuality, and are promptly settled; and even neglect or misapplication of public funds by the disbursing officers is not often accompanied with ultimate losses, as they are under bonds for the faithful discharge of their duties. Accountability, as it regards the public property, is much more difficult, and has heretofore been much less complete. Returns of property in many cases, particularly in the medical department, have rarely been required; and even where they have been, they have not been made with punctuality. It cannot be doubted but that the public have sustained very considerable damage from this want of accountability. Every article of public property, even the smallest, ought, if possible, to be in charge of some person who should be responsible for it. It will be difficult to attain this degree of perfection; but it is hoped, by making each of the subordinate departments of the War Department liable for the property in its charge, a very considerable improvement and reduction of expenses will be made.



On the quality of the ration, and the system of supplying and issuing it, which I propose next to consider, the health, comfort, and efficiency of the army mainly depend. Too much care cannot be bestowed on these important subjects; for let the military system be ever so perfect in other particulars, any considerable deficiency in these must, in all great military operations, expose an army to the greatest disasters. All human efforts must, of necessity, be limited by the means of sustenance. Food sustains the immense machinery of war, and gives the impulse to all its operations; and if this essential be withdrawn, even but for a few days, the whole must cease to act. No absolute standard can be fixed, as it regards either the quantity or quality of the ration. These must vary, according to the habits and products of different countries. The great objects are, first, and mainly, to sustain the health and spirit of the troops; and the next, to do it with the least possible expense. The system which effects these in the greatest degree is the most perfect. The ration, as established by the act of the 16th March, 1802, experience proves to be ample in quantity, but not of the quality best calculated to secure either health or economy. It consists of eighteen ounces of bread, or flour; one pound and a quarter of beef, or three-quarters of a pound of pork; one gill of rum, brandy, or whiskey; and at the rate of two quarts of salt, four quarts of vinegar, four pounds of soap, and one pound and a half of candles, to every hundred rations.

The objection to it, in relation to the health of the army, is fully stated in a report of the surgeon general to the War Department, marked I, which I would respectfully annex as a part of this report. Under this view of the subject, more need not be added, except to urge its importance, both on the score of humanity and policy.

Our people, even the poorest, being accustomed to a plentiful mode of living, require, to preserve their health, a continuation, in a considerable degree, of the same habits of life, in a camp; and a sudden and great departure from it subjects them, as is proved by experience, to great mortality. Our losses, in the late and revolutionary wars, from this cause, were probably much greater than from the sword. However well qualified for war in other respects, in the mere capacity of bearing privations we are inferior to most nations. An American would starve on what a Tartar would live with comfort. In fact, barbarous and oppressed nations have, in this particular, a striking advantage, which, however, ought to be much more than compensated by the skill and resources of a free and civilized people. If, however, such a people want the skill and spirit to direct its resources to its defence, the very wealth, by which it ought to defend itself, becomes the motive for invasion and conquest. Besides, there is something shocking to the feelings, that in a country of plenty beyond all others, in a country which ordinarily is so careful of the happiness and life of the meanest of its citizens, that its brave defenders, who are not only ready, but anxious to expose their lives for the safety and glory of their country, should, through a defective system of supply, be permitted almost to starve, or to perish by the poison of unwholesome food, as has frequently been the case. If it could be supposed that these considerations are not sufficient to excite the most anxious care on this subject, we ought to remember, that nothing adds more to the expense of military operations, or exposes more to its disasters, than the sickness and mortality which result from defective or unwholesome supplies. Impressed with this view of the subject, considerable changes have been made in the ration, under the authority of the eighth section of the act regulating the staff of the army, passed at the last session of Congress. The vegetable part of the ration has been much increased. Twice a week, a half allowance of meat, with a suitable quantity of peas or beans, is directed to be issued. Fresh meat has also been substituted twice a week for salted. In the southern division, bacon and kiln-dried Indian corn meal has been, to a certain extent, substituted for pork and wheat flour. In addition, orders have been given, at all of the permanent posts where it can be done, to cultivate a sufficient supply of ordinary garden vegetables for the use of the troops; and at the posts remote from the settled parts of the country, the order is extended to the cultivation of corn, and to the supply of the meat part of the ration, both to avoid the expense of distant and expensive transportation, and to secure at all times a supply within the posts themselves.

In addition to these changes, I am of opinion that the spirit part of the ration, as a regular issue, ought to be dispensed with; and such appears to be the opinion of most of the officers of the army. It both produces and perpetuates habits of intemperance, destructive alike to the health, and moral and physical energy of the soldiers. The spirits ought to be placed in depot, and be issued occasionally under the discretion of the commander. Thus used, its noxious effects would be avoided, and the troops, when great efforts were necessary, would, by a judicious use, derive important benefits from it. Molasses, beer, and cider, according to circumstances, might be used as substitutes. The substitution of bacon and kiln-dried corn meal in the southern division will have, it is believed, valuable effects. They are both much more congenial to the habits of the people in that section of our country. Corn meal has another, and, in my opinion, great and almost decisive advantage—it requires so little art to prepare it for use. It is not easy to make good bread of wheat flour, whilst it is almost impossible to make bad of that of Indian corn. Besides, wheat is much more liable to be damaged than the Indian corn; for the latter is better protected against disease and the effects of bad seasons in time of harvest than any other grain; and, when injured, the good is easily separated from the bad. Experience proves it to be not less nutritious than wheat, or any other grain. Parched corn constitutes the principal food of an Indian warrior; and such are its nutritious qualities, that they can support long and fatiguing marches on it alone.

I next proceed to consider the system of supplying the army with provisions, or the establishment of a commissariat; and, as they are connected in their nature, I propose to consider that part of the resolution in relation to a commissariat, and the mode of issuing the rations, at the same time.

The system established at the last session will, in time of peace, be adequate to the cheap and certain supply of the army. The act provides for the appointment of a commissary general, and as many assistants as the service may require, and authorizes the President to assign to them their duties in purchasing and issuing rations. It also directs that the ordinary supplies of the army should be purchased on contracts to be made by the commissary general, and to be delivered, on inspection, in the bulk, at such places as shall be stipulated in the contract. Document marked J contains the rules and regulations which have been established by the order of the President, and presents the operation of the system in detail. It is believed that it is as well guarded against fraud as any other department of our military supplies; and, judging from the contracts already formed under it, will, when improved by experience, probably make a very considerable saving. It would improve the system to authorize the appointment of two deputy commissaries, one for each division, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of major of infantry, to be taken from the line or from citizens; and so to amend the act of the last session as to authorize the President to appoint the assistant commissaries, either from the line or citizens. When the assistant commissary is not taken from the line, to make his pay equal to that of a subaltern appointed from the line it ought to be fifty dollars per month, with two rations a day. It should be the duty of the deputy commissaries to perform such service as the commissary general might prescribe, and particularly to inspect the principal depots, and, in cases of necessity, to make the necessary purchases. When a suitable subaltern cannot be had, or when his services are necessary in the line, the power proposed to be vested in the President to select from citizens would be important. It is not believed that any other alteration would be necessary in peace; but the system would require great enlargement in war, to render it sufficiently energetic to meet the many vicissitudes incidental to the operations of war.

It would then be necessary to divide the system into two divisions, one for purchasing, and the other for issuing of rations, with as many deputy commissaries of purchases and issues as there may be armies and military districts, to whom ought to be added a suitable number of assistants. The basis of the system ought in war to be the same as is now established. The ordinary supplies ought to be by contract on public proposals. By a judicious collection of provisions at proper depots, combined with an active and energetic system of transportation, it would be seldom necessary to resort to any other mode of purchasing. To provide, however, for contingencies, the purchasing department ought to be efficiently organized, and a branch of it, as already stated, attached to each army and military department. As it is the means to be resorted to in cases of necessity, it ought to possess those high and discretionary powers which do not admit of exact control. It is, in its nature, liable to many abuses; and to prevent them from being great, more efficient regulations and checks are required than in any other branch of the general staff.

The defects of the mere contract system is so universally acknowledged by those who have experienced its operation in the late war, that it cannot be necessary to make many observations in relation to it. Nothing can appear more absurd than that the success of the most important military operations, on which the very fate of the country

may depend, should ultimately rest on men who are subject to no military responsibility, and on whom there is no other hold than the penalty of a bond. When we add to this observation, that it is often the interest of a contractor to fail at the most critical juncture, when the means of supply become the most expensive, it seems strange that the system should have been continued for a single campaign. It may be said that, when the contractor fails, the commander has a right to purchase at his risk, by which the disasters which naturally result from a failure may be avoided. The observation is more specious than solid. If, on failure of the contractor, there existed a well organized system for purchasing the supplies, there would be some truth in it; but without such a system, without depots of provisions, and with the funds intended for the supply of the army perhaps in the hands of the contractor, his failure must generally be fatal to a campaign. It is believed that a well-organized commissariat, whose ordinary supplies are obtained by contract founded on public notice, possesses (besides those peculiar to itself) all of the advantages fairly attributable to the system of issuing rations by contract. It is equally guarded against fraud, and its purchases can be made on terms more advantageous. A considerable objection to the system of issuing the ration by contract is, that the merchants and capitalists are deterred from bidding, by the hazard of issuing the ration; and thus the sphere of competition is contracted, and the contracts for supplying of the army often thrown into the hands of adventurers. This objection is avoided under the present system, by which the nation will be cheaply supplied, and the danger of failure almost wholly removed.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

J. C. CALHOUN.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *October 21, 1818.*

SIR:

Conformable to your order of the 5th instant, I have the honor to lay before you the following reports:

No. 1. Presents the organization of the army of the United States under existing laws.

No. 2. Contains a list of military posts, maritime and inland, at present occupied, and the number and description of troops at each, taken from the last returns on file in this office.

No. 3. Shows the organization of the army under the act of March, 1802, and the organization of the peace establishment previous to the late war.

No. 4. Shows the distribution of the troops under the organization of March, 1802, at the close of that year, with the number at each post and station.

On that part of your order requiring the strength and organization of a brigade at the close of the war of the revolution, in 1783, I have to state that I have not been able to obtain any documents which establish the strength of such organization at that or any other period, except what is contained in a note to the army regulations during the late war. It is there stated that two regiments form a brigade, and two brigades form a division; but I know of no established regulation on the subject.

I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

D. PARKER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Organization of the army, 1818.

CORPS OR REGIMENT.	Major generals.	Brigadier generals.	Adjutant and inspector general.	Quartermaster general.	Adjutants general.	Inspectors general.	Assistant adjutants general.	Assistant inspectors general.	Deputy quartermasters general.	Assistant deputy quartermasters general.	Topographical engineers.	Assistant topographical engineers.	Paymaster general.	Judge advocates.	Surgeon general.	Post surgeons.	Apothecary general.	Assistant apothecaries.	Commissary general of purchases.	Deputy commissaries of purchases.	Assistant commissaries of issues.	Storekeepers.	Commissary general of supplies.	Assistant commissaries of supplies.	Chaplains.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.
General staff, - - -	2	4	1	1	2	2	4	4	2	16	-	-	1	2	1	40	1	2	1	2	6	-	1	*	1	-	-
Department of engineers, †	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Ordnance department, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*18	-	-	-	-	1
Regiment of light artillery,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Corps of artillery,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
First regiment of infantry,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Second regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Third regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Fourth regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Fifth regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Sixth regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Seventh regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Eighth regiment of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Rifle regiment, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total, - - -	2	4	1	1	2	2	4	4	2	16	6	4	1	2	1	40	1	2	1	2	6	18	1	-	1	12	16

\* The officers, mechanics, artificers, and laborers, of the ordnance with this (\*) prefixed, are unlimited by law, and the numbers now in service are assumed as the organization.  
 † The chief engineer, and senior officer of the corps, is allowed one assistant. The 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 4 musicians, and 80 men, composing the company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners, attached to the engineers, are, by law, added to the peace establishment of 10,000 rank and file.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY—Continued.

CORPS OR REGIMENT.	Majors.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Surgeons' mates.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Third lieutenants.	Armorsers.	Sergeant majors.	Quartermaster sergeants.	Principal musicians.	Master mechanics.	Mechanics.	Artificers.	Laborers.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates and matrosses.	Total commissioned.	Total non-commissioned & privates.	Aggregate.
General staff, - - - - -	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	96	-	96
Department of engineers,†	2	.	.	.	6	6	6	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.	32	21	53
Ordnance department, -	2	.	.	.	10	10	10	10	.	.	.	.	*	*72	*88	.	.	.	.	.	44	.	346
Regiment of light artillery,	1	1	1	1	10	10	20	10	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	660	46	764	810
Corps of artillery, - - -	4	.	.	.	32	64	64	.	8	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	160	256	128	3,200	168	3,776	3,944
First regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Second regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Third regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Fourth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Fifth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Sixth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Seventh regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Eighth regiment of infantry,	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Rifle regiment, - - - - -	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	.	1	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	40	40	20	680	37	784	821
Total, - - - - -	18	10	10	10	148	180	190	10.	18	10	42	21	3	72	108	121	560	656	328	9,980	719	11,635	12,656

\* The officers, mechanics, artificers, and laborers of the ordnance, with this (\*) prefixed, are unlimited by law, and the numbers now in service are assumed as the organization.

† The chief engineer, and senior officer of the corps, is allowed one assistant. The 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 4 musicians, and 80 men, composing the company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners, attached to the engineers, are, by law, added to the peace establishment of 10,000 rank and file.

A statement exhibiting the organization of the army which composed the military peace establishment under the laws of March, 1802, and April, 1808.

REGIMENTS & CORPS.		REMARKS.	
General staff,	1	1	46
Engineers,	1	1	39
Regt of artilleryists,	1	1	1,638
First infantry,	1	1	1,120
Second infantry,	1	1	640
General staff, added by act of April, 1808,	2	2	640
Light artillery,	2	2	805
T. light dragons,	2	2	38
Third infantry,	2	2	580
Fourth infantry,	2	2	817
Fifth infantry,	2	2	724
Sixth infantry,	2	2	849
Seventh infantry,	2	2	680
Riflemen,	2	2	849
Aggregate,	2	2	849
	3	3	9,996
Brigadier generals.	1	1	
Aids-de-camp.	1	1	
Adjutant and inspector.	1	1	
Brigade inspectors.	1	1	
Brigade quartermasters.	1	1	
Paymaster of the army.	1	1	
District paymasters.	7	7	
Assistant paymasters.	2	2	
Purveyor of public supplies.	1	1	
Superintendent of military stores.	1	1	
Storekeepers.	As many as the service may require.		
Military agents.	3	3	
Assistant military agents.	One to each post, or as many as the service may require.		
Hospital surgeons.	5	5	
Hospital surgeons' mates.	15	15	
Hospital stewards.	One to each hospital.		
Ward masters.	One to each hospital.		
Surgeons.	2	2	
Surgeons' mates.	25	25	
Chaplains.	3	3	
Colonels.	12	12	
Lieutenant colonels.	12	12	
Majors.	16	16	
Captains.	192	192	
First lieutenants.	192	192	
Second lieutenants.	192	192	
Ensigns and cornets.	58	58	
Cadets.	200	200	
Riding masters.	1	1	
Sergeant majors.	8	8	
Quartermaster sergeants.	8	8	
Principal musicians.	22	22	
Saddlers and farriers.	16	16	
Sergeants.	472	472	
Corporals.	472	472	
Musicians.	316	316	
Artificers.	241	241	
Privates.	7,590	7,590	
Total commissioned, warrant, and non-com'd officers and privates.	9,996	9,996	
	9,996—Aggregate of the peace establishment before the war of 1812.		
	84—Staff of the army before the war of 1812.		
	3,323—Aggregate establishment under the act of March, 1802.		

## C.—No. 4.

The reduced army, under the act of March, 1802, was distributed as follows on the 1st of January, 1803.

<i>Posts on the Seaboard.</i>			<i>Frontier Posts.</i>		
Fort Green, Georgia	-	64	Fort Niagara	-	153
Fort Johnson, South Carolina	-	84	Fort Detroit	-	339
Fort Johnston, North Carolina	-	27	Michilimackinac	-	125
Fort Nelson, Virginia	-	71	Fort Wayne, N. W. T.	-	64
Fort M <sup>h</sup> Henry, Maryland	-	76	Fort Fayette, Pittsburg	-	71
Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania	-	136	Post Vincennes, Indiana Territory	-	75
Fort Jay, New York	-	72	Kaskaskias	-	78
West Point, State of New York	-	82	Fort Massac	-	71
Fort Trumbull, Connecticut	-	39	Fort Pickering, Chickasaw Bluffs	-	78
Fort Wolcott, Rhode Island	-	108	Fort Adams, M. T.	-	378
Fort Independence, Boston	-	88	Fort Stoddart, Mobile	-	76
Fort Constitution, Portsmouth	-	42	S. W. Point, Tennessee	-	234
Fort Sumner, Portland	-	28	Fort Wilkinson, Georgia	-	214
		<u>917</u>			<u>1,956</u>
		Posts on the seaboard,	-	-	917
		Frontier posts,	-	-	<u>1,956</u>
		Aggregate,	-	-	<u><u>2,873</u></u>

NOTE.—The army consisted of a regiment of artillery, four battalions, 1,628; two regiments of infantry, 805 each, 1,610—3,238, exclusive of the engineer corps and the general staff.

D.—No. 2.

Distribution of the army of the United States, showing the strength of posts and garrisons. Division of the north, commanded by Major General Jacob Brown.

Departments.	Fortifications, &c.	Where situated.	Number of cannon.	Commanding officers.	Regiments or corps.	Aggregate of commands.
Department No. 2. Brevet Brigadier Gen. Porter, commanding head-quarters, Boston, Massachusetts.	Battery, - -	Passamaquoddy, District of Maine,	4	} Capt. Leonard, -	Light artillery, 1 company, -	70
	Battery, - -	Machias, do.	4			
	Enclosed work, -	Castine, do.	6			
	Enclosed battery, -	Castine, do.	3	} Major Crane, -	Corps of artillery, 2d battalion, 1 company, -	98
	Battery, - -	Damariscotta, do.	3			
	Enclosed battery, -	Edgecomb, do.	6			
	Enclosed battery, -	Georgetown, do.	6	} Lt. Col. Walbach, -	Corps of 2d battalion, 2 companies, -	195
	Fort Preble, - -	Portland, do.	14			
	Fort Scammel, -	Portland, do.	15			
	Battery, - -	Portland, do.	5	} Lt. Col. Harris, -	Light artillery, 1 company, -	70
	Fort Constitution, -	Portland, New Hampshire,	36			
	Fort McClary, - -	Kittery, District of Maine,	10			
	Enclosed Battery, -	Gloucester, Massachusetts,	6	} Lt. Col. Eustis, -	Light artillery, 5 companies, -	390
	Fort Pickering, -	Salem, do.	6			
	Fort Sewall, - -	Marblehead, do.	8			
	Fort Independence, -	Boston harbor, do.	42	} Lt. Col. Towson, -	Light artillery, 2 companies, -	146
	Fort Warren, - -	Boston harbor, do.	12			
	2 Batteries, - -	Boston harbor, do.	14			
	Enclosed batteries, -	Plymouth, do.	5	} Capt. McDowell, -	Light artillery, 1 company, -	53
	Enclosed battery, -	New Bedford, do.	6			
	Fort Wolcott, - -	Newport, Rhode Island,	28			
	Fort Adams, - -	Newport, do.	17	} Capt. Talcott, -	Ordnance, - - - -	48
	Fort Hamilton, -	Newport, do.	-			
Fort Green, - -	Newport, do.	6				
Battery at the Dumplins, -	Newport, do.	10	} Lt. Col. House, -	Corps of artillery, 1 company, 2d and 3d of 4th battalion, -	306	
Fort Griswold, - -	New London, Connecticut,	12				
Fort Trumbull, - -	New London, do.	18				
Fort Hall, - -	New Haven, do.	6	} Major Thayer, Captain Tyler, -	Bombardiers, sappers, and miners, Ordnance, - - - -	86 27	
Arsenals, - -	Charlestown and Watertown, Massachusetts,	-				
Department No. 3. Major General Scott, head- quarters, New York.	Battery, - -	Sag Harbor, Long Island, New York,	6	} Lt. Col. House, -	Corps of artillery, 1 company, 2d and 3d of 4th battalion, -	306
	Fort Columbus, -	New York harbor, do.	60			
	Castle Williams, -	New York harbor, do.	102			
	Fort Lewis, - -	New York harbor, do.	-			
	Fort Wood, - -	New York harbor, do.	24			
	Fort Gibson, - -	New York harbor, do.	14			
	Castle Clinton, -	New York harbor, do.	28			
	Humbert Battery, -	New York harbor, do.	16			
	Fort Gansevoort, -	New York harbor, do.	12			
	Post, - -	West Point, do.	-			
Arsenal, - -	New York city, do.	-				

## DIVISION OF THE NORTH—Continued.

Departments.	Fortifications, &c.	Where situated.	Number of cannon.	Commanding officers.	Regiments or corps.	Aggregate of commands.
Department No. 4. Brevet Col. Mitchell, head- quarters, Baltimore, Md.	Fort Mifflin, -	Delaware river, Pennsylvania, -	37	Major Biddle, -	Corps of artillery, 1 company, 3d battalion, -	121
	Fort McHenry, -	Baltimore, Maryland, -	30	Colonel Hindman, -	Corps of artillery, 1 company, 3d battalion, -	118
	Fort Madison, -	Annapolis, do. -	13	} Capt. Reed, -	Corps of artillery, 1 company, 3d battalion, -	103
	Fort Severn, -	Annapolis, do. -	6		} Lt. Colonel Jones, -	Corps of artillery, 1 company, 3d and 1st of
	Fort Washington, -	On the Potomac, do. -	19	4th battalion, -		123
	Arsenal, -	On the Schuylkill and Frankford creek, Pa. -	-	Captain Rees, -	Ordnance, -	24
	Arsenal, -	Near Baltimore, Maryland, -	-	Lieutenant Baden, -	Ordnance, -	32
Arsenal, -	Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, -	-	Major Wolley, -	Ordnance, -	61	
Department No. 1. Brevet Major General Scott, head-quarters, New York.	Plattsburg, -	New York, -	-	Colonel Atkinson, -	6th infantry, -	431
	New work erecting, Sackett's Harbor, -	At Ronse's Point, New York, -	-	} Colonel Brady, -	2d infantry, and 1 company 1st battalion corps	
	Fort Pike, -	Sackett's Harbor, New York, -	-		of artillery, -	555
	Fort Niagara, -	Niagara, do. -	-	} Lt. Colonel Pinkney, -	2d infantry, and 1 company 1st battalion corps	
	Greenbush, -	do. -	-	Major Worth, -	of artillery, -	100
	Arsenal, -	Rome, do. -	-	Captain Welch, -	2d infantry, -	74
Arsenal, -	Watervliet, do. -	-	Major Dalaby, -	Ordnance, -	15	
Department No. 5. Brevet Major General Ma- comb, head-quarters, De- troit, Michigan Territory,	Detroit, -	Michigan Territory, -	-	Major Marston, -	5th infantry, and 1 company 1st battalion corps	
	Grosse Island, -	Opposite Malden, -	-	1st Lt. Gooding, -	of artillery, -	168
	Fort Gratiot, -	Outlet of Lake Huron, -	-	Captain Fowle, -	5th infantry, -	31
	Fort Wayne, -	Head of Miami of the Lake, -	-	Major Vose, -	5th infantry, -	41
	Mackinaw, -	-	-	Captain Peirce, -	5th infantry, -	91
	Fort Howard, -	Greenbay, -	-	Major Taylor, -	Corps artillery, 1st battalion, and 3d infantry,	195
	Fort Dearborn, -	Chicago, -	-	Major Taylor, -	3d infantry, -	174
	Fort Harrison, -	Indiana, -	-	Captain Baker, -	3d infantry, -	84
				Major Chunn, -	1 company of 3d infantry, withdrawn by Maj.	
					General Brown's order, -	65
				Aggregate, north division, -	4,054	



D. No. 2.—Continued.

*Distribution of the army of the United States, showing the strength by posts and garrisons. Division of the south, commanded by Major General Andrew Jackson.*

100	Departments.	Fortifications, &c.	Where situated.	Number of cannon.	Commanding officers.	Regiments or corps.	Aggregate of commands.		
200	Brevet Major General Gaines, head-quarters, Fort Hawkins.	Fort Nelson, -	Norfolk, Virginia, -	37	Lieut. Col. Macrea, -	Corps of artillery, 2d battalion, -	88		
		Fort Norfolk, -	Norfolk, Virginia, -	30	Lieut. McIlvain, -	Corps of artillery, 2d battalion, -	50		
		Crane Island, -	Norfolk, Virginia, -	20					
		Fort Powhatan, -	James river, -	13					
		New work erecting at	Old Point Comfort, Virginia.						
		Fort Johnson, -	Smithfield, North Carolina, -	8	} Lt. N. G. Wilkinson,	Corps of artillery, 2d battalion, detachment,	10		
		Fort Hampton, -	Beaufort, -	5					
		Arsenal, -	Greenleaf's Point, Washington, -	-					
		Arsenal, -	Near Richmond, Virginia, -	-	Captain Nelson, -	Ordnance, -	30		
					Captain Hayden, -	Ordnance, -	27		
		Brevet Major General Gaines, head-quarters, Fort Hawkins.	Department No. 7.	Fort Wingaw, -	Georgetown, South Carolina, -	6	} A subaltern's guard.		
				Fort Johnston, -	do. -	16			
				Castle Pinckney, -	Charleston, do. -	30			
				Fort Moultrie, -	Charleston, do. -	40			
				Fort Mechemic, -	Charleston, do. -	7			
Fort Jackson, -	Savannah, Georgia, -			6					
Fort Marion, -	Beaufort, South Carolina, -			6					
Ferdinandiana, -	Amelia Island, -			{ -	Captain Payne, -	1st and 2d battalion of artillery, -	222		
				{ -	Major Burd, -	Battalion of 4th infantry, -	267		
					Captain Margart, -	Ordnance, -	1		
Brevet Major General Gaines, head-quarters, Fort Hawkins.	Department No. 8.	Creek Agency.							
		Fort Mitchell, -	On the Chattahoochie, one hundred miles from Fort Scott.						
		Fort Montgomery, -	Between Alabama river and Bear creek, Arkansas Territory.						
		Fort Jackson, -	Junction of Alabama & Tallahoosa rivers.						
		Fort Williams, -	On the Coosa river.						
		Fort Gaines, -	Sixty miles northwest from Fort Scott, Georgia.						
		Fort Scott, -	On Flint river, Georgia, -		Captain Donaho, -	1 battalion artillery and 7 infantry, -	87		
		Fort Gadsden, -	East side of the Appalachianicola river, East Florida.		Major Twiggs, -	7th infantry, 8 companies, -	210		
		Fort St. Mark's, -	Mouth of St. Mark's river, East Florida, -		Major Fauning, -	4th battalion artillery, and 1 and 7 infantry, -	245		
		Fort Barancas, -	Pensacola, West Florida, -		Major Brook, -	4th battalion artillery, and 1 infantry, -	110		
		Pensacola, -	Pensacola, West Florida, -		Colonel King, -	4th and 8th infantry, -	408		
		Fort Crawford, -	Mouth of the Escambia river, -		-	8th infantry, 2 companies, -	94		
Camp Calhoun, -			Major Dorman, -	8th infantry, 1 company, -	55				

DIVISION OF THE SOUTH—Continued.

Departments.	Fortifications, &c.	Where situated.	Number of cannon.	Commanding officers.	Regiments or corps.	Aggregate of commands.					
Department No. 8. Brevet Major General Ripley, head-quarters, New Orleans.	Mobile, -	Alabama Territory, -	}	-	3d battalion, corps artillery, and 8 infantry,	46					
	Fort Charlotte, -	Mobile, Alabama Territory, -		-							
	Fort Boyer, -	Mobile, Alabama Territory, -		-							
	Fort Stoddart, -	Junction of Tombigbee and Alabama.	-	20	Major Humphreys, -	3d battalion artillery, 1 company,	85				
	Fort Plaquemine, -	Outlet of Lake Pontchartrain, -	-					-	3d battalion artillery, 1 company,	34	
	Fort Petit Coquille, -	New Orleans, Louisiana, -	-					} Major Maney, -	3d battalion artillery, 1 company,	57	
	Bayou St. John, -	Louisiana, -	-						Major Whartenby, -	1st infantry, 5 companies,	183
	Fort St. Charles, -	Mississippi river, Mississippi Territory.	-					-	1st infantry, 2 companies,	96	
	Baton Rouge, -	On Red River, Louisiana, -	-					-	1st infantry, 1 company,	57	
	Fort Adams, -	At Baratavia.	-					-	1st infantry, 1 company,	47	
	Fort Covington, -	New Orleans, Louisiana, -	-					-	Ordnance,	7	
	Attakapas, -	Missouri Territory, -	-					-	Lieut. Col. Chambers, -	Rifle regiment, 4 companies,	417
	Natchitoches, -	On the Arkansas, -	-					-	Major Bradford, -	Rifle regiment, 1 company,	71
New work erecting Depot, -	Missouri river, -	-	-					-	Rifle regiment, 1 company,	46	
Department No. 9. Brevet Brig. General Smith, head-quarters, Belle Fontaine.	Fort Osage, -	Illinois Territory, -	-					-	Rifle regiment, 1 company,	62	
	Fort Edwards, -	Rock Island, Mississippi, -	-					-	Rifle regiment, 1 company,	62	
	Fort Armstrong, -	Prairie du Chien, -	-	-	Rifle regiment, 2 companies,	146					
	Fort Crawford, -	Newport, Kentucky, -	-	-	4th battalion, corps artillery, 1 company,	31					
	Garrison, -	Newport, Kentucky, -	-	-	Ordnance,	16					
	Arsenal, -	-	-	-	-	-					
	-	-	-	-	-	-					
					Aggregate, south division,	3,367					
Division of the north, - - - - -					4,054						
Division of the south, - - - - -					3,367						
Aggregate, - - - - -					<u>7,421</u>						

This report of the distribution of the army is taken from the latest returns of posts on file in this office.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, October, 1818.

D. PARKER, Adjutant and Inspector General.

## E.

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1818.

SIR:

Agreeably to your request, I have the honor to lay before you the following estimate of the extent of the United States' frontier, hastily compiled from the most accurate maps of the country, and from other sources of intelligence that have come under my observation.

The first column of the estimate contains distances along the sinuosities of the coasts, the meanders of rivers, &c.; and the second, distances estimated from point to point, throughout the whole extent of our maritime and inland frontiers.

FRONTIER LINES.	Gen'l courses.	Meanders.
	Miles.	Miles.
From the bay of Passamaquoddy to Portsmouth, N. H.	250	600
Thence to Boston, Massachusetts	65	90
Thence round Cape Cod to Newport, R. I.	170	280
Thence through Long Island Sound to New York	160	240
Thence to Cape May	140	170
Thence along the shores of Delaware bay to Cape Henlopen	120	140
Thence to Cape Henry, across the entrance of Chesapeake bay	140	160
Thence along the shores of Chesapeake bay	370	900
Thence to Cape Fear	300	650
Thence to Charleston, South Carolina	150	220
Thence to Savannah, Georgia	100	150
Thence to St. Mary's river	135	175
Thence along the boundary lines between the Floridas and the United States	470	470
Thence to the head of Mobile bay	100	130
Thence to the main part of the Mississippi river	135	300
Thence to the mouth of the Sabine river	320	540
Thence up the Sabine river to the north boundary of Louisiana	260	260
Thence to the confluence of the Kiamisky and Red rivers	75	100
Thence up the Kiamisky to Jack's Fork, up said Fork, to the Mountain Gap, through the said Gap to the Meline Fork of Poteau river, and down said Meline and Poteau to Belle Point, on the Arkansas river,	145	180
Thence up the Arkansas to the mouth of the Six Balls, or Grand river	120	120
Thence northerly, up the Grand, and down the Kensau to the Missouri	400	400
Thence up the Missouri to Fort Mandan, or the Mandan Village	1,260	1,260
Thence southeasterly to Stony Lake, the source of the St. Peter's	240	240
Thence down the St. Peter's to its confluence with the Mississippi	300	300
Thence down the Mississippi, up the St. Croix, and down the Burntwood river, to Fond de Lac, the head of Lake Superior	340	340
Thence to the Falls of St. Mary, the outlet of Lake Superior	440	680
Thence to Mackinaw	85	100
Thence to the outlet of Lake Huron	220	290
Thence to Detroit	95	100
Thence to Buffalo, New York	300	375
Thence to Sackett's Harbor	205	240
Thence to the point where the 45th parallel of latitude intersects the St. Lawrence	135	160
Thence eastwardly on the 45th parallel of latitude, to Connecticut river	165	165
Thence to the northeast extremity of the United States	250	250
Thence southerly, to the bay of Passamaquoddy	210	210
Amount,	8,370	10,985
To the above may be added, the coasts of Lake Michigan and Green bay	700	750
And that of Lake Champlain	180	220
Amounting to an aggregate for the whole frontier of the United States	9,250	11,955
If the coasts of the Floridas be substituted instead of the boundary lines between them and the United States, the aggregate amount will be	9,840	12,885

In the foregoing estimate, as far as it relates to the western country particularly, the lines have been selected with a view to military operations in that section of the United States' territory.

The following are frontier positions remote from the seat of the Government. In estimating the distances, regard has been paid to the nearest practicable routes for travelling. In the first column is the probable distance by land, and in the second the distance by inland water communication. The third exhibits the bearings of the several points from the city of Washington.

POSITIONS.	By land.	By water.	Bearings.
	Miles.	Miles.	
Robinson, Maine, at the head of the bay of Passamaquoddy	368	-	N. E.
Plattsburg, New York	578	-	N. N. E.
Sackett's Harbor, New York	580	-	N. by E.
Buffalo, New York	430	-	N. N. W.
Falls of St. Mary, outlet of Lake Superior	-	860	N. W. by N.
Detroit, Michigan Territory	561	548	N. W.
Mackinaw, do.	-	320	N. W.
Head of Green bay, or mouth of Fox river	850	1,000	N. W. by W.
Fond de Lac, or head of Lake Superior	-	1,308	N. W. by W.
Chicago, Lake Michigan	-	760	W. N. W.
Confluence of the Mississippi and St. Peter's, latitude 45 deg. 6 min.	1,250	2,360	W. N. W.
Fort Mandan, M. T. <i>via</i> Wheeling, Columbus, Fort Clark, Fort Armstrong, and the most southerly bend of the St. Peter's	1,440	-	W. N. W.
Do. <i>via</i> the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri	-	4,492	W. N. W.
Do. <i>via</i> the Ohio, Mississippi, and St. Peter's	-	2,900	W. N. W.
Fort Armstrong, on the Mississippi, near Rock river	330	1,932	W. by N.
St. Louis, Missouri Territory (the road not direct)	957	1,592	W.
Belle Point, on the Arkansas	-	2,220	W. S. W.
Do. <i>via</i> Nashville, and the Upper Chickasaw Bluffs, on the Mississippi river	1,200	-	
New Orleans, by a course south of the Alleghany mountains, and by way of the Ohio and Mississippi	1,185	2,420	S. W.
St. Mary's, Georgia	808	-	S. S. W.
Beaufort, North Carolina	400	-	S.

The extent of a line circumscribing the whole of the United States' Territory, not regarding the indentation of coasts, &c., may be estimated at about eight thousand miles.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your most obedient and very humble servant,

S. H. LONG, *Maj. Top. Engineers.*

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

SIR: PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, CITY OF WASHINGTON, *October 24, 1813.*

Conformably to your letter of the 6th instant, I have the honor to transmit you statements showing the monthly pay and emoluments of the troops of the United States.

1st. At the close of the revolutionary war in the year 1783; and

2d. At the close of the late war with England, in the year 1815.

The first I have elicited exclusively from the thirteen volumes of journals of the old Congress, from the 5th of September, 1774, forward; and as the subject is involved in some considerable obscurity, from the frequent repeals and re-organizations which took place respecting the army, sometimes partial and sometimes total, I cannot be answerable that it is perfectly correct; it is the best, however, that the materials afforded, the time allowed, and my other duties have permitted me to make; and I hope may not prove unacceptable.

With perfect respect, I am, sir, your most obedient,

NATHANIEL FRYE, JUN. *Chief Clerk.*

To the Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

F.

Schedule of the monthly pay and emoluments of the troops of the revolutionary army, at the close of the war, in the year 1783.

RANK OR GRADE.	PAY PER MONTH.	SUBSISTENCE.			FORAGE.	TRANSPORTATION.				REMARKS.
		Rations per day in kind.	Subsistence money per month, in addition to the rations in kind.	Aggregate amount.	Number of rations per day for saddle horses.	Covered four horse wagons.	Open four horse wagons.	Two horse wagons.	Bat horses.	
Major general, - - - -	\$166	5	\$31 60-90	\$51 60-90	7	1	-	1	-	
Aid-de-camp, - - - -	50	1 1-2	8	14	2	-	-	-	-	
Brigadier general of cavalry, -	156 1-4	4	25 30-90	41 30-90	5	1	-	-	-	
Brigadier general, - - - -	125	4	25 30-90	41 30-90	5	1	-	-	-	
Aid-de-camp, - - - -	50	1 1-2	8	14	2	-	-	-	-	
Brigade major of cavalry, artillery, or infantry, -	50	1 1-2	8	14	-	-	-	-	-	
Brigade quartermaster, - - - -	15	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	In addition to his pay as a captain or subaltern in the line.
Brigade chaplain, - - - -	50	1 1-2	8	14	1	-	-	-	-	*As many as the service may require. †According to his rank, and as many as necessary.
Quartermaster general, - - - -	166 60-90	15	-	60	*	†	-	-	-	
Deputy quartermaster general with southern army, -	125	12	-	48	2	1	-	-	-	
Deputy quartermaster general with main army, -	75	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	
Assistants, each - - - -	30	2	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	
Commissary of forage for the main army, - - - -	60	5	-	20	2	1	-	-	-	Alias commissary of forage.
Commissary of forage for the southern army, - -	60	5	-	20	2	-	-	1	-	Alias deputy commissary, with a separate army.
Wagon master, - - - -	60	5	-	20	3	1	-	-	-	
Deputy wagon master for southern army, - - - -	50	4	-	16	2	-	-	1 0	2	
Wagon conductor, - - - -	20	1 1-2	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	
Director of artificers, - - - -	40	3	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	
Sub-director of artificers, - - - -	26 60-90	2	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	
Adjutant general, - - - -	125	4	25 1-3	41 1-3	4	2	-	1	-	
Deputy adjutant general, - - - -	75	2	12 2-3	20 2-3	3	1	-	1	-	
Assistant adjutant general, - - - -	50	1 1-2	8	14	3	-	-	-	-	
Assistant deputy adjutant general, - - - -	50	1 1-2	8	14	-	-	-	-	-	
Clerk to adjutant general, - - - -	40	1	6 1-3	10 1-3	-	-	-	-	-	
Inspector general, - - - -	300	-	-	-	-	‡	-	-	-	‡ According to his rank, or as many as the commander-in-chief may direct. [To be a general officer. Major General Steuben appointed additional pay, in lieu of extra pay, subsistence, forage, and wagons, to himself and family.—Resolution of 30th December, 1782.]
His secretary, (in addition to his aids as a general officer,) to be taken from the line, and have the pay and emoluments of an aid, which were -	50	1 1-2	8	14	2	-	-	-	-	In addition to his pay, &c. in the line.
Inspector for separate army, to be taken from the field officers of the line of the army, - - - -	30	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	
Assistant inspector for separate army, to be taken from the captains or subalterns of the line, -	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Paymaster general, - - - -	150	1 1-2	11	17	-	-	-	-	-	In addition to his pay in the line. [Nov. 1779. Allowed \$14,000 per annum, cur'cy.—Reso. 12th
Deputy paymaster general, - - - -	-	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	‡ And $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the money they disbursed.—
Assistant deputy paymaster general, - - - -	-	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	‡ Resolution 3d May, 1780.
Deputy paymaster general for the southern army, -	75	1 1-2	11	17	1	-	-	1	-	
Deputy paymaster general for the main army, - -	75	1 1-2	11	17	1	-	-	1	-	

F.—Continued.

RANK OR GRADE.	PAY PER MONTH.	SUBSISTENCE.			FORAGE.	TRANSPORTATION.				REMARKS.
		Rations per day in kind.	Subsistence money per month, in addition to the rations in kind.	Aggregate amount.	Number of rations per day for saddle horses.	Covered four horse wagons.	Open four horse wagons.	Two horse wagons.	Bat horses.	
Assistant paymaster general, - - -	\$70	2	-	\$8	-	-	-	-	-	
Director of hospital, - - -	102	-	\$60	60	-	-	-	-	-	\$1,000 per annum.
Deputy director of hospital, and physician, - - -	100	-	48	48	-	-	-	-	-	No additional compensation.
Surgeon, - - -	90	-	40	40	-	-	-	-	-	
Apothecary and purveyor, - - -	92	-	32	32	-	-	-	-	-	
Deputy apothecary and purveyor, - - -	59	-	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	
Mates, - - -	42	-	12	12	-	-	-	-	-	
Stewards, - - -	31	-	8	8	-	-	-	-	-	
Ward masters, - - -	21	-	8	8	-	-	-	-	-	
Commissary general of military stores, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Assistants or superintendents, to be taken from officers of the army, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Field commissary of military stores, - - -	50	2	-	8	2	-	-	1	1	
Deputy field commissary of military stores, - - -	40	2	-	8	-	-	-	-	1	
Conductor or clerk, - - -	30	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	
Commissaries of prisoners for the army, each - - -	75	2	12 2-3	20 2-3	2	-	-	1	-	
Assistant commissary of pris'rs for the army, each - - -	40	4	-	16	2	-	-	1	-	Alias deputy with separate army.
Commissary of marine prisoners, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$1,200 per annum.
Geographer to the main army, - - -	60	3	-	12	2	-	-	1	-	
Geographer to the southern department, - - -	60	3	-	12	2	-	-	1	-	
Assistant geographer, - - -	30	1	-	4	1	-	-	-	-	
Chain-bearer, - - -	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Judge advocate, - - -	75	2	12 2-3	20 2-3	2	-	-	1	-	Alias fifty cents per day, if not soldiers.
Deputy judge advocate for southern army, to be taken from the officers of the line of the army, - - -	60	2	12 2-3	20 2-3	2	-	-	1	-	Including pay and emoluments in the line.
Deputy judge advocate in the same army with the judge advocate, to be taken from the officers of the line of the army, - - -	15	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	In addition to his pay, &c. in the line.
Clothier general, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$5000 per annum.
Deputies, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Compensation to be ascertained by clothier general.
Surveyor of ordnance, - - -	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	In addition to his appointments as a field officer of artillery.
Inspector of rations and of expenditures of public property:										
One for southern army, - - -	166 2-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
One for main army, - - -	166 2-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Captain of engineers, - - -	50	1	6 30-90	10 30-90	1	-	-	-	-	
Lieutenant, - - -	33 1-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90	-	-	-	-	-	
Sergeant, - - -	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Corporal, - - -	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Private, - - -	8 1-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Colonel of artillery,	100	2	12 60-90	20 60-90	2	1
Lieutenant colonel,	75	1 1-2	11	18	2	1
Major,	63 1-2	1 1-2	8	14	2	1
Captain,	50	1	6 30-90	10 30-90		
Captain lieutenant,	33 1-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
First lieutenant,	33 1-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Second lieutenant,	33 1-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Paymaster and clothier,	30	1	6 30-90	10 30-90		
Adjutant,	16	1	6 30-90	10 30-90	1	
Quartermaster,	16	1	6 30-90	10 30-90	1	
Surgeon,	59	1 1-2	4 60-90	10 60-90	1	
Surgeon's mate,	42	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Sergeant major,	11 23-90					
Quartermaster sergeant,	11 23-90					
Fife major,	10 38-90					
Drum major,	10 38-90					
Sergeant,	10					
Bombardier,	9					
Corporal,	9					
Gunner,	8 2-3					
Drummer,	8 2-3					
Fifer,	8 2-3					
Matross,	8 1-3					
Colonel of cavalry,	93 3-4	2	12 60-90	20 60-90	3	1
Lieutenant colonel,	75	1 1-2	11	18	2	1
Major,	60	1 1-2	8	14	2	1
Captain,	50	1	6 30-90	10 30-90	2	
Lieutenant,	33 1-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90	1	
Cornet,	26 2-3					
Ridingmaster,	33 1-3					
Paymaster of battalion,	25	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Adjutant of battalion,	15	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Quartermaster of battalion,	15	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Surgeon of battalion,	60	1 1-2	4 60-90	10 60-90	1	
Surgeon's mate,	40	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Quartermaster sergeant,	15					
Sergeant,	15					
Trumpet major,	11					
Trumpeter,	10					
Saddler,	10					
Farrier,	10					
Corporal,	10					
Dragoon,	8 1-3					
Colonel of infantry,	75	2	12 60-90	20 60-90	2	1
Lieutenant colonel,	60	1 1-2	11	17	2	1
Major,	50	1 1-2	8	14	2	1
Captain,	40	1	6 30-90	10 30-90		
Captain lieutenant,	26 2-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Lieutenant,	26 2-3	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Ensign,	20	1	3 15-90	7 15-90		
Paymaster and clothier,	30	1	6 30-90	10 30-90		
Adjutant,	13	1	3 15-90	7 15-90	1	

\* For the captains and subalterns of a regiment.

In addition to his pay in the line.  
In addition to his pay in the line.  
In addition to his pay in the line.

Not commissioned.

In addition to his pay in the line. } Each, exclusive  
In addition to his pay in the line. } of their allow-  
In addition to his pay in the line. } ance in the line.

\*For those of a regiment.

In addition to his pay in the line.  
In addition to his pay in the line.

RANK OR GRADE.	PAY PER MONTH.	SUBSISTENCE.			FORAGE.	TRANSPORTATION.				REMARKS.
		Rations per day in kind.	Subsistence money per month, in addition to the rations in kind.	Aggregate amount.	Number of rations per day for saddle horse.	Covered four horse wagons.	Open four horse wagons.	Two horse wagons.	Bat horses.	
Quartermaster, - - - - -	13	1	3 15-90	7 15-90	1	}	-	-	-	In addition to their pay in the line.
Surgeon, - - - - -	59	1 1-2	4 60-90	10 60-90	1					
Surgeon's mate, - - - - -	40	1	3 15-90	7 15-90						
Sergeant major, - - - - -	10									
Quartermaster sergeant, - - - - -	10									
Sergeant, - - - - -	10									
Drum major, - - - - -	9									
Fife major, - - - - -	9									
Drummer, - - - - -	7 1-3									
Fifer, - - - - -	7 1-3									
Corporal, - - - - -	7 1-3									
Private, - - - - -	6 2-3									
Captain of provosts, - - - - -	50	1	6 30-90	10 30-90	1		1†		†With prisoners and guards.  } To be mounted and accoutred as light dragoons.	
Lieutenant, - - - - -	33 1-3	1	3 15 90	7 15-90						
Clerk, - - - - -	33 1-3									
Quartermaster sergeant, - - - - -	15									
Sergeants, - - - - -	15									
Trumpeters, - - - - -	10									
Corporals, - - - - -	10									
Executioners, - - - - -	10									
Provosts or privates, - - - - -	8 1-3									

NOTE.—I have not been able to satisfy myself perfectly with regard to the monthly pay of the major general and the brigadier general; it is put down here as fixed by a resolution of the 16th of June, 1775, because I have not found any subsequent resolution which altered it; but, on resorting to a gentleman who acted a part in the eventful scenes of that day, he informs me that, from the sums received for five years' full pay, as a commutation for half-pay for life, it would seem to be one hundred and fifty dollars per month for a major general, and one hundred dollars for a brigadier. I have, nevertheless, thought it most proper to take the Congressional journals as my guide.

Officers who were entitled to rations of provision, either for themselves or servants, were also entitled to receive at the rate of four dollars per month for each ration, when the same were not drawn in kind.

Officers entitled to forage, and who kept their horses at their own expense, were to be paid therefor by the quartermaster general, at the average price given by him for the forage of the army. The ration of forage consisted of fourteen pounds of hay, and ten quarts of oats, per day, for each saddle horse.

It appears that officers were entitled to the pay, rations, and clothing of a soldier, for each private servant they were allowed to keep; but I have not been so fortunate as to find, in my researches through the printed journals, any resolution designating the number of servants to which each grade was entitled. They also appear to have been permitted to enlist as soldiers boys between the ages of fifteen and eighteen years, and employ them as servants until they were fit to bear arms.

These compensations are all to be considered as fixed upon a specie basis, excepting that of the paymaster general at fourteen thousand dollars per annum, and of the clothier general at five thousand dollars, which are presumed to have been in the currency of the day.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, CITY OF WASHINGTON, October 24, 1818.

NATHANIEL FRYE, JUN., Chief Clerk.

To the Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN, Secretary of War, at Washington.



## G.

Schedule showing the compensation of the army of the United States at the close of the late war with Great Britain, in the year 1815.

101	Generals, staff, &c.	Pay per month.	No. rations per day at 20 cents each.	Dollars per month for forage.	No. of horses.	Clothing of private waiters per mo.	Remarks.
	Major general, - - - -	\$200	15	56	7		
	Four waiters, - - - -	32	4	-	-	\$12 09 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	Secretary to general commanding United States' army,	24	-	16	2	-	In addition to his compensation in the line.
	Aid-de-camp to a major general,	24	4	16	2	-	In addition to his compensation in the line; not to be taken from higher rank than a capt.
	Brigadier general,	104	12	40	5		
	Three waiters, - - - -	24	3	-	-	9 07 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	Aid to a brigadier general,	20	-	16	2	-	In addition to his compensation in the line; not to be taken from higher rank than lieut.
	Brigade major, - - - -	24	-	16	2	-	In addition to his compensation in the line; not to be taken from higher rank than lieut.
	Brigade chaplain, - - - -	50	4	16	2	-	Pay, &c. of a major of infantry.
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Judge advocate, - - - -	50	4	16	2	-	Pay, &c. of a major of infantry.
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Adjutant and inspector general,	104	12	40	5	-	Pay, &c. of a brigadier general.
	Three waiters, - - - -	24	3	-	-	9 07	
	Adjutant general, - - - -	90	6	40	5	-	Pay, &c. of a colonel of cavalry.
	Two waiters, - - - -	16	2	-	-	6 04	
	Assistant adjutant general,	60	4	32	4	-	Pay, &c. of a major of cavalry.
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Inspector general, - - - -	75	6	32	4	-	Pay, &c. of a colonel of infantry.
	Two waiters, - - - -	16	2	-	-	6 04	
	Assistant inspector general,	60	4	32	4	-	Pay, &c. of a major of cavalry.
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Topographical engineer,	60	4	32	4	-	Pay, &c. of a major of cavalry.
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Assistant topographical engineers,	40	3	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a captain of infantry.
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Paymaster general, - - - -	166 $\frac{3}{4}$	-	-	-	-	Salary of 2,000 dollars per annum.
	Deputy paymaster general, - - - -	50	-	-	-	-	In addition to his compensation in the line.
	Assistant deputy paymaster general,	30	-	-	-	-	In addition to his compensation in the line.
	District paymaster, - - - -	50	4	24	3	-	
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Assistant district paymaster, - - - -	40	3	8	1	-	
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Quartermaster general, - - - -	104	12	40	5	-	Chief of the Department.
	Three waiters, - - - -	24	3	-	-	9 07	
	Quartermaster general, - - - -	75	6	32	4	-	
	Two waiters, - - - -	16	2	-	-	6 04	
	Deputy quartermaster general,	60	4	32	4	-	
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
	Assistant deputy quartermaster general,	40	3	-	-	-	
	One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	

Generals, staff, &c.	Pay per month.	No. rations per day at 20 cents each.	Dollars per month for forage.	No. of horses.	Clothing of private waiters per mo.	Remarks.
Principal wagon-master, - - -	\$40	3	8	1		
Wagon-master, - - -	30	2	8	1		
Principal wagon-master, - - -	40	3	16	2		
Assistant forage-master, - - -	30	2	8	1		
Conductor of artillery, - - -	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a lieutenant of artillery.
Principal barrack-master, - - -	40	3	16	2		
Deputy barrack-master, - - -	30	2	8	1		
Commissary general of purchases, - - -	250	-	-	-	-	3,000 dollars per annum.
Deputy commissary general of purchases, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the amount disbursed by him; not to exceed, however, 2,000 dollars.
Superintendent general of military supplies, - - -	250	-	-	-	-	3,000 dollars per annum.
Special commissary of military supplies, - - -	60	4	32	4		
One waiter, - - -	8	1	-	-	\$3 02	
Assistant commissary of military supplies, - - -	60	4	32	4		
One waiter, - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Superintendent of artificers, - - -	45	3	8	1		Of the corps of artificers.
Assistant superintendent of artificers, - - -	30	2	-	-		
Master-workman of artificers, - - -	30	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, receivable in kind only.
Under-workman of artificers, - - -	16	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, receivable in kind only.
Laborer of artificers, - - -	-	-	-	-		May be selected from soldiers of the army, or engaged from citizens. No pay fixed.
One colonel of ordnance, - - -	90	6	32	4		
Two waiters, - - -	16	2	-	-	6 04	
One lieutenant colonel of ordnance, - - -	75	5	24	3		
One waiter, - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Major of ordnance, - - -	60	4	24	3		
One waiter, - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Captain of ordnance, - - -	50	3	-	-		
One waiter, - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
First lieutenant of ordnance, - - -	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	-	-		
Second lieutenant of ordnance, - - -	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	-	-		
Third lieutenant of ordnance, - - -	30	2	-	-		
Master-armorers of ordnance, - - -	30	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, drawn in kind only.
Master-carriagemaker of ordnance, - - -	30	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, drawn in kind only.
Master-blacksmith of ordnance, - - -	30	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, drawn in kind only.
Armorer of ordnance, - - -	16	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, drawn in kind only.
Carriagemaker of ordnance, - - -	16	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, drawn in kind only.
Blacksmith of ordnance, - - -	16	-	-	-		1 $\frac{1}{2}$ rations per day, drawn in kind only.
Artificer of ordnance, - - -	13	-	-	-		1 ration per day, drawn in kind only.
Laborer of ordnance, - - -	9	-	-	-		1 ration per day, drawn in kind only.
Physician and surgeon general, - - -	208 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	16	2		2,500 dollars pay per annum.
Two waiters, - - -	16	2	-	-	6 04	
Apothecary general, - - -	150	-	-	-		
One waiter, - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Assistant apothecary, - - -	45	2	16	2		1,800 dollars per annum, pay.

## G—Continued.

Generals, staff, &c.	Pay per month.	No. rations per day at 20 cents each.	Dollars per month for forage.	No. of horses.	Clothing of private waiters per mo.	Remarks.
One waiter, - - - -	\$8	1	-	-	\$3 02	
Hospital surgeon, - - - -	75	6	16	2	-	
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Hospital surgeon's mate, - - - -	40	2	16	2	-	
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Steward of hospital, - - - -	20	2	-	-	-	
Ward-master of hospital, - - - -	16	2	-	-	-	
Garrison surgeon, - - - -	45	3	16	2	-	
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Garrison surgeon's mate, - - - -	30	2	16	2	-	
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Professor of natural and experimental philosophy, - - - -	60	5	24	3	-	Pay, &c. of a lieutenant colonel of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Ass't professor of natural and experimental philosophy, - - - -	40	3	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a captain of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Professor of mathematics, - - - -	50	4	24	3	-	Pay, &c. of a major of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Assistant professor of mathematics, - - - -	40	3	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a captain of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Professor of the art of engineering, - - - -	50	4	24	3	-	Pay, &c. of a major of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Assistant professor of the art of engineering, - - - -	40	3	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a captain of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Teacher of the French language, - - - -	40	3	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a captain of infantry.
One servant, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	
Teacher of drawing, - - - -	40	3	-	-	-	Pay, &c. of a captain of infantry.
One waiter, - - - -	8	1	-	-	3 02	

1818.]

REDUCTION OF THE ARMY CONSIDERED.

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SCHEDULE G.—Continued.

RANK OR GRADE.	CORPS OF ENGINEERS.				LIGHT ARTILLERY.				CORPS OF ARTILLERY.				LIGHT DRAGOONS.				INF'RY & RIFLEMEN.				RANGERS.				SEA FENC'S.			Remarks.	
	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Forage: No. of horses allowed.	Waiters: No. allowed.	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Forage: No. of horses allowed.	Waiters: No. allowed.	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Forage: No. of horses allowed.	Waiters: No. allowed.	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Forage: No. of horses allowed.	Waiters: No. allowed.	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Forage: No. of horses allowed.	Waiters: No. allowed.	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Forage: No. of horses allowed.	Waiters: No. allowed.	Pay per month.	Subsistence: No. rations per day.	Waiters allowed.		
Colonel,	\$75	6	4	2	\$90 00	6	5	2	\$90 00	6	4	2	\$90 00	6	5	2	\$75	6	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	No full cols. art. <i>but by brevet.</i>	
Lieutenant Colonel,	60	5	3	1	75 00	5	4	1	75 00	5	3	1	75 00	5	4	1	60	5	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Major,	50	4	3	1	60 00	4	4	1	60 00	4	3	1	60 00	4	4	1	50	4	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Adj't & paymaster, each,	*10	-	2	-	10 00	-	-	-	*10 00	-	2	-	*10 00	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	In addition to pay as subalterns.	
Quartermaster,	-	-	-	-	10 00	-	2	-	10 00	-	2	-	10 00	-	2	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Same.	
Surgeon,	-	-	-	-	60 00	2	2	1	60 00	2	2	1	60 00	2	2	1	60	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Surgeon's mate,	-	-	-	-	45 00	2	2	1	45 00	2	2	1	45 00	2	2	1	45	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sergeant major,	-	-	-	-	12 00	-	-	-	12 00	-	-	-	12 00	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Quartermaster sergeant,	-	-	-	-	12 00	-	-	-	12 00	-	-	-	12 00	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Principal musician,	11	-	-	-	11 00	-	-	-	11 00	-	-	-	11 00	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Principal farrier,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Captain,	40	3	-	1	50 00	3	3	1	50 00	3	3	1	50 00	3	3	1	40	3	-	-	\$50 00	3	3	1	\$40	3	1	No pay fixed by law.	
First lieutenant,	30	3	-	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	3	3	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	3	3	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	3	3	-	30	3	-	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	3	3	-	30	3	-	Officers of the rangers, when mounted, same pay, &c. as dragoon officers; when not mounted, same pay, &c. as infantry officers.	
Second lieutenant,	25	3	-	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	2	2	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	2	2	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	2	2	-	25	3	-	-	33 33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	3	2	-	25	3	-		
Do. and cond'r of art'y,	-	-	-	-	30 00	2	2	-	30 00	2	2	-	30 00	2	2	-	23	3	-	-	30 00	2	2	-	23	3	-		
Third do.	-	-	-	-	30 00	2	2	-	30 00	2	2	-	30 00	2	2	-	23	3	-	-	30 00	2	2	-	23	3	-		
Cornet,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	3	2	-	20	3	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	3	2	-	-	-	-		
Ensign,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	2	2	-	20	3	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	3	2	-	-	-	-		
Riding master,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	2	2	-	20	3	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	3	2	-	-	-	-		
Master of the sword,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	2	2	-	20	3	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	3	2	-	-	-	-		
Cadet of Mil. Academy,	16	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	2	2	-	20	3	-	-	26 66 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	3	2	-	-	-	-		
Sergeant,	11	-	-	-	11 00	-	-	-	11 00	-	-	-	11 00	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	Non-com'd officers and privates of rangers allowed \$1 a day, when they furnish their own horses, arms, equipments, rations, and forage; 75 cents a day when not mounted.	
First lieutenant,	10	-	-	-	10 00	-	-	-	10 00	-	-	-	10 00	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-		
Musician,	9	-	-	-	9 00	-	-	-	9 00	-	-	-	9 00	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-		
Private,	8	-	-	-	8 00	-	-	-	8 00	-	-	-	8 00	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-		
Boatswain of sea fencibles,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-		
Gunner of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-		
Quartermaster of do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	-		
Men of do. do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	-		
Driver of artillery,	-	-	-	-	8 00	-	-	-	8 00	-	-	-	8 00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-		
Artificer,	13	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rations at 25 cents each. Rations drawn in kind.	
Saddler,	-	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Farrier,	-	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Blacksmith,	-	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13 00	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		

\* No adjutant to the corps of engineers; no paymaster to the corps of artillery, or regiment of light dragoons. Subsistence of com'd officers at 20 cts. per ration; forage at \$8 per month for each horse; \$8 pay per month, 1 ration, or 20 cents per day for subsistence, and \$3.02 5-12 per month for clothing, is allowed for each waiter actually employed and mustered.

## TRANSPORTATION.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
CITY OF WASHINGTON, October 24, 1818.

To each company or detachment of one hundred men, shall be allowed one four-horse wagon and team, or two two-horse wagons and teams, for the conveyance of baggage and camp equipage, consisting of one common tent, one iron kettle, and two tin pans, for every six men.

When officers are ordered on distant commands, the following rates are to govern in the allowance made to them for the transportation of their baggage, at two dollars per one hundred pounds, per one hundred miles :

To a major general,	-	-	-	-	-	1,250 pounds.
To a brigadier general,	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 do.
To a colonel,	-	-	-	-	-	750 do.
To a lieutenant colonel,	-	-	-	-	-	600 do.
Major,	-	-	-	-	-	500 do.
Hospital surgeon,	-	-	-	-	-	750 do.
Captain,	-	-	-	-	-	400 do.
Surgeon,	-	-	-	-	-	400 do.
Subaltern,	-	-	-	-	-	300 do.
Surgeon's mate,	-	-	-	-	-	300 do.
Cadet,	-	-	-	-	-	200 do.

The most direct post route will determine the distance for the amount of transportation, whether performed by land or by water.

To every officer, ordered on general courts-martial, temporary commands, or on other duties, on the seaboard, or in the Atlantic States, there will be allowed, if he so elect, in lieu of the transportation of his baggage, his stage hire; no delay being admitted on the road. Receipts from the stage offices, or certificates on honor, of the performance of the duty will be required.

NOVEMBER 9, 1812.

No allowance for transportation of baggage to officers fulfilling the first order after appointment.

MAY 2, 1814.

Officers, prisoners of war, are allowed for transportation of baggage, from the places where they are paroled, to their respective homes, unless transportation is provided by the enemy or the Government.

NATHANIEL FRYE, JUN. *Chief Clerk.*

HON. JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

## H.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, October 19, 1818.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit a report, exhibiting the allowances to officers at different periods, as far as information I have been able to ascertain them. This report, I am well aware, is extremely defective, but it contains all the information I have been able to collect from the documents in the public offices here, as well as from other sources.

The allowance for clothing has undergone but little alteration since the revolution. That for fuel is rather better now than it was then; to troops in camp or quarters, the allowance is a valuable one; but to officers whose duties require them to move frequently, it is of trifling advantage. Many officers, and those too the most actively employed, are, from their situation, deprived of the allowance. They, as well as the service, would, in my opinion, be benefited if an allowance in money could be made in lieu of fuel.

The allowance for transportation, at the close of the revolution, was estimated in wagons and horses, the expense of which I have not the means of ascertaining. To officers travelling on duty, and to those employed on the recruiting service, the sum of three dollars per day was allowed for their expenses. And it appears that in many cases of extraordinary duties, the actual expenses of the officers employed were paid by resolution of Congress.

I have not been able to find any regulation in relation to the allowance to officers for transportation, or for travelling expenses, between 1783 and 1801; but in the appropriations made by Congress for the support of the military establishment, the travelling expenses of officers were sometimes enumerated. The late regulation which reduces the transportation of general officers, and raises that of others, is a fair and liberal allowance, and requires no alteration.

The allowance of quarters is ample; but such is the operation of the present regulation, that the active officer is the greater part of his time deprived of it, whilst the officer in garrison is able to avail himself of all its advantages. I think the service would be benefited if an allowance in money were made in lieu of quarters, to all officers on duty who are not stationed at permanent posts, camps, or cantonments.

At the close of the revolutionary war, officers either received forage in kind, or the actual cost of it in money, at the posts where they were respectively stationed. The present allowance is as liberal as ought to be expected; it should not, however, be subject to contingencies, but be made permanent, and paid, whether the number of horses required be kept or not.

From 1783, to the commencement of the late war, the allowance for servants was better than at present; it is now, however, sufficient; but the observations made in relation to forage apply equally to it.

Straw is an allowance to the soldier, and should only be furnished in kind.

Stationary and camp equipage, though mentioned in the report, are not properly allowances; they are furnished merely to enable officers and soldiers to perform their public duties.

For 1801, the sum of one hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars was appropriated for the service of the quartermaster's department.

For 1811, the sum of two hundred and seventy thousand dollars was appropriated; and for 1818, the sum of four hundred and sixty thousand dollars was found necessary. This increase is to be ascribed rather to the extension of our frontier, to the increased price of supplies, and to the situation of our military posts, than to the increase of the army. The supplies for the troops stationed on the Mississippi and its tributaries are transported at much greater expense than formerly; the increase of population is so rapid in the new States and Territories, as to consume the greater part of their surplus produce. Supplies for the army are, therefore, necessarily drawn from a distance, and those intended for the posts on the line extending from the lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, have to encounter the rapid currents of the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Arkansas and Red river; and as our posts are every year extending in that direction, the expenses of the department must necessarily increase.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Quartermaster General.*

The Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

H—Continued.  
*Allowance of clothing at different periods.*

AT WHAT PERIODS.	Each non-commissioned officer, musician and private, per annum.																For 5 years.										
	Uniform coats.	Woollen vests.	Cloth breeches.	Woollen overalls.	Woollen stockings.	Woollen socks.	Hat or cap.	Shirts.	Linen overalls.	Shoes pair.	Blankets.	Rifle shirts.	Woollen gloves.	Shoe buckles.	Stocks.	Roundabouts.	Ratigue frocks.	Flannel shirts.	Gaiters.	Knapsacks.	Haversacks.	Ratigue trousers.	Knapsacks.	Haversacks.	Blankets.	Great coats.	Hats or caps.
In 1783,	-	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	4	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
In 1801,	-	1	1	-	2	2	4	1	4	2	4	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
In 1815,	-	1	1	-	2	2	2	1	4	2	4	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
In 1818,	-	1	-	-	2	2	2	-	2	2	3	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, October 19, 1818.

TH. S. JESUP, *Quartermaster General.*

*Allowance of fuel at different periods.*

TO WHOM.	Per ann.	1783.		1801.		1815.		1818.						
		Monthly allowance.												
		Winter.		Summer.		Winter.		Summer.		Winter.		Summer.		
		Cords.	Feet.	Cords.	Feet.	Cords.	Feet.	Cords.	Feet.	Cords.	Feet.	Cords.	Feet.	
Major generals,	-	18	2	4	1	2	6	0	1	-	6	-	1	-
Brigadier generals,	-	18	2	4	1	4	4	4	1	-	4	4	1	1
Quartermaster general,	-	18	2	-	1	-	3	-	1	-	4	4	1	1
Adjutant general,	-	18	2	-	1	-	3	-	1	-	3	-	1	1
Assistant adjutant gen.,	-	9	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	3	-	1	1
Colonel,	-	9	1	4	-	6	3	-	1	-	3	-	1	1
Lieutenant colonel,	-	9	1	4	-	6	3	-	1	-	3	-	1	1
Major,	-	9	1	4	-	6	3	-	1	-	3	-	1	1
Captain,	-	4½	1	-	-	4	1	4	-	4	1	4	-	4
Subaltern,	-	4½	1	-	-	4	-	3	-	2	-	6	-	2
Chaplain,	-	9	1	-	-	4	1	4	-	4	1	4	-	4
Judge advocate,	-	9	1	-	-	4	1	4	-	4	1	4	-	4
Surgeon,	-	4½	1	-	-	4	1	4	-	4	1	4	-	4
Surgeon's mate,	-	4½	1	-	-	4	-	3	-	2	-	6	-	2
Every eight non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates,	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Every six ditto,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	1	-	-	4

Allowance in 1801, increased one-third above the 39th degree. Allowance in 1818, increased one-fourth above the 40th degree, for December, January, and February.

*Allowance of transportation at different periods.*

TO WHOM.	1783.		1801.	1815.	1818.
	4 horse wagons.	2 horse wagons.	Pounds of baggage.	Pounds of baggage.	Pounds of baggage.
Major general,	-	-	1	1,250	1,000
Brigadier general,	-	-	1	1,000	900
Colonel,	-	-	-	750	800
Lieutenant colonel,	-	-	-	600	750
Major,	-	-	-	500	700
Quartermaster general,	-	-	unlimited,	-	900
Adjutant general,	-	-	2	-	800
Judge advocate,	-	-	-	-	700
Chaplain,	-	-	-	-	700
Captains and subalterns of a regiment,	-	-	1	-	-
Captain,	-	-	-	400	600
Subaltern,	-	-	-	300	500
Surgeon,	-	-	-	500	600
Surgeon's mate,	-	-	-	300	500
Cadet,	-	-	-	-	450
A company of 75 men,	-	-	1	-	-
A company of 100 men, in 1815,	-	-	1	-	-
A company of 78 men, in 1818,	-	-	1	-	-

## H—Continued.

*Allowance of quarters at different periods.*

TO WHOM.	1783.		1801.		1815.		1818.	
	Rooms.	Kitchens.	Rooms.	Kitchens.	Rooms.	Kitchens.	Rooms.	Kitchens.
Major generals, - - -	-	-	-	-	3	1	3	1
Brigadier generals, - - -	-	-	4	1	2	1	2	1
Quartermaster general, - - -	-	-	3	1	1	1	2	1
Adjutant general, - - -	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1
Colonel, - - -	-	-	2	-	1	1	1	1
Lieutenant colonel, - - -	-	-	2	-	1	1	1	1
Major, - - -	-	-	2	-	1	1	1	1
Captain, - - -	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Judge advocate, - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Chaplain, - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Hospital and regimental surgeon, - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Two surgeon's mates, - - -	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Two subalterns, - - -	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Post surgeons, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Regimental and battalion paymasters, - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Surgeon, - - -	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-

*Allowance of horses at different periods.*

TO WHOM.	1783.	1801.	1815.	1818.
	Number of Horses.	Monthly allowance.	Monthly allowance.	Number of Horses.
Major generals, - - -	7	\$20	\$20	7
Brigadier generals, - - -	5	16	16	5
Colonels, - - -	2	-	12	4
Lieutenant colonel, - - -	2	12	11	3
Chaplain, - - -	1	-	10	3
Adjutant general, - - -	4	16	-	4
Quartermaster general, - - -	unlimited.	20	-	5
Deputy quartermaster general, - - -	2	12	-	3
Assistant adjutant general, - - -	2	-	-	3
Judge advocates, - - -	2	-	10	3
Surgeon, - - -	1	10	10	2
Adjutant, - - -	1	6	6	2
Quartermaster, - - -	1	6	6	2
Surgeon's mate, - - -	-	6	6	2
Major, - - -	2	10	10	3

REMARKS.—1802.—Officers travelling, and sitting on general courts-martial, or attending as witnesses, allowed, in addition to their transportation, one dollar per day for those entitled to forage, and one dollar and twenty-five cents to those not entitled to forage. This allowance continues at this time. Soldiers employed at work on fortifications, or opening military roads, allowed fifteen cents per day, and an extra gill of whiskey.

Price of forage at the several posts allowed when not drawn in kind. Eight dollars per month for each horse actually kept in service.

*Allowance of waiters at different periods.*

GRADES OF OFFICERS.	1783.	1801.	1815.	1818.
	Number allowed.			
Major generals, - - -	4	-	4	4
Brigadier generals, - - -	4	-	3	3
Quartermaster general, - - -	4	2	-	3
Adjutant general, - - -	4	-	-	-
Colonel, - - -	2	-	2	2
Lieutenant colonel, - - -	2	3	1	2
Major, - - -	1	2	1	2
Captain, - - -	-	1	1	1
Lieutenant, - - -	-	1	1	1
Surgeon, - - -	-	2	1	1
Surgeon's mate, - - -	-	1	1	1

H—Continued.

Allowance of stationary at different periods.

TO WHOM.	1783.			1801.			1815.			1818.		
	Quires of paper.	Blank books.	Quills, ink, and wafers.	Quires of paper.	Blank books.	Quills, ink, and wafers.	Quires of paper.	Blank books.	Quills, ink, and wafers.	Quires of paper.	Blank books.	Quills, ink, and wafers.
Major general, or officer commanding division or district,	-	-	-	-	-	8	Unlim'd	Unlim'd	50 quills, 50 wafers, and 1 paper of ink powder to each 6 quires.	Unlim'd	Unlim'd	50 quills, 50 wafers, and 1 paper of ink powder to each 6 quires.
Every other general officer commanding a brigade,	-	-	-	-	-	8	24	-	-	24	-	-
Every officer commanding a regiment or battalion,	-	-	-	-	-	8	18	1	-	18	1	-
Officer commanding a separate post or garrison of two companies,	-	-	-	24	1	8	12	1	-	-	-	-
Officer commanding a separate post or garrison of five companies,	-	-	-	36	1	8	18	1	-	12	1	-
For the use of every company,	-	-	-	2	1	8	6	1	-	2	1	-
Major,	-	-	-	2	-	8	2	-	-	2	-	-
Captain,	-	-	-	2	-	8	2	-	-	2	-	-
Lieutenant,	-	-	-	2	-	8	2	-	-	2	-	-
Surgeon,	-	-	-	2	-	8	2	-	-	2	-	-
Surgeon's mate,	-	-	-	2	-	8	2	-	-	2	-	-

Allowance of straw at different periods.

TO WHOM.	1783.	1801.	1815.	1818.
	lbs. allowed.	lbs. allowed.	lbs. allowed.	lbs. allowed.
Every 2 men for the period of 32 days,	-	44	44	44

Allowance of camp equipage at different periods.

TO WHOM.	1783.			1801.			1815.			1818.		
	Common tents.	Camp kettles.	Tin pans.	Common tents.	Camp kettles.	Tin pans.	Common tents.	Camp kettles.	Tin pans.	Common tents.	Camp kettles.	Tin pans.
Every 6 non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	1	2

I.

SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 16, 1818.

Sir:

In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report:

In deciding upon the component parts of the ration, to be furnished the army, it must be obvious, that so far as the health of the troops is concerned, those will of course be the best which afford the greatest quantity of good, nutritious matter, from a given quantity of food; but as the soldier is, in general, his own cook, it is also necessary that they be of such a nature, as to enable him effectually to extract this nutriment in the easiest and most simple manner. The first will depend on the habits of the soldier, previous to enlistment, and the last upon the mode of cooking, which the experience of the army has found most convenient and advantageous.

It is a well known fact, that every animal, in order to enjoy health, strength, and vigor, must be supplied with food adapted to its habits, whether *natural* or *acquired*. The former cannot in most cases be essentially changed, without serious consequences; the lion, for example, cannot subsist on hay, or the ox on game; while in others, the digestive organs may, *by degrees*, become so accustomed to unnatural food, as to render it not only consistent with,



but necessary to health; thus, the horse may be taught to live on meat. Hence it follows that a ration perfectly adapted to the wants of a Cossack might be totally useless, and perhaps injurious, to an American; for man may, in this respect, be considered a genus, the several species of which are determined by the age, country, or tribe to which he belongs; the Greenlander and the Hindoo, the ancient Spartan and the modern epicure, would find nearly as much difficulty in subsisting upon the same food as the wolf and the sheep.

Such being the effect of custom, it must be evident, that whenever a man has confirmed his natural propensities by long habit, any change, especially a sudden one, will be attended with most injurious, if not fatal, effects; and this is precisely the condition of the American soldier; for if the natural diet of man is *altogether* vegetable, and if the people of this country differ but little in their mode of living from that pointed out by nature, and are also accustomed to a great variety, and consequently too frequent changes in the several articles of their diet, it must be obvious that a ration composed of bread and meat only, and chiefly of the latter, cannot be consistent either with "comfort, convenience, or health."

That man was not originally carnivorous is proved by history, both sacred and profane; and this is confirmed by the fact, that nearly all those animals, whose usefulness depends upon their health, strength, and vigor, or upon the nutritious quality of their solids, such as the horse, elephant, camel, mule, sheep, and most of those used for food, subsist upon vegetables; while the carnivorous species, as the tiger, wolf, dog, and even the lion, though they possess a greater degree of agility, from their natural conformation, have nothing of that real strength and vigor, which renders the former animals important assistants to us during life, nor of that healthy *embonpoint*, which makes some of them equally useful after death.

The same is true with respect to man, in his present unnatural state; the natives of this country, who subsist principally on game, those tribes of Bedouins, whose deserts scarcely afford food for their cattle, and the Greenlander, whom necessity has taught to live upon dried fish and blubber, are all from their *general habits* hardy, but they are, *cæteris paribus*, inferior to the Hindoo, whose fear of feeding upon his grandsire confines him to pulse and light vegetables; much less have they the *stamina* of those whom our second nature, habit, has accustomed to a judicious mixture of both these kinds of food.

Custom, it is true, renders a certain portion of animal food necessary to produce the highest state of health and vigor; but it is believed the quantity required for this purpose has been exceedingly overrated. This has arisen from observing that certain classes of men, noted for their health and strength, indulge largely in such kind of diet; but the conclusion by no means follows from the premises, for these same men will also indulge in large potations of ardent spirits, and various other excesses, without *apparent* injury; this, therefore, only proves what they can *bear*, and not what is *best* for them.

The correctness of the position will further appear from the diet found necessary for the delicate and the valetudinarian; there the great difficulty is to procure food sufficiently light, that is, of sufficient bulk to satisfy hunger, without too much nutriment to oppress digestion; for physiologists, when discoursing upon the digestive organs, and the quality of food best suited to them, have shown that the former requires from the latter what they have termed the stimulus of *distention*, as well as a due degree of excitement from nutritious matter, to produce healthy action; that a certain bulk is as necessary, as a certain quantity of nutriment; and that so far as one of these is increased at the expense of the other, so far the diet varies from the healthy standard. Thus it not only appears that a vegetable diet is natural to man, but we are taught its *modus operandi*; and that although it actually contains much less nourishment than animal matter, yet, from its being in a state of subdivision, it is so *diluted*, as it were, as to be fully acted upon by the stomach; whereas, in a more concentrated form it becomes an unnatural stimulus, and destroys the powers of the digestive organs.

Now we may conclude, *a priori*, that the diet of the people of this country will be that which is best suited to them; for such is the facility of obtaining the means of subsistence, that even the laborers in our cities, probably the poorest class of men among us, are enabled to procure most of the articles supplied in the markets; and such is the profusion with which we are blessed, that these consist of almost every thing the palate can desire, or the stomach digest; being, therefore, under no restraint from poverty or scarcity, it is to be presumed they would follow, in a great measure, the indications of nature; and that this is a fact, will appear from a cursory reflection upon the mode of living in the different parts of the country; for when we take into account the quantity of farinacea, employed in bread, pudding, &c., the great variety and abundance of fruits and of the lighter vegetables, in addition to the more nutritious ones, as pease, beans, rice, potatoes, and many roots, it is probable four-fifths of our diet is vegetable, and perhaps two-thirds, in every case. Even at dinner, when meat is most used, it is generally in this proportion, and it constitutes but a small part of our morning and evening meals. There are no doubt exceptions, but these proportions will be found in general correct.

The cheapness of living, however, not only enables the mass of our population to procure food of the best kind, but also to obtain a great variety of the essential articles, and many even of the luxuries of life; there are few who, to fish and poultry, and almost all the vegetables in use, do not add tea, coffee, sugar, spices, and other condiments; and with this variety of food they are accustomed to no small variety in the mode of preparing it. The very general use of tea, or some other warm effusion, at the morning and evening meals, is a point of no small importance; and nothing but experience can fully convince one how severely the want of it is felt, and of course how necessary that or a substitute is for the health of the soldier.

But, secondly, the experience of the army proves, that not only the habits of the soldier previous to enlistment, but also the mode of cooking found most effectual and convenient, requires a material change in the component parts of the ration. For since the business of cooking belongs in civil life almost entirely to females, when a man is confined to bread and meat, he is not only suddenly deprived of his accustomed means, but is entirely ignorant of the best mode of employing them afforded him; and one of the last things a young officer or soldier learns is, how to manage his domestic concerns; though he soon becomes acquainted with the necessity of this knowledge, both for his health and his comfort.

When a recruit receives his ration, if the meat be fresh, he broils it to a cinder on the coals, on the end of his ramrod; if salt pork, he eats it raw; and if salt beef, he boils it; and with his bread, will make a pretty good meal for some time, but in the morning and evening he feels the want of his usual infusion of tea, and at noon his customary supply of vegetables. As a substitute for the former, he warms his stomach with a gill of undiluted, corroding whiskey, and, after living a few weeks in this way, is sent to the surgeon, worn down with dysentery, diarrhoea, and other complaints of the stomach and bowels; if the surgeon be sufficiently acquainted with his duty to give him a light diet of soup, fresh vegetables, and hospital stores, instead of loading him with medicine, he is shortly restored to health; and, from the same causes as before, as shortly returned to the hospital, and after being for some months a burthen to himself and the community, he is either buried, or discharged service, and perhaps pensioned. This is a process, which every one on duty during the late war has repeatedly witnessed, which occurred with the majority of those enlisted, and which rendered the muster-rolls of the army a mere list of invalids.

Whenever the mortality was great, during the late war, it was attributed to the quality of the ration; but the fact is, it was, on an average, as good as these places as usual; and that this was the case, is proved from the circumstance, that the regiments, at these stations, commanded by experienced officers, as well as those in the vicinity, were often in a great measure exempted from disease.

There were two corps, one noted for their good police, and the other for their depredations on the fields and gardens of the citizens, who were a continual proof of the true cause of this difference in the health of the men; for experience soon taught both officers and men the importance of preparing their food in the form of soups; and whenever this was done, either in consequence of police regulations, or from the soldiers obtaining a supply of the necessary ingredients, the good effects were constantly observed; and from what has been adverted to relative to the diet natural to man, and the *rationale* of its operation, the reasons must be obvious.

It is true the same judicious arrangements, which not only obliged the men to cook their provisions in the best manner, but also provided them with the necessary ingredients, would conduce to their health in various ways; but when, as was the case in the corps above alluded to, change of position or circumstances produced the same result upon those who had no police at all; and the only apparent difference in their situation arose from their being able

to obtain a variety of articles, in addition to their ration, and to prepare them in a suitable manner, there can be no doubt that the nature, and not the quality of the ration, was the true cause of its effects. This is also confirmed by the practice found most beneficial in the hospitals, as most patients require only a proper diet to restore them to health, while animal food in a solid form was generally nauseated.

One of the divisions of the French army, in 1810, was so far reduced by diarrhœa and dysentery, as to produce a full and satisfactory investigation of its causes; and it was clearly shown, in a memoir of the surgeon general of the division, to arise entirely from the ration to which they had for some time been confined. Being unable to obtain the usual supply of vegetables, they were furnished, like our army, with bread and meat only, and principally the latter, which was in general salted pork; so that the effects of such a diet are not peculiar to our own country.

In fact, if we compare our ration with that of the French and English, the two nations probably best instructed in most military matters, the defects of the former will be apparent.

They are as follows:

<i>French.</i>	<i>English.</i>	<i>American.</i>
Bread 24 1-10 oz. or	Flour or	Flour 18 oz.
Biscuit 17 3-4 oz.	Bread 24 oz.	Beef 20 oz.
Fresh meat or	Beef 16 oz. or	Pork 12 oz.
Salt beef 8 oz. or	Pork 8 oz.	Whiskey 1 gill
Salt pork 6 1-2 oz.	Peas 1 gill	
Rice 1 oz.	Butter or	
Dried pulse 2 oz.	Cheese 1 oz.	
Wine 2 gills, (nearly)	Rice 1 oz.	
Brandy 1-2 gill. (nearly)		

From this it appears the American has more than twice as much meat as the French, and more even than the British soldier, while our ration of bread is about two-thirds of theirs, although we have no other vegetable. It should also be observed, that the British issue no ardent spirits, and the French but a small portion, though their habits, in this respect, render such an allowance at least harmless.

Since, then, the health, and, of course, the efficiency of an army depends so much upon the ration, this subject becomes one of no small political importance; and an "old soldier" of our country, in his "Advice to young Generals," has very pertinently commenced with "the belly," as he considers a man's stomach to have an essential effect both upon his ability and his inclination to fight; and, among other causes of the almost universal success of the armies of barbarians, and especially of semi-civilized nations, their being subject to little or no change in their mode of living when in actual service, is a very prominent one; for they are not only less liable to be diminished by disease, but they add to the full enjoyment of all their physical powers the no less important *moral effect* of high health, and consequent good spirits, the want of which generally completes the destruction of a beaten and retreating army.

Among the ancients, the ration of the soldier was principally, if not entirely, vegetable; and it is well known what immense burthens they carried, what fatigues they underwent, and what surprising marches they often performed; this, however, probably depended, in a great measure, like the success of the armies above alluded to, upon the little change required in their mode of living when called from their homes to the field.

Whenever, therefore, the progress of civilization, or the natural fertility of a country, enables the mass of the population to habituate themselves to a degree of luxury in living, it becomes necessary, in time of war, to put in requisition the wealth and means these very circumstances produce in time of peace to counteract the evil. If an army of barbarians required less in the field, they had also fewer resources; and since experience has shown the impossibility of accommodating our habits to our supplies, it becomes necessary to adapt our supplies to our habits. The truth of these remarks will appear from considering that, in the progress of almost every nation from barbarism to civilization, the point at which their armies have been most formidable and efficient is that where they unite the hardihood of the former to the resources of the latter, where they have the use of wealth and science, without having learned to abuse them. This may be exemplified in the history of the Russian empire, since the time of Peter the Great.

Although not *immediately* connected with this subject, it may be well to observe, that what has been advanced in relation to the ration is applicable in the fullest extent to the medical attendance and supplies of our army. The soldier who, previous to enlistment, had no physician but nature, no nurse but whom chance or charity furnished, and who never knew what comfort and convenience were, will easily struggle through a disease that would be inevitably fatal to one who had been from his infancy accustomed to every assistance that professional skill and the solicitude of friends, aided by a competency at least, can afford.

But, from the multiplicity of charitable institutions among us, even our paupers are better attended and furnished, when sick, than the soldier can possibly be, without liberal supplies from the public, assisted by an effectual organization of the medical staff, a rigid observance of regulations, and a strict attention to duty. Policy and economy, therefore, no less than humanity, require attention to this subject; since, in addition to the loss of much time, it costs the public several hundred dollars to supply the place of a good soldier, who might often have been saved for the twentieth part of that sum.

*Sutling*, also, is a subject that deserves to be particularly noticed, since it is of nearly as much importance to the health, comfort, and convenience of the army as the nature of the component parts of the ration. To the officers it is more so; for, both in time of peace and in active service, they are generally stationed so far from cities and villages, as to render them altogether dependent upon the occasional supplies of the irregular followers of a camp; and, too often, money cannot procure a decent meal. From the experience of the late war, there can be no doubt but this circumstance alone rendered the service on the frontier more unpleasant and unpopular, and caused more *desertion*, if it may be so termed, than all others together. In fact, it often amounted to absolute want; for, after living a few weeks upon the soldier's ration, diarrhœa and dysentery would render bread and meat as useless as stocks and stones. And, even when the camp was surrounded with hucksters, they extorted in a short time all the money an officer possessed, for supplying him with a bare subsistence; so that it too often happened that those, particularly in the subordinate grades, were, from absolute poverty, obliged to descend to habits and practices totally inconsistent with the character of officers or gentlemen. It would frequently require nearly all the pay and emoluments of a captain to discharge his mess-bill; the situation of subalterns, therefore, may be well imagined, since the scarcity of supplies rendered it almost impossible to adapt one's living to his means.

Feeling the importance of this subject, commanding officers repeatedly attempted to obtain and secure regular sutlers, who, from having the exclusive right to sell to their corps, might be able and willing to furnish them regularly at a low rate. But this was found impracticable: in the first place, from the irregularity with which the army was paid; and, secondly, from the small security the sutler had for his money. The former was, of course, the chief cause of the latter.

I have known an honest and faithful man lose from 800 to 1,000 dollars by the death, desertion, and discharge of soldiers, who had not been paid for many months, and some of them for two years. The consequence was obvious: the sutler was soon obliged to quit his business, and, in the mean time, to charge an enormous profit to make up for these losses, in addition to those arising from the necessity of borrowing money or purchasing at a long credit, and, of course, at a great advance.

In actual service, *perhaps*, the troops cannot always be regularly paid; some mode should therefore be adopted to secure the sutler his just and *authorized* demands in *all cases*, which, I apprehend, might be easily effected. If this were done, he could furnish a mess of ten men with all the groceries, &c. they require for ten dollars per month; whereas they now spend one-half their pay for occasional supplies of the very worst kind; and, at the same time, a mess of officers might live better for three dollars per week than they often do for four or five times that sum.

In the British army this subject has received the attention it deserves; so that one of their regiments is generally better supplied, and at a cheaper rate than any of the neighboring citizens; and it is surely of equal importance to us, if, without costing the public a cent, we can by suitable laws and regulations enable both officers and men to purchase health and comfort for half the money they now pay for imposition and disease.

Before quitting this point it should be observed, that no important arrangement for the army can be considered in the *abstract*; there is such a mutual dependance of all military regulations, that it is often impossible to foresee the consequences of bad ones.

From the want of proper and regular supplies, for example, the important subject of *messing* has been almost entirely neglected. An officer, instead of finding his regimental mess a comfortable home, in which he feels an interest, and to which he is pleased to return, submits with reluctance to a few months of privation and hardship, and then commences his operations to effect a retreat to the interior, and leaves his place to be temporarily supplied by another equally discontented sojourner; and it is a fact, no less important than true, that those commanding officers, who have made the greatest progress in regimental police, have the least trouble in calling home their wandering officers, and keeping them there. It is in vain to say, as is often the case, that a soldier must expect these things; for, like all others, he will, to a certain extent, consult his own convenience. The camp at French Mills, in the fall of 1813, was sufficient proof that the comforts of officers are of no small importance to the public; for as soon as they found themselves in the wilderness, without houses or food, they not only quitted their posts upon the most trifling pretences, but many, who would have faced the enemy with pleasure, fled from privation in a manner that came little short of *desertion*. After what has been observed upon the nature of the ration, the necessity of a regimental grocery for the *health* as well as comfort both of officers and men, will not probably require further proof.

With regard to the articles best suited to compose the ration, it is necessary that they be not only adapted to the habits of the soldier, but also of such a nature as to be easily procured, of a good quality, and capable of being preserved from injury in the several parts of the country where they are to be used. Wheat flour is easily damaged in all places, and in that state is extremely prejudicial to health. Most of the diseases of the troops during the late war were, by general consent, attributed to the ration; but though by no means true to the extent believed, it was too often so; and, nine times in ten, damaged flour was the noxious article. At French Mills, particularly, where the mortality was almost incredible, the flour was unfit for any human stomach. Where it can be obtained, therefore, *kiln-dried corn meal* is far preferable to flour in every respect; but where it cannot, the evil may in a great measure be remedied by causing the latter to be baked in the form of hard biscuits, which can not only be preserved a much longer time, but are more palatable and less injurious when damaged, and far more nutritious when good, than the soft bread furnished to or made by the soldiers.

This, it is believed, is a matter of no small importance, not only on account of the bad effects of damaged flour, but from the fact well known to many valetudinarians, and most physicians, that hard bread, or soft bread toasted, is much more easily digested, and affords more nutriment, than in any other form, however good the quality may be; and since a pound of this bread will be equal to a pound of flour, the baking will be but little if any additional expense.

For the same reason that kiln dried corn meal should, in many cases, be substituted for flour, bacon ought to be furnished instead of salt beef and pork; at the south, particularly, this change appears absolutely necessary for the health of the troops. With this alteration, and a proper reduction of the *quantity* of the meat, this part of the ration, provided a due proportion of it be *fresh*, would be as good as can possibly be required.

As to the additional vegetables that may be substituted for part of the meat, the kinds best adapted to this purpose, on every account, are those used by the British and French, viz: peas, beans, and rice; they may be obtained in abundance, and generally at a low rate; and if issued either regularly or occasionally, would not only promote the health and comfort of the soldier, by approaching nearer to his accustomed food, but by enabling him to introduce frequent changes in his mode of preparing it.

The deleterious effects of ardent spirits, particularly in the army, are well known; for, in the reports of sick, "sudden death from intoxication" is no small item. It is suggested, therefore, whether this troublesome poison should not be altogether excluded, and the healthy drinks of molasses and water, or beer, substituted for it. If I am rightly informed, by supplying molasses and the *essence* of spruce, one *quart* of beer may be furnished for about the same sum as one *gill* of whiskey. The necessity of this will be more evident when it is remembered that, in fact, the soldier has at present only water with his meals: for, notwithstanding all regulations, he will make a morning dram of his whiskey, which is one chief cause of its injurious effects.

At the request of the surgeon attending a post, where the men were severely attacked with dysentery this last summer, the commanding officer stopped the whiskey altogether, and an immediate check was given to the disease. This, however, is but one of many instances of the good consequences resulting from such orders, and particularly at the south, during the summer months.

Almost all classes of men among us are accustomed to the free use of spices and other condiments, particularly of *pickles*; which, on account of the vegetable acid they contain, are both a pleasant and healthy stimulus to the stomach. Indeed, vinegar is of great use on many accounts; it is one of the best correctors of the superabundance of bile, induced by an unnatural or long continued stimulus; whether it be the excessive heat of a warm climate, an abundance of animal food, or that of a crude consistence, or a too free use of ardent spirits; in the latter case, as well as where laudanum or other narcotics have been taken, it seems to act as a specific. Whenever, therefore, the soldiers are supplied with the lighter vegetables, as cabbages, beets, cucumbers, &c. which may, by suitable arrangements easily be done, especially on the peace establishment, there can be no doubt of the benefit of allowing a sufficient quantity of vinegar to furnish them with a regular supply of pickles, and even without these it might be used with great advantage, and would generally be very acceptable in its simple form.

If, from these considerations, it should appear that the health of the army requires alterations in the ration, they will be of still greater weight when we remember, that, from the nature of our public institutions, the greater part of our force in actual service does, and will for many years, consist of militia, of men who must necessarily, in all cases, be suddenly taken from their customary habits and comforts, and exposed to all the hardships and privations of the soldier, without any of his advantages; the effects of this have been too lately and too severely felt, to be soon forgotten; and it is suggested whether this circumstance be not of sufficient importance to have a very considerable influence in deciding not only the nature of the ration, but of all those supplies upon which militia, when on duty, are equally as dependant as the regular soldiers; and as every able-bodied citizen is liable, at a moment's warning, to feel the necessity of having these supplies as good as practicable, he will have less objection to furnish his portion of any additional expense that may be necessary to insure their provision.

All which is respectfully submitted.

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

JOSEPH LOVELL, *Surgeon General.*

[J.]

#### REGULATIONS OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

##### COMMISSARY GENERAL.

The commissary general of subsistence will be stationed at Washington, and will have a general superintendance of his department. He will make all estimates of expenditures for his department, regulate the transmission of funds to his assistants, receive their returns and accounts, and adjust them for settlement.

##### ASSISTANT COMMISSARIES.

It shall be the duty of the assistant commissaries or storekeepers to receive and account, in the manner hereafter prescribed for all subsistence stores intrusted to their charge, and to make and transmit to the proper accounting

officer, through the office of the commissary general, all returns and accounts. They will not receive subsistence stores from the contractors, until duly inspected according to the terms of the contract.

In case of failure on the part of the contractor, or a deficiency of rations, the assistant commissary, stationed at the depot where such failure happens, shall give immediate notice thereof to the commissary general; and shall, at the same time, make purchases of the necessary supplies on the best terms possible.

It shall be the duty of the several assistant commissaries or storekeepers, stationed at the depots where subsistence stores shall have been inspected and delivered agreeably to the conditions of the contract, to give the contractor duplicate receipts for the same, stating at length the articles, as enumerated in the contract.

Whenever it is found necessary to forward subsistence stores to an out-post, the assistant commissary or storekeeper, stationed at the depot, will require the necessary transportation of the quartermaster's department, and will forward, with the supplies, triplicate invoices, two of which will be receipted and returned by the receiving commissary, and one of them must accompany the monthly return of stores received and issued.

The assistant commissary or storekeeper will be held strictly accountable for the good condition of the supplies when turned over to the quartermaster's department for transportation. They will be held accountable for the safe keeping and storage of all supplies intrusted to their charge, and they will require of the quartermaster's department good and sufficient store-houses for that purpose; and it will be their duty to examine frequently into the state of the stores, and to prevent damage or waste of any description.

Should subsistence stores become damaged or unfit for issue, the assistant commissary or storekeeper having them in charge will report the same to the commanding officer of the post, who is hereby authorized and required to institute a board of survey, to be composed of two officers, when the service will permit; otherwise of two respectable persons well qualified, to act under oath; and all stores found damaged and unfit for issue, from causes other than neglect of the assistant commissary or storekeeper, shall be condemned and sold—the auctioneer's bill of such sale to accompany the account current, and an invoice of the stores thus condemned, with the cause of damage, certified by the board of survey, to accompany the monthly return of stores received and issued; and in case the board of survey be of opinion that stores have been damaged by neglect of the assistant commissary or storekeeper, they will make out an invoice of the articles damaged, and certify the same to the commissary general at Washington, who will have the amount of such damaged articles charged to the assistant commissary or storekeeper in his accounts with the United States.

Issues to the troops will be made on provision returns signed by the commanding officer of the post, agreeably to the form hereafter prescribed; and at the end of every month the assistant commissary will make out duplicate abstracts, which will be compared with the original returns, and certified by the commanding officer of the post; one of which abstracts must accompany the monthly return of stores received and issued. Issues will be made for men in hospital, on returns of the senior surgeon, for the whole or parts of rations. When parts only are drawn, the assistant commissary will, on requisition of the surgeon, purchase and issue eggs, fowls, milk, or other articles of subsistence, in lieu thereof, which he will account for in the same manner as other subsistence stores purchased and issued.

Abstracts for issues to the hospital will be made out by the assistant commissary, and certified by the surgeon in the usual form; one of which will accompany the return of stores received and issued.

Officers commanding recruiting parties, distant from depots, will enter into a written contract for the rations necessary for his party, first giving the necessary public notice for proposals. The issues will be made on returns for the complete ration, of which abstracts will be made at the end of each month, certified in the usual form. A duplicate or certified copy of the contract will be forwarded to the commissary general at Washington.

When troops are detached to points where there is no assistant commissary, the commanding officer of the post or detachment may appoint an officer to do that duty, who will, while acting, be entitled to the additional pay of an assistant commissary; but as such appointments are only necessary to meet the casualties of service, the officer thus appointed will not be considered on pay after he has ceased to perform the duties. Officers making appointments of this nature will forthwith report them to the commissary general at Washington.

The assistant commissaries will be located by the commissary general at the several permanent depots and established posts, and they will not be removed but by orders from the commanding general of the troops, or the commissary general of subsistence, except when posts are evacuated, or in case of courts-martial; in the latter case, a suitable person is to be appointed by the commanding officer to do that duty.

A reasonable per centage will be allowed for unavoidable waste in issuing provisions, to be accounted for in the monthly returns of stores received and issued.

Dr. *The United States, in account current for expenditure in the subsistence department, with* Cr.  
*A. B. assistant commissary.*

Date.		Amount.	Date.		Amount.
June 30, 1819,	To amount paid per abstract, No. 1.	\$2,560	June 1, -	By draft in my favor, on the Treasurer of the United States,	\$2,560

I certify, on honor, that the above account current exhibits an accurate and true statement of all moneys received and paid away by me, on account of subsistence of the army, and heretofore accounted for, and that a balance of \_\_\_\_\_ dollars and \_\_\_\_\_ cents is due.

*Abstract of purchases made on account of subsistence of the army, by \_\_\_\_\_, assistant commissary of subsistence, for the month of \_\_\_\_\_.*

Date of payment.	Vouchers.	To whom made.	FOR WHAT PURPOSE.										Amount.	
			Pounds of bacon.	Barrels of pork.	Pounds of fresh beef.	Barrels of flour.	Gallons of whiskey.	Barrels of corn meal.	Bushels of peas.	Bushels of beans.	Bushels of salt.	Pounds of candles.		Gallons of vinegar.
June 30, 1819,	1	A. B.	-	40	-	100	900	-	-	-	50	400	300	\$2,560

J—Continued.

I certify and attest, on my word of honor, that the purchases were made agreeably to the above abstracts, and that the sums were actually paid as charged. I also certify and attest, on my word of honor, that I was wholly uninterested in the purchase, and that the articles were procured at the lowest market price.

Return of provisions received and issued at \_\_\_\_\_, during the quarter ending \_\_\_\_\_.

Dates.	Abstracts of.	From whom received.	Pork	Salt	Fresh	Bacon.	Corn	Flour	Peas.	Beans.	Pounds of Soap.	Pounds of Candles.	Bushels of Salt.	Gallons of Whiskey.	Gallons of Vinegar.
			Barrels.	Barrels.	Beef.	Beef.	Meal	rels.	Bushels.	Bushels.					
April —, 1818,	- A. No. 1, to - B. No. 1, to	On hand, as per last return,													
		Contractors and others, - By purchase, -													
		Total to be accounted for, -													
	Abstracts.	To whom issued.													
May 12,	- Aa. No. 1, to	Assistant commissaries and others, -													
June 1,	- Bb. No. 1, to	Condemned and sold, -													
June 3,	- Cc. No. 1, to	Issued to the troops, -													
June 30,	- Dd. No. 1, to	Issued to the troops, -													
		Total issued, &c. -													
		On hand, June 30, 1818, -													

Abstract of provisions issued from the \_\_\_\_\_ to the \_\_\_\_\_ to the troops of the United States, stationed \_\_\_\_\_, under the command of \_\_\_\_\_, by A. B., assistant commissary of subsistence.

Date.	Number of returns.	Number of men.	Number of women.	No. of days drawn for.	Rations of fresh beef.	Rations of bacon.	Rations of pork.	Rations of flour.	Rations of corn meal.	Rations of peas or beans.	Rations of whiskey.	Rations of salt.	Rations of soap.	Rations of candles.	Rations of vinegar.	Remarks.
Total rations,																
					Pounds.	Pounds.	Barrels.	Pounds.	Barrels.	Pounds.	Barrels.	Gills.	Quarts.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Gallons.
Total quantity,																

I certify that I have carefully examined the above abstract with the original returns now in my possession, and find a correct and true account of the issues to the troops at \_\_\_\_\_, under my command, in the month of \_\_\_\_\_, amounting to  
 rations fresh beef,                      rations bacon,                      rations pork,                      rations flour,  
 rations corn meal,                      rations peas or beans,                      rations whiskey,                      rations salt,  
 rations soap,                      rations candles, and                      rations vinegar.

J—Continued.

Provision return for Captain A. B.'s company, ——— regiment of ——— for four days, commencing 1st, and ending 4th June, 1819.

	Number of men.	Number of women.	Total.	Rations of flour.	Rations of corn meal.	Rations of bacon.	Rations of fresh beef.	Rations of pork.	Rations of whiskey.	Rations of peas.	Rations of beans.	Small rations, such as soap, vinegar, salt, and candles.
Fort Hawkins, (Geo.) June 1, 1818.												

The assistant commissary, C. D. will issue agreeably to the above return.

E. F. Colonel of Infantry.

The United States,

To A. B. Dr.

To 100 barrels of fine flour, at ten dollars,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$1,000
To 40 barrels of prime pork, at twenty dollars,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	800
To 900 gallons of proof whiskey, at sixty cents,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	540
To 50 bushels of salt, at one dollar,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50
To 400 pounds of candles, at twenty dollars,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80
To 300 gallons of vinegar, at thirty cents,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90
												<u>\$2,560</u>

June 30, 1819, received of C. D., assistant commissary of subsistence, \$2,560, in full of the above amount.

Signed duplicate receipts.

E. F.

Invoice of subsistence stores forwarded by ———, assistant commissary of subsistence, stationed at Fort McHenry, to C. D. assistant commissary of subsistence, at Fort Severn, Annapolis.

Sixty barrels of fine flour.  
 Thirty barrels of prime pork.  
 Sixteen barrels, containing five hundred gallons proof whiskey.  
 Ten bags, containing thirty bushels of salt.  
 Seven boxes, containing two hundred pounds of candles.  
 Four casks, containing two hundred gallons of vinegar.

Triplicate, A. B.  
 Assistant Commissary of Subsistence.

FORT SEVERN.

Received the above,

1818.

C. D.  
 Assistant Commissary of Subsistence.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 169.

[2d SESSION.]

ESTIMATES FOR THE YEAR 1819.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 22, 1818.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 19, 1818.

SIR:

I have received your three letters of the 16th and 17th instant, in relation to the estimates of the War Department for the year 1819; in answer to which I respectfully submit, for the consideration of the committee, the reports and statements upon which the estimates were formed. It is believed that they will afford a much fuller and more satisfactory view of the reasons which governed the Department in determining the amount of the respective appropriations which have been asked for, than could be presented within the ordinary limits of a letter. The documents are so voluminous, that, to avoid the trouble of copying, I have transmitted the originals; and I must request of you to return them, after the committee shall have done with them. Should it be thought advisable to lay any part of them before the House, they can be copied for that purpose.

Under the head of "pay of the army," it is estimated that there will be a probable balance, at the end of the year, of about \$300,000; and, consequently, that sum may be deducted from the appropriation of the ensuing year.

Orders have been given to suspend the works at Rouse's Point until the line between the United States and Lower Canada shall be determined. The sum of \$200,000, which was estimated for it, will probably not be required, and may be omitted in the appropriation for fortifications.

Since the estimates were formed, the contracts under the new system for supplying the army with provisions after the 1st of June next have been completed, and it is ascertained that a reduction may be made under the head of subsistence. The contract system will terminate on the 1st of June next. To complete the deliveries under the present contracts until that time will probably require the sum of \$303,441; and it is estimated that the expense of subsistence from the 1st of June, 1819, at which time the system of supplying the army by commissaries will commence, until the 1st of June, 1820, cannot exceed \$503,700; but as four-fifths of the rations will be required, by the

terms of the contracts, to be delivered between the 1st of June, 1819, and the 1st of January, 1820, the sum of \$403,160 will be necessary to meet the deliveries in 1819; and, consequently, the whole appropriation required for the next year, under this head, will be \$706,601, instead of \$858,125, the sum stated in the estimate.

On a review of the estimate for clothing, it is believed that the sum of \$400,000 will be ample; and, consequently, \$30,000 may be subtracted from the estimate.

Document marked E\* will show on what grounds the sum of \$50,000 is asked for the medical and hospital department. On the 1st of January last it was estimated that there was a balance of \$15,000, which, added to the sum appropriated for the current year, viz: \$15,000, makes \$30,000, as applicable to the service of this year; in addition to which, there was transferred to this item, by order of the President, during the present year, the sum of \$50,000. The disbursements in the medical and hospital department will probably not fall short of \$70,000 during the present year.

By the statement from the Ordnance Department, marked G\*, it will appear that no new contract has been made during the present year for cannon, except with Wirt & Clark; and, consequently, the estimates under that item are on account of old contracts, and will be necessary to meet the engagements under them. It will also appear that the sum of \$70,000, instead of \$50,000, will be required for the arsenal at Augusta. The estimate for the arsenal at Frankfort is to complete the works commenced there.

The appropriations already made of \$200,000, on account of subsistence, and \$50,000 for arrearages for holding Indian treaties, will of course be deducted from their respective items in the general appropriation.

There will probably be a balance, under the head of bounties and premiums, of near \$30,000; which sum will be applicable to the service of the ensuing year, and may be taken from the sum contained in the estimates.

The appropriations made for the current expenses of the army, for the year 1818, amounted to \$3,599,245, which, of course, excludes the disbursements for fortifications and ordnance, which are of a permanent nature. The appropriation asked for the current expenses of the year 1819, excluding the same disbursements, and estimating the expense of subsistence under the new system of supplying the army, for seven months only, (viz: from the 1st of June, 1819, until the 1st of January, 1820,) amounts to \$3,077,789, making a difference of \$521,456.

The estimates have been formed on the supposition of our military establishment being full, which, in that case, would consist of 12,656 officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.

If further information should be required, it will afford me pleasure to give it.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *October 12, 1818.*

SIR:

Agreeably to your orders of 29th August, 5th and 25th of September, I have the honor to present the subjoined report and estimates of the sums which will be required to be appropriated for the engineer department, for the year 1819, comprising the following heads and amounts:

Fortifications, as per statement and schedule A,	-	-	-	-	-	\$838,000 00
Military academy,	-	B,	-	-	-	35,640 00
Engineer office,	-	C,	-	-	-	3,990 00
Arrearages,	-	D,	-	-	-	3,440 00
Survey of western waters,	-	E,	-	-	-	6,500 00
Total amount,	-	-	-	-	-	\$887,570 00

A.

#### FORTIFICATIONS.

It has been determined by the War Department that the fortifications which may be hereafter constructed upon the Atlantic, and Gulf of Mexico frontiers, shall be permanent works, and of dimensions adequate to the defence of the positions or passes which they may occupy. This mode of construction is the best calculated to secure the object for which fortifications are erected upon the extreme seacoast of the Union, namely, to protect the important and valuable points. It is also true economy. The expense once incurred upon the above principle, will not require to be repeated. An important variation in the mode of conducting the disbursement on account of fortifications has also been commenced by order of the War Department, to wit: in lieu of the common mode of purchasing materials, and hiring artisans to put them together in the works, the whole works are to be contracted for, to be erected and finished for a specified sum; the contractors furnishing any material and workmanship—sufficient bonds being taken to ensure a faithful execution of the contract under the supervision and direction of an officer of engineers. In relation to the foregoing principles, the following works are to be constructed, viz: On the Gulf of Mexico frontier, at (No. 1.) Barrataria, on the west end of Grande Terre, commanding the entrance into Barrataria bay; (No. 2.) Plaquemine Turn, on the banks of the Mississippi river, sixty miles below New Orleans; (No. 3.) Bayou Bienvenue, near lake Borgne, covering the approach to New Orleans through that lake.

No. 4, Chef Menteur. } These two works are to be upon the margin of the passes into Lake Pontchartrain, to No. 5, Rigolets. } cover the approach of the rear of New Orleans and the country above.  
 No. 6, Mobile Point. } These two works command the entrance into Mobile bay. The whole expense of No. 7, Dauphin Island. } these works will be *three millions of dollars*. Of the above mentioned, the most important have been contracted for, to wit: Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7. These four works will cost \$1,800,000, and are to be completed within four years.

Dauphin Island,	\$632,000,	to mount	118	cannon.
Mobile Point,	632,000,	do.	118	do.
Rigolets,	268,000,	do.	64	do.
Chef Menteur,	268,000,	do.	64	do.

Total amount, - - - \$1,800,000, 364 cannon.

Consequently, for the year 1819 it will be necessary to appropriate for these four works from the fund on hand, and which may be appropriated, \$450,000. Two of the contractors, for the above have left the Atlantic States, with artisans and cargoes of materials, to commence the works in the ensuing December, under the directions of officers of the corps of engineers.

#### CHESAPEAKE BAY.

The fortifications to be constructed in this important estuary, and at the mouth of the ——— which disembogue into the bay, are depending upon some contingencies not yet adjusted; they have, however, been so far settled as to enable the Government to determine to fortify the entrance into Hampton Roads, at Old Point Comfort, and upon the Rip Rap Shoals. The work contemplated for Old Point Comfort is to mount two hundred and fifty cannon, and the one upon the Rip Rap Shoal to mount two hundred and fifty cannon. These extensive works will cost about \$3,000,000. The contracts entered into will require an appropriation for the year 1819, from the fund on hand, and from what may be appropriated, amounting to \$330,000. The contracts are made for the foundation of

\* The statements E and G are not to be found.

the work upon the Rip Rap Shoal, and for Old Point Comfort; the work at the former place is progressing; about two millions of bricks, and about twenty thousand perch of building stone, are collected at Old Point Comfort, under the care of an officer of engineers. The work at this position will commence next spring. Of the other contemplated works in Chesapeake bay, between the Middle Ground and Horse Shoe, or Fork river, St. Mary's, and Baltimore, I refer to the report upon that subject made by the Board of Engineers.

DELAWARE BAY.

The key to the water approach by this bay is the Pea Patch; an enclosed work has been recommended and adopted for this position, to mount one hundred and twenty cannon, which will cost \$300,000. For the year 1819, I recommend that \$100,000 be appropriated from the fund on hand, and from what may be appropriated. The work is progressing under the direction of an officer of engineers, who will have completed the foundation of this work in the course of a few weeks. The foundation is altogether of piles, the Pea Patch being an island of soft mud. Stones are collecting to commence the superstructure of this work at the opening of the next spring. To complete the defence of this pass, it will be necessary to occupy with works the shoals of the adjacent Delaware and New Jersey shores; and to aid the whole, two steam batteries will be requisite. As this part of the plan is not yet mature, I shall not recommend any further appropriation for the pass for the year 1819.

NEW YORK HARBOR.

The only work now progressing in this harbor is a castellated tower, building at the Narrows, upon Hendrick's reef; it will mount ninety-six cannon, and will cost \$275,000; it is more than half finished, and can be completed in the year 1819, and will require \$110,000 to be appropriated. The other positions which must of necessity be occupied to complete the defence of New York, are, first, Sandy Hook; second, Staten Island; third, west end of Long Island; fourth, Brooklyn Heights; and fifth, Frog Point, near the Sound. The estimates for these works not being completed, I shall not recommend any specific appropriation for them.

LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

The positions which it has been thought necessary to occupy at the northern extremity of this lake, are Rouse's and Island Points, in the vicinity of each other, and of the boundary line between the United States and Canada; the whole of these works being contemplated to withstand a siege, and will mount nearly three hundred pieces of cannon. For these works, for the year 1819, I recommend that \$200,000 be appropriated. The works have been commenced under the direction of an engineer officer, and are now progressing. I do not at this time recommend any appropriation for the positions at the eastern extremity of Long Island, Rhode Island, Boston, Portsmouth, Portland, or Penobscot harbors, or for those positions which are south of Chesapeake bay, on the Atlantic frontier; because the Board of Engineers have not yet had an opportunity to examine and report in relation to them.

The following statement, and recapitulation of the foregoing items, will show that it will be necessary to appropriate \$838,000 for fortifications for the year 1819, in addition to the unexpended fund which will be on hand, on 31st December, 1818. The reason why this unexpended balance remains on hand; will be obvious, when it is considered that the works contemplated, when the last appropriation was made, have not been commenced, because the plans of them were not fully determined upon until late in the current year, to wit:

Gulf of Mexico frontier	-	-	-	-	-	\$450,000
Chesapeake bay	-	-	-	-	-	330,000
Delaware bay	-	-	-	-	-	100,000
New York harbor	-	-	-	-	-	110,000
Lake Champlain	-	-	-	-	-	200,000
						\$1,190,000

To which sum I add the difference between it and the amount of the subjoined statement, (\$1,438,000 which difference will be required for such new works as may be adopted from the surveys which are now making, and the contingencies attending the same	-	-	-	-	-	248,000
						\$1,438,000

*Statement of the unexpended balance of fortification fund.*

On hand 16th April, 1818	-	-	-	-	-	\$1,038,289 82
Amount expended to 6th of October, 1818, as per report F,	-	-	-	-	\$363,030 00	
Amount that will probably be expended by the 31st of December, 1818	-	-	-	-	75,269 82	
						438,289 82
Amount of fortification fund on hand, unexpended 31st December, 1818	-	-	-	-	-	\$600,000 00
To this sum I add the amount which is recommended to be appropriated for the year 1819	-	-	-	-	-	838,000 00
						\$1,438,000 00

B.

*Estimate of the expenditures necessary to be made at the Military Academy in the year 1819.*

For quarters for the superintendent,	-	-	-	-	-	\$5,000
Four houses for professors and teachers, at \$3,900 each,	-	-	-	-	-	15,600
Stationary,	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Books and library,	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Fuel for 80 cadets' rooms,	-	-	940 cords.	-	-	
For the staff steward, offices, bombardiers and guard,	-	-	700 cords.	-	-	
			1,640 cords, at \$5½, and \$½ for distributing,	-	-	9,840
Repairs,	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Contingencies,	-	-	-	-	-	3,000
						\$39,440
Amount of fund on hand, 16th April, 1818,	-	-	-	-	\$9,591 14	
Probable expenditure to 31st December, 1818,	-	-	-	-	5,791 14	
						3,800
Amount necessary to be appropriated for the year 1819,	-	-	-	-	-	\$35,640

N. B. The two first items in the above estimate for the Military Academy, amounting to \$20,600, are for buildings long since contemplated. They are required for the comfortable accommodation of the officers of that institution. The existing buildings do not afford the room required. As the buildings will be of a permanent structure, it will be seen that the current annual expense of the Academy will be reduced to \$18,840.



## C.

*Estimate of the expense of an office for the Engineer Department for the year 1819.*

Rent of an office until 1st of June, 1819, four rooms: one for the chief engineer, one for the clerks, one for maps, plans, books, &c., and one for drawing, -	\$ 200 00
Hire for two clerks, \$1,000 and \$1,200, -	2,200 00
Fuel for seven months, -	336 00
Books, maps, and stationary, -	1,000 00
Advertisements, -	254 00
	<u>\$3,990 00</u>

## D.

*Estimate of arrearages in forming the Engineer Department at Washington.*

Office rent, -	\$ 120 00
Clerk hire, eight months, at \$90, -	720 00
For the purchase of maps, charts, and plans, by order of the War Department, -	2,000 00
Stationary, tables, chairs, drawing boards, advertisements, &c. -	600 00
	<u>\$3,440 00</u>

## E.

*Estimate of the expense of making a survey of the watercourses tributary to and west of the Mississippi; also of those tributary to the same river, and northwest of the Ohio river.*

For a small steamboat, to draw 18 inches of water, with the requisite equipment for the voyage, -	\$5,000 00
For astronomical and surveying instruments, and stationary, -	1,000 00
Contingencies, -	500 00
	<u>\$6,500 00</u>

Respectfully submitted:

J. G. SWIFT, *Chief Engineer.*Honorable J. C. CALHOUN, *Secretary of War.*

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 170.

[2d SESSION.]

## NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMY, ITS DISTRIBUTION, AND NUMBER OF ORDNANCE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 12, 1819.

*To the Senate of the United States:*

JANUARY 11, 1819.

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, requesting me to "cause to be laid before a statement of the effective force now composing the military establishment of the United States; also, a statement of the different posts and garrisons at and within which troops are stationed, and the actual number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates at each post and garrison, respectively; also, to designate in such statement the number of artillerists, and the number and caliber of ordnance at each of the said posts and garrisons," I transmit a report from the Secretary of War, which, with the documents accompanying it, contains all the information required.

JAMES MONROE.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 11, 1819.*

The Secretary of War, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, requesting the President of the United States "to cause to be laid before the Senate, as soon as may be, a statement of the effective force now composing the military establishment of the United States; also, a statement of the different posts and garrisons at and within which troops are stationed, and the actual number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates at each post and garrison, respectively; also, to designate in such statements, the number of artillerists, and the number and caliber of ordnance at each of the said posts and garrisons," has the honor to transmit to the President of the United States a report of the Adjutant and Inspector General, marked A., and one from the colonel of ordnance, marked B., which comprehend all the information required by the resolution.

J. C. CALHOUN.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, *January 9, 1819.*

Sir:

I have the honor to lay before you a return of the army, by corps and regiments, and a detailed report of posts, showing the names and rank of the commanders, the corps, and the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, at such as are garrisoned. The names and situations of all permanent works, and the number of cannon at each, are given, as well those that are unoccupied, as those where troops are at present stationed.

This report, which I believe contains all the information required from me in relation to the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, is consolidated from the latest returns on file in this office.

I have the honor to be, sir, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

D. PARKER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

103 m













POSTS AND GARRISONS—Continued.

Division, and by whom commanded.	Departments, and by whom commanded.	Forts, garrisons, fortifications, and cantonments.	Where situated.	Number of cannon.	Commanding officers of posts.	Regiments or corps by whom the posts are garrisoned.	Captains.	Second lieutenants.	Third lieutenants.	Mechanics.	Artificers.	Laborers.	Total.	Aggregate.		
Maj. Gen. Jackson, commanding Division of the South.	Brevet Major General Ripley, commanding Western Section Department No. 8.	Staff of Western Sec. 8th Dep't, Mobile, - - - - -	Head-quarters, New Orleans, Alabama Territory, - - - - -	-	Brigadier Gen. Ripley,	General Staff.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46		
		Fort Bayer, - - - - -	Alabama Territory, - - - - -	-	-	-	} 3d battalion artillery, and 8th infantry.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Fort Charlotte, - - - - -	Mobile, Alabama Territory, - - - - -	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Fort Stoddart, - - - - -	Junction of Tombigbee & Alab'a.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Fort Plaquemine, - - - - -	Outlet of Lake Pontchartrain, - - - - -	20	Major Humphry,	3d battalion artillery, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	85	
		Fort Petit Coquille, - - - - -	Outlet of Lake Pontchartrain, - - - - -	-	-	3d battalion artillery, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	
		Bayou St. John, - - - - -	} New Orleans, Louisiana, - - - - -	-	Major Maney, - - - - -	3d battalion artillery, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	
		Fort St. Charles, - - - - -		Louisiana, - - - - -	-	Major Whartenby, - - - - -	1st infantry, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	183	
		Baton Rouge, - - - - -	Mississippi river, Miss. Territ'y.	-	-	-	1st infantry, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	
		Fort Adams, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	1st infantry, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	
	Fort Covington, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	1st infantry, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47		
	Attakapas, - - - - -	On Red River, Louisiana, - - - - -	-	-	-	1st infantry, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47		
	Natchitoches, - - - - -	New Orleans, Louisiana, - - - - -	-	Lieutenant Symington,	Ordnance, - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	2	2	4	5		
	Depot, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	610	
	Brevet Brig. Gen. Smith, commanding Department No. 9.	Staff of Department No. 9, - - - - -	Head-quarters, Belle Fontaine, Missouri Territory, - - - - -	Brevet Brig. Gen. Smith,	Rifle regiment, & general staff.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	417	
		Belle Fontaine, - - - - -	Missouri Territory, - - - - -	Lieut. Col. Chambers,	Rifle regiment, 4 companies, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	
		Belle Point, - - - - -	On the Arkansas, - - - - -	Major Bradford,	Rifle regiment, 1 company, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46	
		Fort Osage, - - - - -	Missouri river, - - - - -	-	Rifle regiment, 1 company, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62	
		Fort Edwards, - - - - -	Illinois Territory, - - - - -	-	Rifle regiment, 1 company, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62	
		Fort Armstrong, - - - - -	Rock Island, Mississippi, - - - - -	-	Rifle regiment, 1 company, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	146	
Fort Crawford, - - - - -		Prairie du Chien, - - - - -	-	Major Morgan,	Rifle regiment, 2 companies, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31		
Garrison, - - - - -		Newport, Kentucky, - - - - -	-	Captain L. Scott,	4th battalion art'y, 1 company, - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5		
Arsenal, - - - - -		Newport, Kentucky, - - - - -	-	Captain Richardson,	Ordnance, - - - - -	-	1	-	1	3	-	-	3	-		
														3	840	
Grand total of posts, - - - - -													-	7,270		

NOTE.—The preceding return of the army gives the clearest view of its present strength and disposition that can be collected from the last returns and reports on file in this office. The return by regiments and corps exhibits all who are borne on the rolls, and the return by posts contains only those present.



B.

SIR: ORDNANCE OFFICE, January 11, 1819.

I have the honor to transmit a return of ordnance, mounted and dismounted, at the several posts and stations, agreeable to the latest returns received at this office. Very respectfully, &c.

DECIUS WADSWORTH, Colonel of ordnance.

The Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN.

*Statement of ordnance on hand at the military posts and depots of the United States, from returns received at the department of ordnance, up to the 31st December, 1818.*

STATIONS.	MOUNTED ORDNANCE.					DISMOUNTED ORDNANCE.				
	Mortars, heavy and light, 10 inch.	Battering cannon, 42, 32, 24, and 18 pounders.	Field cannon, 12 and 6 pounders.	Howitzers, 8 and 5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> inches.	Columbiads, 100, 50, 32, 24, and 18 pounders.	Mortars, heavy and light, 10 inch.	Battering cannon, 42, 32, 24, and 18 pounders.	Field cannon, 12 and 6 pounders.	Howitzers, 8 and 5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> inches.	Columbiads, 100, 50, 32, 24 & 18 pounders.
United States' armory, Springfield, Massachusetts, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	2	-	-
Fort George, Castine, Maine, -	-	4	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Harbor of Portland, Maine, -	1	33	11	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
Harbor of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, -	-	35	13	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
United States' arsenal, Charlestown, Massachusetts, -	2	3	15	4	-	4	8	8	1	-
United States' arsenal, Marblehead, Massachusetts, -	-	27	4	-	-	-	6	1	-	-
Harbor of Boston, Massachusetts, -	4	24	10	4	-	-	23	-	-	4
Harbor of Newport, Rhode Island, -	2	16	4	2	-	6	65	15	3	-
Harbor of New London, Connecticut, -	-	7	5	1	-	-	36	4	-	-
Harbor of New York, -	5	236	12	2	5	4	70	22	-	33
West Point, New York, -	2	2	6	2	-	3	-	3	7	-
United States' arsenal, Watervliet, New York, -	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	3	7	-
United States' military store Sag Harbor, New York, -	-	-	-	-	-	3	59	51	4	-
U. S. arsenal Rome, and depot Batavia, New York, -	1	6	2	-	-	1	-	7	1	-
Fort Pike, Sackett's Harbor, New York, -	5	10	9	1	1	-	-	21	4	-
Fort Niagara, New York, -	1	7	7	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harbor of Plattsburg, New York, -	1	10	10	8	-	2	-	4	-	-
United States' military store Sag Harbor, New York, -	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United States' laboratory, city of New York, -	7	18	34	2	-	3	-	-	-	-
U. S. arsenal, Philadelphia, including Wilmington and Newcastle, Delaware, -	-	-	-	-	-	11	42	115	18	-
Forts Mifflin and Gaines, Philadelphia, -	-	49	5	1	-	4	16	-	2	-
United States' arsenal Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	78	23	-
Fort McHenry and its dependencies, Baltimore, -	5	20	6	-	-	-	19	2	2	-
United States' arsenal, near Baltimore, Maryland, -	-	2	-	-	-	4	22	14	10	-
Fort Severn, Annapolis, Maryland, -	-	4	7	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Fort Washington, Potomac, Maryland, -	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	8	-	2
U. S. arsenal Greenleaf's Pt. and Little Falls magazine, -	-	-	-	-	-	21	117	103	6	6
United States' arsenal near Richmond, Virginia, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	69	86	30	-
Harbor of Norfolk, Virginia, -	-	32	11	3	4	-	-	3	1	-
Fort Powhatan, Virginia, -	-	5	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Hampton, Beaufort, North Carolina, -	-	5	3	-	-	-	17	-	-	-
Fort Johnson, Smithville, North Carolina, -	-	8	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Newbern and Wilmington, North Carolina, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, -	1	48	6	4	-	-	11	6	-	-
United States' arsenal, Charleston, South Carolina, -	5	3	2	5	-	-	38	5	-	-
Fort Scott, Georgia, -	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	2	-
Fort Wayne, Savannah, Georgia, -	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	2	-	-
Fort Hawkins, Georgia, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
*Fort Jackson, near Savannah, Georgia, -	-	8	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Charlotte, Mobile Territory, -	-	-	4	4	-	-	1	16	6	-
Fort Boyer, Mobile Territory, -	-	7	1	-	-	-	3	6	-	-
New Orleans, Louisiana, -	-	7	27	1	1	-	10	18	2	-
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Petite Coquille, Louisiana, -	-	8	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort St. Philips, -	-	8	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Claiborne, Natchitoches, -	1	40	5	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Wayne, Ohio, -	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*United States' arsenal, Newport, Kentucky, -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	1	-
*United States' depot, Detroit, Michigan Territory, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
*Belle Fontaine, -	-	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Clark, Indiana Territory, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Osage, Indiana Territory, -	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Harrison, Indiana Territory, -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Armstrong, Indiana Territory, -	-	1	5	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Edwards, Indiana Territory, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Fort Crawford, Indiana Territory, -	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
*Michilimackinac, Indiana Territory, -	-	2	11	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Dearborn, Chicago, -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gross Isle, Michigan Territory, -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Shelby, Detroit, Michigan Territory, -	-	3	5	3	-	-	1	6	1	-
Fernandini, Amelia Island, -	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-
Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine, -	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United States' depot, Hartford, Georgia, -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United States' depot, Pensacola, -	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Forts Gaines and Gadsden, Georgia, -	-	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Gratiot, Michigan Territory, -	-	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	44	754	344	80	15	71	727	621	116	45

ORDNANCE OFFICE, WASHINGTON, January 11, 1819.

DECIUS WADSWORTH, Colonel of ordnance.

\*From returns dated 31st December, 1817.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 171.

[2d SESSION.

## EXTRA PAY TO SOLDIERS ON FATIGUE DUTY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 15, 1819.

SIR:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 14, 1819.*

In conformity with the resolutions of the House of Representatives of the 6th and 7th instant, "directing the Secretary of War to report to the House of Representatives the present strength and distribution of the army of the United States, and to subjoin to such report the number and value of the extra days' labor performed by the several detachments thereof, respectively, in the year ending on the 30th day of October last, upon roads or other objects of fatigue duty; together with a statement of such objects, if any there are, of a similar nature, to which it is contemplated to direct the labor of the troops in the current year, distinguishing the sums expended on roads; and, also, to include in the report of the strength of the army called for by the resolution of the 6th instant, the amount in value, if any, of the extra compensation in subsistence, clothing, or pay, allowed the troops for extra labor during the year ending on the 30th of October last, in fatigue duties, distinguishing that which has been bestowed in compensation for labor on roads," I have the honor to state that the report which I had the honor to lay before the House, the 18th November last, in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 20th of April, 1818, gives the strength and distribution of the army of the United States.

The report of the Third Auditor of the Treasury Department, transmitted herewith, furnishes "the number and value of the extra days' labor performed by the several detachments of the army, in the year ending the 1st day of October, 1818, upon roads and other objects of fatigue duty." In relation to "such objects of a similar nature, to which it is contemplated to direct the labor of the troops in the present year," I have to state, that it is contemplated to employ the soldiers, as far as practicable, upon the road between Plattsburg and Sackett's Harbor, in the State of New York; upon the road from Detroit to Fort Meigs, in the State of Ohio; upon the road from the Muscle Shoal, in Tennessee, to Madisonville, &c., and upon fortifications and the repairs of barracks, particularly in constructing the barracks at Baton Rouge. No extra subsistence, except whiskey, nor extra articles of clothing, are allowed to soldiers while employed on extra labor; when a greater quantity of clothing than what is allowed by fixed regulations is issued, its value is deducted from the pay of the soldier.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

The SPEAKER of the House of Representatives of the United States.

Statement of extra labor upon roads, and other objects of fatigue duty, paid for by the several officers in the Quartermaster's Department, from October 1, 1817, to October 1, 1818, as far as the accounts have been received at this office, including the extra whiskey allowed by the regulations of the War Department, and issued by the contractors of the army.

By whom paid.	For what period.	At what place.	For what purpose.	No. of days, at 15 cents per day.		Gills of whiskey at three cts.		Total amount.
Lieutenant Jacob Brown, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Plattsburg, -	Making road from Plattsburg to Chatague, -	8,091	\$1,213 65	8,091	\$242 73	\$1,456 38
Lieutenant Jacob Brown, -	Second and third quarters, 1818, -	Plattsburg, -	Building and repairing barracks, -	9,900	1,485 00	9,900	297 00	1,782 00
Lieutenant Otis Fisher, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Detroit, -	Making road from Plattsburg to Chatague, -	2,670	400 50	2,670	80 10	480 60
Lieutenant Otis Fisher, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Detroit, -	Repairing barracks, -	1,267	190 05	1,267	38 01	228 06
Captain Lewis B. Willis, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	-	Making road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals, -	1,515	227 25	1,515	45 45	} 275 22
Captain Lewis B. Willis, -	First quarter, 1818, -	-	Making road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals, -	14	2 10	14	42	
Lieutenant Trueman Cross, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	New Orleans, -	Making road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals, -	7,661	1,149 15	7,661	229 83	} 1,398 06
Lieutenant Trueman Cross, -	First and second quarters, 1818, -	New Orleans, -	Making road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals, -	106	15 90	106	3 18	
Captain Wm. L. Robeson, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	New Orleans, -	Making road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals, -	133	19 95	133	3 99	23 94
Lieutenant Thomas F. Huntt, -	First and second quarters, 1818, -	New Orleans, -	Making road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals, -	746	111 90	746	22 38	134 28
Lieutenant Jas. McGunnigle, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Belle Fontaine, -	Labor on fortifications at Belle Fontaine and Fort Edwards, -	2,843	426 45	2,843	85 29	} 949 81
Lieutenant Jas. McGunnigle, -	First and second quarters, 1818, -	Belle Fontaine, -	Labor on fortifications at Belle Fontaine and Fort Edwards, -	2,433 3/4	365 06	2,433 3/4	73 01	
Lieut. Col. Talbot Chambers, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, and first and second quarters, 1818, -	Fort Crawford, -	Labor on fortifications, -	5,594	839 10	5,594	167 82	1,006 92
Mr. Lewis Morgan, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Green Bay, -	Labor on fortifications, -	685	102 75	685	20 55	123 30
Lieutenant Horace C. Story, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Boston, -	Labor on fortifications, -	177	26 55	177	5 31	31 86
Lieutenant Joshua B. Brant, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, and first, second, and third quarters, 1818, -	Sackett's Harbor, -	Labor on fortifications, -	3,418	512 70	3,418	102 54	615 24
Lieutenant Wm. H. Chase, -	Third quarter, 1818, -	Fort Niagara, -	Labor on fortifications, -	511	76 65	511	15 33	91 98
Lieut. Col. Joseph G. Totten, -	Second and third quarters, 1818, -	Rouse's Point, -	Labor on fortifications, -	6,741	1,011 15	6,741	202 23	1,213 38
Lieutenant Allen Lowd, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, and second and third quarters, 1818, -	Fort Niagara, -	Repairing barracks, -	3,373	505 95	3,373	101 19	607 14
Captain J. F. Hieleman, -	First and second quarters, 1818, -	Sackett's Harbor, -	Labor on fortifications, -	536	80 40	536	16 08	96 48
Colonel James R. Mullany, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, and first and second quarters, 1818, -	New York, -	Services in quartermaster's department, -	196	29 40	196	5 88	35 28
Major Willoughby Morgan, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, and first and second quarters, 1818, -	Fort Armstrong, -	Cutting, hauling, and sawing wood, &c. -	4,574	686 10	4,574	137 22	823 32
Lieutenant Turby F. Thomas, -	Fourth quarter, 1817, -	Green Bay, -	Cutting, hauling, and sawing wood, &c. -	6,282	942 30	6,282	188 46	1,130 76
				69,466 3/4	\$10,420 01	69,466 3/4	\$2,084 00	\$12,504 01

Recapitulation.

Expended on account of roads, -	\$3,768 48
Expended on account of fortifications, -	4,128 97
Expended on account of repairing barracks, &c. -	2,652 48
Expended on account of cutting, sawing, and hauling wood at barracks, -	1,954 08

\$12,504 01

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, THIRD AUDITOR'S OFFICE, January 12, 1819.

PETER HAGNER, Auditor.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 172.

[2d Session.

## THE MILITIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 22, 1819.

Mr. HARRISON, from the committee upon the improvement in the organization and discipline of the militia, made the following report:

That, having had the subject under their consideration, and finding that a bill containing a system of organization and discipline, reported at the last session, was before the House, they have nothing further to offer on the particular points contained in the bill. But as it is their opinion that, if the bill should be adopted, it will be advancing but a single step towards the attainment of the important object of rendering the militia, in all cases, a substitute for a standing army, they have directed their attention towards some ulterior measure by which it might be effected. They have been enabled to devise none better than that which is contained in the report made to this House on the 17th January, 1817; and they beg that the following extract therefrom may form a part of their report:

"The great difficulty to be encountered is the *application* of a system of discipline or military instruction to a great population scattered over an immense territory.

"The accomplishment of this object, at once, is evidently not within the power of the Government. To instruct the present militia of the country, to any useful extent, would require a larger portion of their time than they can possibly spare from the duty of providing for their families, unless they are liberally paid: to pay them would absorb all the resources of the nation. The alternative appears to be to direct the efforts of the Government to instruct such a portion of the militia as their means will allow, and which would produce the most beneficial result upon the whole mass; leaving to the effects of another system the gradual introduction of those military acquirements which, in a republican Government, it is so essential for every citizen to possess. Acting upon this principle, and believing that the instruction which it is in the power of the Government to give would be more usefully bestowed upon the whole of the officers and sergeants of the militia, than upon any particular class the sections of the bill which relate to this part of the subject have been adopted by the committee. They have also considered it to be proper to annex some estimates of the annual expense of the system they recommend.

"Although it may be considered that, by presenting a bill for the organization and classification of the militia, and the exposition of their motives which accompany it, the committee have performed the task assigned them by the resolution under which they acted, they have, nevertheless, believed it to be their duty to submit some further views, the result of their deliberations upon this important subject.

"This course may be more excusable, as the committee have no hesitation in acknowledging that the plan embraced by the bill is a mere expedient—a choice of difficulties—a system which, although it will place the militia upon a much better footing than they have before stood on, yet is not likely to produce that great desideratum—that indispensable requisite in a Government constituted like ours—the diffusion of a military spirit and military information throughout the great mass of the people.

"The part of the subject which still remains to be discussed will be best understood by dividing it into two distinct propositions:

"1st. Is it desirable that the whole male population of the United States, of the proper age, should be trained to the use of arms, so as to supersede, under any circumstances, the necessity of a standing army?

"2d. Is it practicable?

"The solicitude which has been manifested by the great men who have successfully filled the office of Chief Magistrate of the United States, for the adoption of a system of military discipline for the militia, which would produce the effect contemplated by the first proposition, sufficiently manifests their sense of its importance. The subject was often and warmly recommended by the Father of his country, and, at an early period of his administration, a plan for the purpose was proposed by the Secretary of War, and, being corrected agreeably to his suggestions, was submitted to the National Legislature. It is believed that objections to the expense and supposed difficulty of executing this plan, and to its object, was the cause of its being rejected. Is the opinion which prevailed at that period, that an energetic national militia was to be regarded as the capital security of a free republic, less apparent at the present? Has any thing since occurred, either in the history of our own or of any other country, to show that a standing "army, forming a distinct class in the community," is the proper defence of a Government constructed like ours? Do the events of the late war show that discipline is not necessary for the militia? or does the present aspect of the political world afford so much security as to justify the indifference which prevails in providing an effectual national defence?

"It is impossible that any American can recur to many of the events, and particularly to the concluding scenes of the late war, without feeling that elevation of mind which a recollection of his country's glory is calculated to produce. There are, however, others, and not a few, that are eminently calculated to show that an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure can be distinctly traced to the want of discipline in the militia. The glorious success which, in several instances, crowned their efforts was the result of uncommon valor, or of valor united with the advantage of a position suited to their peculiar character. The greater part of the American militia, accustomed from their early youth to the use of fire-arms, are doubtless more formidable than any other troops in the world in the defence of a line or rampart. Victories in the field are gained by other qualities; by those disciplined evolutions which give harmony and concert to numerous bodies of men, and enable whole armies to move with the activity and address of single combatants. Let our militia be instructed, and America would be equal to a contest with the rest of the world united. The improvements which have been made in the art of war since the commencement of the French revolution give greater advantages to invading and disciplined armies, acting against those of a contrary character, than they before possessed. This arises from their increased activity, produced by the great multiplication of their light troops; the celerity of movement given to the artillery; and, above all, to the improvements in the staff, placing the subsistence of large armies upon a footing of security beyond what was formerly supposed to be possible. An improvement in tactics, which gives advantages to the professed soldier who fights for conquest over the citizen who bears arms only in the defence of his country, is perhaps to be regretted, and no alternative is left to the latter but to perfect himself in the same arts and discipline. It is believed that there is no instance on record of a republic, whose citizens had been trained to the use of arms, having been conquered by a nation possessing a different form of Government. Small republics have been overthrown by those which were more powerful, as Saguntum destroyed by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome: but it has been observed of those Governments, that "their walls and towers became their funeral piles, leaving nothing to their conquerors but their ashes."

"The committee cannot conceive that any aspect, however pacific it may be, which the Governments of Europe may for the present have assumed towards this country, should be used as an argument to procrastinate, even for a day, any measure calculated to render their future hostility abortive. It cannot be believed that any real friendship can exist in the breasts of the sovereigns of that continent for a Government which has been founded upon principles so opposite to theirs, and which, by the happiness it diffuses, affords an eternal satire and reproach upon their conduct. Whatever security, then, may be derived from their policy, none can certainly be expected from their forbearance, whenever, from a change of circumstances, they may think it proper to change their policy. The liberties of America must, then, be preserved as they were won—by the arms, the discipline, and the valor of her free-born sons.

"But the defence of our country against a foreign enemy does not constitute the only (perhaps not the chief) motive of military improvements to the extent contemplated by the proposition we are considering. The safety of a republic depends as much upon the equality in the use of arms amongst its citizens, as upon the equality of rights;

nothing can be more dangerous in such a Government than to have a knowledge of the military art confined to a part of the people, for sooner or later that part will govern.

"The effects of discipline possessed by a few, to control numbers without, is to be seen in all the despotic Governments of modern, as well as ancient times.

"In general, however, the subjects of those despotic Governments, which preserve their authority by standing armies, are not allowed the use of arms; but the use of arms is not alone sufficient. A striking example of this is to be found in one of the Grecian republics. The Spartans were enabled, by the force of discipline alone, to keep in subjection for ages the Helots and other ancient inhabitants of Laconia. These men were not only allowed the use of arms, but upon almost every occasion formed the greater part of the Lacedemonian army; nor were they deficient in bravery; but they were not permitted to learn that admirable discipline which distinguished the Oplites, or heavy armed infantry of Sparta.

"Another important consideration, urging the diffusion of a military spirit amongst our citizens is, the counterpoise it will afford to that inordinate desire of wealth, which seems to have pervaded the whole nation, bringing with it habits of luxury, manners, and principles, highly unfavorable to our republican institutions.

"The first effect of this state of society is the substitution of a standing army for a national militia. Upon this subject, the committee beg leave to make a quotation from the report of General Knox, corrected by President Washington. 'It is,' says the patriotic Secretary, 'the introduction of vice and corruption of manners into the mass of the people, that renders a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised, and avarice, indolence and effeminacy of manners predominate, and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate the minds of the youth in the paths of virtue and honor, that a standing army is formed and riveted forever.' So true is the principle here contended for, that it is believed there is no instance in history of a nation losing its liberties where the military spirit of the people did not decline in the same proportion that the corruption of manners advanced. Nor was any free Government ever overturned by an internal convulsion, until the destruction of that spirit had been first produced in the *body of the people*. It was not until the amusements of the theatre, the baths, and the public gardens had superseded the exercises of the Campus Martius, that a Roman army dared to revolt against its country, and with the power of the sword to substitute for its free institutions the arbitrary will of a dictator; eighty years before the successful usurpation of Cæsar, the revolt of an army could have produced no such consequence.

"But the habits of the people had been changed; no longer in every Roman citizen was to be found a trained and practised soldier; the higher tactics were cultivated, indeed, with zeal and success by a martial nobility. No period had been more prolific of great generals. At none had the discipline of the legions been so perfect; but they were no longer filled by citizens taking their routine of service. The military had become a distinct profession; composed of men, who, in the habits of war and pillage, had forgotten the sacred obligations attached to their character as citizens, and who were ever as ready, upon the suggestion of their leader, to turn their arms against their country, as the enemy whom they were raised to oppose.

"As in every age, then, and in every country, the same cause will produce the same effects; the palladium of American liberty must be the diffusion of military discipline and a military spirit through the whole body of the people.

"But secondly. Is the object attainable?

"That it is not attainable by any of the systems which have heretofore been in use in the United States, is very evident from the little success which has attended them. The late war repeatedly exhibited the melancholy fact of large corps of militia going to the field of battle, without understanding a single elementary principle, and without being able to perform a single evolution. Yet militia laws exist, and have existed, in all the States since the war of the revolution, which set apart, with great precision, a number of days in each year for the purposes of training and discipline. But from this plan no good fruit has ever been produced. It was an error, indeed, common to all the militia systems in use in the United States, that the periods for training were too short and too distant from each other to produce much benefit.

"To remedy this defect, camps of discipline have been recommended. One of the reasons which governed the committee in rejecting that part of the Secretary of War's recommendation has been explained above; but if that objection could be overcome, the committee are far from thinking that the object could at all be accomplished in that way. There is another more formidable obstacle to success; more formidable, because it arises from the nature of our Government, and the constitution of the human character. The sentiments and habits of a free country necessarily produces amongst the citizens a superior restlessness under restraint than is to be met with in the subjects of a monarchy. This spirit frequently manifests itself even in a career of military services, where the high interests involved, (and in which they largely partake,) and the evident necessity of discipline, might be supposed able to correct it. There can scarcely be a restraint more vexatious and disgusting to a *grown man* than the initiatory lessons of the military art. Military discipline consists in the observance of a number of minute particulars which, to the novice in arms, have no apparent object, but which form the links of a beautiful and connected system. It is believed that to this cause is to be attributed the little progress which has been made in training the militia of the United States; nor is there much prospect that any change of system could, with regard to the *present militia*, produce the result at which we aim.

"In searching for landmarks to guide us to our object, it will be in vain that we direct our attention to the modern nations of Europe; from them we can borrow nothing to aid our purpose; Governments formed upon artificial distinctions in society, which estimate their security by the inability of their subjects to resist oppression, can furnish a free people with no guides in organizing a system of defence which shall be purely national. We are, however, not without resource.

"The ancient republics, from which we have drawn many of the choicest maxims upon which to found our civil institutions, will furnish also a most perfect model for our system of national defence. The whole secret of ancient military glory; the foundation of that wonderful combination of military skill and exalted valor which enabled the petty republic of Athens to resist the mighty torrent of Persian invasion, which formed the walls of Sparta, and conducted the Roman legions (influenced, indeed, by unhallowed motives) to the conquest of the world, will be found in the military education of their youth. The victories of Marathon and Platea, of Cyncephele and Pydna, were the practical results of the exercises of the Campus Martius and Gymnasia. It is on a foundation of this kind, and of this kind only, that an energetic national militia can be established.

"An examination into the employments and obligations of individuals comprising the society,' says General Knox, 'will evince the impossibility of diffusing an adequate knowledge of the art of war by any other means than a course of discipline during the period of non-age; the time necessary to acquire this important knowledge cannot be afforded at any other period of life with so little injury to the public or private interests.' Nothing is more true than what is here advanced; and yet it is most singular that the amiable and patriotic Secretary should have founded his plan upon a course of instruction, to commence within the limits of non-age, indeed, but at so advanced a period of it, that all the objections which could be made to disciplining the militia at a more advanced age will apply equally to it, with the addition of others which are more cogent, and which are supposed to be inherent in the system itself. Of his advanced corps, composed of the youth of 18, 19, and 20 years of age, those of 18 and 19 are to be drawn out for thirty days in each year, and those of twenty for ten days, to be instructed in camps of discipline.

"It has been strongly urged against this plan, that the separation of the youth, at that critical age, from the superintending vigilance of their parents and guardians, would be a very dangerous step, and that the loss of time from the pursuit of their professions and occupations would prove to them a most serious evil.

"Whatever force there may be in these objections the committee are fully persuaded that the improvement to be derived from the execution of this plan would not compensate for the expense and loss of time it would occasion. The perfection of discipline, as it regards the soldier, is the grace, the precision, and address with which he performs certain evolutions. To arrive at this perfection, long continued practice is essential.

"And since it must be evident that the time necessary for this purpose cannot be taken from the avocations of our citizens, after they have arrived at the age of manhood, the only alternative is to devise a system of military instruction, which shall be engrafted on and form a part of the ordinary education of our youth.

The organization of a system, thus extensive in its operations, must necessarily be a work of some time and difficulty. The want of statistical information will prevent the committee from submitting to the House, at this time, more than the outline of their plan. It is embraced in the following propositions:

"As the important advantages of the military part of the education of the youth will accrue to the community and not to the individuals who require it, it is proper that the whole expense of the establishment should be borne by the public Treasury.

"That to comport with the equality, which is the basis of our constitution, the organization of the establishment should be such as to extend, without exception, to every individual of the proper age.

"That, to secure this, the contemplated military instruction should not be given in distinct schools, established for that purpose, but that it should form a branch of education in every school within the United States.

"That a corps of the military institutions should be formed to attend to the gymnastic and elementary part of education in every school in the United States, whilst the more scientific part of the art of war shall be communicated by professors of tactics to be established in all the higher seminaries.

"The committee are fully aware that the establishment of an institution, which, from its nature, is calculated to produce an important change in the manners and habits of the nation, will be received with caution and distrust by a people jealous of their liberties, and who boast of a Government which executes its powers with the least possible sacrifice of individual right. An encroachment upon individual rights forms no part of their system. It is not a conscription which withdraws from an anxious parent a son for whose morals he fears more than for his life. It is not a Persian or Turkish mandate to educate the youth within the purlieus of a corrupt court, but a system as purely republican in practice as in principle.

"The means are furnished by the Government, and the American youth are called upon to qualify themselves under the immediate inspection of their parents, or of tutors chosen by their parents, for the sacred task of defending the liberties of their country.

"Although the system of General Knox widely differs from that which has been recommended by the committee, his opinion of the effects to be produced by it is conceived to be more particularly applicable to the latter. 'If the United States,' says he, 'possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution, for the military instruction of the youth, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its extensive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country, reverence and obedience to its laws, courage and elevation of mind, openness and liberality of character, accompanied by a just spirit of honor. In addition to which, their bodies will acquire a robustness, greatly conducive to their personal happiness; while habit, with its silent, but efficacious operations, will durably cement the system.'

"That the House may possess all the information necessary to act upon this important subject, the committee respectfully recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the Secretary of War be required to prepare and lay before this House, at the next session of Congress, a plan for the military instruction of all the youth of the United States in the way which is best calculated for the purpose, with as little injury as possible to the ordinary course of education."

*Estimates of the expenses of training the officers and sergeants of the militia of the United States. These estimates are made on a supposed number of one hundred thousand men, divided equally, as nearly as may be, into twenty-five brigades.*

1st. Estimate upon the supposition that the officers and sergeants receive full pay, without rations, or an allowance for rations or forage, except to the sergeants, for whom rations might be necessary.

Each brigade containing, according to estimate, four thousand men, will be composed of four regiments, or forty companies.

There would then be the following field and staff officers, who should attend the training:

1 Brigadier full pay, \$104	-	-	-	-	\$ 104 00
1 Brigade inspector, with the pay of major,	-	-	-	-	50 00
4 Colonels, at \$75	-	-	-	-	300 00
4 Lieutenant colonels, at \$60	-	-	-	-	240 00
4 Majors, at \$50	-	-	-	-	200 00
40 Captains, at \$40	-	-	-	-	1,600 00
40 Lieutenants, at \$30	-	-	-	-	1,200 00
40 Second lieutenants, at \$25	-	-	-	-	1,000 00
160 Sergeants, \$8 pay, and \$6 for rations	-	-	-	-	2,240 00
					Amount of expenses of one brigade,
					\$6,934 00

The adjutant to be taken from the line.

Brigades 25.

Expense of training officers for one month, at full-pay, of twenty-five brigades, or one hundred thousand men, \$173,850 00

And estimating the United States' militia at a million, then the total expense of training the officers of the whole militia would be some hundred thousand dollars less than two millions.

The following estimate is made on the supposition of the officers receiving only half-pay; the estimate proceeds, however, upon a supposition that no officer is to receive less than thirty dollars per month; and the sergeants full-pay and rations.

Second estimate for 100,000 men.

1 Brigadier, half-pay,	-	-	-	-	\$ 52 00
1 Brigade inspector,	-	-	-	-	30 00
4 Colonels, half-pay,	-	-	-	-	150 00
4 Lieutenant colonels, half-pay,	-	-	-	-	120 00
4 Majors, \$30 each,	-	-	-	-	120 00
120 Captains and lieutenants, at \$30	-	-	-	-	3,600 00
160 Sergeants, pay and rations,	-	-	-	-	2,240 00
					For officers of one brigade,
					\$6,312 00
					For twenty-five brigades,
					\$157,800 00
					And for 1,000,000,
					\$1,578,000 00

At thirty dollars per month, except sergeants, and leaving them on full pay and rations, then the amount would be varied, as will appear by the third estimate, viz:

134 Officers in a brigade of 4,000, at \$30	-	-	-	-	\$ 4,020 00
160 Sergeants on full pay and rations,	-	-	-	-	2,240 00
One brigade,	-	-	-	-	\$ 6,260 00
For 100,000, making twenty-five brigades,	-	-	-	-	\$ 156,500 00
And for 1,000,000,	-	-	-	-	\$1,565,000 00

*Copy of General Knox's report on the arrangement and classification of the militia, made to the House of Representatives, on the 18th January, 1790.*

SIR:

WAR OFFICE, January 18, 1790.

Having submitted to your consideration a plan for the arrangement of the militia of the United States, which I had presented to the late Congress, and you having approved the general principles thereof, with certain exceptions, I now respectfully lay the same before you, modified according to the alterations you were pleased to suggest.

It has been my anxious desire to devise a national system of defence, adequate to the probable exigencies of the United States, whether arising from internal or external causes; and, at the same time, to erect a standard of republican magnanimity, independent of and superior to the powerful influence of wealth.

The convulsive events generated by the inordinate pursuit of riches or ambition require that the Government should possess a strong corrective arm.

The idea is therefore submitted, whether an efficient military branch of government can be invented with safety to the great principles of liberty, unless the same shall be formed of the people themselves, and supported by their habits and manners.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the most perfect respect, your obedient servant,

H. KNOX,  
Secretary for the War Dep.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

#### THE INTRODUCTION.

That a well-constituted republic is more favorable to the liberties of society, and that its principles give a higher elevation to the human mind than any other form of Government, has generally been acknowledged by the unprejudiced and enlightened part of mankind.

But it is at the same time acknowledged that, unless a republic prepares itself, by proper arrangements, to meet those exigencies to which all states are in a degree liable, its peace and existence are more precarious than the forms of Government in which the will of one directs the conduct of the whole for the defence of the nation.

A Government whose measures must be the result of multiplied deliberations is seldom in a situation to produce instantly those exertions which the occasion may demand; therefore, it ought to possess such energetic establishments as should enable it, by the vigor of its own citizens, to control events as they arise, instead of being convulsed or subverted by them.

It is the misfortune of modern ages that Governments have been formed by chance and events instead of system; that, without fixed principles, they are braced or relaxed, from time to time, according to the predominating power of the rulers or the ruled; the rulers possessing separate interests from the people, excepting in some of the high-toned monarchies, in which all opposition to the will of the prince seems annihilated.

Hence, we look round Europe in vain for an extensive Government, rising on the power inherent in the people, and performing its operations entirely for their benefit. But we find artificial force governing every where, and the people generally made subservient to the elevation and caprice of the few; almost every nation appearing to be busily employed in conducting some external war, grappling with internal commotion, or endeavoring to extricate itself from impending debts which threaten to overwhelm it with ruin. Princes and ministers seem neither to have leisure nor inclination to bring forward institutions for diffusing general strength, knowledge, and happiness; but they seem to understand well the Machiavelian maxim of politics—divide and govern.

May the United States avoid the errors and crimes of other Governments, and possess the wisdom to embrace the present invaluable opportunity of establishing such institutions as shall invigorate, exalt, and perpetuate the great principles of freedom; an opportunity pregnant with the fate of millions, but rapidly borne on the wings of time, and may never again return.

The public mind, unbiassed by superstition or prejudice, seems happily prepared to receive the impressions of wisdom. The latent springs of human action, ascertained by the standard of experience, may be regulated and made subservient to the noble purpose of forming a dignified national character.

The causes by which nations have ascended and declined, through the various ages of the world, may be calmly and accurately determined; and the United States may be placed in the singularly fortunate condition of commencing their career of empire, with the accumulated knowledge of all the known societies and Governments of the globe.

The strength of the Government, like the strength of any other vast and complicated machine, will depend on a due adjustment of its several parts. Its agriculture, its commerce, its laws, its finance, its system of defence, and its manners and habits, all require consideration, and the highest exercise of political wisdom.

It is the intention of the present attempt to suggest the most efficient system of defence which may be compatible with the interests of a free people; a system which shall not only produce the expected effect, but which, in its operations, shall also produce those habits and manners which will impart strength and durability to the whole Government.

The modern practice of Europe, with respect to the employment of standing armies, has created such a mass of opinion in their favor, that even philosophers and the advocates for liberty have frequently confessed their use and necessity in certain cases.

But whoever seriously and candidly estimates the power of discipline and the tendency of military habits will be constrained to confess that, whatever may be the efficacy of a standing army in war, it cannot in peace be considered as friendly to the rights of human nature. The recent instance in France cannot, with propriety, be brought to overturn the general principle built upon the uniform experience of mankind. It may be found, on examining the causes that appear to have influenced the military of France, that, while the springs of power were wound up in the nation to the highest pitch, the discipline of the army was proportionably relaxed. But any argument on this head may be considered as unnecessary to the enlightened citizens of the United States.

A small corps of well-disciplined and well-informed artillerists and engineers, and a legion for the protection of the frontiers and the magazines and arsenals, are all the military establishment which may be required for the present use of the United States.

The privates of the corps to be enlisted for a certain period, and after the expiration of which to return to the mass of the citizens.

An energetic national militia is to be regarded as the capital security of a free republic; and not a standing army, forming a distinct class in the community.

It is the introduction and diffusion of vice and corruption of manners into the mass of the people that render a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised, and avarice, indolence, and effeminacy of manners predominate, and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate the minds of the youths in the paths of virtue and honor, that a standing army is formed and riveted forever.

While the human character remains unchanged, and society and Governments of considerable extent are formed, a principle ever ready to execute the laws and defend the state must constantly exist. Without this vital principle the Government would be invaded or overturned, and trampled upon by the bold and ambitious. No community can be long held together, unless its arrangements are adequate to its probable exigencies.

If it should be decided to reject a standing army for the military branch of the Government of the United States, as possessing too fierce an aspect, and being hostile to the principles of liberty, it will follow that a well-constituted militia ought to be established.

A consideration of the subject will show the impracticability of disciplining at once the mass of the people. All discussions on the subject of a powerful militia will result in one or other of the following principles:

1st. Either efficient institutions must be established for the military education of the youth, and that the knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the community by the means of rotation: or,

2dly. That the militia must be formed of substitutes, after the manner of the militia of Great Britain.

If the United States possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its extensive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country; reverence and obedience to its laws; courage and elevation of mind; openness and liberality of character, accompanied by a just spirit of honor; in addition to which their bodies will acquire a robustness greatly conducive to their personal happiness, as well as the defence of their country; while habit, with its silent but efficacious operations, will durably cement the system.

Habit, that powerful and universal law, incessantly acting on the human race, well deserves the attention of legislators. Formed at first in individuals, by separate and almost imperceptible impulses, until at length it acquires a force which controls with irresistible sway. The effects of salutary or pernicious habits operating on a whole nation are immense, and decide its rank and character in the world.

Hence, the science of legislation teaches to scrutinize every national institution, as it may introduce proper or improper habits, to adopt with religious zeal the former, and reject with horror the latter.

A republic, constructed on the principles herein stated, would be uninjured by events sufficient to overturn a Government supported solely by the uncertain power of a standing army.

The well-informed members of the community, actuated by the highest motives of self-love, would form the real defence of the country. Rebellions would be prevented, or suppressed with ease. Invasions of such a Government would be undertaken only by madmen, and the virtues and knowledge of the people would effectually oppose the introduction of tyranny.

But the second principle (a militia of substitutes) is pregnant, in a degree, with the mischiefs of a standing army, as it is highly probable the substitutes, from time to time, will be nearly the same men, and the most idle and worthless part of the community. Wealthy families, proud of distinctions, which riches may confer, will prevent their sons from serving in the militia of substitutes; the plan will degenerate into habitual contempt; a standing army will be introduced, and the liberties of the people subjected to all the contingencies of events.

The expense attending an energetic establishment of militia may be strongly urged as an objection to the institution. But it is to be remembered that this objection is levelled at both systems, whether by rotation or by substitutes; for, if the numbers are equal, the expense will also be equal. The estimate of the expense will show its unimportance when compared with the magnitude and beneficial effects of the institution.

But the people of the United States will cheerfully consent to the expenses of a measure calculated to serve as a perpetual barrier to their liberties; especially as they well know that the disbursements will be made among the members of the same community, and therefore cannot be injurious.

Every intelligent mind would rejoice in the establishment of an institution, under whose auspices the youth and vigor of the constitution would be renewed with each successive generation, and which would appear to secure the great principles of freedom and happiness against the injuries of time and events.

The following plan is formed on these general principles:

1st. That it is the indispensable duty of every nation to establish all necessary institutions for its own perfection and defence.

2dly. That it is a capital security to a free State for the great body of the people to possess a competent knowledge of the military art.

3dly. That this knowledge cannot be attained in the present state of society, but by establishing adequate institutions for the military education of youth; and that the knowledge acquired therein should be diffused throughout the community by the principles of rotation.

4thly. That every man of the proper age and ability of body is firmly bound by the social compact, to perform, personally, his proportion of military duty for the defence of the State.

5thly. That all men of the legal military age, should be armed, enrolled, and held responsible for different degrees of military service.

And 6thly. That, agreeably to the constitution, the United States are to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

#### THE PLAN.

The period of life on which military service shall be required of the citizens of the United States, to commence at eighteen, and terminate at the age of sixty years.

The men comprehended by this description, exclusive of such exceptions as the Legislatures of the respective States may think proper to make, and all actual mariners, shall be enrolled for different degrees of military duty, and divided into three distinct classes.

The first class shall comprehend the youth of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age, to be denominated the advanced corps.

The second class shall include the men from twenty-one to forty-five years of age, to be denominated the main corps.

The third class shall comprehend, inclusively, the men from forty-six to sixty years of age, to be denominated the reserved corps.

All the militia of the United States shall assume the form of the legion, which shall be the permanent establishment thereof.

A legion shall consist of one hundred and fifty-three commissioned officers, and two thousand eight hundred and eighty non-commissioned officers and privates, formed in the following manner:

1. *The legionary staff.*—One legionary, or major general; two aids-de-camp of the rank of major, one of whom to be the legionary quartermaster; one inspector and deputy adjutant general, of the rank of lieutenant colonel; one chaplain.

2. *The brigade staff.*—One brigadier general; one brigade inspector, to serve as an aid-de-camp.

3. *The regimental staff.*—One lieutenant colonel commandant; two majors; one adjutant; one paymaster, or agent; one quartermaster.



4. *Two brigades of infantry.*—Each brigade of two regiments; each regiment of eight companies, forming two battalions; each company of a captain, lieutenant, ensign, six sergeants, one drum, one fife, and sixty-four rank and file.

5. *Two companies of riflemen.*—Each company to have a captain, lieutenant, ensign, six sergeants, a bugle-horn, one drum, and sixty-four rank and file.

6. *A battalion of artillery.*—Consisting of four companies, each to have a captain, captain-lieutenant, one lieutenant, six sergeants, twelve artificers, and fifty-two rank and file.

7. *A squadron of cavalry.*—Consisting of two troops, each troop to have a captain, two lieutenants, a cornet, six sergeants, one farrier, one saddler, one trumpeter, and sixty-four dragoons.

In case the whole number of the advanced corps in any State should be insufficient to form a legion of this extent, yet the component parts must be preserved, and the reduction proportioned, as nearly as may be, to each part.

The companies of all the corps shall be divided into sections of twelve each. It is proposed by this division to establish one uniform vital principle, which, in peace and war, shall pervade the militia of the United States.

All requisitions for men to form an army, either for State or federal purposes, shall be furnished by the advanced and main corps, by means of the sections.

The Executive Government, or commander-in-chief of the militia of each State, will assess the numbers required on the respective legions of these corps.

The legionary general will direct the proportions to be furnished by each part of his command. Should the demand be so great as to require one man from each section, then the operation hereby directed shall be performed by single sections. But if a less number should be required, they will be furnished by an association of sections or companies, according to the demand. In any case, it is probable that mutual convenience may dictate an agreement with an individual to perform the service required. If, however, no agreement can be made, one must be detached by an indiscriminate draught, and the others shall pay him a sum of money, equal to the averaged sum which shall be paid in the same legion for the voluntary performance of the service required.

In case any sections, or companies of a legion, after having furnished its own quota, should have more men willing to engage for the service required, other companies of the same legion shall have permission to engage them. The same rule to extend to the different legions in the State.

The legionary general must be responsible to the commander-in-chief of the militia of the State, that the men furnished are according to the description, and that they are equipped in the manner, and marched to the rendezvous, conformably to the orders for that purpose.

The men who may be draughted shall not serve more than three years at one time.

The reserved corps, being destined for the domestic defence of the State, shall not be obliged to furnish men, excepting in cases of actual invasion or rebellion, and then the men required shall be furnished by means of the sections.

The actual commissioned officers of the respective corps shall not be included in the sections, nor in any of the operations thereof.

The respective States shall be divided into portions or districts, each of which to contain, as nearly as may be, some complete part of a legion.

Every citizen of the United States, who shall serve his country in the field, for the space of one year, either as an officer or soldier, shall, if under the age of twenty-one years, be exempted from the service required in the advanced corps. If he shall be above the age of twenty-one years, then every year he shall so serve in the field shall be estimated as equal to six years' service in the main or reserved corps, and shall accordingly exempt him from every service therein for the said term of six years, except in cases of actual invasion or rebellion within the State in which he resides. And it shall also be a permanent establishment, that six years' actual service in the field shall entirely free every citizen from any further demands of service, either in the militia or in the field, unless in cases of invasion or rebellion.

All actual mariners or seamen, in the respective States, shall be registered in districts, and divided into two classes; the first class to consist of all the seamen, from the age of sixteen to thirty years, inclusively; the second class to consist of all those of the age of thirty-one to forty-five, inclusively.

The first class shall be responsible to serve three years on board of some public armed vessel or ship of war, as a commissioned officer, warrant officer, or private mariner; for which service, they shall receive the customary wages and emoluments.

But should the State not demand the said three years' service during the above period, from the age of sixteen to thirty years, then the party to be exempted entirely therefrom.

The person so serving shall receive a certificate of his service, on parchment, according to the form which shall be directed, which shall exempt him from any other than voluntary service, unless on such exigencies as may require the services of all the members of the community.

The second class shall be responsible for a proposition of service in those cases to which the first class shall be unequal.

The numbers required shall be furnished by sections, in the same manner as is prescribed for the sections of the militia.

#### OF THE ADVANCED CORPS.

The advanced corps are designed, not only as a school, in which the youth of the United States are to be instructed in the art of war, but they are, in all cases of exigence, to serve as an actual defence to the community.

The whole of the armed corps shall be clothed according to the manner hereafter directed, armed and subsisted, at the expense of the United States; and all the youth of the said corps, in each State, shall be encamped together, if practicable, or by legions; which encampments shall be denominated the annual camps of discipline.

The youth of eighteen and nineteen years shall be disciplined for thirty days successively in each year; and those of twenty-years shall be disciplined only for ten days in each year, which shall be the last ten days of the annual encampments.

The non-commissioned officers and privates are not to receive any pay during the said time; but the commissioned officers will receive the pay of their relative ranks, agreeably to the federal establishment for the time being.

In order that the plan shall effectually answer the end proposed, the 1st day of January shall be the fixed period, for all who attain the age of eighteen years in any part or during the course of each year, to be enrolled in the advanced corps, and to take the necessary oaths to perform, personally, such legal military service as may be directed, for the full and complete term of three years, to be estimated from the time of entrance into the said corps; and also to take an oath of allegiance to the State, and to the United States.

The commanding officer, or general of the advanced legions of the district, shall regulate the manner of the service of the youth, respectively, whether it shall be in the infantry, artillery, or cavalry; but after having entered into either of them, no change should be allowed.

Each individual, at his first joining the annual camps of discipline, will receive complete arms and accoutrements, all of which, previously to his being discharged from the said camps, he must return to the regimental quartermaster, on the penalty of ——— dollars, or ——— months' imprisonment.

The said arms and accoutrements shall be marked in some conspicuous place with the letters M. U. S. And all sales or purchases of any of said arms or accoutrements shall be severely punished according to law.

And each individual shall, also, on his first entrance into the advanced corps, receive the following clothing: one hat, one uniform short coat, one waistcoat, and one pair of overalls, which he shall retain in his own possession, and for which he shall be held accountable, and be compelled to replace all deficiencies during his service in the annual camps of discipline.

Those who shall serve in the cavalry shall be at the expense of their own horses, and uniform helmets, and horse furniture; but they shall receive forage for their horses, swords, pistols, and clothing, equal in value to the infantry.

At the age of twenty-one years, every individual having served in the manner and for the time prescribed shall receive an honorary certificate thereof, on parchment, and signed by the legionary general and inspector.

The names of all persons to whom such certificates shall be given shall be fairly registered in books to be provided for that purpose.

And the said certificate, or an attested copy of the register aforesaid, shall be required as an indispensable qualification for exercising any of the rights of a free citizen, until after the age of \_\_\_\_\_ years.

The advanced legions, in all cases of invasion or rebellion, shall, on requisition of lawful authority, be obliged to march to any place within the United States; to remain embodied for such time as shall be directed, not to exceed one year, to be computed from the time of marching from the regimental parades, during the period of their being on such service; to be placed on the continental establishment of pay, subsistence, clothing, forage, tents, camp equipage, and all such other allowances as are made to the federal troops, at the same time, and under the same circumstances.

If the military service so required should be for such a short period as to render an actual issue of clothing unnecessary, then an allowance should be made in proportion to the annual cost of clothing for the federal soldier, according to estimates to be furnished for that purpose from the War Office of the United States.

In case the legions of the advanced corps should march to any place, in consequence of a requisition of the General Government, all legal and proper expenses of such march shall be paid by the United States. But should they be embodied and march in consequence of an order derived from the authority of the State to which they belong, and for State purposes, then the expenses will be borne by the State.

The advanced corps shall be constituted on such principles that, when completed, it will receive one-third part, and discharge one-third part of its numbers annually. By this arrangement, two-thirds of the corps will at all times be considerably disciplined; but as it will only receive those of eighteen years, it will not be completed until the third year after its institution. Those who have already attained the ages of nineteen and twenty years will, in the first instance, be enrolled in the main corps.

But one-half of the legionary officers to be appointed the first, and the other the second year of the establishment.

The officers of each grade in the States, respectively, shall be divided into three classes, which shall by lot be numbered one, two, and three; and one of the said classes, according to their numbers, shall be deranged /every third year. In the first period of nine years one-third part will have to serve three, one-third part six, and one-third part nine years; but after the said first period, the several classes will serve nine years, which shall be the limitation of service by virtue of the same appointment; and in such cases where there may not be three officers of the same grade, the limitation of nine years' service shall be observed. All vacancies occasioned by the aforesaid derangements, or any casualties, shall be immediately filled by new appointments.

The captains and subalterns of the advanced corps shall not be less than twenty-one, nor more than thirty-five; and the field officers shall not exceed forty-five years of age.

Each company, battalion, and regiment shall have a fixed parade or place at which to assemble. The companies shall assemble at their own parade, and march to the parade of the battalion, and the battalions to the regimental parade; and, when thus embodied, the regiment will march to the rendezvous of the legion. Every commanding officer of a company, battalion, and regiment will be accountable to his superior officer that his command is in the most perfect order.

The officers to receive subsistence money in lieu of provisions, in proportion to their respective grades; and those whose duties require them to be on horseback will receive forage in the same proportion.

Every legion must have a chaplain, of respectable talents and character, who, besides his religious functions, should impress on the minds of the youths, at stated periods, in concise discourses, the eminent advantages of free Governments to the happiness of society, and that such Governments can only be supported by the knowledge, spirit, and virtuous conduct of the youth; to be illustrated by the most conspicuous examples of history.

No amusements should be admitted in camp but those which correspond with war—the swimming of men and horses, running, wrestling, and such other exercises as should render the body flexible and vigorous.

The camps should, if possible, be formed near a river, and remote from large cities. The first is necessary for the practice of the manœuvres; the second to avoid the vices of populous places.

The time of the annual encampments shall be divided into six parts or periods, of five days each; the first of which shall be occupied in acquiring the air, attitudes, and first principles of a soldier; the second, in learning the manual exercise, and to march individually, and in small squads; the third and fourth, in exercising and manœuvring in detail, and by battalions and regiments; in the fifth, the youth of twenty having been disciplined during the two preceding annual encampments are to be included. This period is to be employed in the exercise and tactics of the legion, or, if more than one, in executing the grand manœuvres of the whole body—marching, attacking, and defending, in various forms, different grounds and positions; in fine, in representing all the real images of war, excepting the effusion of blood.

The guards, and every other circumstance of the camp, to be perfectly regulated.

Each State will determine on the season in which its respective annual encampments shall be formed, so as best to suit the health of the men and the general interests of the society.

The United States to make an adequate provision to supply the arms, clothing, rations, artillery, ammunition, forage, straw, tents, camp equipages, including every requisite for the annual camps of discipline; and also for the pay and subsistence of the legionary officers, and for the following general staff: one inspector general, one adjutant general, one quartermaster general, with a deputy for each State.

These officers will be essential to the uniformity, economy, and efficacy of the system; to be appointed in the manner prescribed by the constitution of the United States.

The quartermaster general shall be responsible to the United States for the public property of every species delivered to him for the annual camps of discipline; and his deputy in each State shall be responsible to him.

At the commencement of the annual camps of discipline, the deputy quartermaster will make regular issues to the legionary or regimental quartermasters, as the case may be, of all the articles of every species provided by the United States.

The return for the said articles to be examined and certified by the highest legionary or regimental officer, as the case may be, who shall be responsible for the accuracy thereof.

At the expiration of the annual camps of discipline, all public property (clothing excepted) shall be returned to the deputy quartermaster of the State, who shall hold the legionary quartermaster accountable for all deficiencies. All the apparatus and property so returned shall be carefully examined, repaired, and deposited in a magazine, to be provided in each State for that purpose, under the charge of the said deputy quartermaster, until the ensuing annual encampment, or any occasion which may render a new issue necessary.

Corporeal punishments shall never be inflicted in the annual camps of discipline; but a system of fines and imprisonment shall be formed for the regular government of said camps.

#### OF THE MAIN CORPS.

As the main and reserved corps are to be replenished, by the principle of rotation, from the advanced corps, and ultimately to consist of men who have received their military education therein, it is proper that one uniform arrangement should pervade the several classes.

It is for this reason the legion is established, as the common form of all the corps of the militia.

The main legions, consisting of the great majority of the men of the military age, will form the principal defence of the country.

They are to be responsible for their proportion of men, to form an army whenever necessity shall dictate the measure; and, on every sudden occasion, to which the advance corps shall be incompetent, an adequate number of non-commissioned officers and privates shall be added thereto from the main corps, by means of the sections.

The main corps will be perfectly armed in the first instance, and will practice the exercise and manœuvres four days in each year; and will assemble in their respective districts, by companies, battalions, regiments, or legions,

as shall be directed by the legionary general; but it must be a fixed rule that, in the populous parts of the States, the regiments must assemble once annually, and the legions once in three years.

Although the main corps cannot acquire a great degree of military knowledge in the few days prescribed for its annual exercise, yet, by the constant accession of the youth from the advanced corps, it will soon command respect for its discipline as well as its numbers.

When the youth are transferred from the advance corps, they shall invariably join the flank companies, the cavalry, or artillery of the main corps, according to the nature of their former services.

#### OF THE RESERVED CORPS.

The reserved corps will assemble only twice annually, for the inspection of arms, by companies, battalions, or regiments, as shall be directed by each State. It will assemble by legions, whenever the defence of the State may render the measure necessary.

Such are the propositions of the plan, to which it may be necessary to add some explanations.

Although the substantial political maxim, which requires personal service of all the members of the community for the defence of the State is obligatory under all forms of society, and is the main pillar of a free Government, yet the degrees thereof may vary at the different periods of life, consistently with the general welfare. The public convenience may also dictate a relaxation of the general obligation, as it respects the principal magistrates and the ministers of justice and of religion, and perhaps some religious sects. But it ought to be remembered, that the measures of national importance never should be frustrated by the accommodation of individuals.

The military age has generally commenced at sixteen, and terminated at the age of sixty years; but the youth of sixteen do not commonly attain such a degree of robust strength as to enable them to sustain, without injury, the hardships incident to the field; therefore the commencement of military service is herein fixed at eighteen, and the termination, as usual, at sixty years of age.

As the plan proposes that the militia shall be divided into three capital classes, and that each class shall be formed into legions, the reasons for which shall be given in succession.

The advance corps, and annual camps of discipline are instituted in order to introduce an operative military spirit in the community; to establish a course of honorable military service, which will at the same time mould the minds of the young men to a due obedience of the laws; instruct them in the art of war; and, by the manly exercise of the field, form a race of hardy citizens, equal to the dignified task of defending their country.

An examination into the employments and obligations of the individuals composing the society, will evince the impossibility of diffusing an adequate knowledge of the art of war by any other means than a course of discipline, during the period of non-age. The time necessary to acquire this important knowledge cannot be afforded at any other period of life, with so little injury to the public or private interests.

Without descending to minute distinctions, the body of the people of the United States may be divided into two parts: the yeomanry of the country, and the men of various employments resident in towns and cities. In both parts it is usual for the male children, from the age of fourteen to twenty-one years, to learn some trade or employment, under the direction of a parent or master. In general, the labor or service of the youth during this period, besides amply repaying the trouble of tuition, leaves a large profit to the tutor. This circumstance is stated to show that no great hardships will arise in the first operations of the proposed plan; a little practice will render the measure perfectly equal, and remove every difficulty.

Youth is the time for the State to avail itself of those services which it has a right to demand, and by which it is to be invigorated and preserved; in this season, the passions and affections are strongly influenced by the splendor of military parade. The impressions the mind receives will be retained through life. The young man will repair with pride and pleasure to the field of exercise; while the head of a family, anxious for its general welfare, and perhaps its immediate subsistence, will reluctantly quit his domestic duties for any length of time.

The habits of industry will be rather strengthened than relaxed by the establishment of the annual camps of discipline, as all the time will be occupied by the various military duties. Idleness and dissipation will be regarded as disgraceful, and punished accordingly. As soon as the youth attain the age of manhood, a natural solicitude to establish themselves in the society will occur in its full force. The public claims for military service will be too inconsiderable to injure their industry. It will be sufficiently stimulated to proper exertions, by the prospects of opulence attending on the cultivation of a fertile soil, or the pursuits of a productive commerce.

It is presumed that thirty days, annually, during the eighteenth and nineteenth, and ten days during the twentieth year, is the least time that ought to be appropriated by the youth to the acquisition of the military art. The same number of days might be added during the twentieth, as during the two preceding years, were not the expense an objection.

Every means will be provided by the public to facilitate the military education of the youth, which it is proposed shall be an indispensable qualification of a free citizen; therefore they will not be entitled to any pay. But the officers, being of the main corps, are in a different predicament; they are supposed to have passed through the course of discipline required by the laws, and to be competent to instruct others in the military art. As the public will have but small claims for personal services on them, and as they must incur considerable expenses to prepare themselves to execute properly their respective offices, they ought to be paid while on actual duty.

As soon as the service of the youth expires in the advanced corps, they are to be enrolled in the main corps. On this occasion the republic receives disciplined and free citizens, who understand their public rights, and are prepared to defend them.

The main corps is instituted to preserve and circulate throughout the community the military discipline acquired in the advanced corps; to arm the people, and fix firmly, by practice and habit, those forms and maxims which are essential to the life and energy of a free Government.

The reserved corps is instituted to prevent men being sent to the field whose strength is unequal to sustain the severities of an active campaign; but by organizing and rendering them eligible for domestic service, a greater proportion of the younger and robust part of the community may be enabled, in cases of necessity, to encounter the more urgent duties of war.

It would be difficult, previously to the actual formation of the annual camps of discipline, to ascertain the number in each State of which it would be composed. The frontier counties of several States are thinly inhabited, and require all their internal force for their immediate defence. There are other infant settlements from which it might be injurious to draw away their youth annually for the purpose of discipline.

No evil would result, if the establishment of the advanced corps should be omitted in such districts for a few years. Besides, the forbearance in this respect would lessen the expense, and render the institution more compatible with the public finances.

The several State Legislatures, therefore, as best understanding their local interests, might be invested with a discretionary power to omit the enrolments for the advanced corps in such of their frontier and thinly inhabited counties as they may judge proper.

If the number of three millions may be assumed as the total number of inhabitants within the United States, half a million may be deducted therefrom for blacks; and, pursuant to the foregoing ideas, another half million may be deducted on account of the thinly settled parts of the country.

The proportion of men of the military age, from eighteen to sixty years, inclusively, of two millions of people, of all ages and sexes, may be estimated at four hundred thousand. There may be deducted from this number, as actual mariners, about fifty thousand, and a further number of twenty-five thousand, to include exempts of religious sects, and of every other sort which the respective States may think proper to make.

Three hundred and twenty-five thousand, therefore, may be assumed as the number of operative fencible men to compose the militia. The proportion of the several classes of which would be nearly as follows:

Firstly. The advanced corps, one-tenth composed of the youth of the ages of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	325,000
Secondly. The main corps, six-tenths and one-twentieth,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	211,250
Thirdly. The reserved corps, two-tenths and one-twentieth,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81,250
										<u>325,000</u>

The following estimate is formed, for the purpose of exhibiting the annual expense of the institution of the advanced corps, stating the same at thirty thousand men.

*Estimate of the expense of the annual camps of discipline, as proposed in the foregoing plan, arising on each of the first three years, and, after that period, of the annual expense of the institution.*

*The first year.*

10,000 suits of uniform clothing, stated at eight dollars, each suit of which shall serve for three years' discipline,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$80,000
10,000 rations per day for thirty days, each ration stated at ten cents,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,000
The expense of four complete corps of legionary officers of all descriptions for thirty days, including pay, subsistence, and forage,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,870
Forage for the cavalry,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,800
Straw, camp-kettles, bowls, axes, canteens, and fuel,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,000
Annual proportion of the expense of tents for officers and soldiers, which may serve for eight annual encampments,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,000
Four legionary standards,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Regimental colors,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
Consumption of powder and ball, shot and shells, damage to arms and accoutrements, and artillery, and transportation of the same, stated at	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25,000
Hospital department,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Contingencies of the quartermaster's and other departments,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000
General staff, adjutant general, quartermaster general, inspector general, and their deputies,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000
										<u>Entire expenses of the first year, \$225,670</u>

*Additional expenses on the second year.*

10,000 rations per day for thirty days, are 300,000 rations, at 10 cents,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$30,000
The expense of four complete corps of legionary officers, of all descriptions, for thirty days, including pay, subsistence, and forage,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,870
Four legionary standards,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Regimental colors,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
Forage for the cavalry,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,800
Tents, straw, camp-kettles, bowls, axes, canteens, and fuel,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,000
Hospital department,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Contingencies in quartermaster's and other departments,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000
Ammunition, damage to arms and accoutrements,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000
										<u>Expense of the first year, 225,670</u>
										<u>Combined expenses of the first and second years, \$346,340</u>

*Additional expenses on the third year.*

The expense of 10,000 rations for ten days, is 100,000 rations, at 10 cents,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$10,000
Forage,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,600
For the camp equipage,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000
Tents,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500
Hospital stores,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
Ammunition, damage to arms and accoutrements,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000
Contingencies in the quartermaster's and other departments,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000
										<u>44,100</u>
										<u>Combined expenses of the first and second years, 346,340</u>
										<u>The total expense of the first three years, \$390,440</u>

It is to be observed, that the officers for four legions will be adequate to command the youth of eighteen who commence their discipline the first year, and that the same number of officers will be required for the second year. The youth of the third year may be incorporated by sections, in the existing corps, so that no additional officers will be required on their account.

Hence it appears, that the expense of 10,000 men for one year, amounts to \$225,670  
 20,000, for the second year, to 346,340  
 30,000, for the third year, to 390,440

If the youth of the three ages of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty, be disciplined at once, the last mentioned sum will be about the fixed annual expense of the camps of discipline; from which, however, is to be deducted \$6,000, being the expense of the standards and colors, the former of which will be of a durable nature, and the latter will not require to be replaced oftener than once in twenty years, 6,000

The annual expense of the advance corps, 384,440

Thus, for a sum less than four hundred thousand dollars annually, which, apportioned on three millions of people, would be little more than one-eighth of a dollar each, an energetic republican militia may be durably established; the invaluable principles of liberty secured and perpetuated; and a dignified national fabric erected on the solid foundation of public virtue.

The main and reserved corps must be perfectly organized in the first instance, but the advanced corps will not be completed until the third year of its institution.

The combination of troops, of various descriptions, into one body, so as to invest it with the highest and greatest number of powers, in every possible situation, has long been a subject of discussion and difference of opinion. But no other form appears so well to have sustained the criterion of time and severe examination, as the Roman legion. This formidable organization, accommodated to the purposes of modern war, still retains its original energy and superiority. Of the ancients, Polybius and Vegetius have described and given the highest encomiums of the legion. The former, particularly, in his comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages of the Macedonian

and Roman arms, and their respective orders of battle, has left to mankind an instructive and important legacy. Of the moderns, the illustrious Mareschal Saxe has modelled the legion for the use of fire-arms, and strenuously urges its adoption, in preference to any other form. And the respectable and intelligent veteran, late inspector general of the armies of the United States, recommends the adoption of the legion.\*

"Upon a review," says he, "of all the military of Europe, there does not appear to be a single form which could be safely adopted by the United States. They are unexceptionably different from each other, and, like all other human institutions, seem to have started as much out of accident as design. The local situation of the country, the spirit of the Government, the character of the nation, and, in many instances, the character of the prince, have all had their influence in settling the foundation and discipline of their respective troops, and render it impossible that we should take either as a model. The legion alone has not been adopted by any; and yet I am confident in asserting, that whether it be examined as applicable to all countries, or as it may immediately apply to the existing or probable necessity of this, it will be found strikingly superior to any other:

"1st. Being a complete and little army of itself, it is ready to begin its operations on the shortest notice, or slightest alarm.

"2d. Having all the component parts of the largest army of any possible description, it is prepared to meet every species of war that may present itself; and

"3d. As in every case of detachment, the first constitutional principle will be preserved, and the embarrassments of draughting and detail, which, in armies differently framed, too often distract the commanding officer, will be avoided."

It may easily suggest itself from this sketch, that, in forming a legion, the most difficult task is to determine the necessary proportion of each species of soldiers which is to compose it.

This must obviously depend upon what will be the theatre, and what the style of the war. On the plains of Poland, whole brigades of cavalry would be necessary against every enemy; but in the forests and among the hills of America, a single regiment would be more than sufficient against any. And as there are but two kinds of war to which we are much exposed, viz: an attack from the sea side by a European Power, aided by our sworn enemies settled on our extreme left, and an invasion of our back settlements by an Indian enemy, it follows, of course, that musketeers and light infantry should make the greatest part of our army.

The institution of the section is intended to interest the patriotism and pride of every individual in the militia; to support the legal measures of a free Government; to render every man active in the public cause, by introducing the spirit of emulation, and a degree of personal responsibility.

The common mode of recruiting is attended with too great destruction of morals to be tolerated, and is too uncertain to be the principal resource of a wise nation in time of danger. The public faith is frequently wounded by unworthy individuals, who hold out delusive promises which can never be realized. By such means, an unprincipled banditti are often collected for the purpose of defending every thing that should be dear to freemen. The consequences are natural; such men either desert in time of danger, or are ever ready, on the slightest disgust, to turn their arms against their country.

By the establishment of the sections, an ample and permanent source is opened, whence the state, in every exigence, may be supplied with men whose all depends upon the prosperity of their country.

In cases of necessity, an army may be formed of citizens, whose previous knowledge of discipline will enable it to proceed to an immediate accomplishment of the designs of the state, instead of exhausting the public resources by wasting whole years in preparing to face the enemy.

The previous arrangements necessary to form and maintain the annual encampments, as well as the discipline acquired therein, will be an excellent preparation for war.

The artillery and its numerous appendages, arms, and accoutrements of every kind, and all species of ammunition, ought to be manufactured within the United States. It is of high importance that the present period should be embraced to establish adequate institutions to produce the necessary apparatus of war.

It is unworthy the dignity of a rising and free empire to depend on foreign and fortuitous supplies of the essential means of defence.

The clothing for the troops could, with ease, be manufactured within in the United States, and the establishment in that respect would tend to the encouragement of important manufactories.

The disbursements made in each State for the rations, forage, and other necessary articles for the annual camps of discipline, would most beneficially circulate the money arising from the public revenue.

The local circumstances of the United States, their numerous seaports, and the protection of their commerce, require a naval armament. Hence the necessity of the proposed plan, embracing the idea of the States obtaining men on republican principles, for the marine as well as the land service. But one may be accomplished with much greater facility than the other, as the preparation of a soldier for the field requires a degree of discipline which cannot be learned without much time and labor; whereas, the common course of sea service on board of merchant vessels differs but little from the service required on board of armed ships; therefore, the education for war, in this respect, will be obtained without any expense to the State. All that seems to be requisite on the head of marine service is, that an efficient regulation should be established in the respective States to register all actual seamen, and to render those of a certain age amenable to the public for personal service, if demanded within a given period.

The constitutions of the respective States, and of the United States, having directed the modes in which the officers of the militia shall be appointed, no alteration can be made therein. Although it may be supposed that some modes of appointment are better calculated than others to inspire the highest propriety of conduct, yet there are none so defective as to serve as a sufficient reason for rejecting an efficient system for the militia. It is certain that the choice of officers is the point on which the reputation and importance of a corps must depend. Therefore, every person who may be concerned in the appointment should consider himself as responsible to his country for a proper choice.

The wisdom of the States will be manifested by inducing those citizens of whom the late American army was composed to accept of appointments in the militia. The high degree of military knowledge which they possess was acquired at too great a price, and is too precious, to be buried in oblivion; it ought to be cherished, and rendered permanently beneficial to the community.

The vigor and importance of the proposed plan will entirely depend on the laws relative thereto; unless the laws shall be equal to the object, and rigidly enforced, no energetic national militia can be established.

If wealth be admitted as a principle of exemption, the plan cannot be executed. It is the wisdom of political establishments to make the wealth of individuals subservient to the general good, and not to suffer it to corrupt or attain undue indulgence.

It is conceded, that people, solicitous to be exonerated from their proportion of public duty, may exclaim against the proposed arrangement as an intolerable hardship. But it ought to be strongly impressed, that while society has its charms, it also has its indispensable obligations. That to attempt such a degree of refinement as to exonerate the members of the community from all personal service, is to render them incapable of the exercise, and unworthy of the characters of freemen.

Every State possesses not only the right of personal service from its members, but the right to regulate the service on principles of equality for the general defence. All being bound, none can complain of injustice, on being obliged to perform his equal proportion. Therefore, it ought to be a permanent rule, that those who in youth decline or refuse to subject themselves to the course of military education established by the laws, should be considered as unworthy of public trust or public honors, and be excluded therefrom accordingly.

If the majesty of the laws should be preserved inviolate in this respect, the operations of the proposed plan would foster a glorious public spirit, infuse the principles of energy and stability in the body politic, and give a high degree of political splendor to the national character.

\* Vide letter addressed to the inhabitants of the United States on the subject of an established militia.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 173.

[2d SESSION.]

## ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACADEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 29, 1819.

SIR:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 15, 1819.*

In reply to that part of your letter of the 20th of November which requests my opinion on the expediency of establishing one or more additional military academies, and their places of location, and such other information and facts as I may deem proper to communicate on these subjects, with the probable annual expenses of these establishments, I have the honor to make the following statement:

The number of cadets now authorized by law is two hundred and fifty, who are divided into four classes; the cadets of one of which every year terminate their studies, and are promoted into the army. As the academy is now nearly full, it is probable that the number which will annually terminate their studies, and, consequently, will be candidates for promotion, will not be much short of fifty. The number of vacancies in the army which have occurred from the 1st of August, 1816, to the 1st of May, 1818, has been one hundred and forty-eight, or about eighty-four per annum; but, as it is probable that the causes which have operated to produce so many vacancies in this time have been accidental, and consequent on the change from active service to the inactivities of a peace establishment, there will not, it is believed, in future be so many; and that the cadets who will annually terminate their studies at West Point will be equal, or nearly so, to the annual average vacancies. In this view of the subject, an additional military academy would not now be required. But it seems to me that the question ought not to be determined by a reference simply to the wants of our military peace establishment, which, from our geographical position, and the policy of our Government, will always bear a small proportion to the population of the country, and to our military establishment in time of war. So far from graduating the number or extent of our military academies, by the want of the army in time of peace, the opposite principle would probably be more correct; that, in proportion as our regular military establishment is small, the Government ought to be careful to disseminate, by education, a knowledge of the art of war. The army itself is a practical school of this art, which, except in the higher branches, may, where it bears a large proportion to the population of the country, supersede other modes of perpetuating or disseminating this indispensable art. But in a country situated as ours is, with a small standing army, and far removed from any Power from which we have much to fear, the important knowledge of the art of defending our shores will, in a long peace, without the particular patronage of the Government, be nearly lost. The establishment of military academies is the cheapest and safest mode of producing and perpetuating this knowledge. The Government ought to furnish the means to those who are willing to bestow their time to acquire it. The cadets who cannot be provided for in the army will return to private life; but, in the event of war, their knowledge will not be lost to the country. The Government may then avail itself of their military science; and, though they may not be practically acquainted with all of the details of the duty in the army, they will acquire it in a much shorter time than those who have not had the advantage of a military education. No truth is better supported by history than that, other circumstances being nearly equal, victory will be on the side of those who have the best instructed officers. The duties of a soldier are few and simple, and, with well instructed officers, they can be acquired in a short time; as our own experience, and that of other countries, has satisfactorily proved. To form competent officers, in the present improved state of the art of war, is much more difficult; as an officer, besides a knowledge of the duties belonging to the soldier, has others of a more difficult nature to acquire, and which can only be acquired by a long experience, or by regular military education.

With these views, I would recommend one additional military academy. It ought to be placed where it would mutually accommodate the Southern and Western portions of our country, which are the most remote from the present institution.

Besides an additional academy, I would submit, for the consideration of the committee, the propriety of establishing a school of practice, to be fixed near the seat of Government. On this important subject, I respectfully annex, as a part of this communication, a report from General Bernard and Colonel McRee to this Department, in which the subject is so fully discussed as to supersede the necessity of any further observations.

The expenses of erecting the necessary buildings for an additional military academy, on a scale as extensive as that at West Point, would cost about one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, of which sum, however, but a small part would be required for this year. The current expense of the institution would (excluding the pay of the cadets, which is sixteen dollars per month and two rations per day) probably amount to about twenty-two thousand dollars per annum.

For the school of practice there would be but little expense, except the erection of the necessary buildings for the accommodation of the institution. The pay of the superintendent and professors, should they be even taken from citizens, would not exceed eight thousand five hundred dollars, which would constitute nearly the whole of the current expense, as the lieutenants of the artillery and engineers, while at the institution, will not receive any additional pay or emoluments. The expense of the buildings may be estimated at eighty thousand dollars, of which, however, but a small part would be required for the present year.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON,

*Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Rep's.**Considerations on the course of instruction necessary for the officers of the different arms of an army.*

Circumstances of locality, the nature of the operations of war, and the variety of the means employed for the purposes of destruction and preservation, have naturally led to the subdivision of an army into several parts, which differ in their manner of combating, but which are also intended to render reciprocal aid to each other, to co-operate the most efficaciously to the same end, and to constitute, when in action, but one combined whole.

This subdivision existed among the ancients, as it does among the moderns; and with both, (the absolute and relative numerical force of these subdivisions being supposed nearly equal,) the systems of war have been uniformly more perfect, and productive of great results, in proportion as the several parts were better calculated to act with promptitude, precision, and in concert. These parts are designated in modern armies by the word *arm*, and consist of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. Each of these arms acts occasionally as principal or as accessory. In a battle, the infantry is in general the principal arm; while the three others are more or less accessories; in the pursuit of a retreating army, the cavalry becomes the principal; and in a siege, the artillery and engineers are the principal arms, and the rest are merely great auxiliaries.

Among the means which modern discipline employs, to give the greatest effect to the combined action of these arms, is instruction. And here the same motives which have resorted to a subdivision of labor as a powerful cause of perfection in objects of general industry have also led to a subdivision of military instruction, as most productive of that concert and efficiency desirable in the operations of an army. This instruction, and the objects and advantages of its subdivision, are the subjects of present consideration.

To obtain, by the aid of military instruction, greater effect in the particular or combined employment of the different arms, two modes immediately present themselves: 1st. That each arm should be composed of individuals

versed exclusively in the theory and practice of that arm. 2d. That the individuals composing each arm should be instructed equally in the theory and practice of all the other arms. The first of these methods is insufficient; because, in giving to each individual merely the knowledge necessary to the duties of his own arm, it leaves him deficient of what is necessary to connect the operations of that arm with the operations of the rest, as parts of one general system. The second is impracticable; because it is the privilege of but few individuals to possess that facility of intellect which is requisite to embrace four branches of knowledge as extensive as are those in question, and to practise them all with that correctness and promptitude which is the peculiar advantage of such as devote themselves principally to but one of these branches. In order to avoid both these inconveniences, the theoretical and practical knowledge necessary in the conduct and operations of an army has been divided into two distinct classes; the one embracing whatever is common to all the arms, the other confined to what particularly appertains to each arm. A consequent and similar division has followed in the instruction; the first branch to include what is necessary and useful to the service of every arm, the second to include the theory and practice of each arm in particular. Hence the necessity of an elementary or common school, where the knowledge common to every arm should be given alike to all who are intended for the army; and a school of a higher order, for the purpose of increasing (when necessary) the elementary knowledge which has previously been acquired to the extent demanded, and teaching its application to the particular objects and duties of each arm, which constitute a school of application. In those countries which have large military establishments, there is a school of application for each arm. But those nations who, in time of peace, keep but a feeble military force on foot, find it advantageous to unite, as far as possible, these different schools of application in one, where such as are admitted for the service of those arms which demand a more advanced theoretical, or more varied practical knowledge, receive their last degree of academical instruction. In this last case, the students at the school of application receive likewise two kinds of instruction: 1st. That which is common to the several arms to which they are destined; and 2d. That which is exclusively necessary to the arm in which they are respectively to serve.

Among all nations possessing military schools, the schools of application for such as are destined for the infantry and cavalry, are the regiments of the army in which they are to serve. It is on joining and doing duty with their respective regiments that they learn to apply the instruction received at the elementary school, and acquire whatever relates to the discipline, the conduct, administration, and legislation of troops.

This cannot be the case, however, with those destined for the artillery and engineers, or the topographical corps. They are all, more or less, liable to be employed separately and immediately after leaving the school, and are deprived of the advantages peculiar to the officer of infantry or cavalry, of making their first essays in their professional duties, under the eyes of their chiefs, or of those who have preceded them; and being unassisted by the advice or opinions of their superiors in rank, knowledge, and experience, they are not only left without the means of obtaining the instruction of which they are yet deficient, but are also frequently exposed, in the execution of the duties confided to them, to compromise the public service by the commission of errors which too often lead to irreparable misfortunes, and which are productive, at least, of a wasteful expenditure of public property, always beyond, sometimes exceeding a hundred fold, the expense of giving a proper education to the individual who has not been qualified to exercise his profession, with satisfaction to himself, or usefully to his country.

These considerations alone appear to us sufficient to show the advantage, if not necessity, of dividing the course of military instruction between two schools—the one elementary, and the other a school of application.

The elementary school at West Point has hitherto been very inferior as such, and altogether inadequate to the objects for which it was established. A project has been presented, however, calculated to place this school upon the footing of the most perfect of the kind which exists. As to a school of application, there is none. The degree of instruction given to the cadets at the school of West Point has heretofore been for the most part limited to a general acquaintance with those branches of knowledge which are common to all the arms of an army, and which ought to have been extended and applied to artillery, fortification, and topography. The consequence has been, that the officers of infantry, artillery, engineers, and of the topographical corps, have had the same degree and kind of instruction; and the only real difference which existed between them on leaving the school consisted in the uniform of their respective corps or regiments. If any have been so fortunate as to render themselves serviceable, either in the artillery or engineers, the cause must be sought for in their own industry, and not in the education received by them at West Point, which was barely sufficient to excite a desire for military inquiries and of military pursuits.

It remains to enumerate the branches of knowledge which are common to all the arms; and those which are necessary, and appertain more or less exclusively to each or several of these arms. The subjoined table exhibits the two principal divisions of the instruction. The first part includes the branches of knowledge that are necessary to all who are destined for any arm of the military establishment, either as officers in the exercise of their immediate professional duties, or as men of information, liable, in the course of their military career, to be intrusted with other interests. It is, therefore, that the mathematics, for instance, are extended further than is strictly necessary to the officer of infantry; that natural and experimental philosophy, and chemistry, are inserted under the elementary division, rather as forming part of a liberal education than of mere military utility; and finally, the several kinds of drawing are only taught in the elementary division, as an advantageous introduction to the prompt acquisition and exercise of the art of topographical delineations. This division or elementary part of the instruction will require five professors, three teachers, and two instructors. The number of assistants, &c. depend upon the number of individuals at a school.

The same table presents the second part of the instruction, which is in addition to the first, and is necessary to those destined to the engineers, artillery, or topographical corps. Here the mathematics are carried to a higher degree, which is rendered necessary by their applications to machines, the theory of artillery, the construction of charts, &c. Descriptive geometry is applied to machines and fortification. Fortification is taught to the extent which is exclusively necessary to the officer of engineers and artillery, to the extent that is only required for the officers of that arm. Geometry and trigonometry receive their application to topographical operations, and spherical trigonometry and descriptive geometry to the projection, &c. of charts. This part of the instruction will demand four professors. Because, either these two divisions of the instruction will be taught at one school, or at two separate schools. In the first case, the professors of the elementary course will be insufficient, and cannot attend to a course of instruction thus extended; in the second case, the four professors before mentioned become absolutely necessary. But whether the entire course (or both of these divisions of the instruction) shall be taught at the same or at two separate schools, it will not be the less indispensable; and a division of it, similar to that here established, should still exist in fact. The question is, therefore, reduced to this: Shall the elementary, or first part of the course of instruction, be taught at West Point, and the second part at a separate school to be established elsewhere? Or shall the second part constitute an additional class or classes, at the school of West Point, to consist of those cadets only who are destined for the engineers, artillery, and topographical corps, and who shall have previously passed through the elementary classes?

The second division of the course of instruction exhibited by the annexed table, and which must constitute either a school or classes of application, is *practical* as well as *theoretical*. The application of the elementary branches of instruction, and the higher branches of mathematics, to the theory of artillery, fortification, and topography, forming the *theoretical* or academic part of this division of the course of instruction; while the application of these theories to the circumstances of the grounds, &c. requires and must be taught to the students by a course of actual experiments, and practical exemplifications in the field. It is necessary to make this remark, in order to a just appreciation of all the considerations which should influence in the decision of the present question.

The advantages which may be derived from a union of the school of application, in the shape of additional classes to the elementary school, are almost exclusively those of economy, and admit of being correctly ascertained; they consist—

1st. In having certain duties that are common and necessary to both establishments performed by the same individuals who are now employed for those purposes at West Point. Such are the duties of the superintendent, most of the officers of the military staff, and disbursing department.

2d. In the purchase of an additional site, which will be avoided.

3d. In saving the additional expense of quarters, academical and other buildings, to the extent that they now exist at West Point beyond the wants of that establishment.

4th. In saving the expense of purchasing a library, instruments, &c. to the extent of those now on hand at West Point.

5th. In saving the travelling and other expenses to which the graduates of the elementary school would be subjected, in order to join and commence their course at the school of application, if these institutions were separate.

And,

6th. In avoiding a loss of time on the part of the graduates, which would take place on their transfer to the school of application in the case just supposed.

The following are the considerations which oppose a union, and which consequently urge a separation of these two schools:

1st. The classes of application will consist of those individuals destined for the artillery, engineers, and topographical corps, who shall have graduated at the termination of the elementary course of instruction, and who will consequently be then promoted by brevet or otherwise in the same manner as those destined for the infantry. There must probably be two classes of application; and the number of students of which they ought to consist, in order to supply the annual vacancies in their respective arms, will not be less than seventy. The school will therefore be augmented by this amount, and will be composed of commissioned officers and cadets, whose rights, interests, and occupations will be more or less dissimilar, and who must consequently be governed by regulations, &c. essentially different, which will at once destroy that unity of system necessary to all military institutions.

2d. The difference in point of rank in the students of the elementary classes and those composing the classes of application will originate claims to precedence and superiority on the one part, and resistance to such pretensions on the other, which no regulations can restrain within proper limits.

3d. It will be necessary to have two sets of professors at the same school, and in several instances two professors of the same department of science, who will be independent of each other. Hence increased occasions of discord. Individual interest and feelings must of necessity, and frequently will, be brought into collision, which experience has sufficiently proved would lead first to divisions among the academic staff, and finally to the formation of parties among the officers and cadets, destructive of that harmony and order which should prevail, and are believed essential to the successful operations of the school.

4th. The duties of the two sets of professors, the studies and occupations of the officers and cadets, being different in their character, and requiring to be arranged differently as to time and other circumstances, will render two distinct systems of organization and police indispensable, which frequently cannot be made to accord without incurring some inconvenience or injury, or without the sacrifice of some advantage on the part of one or the other division of the school, and perhaps of both. The superintendent will, in fact, have two schools to govern and conduct; his time and attention will therefore be divided, alternately occupied with the peculiar concerns of each, and frequently employed in reconciling conflicting interests. The whole system of administration for the two schools will be more or less controlled or influenced by the inconvenient and unnecessary relations in which they are placed to each other.

The advantages and disadvantages here enumerated as attending the union of the two divisions of the course of military instruction at the same school are obviously too different in their kind to admit of being compared, nor is it necessary that they should be. The expense attending the separate establishment of a school of application might be offered as a reason for rejecting it altogether, but by no means for uniting it to the elementary school, when the operations of both would be obstructed in consequence of so doing, and their ultimate success rendered more than doubtful.

Among the advantages that will be derived from the establishment of a school of application, are the means it will afford of providing for other departments of national service besides those which have been mentioned; and by locating it immediately under the eyes of the Government, the measures necessary to enlarge or to adapt it to the particular objects in view will be more readily ascertained, and applied with greater certainty of effect. The necessity of this institution will become urgent in the event of one or more additional elementary schools being created. It will then be expedient, for those very reasons of economy which now form the only objections that can be opposed to it; and it will be necessary, because it will enable the respective candidates for the engineer, artillery, and topographical corps to be assembled at the same school, and to receive in common their last degree of instruction; and because by no other means can that uniformity in the instruction and duties of each of these arms be attained which is essential to their perfection.

We are therefore of opinion that a school of application is decidedly necessary to the military service of the country; that, to be rendered efficient, it ought to be separate from all immediate connexion with any other institution; and that it should have a central location, and as little removed as possible from under the observation of Government.

Which is respectfully submitted to the Hon. J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of War.

BERNARD, *Brigadier General.*  
WM. McREE, *Major Engineers.*



Table of a course of instruction for officers of the various arms of an army.

The course of instruction necessary for the officers of infantry, artillery, engineers, and topographical corps.	Division of instruction common to infantry, artillery, engineers, and topographical corps.	Mathematics,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arithmetic, including logarithms,</li> <li>Geometry,</li> <li>Algebra,</li> <li>Plane trigonometry,</li> <li>Mechanical powers,</li> </ul> }	1 professor.
		Natural and experimental philosophy,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Of bodies,</li> <li>Laws of motion and forces, gravity and attraction, &amp;c.</li> <li>Properties and theory of air, water, light, heat, &amp;c.</li> <li>Theory of electric, galvanic, and magnetic fluids,</li> <li>Geology,</li> <li>Elements of astronomy,</li> </ul> }	1 professor.
		Chemistry,	Animals, vegetables, and mineralogy,	1 professor.
		Descriptive geometry and fortification,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Elements of descriptive geometry,</li> <li>Castrametation and field fortification,</li> <li>Attack and defence of field fortifications and retrenched posts, &amp;c.</li> <li>Military reconnoitings,</li> </ul> }	1 professor.
		Artillery,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Elements of artillery,</li> <li>Garrison and field services of artillery, &amp;c.</li> </ul> }	1 instructor.
		Infantry,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drill of the soldier, school of the platoon, battalion, evolutions of the line, &amp;c.</li> <li>Elements of grand tactics and strategy,</li> </ul> }	1 instructor.
		Drawing,	Human figure, landscape, and topographical delineations,	1 master.
		French language,	- - - - -	1 master.
	Riding & sword exercise,	- - - - -	1 master.	
	Division of instruction necessary to the artillery, engineers, and topographical corps.	Mathematics,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conic sections,</li> <li>Spherical trigonometry,</li> <li>Fluxions,</li> <li>Mechanics,</li> <li>Application of fluxions and mechanics to machines,</li> </ul> }	1 professor.
		Descriptive geometry and fortification,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Application of descriptive geometry to machines and to fortifications,</li> <li>Fortification (permanent) of places, sea-coasts, and retrenched camps,</li> <li>Attack and defence of fortresses, &amp;c.</li> <li>Mines,</li> <li>Construction of works of fortifications and military edifices,</li> </ul> }	1 professor.
		Artillery,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Constructions of small arms, cannon, mortars, howitzers, &amp;c.</li> <li>Gun carriages, caissons, &amp;c.</li> <li>Service in sieges, in the field, &amp;c. &amp;c.</li> <li>Preparation of munition of war, fire-works, &amp;c.</li> </ul> }	1 professor.
		Topography,	{ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Application of descriptive geometry, &amp;c. to the projection of geographical charts,</li> <li>Geodesy,</li> <li>Topographical surveys and representations of ground,</li> <li>Knowledge and practice of instruments employed in the operations of topography, geography, and geodesy,</li> </ul> }	1 professor.

NOTE.—This presents only the heads of instruction; an analysis of each would enlarge the table to a volume.

MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 5, 1819.

To the Senate of the United States:

FEBRUARY 5, 1819.

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 25th of last month, requesting me "to cause to be laid before it a copy of the rules and regulations adopted for the government of the Military Academy at West Point; also, how many cadets have been admitted into the academy; the time of the residence of each cadet at that institution; and how many of them have been appointed officers in the army and navy of the United States," I transmit a report from the Secretary of War, which, with the accompanying documents, will afford all the information required by the said resolution.

JAMES MONROE.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 4, 1819.*

The Secretary of War, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 25th of January last, "that the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before the Senate a copy of the rules and regulations adopted for the government of the Military Academy at West Point; also, how many cadets have been admitted into the academy; the time of the residence of each cadet at that institution; and how many of them have been appointed officers in the army and navy of the United States," has the honor to transmit, herewith, a list of cadets who have been admitted at the Military Academy at West Point, in the State of New York; the time of their admission, and promotion, &c.; and the time they remained at that institution; and a copy of the rules and regulations adopted for the government of the Military Academy at West Point.

The cadets are under the government of the rules and articles of war, so far as they are applicable, and under the orders of the superintendent of the academy.

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

SIR:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *July 1, 1816.*

I have the honor to return the regulations defining a complete course of education, drawn up by the academical staff, and transmitted by you to this Department, which has been approved, with such modifications as have been judged necessary, by the President.

From the age at which cadets are admitted into the academy, the study of the English grammar is deemed indispensable to give them a correct and intimate knowledge of the structure of their own language.

Although a critical knowledge of the Latin and Greek languages is not considered essentially necessary, yet, where the cadets have studied those languages before their appointments, it is believed that the review of those languages during the last year of study will add to the reputation of the institution, and cannot fail to be useful to the cadets.

It is expected that the duties required by these additions will be performed by the chaplain employed in the academy. The performance of these duties, it is hoped, will be an inducement with Congress, when this subject shall again be brought under their consideration, to make the appointment permanent, not only at West Point, but at such other establishment of that nature as shall be deemed necessary by that body.

If, in the opinion of the academical staff, these branches of education can be advantageously prosecuted at periods different from those fixed in the regulations, their suggestions will be attended to with pleasure.

The inducement to the other alterations will readily suggest itself to your mind. That a cadet, who having been thrown into a class below him, and subsequently in the course of his education finds himself placed in the same situation, will not be qualified for an engineer, may be readily conceived; but it by no means follows that he may not possess many of the qualifications of a general in a higher degree than some of those who greatly excel him in his studies. The absolute dismissal for that cause has, therefore, been changed into a reference to the War Department.

These regulations will apply to all cases where the cadet presents himself for admission after they are received at the academy, notwithstanding their appointments may be of anterior date.

The regulation requiring the unmarried professors, teachers, and assistants to eat with the cadets, is believed to be conformable to the general usage of colleges, and ought not to be considered onerous. I understand, also, that Captain Partridge is himself a bachelor, and of course subject to the regulation. From his signing some of his acts as superintendent of the academy, he may have supposed that he was not embraced by the rule. This, however, is a mistake. No officer, as long as the law remains as it is, can be the superintendent of the institution but the principal officer of the corps of engineers, or the next in command of that corps, in case of his absence. If, however, in your opinion, the proposition made by the academical staff to attend the mess-houses, and make daily reports of the fare, will protect the cadets from imposition, you are authorized to suspend the rule until further orders.

I have the honor, &c.

WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD.

General JOSEPH G. SWIFT, *New York.*

UNITED STATES' MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, *May 22, 1816.*

The following branches of science and instruction shall be considered as comprising a complete course of education at the Military Academy at West Point, State of New York:

The English and French languages, and the review of the Latin and Greek languages, mathematics, military drawing, natural and experimental philosophy, including astronomy, engineering, geography, history, ethics, military instruction, and the sword exercises.

*English language.*—A course of English shall embrace English grammar and composition.

*French language.*—A course of French shall consist in pronouncing the language tolerably, and translating from French into English, and from English into French, with accuracy.

*Latin and Greek languages.*—A course of Latin and Greek shall embrace the review of the Latin and Greek authors usually taught in academies.

No cadet shall be compelled to study these languages who shall not have been taught them previous to his appointment.

*Mathematics.*—A complete course of mathematics shall embrace the following branches, viz: The nature and construction of logarithms and the use of the tables; algebra, to include the solution of cubic equations, with all the preceding rules; geometry, to include plane and solid geometry, also ratios and proportions, and the construction of geometrical problems; application of algebra to geometry; practical geometry on the ground; mensuration of planes and solids; plane trigonometry, with its application to surveying and measuring heights and distances; spherical trigonometry, with its application to the solution of spherical problems; the doctrine of infinite series; conic sections, with their application to military and other projectiles; fluxions, to be taught and studied at the option of the professor and student.

*Drawing.*—A complete course of drawing shall include the elementary drawing of figures; rules and practice of perspective plans and profiles of permanent fortifications; of every kind of field works; and, also, topographical plans.

*Philosophy.*—A complete course of philosophy shall embrace the following branches, viz: The principles of mechanics, with their general application; hydrostatics, hydraulics, pneumatics, optics; the elements of chemistry, electricity, magnetism, and astronomy.

*Engineering.*—A complete course of engineering shall embrace the following branches, viz: Military and civil architecture; permanent and field fortification; field works, generally; rules for the labor, time, and materials necessary for the construction of different kinds of works; also, rules for the construction of all the appendages necessary in field works; the construction of mines and fougasses, and the different modes of attacking and defending fortified places; also, castrametation.

*Geography.*—A complete course of geography shall embrace the solution of the several problems of the spheres, usually prefixed to the systems of geography, by means of the globe. A knowledge of the grand divisions of the earth; of the extent, boundaries, and relative situations of the several countries situated in each of these grand divisions; embracing, likewise, a knowledge of their natural productions, commerce, manufactures, government, naval and military strength, relative importance, and the use of the maps, &c.

*History.*—A complete course of history shall embrace a course of universal history; the history of America generally; the history of the American revolutionary war, &c.; the history of the United States, or such particular States as the professor in that department shall judge proper.

*Ethics.*—A course of ethics shall include the elements of moral science, also of natural and political law.

*Military instruction.*—A complete course of military instruction shall embrace a general course of tactics; a knowledge of infantry duty, to commence with the elementary drill of the soldier, and to include the discipline and police of the battalion and platoon in all their parts; a knowledge of artillery duty, including the artillery drill; practical gunnery; and, also, all the performance of all the regular duties of the camp.

*Sword exercise.*—Under the sword exercise shall be included the broad sword exercise, and the cut and thrust, or small sword, either or both, according to circumstances.

*Assignment of duties.*—Each professor and instructor shall be limited in the discharge of his official duties to his own department, and not to interfere with any other department. Each professor and teacher, at the head of a separate department, shall be the judge of the proper mode of conveying instruction in his own department, and shall be held responsible for the correctness of this mode.

*Division of time.*—To complete the preceding course of studies will require four years. The branches to be pursued, and the course to be completed in each year, shall be as follows:

*First year.*—The course of the first year shall embrace English grammar and composition, and the French language, logarithms, algebra, and plane geometry, to include ratios and proportions.

*Second year.*—The course of the second year shall embrace a continuation of the French language; the geometry of planes and solids, and the construction of geometrical problems; the application of algebra to geometry, and the mensuration of planes and solids; plane and spherical trigonometry, with their applications; conic sections; practical geometry and drawing.

*Third year.*—A course for the third year shall embrace natural and experimental philosophy, astronomy, engineering and drawing continued.

*Fourth year.*—A course for the fourth year shall embrace geography, history, and ethics, the review of the English grammar, and of the Latin and Greek languages; also a general review of the most important branches in each of the departments.

*Rules for classification.*—The cadets at the Military Academy shall constitute four classes. All the cadets who are admitted as members of the academy in each year shall constitute the first lower class. If, however, at the general examination next ensuing the time of admission, it shall appear that any cadet is sufficiently advanced in his studies, he may be admitted into the next higher class. On the contrary, if, at either of the general examinations, any cadet shall be found unqualified to proceed with his class, he shall be put back into the next lower class. No intermediate classes will, in any case, be allowed.

*Qualifications necessary for admission.*—Each cadet, previous to his being admitted a member of the Military Academy, must be able to read distinctly and pronounce correctly; to write a fair legible hand; and to perform with facility and accuracy the various operations of the ground rules of arithmetic, both simple and compound; of the rules of reduction of single and compound proportion, and also of vulgar and decimal fractions.

*Promiscuous regulations.*—1st. Every cadet, when he shall have completed the foregoing course of studies shall be entitled to his diploma signed by the academic staff, agreeably to law and existing regulations.

2d. The military instruction of the cadet shall be under the immediate direction of the superintendent of the academy, and shall be attended to at such times as will interfere the least with their other academic duties.

3d. The particular course of studies to be completed by the classes, between the general examinations in each year, shall be determined by the superintendent and academic staff, in such manner as experience shall point out to be the most conducive to the interests of the institution.

4th. Any cadet who shall have been reduced to a lower class, and shall, upon a second examination, be found unqualified to advance with this class to the next higher grade, shall, unless he shall have been prevented from attending to his studies by sickness, necessary absence, or some other evident necessity, be reported to the Secretary of the Department of War by the academic staff, stating the branches of science in which he is most deficient, those in which he has made the greatest proficiency, as well as the general inclination, temper, and habits which appear to predominate in his actions; and especially whether his dominant propensities impel him to the profession of arms. Upon this report he shall be dismissed, or retained, at the will of the President.

5th. The superintendent of the academy and the academic staff shall be at liberty to propose to the Secretary of War such alterations and amendments to the foregoing course of studies as they shall, at any time, conjointly deem necessary for the good of the institution; the whole, or a majority of them, agreeing to such alterations and amendments.

6th. Should it be found, by experience, that too large a portion of study or instruction is assigned in the preceding course of studies to any particular year, the superintendent and academic staff conjointly shall be at liberty to transfer, from the course of one year to that of another, such particular portions of study or instruction as may appear necessary to produce an equality; the whole, or a majority of them, agreeing to such transfer.

The foregoing course of studies and instructions is respectfully submitted to the honorable Secretary of War.

*Rules with respect to the promotion of cadets of the United States' Military Academy.*

1. That in the governmental promotion of the cadets, the lineal rank of each graduating class shall be established in conformity to the principle of general merit, as ascertained by a competent board of examiners.

2. That the distribution of cadets to the several corps of the army at the time of promotion, shall be made according to their particular talents and qualifications ascertained in like manner; provided, that this distribution be allowed, in no instance, to interfere with the principle of rank according to general merit.

3. No cadet to be promoted from the academy until he shall have completed his course of studies at the same, and received the diploma of the academic staff to that effect.

4. No cadet who shall resign his warrant, or otherwise be separated from the academy, before the completion of his studies, shall, on any account, receive an appointment in the army of the United States, until after the promotion of the class to which he belonged; nor then, if such appointment interfere in the smallest degree with the rank of any member of that class.

5. No cadet who shall be dismissed the institution, or compelled to resign on account of idleness, neglect of duty, or any species of bad conduct, shall be eligible to any office or post in the army of the United States, until at least five years after the promotion of the class to which he belonged.

Register of cadets who have been admitted at the Military Academy, West Point, in the State of New York; the time of their admission and promotion, &c.; and the time they remained at that institution.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Armistead, W. K.	May 1, 1801,	Engineers,	March 5, 1803.	
Allen, Hannibal N.	Jan. 14, 1803,	Artillery,	July 5, 1804.	
Allen, Ethan A.	Dec. 10, 1804,	Artillery,	Nov. 14, 1806.	
Anderson, John,	Oct. 9, 1806,	Artillery,	Dec. 9, 1807.	
Aikens, Asa,	June 8, 1807,	-	-	Resigned April 2, 1808.
Alexander, John R.	Oct. 19, 1807,	-	-	Resigned September 30, 1810.
Abert, John J.	Jan. 18, 1808,	-	-	Resigned April 1, 1811.
Ashley, Richard,	April 14, 1809,	Artillery.	-	
Adams, Isaac A.	Oct. 1, 1812,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Allanson, John S.	Oct. 24, 1812,	1st reg. artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
Armstrong, Robert L.	April 14, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Armstrong, James K.	April 14, 1813,	-	-	
Armistead, W. C. N.	April 14, 1813,	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1818.
Armstrong, John,	Dec. 8, 1813,	Artillery,	1814.	
Alexander, Edward,	May 20, 1814,	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Antill, Alexander,	May 4, 1814,	-	-	
Albuten, Edward R.	Oct. 24, 1814,	-	-	Resigned July, 1817.
Ashton, Richard,	July 9, 1816,	-	-	Dismissed February 28, 1817.
Allston, Robert U.	Dec. 27, 1816.	-	-	
Alexander, E. B.	Oct. 20, 1817,	-	-	Admitted October 6, 1818.
Abercrombie, John,	Jan. 6, 1817,	-	-	
Allenson, D. W.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted November 6, 1818.
Anderson, Marcus,	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted November 6, 1818.
Bennett, Thomas,	July 8, 1803,	Artillery,	Nov. 14, 1806.	
Bomford, George,	Oct. 24, 1804,	Engineers,	July 1, 1805.	
Beall, Thomas J.	March 6, 1806,	Artillery.	-	
Babcock, Samuel,	April 28, 1806,	Engineers,	Feb. 28, 1808.	
Buck, Daniel A.	July 9, 1806,	Engineers,	Feb. 28, 1808.	
Burton, Oliver G.	March 20, 1807,	Infantry,	June 18, 1808.	
Byrne, Patrick,	Jan. 16, 1808,	-	-	
Blanchard, Charles,	June 15, 1808,	-	-	Resigned August 11, 1808.
Brush, John S.	June 13, 1808,	Artillery,	January 3, 1812.	Resigned July 20, 1811.
Bliss, John,	March 8, 1808,	2d reg't infantry,	-	
Buck, Leonidas,	June 15, 1808,	6th reg't infantry,	January 3, 1812.	
Bell, John R.	June 15, 1808,	Light artillery,	January 3, 1812.	
Burchstead, Henry,	Feb. 16, 1809,	2d reg't infantry,	-	Dismissed July 31, 1810.
Boixaubin, Mariel V.	April 14, 1809,	Light artillery.	-	
Broom, Thomas R.	April 9, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Brent, Robert C.	April 14, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Badolet, James,	April 16, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Beneville, Benjamin,	April 14, 1813,	Light artillery,	January 15, 1817.	
Birdsall, Stephen,	June 4, 1813,	1st reg't artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
Booth, William A.	June 11, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Brooke, Edmund,	May 11, 1813,	Marines.	-	
Brunot, Hillary,	May 20, 1813,	2d reg't infantry,	July 21, 1814.	
Brewerton, George,	June 24, 1813,	-	-	Resigned, 1817.
Brewerton, Henry,	June 24, 1813.	-	-	
Baird, Thomas J.	June 22, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Blaney, George,	July 7, 1813,	Engineers,	March 4, 1815.	
Brown, Alonzo,	July 13, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Beall, Benjamin L.	Jan. 1, 1814,	-	-	Resigned October 15, 1818.
Bourdly, William C.	May 25, 1814.	-	-	
Brockenborough, Austin,	May 20, 1814.	-	-	
Buryman, John R.	May 20, 1814.	-	-	
Berier, Francis N.	May 13, 1814,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Brook, Leonard O.	June 29, 1814,	4th reg't infantry,	July 24, 1818.	
Bache, Hartman,	July 11, 1814,	Assist. Top. Eng.	July 24, 1818.	
Bernard, Edward,	July 26, 1814,	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1818.
Baker, Henry H.	Aug. 6, 1814,	-	-	Resigned May 1, 1818.
Berryman, Henry,	Aug. 6, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Bruff, Thomas O.	Aug. 14, 1814,	-	-	Resigned September, 1818.
Baily, Thomas J.	Sept. 27, 1814,	-	-	Dismissed January 1, 1817.
Barberine, Francis N.	Oct. 11, 1814.	-	-	
Butler, Edward,	Oct. 11, 1814,	-	-	Resigned April 30, 1817.
Brown, Harvey,	Oct. 11, 1814,	Light artillery,	-	Dismissed January 1, 1817;
Barney, Joshua,	Oct. 24, 1814.	-	-	restored Nov. 23, 1817.
Bowes, John R.	Feb. 8, 1815.	-	-	
Bourdly, William C.	Feb. 7, 1815,	-	-	Resigned May 21, 1818.
Bullus, Oscar,	July 10, 1815,	-	-	Transferred to the navy.
Blaney, James R.	July 24, 1815,	-	-	
Ball, Catesby A. H.	July 25, 1815,	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Blanco, Lewis,	Dec. 2, 1816,	-	-	Dismissed February 28, 1818.
Blanco, Metho,	Dec. 2, 1816,	-	-	Dismissed February 28, 1818.
Bainbridge, Henry,	Nov. 27, 1816.	-	-	
Brackenridge, James,	July 9, 1816.	-	-	
Brook, Robert S.	July 9, 1816.	-	-	
Buchanan, William P.	Sept. 2, 1816.	-	-	
Brown, William T.	April 2, 1816,	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Butler, Edward G.	July 8, 1816.	-	-	
Bradford, Alex. B.	Sept. 12, 1816.	-	-	
Barron, Alexander,	Sept. 21, 1816,	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1818.

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Bliss, Horace,	Sept. 8, 1817.	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Buswell, Hammond,	Oct. 29, 1817.	-	-	
Brooke, Alonzo,	Oct. 20, 1817.	-	-	
Bourdine, Clark,	Feb. 14, 1817.	-	-	Admitted September 10, 1818.
Brewer, W. C.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Birdsall, Egbert,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Benton, C. B.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Burke, H. D.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Boss, H.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Boyce, William B.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Resigned October 7, 1818.
Blan, John L.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Bowen, H. C.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Burnett, Napoleon,	May 30, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Buck, T. F.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Barlow, Aaron,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Brock, C. W.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Bell, Henry E.	June 9, 1816.	-	-	
Bell, William H.	Sept. 1, 1817.	-	-	
Baker, Joshua,	July 14, 1804.	-	-	
Chouteau, Auguste,	May 15, 1805.	Artillery,	Dec. 9, 1807.	
Clark, Saterlee,	Oct. 9, 1806.	Artillery,	Dec. 9, 1807.	
Champion, Samuel,	March 8, 1808.	Light artillery.	-	
Cobb, James D.	April 2, 1808.	Artillery,	January 24, 1809.	
Conklings, Solomon,	June 15, 1808.	6th reg't infantry,	January 3, 1812.	
Conant, Augustus,	June 15, 1808.	Engineers.	-	
Outbush, William,	Feb. 16, 1809.	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1810.
Chandler, John A.	April 6, 1813.	1st reg't artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
Childs, Thomas,	May 25, 1813.	Light artillery,	Nov. 15, 1817.	
Cooper, Samuel,	May 19, 1813.	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Craig, Isaac E.	July 8, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2, 1818.	
Cochran, Alexander,	Jan. 8, 1814.	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Chambers, Joseph N.	May 4, 1814.	Engineers,	March 4, 1815.	
Chase, William H.	May 9, 1814.	-	-	Resigned August 3, 1818.
Cooper, Granville,	May 2, 1814.	-	-	
Cuniman, Joseph,	May 9, 1814.	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	Dismissed, 1816.
Cooper, George,	June 1, 1814.	-	-	
Chambers, James A.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	
Cooper, James M.	July 27, 1814.	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Corprew, George W.	Oct. 11, 1814.	-	-	Resigned December 6, 1816.
Cooper, James,	Oct. 7, 1814.	-	-	Resigned November 12, 1816.
Carter, London,	Oct. 13, 1814.	-	-	
Coolidge, John H.	Nov. 7, 1814.	-	-	
Conant, Roswell,	Dec. 22, 1814.	-	-	
Cruger, William E.	Feb. 7, 1815.	-	-	Resigned January 3, 1818.
Corbin, Richard,	May 10, 1815.	-	-	Transferred to the navy.
Clinton, James H.	May 10, 1815.	-	-	
Cruger, Nicholas J.	July 9, 1816.	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Cutts, Charles,	Aug. 15, 1817.	-	-	
Cupron, Seth M.	Oct. 4, 1817.	-	-	Resigned July 25, 1818.
Clark, Israel,	Feb. 1, 1817.	-	-	
Craig, John S.	Oct. 9, 1817.	-	-	
Cross, Richard,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Coulton, Henry,	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Clary, E. D.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 21, 1818.
Clark, Henry,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Collins, R. D. C.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Cadle, Joseph,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Cook, William,	July 21, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 17, 1818.
Canfield, Augustus,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Cathcart, George D.	July 21, 1818.	-	-	Admitted October 15, 1818.
Chipley, William D.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Calhoun, S. C.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Carlisle, John W.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Cunningham, P. H.	-	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Coulter, Henry S.	-	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Courtney, Edward H.	-	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Cooke, James H.	-	-	-	Dismissed July 25, 1803.
Doyle, John,	March 2, 1805.	-	-	Resigned, 1806.
Dyer, Luther,	March 20, 1807.	Engineers,	June 2, 1812.	
De Russey, Edward,	Jan. 2, 1809.	Artillery.	-	
Dallaby, James,	June 15, 1808.	-	-	Dismissed August 8, 1809.
Davis, Sutherland D.	Sept. 12, 1812.	1st reg't artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
Dana, N. G.	Dec. 1, 1812.	Artillery.	-	
Dix, John A.	April 14, 1813.	1st reg't artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
De Russey, Lewis G.	April 14, 1813.	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Davis, Jackman,	June 24, 1813.	-	-	Resigned, 1816.
Duffy, John B.	July 13, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Dullany, Henry R.	July 7, 1813.	-	-	Died September, 1815.
Dauny, Thomas,	July 29, 1813.	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Desponville, Charles,	July 13, 1813.	-	-	Dismissed, 1815.
Dulany, William A.	Dec. 27, 1813.	Light artillery,	1816.	
Davis, Charles,	May 3, 1814.	-	-	
Dumeste, Jacob A.	-	-	-	

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Davidson, William B.	May 9, 1814,	Ordnance,	Dec. 2, 1815.	
Delafield, Richard,	May 4, 1814,	Engineers,	July 24, 1818.	
Dehart, William C.	July 26, 1814,			
Dangerfield, Joseph,	July 26, 1814,	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Dana, Charles,	Sept. 28, 1814,	-	-	Resigned, 1815.
Dimmock, Justin,	Sept. 26, 1814,	-	-	
Dubois, Emanuel,	Oct. 6, 1814,	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1818.
Dimmock, Charles,	Dec. 14, 1816,	-	-	
Dupont, Samuel,	July 9, 1816,	-	-	Transferred to the navy.
Doro, Thomas J.	Aug. 15, 1817,	-	-	
Day, Robert,	Feb. 15, 1817,	-	-	
Donaldson, A. J.	Feb. 14, 1817,	-	-	
Dutton, George,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 7, 1818.
Denny, St. Clair,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 10, 1818.
Denny, John,	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Resigned Dec. 1, 1818; admitted September 1, 1818.
Day, Hannibal,	Feb. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Dunlap, D. G.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Dusenburg, Samuel B.	Dec. 2, 1815,	-	-	
Eveleth, William S.	July 22, 1813,	Engineers,	March 4, 1813,	Died October 4, 1818.
Embury, Peter,	May 4, 1814,	Light artillery.		
Eakin, Constantine,	Sept. 15, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Emmett, John P.	Oct. 1, 1814,	-	-	Resigned, 1817.
Elliason, William A.	Feb. 25, 1816,	-	-	
Edwards, John M.	July 25, 1815,	-	-	
Easton, Isaac C.	Jan. 17, 1816,	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Easton, David,	November 27,	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Edson, Alvin,	Feb. 5, 1817,	-	-	
Ewing, Putman,	June 14, 1817,	-	-	
Edwards, Thomas,	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Ellis, Samuel C.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Emmerson, Freeman,	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Eastland, N. W.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted November 6, 1818.
Fay, Hermard A.	March 20, 1807,	Artillery.		
Fielos, Benjamin,	Jan. 2, 1808,	1st reg't infantry.		
Fanning, Alexander,	April 14, 1809,	Artillery.		
Fitzhugh, Henry W.	July 30, 1812,	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Fowle, Oliver Cromwell,	April 14, 1813,	-	-	Resigned, 1814.
Forsyth, Robert M.	July 28, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Feltus, Henry J.	May 4, 1814,	-	-	
Fairfax, George W.	May 9, 1814,	-	-	Resigned February 19, 1816.
Fields, John C.	May 2, 1814,	-	-	
Frost, George W.	July 27, 1814,	-	-	Resigned March 8, 1816.
Forsyth, Robert A.	Sept. 22, 1814,	-	-	Resigned February 28, 1817.
Fenner, William,	Oct. 1, 1814,	-	-	Resigned March 1, 1816.
Fairfax, W. M. C.	March 2, 1816,	-	-	
Floyd, Charles,	July 9, 1816,	-	-	Dismissed Sept. 30, 1817.
Fillebrown, Silas B.	Oct. 9, 1817,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 1, 1818.
Fales, John W.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 30, 1818.
Folger, George W.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 30, 1818.
Feltus, Edward,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 1, 1818.
Fennemore, William H.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	
Fulton, Jefferson H.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 30, 1818.
Florince, Jacob,	March 2, 1801,	Artillery,	March 27, 1804.	
Gates, Samuel,	March 2, 1801,	Artillery,	March 6, 1806.	
Gates, William,	July 14, 1804,	Engineers,	Oct. 30, 1806.	
Gratiot, Charles,	April 28, 1806,	-	-	
Greenwood, Ethan A.	Oct. 20, 1806,	Artillery.		
Gibson, James,	June 15, 1808,	-	-	Dismissed August 8, 1809.
Griswold, James F.	Sept. 2, 1812,	Artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
Gardiner, George W.	April 14, 1813,	Light artillery,	Jan. 1, 1817.	
Gardiner, Thomas I.	April 14, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Gardiner, George W.	May 29, 1813,	-	-	Resigned, 1816.
Gray, Nicholas,	June 11, 1813,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Graham, William M.	June 19, 1813,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Graham, James D.	June 19, 1813,	-	-	Resigned Sept. 30, 1818.
Groynne, Thomas P.	July 28, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Griswold, Henry W.	Dec. 27, 1813,	-	-	Resigned Nov. 15, 1818.
Gibbs, George K.	Jan. 8, 1814,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Gano, Aaron G.	May 2, 1814,	Ordnance,	March 2, 1815.	
Gordon, William W.	May 9, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Griffith, Frederick,	May 9, 1814,	-	-	
Gorham, Benjamin,	May 9, 1814,	-	-	Resigned, 1817.
German, Sutherland,	June 11, 1814,	-	-	
Gilbert, Henry,	July 26, 1814,	Light artillery.		
Gaunt, Edward S.	Aug. 1, 1814,	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Gough, John,	Nov. 7, 1814,	5th infantry,	July 24, 1818.	
Giles, Henry P.	Dec. 19, 1814,	-	-	Resigned February 1, 1816.
Guy, James B.	Aug. 24, 1815,	-	-	
Gurrant, Charles,	Dec. 12, 1816,	-	-	
Gaillard, Daniel S.	Jan. 16, 1817,	-	-	
Grier, James,	Aug. 15, 1817,	-	-	
Giles, George W.	Oct. 27, 1817,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 10, 1818.
Gwynn, Walter,				

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Gaillard, William W.	Aug. 13, 1817,	-	-	Admitted Nov. 14, 1818.
Gird, Henry H.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 1, 1818.
Grayham, Campbell,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 1, 1818.
Grayham, Alfred,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Grimble, Charles F.	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 30, 1818.
Gardiner, Nathaniel,	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Nov. 6, 1818.
Green, Farnifold.				
Hulman, Julius F.	April 14, 1803,	Artillery,	March 6, 1806.	
Hyght, George W.	March 20, 1807,	-	-	Resigned July 31, 1810.
Huntington, Minor,	March 20, 1807,	Infantry,	June 18, 1808.	
Hoburt, Henry A.	Jan. 20, 1808,	Light artillery.	-	
Holly, Samuel H.	Dec. 3, 1808.	-	-	
Hall, Ansant,	June 15, 1808,	Infantry.	-	
Haxtun, Milton,	June 15, 1808,	Light dragoons,	Jan. 27, 1809.	
Hoburt, William F.	Feb. 16, 1809,	Light artillery,	Jan. 3, 1812.	
Humphrey, Evans,	May 19, 1813,	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Herberger, Stephen,	June 16, 1813,	-	-	Resigned, 1815.
Hills, John,	July 31, 1813,	Ordnance,	March 2, 1815.	
Hunt, Samuel,	May 2, 1814.	-	-	
Haviland, Benjamin L.	June 7, 1814,	-	-	Resigned August 22, 1816.
Hamilton, William,	June 15, 1814,	-	-	Resigned, 1817.
Hall, William G.	June 15, 1814.	-	-	
Heupburn, James S.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	
Hawkins, Edgar S.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	
Hutt, John,	Sept. 21, 1814,	-	-	Dismissed February 23, 1818.
Hitchcock, Ethan,	Oct. 11, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Hopkins, David,	Nov. 8, 1814,	-	-	Resigned Sept. 24, 1816.
Harding, Edward,	Oct. 15, 1814,	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Harleston, John,	Feb. 24, 1815,	-	-	Resigned October 4, 1816.
Hamtramck, Francis,	March 1, 1815.	-	-	
Holmes, C. Rutledge,	Dec. 4, 1816.	-	-	
Hunter, William G.	Nov. 16, 1816.	-	-	
Hoburt, Samuel,	March 29, 1817.	-	-	
Henry, Julian,	May 12, 1817.	-	-	
Harris, James,	Oct. 14, 1817.	-	-	
Hobbs, Henry,	Nov. 16, 1817,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 1, 1818.
Henshaw, James,	Sept. 6, 1817.	-	-	
Hunt, Robert S.	July 2, 1817.	-	-	
Holland, John C.	Jan. 29, 1817.	-	-	
Hoffman, Henry B.	July 21, 1818.	-	-	
Hutt, Charles,	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Hewitt, S. H.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 21, 1818.
Hunter, David,	July 21, 1818.	-	-	
Harman, Thomas J.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 24, 1818.
Holmes, Norman,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Resigned August 25, 1818.
Hamilton, W.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Harding, William H.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 10, 1818.
Hunter, David,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 14, 1818.
Homer, R. H.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Houston, Oswald,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Hopson, J. D.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted Sept. 24, 1818.
Jackson, Henry B.	March 2, 1801,	Artillery,	April 14, 1803.	
Jones, Maurice W.	Nov. 10, 1803.	-	-	
Inderwink, Charles,	Nov. 23, 1807,	-	-	Dismissed August 29, 1808.
Irvine, Armstrong,	June 15, 1808,	Light artillery.	-	
Johnson, Joel,	April 14, 1809,	-	-	Resigned May 12, 1810.
Jackson, Allen, H.	June 24, 1813,	-	-	Resigned, 1816.
Johnson, Milo,	July 22, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Jacot, Daniel,	May 4, 1814,	-	-	Resigned, 1817.
Jameson, Titus J.	June 3, 1814,	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Jenners, William,	July 6, 1814,	-	-	Resigned December 10, 1816.
Johnson, William,	Aug. 6, 1814,	-	-	Resigned April 30, 1817.
Jones, Lucius,	Nov. 12, 1814,	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Jackson, John J.	March 8, 1815,	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Jones, John C.	May 10, 1815,	-	-	Resigned, November 27, 1817.
Johnson, Z. F.	July 28, 1815,	-	-	Dismissed October 31, 1818.
Johnson, Nathaniel,	July 9, 1816,	-	-	Resigned February 10, 1818.
James, William H.	Jan. 19, 1816,	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1816.
Jones, M. A.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Ingalls, T. R.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 21, 1818.
Johnson, Thomas,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Johnson, T. F.	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted October 26, 1818.
James, John J.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Jones, E.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Irvin, Henry L.				
Kelly, John J.	Nov. 6, 1804,	-	-	Resigned November 30, 1806.
Ketchum, Thomas,	June 15, 1808,	Light artillery.	-	
Kingsbury, Lawson,	June 15, 1808,	-	-	Resigned May 31, 1809.
Ken, Eli W.	Dec. 25, 1813.	-	-	
Kirk, John C.	Feb. 5, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Karrick, George Ord,	Mar. 17, 1814,	-	-	Resigned in 1817.
Kirtland, Ambrose,	April 7, 1814,	-	-	Resigned in 1816.
Kingsby, Zebina J. D.	April 12, 1814.	-	-	

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Kepple, John H.	July 9, 1814.	-	-	Resigned in 1818.
Ken, William H.	Feb. 24, 1815.	-	-	[* Frederick Lewis was educated in France at the expense of his family; while abroad he was a Cadet on half-pay, but never received any; as when offered it was declined. He resigned in 1805, and entered the corps of engineers in 1812 as 2d lieutenant.]
Kennedy, Samuel,	Jan. 6, 1817.	-	-	
Leviz, Simon M.	Mar. 2, 1801.	Engineers,	October 12, 1802.	Resigned in 1806.
Little, John,	Dec. 24, 1801.	Artillery,	May 1, 1803.	
Livingston, John,	June 7, 1802.	-	-	Resigned April 1, 1810.
Lewis, Frederick,*	Jan. 25, 1803.	Engineers,	July 6, 1812.	
Louiner, Lewis,	July 14, 1804.	Infantry,	Novem. 14, 1806.	Resigned in 1806.
Lucas, Robert,	Dec. 29, 1804.	Artillery,	Novem. 14, 1806.	
Lorimer, Auguste,	Nov. 22, 1804.	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1810.
Leonard, Luther,	Oct. 9, 1806.	Artillery.	-	
Lillington, John A.	March 8, 1808.	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1810.
Larraby, Adam,	Jan. 18, 1808.	Light artillery.	-	
Loomis, Gustavus,	June 15, 1808.	Artillery.	-	Resigned August 25, 1817.
Lefingwell, Wm. C.	April 14, 1809.	-	-	
Loring, Henry H.	April 14, 1813.	Light artillery,	July 24, 1818.	Resigned January 31, 1816.
Low, Bradley, S. A.	May 7, 1813.	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Loring, Nathaniel H.	May 8, 1813.	-	-	Resigned in 1817.
Lendrum, Thomas W.	June 16, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Leslie, Thomas J.	July 5, 1813.	Engineers,	March 4, 1815.	Resigned in 1817.
Lee, Alfred,	Jan. 8, 1814.	-	-	
Little, Edwin. E.	May 9, 1814.	-	-	Resigned in 1817.
Lee, Richard B.	May 7, 1814.	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Lamb, John,	May 9, 1814.	-	-	Resigned in 1817.
Livingston, Edward,	June 3, 1814.	-	-	
Lagnel, Julius A.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	Resigned September 24, 1816.
Livingston, Morgan,	July 26, 1814.	-	-	
Lambert, Edward J.	July 13, 1814.	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	Dismissed in 1815.
Leib, George,	Feb. 8, 1815.	-	-	
Lindsey, William C.	March 4, 1815.	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Lindsey, George F.	March 8, 1815.	-	-	
Lacy, Robert A.	Dec. 2, 1815.	-	-	Died January 1, 1817; accidental discharge of a gun.
Lengle, John L.	Dec. 9, 1815.	-	-	
Lowe, Vincent M.	Jan. 17, 1816.	-	-	Died October 16, 1818.
Lacock, Dryden,	Jan. 17, 1816.	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Long, Armistead,	Nov. 27, 1816.	-	-	
Lacey, Westwood,	Dec. 27, 1816.	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Lowndes, Rawlings,	May 1, 1816.	-	-	
Lowndes, Thomas O.	Dec. 12, 1816.	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Latrobe, John H.	Dec. 3, 1817.	-	-	
Lawrence, B. Lewis,	Aug. 18, 1817.	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Lincoln, Albert,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
Lee, Francis,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Launch, J. D.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Lee, C. L.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Lussell, Francis,	July 21, 1818.	-	-	
McRee, William,	April 14, 1803.	Engineers,	July 1, 1805.	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Macomb, William,	Dec. 3, 1803.	-	-	
Mulson, Samuel,	July 6, 1804.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Martin, Henry L.	March 6, 1805.	-	-	
Mason, Milo,	Mar. 20, 1807.	Infantry,	June 18, 1808.	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Murth, Ormond,	Dec. 3, 1807.	1st reg't infantry.	-	
Murdock, Francis B.	June 15, 1808.	Light artillery,	January 3, 1808.	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Magee, Augustus,	June 15, 1808.	Artillery,	January 24, 1809.	
Manly, George,	Oct. 5, 1808.	3d reg't infantry,	January 3, 1812.	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Merchant, Charles,	Sept. 7, 1812.	1st reg't artillery,	March 11, 1814.	
Monroe, John,	Oct. 12, 1812.	1st reg't artillery,	March 11, 1814.	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Mackenzie, Samuel,	April 14, 1813.	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Mackenzie, John,	April 14, 1813.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
McIntire, William,	June 11, 1813.	-	-	
McLaughlin, Wm. L.	May 24, 1813.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Monroe, James,	Sept. 3, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2, 1813.	
Macburnie, James L.	Nov. 30, 1813.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Middleton, Henry,	Dec. 24, 1813.	Engineers,	March 4, 1815.	
Morton, Edmund,	May 9, 1814.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Morton, Alexander,	May 9, 1814.	-	-	
McKesson, Wm. A.	June 7, 1814.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Malcolm, William G.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	
McNiell, Wm. Gibbs,	July 26, 1814.	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	Resigned September 3, 1806.
McDonald, Angus,	July 30, 1814.	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Maul, Benedict,	July 1, 1814.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Maitland, Wm. S.	Oct. 11, 1814.	-	-	
Morris, William W.	Oct. 27, 1814.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Mulhallon, Daniel,	Oct. 7, 1814.	-	-	
McRee, Samuel,	Feb. 24, 1815.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Millen, Richard,	March 6, 1815.	-	-	
McClellan, Wm. B.	March 8, 1815.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
McArthur, Thomas J.	April 15, 1815.	-	-	
Mansfield, Edward D.	May 10, 1815.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Marshall, Charles,	May 10, 1815.	-	-	
Morris, Lewis,	Aug. 25, 1815.	-	-	Resigned September 3, 1806.
Myers, Jefferson,	Dec. 14, 1816.	-	-	



## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Mason, Thomas	Feb. 5, 1816,	-	-	Resigned December 1, 1817.
Madison, Ambrose	July 9, 1816.	-	-	
Mead, Henry S.	Feb. 1, 1817,	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Mansfield, Joseph	Sept. 4, 1817.	-	-	
Moniac, David	Dec. 25, 1817.	-	-	
Morris, Thompson	Feb. 14, 1817.	-	-	
McRay, John	Oct. 9, 1817,	-	-	Resigned September 1, 1818.
Montgomery, D. M.	Sept. 11, 1817.	-	-	
Morris, Gouverneur	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Morrison, John B.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	
McLain, G. W.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Millard, H.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Macomb, Jasper	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
McCall, George C.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
McCauly, J.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Masey, Elijah	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Miles, D. S.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
McNamara, Thomas	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 26, 1818.
Mason, Enoch	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 26, 1818.
McCormick, P.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 17, 1818.
Miller, Albert S.	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted November 6, 1818.
Noah, Samuel	May 5, 1807,	Infantry,	Decem. 9, 1807.	
Newman, Samuel	Oct. 30, 1807.	-	-	
Newton, Edwin	June 24, 1813,	-	-	Resigned September 21, 1816.
Noel, Thomas	May 25, 1814.	-	-	
Nicholson, Edward L.	May 25, 1814.	-	-	
Nelson, J.	June 11, 1814.	-	-	
Nicholas, William H.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	
Newton, James	July 6, 1814,	-	-	Resigned October 29, 1817.
Newton, William S.	July 1, 1814,	Light artillery,	July 22, 1818.	
Nixon, Richard	Feb. 28, 1815,	-	-	Resigned November 8, 1817.
Nichols, John	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 21, 1818.
Newell, John E.	-	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Osgood, Nathaniel	June 15, 1808,	Artillery,	January 3, 1812.	
Osborn, S. M.	June 15, 1808,	Infantry,	-	Killed at Fort Mims.
Ogden, Cornelius	May 14, 1813.	-	-	
Oakly, William S.	May 18, 1814,	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Orr, John D. W.	Sept. 20, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
O'Neal, William	March 2, 1815,	-	-	Resigned April 1, 1818.
O'Neal, Robert	March 2, 1815,	-	-	Resigned November 19, 1817.
O'Fling, Edmund	May 10, 1815,	-	-	Resigned August 5, 1817.
Porter, Ambrose	March 2, 1801,	-	-	Resigned February 28, 1802.
Proveaux, Joseph	Dec. 2, 1800,	Artillery,	Novem. 14, 1806.	
Partridge, William	Dec. 13, 1805,	Engineers,	October 30, 1806.	
Partridge, Alden	Dec. 14, 1805,	Engineers,	October 30, 1806.	
Post, Justis	Oct. 9, 1806,	Artillery,	Decem. 9, 1807.	
Peters, George P.	Dec. 3, 1807,	Infantry,	June 18, 1808.	
Pike, George W.	Jan. 20, 1808,	-	-	Dismissed September 10, 1810.
Payne, Asa	April 14, 1809,	-	-	Resigned May 24, 1810.
Partridge Milton	Mar. 11, 1813,	-	-	Resigned October 1, 1817.
Parkhurst, Jabez	July 21, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Pooler, Robert M.	Dec. 27, 1813,	Engineers,	March 4, 1815.	
Porter, Giles	April 7, 1814,	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Polk, Edward	June 28, 1814,	-	-	Deserted December, 1816.
Pleasanton, John H.	July 7, 1814,	-	-	Resigned October 7, 1817.
Payne, John	August 6, 1814,	-	-	Resigned February 28, 1818.
Parker, Charles	Sept. 21, 1814,	-	-	Resigned April 30, 1817.
Pratt, John	Sept. 20, 1814,	1st reg't infantry,	July 24, 1818.	
Pickens, John C.	March 1, 1815,	-	-	Resigned April 28, 1817.
Pinckney, Edward	May 10, 1815,	-	-	Resigned March 31, 1818.
Pentland, Joseph	Dec. 27, 1816.	-	-	
Pierce, Charles	Aug. 15, 1817.	-	-	
Prescott, Jonathan	Oct. 9, 1817,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Purviance, —	Oct. 27, 1817.	-	-	
Page, J.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Pickett, John C.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Philip, Joseph A.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Puris, Edward J.	April 4, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Porter, D. M.	July 21, 1818.	-	-	
Person, Ben. E.	-	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Rathbone, Samuel B.	June, 1803,	Artillery,	June 13, 1808.	
Roberts, Attheus	Mar. 20, 1807,	Artillery,	Dec. 12, 1808.	
Robert, Erastus	Dec. 3, 1807,	-	-	Resigned April, 1809.
Randall, Theodore	April 2, 1808.	-	-	
Ronan, George	June 15, 1808,	1st reg't infantry.	-	
Randolph, Thomas B.	Oct. 14, 1808,	Light artillery,	January 3, 1812.	
Rigal, William	May 29, 1813,	Ordnance,	March 2, 1815.	
Ripley, James	May 8, 1813,	Artillery,	June 1, 1814.	
Renwick, William	Dec. 27, 1813,	-	-	Resigned 1816.
Robinson, Thomas	Oct. 4, 1813.	-	-	
Ravurdi, Lewis	Mar. 22, 1814,	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Russell, John C.	May 9, 1814,	Light artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Ramsey, George D.	May 14, 1814.	-	-	

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Rupp, Joseph D.	July 26, 1814.	-	-	-
Rogers, James,	Sept. 14, 1814.	-	-	Resigned 1815.
Roumfort, Augustus,	Sept. 26, 1814.	Marines,	April,	1817.
Ruden, Jacques,	Oct. 27, 1814.	-	-	Resigned November 30, 1818.
Ringgold, Samuel,	Oct. 24, 1814.	Artillery,	July 24,	1818.
Reed, Alexander,	Oct. 5, 1814.	-	-	Resigned 1815.
Ringgold, James,	Nov. 13, 1814.	-	-	Resigned March 23, 1816.
Rodgers, Jason,	Feb. 24, 1815.	-	-	-
Ramsey, Andrew,	March 3, 1815.	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Rodney, Thomas,	Sept. 20, 1814.	-	-	-
Ragland, Thomas,	August 9, 1815.	-	-	-
Robinson, Prescott,	Dec. 27, 1816.	-	-	-
Ratcliff, Charles,	Dec. 27, 1816.	-	-	-
Risby, David,	July 25, 1816.	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Ross, Edward C.	Dec. 14, 1816.	-	-	-
Rowland, Robert,	Dec. 14, 1816.	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Robertson, Perkins,	Dec. 26, 1816.	-	-	-
Rose, William,	Sept. 26, 1817.	-	-	-
Reynolds, J. G.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Root, Edward E.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 3, 1818.
Robert, William,	July 21, 1818.	-	-	-
Ross, James,	July 21, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Swift, Joseph G.	May 12, 1800.	Engineers,	Oct. 12,	1802.
Smith, Nathan,	March 6, 1806.	-	-	-
Smith, James,	June 8, 1807.	-	-	Dismissed May 11, 1808.
Sands, Abraham L.	June 15, 1808.	Artillery.	-	-
Strong, Joel,	June 15, 1808.	-	-	Resigned April 1, 1810.
Smith, Ezra,	June 15, 1808.	Artillery.	-	-
Smith, William W.	April 14, 1809.	Light artillery.	-	-
Sumpter, William,	Jan. 18, 1810.	Light artillery,	January 3,	1812.
Spencer, James,	Jan. 1, 1812.	Artillery,	July 17,	1817.
Staats, Genett B.	May 10, 1813.	-	-	Dismissed 1814.
Swift, William H.	April 14, 1813.	-	-	-
Smith, Henry,	May 28, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2,	1815.
Scott, Robert J.	May 8, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2,	1815.
Smoot, Alexander,	June 11, 1813.	-	-	Resigned June 5, 1816.
Smoot, Joseph,	July 8, 1813.	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Swift, George W.	June 16, 1813.	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Strong, Jasper,	July 13, 1813.	-	-	-
Sloo, John Roe,	June 25, 1813.	Artillery,	March 2,	1815.
Stephenson, Thomas,	July 9, 1813.	Artillery,	July 21,	1814.
Simonson, James,	August 7, 1813.	Ordnance,	March 2,	1815.
Symington, John,	Sept. 10, 1813.	Ordnance,	March 2,	1815.
Spencer, Alexander,	Jan. 15, 1814.	-	-	Resigned 1816.
Spencer, Theodore,	Jan. 5, 1814.	-	-	Resigned 1816.
Smith, John,	Jan. 8, 1814.	-	-	-
Stubbs, James R.	Jan. 8, 1814.	Light artillery.	-	-
Sears, Sylvanus,	April 7, 1814.	-	-	-
Sickels, Ethan C.	May 9, 1814.	-	-	-
Shaver, William,	June 2, 1814.	-	-	Resigned 1816.
Slye, Robert A.	June 15, 1814.	-	-	Resigned October 1, 1816.
Stoddert, Elijah,	July 26, 1814.	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Symminton, Thomas,	July 30, 1814.	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Schwartz, John,	July 19, 1814.	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1817.
Sudler, Thomas G.	July 21, 1814.	-	-	-
Story, Frederick W. C.	August 3, 1814.	-	-	Resigned 1815.
Skinner, Aaron B.	August 3, 1814.	-	-	-
Smith, Samuel S.	Nov. 11, 1814.	Artillery,	July 24,	1818.
Simmons, Charles,	Dec. 22, 1814.	-	-	Resigned November 8, 1817.
Strong, Joseph,	Feb. 8, 1815.	Artillery,	July 24,	1818.
Sykes, William E.	Feb. 24, 1815.	-	-	Resigned May 6, 1817.
Swan, Edward,	June 16, 1815.	-	-	Resigned September 2, 1816.
Scott, John F.	Dec. 24, 1816.	-	-	-
Scott, John B.	Sept. 9, 1817.	-	-	-
Scott, William J.	Aug. 5, 1817.	-	-	Admitted September 4, 1818.
Stith, Townsend,	June 14, 1817.	-	-	-
Stickney, George,	April 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Surle, Frederick,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Smith, Charles J.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Shaw, Charles B.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Snelling, Joseph,	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Shuler, John J.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Shules, George S.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Resigned August 24, 1818.
Stewart, Richard H.	Aug. 14, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Stevenson, James R.	May 20, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 10, 1818.
Slaughter, D. C.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted September 30, 1818.
Scott, James,	-	-	-	Admitted November 6, 1818.
Smith, Constantine.	-	-	-	-
Totten, Joseph G.	Nov. 4, 1802.	Engineers,	July 1,	1805.
Thayer, Sylvanus,	Mar. 20, 1807.	Engineers,	Feb. 28,	1808.
Templeman, George,	Oct. 10, 1808.	Light artillery,	Jan. 3,	1812.
Thompson, Alexander,	Nov. 21, 1810.	6th infantry,	Jan. 3,	1812.
Trescott, George,	Mar. 11, 1813.	Engineers,	Oct. 16,	1813.

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Taylor, William B. G.	June 8, 1813,	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Thruston, Charles M.	July 19, 1813,	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Turner, Daniel,	Jan. 5, 1814,	-	-	Resigned 1816.
Tompkins, Augustus,	May 4, 1814,	-	-	
Tuffts, John M.	May 18, 1814,	-	-	
Tompkins, Daniel D.	July 21, 1814,	-	-	Resigned December 16, 1816.
Taylor, Robert B.	August 3, 1814,	-	-	
Turnbull, William,	Oct. 27, 1814,	-	-	Resigned December 15, 1817.
Taliaferro, Hay,	Nov. 12, 1814,	-	-	Dismissed August 31, 1818.
Tilghman, Thomas,	Mar. 14, 1815,	Engineers,	July 24, 1818.	
Talcott, Andrew,	May 10, 1815,	-	-	
Thompson, Henry,	July 9, 1816,	-	-	
Talmadge, George W.	July 9, 1816,	-	-	
Taylor, Daniel,	Dec. 12, 1816,	-	-	
Tuttle, Stephenson,	Dec. 27, 1816,	-	-	
Tennant, Charles,	Nov. 18, 1817,	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Tyler, Nathaniel,	Oct. 7, 1817,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Taylor, George,	Aug. 15, 1817,	-	-	
Trenor, Eustis,	Nov. 19, 1817,	-	-	Admitted September 21, 1818.
Tohrnstorn, Robert,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	
Turner, John B.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 2, 1818.
Thompson, Edward,	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Thompson, W. B.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Tilton, E. G.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Thompson, J.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Taliaferro, M.	May 23, 1818,	-	-	
Taliaferro, W.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Tyler, H. B.	Sept. 12, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 28, 1818.
Trist, M. P.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted October 31, 1818.
Trezevant, P.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	
Trimble, Isaac,	July 14, 1804,	Artillery,	March 6, 1806.	
Vincent, Paschal,	Jan. 11, 1805,	Artillery,	-	
Vallé, Louis,	July 9, 1806,	Light artillery.	-	
Villard, Hipolite H.	Jan. 2, 1808,	Artillery,	-	
Van Deventer, C.	June 17, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Van Deventer, M. F.	July 13, 1813,	-	-	Resigned 1816.
Vanderburgh, William,	April 7, 1814,	-	-	
Underhill, Fred. A.	May 4, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Vintoo, John R.	May 3, 1814,	-	-	Resigned 1818.
Van Wycke, William H.	Aug. 10, 1814,	-	-	Resigned November 8, 1817.
Vallean, Ming,	Feb. 24, 1815,	Ordnance,	July 24, 1818.	
Vining, Ben. C.	Aug. 15, 1817,	-	-	
Vail, Jefferson,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Vinton, David H.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	
Voorhees, Silsby,	Nov. 23, 1803,	Engineers,	Oct. 30, 1806.	
Willard, Prentiss,	Nov. 6, 1804,	-	-	
Whyte, Matthew N.	May 15, 1805,	Engineers,	July 23, 1810.	
Williams, Alexander J.	May 15, 1805,	-	-	Resigned February 28, 1812.
Williams, Henry J.	May 17, 1805,	Engineers,	October 30, 1806.	
Wood, Eleazer D.	May 27, 1805,	Artillery,	Nov. 14, 1806.	
Windham, John B.	April 13, 1808,	-	-	Dismissed August, 1810, by order of Secretary of War.
Wolcott, Henry,	-	-	-	Dismissed July 31, 1810.
White, Henry C.	June 15, 1808,	-	-	
Willcocks, Joseph N.	June 15, 1808,	3d reg't infantry,	January 3, 1812.	
Wright, John,	May 22, 1812,	Engineers,	March —, 1814.	
Webber, John A.	April 14, 1813,	Light artillery,	Sept. 30, 1816.	
Williams, Wolvert.	May 22, 1813,	Ordnance,	March 2, 1815.	
Wetmore, Samuel W.	April 14, 1813,	Artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Wells, Williams,	May 17, 1813,	Light artillery,	July 21, 1814.	
Willard, Simon,	July 29, 1813,	Ordnance,	March 2, 1815.	
Washington, George A.	July 13, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Wendell, Abraham,	Sept. 2, 1813,	Artillery,	March 2, 1815.	
Webb, Bloomfield,	Nov. 30, 1813,	-	-	
Weed, William B.	May 9, 1814,	-	-	Resigned August 31, 1818.
Winder, John H.	May 11, 1814,	-	-	
Welsh, William H.	May 4, 1814,	-	-	
Whistler, George W.	May 9, 1814,	-	-	
Watson, Charles M.	June 2, 1814,	-	-	
Wright, Robert,	June 9, 1814,	-	-	Resigned June 4, 1818.
Webb, George,	July 2, 1814,	Artillery,	July 24, 1818.	
Walker, James H.	July 26, 1814,	-	-	Resigned September 15, 1816.
White, Richard,	Feb. 8, 1815,	Light artillery,	Dec. 1, 1817.	
Wallace, John R.	Sept. 28, 1814,	-	-	Resigned January 31, 1817.
Whetcroft, William,	Oct. 24, 1814,	Marines,	June 10, 1817.	
Washington, John M.	Oct. 24, 1814,	Artillery,	July 17, 1817.	
Webster, Horace,	Oct. 24, 1814,	3d infantry,	July 24, 1814.	
Worthington, James D.	Nov. 5, 1814,	-	-	
Williams, James A.	Feb. 24, 1815,	-	-	Resigned January 1, 1818.
Woolly, Aaron K.	March 14, 1815,	-	-	
Wolcott, Oliver S.	April 5, 1815,	-	-	Transferred to the navy.
Watkins, George S.	May 10, 1815,	-	-	
Ward, Charles,	Nov. 17, 1815,	-	-	Resigned July 17, 1817.

## REGISTER OF CADETS—Continued.

Names.	Date of appointment.	PROMOTIONS.		REMARKS.
		Corps or regiment.	Date of appointment.	
Wilking, James A.	Nov. 25, 1816.	-	-	Resigned August 5, 1817.
Wright, William,	Feb. 5, 1816,	-	-	
Walker, Benjamin,	Feb. 5, 1817.	-	-	
Wheeler, Otis,	Aug. 15, 1817.	-	-	
Wheellock, John,	Sept. 6, 1817.	-	-	
Wheelwright, W.	Jan. 11, 1817.	-	-	Resigned October 31, 1818.
Wood, James,	Sept. 20, 1817.	-	-	
Wells, Edward L.	March 3, 1817,	-	-	
Wright, Thomas,	Aug. 9, 1817.	-	-	
Waites, Wilson G.	Aug. 13, 1817.	-	-	
Wallace, David,	Feb. 14, 1817.	-	-	
Wells, William W.	Jan. 20, 1817.	-	-	
Wright, A. M.	Aug. 9, 1818,	-	-	
Wales, Samuel,	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Wheellock, T. B.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	
Wollcott, John S.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 24, 1818.
Wright, Benjamin H.	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Wade, G. J. D.	Aug. 29, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Whetten, G. W.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Wragg, Samuel,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 7, 1818.
Watts, John P.	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 1, 1818.
Withers, J. T.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	Admitted November 6, 1818.
Wright, George,	May 20, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 14, 1818.
Wall, William,	July 21, 1818,	-	-	Admitted September 21, 1818.
Willcocks, J. R.	Aug. 19, 1818,	-	-	Admitted October 31, 1818.
Williams, C. C.	Aug. 19, 1818.	-	-	
Young, W. O.	Aug. 19, 1819,	-	-	Admitted September 21, 1818.

15th CONGRESS.]

No. 175.

[2d SESSION.

## CONTRACTS MADE IN THE YEAR 1818.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 25, 1819.

SIR:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, February 24, 1819.

In compliance with an act concerning public contracts, passed April 21, 1808, I have the honor to transmit to Congress statements exhibiting the contracts which were made by the commissary general of subsistence, the ordnance department, the commissary general of purchases, and the engineer department, in the year 1818, marked A, B, C, D.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

The Hon. the SPEAKER of the House of Representatives.

A.

A list of contracts made by the Commissary General of Subsistence in the year 1818.

ARTICLES.	Amount of each article.	Total.
Sterrett Ramsay, for the following articles of subsistence to be delivered at the post of Carlisle:		
51 barrels of pork, at \$22,	-	\$1,122 00
107 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 75,	-	187 25
138 barrels of flour, at \$8,	-	1,104 00
24 barrels of whiskey, at 55 cents per gallon,	-	422 40
9 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound,	-	100 80
360 pounds of candles, at 22 cents,	-	79 20
15 bushels of salt, at \$1 25,	-	18 75
240 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents,	-	60 00
		\$3,094 40
Sterrett Ramsay, for the post of Baltimore:		
857 barrels of pork, at \$19,	-	16,283 00
1,786 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 50,	-	2,679 00
2,296 barrels of flour, at \$9,	-	20,664 00
400 barrels of whiskey, at 55 cents per gallon,	-	7,040 00
143 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound,	-	1,601 60
6,000 pounds of candles, at 19 cents,	-	1,140 00
250 bushels of salt, at 70 cents,	-	175 00
4,000 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents,	-	1,000 00
		50,583 60

## LIST OF CONTRACTS—Continued.

ARTICLES.	Amount of each article.	Total.
Jesse Smith, for the post of Sackett's Harbor:		
385 barrels of pork, at \$16 50, - - -	\$6,352 50	
804 bushels of peas or beans, at 94 cents, - - -	755 76	
1,033 barrels of flour, at \$6 20, - - -	6,404 60	
180 barrels of whiskey, at 48 cents per gallon, - - -	2,764 80	
6,400 pounds of soap, at 10 cents, - - -	640 00	
2,700 pounds of candles, at 20 cents, - - -	540 00	
113 bushels of salt, at 85 cents, - - -	96 05	
1,800 gallons of vinegar, at 30 cents, - - -	540 00	
		\$18,093 71
Charles Bullock, for the post of Fort Hawkins:		
107 barrels of pork, at \$28, - - -	2,996 00	
223 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 50, - - -	557 50	
287 barrels of flour, at \$18, - - -	5,166 00	
50 barrels of whiskey, at \$1 per gallon, - - -	1,600 00	
18 hundredweight of soap, at 15 cents per pound, - - -	302 40	
750 pounds of candles, at 27 cents, - - -	202 50	
31 bushels of salt, at \$3 25, - - -	100 75	
500 gallons of vinegar, at \$1, - - -	500 00	
		11,425 15
George Cooper, for the post of New York:		
428 barrels of pork, at \$16, - - -	6,848 00	
893 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2, - - -	1,786 00	
1,148 barrels of flour at \$8, - - -	9,184 00	
200 barrels of whiskey, at 63 cents per gallon, - - -	4,032 00	
7,100 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound, - - -	795 20	
3,000 pounds of candles, at 15 cents, - - -	450 00	
125 bushels of salt, at 50 cents, - - -	62 50	
2,000 gallons of vinegar, at 15½ cents, - - -	313 33	
		23,471 03
Ralph Parker, for the post of Niagara:		
107 barrels of pork, at \$21, - - -	2,247 00	
223 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 50, - - -	334 50	
287 barrels of flour, at \$6 25, - - -	1,793 75	
50 barrels of whiskey, at 60 cents per gallon, - - -	960 00	
18 hundredweight of soap, at 16 cents per pound, - - -	322 56	
750 pounds of candles, at 20 cents, - - -	150 00	
31 bushels of salt, at 70 cents, - - -	21 70	
500 gallons of vinegar, at 22 cents, - - -	110 00	
		5,939 51
Jonathan Allen, for the post of Boston:		
750 barrels of pork, at \$24, - - -	18,000 00	
1,652 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2, - - -	3,124 00	
2,009 barrels of flour, at \$10, - - -	20,090 00	
350 barrels of whiskey, at 62½ cents per gallon, - - -	7,000 00	
125 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound, - - -	1,400 00	
5,250 pounds of candles, at 15 cents, - - -	787 50	
219 bushels of salt, at 62½ cents, - - -	136 82½	
3,500 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents, - - -	875 00	
		51,413 32½
Izra Smith, for the post of Plattsburg:		
128 barrels of pork, at \$20, - - -	2,560 00	
268 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1, - - -	268 00	
344 barrels of flour, at \$8 50, - - -	2,924 00	
60 barrels of whiskey, at 60 cents per gallon, - - -	1,152 00	
21 hundredweight of soap, at 14 cents per pound, - - -	329 28	
9 hundredweight of candles, at 18 cents per pound, - - -	162 00	
38 bushels of salt, at \$1, - - -	38 00	
600 gallons of vinegar, at 23 cents, - - -	138 00	
		7,571 28
William Hill, for the post of Detroit:		
1,378 barrels of pork, at \$15, - - -	20,670 00	
2,871 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 75, - - -	7,895 25	
3,691 barrels of flour, at \$7 50, - - -	27,682 50	
643 barrels of whiskey, at 45 cents per gallon, - - -	9,259 20	
230 hundredweight of soap, at 12 cents per pound, - - -	3,091 20	
9,645 pounds of candles, at 17 cents, - - -	1,639 65	
402 bushels of salt, at \$1 40, - - -	562 80	
6,430 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents, - - -	1,607 50	
		72,408 10
William Hill, for the post of Pittsburg:		
85 barrels of pork, at \$10, - - -	850 00	
179 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 00, - - -	358 00	
230 barrels of flour, at \$4 25, - - -	977 50	
40 barrels of whiskey, at 34 cents per gallon, - - -	435 20	
14 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound, - - -	156 80	
600 pounds of candles, at 15 cents, - - -	90 00	
25 bushels of salt, at \$1 25, - - -	31 25	
400 gallons of vinegar, at 18 cents per gallon, - - -	72 00	
		2,970 75
Cyrus W. Murray, for the post of Norfolk:		
267 barrels of pork, at \$18, - - -	4,806 00	
558 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 20, - - -	669 60	
717 barrels of flour, at \$8 50, - - -	6,094 50	
125 barrels of whiskey, at 58 cents per gallon, - - -	2,320 00	

## LIST OF CONTRACTS—Continued.

ARTICLES.	Amount of each article.	Total.
Cyrus W. Murray, for the post of Norfolk:		
45 hundredweight of soap, at 9 cents per pound,	-	\$453 60
1,875 pounds of candles, at 18 cents,	-	337 50
78 bushels of salt, at 80 cents,	-	62 40
1,250 gallons vinegar, at 30 cents,	-	375 00
		\$15,118 60
Camillus Griffith, for the post of Philadelphia:		
160 barrels of pork, at \$22,	-	3,520 00
385 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 30,	-	500 50
430 barrels of flour, at \$9 25,	-	3,977 50
75 barrels of whiskey, at 57 cents per gallon,	-	1,368 00
27 hundredweight of soap, at 9 cents per pound,	-	272 16
1,125 pounds of candles, at 18 cents,	-	202 50
47 bushels of salt, at 80 cents,	-	37 60
750 gallons of vinegar, at 30 cents,	-	225 00
		10,103 26
Moses Bliss, for the post of Springfield, Massachusetts:		
51 barrels of pork, at \$20,	-	1,020 00
107 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2,	-	214 00
138 barrels of flour, at \$10,	-	1,380 00
24 barrels of whiskey, at 75 cents per gallon,	-	576 00
9 hundredweight of soap, at 9 cents per pound,	-	90 72
360 pounds of candles, at 18 cents,	-	64 80
15 bushels of salt, at \$1,	-	15 00
240 gallons of vinegar, at 20 cents,	-	48 00
		3,408 52
Bosson, Cowden, & Co. and George Bates, for the post of Newport, Kentucky:		
64 barrels of pork, at \$16,	-	1,024 00
134 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 25,	-	167 50
172 barrels of flour, at \$6 25,	-	1,161 00
30 barrels of whiskey, at 50 cents per gallon,	-	480 00
11 hundredweight of soap, at 10½ cents per pound,	-	129 36
450 pounds of candles, at 18 cents,	-	81 00
19 bushels of salt, at \$1 62½,	-	30 87
300 gallons of vinegar, at 20 cents,	-	60 00
		3,133 73
H. A. Fay, for the post of Albany:		
64 barrels of pork, at \$18,	-	1,152 00
134 bushels of peas or beans, at \$1 25,	-	167 50
172 barrels of flour, at \$8 25,	-	1,419 00
30 barrels of whiskey, at 65 cents per gallon,	-	624 00
11 hundredweight of soap, at 12 cents per pound,	-	147 84
450 pounds of candles, at 18 cents,	-	81 00
19 bushels of salt, at 75 cents,	-	14 25
300 gallons of vinegar, at 23 cents,	-	69 00
		3,674 59
James Johnson, for the post of New Orleans:		
1,652 hundredweight of bacon, at 11 cents per pound,	-	20,352 64
1,110 barrels of pork, at \$15,	-	16,650 00
4,625 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 33½,	-	10,791 67
3,776 barrels of corn meal, at \$4 50,	-	16,992 00
2,549 barrels of flour, at \$7,	-	17,843 00
1,036 barrels of whiskey, at 50 cents per gallon,	-	16,576 00
370 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound,	-	4,144 00
15,540 pounds of candles, at 19 cents,	-	2,952 60
648 bushels of salt, at 66 cents,	-	427 68
10,360 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents,	-	2,590 00
		109,319 59
James Johnson, for the post of Baton Rouge:		
128 hundredweight of bacon, at 11 cents per pound,	-	1,576 96
86 barrels of prime pork, at \$15,	-	1,290 00
357 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 33½,	-	833 00
197 barrels of flour, at \$7,	-	1,379 00
292 barrels of corn meal, at \$4 50,	-	1,314 00
80 barrels of whiskey, at 50 cents per gallon,	-	1,280 00
29 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound,	-	324 80
1,200 pounds of candles, at 19 cents,	-	228 00
50 bushels of salt, at 66 cents,	-	33 00
800 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents,	-	200 00
		8,458 76
James Johnson, for the post of Natchitoches:		
40 hundredweight of bacon, at 13 cents per pound,	-	582 40
27 barrels of pork, at \$19,	-	513 00
112 bushels of peas or beans, at \$3 33½,	-	373 33
91 barrels of corn meal, at \$7 50,	-	682 50
61 barrels of flour, at \$11,	-	671 00
50 barrels of whiskey, at 62½ cents per gallon,	-	500 00
9 hundredweight of soap, at 12 cents per pound,	-	120 96
375 pounds of candles, at 21 cents,	-	78 75
16 bushels of salt, at \$2,	-	32 00
250 gallons of vinegar, at 37½ cents,	-	93 75
		3,647 69

## LIST OF CONTRACTS—Continued.

ARTICLES.	Amount of each article.	Total.
James Johnson, for the post of Arkansas:		
40 hundredweight of bacon, at 16 cents per pound, -	\$716 80	
27 barrels of prime pork, at \$25, -	675 00	
112 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 50, -	280 00	
91 barrels of corn meal, at \$6, -	546 00	
61 barrels of flour, at \$12, -	732 00	
25 barrels of whiskey, at \$1 per gallon, -	800 00	
9 hundredweight of soap, at 16 cents per pound, -	161 28	
375 pounds of candles, at 25 cents, -	93 75	
16 bushels of salt, at \$2 50, -	40 00	
250 gallons of vinegar, at 35 cents, -	87 50	
		\$4,132 33
James Johnson, for the post of St. Louis:		
1,025 hundredweight of bacon, at 11 cents per pound, -	12,628 00	
689 barrels of pork, at \$15, -	10,335 00	
2,871 bushels of peas or beans, at \$2 33, -	6,699 00	
2,343 barrels of corn meal, at \$4 50, -	10,543 50	
1,582 barrels of flour, at \$7, -	11,074 00	
643 barrels of whiskey, at 50 cents per gallon, -	10,288 00	
230 hundredweight of soap, at 10 cents per pound, -	2,576 00	
9,645 pounds of candles, at 19 cents, -	1,832 55	
402 bushels of salt, at 66 cents, -	265 32	
6,430 gallons of vinegar, at 25 cents, -	1,607 50	
		67,848 87
		\$475,815 79½

## B.

This contract, made and entered into this 23d day of February, Anno Domini, 1818, between Robert L. Stevens, of the town of Hoboken, State of New Jersey, of the one part, and the United States of America, through George Bomford, lieutenant colonel of ordnance, deputed as agent therefor, by the Department of War, of the other part, witnesseth: That the said Robert L. Stevens doth hereby contract and engage with the said United States as follows:

That, for the consideration hereinafter mentioned, he will manufacture and deliver, for the use of the United States, and to the order of the aforesaid George Bomford, or of the Department of Ordnance, two thousand elongated shells of the following description:

Two hundred of a size for an eighteen pounder cannon.

Twelve hundred of a size for a twenty-four pounder.

Six hundred of a size for a thirty-two pounder.

But should it be deemed hereafter necessary to have a greater number of large shells, the United States will receive in lieu of the two hundred eighteen pounder shells the like number for eight inch howitzers, or ten inch mortars, the United States paying the difference of price in proportion to the prices given into Government; the said shells to be delivered in three years from the date hereof; one-third of the whole number in each year, until the whole shall be delivered, and to be paid for on inspection, approval, and delivery; the shells to be delivered in perfect preparation for service, with the exception of not being filled. It is, however, understood and agreed, that, after the expiration of the term of the first delivery, (say one year,) that six shells, promiscuously taken from any one part or parcel, shall be filled and fired, and that should they fail to explode, the aforesaid contractor shall be permitted in the first delivery to remedy the defect. That, at the expiration of the second year, a second trial shall be made; and, should the shells of the aforementioned part or parcel fail to explode, the said Stevens, together with his sureties, shall be bound to refund to the United States the sum or sums of money which he may have previously received, agreeably to the terms of this contract. On the proof of the elongated shells, after they shall have been one year completely prepared, (with the exception of the bursting charge,) should a greater number than two out of six fail to explode, the aforementioned forfeiture will be required; it being also understood that the aforementioned shells are to be fired with similar charges to those now used for battering artillery—say one-third and one-fourth the weight of the bullet.

And the said Stevens further engages and binds himself, his father, his brothers, and all other persons whomsoever, having any knowledge of the construction or mode of preparing the said elongated shells, his and their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, as follow: That there shall be furnished to the Department of War, or Ordnance, a full and perfect explanation, in writing, of the construction, preparation, and use of the said elongated shells; that he and the persons before named will never disclose in the manufacturing of the said shells, or through any means whatever, further than may be absolutely necessary in the manufacturing of the said shells. And for further security, that the distribution of labor shall be such as to preclude, as far as possible, a knowledge of their construction to any person whomsoever, excepting to the War and Ordnance Departments, aforesaid, the Secretary of the Navy Department, and the Navy Commissioners, any information as to the manner of construction, preparation, or use of said shells, that this information shall be communicated to the Department of Ordnance in the following manner: The written description shall be enveloped and sealed under a parchment cover, placed securely in a copper box, with a good lock affixed thereto, and locked; which box shall be forwarded by one conveyance, and the key thereof by another. And the parties contracting, as aforesaid, further engage, that they will not, for any consideration whatever, ever make or attempt any elongated shells, or any engine of war in any respect similar to, or upon any of the principles of said shells, for any foreign prince or potentate, or for any person or persons, or any bodies corporate, but only for the use of the said United States, and as may be ordered by the Departments and Board before named, without the consent of the President thereof first had and obtained in writing; and, also, that any improvements which may occur to them in the construction of the said shells shall be communicated, and solely belong to the said United States.

And the said Stevens further engages and agrees, that, although he retains to himself, individually, the right of using the aforesaid shells in time of war, he binds himself, and all persons concerned therein, to such restrictions as the United States may impose, even if they should extend to a total prohibition of such use. And the said George Bomford, acting as aforesaid, doth contract and engage with the said Robert L. Stevens, that, on the delivery of the said elongated shells by him, conformably to the conditions herein stipulated and recited, there shall be paid to him, or any person duly authorized to receive the same, for the said shells, as follows: For each shell suited to an eighteen pounder cannon, twenty dollars and ninety cents; for each shell suited to a twenty-four pounder cannon, twenty-three dollars and ten cents; for each shell suited to a thirty-two pounder cannon, twenty-six dollars and forty cents,

current money of the United States; but, before any payments shall be made, the said Stevens shall make oath, in due form, that neither himself, nor any other person, hath, either directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, in any manner, violated or departed from any of the stipulations herein entered into by him, enjoining secrecy, as to the construction, preparation, and use of the said elongated shells.

Should the said Stevens be required by the Ordnance Department to deliver any of the shells at any other port than that of New York, then, and in that case, he shall be allowed and paid the usual and current expense of packing, boxes, and transportation, unless they shall be transported by officers of the United States.

The United States engages, that if, after the performance of this contract, the War or Ordnance Departments should deem it necessary to make any private contract for a further supply of shells of the aforementioned description, the said Stevens shall have a preference given to him to enter into such a new contract with the United States.

And the said Robert L. Stevens doth further engage, that no member of Congress shall have any interest, or be in anywise concerned, directly or indirectly, in any of the profits or receipts which may accrue to him from this contract.

In testimony whereof, the said parties have hereunto interchangeably subscribed their names, and affixed their seals, the day and year first above written.

ROBERT L. STEVENS,  
GEORGE BOMFORD,  
*Lieut. Col. of Ordnance.*

In the presence of  
WILLIAM THORNTON,  
JOHN MORTON, *Captain of Ordnance.*

## MEMORANDUM.

It is mutually understood that the cost of each elongated shell is as follows:

A shell for an eighteen pounder, - - - - -	\$19 00
A shell for a twenty-four pounder, - - - - -	21 00
A shell for a thirty-two pounder, - - - - -	24 00
A shell for a forty-two pounder, - - - - -	27 50
A shell for a fifty pounder, - - - - -	30 00
A shell for an hundred pounder, - - - - -	45 00

Should a less number than 15,000 be ordered, an advance of ten per cent. must be made on the above estimate; should 25,000 or more be contracted for, a deduction of five per cent. on the estimate will be made.

Be it made known by these presents, that it is hereby mutually agreed, by and between the United States of America, through the agency of George Bomford, lieutenant colonel of ordnance, deputed by the Department of War for that purpose, on the one part, and James C. Neilson, of the city and county of Baltimore, and State of Maryland, merchant, on the other part:

That the said James C. Neilson be hereby authorized, and he engages accordingly, to make purchases in Europe of certain implements and materials for the use of the armories of the United States, (according to lists thereof, to be furnished by superintendents of said armories,) at the lowest cash prices for such articles as may be current or attainable. The said Neilson also engages to render to the Department of Ordnance all the original bills and invoices of the aforesaid articles so purchased by him, and to transact all the necessary and usual measures of forwarding them to the ports of New York and Baltimore; and from thence to the respective armories, as he may be directed by the aforesaid Department: the whole to be delivered on or before the first day of November next ensuing.

And the said United States, through their agent aforesaid, do engage to advance to the said James C. Neilson, for the purposes herein mentioned, a sum amounting to not less than twenty-five thousand dollars, and not to exceed thirty thousand dollars, upon his executing and rendering to the Department aforesaid a bond of surety for the faithful performance of this agreement. And the United States do further agree, to allow and pay to the said Neilson a clear commission of five per centum on the original cost of the aforesaid articles, and upon the customary charges of importation and transportation, or-delivery hereof, as herein prescribed.

And it is further understood between the parties hereunto, that, should the list of articles, or the purchase thereof, not amount to the sum advanced to the said Neilson, he shall be at liberty to expend the whole in the purchase of similar implements and materials, and in such proportions as in his own judgment may seem advisable and suitable.

In testimony whereof, the parties to these presents have interchangeably signed their names, and affixed their seals, this fourth day of March, A. D. 1818.

GEORGE BOMFORD,  
*Lieut. Col. of Ordnance.*  
JAMES C. NEILSON.

Witness present,  
JOHN MORTON, *Capt U. S. Ordnance.*

Know all men by these presents, that it is hereby mutually agreed by and between the United States, by the agency of George Bomford, lieutenant colonel of ordnance, deputed therefor by the Department of War, and Jacob Richards, of Cecil county, Maryland, that the said Jacob Richards shall and will manufacture and deliver, within two years from the date hereof, thirty-five thousand musket stocks, for the use of the armories of the United States; the same to be cut and shaped from sound, thrifty, close-grained old field walnut plank, full two and one-quarter inches thick, entirely free from knots, sap, and every kind of defect; the said musket stocks to be sawed, and, in other respects, strictly conformable to a pattern which shall be furnished, if necessary, by the Department of Ordnance; the stocks to be delivered in the numbers following, viz: five thousand on the 20th October next ensuing; fifteen thousand on the 20th October, 1819; and fifteen thousand on the 20th October, 1820: which he engages to deliver at the city of Baltimore, to an officer or agent of the United States, as shall be designated therefor, on information given to the said Richards.

It is further agreed, that the price of the said musket stocks is, and shall be, at the rate of twenty-five cents each, money of the United States, and payable to the amount of each and every parcel delivered, after due inspection by a person or persons to be appointed for that purpose by the United States; and, after such inspection, shall certify that the same have been approved by him as conformable, in all respects, to the stipulations of this agreement. It is expressly conditioned, that no member of Congress is, or shall be, admitted to any share or part of this contract or agreement, or to any benefit to arise therefrom.

Witness the hands and seals of the said parties, at Octoraro Mills, Cecil county, Maryland, this fourth day of July, 1818.

JACOB RICHARDS,  
JOHN H. CROMWELL,  
JAMES L. PORTER.

Sealed and delivered, in presence of  
WILLIAM E. DORSEY,  
EDMUND PHYSICK.



Articles of agreement made and concluded at the city of Washington, this 1st day of August, A. D. 1818, between Decius Wadsworth, colonel of ordnance, with the approbation and consent of the honorable John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, of the one part, and Daniel Bussard, of Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, of the other part, witnesseth:

That whereas Messrs. Stull & Williams, of Georgetown, merchants, did, on the 25th day of May, 1815, borrow from the magazines of the United States, six hundred barrels of gunpowder, containing altogether 60,000 pounds, on the condition of returning an equal quantity of serviceable gunpowder when thereunto required; for the performance of which condition, the said Daniel Bussard made himself responsible; and whereas there is now due and owing from the said Stull and Williams, and the said Daniel Bussard, to the United States, on account of the aforesaid loan, the quantity of 39,572 pounds of gunpowder: Now, the said Daniel Bussard doth agree to manufacture and deliver to the United States, within three years from this date, 39,572 pounds of good serviceable gunpowder, one-fourth of which to be of a quality and grain suitable for small arms, and the remainder of a quality and grain suitable for cannon; the whole to be duly proved and inspected according to law, and to be packed in good and serviceable casks, full trimmed, at the expense of the said Daniel Bussard; which shall be received, on the part of the United States, in full satisfaction of the original agreement of the said Stull & Williams, and the said Daniel Bussard.

It is also further agreed that the said Daniel Bussard shall manufacture and deliver to the United States a further quantity of gunpowder, not exceeding 40,000 pounds, within three years from this date; the said powder last mentioned to be packed in good casks, full trimmed, and to be in the proportions for small arms and cannon, and in quality as before stated; for which he shall be allowed twenty-five cents per pound money of the United States. The price of the casks to be charged to the United States.

It is further agreed that an advance shall be made to the said Daniel Bussard, not exceeding ten thousand dollars, to enable him to erect works on Paint creek, suitable for manufacturing gunpowder, and to purchase and lay in materials, the said advances to be made by the Secretary of War, it being fully understood that a sum not less than five thousand dollars be expended on the works at Paint creek, and in providing materials for manufacturing gunpowder.

It is further agreed, that the said Daniel Bussard shall give security for the faithful performance of the said contract, by a conveyance, or by conveyances, in trust to Thomas Mustine, of Georgetown, of so much of his real estate as may be deemed sufficient for that purpose, with a power to sell the same in case of his failure to perform faithfully the said contract.

It being further understood that parts of the said property shall, from time to time, be released from the incumbrance, as the said contract shall, in part, be fulfilled, so as to justify such release.

In testimony whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above named.

DANIEL BUSSARD,  
DECIUS WADSWORTH,  
*Colonel of Ordnance.*

Witnesses present,  
THOS. G. RINGGOLD,  
WM. RIDDALL.

Whereas a contract was concluded on the 4th day of February, A. D. 1815, between Lieutenant Colonel Bomford, of the Ordnance Department, on behalf of the United States, and Randolph Ross, of Montgomery county, in Virginia, for the delivery of two hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, for the United States' service, at the rate of fifty-five cents per pound: And whereas the said contract contained a clause, purporting that if the Government of the United States should want a further supply of gunpowder, the said Randolph Ross should be entitled to deliver a further quantity of one hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, at the same price of fifty-five cents per pound: Now, this agreement made between Decius Wadsworth, colonel of ordnance, in the service of the United States, acting under the direction of the honorable J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, of the one part, and the said Randolph Ross, of the other part, witnesseth:

That the said Randolph Ross doth agree to deliver to the United States, within three months from this date, or as soon as the same can be conveniently inspected and proved, one hundred thousand pounds of serviceable gunpowder, one-half of which to be of a quality and grain suitable for muskets, two-fifths of the same to be of a grain and quality suitable for cannon, and one-tenth of a grain and quality suitable for rifles; the whole of the said powder shall be well glazed, and packed in good casks, full trimmed, each cask containing one hundred pounds, nett weight, of gunpowder; the expense of the casks to be defrayed by the said Randolph Ross. It is further agreed, that the said powder shall be proved, inspected, and received, at or near the city of Richmond, in Virginia. The inspection and proof to be made by an officer of the Ordnance Department, to be deputed for that purpose. It is further agreed, that the said Randolph Ross shall be entitled to receive, for the powder he may deliver under this contract, at the rate of forty-five and a half cents per pound. But as the funds of the Ordnance Department will not permit its being paid for immediately, the said Randolph Ross consents to the payment being deferred until suitable provision be made, and money appropriated by Congress to satisfy his demand; it being understood the proper representation will be made to Congress, at their next session, by the Secretary of War, to that effect.

It is understood and agreed, that the execution of this contract shall be a final settlement of all claims against the United States by the said Randolph Ross having relation to contracts for gunpowder.

In testimony whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands, and affixed their seals, this thirteenth day of August, A. D. 1818.

DECIUS WADSWORTH,  
*Colonel of Ordnance.*  
RANDOLPH ROSS.

Witness present,  
JAMES T. ALEXANDER,  
Witness present, for Ross,  
JNO. G. GAMBLE.

This agreement, made the 15th day of August, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, between Decius Wadsworth, colonel of ordnance in the service of the United States, with the approbation and consent of the honorable John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, of the one part, and William Wirt and John Clarke, Esquires, of the other part, witnesseth:

That the said Wirt and Clarke do engage to fabricate and deliver to the United States, under the act of Congress for arming and equipping the militia, within eighteen months from this date, one hundred and twenty light six pounder cannon, (iron,) and sixty iron twenty-four pounder howitzers; also, twenty tons of six pounder round shot, and twenty tons of spherical case shot suitable for twenty-four pounder guns or howitzers, and ten tons of spherical case shot for six pounders and twelve pounders, in such proportion for each caliber as shall be directed by the Ordnance Department, at the following rates or prices, viz: Light six pounders at seventy dollars each gun; twenty-four pounder howitzers at seventy-five dollars each; round six pounder shot at one hundred and twenty dollars per ton; spherical case shot, for twenty-four pounders, at two hundred and twenty dollars per ton; spherical case shot, for six pounders and twelve pounders, at two hundred and fifty dollars per ton. One-half of the above cannon, cannon shot, and spherical case shot, to be delivered within twelve months from this present date; the drawings,

patterns, and dimensions of the different guns, shot, and shells, to be furnished by the United States' Ordnance Department, with all convenient despatch, to the said contractors, Messrs. Wirt and Clarke.

It is further and hereby agreed that, to enable the said contractors to provide stock and make the necessary preparations, there shall be advanced to the said Wirt and Clarke, out of the fund provided by Congress for arming and equipping the militia, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, which shall be reimbursed to the United States out of the guns, shot, and shells, hereby contracted to be delivered, in a reasonable proportion, according to the quantities which may be delivered from time to time.

It is further agreed, that the said Wirt and Clarke shall fabricate and deliver to the United States, within two years from this date, for the general service of the United States, one hundred and fifty tons of heavy cannon and mortars, consisting of twenty-four pounder battering cannon, or other larger calibers, and mortars of eight inches, of ten inches, and of thirteen inches, in such proportions of each as shall be demanded; and fifty tons of heavy cannon shot and shells, for mortars of eight inches, of ten inches, and of thirteen inches, in such proportions of each as shall be demanded, at the following rates or prices, viz: For heavy cannon, of the caliber of twenty-four pounders and upwards, and for mortars of eight, ten, and thirteen inches, one hundred and thirty-three and one-third dollars per ton; for round shot, suitable for twenty-four pounders and larger calibers, ninety-five dollars per ton; for eight, ten, and thirteen inch shells, one hundred and fifty dollars per ton.

It is agreed that all the cannon, cannon shot, and shells, herein mentioned, shall be delivered at the Bellona foundry, on James river, and be inspected and proved at the foundry; the inspection and proof being made at the expense of the United States; it being understood the contractors will furnish, free of expense, the necessary aid of laborers to assist in moving and proving guns.

It is further agreed, that the cannon shall be proved, and the shot and shells inspected, conformably to such regulations as have or hereafter may be established by the Ordnance Department; and the necessary drawings and dimensions, and weights of the cannon, cannon shot, and shells, shall be furnished by the Ordnance Department to the contractors, Messrs. Wirt and Clarke, with all convenient despatch.

In testimony whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and affixed their seals, the day and year first above written.

WILLIAM WIRT,  
JNO. C. CLARKE,  
DECIUS WADSWORTH, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Witness: WILLIAM RIDDALL.

Whereas a contract or agreement was made between George Bomford, lieutenant colonel of ordnance, and Alexander McRae, of the city of Richmond, in Virginia, bearing date the 28th July, 1817, for the manufacture and delivery to the United States of ten thousand stands of arms, by the said Alexander McRae, in parcels of two thousand stands per annum; and to aid the said Alexander McRae in executing the work, it was stipulated that an advance of ten thousand dollars should be made to the said Alexander McRae, as, by a reference to the said contract, will more at large appear; and whereas the Secretary of War, on the application of the said Alexander McRae, has consented to make a further advance of fifteen thousand dollars: Now, it is hereby mutually agreed between the said Alexander McRae and Decius Wadsworth, colonel of ordnance, acting under the direction and with the approbation of the honorable John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, that sufficient security shall be given to the United States for the amount of all moneys advanced; that is to say, that, by way of security for such moneys so advanced, a good and sufficient instrument of writing, conveying to the United States a lien on a certain piece or parcel of land, situate and being on Fine creek, in the county of Powhatan, and State aforesaid, containing ten acres, be the same more or less, and which is commonly called Pleasant's Mill Seat, whereof Zachariah Brooks, of the said city of Richmond, is the owner of one moiety, and Branch T. Archer, of the said county of Powhatan, and the said Alexander McRae, are each the owner of one-fourth part, shall be executed by the said McRae, as attorney in fact for the said Brooks and the said Archer, and in his own proper person, for himself, or by the said Brooks, the said Archer, and the said McRae, each for himself. And it is further and hereby agreed that, on the delivery of the arms referred to in the contract aforesaid, a deduction, proportioned to the amount of the said advances, shall be made on each and every stand of arms agreed to be delivered.

In testimony whereof, the parties to these presents have hereunto set their hands and seals, this — day of August, A. D. 1818.

ALEXANDER McRAE,  
DECIUS WADSWORTH,  
*Colonel of Ordnance.*

Witness present: WILLIAM RIDDALL.

#### MEMORANDUM.

It is understood and agreed that the price of medium eighteen pounder cannon, to be fabricated for the United States' service by Peter Townsend, shall be two hundred and twenty dollars for each gun, and not two hundred and twenty dollars per ton, as expressed (by mistake) in the contract made and concluded between Lieutenant Colonel Bomford, of the Ordnance Department, and the said Peter Townsend, bearing date the 30th day of January, A. D. 1816. It is further agreed, in pursuance of the terms of the contract above specified, that a further advance of fifteen thousand dollars shall be made to the said Peter Townsend, viz: Seven thousand five hundred dollars at this present time, and seven thousand five hundred dollars in the month of December next, to complete the full sum of sixty thousand dollars, agreed to be advanced to the said Peter Townsend by the terms of his original contract.

It is further agreed that the cannon, mortar, shot, and shells, &c. contracted for by the said Peter Townsend shall be fabricated and delivered for inspection at the rate of one hundred and twenty tons per annum, computing from this present date, until the whole entire quantity contracted for shall have been received.

Dated at the Ordnance Office at Washington, this 1st day of September, A. D. 1818.

DECIUS WADSWORTH,  
*Colonel of Ordnance.*  
PETER TOWNSEND.

Witness the signature of D. Wadsworth: THOS. G. RINGGOLD.

Witness the signature of P. Townsend: JAMES T. ALEXANDER.

Articles of agreement, made and concluded at Washington City, in the District of Columbia, this sixteenth day of October, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, between Decius Wadsworth, colonel of ordnance, in the service of the United States, with the approbation and consent of the honorable John C. Calhoun, Secretary of the Department of War, on behalf of the United States, and Asa Waters, of Milbury, in the State of Massachusetts, witness:

That the said Asa Waters doth covenant and agree to manufacture and deliver for the United States' service, ten thousand stands of arms, with bayonets and ramrods complete, at the rate of two thousand stands each year, for five years, commencing with the first day of April, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen. The arms so to be manufactured shall be, in pattern and quality, equal to those made at Springfield armory, for the United States' service; and the barrels shall be proved, and the arms inspected, conformably to the regulations of the Ordnance

Department, and shall be packed in good boxes and cases, in the usual manner, each box or case containing twenty stands of arms complete, in good order for transportation; and the said arms, after being duly proved and inspected, shall be delivered at the arsenal of the United States, at Watertown, in the neighborhood of Boston, or at such other convenient place in the vicinity of Boston as may be designated by the Ordnance Department; the said Asa Waters being allowed a reasonable price for the boxes or cases used for packing the arms, and a reasonable price for the expenses of transporting the arms from Milbury to the arsenal.

It is further agreed, that the price of the arms so to be manufactured shall be fourteen dollars for each stand complete, with bayonet and ramrod, inspected, proved, and packed, ready for transportation; the said Asa Waters to be entitled to have the arms proved and inspected, in parcels of not less than two hundred and fifty barrels or muskets, to be proved and inspected at the same time; the inspection and proof to be made at the expense of the United States, by a person to be deputed by the Ordnance Department for that purpose.

It is further agreed, that to aid the said Asa Waters in providing iron and other stock for carrying on the business, an advance of money equal to one dollar for each stand of arms contracted for shall be made to him; that is to say, five thousand dollars at this present time, and five thousand dollars on the first of April next; which advances shall be reimbursed by a deduction of one dollar on each stand of arms on their delivery.

It is further agreed, that the said Asa Waters shall give satisfactory security for the faithful performance of this contract, by a penal bond, in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, with one or more approved sureties.

It is further agreed, that if the Ordnance Department should so far change the model of the muskets manufactured at the national armories, as to direct the barrels and bayonets to be finished of a brown color, after the manner commonly used, and direct the locks to be finished without polishing, the said Asa Waters will conform to the directions which may be issued from the Ordnance Department to that effect, without claiming any extra compensation therefor; it being fully understood that the muskets contracted for by the said Asa Waters shall be, in all respects, of a uniform pattern with those which may be made at the United States' armory. Should any alterations of pattern, other than above mentioned, be decreed by the Ordnance Department, the said Asa Waters will be entitled to compensation for any extra expenses occasioned by such alterations.

Whereas the said Asa Waters has used a method of welding barrels for fire-arms by a tilt hammer, moved by water, of which method he claims to be the inventor, and has obtained from the President of the United States letters patent, allowing the exclusive use of the said invention for the period of fourteen years, from the date of the said letters patent, it is agreed by the said Asa Waters, that the aforesaid method of welding barrels may be used at all or any of the armories of the United States, and at any place where arms are or shall be made for the United States' service, during the continuance of this contract. The said Asa Waters doth hereby covenant and agree, that no member of Congress is or shall be interested in this contract, directly or indirectly. It is understood and agreed, that the right shall be reserved to the United States of extending this contract to the fabrication of twenty thousand stands of arms, at the rate of two thousand stands a year; and in case of such extension, the privilege of using the method of welding gun-barrels by the tilt hammer, at the public armories of the United States, and at other places where arms shall be made for their use and service, will be understood to be conceded without limitation.

In testimony whereof, the parties to these presents have hereunto set their hands and affixed their seals, the day and year first above written.

ASA WATERS,  
DECIUS WADSWORTH, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Witnesses present: JAMES T. ALEXANDER,  
WILLIAM RIDDALL.

Know all men by these presents, that it is mutually agreed by and between the United States of America, (by the agency of Abraham R. Woolley, Esq., major of ordnance,) and Colonel James Johnson, Great Crossings, Scott county, Kentucky: that the said Colonel James Johnson shall and will manufacture and deliver, within nine months from the date hereof, thirty thousand pounds of good and approved cannon powder. Said powder is to give on proof a range of one hundred and eighty-five yards upon a horizontal plane to an iron ball of the diameter and weight of a twenty-four pounder projected from an iron howitzer, eprouvette of the caliber of a twenty-four pounder, the muzzle elevated at an angle of forty-five degrees from the plane of the horizon, charged with one ounce avoirdupoise weight of the said powder, and is to be proved and inspected by the said Major A. R. Woolley, or by an officer of the Ordnance Department, to be appointed for that purpose by him. It is further agreed that the said powder shall be delivered at Pittsburg, New Orleans, or Bellefontaine, or at any intermediate post or place on the Ohio or Mississippi rivers, agreeable to directions to be given by George Bomford.

It is also understood that the said powder is to be of a uniformly large hard grain, and highly glazed; that no small grain whatever is to be intermixed with the large, and that no nitre shall be used in the manufacture of the said powder that has not been refined and is not perfectly pure. The price of the said powder, when delivered, is and shall be thirty-five cents for each and every pound delivered in good and substantial barrels of well seasoned stuff, containing one hundred pounds of powder in each barrel; the barrels to be furnished at the expense of Colonel James Johnson and the boat or boats in which the said powder shall be transported shall have an additional lining of well seasoned boards to protect the casks and powder from the dampness of the bottom of the boat.

In witness whereof, we, the said parties, have interchangeably set our hands and affixed our seals, this first day of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen.

JAMES JOHNSON.

Witness: RICHARD M. JOHNSON.

I guaranty the execution of the above contract on the part of Colonel James Johnson.

BENJAMIN JOHNSON.

Test: RICHARD M. JOHNSON.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *January 5, 1819.*

In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to state that a contract has been entered into between the Ordnance Department and Nathan Starr, Jun., of Middletown, in the State of Connecticut, for ten thousand sabres for cavalry, and four thousand swords for infantry or artillery. The price of the sabres for cavalry to be five dollars, and of the swords for artillery four dollars, with iron scabbards, according to sample; to be delivered and paid for at the rate of not more than three thousand swords per annum, nor less than twenty-five hundred. As the writings relating to this last contract are not yet completed, it can only be noticed in this manner.

Agreements have been made between the Ordnance Department and Robert Dingee, of Yonkers, near New York, for two thousand sets of accoutrements for infantry, with buff belts, and breastplate of brass, at the rate of three dollars a set; and for two thousand five hundred sword belts for infantry, to be made of buff leather, at one dollar and twenty-five cents each, including buckle, hook, and clasp.

An agreement has also been made between the Ordnance Department and J. Lukins & Son, of Philadelphia, for three thousand sets of accoutrements for infantry, at two dollars and sixty-two and a half cents a set.

The agreements for accoutrements and sword belts above stated have been arranged by means of a correspondence by letters, without the formality of any written contract.

DECIUS WADSWORTH, *Col. of Ordnance.*

## C.

Statement of contracts made in the Department of Purchases, by the Commissary General and deputies, for the service of the year 1818. By Callender Irvine, Commissary General of Purchases.

Dates.	Contractors' names.	Quantities and articles contracted for.	Prices.	Where to be delivered.	Remarks.	
1817.						
Dec. 1,	James Maxwell,	10,000 yds. c. drilling,	\$0 31 per yard,	Philadelphia,	All delivered agreeable to contracts, except John Parke's contract, which was cancelled.	
4,	John Parke,	10,000 do. do.	31 per yard,	"		
9,	John Hewson,	30,000 do. shirting,	26 per yard,	"		
9,	Patrick Valally,	5,000 do. drilling,	31 per yard,	"		
9,	Thomas Ford,	10,000 do. do.	31 per yard,	"		
10,	Robert Dickson,	4,000 do. shirting,	26 per yard,	"	Executed in part—contract cancelled.	
11,	Peter H. Schenk,	20,000 do. do.	26 per yard,	New York,	Shirting delivered to D. Noon, deputy commissary, and paid for by him; embraced in his statement of contracts.	
12,	Louis Toulon,	5,000 do. do.	26 per yard,	Philadelphia,	All delivered agreeable to contracts.	
15,	Jacob Taylor,	10,000 do. do.	26 per yard,	"		
17,	John Patterson,	5,000 do. do.	26 per yard,	"		
19,	John Hinshillwood,	5,000 do. drilling,	31 per yard,	"		
23,	George McClelland,	5,000 do. shirting,	26 per yard,	"		
Feb. 9,	John Hewson,	20,000 do. drilling,	33 per yard,	"		
13,	George Geissel,	250 doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.	"		
14,	James Arthurst,	8,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ white wool kersey,		"		Grey kersey delivered.
		3,000 do. grey do.	70 per yard,	"		
18,	J. & W. Rogers,	8,000 do. white do.	85 per yard,	"		Contr't nearly complet'd.
20,	T. & P. Kelly,	18,000 do. grey do.	70 per yard,	"		
20,	Burd Patterson,	4,000 do. grey do.	85 per yard,	"	All delivered agreeable to contracts.	
21,	Henry Tarbett,	150 doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.	"		
24,	Dennis Kelly,	40,000 yds. flannel,	45 per yard,	"	All delivered agreeable to contracts.	
25,	V. & Cs. Dupont & Co.	8,500 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ blue cloth,	2 50 per yard,	"		
		4,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ black cloth,	2 46 per yard,	"		
27,	William Dawson,	200 doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.	"	All delivered agreeable to contracts.	
Mar. 3,	James Kershaw,	11,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey kersey,	85 per yard,	"		
3,	S. & Jona. Rogers,	8,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ white do.	70 per yard,	"	Has delivered 7,000 yard.	
3,	George McCallmont,	10,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey cloth,	1 91 per yard,	"		
		10,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey kersey,	85 per yard,	"	All delivered agreeable to contracts.	
		2,500 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ rifle cloth,	2 50 per yard,	"		
3,	Burton & Whyat,	5,000 yds. flannel,	45 per yard,	"		
3,	Francis Bellemere,	150 doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.	"		
4,	James Maxwell,	10,000 yds. c. drilling,	32 per yard,	"		
5,	Frederick Haas,	100 doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.	"		
5,	Joseph Ozeas,	100 doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.	"		
April 1,	James Maxwell,	10,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ c. drilling,	33 per yard,	"		Has delivered 17,000 yds.
1,	John Hewson,	20,000 yds. c. shirting,	29 per yard,	"		
1,	Geo. McClelland,	10,000 yds. c. shirting,	29 per yard,	"		All delivered agreeable to contract.
1,	John Hinshillwood,	20,000 yds. c. drilling,	33 per yard,	"		
1,	Jacob Taylor,	10,000 yds. c. drilling,	33 per yard,	"		
1,	John Watt,	5,000 yds. c. drilling,	33 per yard,	"	Has delivered 6,000 yds.	
Aug. 1,	Burd Patterson,	10,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ white kersey,	70 per yard,	"		
	Leavenworth & Co.	1,286 gross yellow coat buttons, various,	2 25 per gross,	"	Delivered agreeable to contract.	
		2,055 do. vest do.	1 25 per gross,	"		
	William Rogers,	30,000 yds. c. shirting,	29 per yard,	"	Has delivered 18,000 yds. This contract is dated in 1817, and was to be executed by Oct. 1818. The deliveries are deficient about 1,700 blankets.	
	Edgar Patterson,	5,000 blankets,	3 00 each,	Philadelphia & Washington.		

Contracts made by Darby Noon, Deputy Commissary during the year 1818.

1818.	Scovill, Lansom, & Co.	677 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey kersey,	2 00 per yard,	N. York city,	Delivered agreeable to contract.
		62 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ blue cloth,	2 50 per yard,		
	William Arrison,	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds. flannel,	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ per yard,	N. York city,	Delivered agreeable to contract.
	John Flark,	20 gr. suspender butt.	33 $\frac{1}{2}$ pr. gross,		
		7,890 yds. tow cloth,	31 per yard,	N. York city,	Delivered agreeable to contract.
		381 lbs. sewing cotton,	1 31 per lb.		
		63 lbs. sewing thread,	1 56 per lb.	N. York city,	Delivered agreeable to contract.
		109 $\frac{1}{2}$ doz. pr. stockings,	5 75 per doz.		
	Ephraim Howard,	36 gro. shirt buttons,	9 per gross,	N. York city,	Delivered agreeable to contract.
	Friend Humphrey,	9,000 pairs of shoes,	1 40 per pair,		
	Keating Rawson,	2,000 pairs of shoes,	1 40 per pair,	Albany and N. York city.	Delivered agreeable to contract.
	John Topping,	5,000 pairs of shoes,	1 40 per pair,		
	Goble, Nichols, & Andrews.	3,000 pairs of shoes,	1 40 per pair,	N. York city,	All delivered agreeable to contracts.
	James Rundlett,	8,803 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ white kersey,	70 per yard,		
		5,511 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey do.	1 70 per yard,		
		99 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds. do. do.	2 00 per yard,	N. York city,	
		2,207 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds. do. cloth,	1 91 per yard,		



## STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS—Continued.

Date.	Contractors' names.	Quantities and articles contracted for.	Prices.	Where to be delivered.	Remarks.
1818.	W. A. & D. Lewis,	1,239 pairs of shoes,	\$1 49 per pair,	Newport, Ky.	Delivered agreeably to contract. This contract completed, except the shirting for sergeants, and the contract extended to make up for the failure of L. Sanders in cotton goods. The factory is exclusively engaged for the U. S., and makes a delivery twice a month.
	William Blackburn,	3,000 yds. twilled cotton, 4,500 yds. c. shirting, 1,500 yds. twilled cotton, 300 yds. c. shirting, 150 yds. twilled cotton,	36 per yard, 28 per yard, 34 per yard, 31 per yard, 39 per yard,	Newport, Ky.	
	Lewis Sanders,	5,500 yds. twilled cotton, 500 yds. bleached do. 2,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey kersey, 500 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ grey kersey, 2,000 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ white do. 500 yds. $\frac{3}{4}$ white do.	34 per yard, 36 per yard, 85 per yard, 95 per yard, 70 per yard, 80 per yard,	Newport, K.	No deliveries have been made on this contract.

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, PHILADELPHIA, December, 8, 1818.

CALLENDER IRVINE,  
Commissary General of Purchases.

J. C. CALHOUN, Esq., Secretary of War.

## D.

Contract made between Joseph G. Swift and Benjamin W. Hopkins on the 13th May, 1818.

This agreement or contract, made and concluded this thirteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, by and between Joseph G. Swift, chief engineer, on the part of the War Department of the United States, of the one part, and Benjamin W. Hopkins, of the State of Vermont, of the other part, witnesseth: That the said Benjamin W. Hopkins will, for the consideration hereinafter stated, well and truly construct, or cause to be constructed, at such place in the vicinity of Mobile Point, Alabama, as the United States by any engineer may direct, a fort, to be constituted of such walls, ditches, embankments, buildings, parts, and dimensions, as the said engineer may, from time to time, prescribe. And the said Benjamin W. Hopkins will well and truly furnish all materials of such quality, and all artisans, laborers, and workmanship, requisite for the construction of the fort aforesaid, as may be prescribed by the said engineer, and the whole workmanship and materials to be executed and found by the said Benjamin W. Hopkins; and the said Benjamin W. Hopkins will grout, or cause to be grouted, all the walls of the said fort; and that the construction of the said fort shall be commenced by the said Benjamin W. Hopkins, on or before the first day of October, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen; and that the said fort shall be completed, or caused to be completed, by him, the said Benjamin W. Hopkins, by the first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one. And the said War Department of the United States, by Joseph G. Swift aforesaid, will well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, unto him, the said Benjamin W. Hopkins, for the workmanship and materials aforesaid, as follows, that is to say: for every cubic yard of earth excavated and removed as aforesaid, eighty-three cents and eight-tenths of a cent; for every cubic yard of brick masonry, eleven dollars; for all carpentry, where scantling or joists may be used of dimensions not exceeding in measure ten by ten inches in breadth and thickness, sixty-two and one-half of a cent per yard, running measure; for all carpentry, where joists, of dimensions smaller than six inches by eight inches breadth and thickness, may be used, forty-four cents per yard, running measure; for all flooring with two inch stuff, two dollars and twenty-five cents per square yard; for all flooring with three inch stuff, three dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all double doors, five dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all windows, including frames, shutters, sash, and glazing, five dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all bunks and ceilings, one dollar and twenty-five cents per square yard; for all wainscoting, thirty-seven and a half cents per running yard; for all iron work, twenty-five cents per pound. And the said Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the United States as aforesaid, will pay, or cause to be paid, unto him, the said Benjamin W. Hopkins, the amount of value of every cargo of materials which the engineer aforesaid may pronounce to be delivered of proper quality, at or near the said Mobile Point, for the construction of a fort as aforesaid; the said value and amount to be considered in part payment of the work aforesaid: *Provided, always*, That the said Benjamin W. Hopkins shall and do deliver to the said engineer the invoice of the materials so delivered as aforesaid. And the said Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the United States as aforesaid, shall and will pay, or cause to be paid, unto the said Benjamin W. Hopkins, the sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars, if demanded at the close of every month after the work shall have been commenced: *Provided, always*, That the said work, so done at the close of every month as aforesaid, shall amount to twelve thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of the materials used in the construction of the said work. It is clearly understood by this agreement or contract that the work shall be executed agreeably to the orders and to the satisfaction of the said engineer or engineers, whom the Government may appoint to direct or superintend the work as aforesaid; also, it is understood by the parties hereunto, that all walls of masonry shall be estimated in measurement by their actual length, breadth, and thickness. This agreement or contract shall be considered binding upon both parties hereunto subscribing, as soon as the Secretary of War shall have signified, in writing, hereupon, his approval of the securities given for the faithful execution of this agreement. It is also understood that at least thirty thousand cubical yards of masonry will be constructed, and at least one hundred thousand cubical yards of earth will be excavated and removed in constructing the fort as aforesaid.

In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written.

J. G. SWIFT,  
B. W. HOPKINS.Signed, sealed, and delivered in presence of  
C. VANDEVENTER,  
GEORGE BLANEY.

*Contract made between Joseph G. Swift and Richard Harris, July 17, 1818.*

This agreement, or contract, made and concluded this seventeenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, by and between Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the War Department of the United States, of the one part, and Richard Harris, of Richmond, State of Virginia, of the other part, witnesseth: That the said Richard Harris will, for the consideration hereinafter stated, well and truly construct, or cause to be constructed, at such place on Dauphin Island, Mobile Bay, as the United States by any engineer may direct, a fort, to be constituted of such walls, ditches, embankments, buildings, parts, and dimensions, as the said engineer may from time to time prescribe. And the said Richard Harris will well and truly furnish all materials of such quality, and all artisans, laborers, and workmanship, requisite for the construction of the fort aforesaid, as may be prescribed by the said engineer; and the whole workmanship and materials to be executed and found by the said Richard Harris. And the said Richard Harris will grout, or cause to be grouted, all the walls of said fort; and that the construction of said fort shall be commenced, by the said Richard Harris, on or before the first day of December, eighteen hundred and eighteen; and that the said fort shall be completed, or caused to be completed by him, the said Richard Harris, on or before the first day of December, eighteen hundred and twenty-one.

And the said War Department of the United States, by Joseph G. Swift, aforesaid, will well and truly pay, or cause to be paid unto him, the said Richard Harris, for the workmanship aforesaid, as follows, that is to say: for every cubic yard of earth excavated and removed, as aforesaid, eighty-three cents and eight-tenths of a cent; for every cubic yard of brick masonry, eleven dollars; for all carpentry, where scantling or joists may be used, of dimensions not exceeding in measure ten by ten inches breadth and thickness, sixty-two cents and one-half of a cent per yard, running measure; for all carpentry, where joists of dimensions smaller than six inches by eight inches breadth and thickness may be used, forty-four cents per yard, running measure; for all flooring, with two inch stuff, two dollars and twenty-five cents per square yard; for all flooring with three inch stuff, three dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all double doors, five dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all windows, including frames, shutters, sash, and glazing, five dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all bunks and ceilings, one dollar and twenty-five cents per square yard; for all wainscoting, thirty-seven and a half cents per running yard; for all iron work, twenty-five cents per pound. And the said Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the War Department of the United States, as aforesaid, will pay, or cause to be paid unto him, the said Richard Harris, the amount of value of every cargo of materials which the engineer aforesaid may pronounce to be delivered, of proper quality, at Dauphin Island, aforesaid, for the construction of the fort aforesaid; the said value and amount to be considered in part payment of the works aforesaid: *Provided, always*, That the said Richard Harris shall and do deliver to the said engineer, the invoice of the materials so delivered as aforesaid. And the said Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the United States, as aforesaid, shall and will pay, or cause to be paid unto the said Richard G. Harris, the sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars, if demanded, at the close of every month after the work shall have been commenced: *Provided, always*, That the said work so done at the close of every month, as aforesaid, shall amount to twelve thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of the materials used in the construction of said work. It is clearly understood by this agreement, or contract, that the work shall be executed agreeably to the orders, and to the satisfaction of the said engineer, or engineers, whom the Government may appoint to direct or superintend the works, as aforesaid. Also, it is understood by the parties hereunto subscribing, that the walls of masonry shall be estimated in measurement, by their actual length, breadth, and thickness. This agreement, or contract, shall be considered binding upon both parties hereunto subscribing, as soon as the Secretary of War shall have signified, in writing, hereupon, his approval of the securities given for the faithful execution of this agreement. It is also understood, that at least thirty thousand cubical yards of masonry will be constructed, and at least one hundred thousand cubical yards of earth will be excavated and removed in constructing the fort aforesaid.

In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above mentioned.

J. G. SWIFT,  
RICHARD HARRIS.

Signed, sealed, and delivered, in the presence of

C. VANDEVENTER,  
GEORGE BLANEY.

*Contract made between Joseph G. Swift, and James Bennett and Peter Morte, July 20, 1818.*

This agreement, or contract, made and concluded this twentieth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, by and between Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the War Department of the United States, of the one part, and James Bennett and Peter Morte, of the city of Washington, of the other part, witnesseth: That the said James Bennett and Peter Morte will, for consideration hereinafter stated, well and truly construct, or cause to be constructed, at such places at, or in the vicinity of, Chef Menteur and Rigolet Passes, in Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, as the United States, by any engineer, may direct, a fort, or forts, to be constituted of such walls, ditches, embankments, buildings, parts, and dimensions, as the said engineer may from time to time prescribe. And the said James Bennett and Peter Morte will well and truly furnish all materials of such quality, and all artisans, laborers, and workmanship, requisite for the construction of the fort, or forts, aforesaid, as may be prescribed by the said engineer, and the whole workmanship and materials to be executed and found by the said James Bennett and Peter Morte; and the said James Bennett and Peter Morte will grout, or cause to be grouted, all the walls of the said fort, or forts; and that the construction of the said fort, or forts, shall be commenced by the said James Bennett and Peter Morte, on or before the first day of December, eighteen hundred and eighteen; and that the said fort, or forts, shall be completed, or caused to be completed by them, the said James Bennett and Peter Morte, by the first day of December, eighteen hundred and twenty-one. And the said War Department of the United States, by Joseph G. Swift, aforesaid, will well and truly pay, or cause to be paid unto them, the said James Bennett and Peter Morte, for the workmanship and materials aforesaid, as follows, that is to say: for every cubic yard of earth excavated and removed, as aforesaid, eighty-three cents and eight-tenths of a cent; for every cubic yard of brick masonry, eleven dollars; for all carpentry, where scantling or joists may be used, of dimensions not exceeding in measure ten by ten inches breadth and thickness, sixty-two cents and one half of a cent per yard, running measure; for all carpentry, where joists of dimensions smaller than six inches by eight inches, breadth and thickness, may be used, forty-four cents per yard, running measure; for all flooring with two inch stuff, two dollars and twenty-five cents per square yard; for all flooring with three inch stuff, three dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all double doors, five dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all windows, including frames, shutters, sash, and glazing, five dollars and fifty cents per square yard; for all bunks and ceilings, one dollar and twenty-five cents per square yard; for all wainscoting, thirty-seven and a half cents per running yard; for all iron work, twenty-five cents per pound. And the said Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the United States, as aforesaid, will pay, or cause to be paid unto them, the said James Bennett and Peter Morte, the amount of value of every cargo of materials which the engineer aforesaid may pronounce to be delivered, of proper quality, at or near the said Chef Menteur and Rigolet Passes, for the construction of the fort, or forts, as aforesaid; the said value and amount to be considered in part payment of the work aforesaid: *Provided, always*, That the said James Bennett and Peter Morte shall and do deliver to the said engineer, the invoice of the materials so delivered, as aforesaid; and the said Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the United States, as aforesaid, shall and will pay, or cause to be paid, unto the said James Bennett and Peter Morte, the sum of ten thousand dollars, if demanded, at the close of every month after the work shall have been commenced: *Provided, always*, That the said work, so done at the close of every month, as aforesaid, shall amount to ten thousand dollars, exclusive of the materials used in the construction of the said work. It is clearly understood, by this agreement, or contract, that the work shall be executed agreeably to the orders, and to the satisfaction of the said engineer, or engineers, whom the

Government may appoint to direct or superintend the work, as aforesaid. Also, it is understood by the parties hereunto, that all walls of masonry shall be estimated in measurement, by their actual length, breadth, and thickness. This agreement, or contract, shall be considered binding upon both parties hereunto subscribing, as soon as the Secretary of War shall have signified, in writing, hereupon, his approval of the securities given for the faithful execution of this agreement. It is also understood, that at least twenty thousand cubical yards of masonry will be constructed, and fifty thousand cubical yards of earth excavated in constructing the fort, or forts, as aforesaid.

In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above written.

Signed, sealed, and delivered, in presence of  
 FREDERICK LEWIS,  
 GEORGE BLANEY.

J. G. SWIFT,  
 JAMES BENNETT,  
 PETER MORTE.

*Contract made between Joseph G. Swift and Elijah Mix, July 25, 1818.*

This agreement, made between Joseph G. Swift, on the part of the War Department of the United States, of the one part, and Elijah Mix, of New York, of the other part, witnesseth:

That the said Elijah Mix agrees to deliver one hundred and fifty thousand perch of stone, from the banks of York river, in Virginia, agreeably to samples this day lodged in the Engineer Department, at Old Point Comfort, and the Rip Rap Shoals, in Hampton Roads, Virginia, at the rate of not less than three thousand perch per month, commencing by the fifteenth day of September, eighteen hundred and eighteen. And the aforesaid Joseph G. Swift agrees to pay, or cause to be paid him, the said Elijah Mix, three dollars a perch, for every perch of stone delivered at the abovementioned places agreeably to this contract.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals, this twenty-fifth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, at the city of Washington.

J. G. SWIFT,  
 ELIJAH MIX.

Witness, C. VANDEVENTER.

*Contract made between S. Babcock and Thomas Maguire, November 5, 1818.*

Articles of agreement, made and concluded this fifth day of November, eighteen hundred and eighteen, between Thomas Maguire, of Wilmington, and S. Babcock, captain of engineers, on the part of the United States, witnesseth:

That the said Maguire agrees to deliver, at the Pea Patch Island, during the year next ensuing, twenty thousand bushels of lime; said lime to be of the best quality, and to be delivered at such times, and in such quantities, as said Babcock may require: and for every bushel of lime, so delivered in good order, said Babcock agrees, in behalf of the United States, to pay the sum of thirty-nine cents.

Signed in presence of  
 JOHN MOUNT.

THOMAS MAGUIRE,  
 S. BABCOCK.